CENTRE FOR THE

STUDY OF DEMOCRACY

Policy Studies Building, Room 335

138 Union Street
Queens University
Kingston, Ontario, Canada K7L 3N6
Tel: 613 533-6273 Fax: 613 533-2135
www.queensu.ca/csd

Closing the Implementation Gap:

Improving capacity, accountability, performance and
human resource quality in the Canadian and Ontario
public service

Thomas S. Axworthy and Julie Burch

January 2010

Contents
Acronyms
3
Acknowledgements
4
ExecutiveSummary
5
CapacityandPerformance.....................................................................................................................5
Attractingandretainingemployees.................................................................................................. 6
Improvementtoaccountabilitydesign............................................................................................ 6
ForewordbyThomasS.Axworthy
8
GoldenMoments..................................................................................................................................... 11
TruthtoPower......................................................................................................................................... 15
VirtuesoftheMandarins..................................................................................................................... 17
TheWayAhead........................................................................................................................................ 21
CapacityandPerformance.............................................................................................................. 21
AttractingandRetainingEmployees.......................................................................................... 22
ImprovementtoAccountabilityDesign.................................................................................... 22
Introduction
24
Sectionone:Thestateofthepublicservice
29
Surveysays.............................................................................................................................................30
Oncapacityandperformanceimprovements........................................................................ 31
Onattractingandretainingqualityemployees..................................................................... 32
Onaccountabilitydesign................................................................................................................. 34
Commonthemes...................................................................................................................................... 36
Sectiontwo:Thepathtoreform
37
Capacityandperformanceimprovements................................................................................... 37
Attractingandretainingqualityemployees................................................................................ 40
Accountabilitydesign........................................................................................................................... 46
Sectionthree:Goingforward
51
Recommendations
53
CapacityandPerformance.................................................................................................................. 53
AttractingandRetainingEmployees.............................................................................................. 54
ImprovementstoAccountabilityDesign...................................................................................... 56
References
59
Appendices
66
Appendix1:ComparativeAnalysisofPublicServiceEmployeeSurveys
Appendix2:SummaryofRoundtables
Appendix3:RecruitingtheBestandBrightestforEmploymentinCanadasPublicService
Appendix 4: A Report on Human Resources in the Public Service: The Quest to Make
GovernmentanEmployerofChoice

Closing the Implementation Gap

Acronyms
ADM

AssistantDeputyMinister

CIDA

CanadianInternationalDevelopmentAgency

CSD

CentrefortheStudyofDemocracy,SchoolofPolicyStudies,QueensUniversity

CMHC

CanadianMortgageandHousing

CSDES

SurveydesignedandexecutedbytheCentrefortheStudyofDemocracy,
Queen'sUniversity

DM

DeputyMinister

DFAIT

DepartmentofForeignAffairsandInternationalTrade

FAA

FederalAccountabilityAct

EEIT

EmployeeEngagementInterjurisdictionalTeam

EHR

ElectronicHealthRecords

H1N1

Newstrainofpandemicin`luenza

IPAC

InstituteofPublicAdministrationofCanada

LGBT

Referscollectivelytolesbian,gay,bisexual,andtransgenderpeople

MPA

QueensMastersofPublicAdministrationprogramalumni

NPM

NewPublicManagement

OPSES 2009 OntarioPublicServiceEmploymentSurvey

PAC

PublicAffairsCommission

PCO

PrivyCouncilOf`ice

PEP

QueensPublicExecutiveProgramrespondentstoCSDES

PMO

PrimeMinstersOf`ice

PS

Publicservice

PSES

2008FederalPublicServiceEmploymentSurvey

PSMA

PublicServiceModernizationAct

SSHA

SmartSystemsforHealthAgency

Acknowledgements
Thisstudyonthepublicserviceispartof alargerprojectattheCentrefortheStudyofDemocracy
onthecurrentperformanceofcriticalinstitutionsforCanadiandemocracy,like Parliamentandthe
partysystem.
Mr.L.R.(Red)Wilson,aformermemberofthe publicservicewhounderstandshowvitalanasseta
goodpublicservicecan be,agreed thatthe timewasripeforanindependentthinktanktolookat
thefutureofthepublicservice.Wearemostgratefulforhissupportofthisproject.
Thisstudywasalsogreatlyassisted bya grantfrom the Aurea Foundation,and wethankthemfor
their generous contribution. We are especiallyindebted to Peter Munk, the founder of the Aurea
Foundation,andAllanGotlieb,itschair,formakingtheCentrefortheStudyofDemocracyoneofthe
bene`iciariesoftheFoundations`irstgrants.
Thispaperisricherforthevarietyofcontributorstowhomwe oweadebtof gratitude.Weextend
our thanks to Glenda Fisk, Tyler Johnson, Mathew Johnson, Craig Jones, Amie Skattebo, Kyle G.
Toffan,andBenWinningerfortheirresearchinput;DeborahAartsforasuperbjobinconsolidating
allthedisparatepieces;andSaraFrenchforeditingthe`inalpaper.
The two years of time spenton this project hasseen the investments of research, opinions, and
assistancefromagreatnumberofinterestedCanadians.Alltold,fourroundtableshavebeenheld
one in Toronto and one in Ottawa with former studentsof the Queens School of Policy Studies
MastersofPublicAdministration,andattwoatQueenswithacademicsandpolicyexperts,manyof
whom formerlyworkedinthe federalorprovincialcivilservices. Appendix Twocontainsa listof
thosewhoparticipatedandwewishtothankthemall.
TheCSDmethodistocompletepenultimatedraftsofreportsandthensubjectthemtopeerreview
and public scrutiny. Closing the Implementation Gap incorporates many of the insights of the
Roundtableparticipantsandtogivereadersa`lavouroftheirinput,weincludeasummaryoftheir
remarksinAppendix2.
We alsohave animmensedebttotheformerstudentsoftheQueensSchoolofPolicyStudiesMPA
Program,whotookthetime tocompleteoursurvey.Weareequallyindebtedtothe participantsin
the Senior Public Executive Program of the Queens School of Business and the Civil Service
TrainingandDevelopmentInstituteoftheGovernmentofHongKong.Theresponsesofthesesenior
publicservantsallowedustocompare and contrasttheirinsightswithmore recententrants. The
heartofthisstudyisthesurveyincludedinAppendix1andwewanttothankallwhorespondedfor
takingthetimenotonlytoanswertheposedquestions,butalsoinprovidingdetailedandinsightful
commentsintheopenendedsections.

Closing the Implementation Gap

Executive Summary
TherecentcontroversyateHealthOntariohasputthespotlightonthepublicservicein2009,just
astheGomeryInquiryintothe SponsorshipScandaldid in2005. Publicadministration`indsitself
as the unlikely centrepiece of bitterdebates. Thisstudy`indsthatithasbecome evidentthatthe
cornerstoneof theWestminstermodelof responsible governmentwhoisaccountabletowhom
for what?has broken down, and that the resulting confusion has soured the relationship
betweenpoliticiansandpublicservants.Onimplementationissuesthisstudyaf`irmsthenecessity
ofreducingtheturnoverrateinstaf`ingpositions,particularlyatthemoreseniorlevels.
TheGomeryCommissionconcludedthatthepublicservice isdemoralized.Thisstudyseeksto`ind
out why this is so. Through evaluation of surveys conducted by Canadas public service and the
Centre for the Study of Democracyat the School of PolicyStudies, Queens University(CSD), we
havecomparedandcontrastedtheattitudesofcivilservantsinboththe Ontarioandfederalpublic
services. Graduatesof the QueensMaster of PublicAdministration (MPA) andparticipants inthe
QueensPublicExecutive Programsconstitute theCSDsurvey(CSDES)sample.TheMPAsample is
particularlyinstrumentalinthatitcapturestheviewsofyoungerpublicservants.
The`indingsofthe surveyrevealseriousconcerns,amongemployees,aboutinternalmanagement
issues that affect employee engagement, these in`luence performance, which in turn in`luence
implementation. We put forth recommendations under three broad categories: capacity and
performance;attractingandretainingemployees;andaccountability.

Capacity and Performance

Performance improvementmechanismsneedtobe revamped toprovide the autonomy, `lexibility,
andcreativitythatpublicservantswant.Thesurveysindicatethatpublicsectoremployeesfeelthat
theexcessive rotationofseniorstaff(31%have hadthreesupervisorsinthreeyears)1 isa major
issue for performance improvement. With deputy ministers and assistant deputy ministers
spendinglessthantwoyears intheirpositions,publicservantsare constantlyreadjusting to new
management,whichaffectstheirabilitytodotheirjob.
1.

Recognition that the neutrality, merit-based recruitment and expertise of the public
service are fundamental features of our democracy and must be preserved.

2.

Implementation must become as important to the policy process as analysis or

communication is. Cabinets should regularly review implementation issues. A Results
Unit should be created in the Treasury Board to fulfill this function.

3.

The norm for holding senior management jobs in the public service should be five
years.

2008 Public Service Employee Survey, Treasury Board . The public service refers to the core public administration (those
departments and agencies for which the Treasury Board is the employer) and separate employers (principally the Canada Revenue
Agency,theParksCanadaAgency,theCanadianFoodInspectionAgency,andtheNationalResearchCouncilofCanada).

4.

Discourage the use of consultants in line positions in favour of building up the capacity
of the regular public service.

Attracting and retaining employees

While 8090% of respondents say they are content in their job only 55% believe they have
opportunitiesforpromotionandmostthinkthatthejobpostingthattheyrepliedtodoesnotmatch
thejobthattheyendedupdoing.Only2%ofCSDESrespondentsfeltthatthecivilservantsefforts
to identify, recruit and retain young people are working very well. Complaints about the
recruitmentprocesswereprevalent.However,complaintsinthisarea seemtogotwoways,asthe
studyconcludedthatyoung recruitshavehighdemands:theydonotwantorexpectanentrylevel
job;theywantfreedomtochangejobsregularly;andtheyhave unreasonablyhighexpectationsfor
compensationandperks.
5.

Improve the recruitment process.

To improve the attraction of employees this study suggests that the public
service needs to be realistic in its hiring goalsbalancing the needs for both
generalistsandforexperts.Longtermplanningneedsto includedialoguewith
schools ofpublic administrationanddealingwithemployment barriersdueto
citizenshipevenwhenCanadiancredentialshavebeenearned.
6.

Expand Interchange Canada and make it work much more directly as a focus of
Canadas development policy.

Canadaneeds to develop an exchangeprogram that would see its federal and

provincial public servants working abroad in their respective home
departments around the world, while other countrys civil servants come to
work inCanada.Ourideais to greatlyexpandInterchangeCanada andmakeit
muchmoredirectlyafocusofCanadasdevelopmentpolicy.
7.

Establish a Mentoring Program

AformalmentoringprogrammodelledontheSingaporeexperienceneedstobe
adoptedbybothfederalandOntariopublicservices.
Openended comments from the CSDES sample and interviews with public
servants for this study reveal great interest in the potential of mentoring
programs.Winninger, inAppendix4, citesthe Singapore Administrative Service
whereeachnewof`icerisassignedamentorwho canofferfriendlyadviceand
show you the ropes. The 2001 OECD report highlights that mentoring is
especially critical for women and underrepresented minorities because of
perceptionsofanoldboysnetwork.

Improvement to accountability design

The QueensCSD surveyfoundthatwhile 75%of respondents knewwhat was expectedof them
regarding accountability, only52% thought thatthese mechanisms measure the rightfactors. An
areaof concern, according tothesurveys,ishowaccountabilityisshared among politicalstaffand

Closing the Implementation Gap

civil servants. Most respondents felt that neither they (66%) nor political staff (54%) are
adequately trained to work together. This has left public servants feeling vulnerable to political
pressures51%saythat theyare NOTfree from undue politicalpressure andthis`igure risesto
80%formunicipalemployees.
Toaddresstheaccountabilityissuethisstudyrecommendsthat:
8.

A task force or Wise Person Group is established to create an Accountability Code

that will clarify the responsibilities of public servants, ministers and the staffs that
ministers employ. This code, passed as a non-binding resolution in Parliament and the
provincial legislatures, would become the benchmark to guide future accountability
disputes.

9.

It should be a condition of employment in any ministers office that exempt staff be

required to attend a two week course on the essentials of government and the
political-civil service relationship.

10.

Develop an Exempt Staff Code of Conduct and Ethics.

11.

Adopt the title Executive Assistant to more accurately reflect the duties of political
advisors.

12.

Exempt staff post-employment activity restrictions should be reduced to one year.

Ultimately, the public service is a re`lection of the political and institutional context where it
resides. In orderfor public servants to have the clarity, `lexibility, and creativity theyrequire to
implementpoliciesproperly,a workable accountabilitybargainbetweenministers,theirstaffs,and
the publicservice needstobe recreated.Untilthisisachieveditwillbe verydif`iculttoclosethe
implementationgapidenti`iedinthisreport.

Foreword by Thomas S. Axworthy

The civil service in a democracy works under very peculiar conditions. The control
exercised over it from the top is both more lax and more severe than in other
bureaucracies.BecauseoftheconBlictingandunreconciledinterestsintheelectorate,in
thelegislature, andin politicalparties,direction ofthe civil service isoften vacillating
andlacking in vigoron theotherhand,because thecivilservicedealssomuchwith
the private interestsof groups and individuals whose rights must be respected to the
letterexceptinsofaraslegislationauthoritizesinterference,thereisveryrigidcontrol
oftheactionsoftheservicefromthetop.Thereismorerelianceonthebitandtightrein
thanthespur. 2
The subject matter of this study is the peculiar conditions in which Federal and Ontario public
servantswork. J.A.CorryandJ.E. Hodgetts,twoofthe greatestteachersof publicadministrationin
thehistoryofQueensUniversitydevotedtwochaptersoftheirseminalDemocraticGovernmentand
Politics tothe issue ofdemocraticvaluesandtheroleof the publicservice incontributingtotheir
attainment. Written more than a generation ago, the insight that politicians, parliament, and the
public relymoreon restraintandcontrolthe bitandtight reinin theirrelationship withthe
public service, rather than encouraging risk taking and creativity (the spur) could serve as a
descriptionofourcurrentageofaccountabilityoverdrive.Thepublicservicetodayenduresadaily
barrageof criticism fargreaterthaninthedaysofCorryandHodgettsthe bitcutsdeeperthanit
did thenandasthe surveyin the next section demonstrates, thisis taking a toll on the morale,
expectations, andcareerprospectsof the menandwomenwhohave dedicatedtheirlivestopublic
service.
The centrepiece of this study is the Canadian Public Service Career Satisfaction Survey (CSDES)
designedandcarriedoutbytheCentrefortheStudyofDemocracy(CSD),attheQueensUniversity
SchoolofPolicyStudies.Twogroupsweretargetedforthesurvey:i)alumnioftheQueensMasters
of Public Administrationprogram (MPA), halfof whom are young recruits and have less than ten
yearsexperience; and ii) seniorpublicexecutives attending the Public Executive Program atthe
QueensSchoolofBusiness.Therespondentsare,byandlarge,dividedequallybetweentheFederal
andOntarioPublicServices. Althoughnotintegrated intothedata presented, some referencesare
alsomadetotheresponsesofseniorHongKong publicservantswhocompletedasurveyin2009.3
TheHongKongresultsshowthatconcernsaboutaccountabilityresonatefarbeyondourborders.
OnecanarguethatsamplesrestrictedtoQueenspublicadministrationgraduatesorparticipantsof
Queensexecutiveprogramsaretoonarrowtogeneralizeaboutthestateofpublicserviceaswhole.
Suchcaveatsaredulynoted,buttheCSDresultsarebroadlyinline withmanyofthe`indingsofthe
public service employee surveysconducted ona regularbasisbyboth the federal andprovincial
governments.TheCSDsurveyresultsweresupplementedbyaseriesofinterviewsandroundtables
with Ontario and federal public servants who reinforced the survey `indings by augmenting
2

J.CorryandT.Hodgetts(1960),488.
ThomasAxworthyfacilitatedDirectorateSeminarsfortheHongKongSARProgram,April2009.

Closing the Implementation Gap

statisticaldatawith personalcolourandanecdotes. Further,the2009CSD studycomplementsthe

`indings and research of the 2007 Public PolicyForum studyCanadas Public Service in the 21st
Century4 andthethree reportsofthePrimeMinistersAdvisoryCommitteeonPublicService.5Iam
verycon`identthatthissurveyisanaccuratesnapshotofthe currentviewsofmanyin the federal
andOntariocivilservices.
Public servants do a variety things ranging from senior of`icials who manage crises and advise
ministersto the verydifferent rolesof those who deliverfrontline servicesthrough interaction
withcitizens. JamesQ.Wilson(1990),inhisclassicBureaucracy, dividespublicservicesintothree
categories:operations,managers, and executives.6 Allare membersofthe publicservice,yetsome
parts might be in crisis while others are working perfectly well. For example, senior executives
dealing withministersand legislaturesona dailybasismaybe malfunctioning when comparedto
otherparts of the machine, like those providing passports orconstructing highways. Ora policy
framework maybe well thought out and articulated at senior levels, such as in Canadas Public
Health Agencys H1N1 strategy, but the implementation at the delivery levelvaccinationsfor
example, mightbe `lawed. In bodies so vast (estimated employment levels in the federal public
service:401,0007;Ontario:68,6458 ),itisprudenttobe carefulaboutgeneralizations.AsthePublic
Policy Forum Report, A Vital National Institution warned in its summary of several roundtable
discussions there is too much emphasis on the 5,000 employeeswho provide high level policy
advisetopoliticians, andfartoolittle on the 400,000 including Crowns, the Canadian Forcesand
otherorganizations,whoimplementprograms,deliverservicesandworkdirectlywiththepublic.9
Certainly many use the word crisis10 in describing todays public service. Donald Savoie, a very
astute observer of comparative public administration, for example, quotes a former Canadian
senior government of`icial who remarked: the civil service has simply lost its way.11 Savoie
examines, in great detail, the relationship between politicians and civil servants in Canada and
GreatBritain and concludesthatthe oldcooperativemodelisnowbroken12 Politicians directing
policybutstaying outof administration, and civilservantswilling tospeaktruth to power, have
been replaced by court government where individual public servants may `lourish (if they
4

