Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PEASLEE, C. J.
I. "If there is no ground of action in the sovereignty where
the tort is alleged to have occurred, there is none
anywhere. . . . To ascertain the rights resulting from acts
done or omitted, attention must be paid to the circumstances
under which the events took place; and one of the governing
circumstances is the law of the place which characterizes
the act. . . . In like manner, when a right is claimed upon
acts occurring in another country, courts look to the law of
that country, not to extend the binding force of a foreign
law beyond the territorial limits of the sovereignty to
which it belongs, but to ascertain whether the right claimed
exists or not. It is not the foreign law, but the rights
acquired under it, which are enforced by the courts of
another country; and this is true whether the question be
one of contract, tort, or status." MacDonald v. Railway,71
N.H. 448, 450, 451.
"If there is a conflict between the lex loci and the lex
fori, the former governs in torts the same as in contracts,
in respect to the legal effect and incidents of acts. . . .
Therefore, whatever would be a defence to this action if it
had been brought in the state of Maine is a defence here,
although it would not be if the cause of action had arisen
in this state." Beacham v. Portsmouth Bridge, 68 N.H. 382.
CASE,
TO
RECOVER
DAMAGES
FOR
PERSONAL
INJURIES
ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY THE DEFENDANT'S
NEGLIGENCE.
THE
PARTIES
ARE
HUSBAND
AND
WIFE,
For more than a hundred years this theory of the law has
been followed in this state, whenever there has been
occasion to apply it, or any part of it. Wilson v. Rich, 5
N.H. 455; French v. Hall, 9 N.H. 137; Henry v. Sargeant, 13
N.H. 321; Laird v. Railroad, 62 N.H. 254; Leazotte v.
Railroad, 70 N.H. 5; Kimball v. Kimball, 75 N.H. 291; Young
v. Company,76 N.H. 582; Hill v. Railroad, 77 N.H. 151;
Stinson v. Railroad,81 N.H. 473; Marshall v. Railroad, 81
N.H. 548; Lee v. Chamberlin,84 N.H. 182; Precourt v.
Driscoll, 85 N.H. 280; Small v. Railroad,85 N.H. 330;
Richards v. Richards, 86 N.H. 273; Blanchette v. Sargent,
ante, 15.
It has the final approval of the American Law Institute,
Restatement, Conflict of Laws, s. 382 et seq. It is
supported by all our eminent text writers upon the subject.
Story, Conflict of Laws, s. 558; Dicey, Conflict of Laws,
21; Beale, Conflict of Laws, 112; Goodrich, Conflict of
Laws, 189; Wharton, Conflict of Laws, s. 478 b; Minor,
Conflict of Laws, s. 194. The American decisions are almost
uniformly to the same effect. They are collected in 12 C. J.
452, and cross references. In three recent cases the precise
question here involved has been decided adversely to the
plaintiff. Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248; Dawson v.
Dawson, 224 Ala. 13; Howard v. Howard, 200 N.C. 574. *8484
Against this array of authority it is strenuously argued
that the decided cases are distinguishable; that much which
has been said is dicta; that the theory is contrary to the
English law, unsound in principle, unworkable in many
situations and criticized by a group of present day writers.
It is true that none of our decisions involve the precise
facts
here
presented,
but
several
of
them
are
indistinguishable in principle. In Beacham v. Portsmouth
Bridge, 68 N.H. 382, the defendant was a wrongdoer, and by
New Hampshire law the plaintiff was free from contributory
fault. But since by Maine law his driving contrary to the
Sunday law barred a recovery, he had no remedy here for an
accident happening there.
No rule or set of rules has yet been devised which will make
the conflict of laws a logical whole. There are places where
logic has to give way to evident facts. In these places
horse sense has prevailed over the deductions of the
schoolmen. It should continue to do so.
Whether, upon the issue of applying foreign law we should
follow our own views entirely, or adopt those expressed in
the lex loci which are pertinent, is, like most of the
questions involved in this case, a matter of what is sound
policy. That problem will no doubt be solved in the future,
and some definite rules will be evolved, as there have been
already on the main issue of following the lex loci.
As before stated, there is no occasion here to determine
whether we should apply a Maine doctrine of renvoi, since
there is no evidence that such a doctrine exists.