Green,Baird,Fawks,(2007).
See the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth:Report to the Prime Minister on the Public Service of Canada within the annexes the
`irst, second, thirdreport of the Prime Ministers AdvisoryCommittee on the Public Service chaired byThe Right Honourable Donald F.
Mazankowski, P.C., O.C., A.O.E., LL.D.http://www.pcobcp.gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page=information&sub=publications&doc=arra/
162009/3rd3eme/20090226eng.htm
6
JamesWilson,(1990).
7
StatisticsCanada,2009.Retrieved27November2009.http://www.statcan.gc.ca/dailyquotidien/090529/t090529b1eng.htm
8
Howlett, (2009). http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/ontarioshrinkscivilserviceby1500jobs/article1376568/.
Retrieved:25November2009.
9
PublicPolicyForum,(2007).P12.
10 Whether crisis is the right word or not can be debated, but many who work in the public service responded that they perceive
themselvestobe undersigni`icantstress. Graham Lowe, forexample,cites the Statistics Canada CommunityHealthStudytoshow thatin
selfperceived workstress respondents saying that almost always at work they were quite a bit or extremely stressful, public
administration employeeswere nearthe topofthose most under pressure.With37%of the public administration sampleindicatedthat
they were stressed, compared to 22% in primary occupations, like agriculture or processmanufacturing. Only employees in `inancial
management or the healthsector recorded higher percentages of stress than public administration employees generally. Source: Lowe,
2007.www.cprn.org.Retrieved:4January2009.
11 DonaldSavoie,(2008).P15
12 Ibid,P16.
5

implement the wishesof the court), butthe distinct personalityand independentrole of the civil
serviceasawholehaswithered.
The CSDsdata, however, demonstratesthat while the civil service may have some dents, itis far
from broken. Heavy majoritiesof the respondents to the CSD survey reported high levels of job
satisfaction80%of the Queens sample describe theirjobassatisfyingandover50%of Federal
respondentsthinkthattheirorganizationisperforming betterthanitdidwhentheystartedovera
decade ago. In generalabouttwothirds of the respondents are happy with their work, withthe
otherthirdthinkingaboutleavingorareactuallyseekinganotherjob.
TonyDean, then Secretarytothe OntarioCabinet, inhis2007Framework forActionReporttothe
Premiertookmanyinsightsfrom a March 2006surveyof OPS employees and hisconclusions are
roughlysimilartotheQueensstudy.ThereportfoundthatOntarioemployeeswerefairlysatis`ied
and reasonablyengaged with theirjob13. About twothirds of those surveyed said that the work
thattheydogivesgood value fortaxdollarsandthattheirunitplaceshighvalueongoodservice.
The2009OntarioPublicServiceEmployeeSurveyevenshowsanincreasefromthetimeDeanwrote
of job satisfaction among public servants (67% satis`ied and 12% not), which represents an
increasefrom3.50meanin2006to3.77meanin200914.Yet,liketheQueensCSDsurvey,Deanalso
highlighted areasforimprovementonly38%feltthattheyhadopportunitiesforcareergrowth,
only22%feltleaderswereprovidingcleardirection,andonly35%saidtheamountoftrainingand
developmentreceivedmettheirneeds 15.
Eventhoughjobsatisfaction isrelativelyhigh,theQueensCSDsurveydemonstratesthatthere are
signi`icant problem areas, particularly in the political civil servant relationship that Savoie
highlighted. Over half of the respondents believe that their organization suffers from undue
political interference (this number is 10% higher among MPA graduates) and 53% of the MPA
sample believe that political staff are seldom capable and trained adequately for their
responsibilities 16. Savoie argues that civil servants should have a legal basis for resisting
instructions from elected politicians to perform essentially partisan acts, and the Queens CSD
sampledemonstratesthathehasidenti`iedarealconcern17 .
Whatwe heard from our roundtable experts, however, is that the problem is notso much about
interference asitisaboutunderstandingthe relationshipbetweencivilservantsandexemptstaff.
Thisrelationshipissueismoreaboutmisunderstandingsratherthanmalignintent.
Savoie wondersif there ever reallywas a golden age of the political civilservant relationship.
Regardless, he believes that it is not possible to turn the clock back to the way things were.18
Perhaps he is right. Compared to their predecessors two generationsago, todays public service
13

TonyDean,(2007).http://www.gov.on.ca/mgs/graphics/121594.pdf.Retrieved:25November2009.
IpsosReid,2009).
15 TonyDean,(2007
16 Formoreinformationonpolitical staff,seeLiane B. Benoit. MinisterialStaff:the life andtimesof parliamentsstatutoryorphansin
Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities: Restoring Accountability, Volume 1. (Ottawa: Public
WorksandGovernmentServicesCanada,2006.)
17 DonaldSavoie,(2008).P338.
18 Ibid,P335
14

10

Closing the Implementation Gap

must manage in a world with a twentyfourhour news cycle, much less deference to authority,
articulate thinktanksandinterestgroupsof everypersuasion,and the pervasive in`luence ofthe
CharterofRightsand Freedoms, whichhasmade the judiciarymuchmore of apolicyfactor 19. Add
tothisfrequentdeputyministerjobswitchesthatoftenresultindeputiesbringing withthemtheir
closestassociates,sothattherearewholeteamsofseniorof`icialsonthemove.In2007,thePublic
ServiceCommissionhighlighted thisproblem initsannualreportwithastudyof payrecordsthat
showed that 40% of public servants started and ended the year in different jobs; 58% of the
governments5000executivesmovedtodifferentjobs.LindaDuxbury, a human resourcesexpert,
told the OttawaCitizen: Its a big dance. Someone moveswhichcausessomeone else tomove to
actingpositionandsomeoneelsetopositionthemselvesforthenextpromotion20.Managersdonot
staylong enoughtoknowtheir`ilesorgain the trustandloyaltyoftheiremployees. Churnmeans
that there is no one to mentor or train new recruits. Duxbury further re`lected that this trend
resultsinnocorporate memory, soitslike apingpongpolicygame21.HenryMintzberg,Canadas
leading managementtheoristwiselyconcludes that: the whole issue of musicalchairs in senior
management is destructive. The managers Ive seen who are effective are devoted to their
department22.

Golden Moments
Stability,however,wasthenorminthe1960s.IfthePearsonerawasnotinfactagoldenage,there
werecertainlygoldenmomentsandweshouldnotforgettheachievementsofthepastintryingto
constructa betterpublicpolicyfuture. Incertain keyareas, suchasthe constantshuf`le todayof
seniorpublicservantscomparedtothe stabilityandacquiredexpertiseevidentinthe 1960seraof
civil service leaders, there is no doubt that in the past the public service was managed more
intelligently. C.E.S Franks reports, for example, that in September 2009 eleven out of the core
twentytwo deputyministersin Canada had beenintheirof`ice forlessthan twoyears, nine less
thanone year 23. Yet,the PublicAccountsCommitteewastoldbyaSecretarytotheTreasuryBoard
that it took about twoyears fora deputyministertobecome fully effective in a post. As Franks
concludes,totheextentthatthisistruemostdepartmentsinCanada,muchifnotmostofthetime,
areoperatingwithalessthaneffectivedeputyminister24.Constantpersonnelchangesarealsonot
simply an Ottawa phenomenon. Our study frequently references the recent controversy over
Ontarioselectronichealthrecordinitiative(orlackthereof). TheAuditorGeneralof Ontariofound
that a contributing factor to the implementation woes of that project was that, the recent
replacements of eHealth Ontarios board Chair and CEO mark the fourth such overhaul of
leadershipateHealthOntarioanditspredecessor,SSHA.Eachoftheseoverhaulsbroughtwithitits
own period of transition where progress on the initiatives objectives was slowed or, at times,
19

Savoie(2008),P94123hasanexcellentchapteronsocietythenandnow.
OttawaCitizen.Toomuchreshuf`linginPSranks,expertsays.OttawaCitizen.November2007.
21 Ibid.
22 VicPakalnis,CanadasManagementGuruinCanadianGovernmentExecutive.Vol.13.No.1.2007.P6.
23 C.E.S.Franks,fromanunpublishedpaper:"The Functioning ofthePresentDayCanadianHouse ofCommons:a paperpreparedforthe
conferenceinhonourofPeterAucoin,"Halifax,November2009.TableV,page8
24 Ibid.
20

halted 25. The Auditor rightly notes that on eHealth (and his observation applies to the public
serviceasawhole)thatwitheveryseniorchangeinpersonnelthereisapricetobepaidintermsof
losttime,lostexpertise,andworkingrelationships.
Iwasfortunatethatmy`irstexperienceinOttawapolicymakingwasinthe1960sduringthegreat
creative period of the Pearson government. Thiswasalso the tail end of the socalled Mandarin
Era 26. Iobserved `irst hand the men (and a few women) who were responsible for establishing
Canadasreputation as having one of the best public services in the world. Thatwasalsoan era
when political partiesactually debatedpolicyLiberalPartydelegatesatthe 1961Rally, notthe
leadersadvisors, made theCanadaPension Plana platformpriority.Again,in1966, LiberalParty
delegatesresistedanyattempttoundulydelaymedicare27.Mr.Pearson,withagoodeyeforCabinet
talent, broughtthreenewfacesintoCabinetinApril 1967eachofwhomeventuallybecamePrime
Minister. The cabinet that these young menPierre Trudeau, John Turner and Jean Chrtien
joined wasmuchmorethan atalkshop. EquallycriticaltothesuccessofthePearsonGovernment
wasthestrengthof the publicservice.Vibrantvolunteerbasedparties,strongwilledCabinets,and
apowerfulpublicservicemadethe1960sagoldeneraofpublicpolicymaking.Todayeachofthese
threepillarsparty,cabinetandpublicservicehasbeenweakened.
Inthesummerof1967,IbeganworkasajuniorresearchassistanttoWalterGordon,Presidentof
thePrivyCouncil.GordonhadworkedatFinance duringthe warasadollara yearman28 andin
1946hechairedaRoyalCommissiononAdministrativeClassiBicationsinthePublicService.Ihappily
accompaniedMr.Gordon when hemetoldfriendslike W.A.MacIntosh29 whohadalsoheldsenior
positionsintheDepartmentFinanceandReconstructionandIlistenedattentivelyastheyswapped
anecdotes. In discussing the successes of the postwar Mandarite and their preference for
anonymity, Iremembertheirinsightthatthere wasnolimit on whatone could achieve inOttawa
providedyoudidnotcare forpubliccredit.Thisisaninsightthatpoliticalassistantsanxioustoget
theirnamesinpoliticalgossipcolumnsshouldre`lectoncarefully.
Consideringa careerinpublicservice,Iwrote theForeignServiceexamsandwasofferedpositions
inbothExternalAffairsand thePrivyCouncilOf`ice, butthe sirensong of politicswas toostrong.
Keith Daveyand Jim Couttshad little dif`icultyin persuading me to become a political assistant.
Priortothe1960stherehadcertainlybeenpoliticaladvisorstoministersinOttawa,buttheywere
fewin number30. The bestknown wasJackPickersgill who despite being a memberof the public
25

Of`iceoftheAuditorGeneralofOntario,(2009).P10.
Granatstein, (1982).P118. Gordon Robertson, one of the great public servants of that era has written an insightful memoir on
decisionmaking in Ottawa. See Gordon Robertson, Memoirs of a Very Civil Servant: Mackenzie King to Pierre Trudeau. (Toronto:
UniversityofTorontoPress,2000).
27 In contrast, the policy forum at the 2006 Liberal leadershipconvention was a sea of empty chairs, devoid of anydiscussion of the
LiberalRenewalCommissionsreportthatIhadchairedthatyear,whichhadgarneredthecontributionofhundredsofvolunteers.
28 DollaraYear Man, a term used during WWII to describe those business executives who were brought to Ottawa to work in
government, largelyinthe Department of MunitionsandSupplyand inthe Wartime PricesandTrade Board. Theircompaniespaidtheir
salaries,whileOttawaprovidedlivingexpenses.Source:TheCanadianEncyclopedia
29 W.A. MacIntoshbecamea distinguishedPrincipalatQueensUniversity,asdidJ.J.Deutsch, anotherofthe famous mandarinswhoalso
retiredtoQueenstoeducate graduate students, myselfincluded. Fora descriptionof the Mandarinsat the Department of Finance inthe
GoldenAgesee:DavidW.Slater.EconomistsattheDepartmentofFinance,19451980inCanadianBusinessEconomics.(1997).
30 For anexaminationofthe role of politicalstaffpriortoMr. Trudeaus initiative in creating a formal classof exempt politicaladvisors
see:J.R.Mallory,TheMinistersOf`ice:AnUnreformedPartofthePublicServiceinCanadianPublicAdministration.Vol.10.No.1(1967).
26

12

Closing the Implementation Gap

service gave partisan advice to both Mackenzie King and Louis St. Laurent (a transgression of
neutralitythatwouldnotgounnoticed today).Iwasa memberof the `irst generation of political
assistants, a cadre that hasgrown in in`luence eversince. The data from the CSD survey shows
clearly how uneasy many public servants are about the expanding role of political assistants.
However, political advisors make a real contribution to policymaking and this should not be
forgotten when we assess the relationship between ministerial of`ices and the regular public
service. One of thegreatcontributionsof apublicservice iscautionitmustoutline theobstacles
to ministerial orpolitical goals. Ministers are often frustrated, because the main word that they
hearfrom public of`icials is no. Yet, thisis a real service, because of`icialsare trying to protect
their minister from trouble. Political advisors, however, have an opposite virtuethey are
exceedingly energetic, passionately loyal, and keen to tackle what appear to be impossible
objectives.Thereisarole forthe wisdomandmemoryof the publicservice,butalsoanequalrole
forthe commitmentandenergyof the politicaladvisor.We needgoodpoliticaladvisors,justaswe
needgoodpublicservants.
The 1968 innovation of Pierre Trudeau of formally creating a new type of public of`icialthe
political advisoris often cited as the beginning of the aggrandizement of primeministerial
power 31.But, infact,Trudeaupreserved oursystemofa professionalpublicservicebyrecognizing
thatpoliticswascentraltoanygovernment,ministersneededstafftohelpthemdotheirjobs,and
thatitwasinappropriatetoasknonpartisanpublicservantstotake onthesetasks. Advancingthe
agenda of the government, following upon ministerialdirectives, interpreting publicopinion, and
developing anarrativeandcommunicatingaconsistentmessage are allvitaltasks;asimportantto
thesuccessofagovernmentastheprofessionalandtechnicalexpertiseofthepublicservice32.Thus,
the public servant category of exempt staff was born. Exempt, because unlike career public
servants, politicalstaff are notsubjectto themeritbased rulesof the PublicService Commission,
but public servants still, because: political advisors make a legitimate contribution to the policy
process,are subjecttovariousstatutes, such asthePublicService EmploymentAct,theCon`lictof
InterestAct,andtheLobbying ActandarepaidfromallocationsauthorizedbyParliament.In2008,
there were oversix hundred ministerial staff in Ottawa serving twentyseven ministers and `ive
secretariesofstate,includingapproximately80staffpositionsinthePrimeMinistersOf`ice33.
Ministers needassistance from politicalprofessionalsjustastheyneed expertpolicyadvice from
thepublicservice.Publicservantsmayoftenbe frustratedin theirdealingswith politicalservants
astheevidenceinAppendix1demonstratesbuttheymightfeelfarworse iftheywerethrown
intothemaelstromofpoliticallifeintodayspartisanenvironment.The outsideimpressionmaybe
of an allpowerful PMO, butinside the bellyof the beast it isa constantbattle to stay on top of
events, manage a myriad of priorities, and move an agenda forward inch by inch in a federal
countryin aglobalized world. Icantimaginebeing anybusierthan Iwasin directing the PMOin
31

See,forexample,anearlycritiqueinWalterStewart,Shrug:TrudeauinPower.(Toronto:NewPress,1971).
For a description ofthe strategic role ofthe Prime MinistersOf`ice see:Thomas S.Axworthy. Of Secretaries to Princesin Canadian
PublicAdministration.Vol.31.No.2(1988).
33 Alex Smith. Ministerial Staff Issues of Accountability and Ethics, December 2008, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/
ResearchPublications/prb0602e.htm(Accessed:4January2010).
32

Mr. Trudeauslasttermandthatwasin anerathatpredatedthe24hournewscycle, Youtube,and

email! This study has several recommendations on how to recruit and retain quality men and
women forthe public service. We need to be equally diligentin encouraging and supporting the
exemptcategoryofpoliticaladvisor.
Tothatend,we needtorealize thatthe politicaladvisorgroupare nolongerunreformed, asJ.R.
Mallory wrote about the breed in 196734 . The Privy Council Of`ice, for example, describes the
politicaladvisoryfunction inAccountableGovernment: AGuidefor MinistersandMinisters of State
as:

toprovide Ministersand MinistersofStatewith advisersand assistantswho are not

departmental public servants, who share their political commitment, and who can
complementthe professional,expertandnonpartisanadvice andsupportofthePublic
Service. Consequently, theycontribute a particular expertise or point ofviewthat the
PublicServicecannotprovide35 .
TheAccountabilityGuide speci`icallyinstructsthatexemptstaffdonothave the authoritytogive
directionstopublicservantsandin meetingtheirresponsibilitytorespectthe nonpartisanship
of public servants, exempt staff have an obligation to inform themselves about the appropriate
parameters of public service conduct, including public service values and ethics and to actively
assesstheirownconductandanyrequeststheymake todepartmentalof`icialsinthelightofthose
parameters36.
TheConBlictofInterestActhasseveralprovisionsthatapplytoministerial staff(suchasnottouse
their position to in`luence a decision to further private interests) and sets rules for post
employment activities(such as notentering into contractsor accept employment of a periodof
oneyearwithanentitythattheyhavesigni`icantof`icialdealingswith).Formerministerialstaffin
a particularly excessive restriction are prohibited under the Lobbying Act from engaging in
lobbying activitiesfor`iveyears!Inshort, ministerialstaffinOttawa alreadyoperate underastrict
ethicalcodewithsigni`icantprohibitionsonpostpoliticalemployment.
Theproblemisthatfewrealizethisfact,certainlynotthepublicservants,whowereinterviewedfor
thisstudy.Thepredominantimpressionarticulatedbymanypublicservantsinoursamplewasthat
whilepublicservantsare guidedbywellarticulatedcodesof conduct,politicalstaff aremotivated
only by partisan needs. Yet, ethical standards for political behaviourexist in manystatutes and
politicalguidelinesforPCO staff. Thisde factocode shouldbe made explicit ina CodeofEthnical
Conductfor ExemptStaff, asrecommendedbythe GomeryCommission37.Suchacode would help
dispel the image of political staff as amoral political warriors and putexempt staff on an equal
ethicalfootingwiththepublicservice.

34

J.R.Mallory(1967)
PrivyCouncilOf`ice,AccountableGovernment:AGuideforMinistersandMinistersofState,2008,P.37.
36 Ibid,P.3738.
37 Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities: Restoring Accountability, Recommendations.
(Ottawa:MinisterofPublicWorksandGovernmentServices,2007),Chapter7.
35

14

Closing the Implementation Gap

The Gomery Commission also advocated that exempt staff receive training for their important
duties.Trainingandprofessionaldevelopmentarethehallmarksofourprofessionalpublicservices
and there is no reason that such opportunities should be denied to exempt staff given their
legitimateandcriticalroleinthepolicyprocess.AsPrincipalSecretarytothePrimeMinister,Imet
regularlywiththeexemptstafffromeachministersof`iceandsometimesseminarswereorganized
around political topics (usually the latest in political management techniques from the United
Statesorthe United Kingdom), butsuch effortswere ad hoc. As a juniorassistanton Parliament
Hill,Ireceivedverygoodadvice,especiallywhenmeetingveryseniorpublicservants,tokeepquiet
andtakenotes.Butbeyondthispersonalmentoringtherewasnoorientationsession.
TheInstitute ofPublicAdministration ofCanada in 2006 produced an ExecutiveBrief on Training
and Recruitment of Political Staff at Queens Park, which contains ideas worthy of wider
application38 .Theyrecommendedthatthereshouldbeorientationtrainingfornewpoliticalstaffby
currentandformerministerialpersonneland bypublicserviceexecutives.Thereshouldalsobea
systemofmasterclasses,formoreindepthexecutivedevelopment.Justasimportant,thereshould
be similarclassesforpublic servantsonhowtobuildeffective relationshipswith ministerialstaff
andthepremiersof`ice.ThedatainAppendix1showsthatmanypublicservantsfeelthattheyare
notadequatelytrained to deal with politicians and that ministerial assistants are notadequately
trained todeal with theirpublicadministration duties.The IPACprogramwouldmeetboththese
needs.
Aswell as the developmentof a Code of Ethical Con`lict forExempt Staff and better educational
opportunitiesforexemptstaff,akeydisincentiveforpoliticalstaffrecruitment,shouldberemoved.
Theprovisionin the LobbyingAct,whichprohibitsemploymentinlobbying activitiesfor`iveyears
afterleavingaministerialof`ice,istoodraconian.Bylimiting careeropportunitiesforsuchalength
oftime,itdissuadesmanyfrombecomingexemptpoliticalstaff.Aoneyearprohibitionissuf`icient.
There is one change, however, which should be made to more accurately re`lect the function of
politicaladvisors.Theyareassistantsnotdecisionmakers. Todaysdesignation ofChiefofStaff
impliesanexecutiveauthoritythatsuchapositionshouldnotpossess.Inthe1960sseniorpolitical
advisorswerecalledExecutiveAssistantsandthatisamoreaccuratedescriptionforwhattheydo.

Truth to Power
Although I decided against a public service career, I had the good fortune to work with public
servants who were experts in implementation and maintained the higheststandards in speaking
truth to powercareer public servants like Ian Clark, Sylvia Ostrey, Gordon Smith, Robert
Rabinovitch, Robert Fowler, Arthur Kroeger, Maureen ONeil, Huguette LaBelle, Ed Clark, Bob
Adamson, Ian Stewart, Allan Gotlieb, Tommy Shoyama, and Gordon Osbaldeston. In particular, I
learnedmuch fromMichael Pit`ield, Secretarytothe Cabinet. Pit`ieldsapproachtopublic policy
making was often criticized for being unnecessarily complicated. He was trying to achieve
equilibrium between collegial cabinet debates combined with the longterm perspective of the
38

Patrick Dutil. Working with Political Staff at Queens Park: Trends, Outlooks, Opportunities.(Institute of Public Administration of
Canada,2006).

Canadianpublicservice.Ican personallyattestthathewasforthrightin bringing problemstothe

Prime Ministerhe certainly never had trouble speaking truth to powerand he was a stout
defenderof thepublicserviceagainstsome ofthe more problematicideasof thePrime Ministers
Of`ice(manyofwhichIoriginated).
InOttawa inthe 1960sand 70sonedidnotnecessarilyhave along personalrelationship, like Mr.
Pit`ield did with Mr. Trudeau, to speaktruth to power. I saw this characteristic displayed many
times.The`irstthingtomakeclearisthatspeaking truthtopowerdoesnotmeansubstitutingthe
values of appointed public of`icials over those of the elected politicians. By running for of`ice,
politicians dothe heavydemocratic lifting anddemocratic accountabilitygivesthemthe primary
jobofallocating value.Butinassessingtheimpactof the valuechoicethatpoliticiansmake, public
servants have the duty to give their ministers their best professional advice. I have mentioned
Walter Gordon as my `irst Ottawa boss and an anecdote about his controversial 1963 budget
illustrateswelltheframeworkofahealthytruthtopowerrelationship.Inthe1970s,Igottoknow
ClaudeIsbister,whowasacivilservantwhoheld manyseniorjobs,including servingasAssistant
DeputyMinisterofFinanceatthetimeofthe1963budget.Isbisterandhisfellowof`icialswerenot
infavourof manyofthemeasurestoreduceforeigninvestmentthatwereattheheartof Gordons
budget. But, Gordons views on the subject were wellknown, he had campaigned on it and the
Departmentacceptedthatasa ministerhehad the righttopromotepoliciesthathe believedwere
inthe publicinterest.Speakingtruth topower, however,doesimplythe dutyof publicservantsto
givepoliticalsuperiorsthebestpossible informationandadvice.AsadevoteeofMr.Gordon,years
later when I was a member of the PMO, I asked Isbister if the Department of Finance had
deliberately let him down by not pointing out the implementation dif`iculties and `inancial
technicalities in many of the budgets provisions (many had to be withdrawn and Gordons
reputation took a severe hit). Isbistertold me that his conscience was clearhe and others had
suggestedproceeding, in stages, ratherthan througha bold program allatonce. Gordon rejected
thisadvice, ashe wasentitled todo, butthe Departmentfeltithad doneitsjobbynothidingthe
probablereactionofthe`inancialmarkets,nortellingtheministerwhathewantedtohear39.
ThiscaseillustratesthetruthtopowerdynamicsthatJamesR.Mitchellrecentlyoutlinedtoagroup
of civil service leaders. The `irst thing to remember, he said, is that this whole business of
speakingtruthtopowerisnotaboutyou;itisaboutyourdutyasaseniorpublicservant.Itisabout
thefacts,anditcanbeaboutideas,butnotaboutyouandnotyourideas40.
Of course Isbisterscautionsaboutthe 1963 budgetand the doubtsof LouisRasminsky, the then
Governorof the Bankof Canada, were given toMr.Gordon con`identially. There was noAccess to
InformationActor24hournewscycle totrumpetthatseniorof`icialshadreservationsaboutthe
speed of the minister. David Zussman contrasts the situation twenty`ive years ago when the
CanadianPublicServicecould becharacterized asanonymous,wellhidden,andthe unchallenged
primarysource of policyadvice. Asa result, public servantscould be candid with their political
39

The story of the 1963 budget is welltold in Steven Azzi. Walter Gordon and the Rise of Canadian Nationalism. (Montreal: McGill
QueensUniversityPress,1999).P.95110.IsbisterwasalsoakeysourceforAzzisaccount.
40 James R. Mitchell. Can I ReallySpeakTruth toPower? PracticalAdvice for New Executives, Ottawa. March 25, 2007 at the Sussex
Circle.

16

Closing the Implementation Gap

masters in the full knowledge that their advice would be con`idential. Today, however, he
concludes, there appears to be less interest in speaking truth to power given the extremely
partisanenvironment41.
RuthHubbard,aformerDeputyMinisterandChairofthePublicServiceCommissionaddsafurther
dimension tothenecessityof speaking truthtopowerbymaking thepointthatthe exercise does
not have to be a zero sum game. It is a mistake to start every conversation at the political
bureaucratic boundary with a mindset that presumes that what is intended is for one party to
confront the other42 . She gives the example of of`icials understanding the objectives of the
minister while suggesting better means of obtaining the goal or public servants being attentive
enoughtopoliticalrealitiestofashionresponsesthattakeintoaccountthe politicalvaluesoftheir
ministers. With a newly elected government, she recounts, instead of relating choices to the
collective good,the value frame of the previousgovernment,of`icials instead talked intermsof
reducing crime, a reference more in keeping with the goals of the new minister. This skill in
understanding thevalueframeofthepartyinpowerandthenusing thattohighlighttradeoffswas
brought home to me through observation of the effective performance of Tommy Shoyama, a
DeputyMinisterofFinance. Membersof the Liberal caucus, supported bythePMO,wanted more
done forsmallbusiness in a forthcoming budget. Shoyama did notoppose thisgoalheadon, but
instead used a Liberalprinciple wellenunciated invariouscampaigns ofhelping `irstthose who
needhelpmosttoshowthatmoreresourcesdevotedtosmallbusinesswouldtake awayfromthe
envelopethatwastobeusedforpoorseniors.Shoyamawonhispointnotbyconfrontation, butby
skilfuluseofframingandlanguage.AsHubbardstates,ministersareneitherfoolsnormalevolent.
Therefore, the greaterburdenlieswith the deputyhead (orotherseniorpublic servants) rather
than withelectedof`icialsto`ind effectivewaystoenable the highestqualityconversation to take
place43.

Virtues of the Mandarins

Beyond speaking truth topower, whatwere theothercharacteristicsof the publicservantsthatI
knewinthe1960s,1970sand1980sandhowdotheycontrastwithtodayspublicservice?
The `irst is that the senior public servants in Ottawa in the 1960s1980s had tremendous
substantive knowledge of theirdepartments`ield. There was nothing about Finance that Simon
Riesmandidnotknow. DavidGoldenhadhimself inventedtheDepartmentofDefenceProduction.
Bob Adamson of CMHC kneweveryaspect of housing. Seniordeputies stayed in their jobs long
enoughtogainexpertdepth inthe subject.Advancementdepended onthe abilitytodemonstrate
substantive competence. Ministers relied on the expertise of their deputies. Today, as discussed
above,we have amadmerrygoroundofdeputiesjumping toanotherjobwithin eighteenmonths
whenittakesyearstomasteraportfolio.Publicservantsneedtoprovide expertiseandpoliticians
energyand communication skills. Seniorpublic servants, therefore, should stayin theirpositions
41

DavidZussman.Whitherthefearlessadviser?inCanadianGovernmentExecutive.Vol.15.No.1(2009).
Ruth Hubbard. Speaking truth to power:A matter of imagination and courage in Canadian Government Executive. Vol. 15. No. 1
(2009).P11.
43 Ibid
42

fora minimumof`iveyears.Thisisnota newideaitwasrecommendedbytheRoyalCommission

FinancialManagementandAccountabilityin197944.
Second,when I`irstcame toOttawa in the 1960stherelationship between politiciansand senior
public servants was largely one of trust. The essence of trust, writes Paul Thomas, ispositive,
con`ident expectations about the motives, intentions, competence, and anticipated behaviour of
institutions and their leaders 45. As Principal Secretaryto Mr. Trudeau my of`ice could not have
survived excepton a system of trustbetween myself and the Clerksof the PrivyCouncil Michael
Pit`ieldandGordonOsbaldeston.WithbothclerksIestablishedtheruleofnoendruns.Withboth
thePMOandPCOhaving accesstothePrime Ministeritwas imperative toargueissuesopenlyin
frontof him, ratherthan attempting tokeep theotherinstitutionin the dark.Usuallythisentailed
thePMOaddingapoliticalbrie`ingnotetotheCabinetpackageassembledbythePCO.Wereliedon
the PCO toinform us about the agenda, they relied on ustoalertthem topolitical mine`ieldsor
opportunities.
Trustmeansthatpoliticians,politicaladvisors,andpublicservantscandisagreewithoutimpugning
each others motives or character. Senior public servants, a generation ago, certainly had the
courage tosay no to a minister and ministers could say noto the Prime Minister. The head of a
politicalof`icewasan Executive Assistantnota Chiefof Staff,anddeputieswere polite toEAsbut
theywouldnevertakeanorderfromthemnorallowthemselvestobeshutoutofmeetingswiththe
minister.TheMandarinswerepowerful,becausetheytoldthetruthandtheyhadtheexpertiseand
experiencetobackuptheirclaims.
Trust, however, nowseemstobe inshortsupply,inOttawa.Civilityisa companionvirtue totrust.
Previousreportsfromthe Centreforthe StudyofDemocracyhaveshownthatthe alwayspresent
partisanship at Question Period in the House of Commons has nowseeped throughto affectthe
workof House Committeesandrecentlythe same disease has beenallowed topoison the public
servicepoliticalrelationship. Linda Keen, theformerHeadofthe NuclearSafetyCommission,was
dismissed in a dispute withthe Ministerof Energy, butnot before she waswrongly labelledasa
Liberalappointee46.RichardColvin,adiplomatdoinghisjobreportingthefactsfromAfghanistan
ondetaineetransfershasbeen similarlypersonallyattackedbythe MinisterofDefence.Colvinhas
beensupportedpubliclybymanyformerAmbassadors,butnotbytheSecretaryoftheCabinet,who
issupposedtobetheof`icialdefenderofthepublicservice47 .AndwhenColvingavehistestimonyto
a House Committee, he did so alone, instead of being accompanied by the Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs and Trade. Steven Covey, a world renowned management consultant, says about
trustthatwejudgeourselvesbyourintentionsandothersbytheirbehaviour48.Thebehaviourof
44

RoyalCommission onFinancialManagement andAccountability. FinalReport. (Hull:CanadianGovernment Publishing Centre,1979).

P.194.
45 PaulC.Thomas.Trust and Parliament Agenciesin The Evolving PhysiologyofGovernment, Universityof Ottawa Press (2009).215
248
46 CBC News. Nuclear safety watchdog head `ired for 'lack of leadership' January 2008,http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/
2008/01/16/keen`iring.html?ref=rss.Retrieved:5January2010.
47 Steven Chase and Campbell Clark. Former ambassadors condemn Ottawa's attack on diplomat December 2009, http://
www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/formerambassadorscondemnottawasattackondiplomat/article1392248/. Retrieved: 5
January2010.
48 StephenM.R.Covey.CommitmenttotrustinCanadianGovernmentExecutive.Vol.15.No.1(2009).

18

Closing the Implementation Gap

theConservativeGovernmentinattackingtheperformanceofpublicservantsinafashionsimilarto
the usual cutandthrust of party slanging is a radical departure from the norm of the socalled
Golden Age and makes urgentthe necessityofdefending publiclythe traditionof a meritbased
nonpartisanprofessionalpublicservice.
Inthecurrentcontext,arespondenttotheCSDsurveysharedthisopinion:

Often, the politicians go overboard in responding to issuesthe response is political,

notpractical.Forexample,withrespecttoEHealth,theorganizationignoredtherules
the rules did not need a major overhaul. It is not necessary to implement a new
reportingregime.Sometimesyoucanbringinaconsultantforasmallamountofmoney
to accomplishsomethingquickly.So forthe badactionsofone organization, everyone
else thathad beingobeying theruleswaspunished,resulting in more"administrative"
work(process) lesseffectiveness. Sometimesthe senior executivesshould say"no"to
those political responsesrecognize the workload that the political response will
requireand supportthepublicservantsacknowledge theirexpertise, judgmentand
integrity.(Fall,2009)
Third, the senior members of the public service that I worked closely with throughout the
1960s1980s had great pride in their profession. Deputy ministers in that era were primarily
concerned abouttheirown departments, but theyalsomet and socialized informally and had a
wider commitment to the government and public service as a whole. The term horizontal
governmentwasnotinvogue,buttherealityofgovernmentwideprioritieswasclear.Ministersin
thePearsonGovernmenthadwideleewayintheirownportfolios,butalsoenthusiasticallydebated
issues outside of their particular remit. As President of the PrivyCouncil, Mr. Gordon had great
interest in foreign affairs issues, like the Vietnam War. We would discuss the overall agenda of
CabinetasmuchasthedetailsoftheTaskforceontheStructureofCanadianIndustry,whichwashis
main focus at the time. In the early 1970s when I worked for Ronald Basford, the Minister of
Housing, one of my speci`ic duties was to prepare brie`ing notes for him on cabinet issues of
importance outside of hisportfolio.Cabinetwasnotsimplya focus group forthe Prime Minister,
buthadintensedebatesthatdecidedissues.
Indeed,MichaelPit`ielddesignedacabinetcommitteesystemwhereministersintheEconomicand
SocialAffairsCommittee of cabinet were given broad resourceenvelopesthat theycouldallocate
accordingtotheCommitteeswishes.TherewasnoPMOmicromanagementofthisprocess.Deputy
ministers served in mirror committees of the cabinet structure, so that Pit`ield would have the
adviceofhiscivilservicecolleaguesonthebroadissuesofgovernment.Hebroughtthisperspective
tothePrimeMinisterinthedailybrie`ingsandpoliticallyPrimeMinisterTrudeauencouragedwide
debate in cabinet committees and in the caucus. Trudeau loved to compare and contrast the
political and public service perspective on issuesand would have been dismayed if one side had
consistentlydominatedthedebate.
Itistrue thatTrudeau beganthe processtocreate a muchmorepowerfulPMO,but ourmandate
was to work on and direct the issues he was personally interested in, not every issue in every
department. The public service and the political staff interacted on many different levels

departmental, cabinetcommittee,andprime ministerial,witha realbalancebetweenthe political

andtheadministrative.Trudeauvaluedtheexpertiseofthepublicserviceasmuchashevaluedthe
electoralexpertiseoftheLiberalParty.
Fourth,seniormembersof the publicservice in the Pearson andTrudeaugovernmentshadgreat
in`luence because of theirexpertise and longevityin theirposts. But theyalso had a passion for
anonymity 49. J.E. Hodgetts, in hishistoryof theCanadian publicservice from1867to1970which
concludesatjustaboutthe timeIwenttoOttawa, writesof the erathere isa paradoxinthefact
that the administrative branch of government by far the largest of our public and private
institutions and yet, even to theinformedmembersof the generalpublic, itisthe leastvisible.50
Ministers appeared before parliamentarycommitteesto defend and take responsibility for their
ownactionsandthedecisionsoftheirdepartments.Sometimestheypaidaprice.Itisraretodayfor
a ministerto resignoverprinciple orpolicydifferencesbutthe `irstministerforwhom Iworked,
WalterL.Gordon,resignedtwice.Today,incontrast,picturesofpublicservantsaredisplayedinthe
frontpagesofa newspaperorarethe lead storiesinthe televisednewsastheyaresummonedto
appear before parliamentary committees. Ministers publicly blame of`icials for mistakes and
of`icialshave hadtolearn publicrelationsskillsinordertosurvive.Thismaybethe single largest
differencefromtheOttawaIexperiencedinthe1960sandtheOttawaoftoday.
Fifth, thecivilservice Iknewalsoshared aparsimoniousculture thatshunnedpublicdisplayand
wasveryconsciousabout expense accounts. Ionce wastohave lunchwithTommyShoyama,the
DeputyMinister of Finance and had made a reservation in the Chteau Grill. Upon hearing this,
Shoyama said, ah no,neverforgetthatweare paid bytaxpayerswhohave a lot lessthatwe do.
WeateinsteadatMurraysintheLordElginHotel.
Sixth,anothergreatchangesincetheGoldenEraoftheMandarinsistheexplosionoftheconsultant
culture in Ottawa. Ageneration ago, departmentshad expertise inhouse,andifconsultantswere
employed,itwouldbetotestoutideasalreadygeneratedbythebureaucracyorto`ixashortterm
problem.Today,thereisanundergroundpolicytriangleofregularof`icials,consultants(oftenlong
term and retired public servants) and lobbyists. It ishard to believe, butwhen I `irstarrived in
Ottawa there wasnotasingleprofessionallobbyistof`ice.Lawyersmightdiscretelyperformwhat
we would now call lobbying, but there was certainly no industry. Bill Lee a former Executive
AssistanttoPaulHellyer,openedthe `irstlobbyistsof`ice,calledExecutiveConsultantsin thelate
1960s.Today,therearenearly5000 lobbyists,a neardoublingofthe breed,sincethe `irstregister
oflobbyistsin198951.Theremaybeevenagreaternumberofconsultantscarryingoutjobsthatthe
regularpublicservice used todoitself.If theprivate sector wantstopaylarge retainerstotryto
in`luence policy through lobbying, there is little that can be done about it, except making the
processastransparent,aspossible. Withthefederalgovernmentnowrunningan annualde`icitof
49

Foragooddescriptionof the traditionalpublicservice ethos, includinganonymitysee:John Tait. A Strong Foundation, Report of the
Task ForceonPublicValuesandEthicsin CanadianPublic Administration.Vol.40. No.1.1997.Writtenin the mid1990s the TaitReport
discusseda faultline inthe public service around the concept of accountability, a continuing preoccupationofthe publicservice,as the
datainAppendix1testi`ies.
50 Hodgetts,1973.P341.
51 AndrewMayedaandJackAubry.LobbyingAliveandWellinOttawa.EdmontonJournal.January2008.

20

Closing the Implementation Gap

over$50billion,thereissuretobesigni`icantattemptstoreigninpublicsectorspending.Onegood
place to start would be to cutbackradically on the use of outside consultants and toinsist that
departmentsshouldbuildinternalcapacity.Thisthemewillbeexploredlaterinthepaperwhenwe
discusstheeHealthdisputeinOntario.

The Way Ahead

One cannot turn the clock back two generations, but we can suggest improvements that try to
capture the strengths of the Mandarin era while being true to ourown time andconsistentwith
todaysvalues.Certainly, the greaterdiversity,of todayspublicservice,particularlyin genderand
employmentofFrancophones,isagreatimprovementoverthepublicserviceI`irstencounteredin
the1960s.But,themanagementskillsandthepolicyexpertiseofseniorpublicservantsatthatera
isan assetthatweshouldtrytorecreate.Similarly,therewasaclearaccountabilitybargaininthe
1960s between ministers and public servants. Ministers had the public pro`ile and the public
servantshadanonymitythatallowedthem tohave greatpolicyin`luence.Thisbargain cannotbe
exactlyreconstructed,giventhe24/7roleofthemedia,butitispossibletohavemuchmore clarity
inthe relationshipsbetweenministers, theirstaffs,parliament,andpublicservants. Thereisgreat
confusion today, for example, overthe accounting of`icer concept. Deputy ministers in their new
role as accounting of`icers, since the passage of the Federal Accountability Act in 2006, hold
responsibilityintheirownrightfor:thestatutoryauthoritytheyhavebeengranted, forthe public
`inancesforwhichhe orshe isanswerable,andforthe ef`icientadministrationofthe department.
Ministerial responsibility is still the overarching concept, but within that framework deputy
ministersnow have personal responsibility forcertain key activities. However, the Privy Council
Of`ice has provided one set of guidelines to help public servants assess their duties under the
AccountabilityAct, butthePublicAccountsCommitteehasdeveloped a differentprotocol tospell
outthe responsibilitiesandaccountabilityofaccountingof`icers.Theircompeting de`initionofthe
accounting of`icer concept, which was designed to eliminate confusion over responsibility and
accountability,nowappearstohavemademattersworse52.
In integrating past best public policy practiceswith todays challenges, I thinkwe shouldhave a
publicpolicysystemthatachieves/incorporatesthefollowing:

Capacity and Performance

1.

Recognition that the neutrality, merit-based recruitment and expertise of the public
service are fundamental features of our democracy and must be preserved.

2.