VI. The novel complaint is made that the foregoing
conclusions *9090 upon the application of the lex loci set
up fixed rules. The proposal is that instead thereof the
whole matter be left to the discretion of the court to apply
either the foreign or the domestic law to the individual
case as "reason, justice and expediency" require. That might
well be taken as the guide for determining what should be
done in the first stages of the development of the law. But
as the law progresses definite rules are evolved in the
course of the frequent application of those tests. That is
the situation here. It has become settled that reason,
justice and expediency require that causes of action for
foreign torts be dealt with as hereinbefore indicated.
Exception overruled.
All concurred.
11
97 Ala. 126 - 1892
So.
Alabama
v.
Carroll.
Great
Southern
Rail
Road
Co.
803
10
fact
of
plaintiff's
the conduct of persons within its limits, this does not mean
that it may abrogate the rights of parties beyond its
borders having no relation to anything done or to be done
within them. P. 281 U. S. 410.
19
The cases relied upon, in which it was held that a state may
lengthen its statute of limitations, are not in point.
Page 281 U. S. 409
See Atchafalaya Land Co. v. Williams Cypress Co., 258 U. S.
190; National
Surety
Co.
v.
Architectural
Decorating
Co., 226 U. S. 276;Vance v. Vance, 108 U. S. 514. In those
cases, the parties had not stipulated a time limit for the
enforcement of their obligations. It is true that a state
may extend the time within which suit may be brought in its
own courts if, in doing so, it violates no agreement of the
parties. [Footnote 6] And, in the absence of a contractual
provision, the local statute of limitation may be applied to
a right created in another jurisdiction even where the
24
The loss was made payable to Dick and the Texas & Gulf
Steamship Company as their interests might appear. The
steamship company and Suderman & Young, Inc., assignee of
part of the cause of action, intervened as plaintiffs, and
are joined with Dick as appellees. As there are no rights
peculiar to them, they need not be further referred to. Dick
contends that, since the policy was payable to the Texas &
Gulf Steamship Company, the contract was performable in
Texas. The contention is in conflict with the quoted
language of the policy, and there is no provision otherwise
lending support to the argument. Texas is nowhere mentioned
in the policy. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to
show that the steamship company's sole place of business was
in Texas. The state courts made no findings on this claim.
same
footing
was
held
in Riddlesbarger
v.
Hartford
Insurance Co., 7 Wall. 386, 74 U. S. 390. Compare 74 U.
S. Hartford Insurance Co., 13 Wall. 158, 80 U. S. 161. The
validity and effectiveness of a clause limiting the time for
suit, in the absence of a controlling statute, was
recognized also in Texas, Suggs v. Travelers' Insurance Co.,
71 Tex. 579. In that case, decided before the enactment of
article 5545, the Texas court upheld a similar provision in
an insurance policy against the claim of an infant without
capacity to sue. The court described the nature of the
provision thus (p. 581):
"It is said to differ from the statutory limitation in this:
that it does not merely deny the remedy, but forfeits the
liability, when the suit is not brought within the
stipulated time."
[Footnote 3]
Besides the defense here discussed, the answers both of the
Mexican corporation and of the garnishees alleged: (2) that
the suit was not brought within the period provided by the
Commercial Code of Mexico, and that thereby the right of
action was completely barred upon the expiration of one
year; (3) that the policy was void because of plaintiff's
misrepresentations as to the value of the vessel; (4) that
the vessel was not a total loss, and was abandoned in
violation of the terms of the policy. None of these defense
needs to be considered.
[Footnote 5]
The division of this Court in the Tabacos and Dodge cases
was not on the principle here stated, but on the question of
fact whether there were in those cases things done within
the state of which the state could property lay hold as the
basis of the regulations there imposed. Compare Bothwell v.
Buckabee, Mears Co., 275 U. S. 274; Palmetto Fire Ins. Co.
v. Conn, 272 U. S. 295. In the absence of any such things,
as in this case, the Court was agreed that a state is
without power to impose either public or private obligations
on contracts made outside of the state and not to be
performed there. Compare Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Liebing, 259 U. S. 209; E. Merick Dodd, Jr., "The Power of
[Footnote 4]
That a provision requiring notice of loss within a fixed
period and one requiring the bringing of suit stand upon the
25
No. 465
Argued February 8, 11, 1935
[Footnote 6]
Decided March 11, 1935
The state courts placed some reliance on Campbell v.
Holt, 115 U. S. 620. Whether, as there held, a statute of
limitations may also be lengthened so as to affect
liabilities already barred is not here pertinent. There is a
clear difference between the revival of a liability which is
unenforceable only because a statute has barred the remedy
regardless of the will of the parties, and the extension of
a liability beyond the limit expressly agreed upon by the
parties. Compare National Surety Co. v. Architectural
Decorating Co., 226 U. S. 276, 226 U. S. 282; William
Danzer & Co. v. Gulf Island R. Co., 268 U. S. 633, 268 U. S.
636.
[Footnote 7]
Whether a distinction is to be drawn between statutes of
limitation which extinguish or limit the right and those
which
merely
bar
the
remedy
we
need
not
now
determine. Compare Davis v. Mills, 194 U. S. 451, and Texas
Portland Cement Co. v. McCord, 233 U. S. 157, with Canadian
P. Ry. Co. v. Johnston, 61 F. 738.
Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S.
532 (1935)
Alaska Packers Association v.
the
the
by
to
27
"The
commission
shall
have
jurisdiction
over
all
controversies arising out of injuries suffered without the
territorial limits of this state in those cases where the
injured employee is a resident of this state at the time of
the injury and the contract of hire was made in this
state. . . ."
At that time, the California Supreme Court had held,
in Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 184
Cal. 23, 36-44, 192 P. 1021 (writ of error dismissed, 255 U.
S. 445), that this section was applicable to nonresidents of
28
abroad,
it, 1, 31, 35, which, in this case, they have not done.
The California Act is administered by a Commission; the
Alaska Act provides for recovery by suit in the courts of
the Territory, brought in the Judicial division where the
injury occurs ( 24, 25). Each act provides that the
liability imposed and the remedy given by it are in lieu of
all others for the injury suffered. Sections 6(a), 27(a) of
the California Act; 1, 10, 28 of the Alaska Act. While
58 of the California statute authorizes the Commission to
make an award for injuries suffered without the state when
the contract of employment is entered into within, it does
not purport to provide, by regulation of the contract
Life
Insurance
Co.
v.
The necessity is not any the less whether the statute and
policy of the forum is set up as a defense to a suit brought
under the foreign statute or the foreign statute is set up
as a defense to a suit or proceedings under the local
statute. In either case, the conflict is the same. In each,
rights claimed under one statute prevail only by denying
effect to the other. In both, the conflict is to be resolved
not by giving automatic effect to the full faith and credit
clause, compelling the courts of each state to subordinate
its own statutes to those of the other, but by appraising
the governmental interests of each jurisdiction and turning
the scale of decision according to their weight.
If, for the reasons given, the Vermont statute was held to
override the New Hampshire statute in the courts of
Page 294 U. S. 549
34
[Footnote 3]
124
N.E.2d
Argued
October
December 31, 1954, decided
99;
1954
22,
N.Y.
LEXIS
930;
50
1954.
PRIOR
HISTORY: [***1]
Auten v. Auten,
281
App.
Div.
740,
reversed.
APPEAL from a judgment, entered December 1, 1953, upon an
order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the
first judicial department, which (1) affirmed an order of
the Supreme Court at Special Term (SCHREIBER, J.), entered
in New York County, granting a motion by defendant for
summary judgment dismissing the complaint and (2) granted
leave to serve an amended complaint. (See 306 N.Y. 752.)
The Act of May 26, 1790, c. 11, 1 Stat. 122, provided for
the proper authentication of the acts, records, and judicial
proceedings, and declared:
"And
the
said
records
and
judicial
proceedings,
authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such faith and credit
given to them in every court within the United States as
they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from
whence the said records are or shall be taken."
reversed,
etc.
183; Swift
&
Co. v. Bankers
Trust
Co.,
280
N.Y.
135; Myles v. Cuba R.R. Co., 182 Misc. 169; Lann v. United
States Steel Works Corp., 166 Misc. 465; Matter of Palmer,
192 Misc. 385, 275 App. Div. 792; Graham v. First Nat. Bank
of Norfolk, 84 N.Y. 393; Hutchinson v. Ross, 262 N.Y. 381.)