Implementation for too long has been the orphan of the public policy system.
Management is at least as critical a function as policy analysis. The importance of this
function must become central to the career prospects of public servants and the most
senior level of political decision-makers must devise systems to regularly assess

52

Savoie, (2008),P58. C.E.S.Franks wasthe `irst to raise the issue ofthe dueling protocols betweenthe Public AccountsCommittee
andthePrivyCouncilOf`iceoverwhattheaccountingof`icerconceptimpliesinpracticefortheprincipleofministerialresponsibility.

implementation issues. A Results Unit, as described in the next section, located in

Treasury Board should make regular reports to cabinet.
3.

A public service with less turnover based on the understanding that it takes time to
learn a subject and to manage intelligently.

4.

The use of consultants for long-term or line jobs in the public service should be
discouraged so that internal capacity within departments is cultivated.

Attracting and Retaining Employees

5.

To maintain a strong public service in the future such a career must be attractive to a
new generation of recruits, especially in light of the rapidly approaching retirement of
the baby boom generation. To achieve an improved public service, greater attention
must be paid to mentoring, opportunities to learn and develop, and lifestyle-work
balance.

Improvement to Accountability Design

6.

Our traditional system of a partnership between a professional non-partisan public

service and strong ministers advised by competent political assistants is worth
preserving. Politicization of the public service must be resisted as should the
diminution of cabinet as the central decision-making institution. Political staff should
be regarded as a legitimate part of the policy process and enjoy professional
development and post-employment opportunities comparable to the public service.

7.

There must be a new accountability bargain between politicians, their political

advisers, parliament and the public service through the advice of a wise persons
task force. Relationships must be clarified and a new accountability framework voted
on and approved by legislatures to help guide the inevitable debates that will occur
over questions of accountability. As the CSD has argued in earlier studies,
accountability would be enhances by an improved policy development process in our
political parties and an improved oversight role for parliament 53.

8.

Building on existing provisions in several statutes and the PCO Guide to Accountability
there should be a CodeofEthicalConBlictforExemptStaff, comparable to the 2003 Values
andEthicsCode.

9.

Institute training for exempt staff on the essentials of government and the politicalcivil service relationship. Public servants also need course on how to develop an
effective relationship with ministers offices.

10.

The provision of the Lobbying Act which discriminates against political advisors by
prohibiting post-employment opportunities for five years should be reduced to one
year.

53

The Centre for the Study of Democracy in itsprevious report entitled Everything Oldis NewAgain:Observations on Parliamentary
Reform made a series of recommendations to improve parliaments role in the policymaking process.: http://www.queensu.ca/csd/
documents/2008_EverythingOldIsNewAgain_CSDreport_ExpertiseInParliament3.pdf).An extensive planonhowtorenewat least oneof
the Canadian parties can be found in: Thomas S. Axworthy. The Four Key Questions: An Essay on Liberal Renewal. http://
www.queensu.ca/csd/publications/Axworthy_4_Key_Questions.12.4.06.pdf.

22

Closing the Implementation Gap

Expertise, integrity, pride, and trustthese were the civil service attributes and ethics that I
witnessed, learned from, and sawimplemented. It iscertainlypossible torestore these valuesto
public servicestoday. I may be wearing rosetinted glasses when I re`lect upon policymaking a
generationago,butittrulywasagenuinepartnershipbetweenthepublicserviceandtheministers
andstaff from the political realm. The comparative surveydata presented in this studyindicates
thatpublicservants todayhave greatconcern about theconfusedaccountabilityrelationship and
that this in turn negatively impactstheirabilityto achieve superior implementation. The public
service must be con`ident in order to achieve optimum policymaking, we must restore the
con`idencetothepublicservicethatitoncedemonstratedonadailybasis.

ThomasS.Axworthy
Chair,CentrefortheStudyofDemocracy
December2009

Introduction
Public administration hasrecentlybecome the stuff of high politics. In Ontario, questionsin the
legislatureabouttheexpenseaccountsofconsultantsandthesolesourcingofcontractsled,inJune
2009,totheresignationoftheCEOandChairoftheBoardofeHealthOntario,theagencymandated
todevelop electronichealthrecordsforOntarians.InCanada,in2005,theGomeryInquiry intothe
SponsorshipScandalmadepublicits`irstoftworeportsandin2006theaccountabilityissuesraised
by Gomery helped lead to the defeat of the Liberal Government. Public administration, long
relegated to government reports that fewread or academic papers (that even fewer read), has
suddenlybecomeascythetocutdowngovernments.
If the Gomery report focused public attention on the shortcomings of Liberal management of
sponsorship activities in Quebec, the October 2009 Special Report by the OfBice of the Auditor
GeneralofOntario, foundseriouslapsesin the planning of the ElectronicHealth RecordInitiative
(EHR), the oversight of eHealth Ontariobythe Ministryof Health and questionable management
practices within the eHealth Agency itself. The Auditor Generals blockbuster report, in turn,
precipitatedtheresignationoftheMinisterofHealthhoursbeforethereportwasmadepublicand
amonthlaterthedepartureoftheDeputyMinisterofHealth.
The eHealth debacle in Ontario contains manylessons for policymakers and students of public
administration. One ofthe mostimportantconcernsa centralissue of this studythe capacityof
ourpublicservices.BothCanada andOntarioface atsunamiofretirementsintheirpublicservices
overthenextfewyearsasthebabyboomgenerationmoveson. Itisnecessarytomakethe public
service an attractive careerchoice, sothatrecruitsare attracted and retained. Thiswillaffectour
capacitytomaintainorevenimproveuponthedeliveryofpublicservices,whichisakeyconcernof
thisstudy.AsurveyofQueensgraduatesintheOntarioandfederalpublicservicesaskedaseriesof
human resource questions concerning: performance improvements, job satisfaction, learning and
development, worklifestyle balance, and such. Thispaper compares and contraststhe resultsof
this survey with the larger surveys of public service employees commissioned by the two
governments.
The Ontario Auditor Generals report on the eHealth controversy demonstrates that a capacity
implementation gap exists today, not only that there is a projected one for the future54 .
Implementation isthe job of the public service. In an idealpublicpolicy world, politiciansbring
energy, creativity, communication skills and knowledge of public opinion; public servants bring
expertise,memory,andmanagementskills.MinistersofHealth,asthetextbookssaytheyshoulddo,
decidedin2000 thatelectronicrecordswerea healthpriorityacrossCanadabothtoimprove care
andtoin`luencecosts.Yet,nineyearsandabilliondollarslater,astheOntarioAuditorconvincingly
demonstrates, Ontario has little to show forall of thiseffort. Near the bottom in comparison to
otherprovincesinachieving electronicrecordgoals,theAuditorwrotethat,Ontariosprogressin
EHRprojectshasbeen slow, andEHR projects have for the most partnot met expectations. In
54

See C. David Crenna. The Role of Governmental Effectiveness in a New Liberalism: Four Key Gaps in Searching for the New
Liberalism:Perspectives,PoliciesandProspects.HowardAsterandThomasS.Axworthy(eds)(Oakville:MosaicPress,2003).

24

Closing the Implementation Gap

addition,the networkbuiltbySSHA(SmartSystemsforHealthAgency)isnotbeingmanagedcost
effectively55.AfterpagesofdetailtheAuditorwrote:

tosumup, toomanyprocurementsat the eHealth Ontario Agencyand to a lesser

extent at the ministryseHealth programbranch and at SSHA were the product of
rushed decisionmaking, the acceptance of expediency over thoroughness ... poor,
absent,orcontradictingdocumentation;and,aparticularconcern,theconcentration
of decisionmaking power in the hands of few individuals with no compensating
controlstoensurethattheirdecisionswereappropriate" 56.
Thisisnotanimplementation gap,but ratheranimplementationabyss, and Ontariois notalone,
nor is the eHealth controversy an isolated example. Implementation is a vitalthough often
neglectedpartofthe policyprocess.Publicpolicyrequiresideasandoptimalsolutions,hencethe
necessity for good analysis. Ideas, in turn, need to be communicated and adopted, thus the
emphasisonpoliticalleadership.Iftheproofofthepuddingisintheeating,the`inalcriticalstepis
implementationtocarryout,accomplish,ful`ill, produceandcomplete. Implementation depends
ontheoperationaldemandsof the program, theresourcesorcapacitythatarerequiredtoachieve
thegoals,andtheexperienceinlearningonthegroundwhatworks.Whatisneededarestreetlevel
bureaucratsorpeoplewhoknowhowtomakethingsworkontheground.
Implementationisoftenneglectedpolicyadviceandcrisismanagementarethe glamourtasksof
thepublicservice.Yet,itisoftenimplementationfailuresthatleadtopolicydebacles.Thereislittle
doubt that the goal of having eHealth electronic records is an important one, but the `lawed
implementation process led tomajorcontroversy. The goal of raising federal visibility in Quebec
after the 1995 Referendum could certainly be defended, but the implementation shortcuts
practisedbysomepublicservantsandpoliticaladvisorseventuallydestroyedagovernment.
Because of the centrality of implementation, some governments have made the process more
centraltotheagendasofseniordecisionmakers.IntheUnitedKingdom, the CentralPolicyReview
Staff (CPRS) chaired by Lord Rothschild in the 1970s gave British cabinets an overview of
horizontal policy issues and an evaluation of the efforts of departments to cope with these
challenges 57. Cabinettherebygained anondepartmental perspective.Later, Mrs. Thatchercreated
the EfBiciency Unit under Lord Rayner, which carried out evaluations and suggested managerial
improvements58.TonyBlairin2001establishedaDeliveryUnitintheCabinetOf`iceandTreasury.In
2005, the British Cabinet Of`ice began a program of capability reviews, which focused on the
implementationandmanagementabilitiesofvariousdepartments.Twothirdsofthe170capability
assessmentsinthe`irstroundratedadepartmentlessthanwellplaced59 .
In Canada, we need to develop a similar implementation focus in public policymaking. Once a
month,Cabinetshould reviewthe progressorlooming obstaclesof implementationforitscritical
55

Of`iceoftheAuditorGeneralofOntario,(2009),P1011.
Ibid,P13.
57 LordRothschild,(1977),
58 PeterHennessy(1989),P595
59 UnitedKingdom(2009).NationalAuditOf`ice.ReportoftheComptrollerandAuditorGeneral.London:TheStationeryOf`ice.
56

programs. AResultsUnitcomposed of representativesof the TreasuryBoard, ControllerGenerals,

andthePrivyCouncilOf`iceshoulddevelop animplementation evaluationreviewasrobustasthe
regularpolicyandcommunicationaspectsofthecabinetagenda.
Such aunitisrecommendedbecause implementation gaps abound. Withgreatfanfare Parliament
passed the Pledge To Africa Act (2004) to produce generic drugs to help poor countries `ight
diseaseslikeAIDS.Yet,yearslaternotasinglepillhadbeenexported60 .TheGunRegistry,asensible
ideatoaidpolice forcesandprotectcitizenswassubjecttohuge costoverrunsandcoverupsthat
madeitaneasytargetforitsopponentsandlesseneditspubliccredibility.Evenassimpleataskas
developing a nocall registryfrom nuisance telemarketerstook years to create. In the preface to
thisreportreference is made tothe creativityof the Pearson Government of the 1960s; within a
`iveyear period the federal government launched Medicare, the Canadian Pension Plan, Canada
Assistance Act, the Federal Student Loans Programand uni`ied the Armed Forces. These were all
complicatedprogramsinvolvingmanyfederaldepartments, the provinces,privatesectorinterests,
and millions of individual Canadians. The Mandarins carried it off; politicians in the Pearson
governmentgavethemarchingorders,butitwasthepublicservicethatputthewheelstotheroad,
guided the throng towards the desired destination, and concluded the trip with most citizens
satis`ied.Whatcancompareinrecentyearswithsucharecordofimplementation? 61
ThecontroversyovereHealthcentredonconsultantsexpense accountschargingforminorlunch
itemswhilecommandinglargedailyfeesbutintrackingtheimplementationwoesofeHealth,the
OntarioAuditorraisedamuchmoreprofoundissueaboutcapacity.TheeHealthprojectwasoneof
the most visible initiatives inthe largestand bestfunded departmentinthe Ontariogovernment,
buttheprojectwaslargelyrunbyconsultants, notregularemployeesofthe DepartmentofHealth.
TheAuditorofOntariowroteonthispoint:

Thefact thatthedevelopmentofanEHRhadbeen on the governmentsagendaasfar

backastheearly2000scausedustoquestiontheheavy,andinsomecasesalmosttotal,
reliance on consultants. This reliance continued to increase over time. This was
particularly the case at the Ministry, which in 2007 consolidated all of its eHealth
projectsintoaneHealthProgramBranch.By2008,theBranchwasengagingmorethan
three hundredconsultantscomparedtofewerthan thirtyfulltime ministryemployees
evenanumberofseniormanagementpositionswereheldbyconsultants. 62
If capacity within the Department of Health was lacking presumably the Government had little
choicebutto go outside the publicservice todrive the project.Thisbegsthe questionwhywas
capacitylackinginsuchapowerfulministry?Andwhywasitlackingoversuchanextendedperiod?
Theprioritywassetin2000,butthe useofconsultantscontinuedtoincreaseovertime.Onemight
have guessed that consultantswouldhave been usedinitially, but growing internal expertise and
60

Axworthy,(2006).
A September 2008 survey of public sector leaders in Canada by Deloitte Research found that 41% of respondents deemed
governmenttobe less successfulatimplementing large projectsthan tenyearsago.61%ofCanadianrespondentsbelievethatpoliciesare
designed with little or no input from the people expected to implement them. PaulMacmillan and ToddCain.Closing the Gap between
policydesignandexecutioninCanadianGovernmentExecutive.Vol.15.No.1(2009).
62 Of`iceoftheAuditorGeneralofOntario,(2009).
61

26

Closing the Implementation Gap

knowledgeinpublicsectormanagerswouldhavemadesenseforsuchalargeproject.Theopposite
happened. This study surveys public sector employees with the intent to assist a dedicated
workforcetodevelopthecapacitytorun creativelycomplicated projects.TheeHealth storyshows
thatthisisanurgentnecessity.
Many studiesshowthe interrelationship between the humanresources issueshighlighted in this
report and the effectiveness of the public service in implementation. Ralph Heintzman, an
experienced publicservant, capturedthe relationship well inhistalkonPeople, ServiceandTrust:
Exploring the Public Sector Service Value Chain63 . Heintzman argued that employee engagement
leads to service satisfaction by citizens, which in turn leads to greater citizen trust in public
institutions.Thedriversofemployeecommitmentarefactorslike:meaningfulwork,colleaguesand
supervisors(eachofthesefactorscanbeassessedintheCSDsurveyinAppendix1).Supervisorsor
middle managers encourage employees to use their skills, give recognition and organize a
manageable workload.Ifobtained, these leadtobetterorganizationalperformance. Citizensvalue
timeliness, competence, courtesy and fairness in service delivery. Heintzmans advice is to use
drivers of engagement, like the clarityof the mission and managementperformance to improve
implementation. As common sense would argue, superior internal workplace practices lead to
better performance. Yet, many reports demonstrate that human resources do not receive the
prioritytheyshould fromseniorpublic sectormanagers. Linda Duxburymakesthe pointthatthe
things that attract people to a public sectorjobpayand bene`itsare not the thingsthatkeep
employeesmotivated.Engagementdependsoncareerdevelopment,recognition,andworklifestyle
balance64.
It is not only the public sector, of course, where engagement is an issue. An engaged employee
accordingtoGerardH. SeijtsandDan Crim:isa person whois fullyinvolved in and enthusiastic
abouthisorherwork65.Theycitea2005surveyinwhich17%ofCanadianworkersreportedbeing
highlyengaged,66%weremoderatelyengagedand17%wereactivelydisengaged.SeijtsandCrim,
likeRalphHeintzman,arguethatanengagedworkforceisamoreproductiveworkforce:employee
engagementdoesnotmerelycorrelatewithbottomlineresultsitdrivesresults66 .
Ifengagementandpublicsectorcapacityisonethemehighlightedbythesurveydata,thesecondis
accountabilityand the nature of the politicalcivil servant relationship. The eHealth dispute over
implementation cost a CEO, a chair of the board, a minister and his deputy their jobs, but the
sponsorshipaccountabilityscandaldefeatedagovernment.

63

RalphHeintzman(2007).
Linda DuxburyandChrisHiggins.WorkLife Con`lict inCanadainthe NewMillennium:A StatusReportOttawa:Carelton University,
2003. These `indings were also reiterated in a presentation byLinda Duxburyentitled, You, Me and Them:Dealing with Generational
DifferencesintheWorkplace.http://www.calgaryeconomicdevelopment.com/`iles/Misc/DuxburyPresentation.pdf.
65 GerardHSeijtsandDanCrim.(2006).
66 Ibid.P2.
64

Thereisalargeliteratureonthesponsorshipissue,thesubsequentGomeryreportsandtheFederal
AccountabilityAct(2006)67.TheGomeryCommissionfoundclearevidence ofpoliticalinvolvement
inthe administration of theSponsorshipProgram;insuf`icientoversightatthe seniorlevelsofthe
publicservice;anabsenceoftransparency;andtherefusalofministers,seniorof`icials,thePrime
Ministers Of`ice, and public servants to acknowledge their responsibility for the problems of
mismanagementthatoccurred68.
The Sponsorship Program had its origins in 19941995 when the advertising section of Public
WorksandGovernmentServicesCanadabegantodispersefundsforspecialprojects.Thisactivity
intensi`ied after the Quebec referendum in 1995, leading to newspaper articles which began to
questionaspectsof thisspending. Aninternal auditof the program was ordered in2000andthe
AuditorGeneralofCanadamadea dramaticreportinMay2002withcertain`ilesbeing referredto
the RCMP. In December 2003, the Martin Government cancelled the Sponsorship Program and
created the Gomery Commission in February 2004, which attracted considerable attention and
reportedin2005.TheMartinGovernmentwasdefeatedlargelybecauseofthisaccountabilityissue
in2006.
TheSponsorshipScandalisa particularlyvivid example of the dif`icultiesthatcan occurbetween
politicaldemandsandcivilserviceresponsibilities,buttheissueoftheproperrelationshipbetween
thenonpartisanmeritbasedpublicservice and apartisandominatedexecutiveandparliamentis
hardlynew. LucJuilletand KenRasmussen in Defendinga ContestedIdeal, a historyof the public
service commission, argue that,a decisiontobuilda professional andimpartialbureaucracyisof
fundamental importance to the development of modern democracy69. Democratic governments
require legitimacyand legitimacyisderivedinno small measure from the effectiveness of public
servants, indelivering importantpublicgoods and from citizensabilitytotrustthattheywillbe
treatedwithfairnessandimpartialitybythestatebureaucracy70 .Theinteractionsbetweenanon
partisancivil serviceandverypartisanstaffs, however, isoftena dialogue ofthe deaf fraughtwith
misunderstanding, incomprehension, `ingerpointing, and as the Sponsorship Scandal showed,
sometimes outright larceny. Accountability, writes David Johnson in Thinking Government, has
political,legal, andsocialdimensionsanditincludesconcernsofministerialresponsibilityandthe
developing and functioning of a ministerial chainof command and discipline along with broader
questions about the responsiveness of public policies to the needs and interests of society71.
Accountabilityisoftencomplicatedandalwayscrucial.
Who is responsible, as Judge Gomery asked, is the basic question in accountability. The CSDES
surveypointsoutthattheanswertothisquestionisdif`icult,becauseofthelackofclarityaboutthe
properrolesofthepublicservice andtheministersof`ice.These concernsarenotonlyaCanadian
67

See the reports of The Commission of Inquiry intothe Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities: Whois Responsible (2005)
and Restoring Accountability (2006). See also: Francois Perreault. Inside Gomery. Translated Carl Angers (Toronto: Douglas and
MacIntyre, 2006) and RuthHubbard and Jilles Paquet. GomerysBlindersandCanadianFederalism (Ottawa:UniversityofOttawa Press,
2007).
68 TheCommissionofInquiryintotheSponsorshipProgramandAdvertisingActivities:WhoIsResponsible?,P7.
69 JuilletandRasmussen,(2008),P2.
70 Ibid,P2.
71 Johnson(2009),P222.