II. Even assuming, arguendo, that the effect of the English
separation action upon the separation agreement must be
determined in accordance with the rule of law applied by the
courts of New York, the judgment of the Appellate Division
affirming Special Term cannot be sustained. ( Woods v. Bard,
285 N.Y. 11; Krell v. Krell, 192 Misc. 1; Clark v. Kirby,
243 N.Y. 295; Dimick v. Dimick, 230 App. Div. 99; Van
Horn v. Van Horn, 196 App. Div. 472; Chamberlain v. Cuming,
37 Misc. 815; Estin v. Estin, 296 N.Y. 308, 334 U.S. 541;
[***6] Gifford v. Corrigan,
117
N.Y.
257;Rosmarin v. Rosmarin,
238
App.
Div.
798; De
Brauwere v. De Brauwere, 203 N.Y. 460; Patino v. Patino, 195
Misc. 887, 278 App. Div. 756, 278 App. Div. 921.)
[**101]
In his answer, defendant admitted making the
agreement, but, by way of a separate defense - one of
several - claimed that plaintiff's institution of the
separation suit in England operated as a repudiation of the
agreement and effected a forfeiture of her right to any
payments under it. Following a motion by the wife for
summary judgment and a cross motion by the husband for like
relief, the court at Special Term granted the husband's
cross motion and dismissed the complaint. The Appellate
Division affirmed, with leave to the wife, however, to serve
an amended complaint, asserting any cause of action which
accrued prior to the date of the commencement of the English
suit. The ensuing judgment, dismissing all of the wife's
claims which accrued subsequent to that date, is a final
judgment of modification, and the wife's appeal therefrom is
properly before us as of right. (306 N.Y. 752; see, also,
[***11] Cohen and Karger, Powers of the New York Court of
Appeals,
pp.
88-91,
222-223.)
Both of the courts below, concluding that New York law was
to be applied, held that under such law plaintiff's
commencement of the English action and the award of
temporary alimony constituted a rescission and repudiation
of the separation agreement, requiring dismissal of the
complaint. Whether that is the law of this state, or whether
something more must be shown to effect a repudiation of the
agreement
(cf. Hettich v. Hettich,
304
N.Y.
8,
1314; Woods v. Bard, 285 N.Y. 11; Butler v. Butler, 206 App.
Div. 214), need not detain us, since in our view it is the
law of England, not that of New York, which is here
controlling.
466.)
the present
[***20]
action
to
recover
amounts
due
under
it.
FULD, J.
42
and (4) all contributions for support always have been, and
still are being, made from Chicago.
Contrasted with these Illinois contacts, the New York
contacts are of far less weight and significance. Chief
among these is the fact that child and mother presently live
in New York and that part of the "liaison" took place in New
York. When these contacts are measured against the parties'
clearly expressed intention to have their agreement governed
by Illinois law and the more numerous and more substantial
Illinois contacts, it may not be gainsaid that the "center
of gravity" of this agreement is Illinois and that, absent
compelling public policy to the contrary (see Straus
Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co.,254 N.Y. 407, 414), Illinois
law should apply.
As to the question of public policy, we would emphasize that
the issue is not whether the New York statute reflects a
different public policy from that of the Illinois statute,
but rather whether enforcement of the particular agreement
before us under Illinois law represents an affront to our
public policy. (Cf. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99,
111; Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 471; Restatement 2d,
Conflict of Laws, Tentative Draft No. 6, 332a, comment g.)
It is settled that the New York Paternity Law requires
something more than the provision of "the bare necessities
otherwise required to be supplied by the community", that,
"although providing for indemnification of the community,
[it] is chiefly concerned with the welfare of the child".
(See Schaschlo v. Taishoff, 2 N.Y.2d 408, 411.) In our
judgment, enforcement of the support agreement in this case
under Illinois law and the refusal to allow its provisions
to be reopened in the present proceeding does not do
violence to this policy. *561561
As matter of fact, the agreement before us clearly goes
beyond "indemnification of the community" and the provision
of "bare necessities". Whether we read it as a whole, or
look only to the financial provisions concerned ($275 a
month until the child reaches the age of 16), we must
51
[66]
Supra, note 7.
Records, p. 180.
[29]
Rollo, pp. 1-44.
[30]
Supra, note 2.
[31]
Rollo, pp. 80-86.
[32]
Memorandum for Petitioner dated October 9, 1996; rollo,
pp. 149-180; and Memorandum for Private Respondent, 30
October 1996, rollo, pp. 182-210.
[33]
Rollo, pp. 157-159. All caps in the original.
[34]
Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 14, rollo, p. 162;.
[35]
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.
[36]
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damages.
[37]
Memorandum for Private Respondent, p. 9, rollo, p. 190.
[38]
Records, pp. 65-71.
[39]
Supra, note 17, at pp. 65-68.
[40]
Salonga, Private International Law, 1995 edition, p. 3.
[41]
Ibid., citing Cheshire and North, Private International
Law, p. 5 by P.M. North and J.J. Faucett (Butterworths;
London, 1992).
[42]
Ibid.
[43]
Paras, Philippine
Conflict
of
Laws,
sixth
edition
(1984), p. 24, citing Leflar, The Law of Conflict of
Laws, pp. 5-6.
[44]
Supra, note 17.
[45]
83 SCRA 237, 247.
[46]
Supra, note at 17, at p. 6. Morada prays that judgment
be rendered against Saudia, ordering it to pay: (1) not less
than P250,000.00 as actual damages; (2) P4 million in moral
damages;
(3) P500,000.00
in
exemplary
damages;
and
(4) P500,000.00 in attorneys fees.
[47]
Baguioro v. Barrios, 77 Phil. 120.
[27]
[48]
[28]
56
[65]
Georgia
W.
v
Mabel B. Jackson, as
Deceased, Respondent.
Babcock,
Executrix
Court
of
Appeals
Argued
January
Decided May 9, 1963
12
NY2d
CITE TITLE AS: Babcock v Jackson
of
Appellant,
William
of
New
23,
H.
Jackson,
York
1963
473
flown
because
of
bad
weather
or
other
unexpected
developments, or an airplane's catastrophic descent may
begin in one State and end in another. The place of injury
becomes entirely fortuitous. Our courts should if possible
provide protection for our own State's people against unfair
and anachronistic treatment of the lawsuits which result
from these disasters."
The emphasis in Kilberg was plainly that the merely
fortuitous circumstance that the wrong and injury occurred
in Massachusetts did not give that State a controlling
concern or interest in the amount of the tort recovery as
against the competing interest of New York in providing its
residents or users of transportation facilities there
originating with full compensation for wrongful death.
Although the Kilberg case did not expressly adopt the
"center of gravity" theory, its weighing of the contacts or
interests of the respective jurisdictions to determine their
bearing on the issue of the extent of the recovery is
consistent with that approach. (See Leflar, Conflict of
Laws, 1961 Ann. Sur. Amer. Law, 29, 45.)
The same judicial disposition is also reflected in a
variety of other decisions, some of recent date, others of
earlier
origin,
relating
to
workmen's
compensation,
[8]
tortious
occurrences
aristing [*481] out
of
a
[9]
contract,
issues affecting the survival of a tort right of
action [10]and
intrafamilial
immunity
from
tort [11]and
situations involving a form of statutory liability. [12]These
numerous cases differ in many ways but they are all similar
in two important respects. First, by one rationale or
another, they rejected the inexorable application of the law
of the place of the tort where that place has no reasonable
or relevant interest in the particular issue involved. And,
second, in each of these cases the courts, after examining
the particular circumstances presented, applied the law of
some jurisdiction other than the place of the tort because
it had a more compelling interest in the application of its
law to the legal issue involved.
would be the same and the law of New York applied where the
foreign
guest
statute
requires
a
showing
of
gross
negligence.
United States Supreme Court
ALLSTATE INS. CO. v. HAGUE, (1981)
No. 79-938
Argued: October 6, 1980
Decided: January 13, 1981
Held:
argued
the
cause
and
filed
brief
for
65
The
Minnesota
District
Court
disagreed.