28

Closing the Implementation Gap

preoccupationasCSDESdatafromHong Kong demonstrates.HongKonghasrecentlyintroduceda

ministerialsystemandresponsestotheCSDES demonstratethattheeliteHongKongpublicservice
isascon`lictedaboutaccountabilityaspublicservantsinOttawaandQueensPark.Thesurveydata
thatfollowscomparesthe viewsof juniorandseniorpublicservants, who have attended courses
relatedtopublic administration atQueensUniversity(sample describedindetailinthe following
section).Thisdatapointsoutveryrealissuesincapacityandaccountability.

Section one: The state of the public service

Thecapacityof agovernmentdependsonthequalityofitspublicservice.Whileelectedpoliticians
infuse the executive process with momentum and political savvy, public servants provide the
experience, technical expertise, and longterm perspective needed to govern effectively. The
capacity of government depends on the motivation and calibre of the people who make up the
public service. This has always been the case, but achieving this objective for a 21st century
government workforce will only occur if we understand the aspirations, global outlooks, and
expectationsofthecurrentgenerationofcivilserviceaspirants.
Canada has been lacking in this area. In several recenthighpro`ile incidents, the governmenthas
failed to conduct its business ef`iciently and sometimes even failed to conduct it legally. These
scandalshave put culpabilityat the feetof seniorpublicof`icials,mostnotoriouslyin the Gomery
CommissionofInquiryintotheSponsorshipProgramandAdvertisingActivities.
As a result, public service reform is on the agenda. But where to start? There has been some
movementtowardsanewgovernmentorder,butithasnotbeenbalanced.Manyproposedreforms
have centred on the Gomeryrecommended issues of accountabilityand control. While these are
important,theyonlyaddresspartofwhatmustbe donetoimprove theperformance ofthe public
servicecomprehensivelyandeffectively.
What are the challenges affecting the performance of the Canadian public service, and what
managementdirectionsandinstrumentsaretheretoimprovethesituation?
Surveys of public sector employees reveal a moderatelydissatis`ied and unmotivated workforce
withmiddlingoptimismforthefuture.Thiswillnotsuf`icegoing forward.Canadaneedsacreative,
risktaking,globallyinformedpublicservice.Toachieveit, the publicservice mustattracttalented
youngpeopleandcreateaworkenvironmentstimulatingandeffectiveenoughtoretainthem.
Inhis2004paperTheDeadGeneralist,EdStrawarguesthatahighperformingpublicorganization
aligns`ive things: a compelling proposition tothe market, a clearand comprehensive strategyto
deliver that proposition, a structure wholly built around it, instruments to guarantee that all
functions (systems, incentives and performance measures) all point in the same direction, and,
`inally, asetofsharedvaluestosupportthe whole.72 Ole IngstrupandPaulCrookallhavea similar
72

Straw,(2004).P10.

view. Their1998 workThe ThreePillarsof Management: Secrets of SustainedSuccess determined

that the three pillars of wellperforming public organizations are: aim (a mission and clear
direction of where itis headed), character (a strong sense of whatitis and whatis important
namely, trust, communication, and peoplecentred ideas) and execution (the ability to getthings
donethroughinnovation,teamwork,andopennesstochange).73
Ifeffectiveorganizationsarebuiltontheseprinciples,itis`ittingtomeasurethecurrentstateofthe
Canadianpublicservice againstthem. Thisapproach formsthe baseon whichourresearch builds
tocomeupwithrecommendationsforimprovementstothreekeyareasofpublicsectorcapacity:
CapacityandPerformanceimprovements:howcanoptimumperformancebeencouraged
considering the political versus administrative tradeoffsthatpermeate all corners of the
publicsector?
Attractingandretainingqualityemployees:whatreformsandmodi`icationswouldmake
thepublicsectoravaluedanddesirableplacetowork;aplacethatwouldattractandretain
creativeandinnovative,publiclyspiritedCanadians?
Accountability design: how might a better environment be cultivated which facilitates
betteraccountabilitytoParliament, themedia andthe Canadian public,while encouraging
creativityandmanagerial`lexibility?

Survey says
The engagement and satisfaction of Canadian public service employees, and the ability for the
public sector to attract and retain new talent, is of the great interest and concern given the
demographicpressuresthatunderpinpublicsectorreform.
Thisinterestisre`lectedin three keysurveysregarding thejobsatisfactionlevelsofpublicservice
employees working at the federal, provincial, and municipal levels, namely: the Canadian Public
Service Career Satisfaction Survey(CSDES)74 ; Public Service Employee Survey (PSES)75 ; Ontario
Public Service Employee Survey(OPSES)76 .Looking atengagementandsatisfactionfactorsacross
thesectorthroughthewindowsprovidedbythesurveysallowsamorecompleteviewthananyone
ofthethreecouldonitsown.Theseinformedouraimtosuggestimprovementsinthethreecritical
areas: capacity and performance, attracting and retaining employees, and improvements to
accountabilitydesign.
73

IngstrupandCrookall,(1998).P7.
Respondents to the Centre for the Study of Democracys selfadministered Web survey (referred to as CSDES in this document)
includes alumni of Queens Mastersof PublicAdministrationprogram (emailinvitation delivered to 689people inOctober 2009;return
rate of 29%)and three groups of participants in the Public Executive Program, Queens Schoolof Business (September 2008, January
2009,September2009,n=98).
75 The Public Service Employee Survey was administered to all employees in the Public Service for which Treasury Board is the
employeras wellas employeesofparticipating separate agencies. The surveywasa voluntary census,andthe collection wasdoneusing
an electronic questionnaire, between 20081103 and 20090109. Data was also captured from 6172 paper questionnaires received
between November2008andJanuary2009. The target populationfor2008consisted of 257,764individuals. The overallresponse rate
forthe2008PublicServiceEmployeeSurveywas65.8%(169,600).
76 The OPS Employee Survey is a census survey;all69,340 Ontario Public Service employees were invited to participate (online or
manually)to a 98question survey. In 2009, 41,604 employees participated (response rate of almost 60%). Ipsos Reid presented the
surveyresultsonJune1,2009.
74

30

Closing the Implementation Gap

The comparisonsclearly indicate that public servants wantto make a differencewith integrity
intact;theywantautonomy, greater`lexibility, opportunitiestobe more collaborative andcreative,
but are often working in a rigid environment thatdoesnot reward creativity; they are proud of
theirworkandatthe same timeembarrassedbythepublicperception andattitudestowardwhat
theydo.Severalexpressedconcernabouttheprevailing'goodenoughforgovernmentwork'attitude
anattitudethattheyfeelunderminesthereputationofthepublicservice.
Common themes emerged that suggest that public servants want to streamline activities to
maximize ef`iciencies,ensure fairness,andimprovecommunications.Theywanttobe empowered
and rewarded for good performance. Employees value crossdepartmental collaboration and
shouldbeencouragedtodoso.

On capacity and performance improvements

Studiesshowthatprideinonesworkandapositiveinterpersonalrelationshipwithonesbossare
saidtohavefourtimesgreaterimpactononesdiscretionaryworkeffortthanotherfactorssuchas
pay.77 Yet,theprevalenceofrotatingseniorstaffhasbeentaggedbysurveyrespondentsasamajor
issuethataffectsaccountability,productivity,andengagement.
Imaginethe impact of having three differentsupervisorsinthreeyearswhiledoing the same job!
Thisiswhat31%of Federalemployeesreported in thePSES 2008, and in realtermsthatmeans
58,000federalcivilservants.Coincidentally,only31%oftheFederalCSDESsurveyrespondentsfeel
thatchangeismanagedwellwithintheirdepartment.Experience andspecialistknowledgearelost
when seniormanagers are rotated from department to department. Employeesare in a constant
stateof`luxastheyadjusttodifferentworkstyles.
Seniorof`icials(DMsandADMs)spendtoolittletimeinoneplace(generallylessthan2years).This
negativelyimpactsthedepartmentstheyrun,andmakesachievingprogressonresolvingkeyissues
moredif`icult.(CSDES.Q60)
Respondentsexpressedstrongconcernswithmanagementintheiragencies.Trustinthegrievance
processisweakamongstmostrespondentsinthe surveys. Only18%in the PSEScon`identlyfeel
thatthey caninitiate a formal redressprocesswithout fearof reprisal. Similarly,only18% inthe
OPS feelfreetoexpressopinions thatdiverge fromthose of managementwithoutfearof reprisal.
Municipal employee responses indicate that 65% of them trust that their supervisor will take
actiononreportsofwrongdoing(CSDES.Q27),butalmostasmanydisagreeasagreethatcorrective
actionforbadperformanceisinplace(CSDES.Q23).While62%of PSESrespondentssaidthatthey
cancountontheirimmediatesupervisortokeeppromises(PSES.Q34),only51%aresatis`iedwith
thewayinthattheirdepartmentoragencyrespondstomattersrelatedtoharassment(PSES.Q78).
OneCSDESrespondentrecommendedhowtoimprovethis:

Provideaclearand conBidentialwhistleblowermechanismforemployees,sothatthey
may bypass destructive supervisors and directly report instances of waste, theft,
77

JohnGibbons,(2006),P8.

bullying by supervisors, racism, violence, etc. There are too many bad, bad, bad
supervisorsinourdepartmentforemployeestobeabletotrusttakingtheirconcernsto
theirbosses. There needstobe a reliablealternatemechanisminplaceandone that
has real powers and teeth, rather than just a symbolic sinkhole that concerns are
throwninto,nevertobeaddressedinthefuture.
Tenured federal employees, who have weathered recent scandals and who may have had to
implement changesasa result, appeartofeel thattheirorganizationsare performing betternow
thanwhentheystarted.Butonly3%ofthetenuredOntariopublicservicestronglyagreesthattheir
organizationfunctionsaswellasitoncedid.Thesefolksmaybe in`luencedbythe recentEHealth
scandal.

On attracting and retaining quality employees

Finallyand importantlyrecruiting processes are rated as mediocre, with not one response
groupgivingtheprocessarating above59%.While almosthalfofMPArespondentsstatedthatthe
recruitment process was a positive experience (CSDES.Q7), almost half (43%) agreed with that
statement:the processis`lawedandrequiresamajoroverhaul(CSDES.Q12).Itsquite alarming
thatonly2%of all CSDES respondentsthinkthatthecivilserviceseffortstoidentify, recruitand
retainyoung peopleisworking verywell(31.5%agreethatitissuccessful).Andtheseperceptions
aresupportedbyharddata.TheCanadaRevenueAgency,forexample,replacedRevenueCanadaso
that it could be liberated to handle staf`ing, job classi`ications, compensation, and other human
resourceissuesmoreef`iciently.But,staf`ingandrecruitmentcontinuestobeaproblem:the target
oftheagencyisto`illajobin66days,butarecentauditshowedthatittookanaverageof173days,
evenmoretimethaninitspreviousincarnationasagovernmentdepartment78.
Still,despitethesefrustrations,inallthreesurveys,themajorityofrespondentsreportedhighrates
ofjobsatisfaction80%ofboththeCSDESsurveyrespondentsandOPSESarecontent,asare82%
oftheirPSEScounterparts,and90%ofthemunicipalresponderstotheCSESDsurveyarepleased
withthecurrentsituation.
Thenatureofthemodernpublicservicecallsforcollaboration.Inthepast,staffinanorganization
used to work sidebyside with individuals of the same discipline, but each individual would
effectivelyworkalone.Todaythenatureofworkrequiresmoresharingand,hence,moreteamsand
teamwork, Ingstrup and Crookall say.79 In all the surveys reviewed, respondents con`irmed that
elements of teamwork and collaboration were present in their workplaces. But even with 84%
agreeingthattheircolleaguessupportteamwork,oneMPArespondentoftheCSDESsurveyshared
thatgroupmanagementleavesmuchtobedesired:

78
79

KathrynMay,PublicServiceHRAgencytobeShotDownOttawaCitizen.6February,2009.
Ibid,P162.

32

Closing the Implementation Gap

Placeapremiumon managerialeffectiveness,inaddition tothe premiumson subject

matter knowledge and technical skill. Its great to have had experience at the Privy
Council OfBice or the Treasury Board Secretariat, but real effectiveness could be
improved by knowing something about building, directing and maintaining teamsof
people.
Opinionsoffered byboth OPSES and CSDES respondentsindicate changesdue tobudgetcutsand
restructuring effortsseem tohavemade recruitmentandhumanresourceplanning alowpriority.
Only11%ofMPArespondentsstronglyagreethatthejobpostingthattheyrespondedtoaccurately
re`lectthepositiontheywerehiredfor.Manycomplainedaboutthelengthyhiringprocess.
Over30%oftheMPAalumniwhohadonceworkedinthepublicservice,buthadleftindicatedthat
theirreasonforleavingpublicservicewasthattheirexpectationswerenotmet.

I have little autonomyin my job and very little room to make myown decisionson
major projects or issues management. This slows me down (and frustrates me)
considerably. Communication is poor, and I amoften not informed related to the big
picture,evenwithinmybranchonmajorimplementationinitiatives.(CSDES.Q58)
In their own surveys, Ingstrup and Crookall reveal that public organizations have voracious
appetites for new knowledge. Even though the public service traditionally downplaysindividual
rewards for employees, creative, wellperforming agencies seek to establish mechanisms that
catch people doing things right and reward them for it.80 This may be, but the three surveys
analyzed in this report reveal a different picture, one in which employees are constrained from
pushing themselvesto their best potential. Only44% of CSDES respondents admitted that their
organizations are willing to be entrepreneurial and take risks. Justover50% of OPSES and PSES
respondents are encouraged to innovate. But as one roundtable participant quipped, this is
government,notfreelancing,makinguswonderhowinnovativedowe wantourpublicservantsto
be?
Recognition and rewards are for good work could be better. The CSDES responses in this `ield
showedthat71%agreethattheirjobperformance wasevaluatedfairlyandregularly. PSES(67%)
respondents said they receive useful and constructive feedback and suggestions. But in Ontario,
only51%ofOPSESrespondentssaidtheyreceivemeaningfulrecognitionforworkwelldone.
We asked if civil servants think thatthey are fairlypaid compared topeople doing similarwork
(CSDES.Q29):77%ofthePEPrespondentssaidyesthisis20%higherthantheMPArespondents
(57%).
Certainty about career options affects career optimism, and among respondents, prospects for
promotion and professional development are available. In total, 85% of CSDES respondentssaid
theiremployerprovidedthemwithopportunitiestolearnandgrowinthepastyear.However,only
55%ofPSESrespondersbelievethattheyhaveopportunitiesforpromotion(PSES.Q23)withinthe

80

Ibid,P79.

FederalPublicService, andthisnumberdrops to 47%in the OPSwith23%neitheragreeing or

disagreeing(OPS.Q70).
Adaptabilityiscrucialforanorganizationtosucceed,butonly44%ofCSDESrespondentssaidtheir
organizations are wellequipped toplan forfuture change (CSDES Q.44). PSES respondentswere
more optimistic, with 61% believing that their work unittakes time out to rethink its business
processes, but only33% of OPSES respondents think theirorganizationsare prepared to handle
change.
One of the 45% of CSDES respondentswho believe theirorganization is stagnant explained the
problem.

Publicservice can onlychangeiftheemphasisisplacedon the publicandwhatweare

there todo, whichisserve the public andputthepublic Birst. Theculture thatexistsis
more one oflooking outfor yourselforyour job,andlookingat what the nextperson
hasthatyoudidnotgetlookinginvs.lookingout.
Evenif organizationsareprepared fortransformations, theirwilltodosoisquestionable. Overall,
resultsof theCSDES surveyshowthattenuredmunicipalemployeesshowthemostcon`idencein
the change processwith50%agreeing thatitis managed well(CSDES.Q44).FiftypercentofMPA
respondentssaidthattheirorganizationsare nottransparentoropentochange,contrarily,75%of
PEPrespondentsthinkthattheiragency/departmentistransparentandopentochange.

On accountability design
While 75% ofallCSDES respondents indicated thattheyknowwhatis expectedof them because
accountabilitiesarewellde`inedonly52%overallthinkthattherightfactorsarebeingmeasured.
The overall rate of CSDES respondents with personal experience working with politicians
(minister/mayors)andtheirstaff ishigh(92%) and theyunderstandthedifferencebetweentheir
role and therolesofpolitical staffers(CSDES.Q5), butinterestingly66%ofallCSDES respondents
do not feel that they have been adequately trained for the added demands that working with
partisanof`icesbrings.TheCSDESresultsclearlyindicatethatemployeesfeelvulnerabletopolitical
pressures,whichtheybelieveareundermining management. Thisisre`lected inthefactthat51%
ofallCSDESrespondentsindicatethattheirorganizationisNOT freefromundue partisanpolitical
interference(CSDES.Q48).Strawexpoundsonthesechallenges:

The civil service Binds itself serving ministers and sometimes regulating them; it is
impartial and yet also accountable to those ministers. Discharging these often
conBlictingrolessuccessfullyinparallelisnotpossible.81
CSDES demonstrates that public servants want to be engaged in policy decisions. Respondents
indicate that the development of communication policy and `inancial policy should be shared
equallywithpoliticians.TheOntariorespondentsare veryadamantthatthe valuesand objectives
81

Straw,(2004).P9.

34

Closing the Implementation Gap

of policybesharedtheirfederal and municipalcounterpartsarelessconvinced of this. Itsvery

apparentthatfederal and provincialcivilservantsfeel stronglythattheyshouldbe implementing
policy.Theirtenuredmunicipalcounterpartsaresplitonthismatter.
Worriesor concerns about relationswith Ministersof`ices are notcon`ined toCanada. The CSD
also surveyed civil servants in Hong Kong and 88% of that sample indicate that they had not
received adequatetraining to deal withthe demandsofthenewlyestablished ministers of`icesin
theGovernmentofHongKong.

SeniorPublicServantsrespondtoCSDSurvey
HongKong
82.8%understandthedifference
betweentheirroleandtherolesof
exemptpoliticalstaffof`icersfor
theCEandPrincipalOf`icials
88%indicatethattheyhaveNOT
receivedadequatetrainingtodeal
withthedemands

Canada
87.1%understandthedifference
betweentheirroleandtherolesof
exemptpoliticalstaffinthe
Ministersof`ices.
54.2%indicatethattheyhaveNOT
receivedadequatetrainingtodeal
withthedemands

MPArespondentsweighinonpublicserviceandpartisanrelationships82:
48%MPArespondentshave personalexperience dealing withpoliticiansand theirstaff (31%
Federal.35%Ontario.15%Municipal.19%Other)
60%feelthattheydoNOThaveadequate trainingtodealwiththe addeddemandsofworking
withpoliticalstaffers.
39%thinkthattheorganizationthattheyworkforisfreefromunduepoliticalexperience.
1%indicatesthatpolitical(exempt)staffersareALWAYScapableandtrainedeffectivelytoful`ill
theresponsibilitiesgiventothem

(Mosttimes:44%,Seldom:53%).
2%feelthatpoliticalstaffisALWAYScooperativeandeasytoworkwith

(Mosttimes:64%,Seldom:34%).
57% indicate that political staff should NOT be involved in details of the work of the public
service(Shouldbe:32%;Noopinion:11%).

82

CSDESQ.49,6,48,55,56,57,58,5155.

90%thinkthatthepublicserviceshouldhavethemajorresponsibilityforimplementingpolicy.
50% indicate that responsibilities for values and objectives of public policy, development of
`inancial policy, and of communication policies for government, should be shared equally
betweenpoliticiansandthepublicservice.

Common themes
TheCSDES wasdesigned togarnerthoughtful responsesaboutworking in thepublic service. The
relative consistencyof its responsesrepresenting the mean between those of the PSES and OPS
surveyssuggeststhatitdemonstratesafairlygoodunderstandingofthecurrentsituation.
WhileanswerstotheCSDsurveyprovidedbyOPSES respondentsindicatedissatisfactioninlevelof
engagement of senior leadership regarding employee wellbeing (less than 50% agreeing that
senior leadership is genuinely interested in the wellbeing of employees (OPSES.Q59)).
Overwhelmingly (90%), Ontario respondents to CSDES feel that their opinions seem to count
(CSDES.Q37).However, OPSES data revealsthatbarely50%thinkthatthe ministryisonthe right
trackregardingplanning forthefuture(OPSES.Q34),lessthan30%oftheserespondentsindicated
con`idence thatresults from the 2009 employee surveywillbe addressedand only21%indicate
thattheyareawarethatactionwastakenontheconcernsexpressedinthe2007survey.83
Contrarily, only 15% of tenured Federal respondents strongly agree that theiropinion seems to
countsthisisa75pointspreadbetweenfederalandOntariorespondents(CSDES.Q37),yetthe
majority of PSES respondents feel respected, as indicated in the table below (PSES.Q87).
Interestingly, only 54% state that they have con`idence in the senior management of their
departmentoragency(PSES.Q52). Thiscould bethe resultof 35%of thethese employeeshaving
had three differentsupervisors in theircurrent job in the pastthree yearsthats almost58,000
Federal Public Servants. The productivity and engagement implications are immense especially
consideringthesigni`icanceofinterpersonalrelationshipwithonesbosshavingfourtimesgreater
impactononesdiscretionaryworkeffortthanotherfactorssuchaspay.84
Theresultsofallthesurveyspresentapublicservicethatisfarfromcon`identinitsfuturesuccess.
The verbatim anecdotesdrawn fromthe CSD surveys reveal con`licted feelings abouttheirwork,
andfrustrationwithtoomuchchange(managementshuf`ling)ononehand,andstagnation onthe
other(lackof creativity;norisktaking;accountabilityrestrictions).These frustrationsare tipping
thebalanceawayfromcareersinpublicadministration:AlmosthalfofCSDrespondentshave given
seriousthoughttoleavingthepublicservice.Reportsone:

83
84

IpsosReid/OPS,(2009),P20.
Gibbons(2006)P8.

36

Closing the Implementation Gap

The majority of the six and a half years I spent in the public service were very
frustrating.IworkedinBivedifferentdepartmentsandtheoverallmentalitywasalways
the same, which is we do it this way because weve always done it this way. Each
process is cumbersome and complex due to the multiple regulations in the name of
transparency. Managers are given signing authority and accountability under the
Financial Administration Act without training. New employees are usually not given
anyorientationto the work.JobpostingsdonotreBlectthe realityofthe situation.And
the reward, recognition, and consequences of either good or bad behaviour is non
existent. After six and a halfyears, I did not have even one performance assessment.
Therewasnoexitinterview. Iworkinthe privatesectorwith noovertime,more hours
thanIeverdidinthepublicsectorandIcanhonestlysaythatIdnevergoback.Iamso
happy where Iam in the private sector because the opportunitieshere are based on
merit, not length of service. Good work isrecognized. And poor performance is dealt
with.
Of the 24%of all MPA respondentswhohaveleftthe public service, nearlyhalf nowwork inthe
private sector, with most of the rest working fornongovernment organizations. More than 30%
indicatedthattheirreasonforleavingthe publicservicewasthattheirexpectationswerenotmet.
Whynot?
Simplyput, thepublic serviceof todayisnotoperating toitspotential. The surveydatareinforces
CSDs argument that its three main areas of concerncapacityand performance, attracting and
retaining employees, and improving accountability designall need improvements if it is to
functionef`icientlyin 21stcenturyCanada. Canadaspublicservice needs arevisedaccountability
structure. It also needs mechanisms to facilitate betteroverall performance. Both of these areas
havereceivedsigni`icantattentionfrompolicymakersandanalysts.Reformsare inthe works,and
should indeedhelp to make public service better. Of equal concern is recruiting a strong base of
dedicated employees. Since a vibrant workforce will power performance improvements and
accountabilityreforms,creatingoneshouldbeatoppriorityofallpublicsectorstakeholders.

Section two: The path to reform

Capacity and performance improvements
TheCanadianpublicservicesproblemsimposing accountabilitysuggeststructural `lawswiththe
system underwhich employeesmust perform.The current designrestson a tugofwarbetween
politicalandadministrativeneeds,withnoclearmechanismtooverseethestruggle. Strawcallsto
attentiontheinef`icacyofsuchasystem:

Ministersareaccountabletotheelectorateforthedeliveryandyetthemselvesappoint
almostno oneto oversee it.Imaginebecoming chiefexecutive ofa large organization
and being told that the entire management isindependent, that you have no control
overtheirmajorleversofmotivationrecruitment,promotion, andrewardandthey

operateasaseparateorganizationwithamindofitsown.Modernorganizationsdonot
andcannotworklikethat.Neithercangovernment.85
Tingreportsthattheabsenceofmarketinformationandthein`luenceofexternalforcesgivepublic
organizations the reputation of having multiple and even con`licting goals. The resulting clashes
and complexities make organizational performance expectations ambiguous, and appear to
increase formalprocedural limitationsonemployee actionand compensation. In otherwordsits
easier to constrain employees from doing anything wrong than to motivate them todo something
right.86
Similarthemesemergefromthethreesurveys.Employeeshavestrongconcernswithmanagement
intheiragencieslookno furtherthantheskepticismaboutthegrievanceregistering processfor
proof.Theywantde`inedresponsibilities.Theyfeelvulnerable tothepoliticalpressuresthatseem
tobeundermining management. Theywanttostreamlineactivitiesto maximizeef`iciencies.They
wantfairnessandbetter communications. They value crossdepartmentalwork. Theywanttobe
empoweredandrewardedforgoodperformance.
This level of dissatisfaction is collaborated by work done by Peter Larson and David Zussman.
Between May and September of 2006, the two researchers interviewed twenty people who had
joinedthefederalpublicservicemidcareerfromotherareastheprivatesector,voluntaryornot
forpro`itorganizations, and provincial governments, to re`lect onthe move to the federal public
service and their observations on the management culture.87 Overall, it is not a happy story.
Althoughmanywereenergizedbythe challengeofthepublicservice,thepublicservicecadrethey
joined seems traumatized, at least, to judge them from their observations. Obviously, there are
signi`icant limitations to such a small studyand these should not be minimized, but it also
presents importantinsightsaboutthe main barriers preventing the modern public service from
thriving.
Most of Larson and Zussmans interviewees found the federal public service to be an exclusive
entity, ora priesthood, wherein senior of`icials have longstanding alliances and networks with
one another. Thisregime isso focused onissues of equity, entitlement, and fairnessthat itoften
ignorescommonsenseandgoodmanagement.Managersseemunconcernedwithrealoutcomes,
preferringinsteadtoavoidproblemsbyrelyingonrules.Hierarchyandprocessarecharacteristicof
all large organizationscertainly all governmentsbut these elements of organizational design
can, and do, impede the free `low of information while slowing down and impairing decision
making.Asaresult,itcanbeespeciallydif`iculttogetthingsdone,evencomparativelysimpletasks
that should not occupymanyresources. Issues of management, especially`inancial management,
are therefore given secondary status. Likewise, interviewees said that human resources
departments are more separate entities interested in applying rules than instruments to help
deputyministers(orassistantdeputyministers)dothetaskssetoutbytheminister.

85

Ibid, P19.
WhortonandWorthley,(1981).35761.
87 LarsonandZussman.(2006).P4
86

38

Closing the Implementation Gap

Asitwaswith accountabilityreform, effective leadership is alsoin shortsupply. Evert Lindquist

(2006) suggests that a motivated and empowered group of public sectorleaders is necessaryto
effectively undertake public sector reform.88 Unfortunately, a surveyof 400 public and private
executivesdoneforthe PublicPolicyForum(responserate:47%frompublicservantrespondents,
19% from private sectorrespondents)89 found thatprivate sectorrespondents were much more
positive about their leadership than their public sector colleagues. Furthermore, in the public
sector,leaderswhoinnovatetendnottoberewardedwithadvancement.

What do they do to a good deputy? one respondent shared, They move youif
youre hugelysuccessfulanddoagreatjobofrunning yourdepartmentyou run the
riskofbeingmovedtoanevenmoremessedupdepartmentuntilyouburnout.90
Then there are the effects of the New Public Management (NPM) approach. A product of the
ThatcherReaganMulroneyera,NPMdictatesthat, inOsborneandGaeblerswords,governanceis
steering and administration is rowing.91 This orthodoxy creates divisions between the two
streams, andplacesmoreemphasisonresultsthansimplecompliancewithprocess.Ithasbecome
afundamentalcomponentofmanyWesterndemocracies.
NPMdoesnotnecessarilyjivewithcurrentchallengesfacingtheCanadiangovernmentanda wide
body of literature supports this divergence. Lindquist questions how valuable resultsbased
accountability tools can be in a context of budget cuts, organizational downsizing and federal
restructuring.92DwivediandGowarguethatNPMhasnegativeeffectsonemployeemotivationand
institutionalmemory,93 and italso shortenstenures. Underthissystem, C.E.S.Franksarguesthat
deputyministersnolongerspendenoughtimeintheirdepartmenttobecomeestablished.Between
1984 and2004,he pointsout, Canada hadsix Clerksof thePrivyCouncil, seven Secretariesofthe
TreasuryBoard, seven deputyministersof `inance, and twelve deputyministersof industry. With
such astonishingly short periods of time on the job, inef`iciencies abound. As Franks says, a
privatebusinesscouldnotbemanagedproperlywithaseniormanagementturnoverlikethat.94 In
a discussionpapercalledCanadasPublicServiceinthe21stCentury,itiswritten thatsuchhigh
turnover at senior levels makes it dif`icult to implement government priorities, like outcomes
based management. With most deputiesnot expecting to be in theircurrentjobs for more than
eighteenmonths,theydonothavenearlyenoughtimetodevelopasenseofdirection,`indtheright
people, secure the funds, build relations with clients, and create the collaborative work
environmentneededtobuildateamandsustaindirection.95Thismaybeadeliberatecheckagainst
upperlevel complacency as Moshe Maor suggests: the more authority and discretion public

88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

Lindquist,(2006).
LarsonandZussman,(2006).
May,TheOttawaCitizen,3October2006.
GaeblerandOsborne,(1992).
Lindquist,(1996).
DwivediandGow,(1999).P144.
Franks,(2004),P50.
Green,Baird,Fawke,(2007).P11.

managersaregiventomanageprograms,thelesssecurepoliticalexecutiveswantthemtobe.96 But
in practical terms, asJacques Bourgaultstates, thisreduction in position tenure createsproblems
for retention, recruitment, continuity, and the preservation of corporate or organizational
institutionalmemory.97
Unsurprisingly,NPMalsopresentsproblemsinadvancingemployeesinternallyatalllevels,notjust
deputyministersandassistantdeputyministers.DwivediandGow`indthattheemergenceofNPM
inCanadianpublicadministrationhasshiftedthedynamicsoftheworkplace,withasmallnumber
of broadly de`ined classes of clerks and special of`icers displaced by an extremely detailed and
speci`icidenti`icationofdifferentjobswithinthepublicservice.Becauseofthis,experiencedpublic
servantsare unable to be promoted in an orderlyfashion, andnormal personnel have veryshort
careerladdersbecausetheyarehiredto`illveryspeci`icpositions.
Themodesteffectivenessoftheseeffortsataccountabilityreformsandperformanceimprovements
suggeststhatsomethingisawry.Someindustryexpertshaveindicatedthattherehasperhapsbeen
too much emphasis on accountability as a cureall.98 Framing governmentaround accountability
sends the message that public servants should be primarily concerned with looking out for
themselves. This is an ineffective frame for shaping the public service. The context and focus is
entirelynegative.Furthermore,theamountofbureaucraticredtapethatisinvolved inthesetypes
ofreformsisnotconducivetopromoting theintendedchanges. Thisdoesnothavetobe thecase.
With proper evaluation and communication, there is an opportunity to show employees the
positiveeffectsofanopenandaccountablestructure.
Green et al, suggests two considerations to help move the performance of the Canadian public
service closertowardthatofanideal state. The`irstisacknowledgingthataheavilycentralized
and controlled decisionmaking structure is antithetical to an emerging decentralized and
horizontal environment in which power, resources, and information are widely distributed. The
second is that rigid hierarchical and prescriptive accountability mechanisms do not provide the
`lexibilitytodeveloppolicyand toadjustservicedeliverytomeetchanging circumstancesorlocal
realities.99
Anyeffortsatreforming theperformance of the Canadian federal public service mustrightthese
wrongs. This means opening the closedshop personal networks of the priesthood, building
more dynamic human resource capabilities, creating more effective leaders, and managing the
effectsoftheNPMphilosophy.

Attracting and retaining quality employees

Asimportantasaccountabilityand performanceimprovementsare, when itcomestoboostingthe
public services capacity, staf`ing is the `inal frontier. In one wayor another, all the surveys and
literature previously cited touch upon a need to advance current methods of attracting good
96

MosheMaor,(1999).P59.
JacquesBourgault,(2003).P8.
98 SeeAppendixTwo.
99 Green,BairdandFawkes.(2007),P21.
97

40

Closing the Implementation Gap

workers to the public serviceand keeping them there. A healthy, vibrant, stimulated public
workforce will strengthen efforts to improve accountability structures and bureaucratic
performance. Therefore,goingforward,developingastronglabourpoolwillbemostcrucialtothe
successofthepublicservice.
Thisiseasiersaidthandone.Theyoungworkersoftodayhavemanyuniquecharacteristicsthatdo
not necessarily conform to traditional employment standards. They tend to avoid building their
careersaroundspeci`icareasofpersonalexpertise,astheirpredecessorswerewonttodo.Theydo
notwantnorexpecttostartatanentryleveljob;furthermore,theywantthe freedom tomove
andchange positionsregularly. Theysee longevityand securityas lessimportant than challenge
and variety. Theyare described aspossessing unreasonably high expectations forcompensation,
perks, andworkrelatedresponsibilities.100 Forbetterorforworse,however,theyarethe futureof
thepublicworkforce.
There are severalstructuralelements in currentpublicsector staf`ing methodsthat preclude the
effective recruitmentand retention of this new generationmanyemerging from the analysisof
employee surveys. First, the public service has something of a bad rap.Respondentsfeltthatthe
goodenoughfor governmentwork attitudethatis, thatpublic servantscoastalong aninevitable
career path without much effort or investment, underminesthe reputation of the public service.
Thelowmorale permeating manydepartmentsdoesnothelp,nordoesthe conception thatpublic
workisriskaverse andsti`ling.Isthere anythingaboutthisscenariothatwouldbeappealing toa
smart,ambitious,con`ident,youngrecruit?
Second,there are problemswiththerecruitingprocessitself.Budgetcutsandrestructuringefforts
havemaderecruitmentand human resource planning alowpriority, oftenconductedbyreluctant
oruntrainedpersonnel.
Third,governmentstendtooverpromiseaboutthenatureofthepositionstheyhavetooffer.Once
employees are hired, the reality of the job seldom lives up to the hype: only 10% of MPA
respondents strongly agree that the job posting that they responded to accurately re`lects the
positiontheynowhold.
Again, literature supports the existence of these problems. Back in a 1997 report to the Prime
Minister, PrivyCouncilOf`ice of`icial Jocelyne Bourgon usedthe term quietcrisis todescribethe
inabilityofthepublicservicetoattractandkeepworkerssomethingshethenattributedtoyears
of downsizing, pay freezes, criticism, insuf`icient recruitment, and the departure of experienced
public servants.101 Ten yearslater,the cultural shape of the civilservice appearstohave changed
little.Studiesofthepublicservicedone in2006byLinda Duxburyof CarletonUniversityreported
thataboutathirdofpublicserviceworkersarenotcontent:

Theyre stressed and overworked, cant balance family with their jobs, feel trapped
with fewcareer options, andhave little trust forsenior management.She wenton to
100

101

M.Irvine, (2005), P2.

Canada. Government of Canada Privy Council Office, (1998).

saythat bad management is eroding the quality of public servants work, with more
than40%ofthoseshesurveyedcomplainingabouthavingtodothesameormorework
with fewer resources,alack oforganizational stability, constantlychangingpriorities,
andtoomanyapprovalstagesfordecisions.102
These recruitment inadequacies result in fewer people opting to join the public service. This is
causing a big demographicshift, and the average age of publicservice employeesis rising.103 By
someestimates,theaverageageintodaysworkforceisfortysevensevenyearshigherthanitwas
in 1980meaning thatretirementwilldepletethe workforcesigni`icantlyin the coming years.104
Withmorethan half of thecore publicadministrationemployeesagedforty`ive andover, there is
anincreasedriskoflosingnecessaryknowledgeandexpertisepertinenttotheneweconomy.
To attract fresh bodies, some recruiters have had to entice young applicants with job
responsibilities and bene`itssuch as international assignments and job rotationthat have
traditionally been accessible onlytothose atthe highestlevelsof the organizationalhierarchy.105
Some management scholars have theorized that thismaybe changing the psychological contract
between employers and employees, with new hires increasingly negotiating special work
arrangements, expecting unrealistic perks, and exhibiting low levels of job satisfaction and
commitment.106
But aside from bribery, what can the Canadian public service do to make itself an attractive
employer for creative, publicly spirited individuals from diverse backgrounds? Nothing suggests
changequite like cleaning house.InTheDeadGeneralist,Strawarguesthatthe biggestandfastest
route toreformliesinchanging peoplein getting rid oforrelocating unproductive workersand
bringing in managersand staff with the right experience, education, and motivation to dothings
very differently. His solution is radical: a ratio of 70 freshers (new employees) to 30
lifers(veteranemployees),implementedoveronlyafewyears.107
Not all solutions are quite so dramatic. Recently, much attention has been given to the under
utilization and underrepresentation of skilled immigrant workers in the Canadian workplace.
Recruiting newCanadianworkersmay be onestrategybywhichthe Canadianpublicservice can
addressimpending labourshortages while bringing in freshperspectivesabout howgovernment
runs. However,there isworktobedonebeforethiscanhappen.Severalyoungpeopleeagertojoin

102

L.Duxbury,(2007).
Statistics Canada says that within the core public administration (that is, federal government employees excluding the RCMP, the
Canadian Forces andseparateagenciesliketheCanada Revenue Agency),morethan52%of workerswere overtheage of45in2006up
from under40%in1995. At the same time, the proportionof employed Canadiansaged45 andover increased from almost 30%tojust
under 39% The gap between the two groups in 2006 indicates that the public service workforce is much older than the workforce in
general.http://www.statcan.gc.ca/dailyquotidien/070305/dq070305aeng.htm
104 OLeary,Lindholm,Whitford,(2002).P325340.
105 Rushowsky,(2007).PID5.
106 J.M.Twenge,(2006).
107 Straw,(2004).P49.
103

42

Closing the Implementation Gap

thefederalpublicservice,shared theirfrustration ofcoming upagainstemployment barriers due to

their citizenship, even though they possess Canadian credentials108.
Organizations may also `ind it bene`icial to modify their work arrangements to attract non
traditional(read:contingent) employees. Forexample,offering greater`lexibilityabout when and
whereworkiscompletedmaynotonlyincreasetheapplicantpool,butsignaltoapplicantsthatthe
governmentoffersprogressivehumanresourcespractices.
Earlyindoctrinationof young people has proven toalso payoff.Internshipprogramsatall levels
expose young people to the government organism and how it works. Interns who return to
academic life are thoughtlikely to impart the importance of public work to theirpeers. If their
experienceswerepositive,thislogicgoes,theywilltelltheirstories.
There isvalue,inthisinstance,inlookingtorecruitmentimprovementeffortsin similarcountries;
namely, Australia, the UK and New Zealand. These nations share much common ground with
Canada:alluse the samelanguageandoperate usingthesamebasicgovernmentdesign.Moreover,
since 1975, all three have reformed the way their respective governments conduct business,
ultimatelychangingthestructure,expectations,andfutureofseveralinstitutions.
In Australia, afterpreviousefforts at recruitmentproved inef`icient, public of`icialshave made a
priorityof recruitingindividualsfromgraduateprogramsandplacingeachinaworkenvironment
thatpromotesdevelopment, continuing education,andindividualcareerspeci`icgoals. In Britain,
reforms inthisareawhile relativelymodestincludespeci`ictargetstomake governmentmore
representative of women, ethnic minorities, and people with disabilities. One such goal, for
example, involves`illing 25%of the top600positionsinthe publicservicewithfemale candidates.
TheBritishgovernmenthadalsotakenstepstowardoffprivate sectorpoachingthroughatraining
program called Investors in People. At `irst glance, New Zealand is on par with Canada: its
governmenthastakena modestapproachtoattracting recentgraduates,with fewcomprehensive
programsotherthan careerfairs, internships, developmentprogramsandthe like toaddressthe
issue.Still,NewZealandhasdeveloped some programsthathave attractedemployeesdespite not
being created for that purpose. These include equal employment opportunity programs and a
meritbasedsystemofemploymentthatgivesconsistencytohiringprocesses.Anothersuccessful
and perhaps unplannedway New Zealand has bolstered its public service has been through
welcomingolderindividualsbacktotheworkforceafterabolishingitsmandatoryretirementagein
1999.
SowhatcanCanada learnfromthesereforms?Alot.ManyplansforpublicsectorreforminCanada
namely, the Federal Accountability Actdo not fully address the human resource needs that
someofourmostcomparableinternationalcontemporarieshave.Thatisnottosaynothingisbeing
done. There is evidence that government policymakers are seeing the bene`it of recruitment
strategies. In 2007, the Prime Ministerial Advisory Committee on the Public Service, cochaired by

108

Roundtable discussions at Indian Diaspora Meeting, April 23, 2009, Ottawa, hosted by CSD, sponsored by Walter Duncan Gordon
Foundation

Paul Tellier and Don Mazankowski, outlined plans to rebrand the public service as an exciting,
meaningful place to work. It also announced mediumterm action plans to improve human
resources:planning,recruitment,andemployeedevelopment.Mostimportantly,itcalled attention
to the importance of implementing action plans for real changes rather than making future
diagnosticevaluations. Alsoin2007, the14thannualClerks ReportonthePublicServicestargeted
its efforts at revamping its human resources strategy. In fact, the Privy Council Of`ice (PCO) is
requiringeverydepartmentandagencytocreatea newhuman resourcesplanfortheirrespective
organizations.Additionally,adeputyministerscommitteeonpublicservicerenewalthatformedin
2006 is also planning reforms. The committees work is currently being kept secret since it
constitutes advice to Cabinet, but its agenda is to improve leadership, development, and people
managementwithintheservice.