Interpreting
Wisconsin law to disallow stacking, the court concluded that
Minnesota's choice-of-law rules required the application of
Minnesota law permitting stacking. The court refused to
apply Wisconsin law as "inimical to the public policy of
Minnesota" and granted summary judgment for respondent. 4
II
It is not for this Court to say whether the choice-of-law
analysis suggested by Professor Leflar is to be preferred or
whether we would make the same choice-of-law decision if
sitting as the Minnesota Supreme Court. Our sole function is
to determine whether the Minnesota Supreme Court's choice of
its own substantive law in this case exceeded federal
constitutional limitations. Implicit in this inquiry is the
recognition, long accepted by this Court, that a set of
facts giving rise to a lawsuit, or a particular issue within
a lawsuit, may justify, in constitutional terms, application
of the law of more than one jurisdiction. See, e. g., Watson
v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72 -73
(1954); n. 11, infra. See generally Clay v. Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 , [449 U.S. 302, 308]
181-182
Dick and Yates stand for the proposition that if a State has
only an insignificant contact with the parties and the [449
U.S. 302, 311]
occurrence or transaction, application of
its law is unconstitutional. 14 Dick concluded that nominal
residence - standing alone - was inadequate; Yates held that
a postoccurrence change of residence to the forum State 68
While John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S.
178 (1936), held that a postoccurrence change of residence
to the forum State was insufficient in and of itself to
confer power on the forum State to choose its law, that case
did not hold that such a change of residence was irrelevant.
Here, of course, respondent's bona fide residence in
Minnesota was not the sole contact Minnesota had with this
litigation. And in connection with her residence in
Minnesota, respondent was appointed personal representative
of Mr. Hague's estate by the Registrar of Probate for the
County of Goodhue, Minn. Respondent's residence and
subsequent
appointment
in
Minnesota
as
personal
representative of her late husband's estate constitute a
Minnesota contact which gives Minnesota an interest in
71
were
indistinguishable. 6
[449
U.S.
302,
322]
Nevertheless,
I
am
persuaded
that
the
two
constitutional provisions protect different interests and
that proper analysis requires separate consideration of
each.
I
The Full Faith and Credit Clause is one of several
provisions in the Federal Constitution designed to transform
the several States from independent sovereignties into a
single, unified Nation. See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light
Co., 448 U.S. 261, 271 -272 (1980) (plurality opinion);
Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276 -277
(1935). 7 The Full Faith and Credit Clause implements this
design by directing that a State, when acting as the forum
for litigation having multistate aspects or implications,
respect the legitimate interests of other States and avoid
infringement upon their sovereignty. The Clause does not,
however, rigidly [449 U.S. 302, 323]
require the forum
State to apply foreign law whenever another State has a
valid interest in the litigation. See Nevada v. Hall, 440
U.S. 410, 424 (1979); Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 546 -548 (1935); Pacific
Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S.
493, 501 -502 (1939). 8 On the contrary, in view of the fact
that the forum State is also a sovereign in its own right,
in appropriate cases it may attach paramount importance to
its own legitimate interests. 9 Accordingly, the fact that a
choice-of-law decision may be unsound as a matter of
conflicts law does not necessarily implicate the federal
concerns embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
Rather, in my opinion, the Clause should not invalidate a
II
It may be assumed that a choice-of-law decision would
violate the Due Process Clause if it were totally arbitrary
or if it were fundamentally unfair to either litigant. I
question whether a judge's decision to apply the law of his
own State could ever be described as wholly irrational. For
judges are presumably familiar with their own state law and
may find it difficult and time consuming to discover and
apply correctly the law of another State. 14 The forum
State's interest in the fair and efficient administration of
justice is therefore sufficient, in my judgment, to attach a
presumption of validity to a forum State's decision to apply
its own law to a dispute over which it has jurisdiction.
III
Although I regard the Minnesota courts' decision to apply
forum law as unsound as a matter of conflicts law, and
there [449 U.S. 302, 332]
is little in this record other
than the presumption in favor of the forum's own law to
support that decision, I concur in the plurality's judgment.
It is not this Court's function to establish and impose upon
state courts a federal choice-of-law rule, nor is it our
function to ensure that state courts correctly apply
whatever
choice-of-law
rules
they
have
themselves
adopted. 25 Our authority may be exercised in the choice-oflaw area only to prevent a violation of the Full Faith and
of
the
Fourteenth
Amendment
[ Footnote 7 ] See also Sumner, The Full-Faith-and-CreditClause - Its History and Purpose, 34 Or. L. Rev. 224, 242
(1955); Weintraub, supra, at 477; R. Leflar, supra, 73, p.