The steps to recruitment

There are anumberof practicalrecruitmentstepsthe publicservicecan take toconvince dynamic
young workerstojoin,manyofwhicharedetailedinAppendix3.OnbehalfoftheCSD,GlendaFisk
andAmieSkattebohavecreated ablueprintfortheCanadiancivilservicetobulkupitsworkforce
usingboth.Informedbythefeedbackreceivedbyseniormanagersandyoungrecruitsontheformal
and informal recruitment methods outlined in Appendix 3, and their personal experiences, we
suggestthatthefollowing:
Groundrecruitmentin organizationrelatedrequirements,butunderstandtherealitythat
manynewexternalrecruits,aswellasthelowerechelonsofinternalcandidates,arebeing
hiredasinternallymobilepublicservants. The hiring processesofindividualdepartments
need to take this into account. Somehow they must not be unnecessarily narrow, or
excessivelyfocusedonthespeci`icpositionstheyarehiringfor,whilemaintainingclarityin
thedescriptionofthenatureofthepositionbeing`illed.
Make careeroptionsinthe civil service more visible toCanadiansbyvaryingthe sources
throughwhichemployeesareattractedtotheorganization.
Investinmodernizingtheimageandpracticeofhumanresourcesmanagement.
Ensure balance between internallyclosed recruitmentand competitions open externally
withappropriatecriteriaforcreatingthatbalance.
Provide bettertraining to recruiters, those facilitating informationsessionsandforthose
whoconducttheformalselectionprocess
Maximizetheprimacyeffectreduceinterviewjobofferlagtimes.
Berealistic(butnottoorealistic).
Highlighttheintangiblebene`itsofwork,emphasizingtheworldofopportunityitopensup
regarding job prospects and variety of career paths in a way that few private sector
organizationscan.
De`inethefaceofthepublicserviceandbeintentionalinachievingtheideal.

44

Closing the Implementation Gap

Use the considerable clout afforded to Canadian public service by its sheer numbersto
ensurethatschoolsofpublicadministrationarepreparingstudentsforexcellenceinpublic
serviceasaprofession(leadership;ethics;communicationskills).

The steps to retention

Recruitmentisonlypart of creating a productive workforce. Equalcare shouldbe given toissues
surrounding employee retention and ensuring that the bene`its associated with effective
recruitmentpracticesrealize longterm gains.Thatis, effortsshouldbe made to ensure thatonce
recruited and hired, top candidates remain with the civil service, motivated by opportunities to
growandmakeadifferenceinCanada.
Ithelpstolooktowhypeopleareinitiallyattractedtoworkinpublicservice.Formanyitisbecause
theyare stronglymotivated by a desire to make a differencetobecome involved in interesting
policydevelopmentsandtobe empowered to affectoutcomes. Somuchof cultivating thisin new
hirescomesdowntomanagement.
Ina1998studyoncareerdevelopmentinthepublicservice,Duxbury,Dyke,andLamevaluatedthe
humanresources bestpracticesof leading publicsectorcompaniestodraftrecommendationsfor
thepublicservice. Employeesatisfactioncomesdown,theyfound, togoodmanagement. There is
almost uniform consensus that perhaps the most importantfactor contributing tothe successof
any career management and career development system is top management commitment and
support,theywrite.Withoutthedrivingforce fromtheverytop,thebestprocessesandtoolswill
not work or provide the bene`its they are capable of delivering.109 Furthermore, investing
resources:money,time,andtechnology,relaystoemployeesthatcareerdevelopmentisa priority,
andthattheyarevalued.
Ongoing educationwhether through formal training or, increasingly, through mentorship
programsis a big draw for new hires. In 2004, the Treasury Board of Canada released a plan
calling to enhance the role of the thennew Canada School of Public Service in the design and
deliveryof training. Thiswasintendedtoestablisha core learning curriculumforpublic servants
from entry level through successive responsibilities. It also called for certi`ication standards for
publicservicemanagers,specializedprogramsforadvanced`inancialmanagement(aswellasother
core managementfunctionslike internal audit)andmodern,timely,enterprisewide`inancialand
humanresourceinformationsystemstotrackallspendingandprovidethe righttoolsforeffective
scrutinyanddecisionmaking.110
The Ontario Public Service is similarly engaged in promoting mentoring programs and was
recognized asone ofCanada'sbestdiversityemployersforone sucheffort. In 2009, thirtydeputy
ministerspartneredwitheightysevenQueen'sParkemployeesina yearlongdiversitymentorship
program. The program aims to help "underrepresented" employees who are visible minorities,
disabled,aboriginal,LGBTorfrancophoneimprovetheiraccesstotraining,careercounsellingand
109
110

Duxbury,Dyke,Lam.(1998).
Canada.TreasuryBoardofCanada.P26.

networking.111 Another program has been created by a senior analyst in accounting policy and
`inancialreporting,ThomasChong.MrChongreceiveda2009AmethystAward112 forestablishinga
Virtual Group Mentoring Program to improve the selfcon`idence and selfesteem of minority
groupsandenhancingservicedeliverytoOntarians.
Asa recentnationwideprojectshows, such effortsfactorintooverallemployee engagement.The
Employee Engagement Interjurisdictional Team (EEIT) made up of eight Canadian jurisdictions
(British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario, Nova Scotia, Yukon Territories, the Northwest
Territories, and thefederalgovernment) hasdevelopeda comprehensive strategytomeasure and
facilitateemployee engagement,tobeappliedtoemployeesurveysinalljurisdictions.Theresultis
amodelreferredtoastheDoubleE.Ononesideofthemodelisalistoffactorsthataffectemployee
engagement: coworker relationships, worklife balance, quality of leadership, opportunities for
growthand advancement. Ontheothersideisalistof howthesefactorstranslateintoinvigorated
and involved employees: they make workers satis`ied with overall employment, more willing to
positivelyrecommendtheorganization,andmorelikelytoremainwiththe organization.Ifthetwo
Es are in place, workers tend toachieve government goalsand better levels of organizational
performance. Thiscorroboratesresearchdone in2005byDevelopmentDimensionsInternational
Inc.,whichstates,solidandconclusiveevidencefromdozensofstudiesshowsthatorganizations
withahigherpercentageofhighlyengagedemployeesoutperformothersintheirindustries.113
Bynurturing and facilitating the factorsthatengage employees, the publicservice stands amuch
betterchanceofholdingontothetalentitrecruits.

Accountability design
RecentgovernmentscandalssuggestthattheCanadianpublicservicewouldbene`itfroma better
accountabilitystructure. Thismeans,in simpleterms, ensuringthatthe publicservice isopenand
clearabout its obligations and responsibilities to itself and with Parliament. In a parliamentary
democracy, the reasons forthis are fairly obvious. Oursis a system of responsible government,
writes C.E.S. Franks, and constitutionally someone must be responsible and accountable to
Parliamentforwhatthegovernmentdoesandfailstodo.114 Publicservantsshouldhavetoanswer
totheirowninternal colleagues,Parliament,the media,andtheCanadianpublic. Of thistherehas
beenmuchwritten.
OneoftheauthorsofthisstudyarguethattheissueshighlightedbytheGomeryCommission,reveal
the absence of anynotionof responsibilityfromthose inhighpositions, and thatsenior public
111BillTaylor,,Canoe trip withministerripples acrossthe ranks. Mentorshipprogram offeredlive lessonson the conversationscrucialto

decisionmaking,TorontoStar19October2009.http://www.thestar.com/Business/article/589620
112The AmethystAwardsprogram wascreatedin1992 torecognizeexcellenceinthe OntarioPublicService (OPS).Anyindividual, group
or partnershipin the OPS can be nominated. Recipients are selected based onexceptional work inthe areas of client service, innovation,
leadership, professional achievement, building a diverse organization, championing learning and working horizontally across
government.Source:http://www.news.ontario.ca/mgs/en/2009/06/amethystawards2009recipients.html
113 DevelopmentDimensionsInternational,Inc,2005.
114 C.E.S.Franks,(2004).P64.

46

Closing the Implementation Gap

of`icialsignored several internalcomplaintsaboutirregularities, and thatpolitical staff involved

themselvesinpolicyimplementation.The crisisisoftwokinds:moralandstructural.Morallywe
havearetreatfromresponsibility,andthe restorationoftheethicalbasemustbe apriority, while
structurally we have allowed confusion to set in about the separate roles of public servants,
ministers,andtheirpersonalpoliticaladvisors.ThereforeCanadaneeds,torediscovertheethicof
responsibility which isfundamental to the integrityof democraticprocessesin the Westminster
modelofresponsiblegovernment.115
ScholarsofCanadiangovernment,aswellasanalystswithintheTreasuryBoard, have takengreat
interestin the accountabilityde`icitinCanadian government. There is agreement on the need to
reinvigorate the role of the PAC and to more precisely clarify the respective responsibilities of
ministers, deputyministers, and their exemptstaff. Concern has been expressed about the rapid
turnoverof membersof Parliamentvisvisthe executive aswellasturnoverofdeputyministers
within the publicservice. There is also the much larger issue of civic illiteracy that extends, to
some degree, to those whohold elected of`ice, including publicservants, as well as to those who
report or comment on politics and government in the media.116 The management of the public
service itself, its reform and optimal administrative style, has attracted attention for decades as
publicservicestheworldoverhave hadtoacclimatize tohorizontally,increasinglyintrusivepress
scrutiny, freedom of information acts, the effects of constitutions, and international trade
agreements.ThesepressuresarenotuniquetoCanada.
At the centre of this whirlwind of investigation and analysis lies the issue of accountability and
responsibility:theWhoisaccountabletowhomforwhat?questionwhichisthecornerstoneofthe
Westminster model of responsible government.117 In recent years, it is argued, what were once
broadly understood and widely shared conventions regulating accountability between ministers
and deputy ministers have come under pressure, atrophied, or been neglected with the
consequence that, asC.E.S. Franksobservesthat something isseriouslywrong with the waythe
principle of responsibility is construed and practised in Canada.118 While Frankss argument
certainlycarriesweight,itisalsoimportanttorecallthattherewasnogoldenageofaccountability
toParliament.AsAucoin,etal.,contend,

ThereisnoevidencetosupporttheviewthatParliamentonceperformeditsscrutinyor
accountabilityrolesigniBicantlybetterthan itdoestoday. Whatisdifferent,andon this
there is more agreement, is the capacity of the executiveparticularly a majority
government with a determined leadershipto limit the abilityof opposition MPsand
Parliamentary committees of scrutiny and audit to effectively hold ministers
accountable for the discharge of their responsibilities and the management of their
respectivedepartments.119

115

ThomasAxworthy,2005.P7.
Aucoin,Smith,andDinsdale,(2004).P15.
117 RobinSears,(2006).P1927.
118 C.E.S.Franks,(2004).P64.
119 Aucoin,Smith,andDinsdale,(2004).P30.
116

There have been several setsof recommendations for improvement. For instance, in their2005
researchpaperModernizingGovernmentAccountability:A FrameworkforReform,PeterAucoinand
MarkD. Jarvis`ind thateffective change could be as simple asmaking deputy ministers directly
and personally responsible and accountable to Parliament for statutory authorities assigned
explicitlyto them and for those delegated authoritiesthat are conferred directlyon them bythe
PublicServiceCommissionandtheTreasuryBoard.120 Perhapsthemostnotoriouscalltoreformis
Justice John Gomerysreportissuedinresponse toconcernsraised inthe 2003 AuditorGenerals
report. The sponsorship scandal reenergized longstanding issues in Canadian public
administration.Howisit,hisreportasks, thatpoliticiansandpublicservantsareabletoviolate
the public trust in such a `lagrant matter?121 Gomery points out several structural problems:
confusion over the nature of accountability and responsibility relationships within the public
service andbetweenthe public service and ministersof the Crown;a demoralizedpublicservice
unable or unwilling to preventmalfeasance; a legislative apparatusandin particular, the PAC
that is unable to perform the role intended for it by the Westminster model; a general lack of
transparencyaboutgovernmentspending;andreluctancebythepublicservicetocallattentionto
irregularities because of the increased concentration of political power in the Prime Ministers
Of`ice. Ihave become convinced thatwe need to rebalance the relationship between Parliament
andthegovernmentinordertoattainbetteraccountabilitywithingovernment,122 Gomerywrites.
To do so, he issued nineteen different suggestions for reform, split among four different types:
structural,normative/ethical,administrative,andresourceenhancements.
GomeryskeyrecommendationthattherelationshipbetweenParliamentandtheexecutivecanbe
rebalanced by improving accountability to Parliamentis based on several concerns. First, and
most obviously, the PAC is supposed to be the watchdog on the executive. However, given the
imbalance of resources available to the PAC compared to the government, and given the sheer
quantity of material that PAC members are expected to be on top of, and given the relative
inexperience of PAC members in relation togovernmentparticularly majoritygovernmentsina
secondtermitissimplyunreasonabletoexpectthatPACmemberswillbeabletoperformasthe
Westminster model intends. It should be noted that other standing committees of both houses
perform this role and both are hampered by the same list of factors than many commentators
attribute to committee ineffectiveness in performing their role in holding the government to
account.
Second, the current political climate can create intimidation among public servants. It is quite
possible, given that deputy ministers serve at the pleasure of the Prime Minister, to cultivate a
cultureofmanagingupthatis,managingonesdepartmentandtheexpectationsofseniorof`icials
in a way that does not offend the minister or prime ministerrather than managing down, or
running the department according topublicservice valuesof probity, economy, value for money
andethics.

120

AucoinandJarvis,(2005).P10.
Gomery,(2006).P198.
122 Ibid,P198.
121

48

Closing the Implementation Gap

Thisiswhereaccountabilitymattersandwhere,according toGomery,(Franks,etal., 2004)things

broke down: public servants who might otherwise have brought administrative irregularities to
light were constrained from doing so because the federal sponsorship program was viewed asa
priorityofapowerfulPrimeMinister;furthermore,thepublicwatchdogthePACwasinthedark
about the true purpose of the special reserves and what the Department of Public Works and
Government Services was spending those reserveson. Thus, a lack of transparencytransformed
intoreluctance among publicservantstospeaktruthtopowerinthe contextof lostaccountability
andresponsibility.
Still irate over being duped by the sponsorship program, the Canadian public paid Gomerys
`indings and recommendations a great deal of attention. Whatever their merit as harbingers of
change,123 there islittledoubtthathiscondemnationshavepromptedmuchinterestintheissueof
federal accountability, but the overall reform picture is much broader than Gomerys
recommendations.
TheGomeryreportwasboththeproductofpreviousaccountabilityreformsandtheinspirationfor
future ones. Other recommendations issued before and after Gomerys create a more
comprehensive blueprint for reform. Three series of recommendations are particularly relevant.
FirstisthePublicServiceModernizationAct(PSMA),whichwasannounced in2003andcameinto
full force at the end of 2005. Its overallthrustwasto make staf`ing processesfaster, fairer, and
more transparentforboth employeesandmanagers.124 Appropriately,of greatimportance inthe
PSMAis building strongerrelationshipsbetween employees, bargaining agents,human resources
advisors,andmanagerstheinadequaciesofwhich boremuchof theblameforthe failuresofthe
sponsorship scandal. The PSMA aimed to install within the federal public service greater
cooperation and consultation, andwas designed to modernize unfairlabourpracticesand install
morecomprehensivegrievanceprovisions.
ThesecondnotablesetofproposalscomesfromReg Alcock,PresidentoftheTreasuryBoardfrom
December 2003 to February 2006. In 2005, working fora Liberal minoritygovernmenttrying to
mitigatetheelectoralfalloutofthesponsorshipscandal,Alcockbroughtforwardonehundred`ifty
eight separate reforms for the public service. Produced without the bene`it of the `inal Gomery
recommendations, his reportneverthelessidenti`iedseveralcongruentissues. Itsmain proposals
sought a public service that operated bettermore accountably, effectively, ef`iciently, and
transparentlybutnotnecessarilyallthatdifferently.
Finally, a third setof reform recommendationsthe Harper governmentsFederal Accountability
Act (FAA)was drafted and put intolawafter Alcock and Gomerys recommendations, and was

123

The GomerycircusdidliveonTVwhatthe RCMPcouldhave done inprivate forafractionofthecostof thepublicinquiry.Andboth

approacheswould probablyhave generatedthesame results.But eventhoughthere is a greatdealofnationalpride inthe RCMP,there is
alsoconsiderable distrust of it when it comes topoliticallytainted issues.So Gomerywas not just aninquiry;it was more importantly
aboutglasnost.(Paquet,Gilles.2005.Gomeryasglasnost?LiteraryReviewofCanada,13(7),P12.
124 Canada.CanadaPublicServiceAgency,2003.

passed in December 2006.125 The FAA includes stringent rules between lobbyists and public
servants,aswellasa provisiondetailingtheinstallationofanaccounting of`icer.126 Itassumesthat
the realandpersistentproblemin Canadiangovernment and publicadministrationis corruption,
whichmustberootedoutandpunished.127
Aswelldesignedaseachofthefoursetsofrecommendationsmaybe initsown right, eachentails
veryrealproblemsofimplementation.Themiddling resultsofemployeesurveysreferencedabove,
particularlythose detailingchangemanagementskills,suggestthatinstallinga newaccountability
structure willnotbeeasy. Butwhyisthis?Whatmechanismswithinthepublicservice itselfand
itsrelationshipwithotherareasofgovernmentpreventitfromadoptingabetterwaytooperate?
Onceagain,thepublicservicesurveysshedsomelight.
According totherespondents,a rotating rosterofseniorstaff createsworkplace instability. Overa
third of federal PS employees reported thattheyhad three or more supervisors during the last
threeyears.Inevitably,a newmanagerbringschange, yet only19%ofMPArespondentsfeel that
changeismanaged well withintheirdepartment. Experienceandspecializedknowledge areoften
lostasseniormanagers are rotated from departmentto department. Employeesare ina constant
state of `lux as theyadjustto differentwork styles. Butitworksboth ways; employees mustbe
adaptableandopentochange.Astute managersare awarethatwithoutthewillingcommitmentof
staff, change will be stalled. Even with employee buyin, implementing new accountability
structures is no simple task in the context of quicklychanging governments. Straw sumsup the
politicalconundrumthatensues:

[T]he main central civil service which would be driving the change in any normal
organization isnot doing so. Newgovernmentsarrive and are immediatelydependent
on the civil service to enact their election commitments and to respond to events.
Reformtakesa distant place tothe pressuresofthe hereandnow.The politicalwillis
neversufBicient.Theoppositionofthedayhasalwaysseenmostadvantageindefending
the civil service fromgovernment politicizationrather than in backing reform to its
own longterm advantage. The shorttermism of our modern democracy stymies
reform.128

125

CSD researcher Kyle Toffan has done research to suggest that the government did not spend enough time deliberating on these
matters, asexamples in Australia, Britain, andNewZealand prove. The Gomery commissionrecommendsthat the government should
remove the provision in the law and its policies that enables exempt staff members to be appointed toa position inthe public service
without competitionafterhaving servedina ministers of`iceforthree years.Even though itisunclearwhat thespinoff repercussionsof
this implementation will be inthe future,the FederalAccountabilityAct includes this recommendation in itstext. Thiscouldpotentially
have large implicationsforthe qualityof staff that is available to ministers. Prior toreformsinBritain, Australia, and toa lesser extent,
New Zealand, a great dealof debate occurredpriorto government acceptance of recommendations. Many feelthat this needs tobe the
processinCanadaaswell.
126 Franks has questioned the accountability of`icer provision, claiming that, government has construed the powers of the accounting
of`icerand Parliament so narrowly that [he] questions whether the committee could do its job as watchdog of the public purse. (May,
Kathryn. 2007. MPs fear Conservatives trying to limit Parliaments powers, The Ottawa Citizen. 1 April 2007. At http://
www.canada.com/topics/news/politics/story.html?id=a4616425def04200a9a5af481b66a665&k=4087.)
127 Whetheror notthisprioritizationis accurate is opentointerpretationRobin Searshasargued, for example,that actualcorruption
is comparatively rare in Canada, and that endemic problems like political trickery and bureaucratic incompetence are bigger culprits.
(Sears2006,p.20.)
128 Straw,(2004).P16.

50

Closing the Implementation Gap

Furthermore,theCanadianpublicservicetendstobemyopicaboutaccountabilityreform,focusing
more on internal experiences and preferences instead of exploring options available elsewhere.
This is a problem Straw laments, using the British public service as an example of howlimited
connections with the outside world and with one another can create problems. In his view, the
British public service would be much better served by looking to professional institutions,
conferences,seminars,tradejournals,andtimespentonthe groundwithconsumersandfrontline
staff forperspective.129 Are Canadian civil servants encouraged to look outward forinspiration?
MPA surveyrespondents said thatlearning frominstitutional memoryoutweighed learning from
otherorganizationsby three to one, sothe answer appearsto be no, even though conferences,
seminars, and courses to promote such learning are available through the Institute of Public
AdministrationofCanada(IPAC).,forexample.

Section three: Going forward

Ultimately,theaboveexamplesdemonstratethatpeopleareboththecauseoftheproblemsandthe
key to improvements in the public sector. As such, attracting and retaining a better workforce
shouldbewhere the governmentstartseffortstobuilditscapacity.Thereareclearfactorsatwork
thatsupportinvestigatingnewhumanresourcemanagementpolicies.
Employee engagement is crucial to this. To be accountable, employees have to want to be
accountable. To behave responsiblytowards the public trust, they have to want to. To maintain
`idelitytoa ValueandEthics Codefor PublicService, theyhave towantto.Apublicservant,atany
level, has to want to behave ethically, accountably, and responsibly. As Savoie says, the broad
outline of Canadas accountability regime has remained pretty well intact over the years. But
everything else has changed.130 Everything else includes the global cultural milieu in which
publicservicetakesplaceandthatmilieuhasseentheestablishmentofahegemonicvaluesystem
that givespreference to individual needsandadvancementsoversocial wellbeing. Tothe extent
that the Canadian public sector has incorporated operating principles and organizational values
thatcon`lictwith a largerviewof human nature (i.e., as human beingsare more thanbundlesof
appetites, that theyhave loyaltiesandallegiances thatcannot be explained in terms of individual
advancementorgain) there willbetensionandcon`lictwithin andbetweendifferentcomponents
of the political system. There will be failures of the core values of probity, discretion, good
judgement,andpublicspiritedness.
Publicservice,asanamalgamofthevaluesthatsumstoaculture,isare`lectionofthepoliticaland
institutionalcontextin which itresides.The Canadian publicservicehaslong been dominatedby
intelligent and thoughtful people; educated and re`lective by training. To some extent a public
service can only be the antennaeor distant early warning systemof a national society: not
always,butoftenthepublicsectorisamongthe`irsttofeeltheimpactofanewideaorsocialforce.
129
130

Ibid, P29.
Savoie.(2003).P.206.

AstheNPMphilosophyof thelate 1970sand early1980stookholdacrossthe developednations,

public sectorslike Canadasadaptedasbesttheycould, giventhe collision of valuesthatzeitgeist
induced. Now, with some hindsight, it is time to reinvigorate the core principles and cognate
management values that have served Canada so well. Creating a public service that attracts and
retainsthoughtfulandtalentedpeopleimbuedwithastrongethicalpurposeandadesiretoserve
the public interestcannot, in the end, be a taskmuch differentfrom creating anyother kindof
highqualityworkforce.Publicservantsneedtoknowthattheirworkisvalued,thatitisimportant,
that it makesa positive difference, and that they will be recognized fortheirachievements and
sanctionedfortheirlapses.
Improvingthefoundationsof thepublicservice willbe dif`icult,butitisnecessaryif the Canadian
government is to thrive going forward. The transformation is not beyond our ability. Engaging
stakeholdersinopendiscussionregardingimprovementsinthethree criticalareasofpublicsector
capacityisstepone.Steptworequiresthatpressureanddesireforreformbecreatedfollowedby
ownership and responsibilityfor said reform, being evermindful that people support what they
help create.Ifallpartiescan cometogetherandbuild apotentworkforce ofeffective,accountable
andengagedemployees,thecapacityofCanadaspublicservicecanonlyblossom.

52

Closing the Implementation Gap

Recommendations
Capacity and Performance
1.

Recognition that the neutrality, merit-based recruitment and expertise of the public
service are fundamental features of our democracy and must be preserved.
The current partisan attacks on public servants must cease. Our traditional system of a
partnership between politicians, their staffs, and a professional public service depends on
trustandcivility.

2.

Implementation must become as important to the policy process as analysis or

communication is. Cabinets should regularly review implementation issues. A Results
Unit should be created in the Treasury Board to fulfill this function.
While policyadviceisbyfarthe highestratedfunctionofthepublicservice,implementation
isthecruxofpolicydeliveryandthemarkofaneffectivepublicservice. Thereforetobridge
the implementationgap, a reviewofa selecteda projectorprogram,a preauditorgeneral,
departmental debrief, of sorts, should be on the cabinets monthly agenda to ensure that
policyleadstoresults.
This requires that programs are designed and funded with future policy evaluation and
reviewinmind,andthatevaluationsareproperlyresourced.
Of the Australian experience in evidence policy making, the Chair of their Productivity
Commission, Gary Banks, advocates for explicit budgetary provisions for the collection of
baselinedata,particularlyinsocialandenvironmentalareas.

... it is important that we lay the groundwork now to evaluate the consequencesof
thosemeasureslater,sotheinevitableproblemscanbedetectedandtimelyadjustments
made.131
AResultsUnitcomposed ofrepresentativesofthe TreasuryBoard, ControllerGenerals, and
the PrivyCouncil Of`ice should develop an implementation evaluation reviewregiment as
robustastheregularpolicyandcommunicationaspectsofthecabinetagenda.
3.

The norm for holding senior management jobs in the public service should be five years.
ThePrimeMinistersAdvisoryCommitteeonthePublicServicehasissuedthreereportsthat
emphasizeimprovedhumanresourcemanagementandthecentralityofeffectiverecruitment
andsuccession planning. Likewise, recentreportsof theOntario Secretaryof the Cabinetto
the Premier concentrate on increasing employee engagement through opportunities for
growthandachievement, learning and developmentopportunitiesandfairhumanresource
practices. Thesurveydata, especiallythe 2008 PSES, indicate thatseniorof`icials(DMsand
ADMs)spendtoolittletime in oneplace. This negativelyimpactsthe departments theyrun
andmakesachievingprogressonresolving keyissuesmoredif`icult.Asfarbackas1979the

131

Banks, Gary (2009), Evidencebased policy making: What is it? How do we get it? Retrieved 4 December 2009: Evidencebased
%20policymaking_ANZSOG%20Lecture_050209.pdf

RoyalCommission onFinancial ManagementandAccountabilityhad warnedthat, the high

rate of mobility among deputy heads of departments and agencies has become a major
managementproblem.TheLambertCommissionrecommendedthatdeputiesbeexpectedto
serveaperiodofthreeto`iveyears 132.

YoushouldbetherelongenoughtoBixyourBirstwaveofmistakesthatsthebestway
tolearn!(Roundtableparticipant)
4.

Discourage the use of consultants in line positions in favour of building up the capacity
of the regular public service.
Henry Mintzberg believes that middle managers are the heart and the soul of any public
sectororganization.Managementisaboutcraftandartasmuchasitisaboutanalytics.Craft
is about experience and art is the creative side. Science, the systemic analytic side, is
important, but over emphasized. Craft is about getting things done, art is about doing it
creatively, and science about doing it systematically. It takes time to build such an
organization and it cannot be done through consultants. As Mintzberg says, they say a
consultantissomebodywhoborrowsyourwatchandtellsyouwhattimeitis133 .

Attracting and Retaining Employees

5.

132
133

Improve the Recruitment Process

Ground recruitmentin organizationrelated requirements, butunderstand the reality

thatmanynewexternalrecruits, aswellasthelowerechelonsofinternalcandidates,
arebeinghiredasinternallymobilepublicservants.

Make career options in the civil service more visible to Canadians, especially new
Canadians, by varying the sources through which employees are attracted to the
organization.

Ensure balance between internally closed recruitment and competitions opened

externallywithappropriatecriteriaforcreatingthatbalance.

Provide better training to recruiters, those facilitating information sessions and for
thosewhoconducttheformalselectionprocess

Maximizetheprimacyeffectreduceinterviewjobofferlagtimes.

Be realistic (but not too realistic): Highlight the intangible bene`its of work,
emphasizing the world of opportunityitopens up, like job prospects and variety of
careerpathsinawaythatfewprivatesectororganizationscan.

De`inethefaceofthepublicserviceandbeintentionalinachievingtheideal:Usethe
considerablecloutaffordedtheCanadianpublicservicebyitssheernumberstoensure

RoyalCommissiononFinancialManagementandAccountability,P193.
PalankisinCanadasManagementGuruinCanadianGovernmentExecutive.Vol.13.No.1.2007.P8.

54

Closing the Implementation Gap

that schools of public administration are preparing studentsfor excellence in public

serviceasaprofessionbasedonthecurrentandfuturevisions.
6.

Expand Interchange Canada and make it work much more directly as a focus of Canadas
development policy.
Public servantsinCanada couldbe seconded toworkin theirrespectivehome departments
around the world. The excellence of the Canadian public services would become a
development asset, while at the same time giving an exciting international dimension to
federalandprovincialemployees.
Asour data makes clear, learning and personal developmentis a goal greatlycherished by
public servantsin theOPS and the FederalPublicService. Youngerrecruits especiallyvalue
internationalopportunitieseventhoughcomparablyfeware indepartmentswithanexplicit
foreignmandate,likeCIDAorDFAIT.
Our proposal is that Canada should develop a major program of exchange and capacity
buildingwiththepublicservicesofthedevelopingworld.FundedbyCIDAwithcontributions
bythe provinces, bothprovincialandfederaldepartmentswouldinvitepublicservantsfrom
abroadtovisitandworkwithinourministries.
Thereareobviousbene`itstopromotingpublicsectorcivilsocietydialogueandpartnerships,
andthereforeitisrecommendedthatsecondmentstocivilsocietygroupsbeexplored.
InterchangeCanadahasbeenaskillsexchangeprogrambetweentheCanadianpublicservice,
businesses,andothergovernmentssince1971.Thesponsoringorganizationcontinuestopay
aregularsalarytoitsemployees.Thisprogramhasprovenitsvalueandisgoodconceptually,
butitislimitedinitsapplication.In2007,forexample,outof apublicserviceof more than
250,000(thosereportingtoTreasuryBoard)only150employees(.06%)wereonassignment
outsideof the publicservice andamere 328 participantswereon temporaryassignmentto
the public service from a range of outside organizations. The Canada Fellows Program, a
recent innovation, is similar to Interchange Canada except that the Fellows are highlevel
executives.ItsnumberisalsosmallwithaprojectedtwentyFellows.

7.

Establish a Mentoring Program

As the Queens data makes clear, there are a number of accountability issues that perplex
bothCanadianpublic servantsand therelationship betweenthe publicserviceandpolitical
staffs. These are certainly problematic. An idea that would improve the situation is to
establishamentoringprogram.
Openended comments from the CSD sample and interviews with public servants for this
studyrevealgreatinterestinthepotentialofmentoring programs.Winninger,inAppendix4,
citestheSingaporeAdministrative Servicewhereeachnewof`icerisassigneda mentorwho
can offerfriendlyadviceandshowyoutheropes,asaviable model.The 2001OECDreport
highlightsthatmentoring isespeciallycriticalforwomenandunderrepresented minorities
because of the perception that the public service is an oldboys network. Governments
needtoestablishaformalmentoringprogrammodelledontheSingaporeexperience.

Improvements to Accountability Design

8.

Create a Wise Person Group to construct an Accountability Code that clari`ies the
responsibilitiesofpublicservants,ministers,andthestaffsthatministersemploy.
Ataskforceofwidelyrespectedpolitical`igures,boththosewithexperienceasministersand
oppositionmembers,formerseniorpoliticalstaffers,andformerseniorcivilservants,suchas
former secretariesof cabinet, should come togetherto create an accountabilitycode. This
codeshouldbetabledinParliamentandinprovinciallegislaturesandvoteduponsothatthe
values and ethics enunciated would have the legitimacy of being approved by our elected
leaders. While not law, a nonbinding resolution on an accountability framework would
becomeabenchmarktoguidefutureaccountabilitydisputes.

We wantto avoid transformingpartialand perhapscomplementaryperspectivesinto

irreconcilable standpoints, yet we do not want to deny real differences. It is all too
commontoerrinboth directionsassumingthatothersarejustlike us,orcompletely
opaquetous.134
9.

Institute training for exempt staff (political staffers) on the essentials of government
and the political-civil service relationship. Public servants also need courses on how to
develop an effective relationship with ministers offices.
Public servants are among the besttrained employees in Canada. There is a continuous
training pathforeverypublic employee, butnotforexemptstaff. Exemptstaff135 enterthe
public service sometimeshaving onlythe mostrudimentaryknowledge of government, the
public service, codesof conduct, and the history of the ministrieswhere theywillwork. It
shouldbeaconditionof employmentinanyministersof`ice thatexemptstaffberequiredto
attend a two week course on the essentials of government and the politicalcivil service
relationship. Such executive development programs/courses could be offered by the
CanadianSchoolof Public Service orbyschoolsof public policyand should be certi`ied by
governments. The Institute of Public Administration of Canada in 2006 suggested a
comprehensive program of orientation and masters classes for political staff working at
QueensPark.
Paul Thomas, of the Universityof Manitoba, hasan evenmore ambitious idea of creating a
school of governmentforpoliticians, theCanadianequivalentofthe UKsNational Schoolof

134

Kenneth Winston (2003), P175

Cabinet ministers hire their own advisers and political aides, known as exempt staff because they are excluded from the Public
Service Employment Act, whichgovernsthepublic service. Theyhave verylittle jobsecurity. Theycease to be anemployee 30days after
their Minster is no longer a minister, and they can be dismissed at the direction ofthe ministerwith no mechanisms forcomplaint or
appeal.Source:TreasuryBoardSecretariat(2006),P12.135
135.

56

Closing the Implementation Gap

Government136,ortheGraduateSchoolofPoliticalManagement137inWashington,D.C.Thomas
suggests that such a school should offer core introductory courses to all newly elected
legislators,aswellasacourseforthegrowing andin`luentialgroupofpoliticalstaffers.He
also suggests that the Canada School of Public Service provides the physical home forthe
Canada School of Government thatwouldhave itsownsmallpermanent staff with courses
offered to federal, provincial and municipal politicians. This is very worthwhile idea that
needs to be support. The starting point of this large initiative, however, should be the
introductionofcoursesforpoliticalstaffwheretheneedisjudgedtobegreatest.
Further,whenthereisa change ofgovernmenttwothingsshouldoccurduringthetransition
tohelpfostermutualrespectbetweenpoliticalstaffandpublicservants:
i)
The transition teams of the incoming parties should always include a public
servantwith`irsthandexperiencewiththeoutgoing government.Thisexperienceand
institutionalknowledgewillassureasmoothertransition.
ii) After any change in government, new executive assistants(chiefs of staff) and
publicservantsshouldtake the proposedmandatorytrainingcoursetogether. Thereis
value inencouraging an understanding of the relationshipbetweeneachpositionand
thedifferencesintheroles.Itmaybe apositivestepinbuildingrelationshipsbetween
political(exempt)staffandpublicservants.
10.

Develop an Exempt Staff Code of Conduct and Ethics.

ThePCO documentAccountableGovernmentandGuideforMinistersandMinistersof State
2008 de`ineswell the role of political assistantsand containsexplicitstandards of ethical
conduct, such as that exempt staff do not have the authority to give direction to public
servants.TheCon`lictofInterestActprovisionsapplytoministerialstaff,asdotheprovisions
oftheLobbying Act.Thereisalreadya defactoethicalcodeforpoliticalassistants.Thiscode
shouldbeexplicitlyformulatedinananalogousfashiontothe ValuesandEthicsCode forthe
PublicService,whichhasbeeninoperationsinceSeptember2003.

...thatexemptStaffsuchastheChiefofStaffofthePrimeMinistersOfBiceandhisorher
subordinatesbe subject to a Code ofConduct ... None ofthese recommendationshave
beenactedupon,tothebestofmyknowledge. 138
11.

136

Adopt the title Executive Assistant to more accurately reflect the duties of political
advisors.

As the business schoolfor government, we provide high quality learning and development solutions togovernment organisations
andindividualsprovidingpublicservices.Retrieved26November2009:http://www.nationalschool.gov.uk/about_us/index.asp:.
137 The Graduate School of PoliticalManagement (GSPM)at The George Washington Universityseeks to improve politics byeducating
students and professionals in the tools, principles and values of participatory democracy, preparing them for careers as ethical and
effective advocates and leaders at the international, nationaland locallevelsina nonpartisan environment.Retrieved 26 November
2009:http://www.gspm.org/aboutgspm.
138 JohnH.Gomery,TurningAroundCanadasDysfunctionalAccountabilityArrangements,2009IPACConferencePresentation.

Before the nextchange in government occurs, eliminate the title Chief of Staff as itfalsely
denotes executive authority, and replace it with Executive Assistant, or another title that
accuratelyre`lects the nature of the position. Political advisors are assistants not decision
makers. In the 1960s senior political advisors were called Executive Assistants, a more
accuratedescriptionforwhattheydo.
12. Exempt staff post-employment activity restrictions should be reduced to one year.
TheprovisionintheFederalLobbyingAct,whichprohibitsemploymentinlobbyingactivities
for`iveyearsafterleavinga ministerialof`ice,istoodraconian.Limitingcareeropportunities
forthislong dissuadesmanyfrombecomingexemptpoliticalstaff.Aoneyearprohibition is
suf`icient.

58

Closing the Implementation Gap

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Appendices

Appendix1:ComparativeAnalysisofPublicServiceEmployeeSurveys
Appendix2:SummaryofRoundtables
Appendix3:RecruitingtheBestandBrightestforEmploymentinCanadasPublicService
Appendix4:AReportonHumanResourcesinthePublicService:TheQuesttoMakeGovernmentan
EmployerofChoice

66