143.
83
86
I
At least since Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955), the
Court has recognized that both the Due Process and the Full
Faith and Credit Clauses are satisfied if the forum has such
significant contacts with the litigation that it has a
legitimate state interest in applying its own law. The
significance of asserted contacts must be evaluated in light
of the constitutional policies that oversight by this Court
should serve. Two enduring policies emerge from our cases.
87
Both the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses
ensure that the States do not "reach out beyond the limits
imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a
federal system." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (addressing Fourteenth Amendment
limitation on state-court jurisdiction). As the Court stated
in Pacific Ins. Co., supra: "[T]he full faith and credit
clause does not require one state to substitute for its own
statute, applicable to persons and events within it, the
conflicting statute of another state." Id., at 502 (emphasis
added). The State has a legitimate interest in applying a
rule of decision to the litigation only if the facts to
which the rule will be applied have created effects within
the State, toward which the State's public policy is
directed. To assess the sufficiency of asserted contacts
between the forum and the litigation, the court must
U.S.
302,
336]
these
two
important
constitutional
policies. 3 A contact, or a pattern of contacts, satisfies
the Constitution when it protects the litigants from being
unfairly surprised if the forum State applies its own law,
and when the application of the forum's law reasonably can
be understood to further a legitimate public policy of the
forum State.
II
First, the post accident residence of the plaintiffbeneficiary is constitutionally irrelevant to the choice-oflaw question. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates,
supra. The plurality today insists that Yates only held that
a postoccurrence move to the forum State could not "in and
of itself" confer power on the forum to apply its own law,
but did not establish that such a change of residence was
irrelevant. Ante, at 319. What the Yates Court held,
however, was that "there was no occurrence, nothing done, to
which the law of Georgia could apply." 299 U.S., at
182(emphasis added). Any possible ambiguity in the Court's
view of the significance of a postoccurrence change of
residence is dispelled by Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, supra,
cited by the Yates Court, where it was held squarely that
Dick's post accident move to the forum State was "without
significance." 281 U.S., at 408 .
- versus - Chairman,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr.,
Tinga, and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
M/V LOK MAHESHWARI,
THE SHIPPING CORPORATION
OF INDIA, and PORTSERV LIMITED Promulgated:
and/or TRANSMAR SHIPPING, INC.,
Respondents. November 11, 2005
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
*
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeks
the (a) reversal of the November 28, 2001 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-54920, [1]which dismissed
for want of jurisdiction the instant case, and the September
3, 2002 Resolution of the same appellate court,[2] which
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, and (b)
reinstatement of the July 25, 1996 Decision[3] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Civil Case No. CEB-18679,
which held that respondents were solidarily liable to pay
petitioner the sum prayed for in the complaint.
The facts are as follows: Respondent M/V Lok Maheshwari
(Vessel) is an oceangoing vessel of Indian registry that is
owned by respondent Shipping Corporation of India (SCI), a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of India
and principally owned by the Government of India. It was
time-chartered by respondent SCI to Halla Merchant Marine
Co. Ltd. (Halla), a South Korean company. Halla, in turn,
sub-chartered the Vessel through a time charter to Transmar
Shipping, Inc. (Transmar). Transmar further sub-chartered
the Vessel to Portserv Limited (Portserv). Both Transmar and
SECOND DIVISION
93
and
against
the
defendants
Portserv and/or Transmar].
[Vessel,
SCI,
the
sum
of
US$103,544.00,
representing
the
outstanding
obligation;
(b) interest of US$10,978.50 as of
July
3,
1996,
plus
additional
interest at 18% per annum for the
period
thereafter,
until
the
principal account is fully paid;
(c) attorneys fees of P300,000.00; and
(d) P200,000.00
as
litigation
expenses.
SO ORDERED.
The appellate court denied petitioner Crescents motion
for reconsideration explaining that it dismissed the
instant action primarily on the ground of forum non
conveniens considering
that
the
parties
are
foreign
corporations
which
are
not
doing
business
in
the
Philippines.
94
1.
Philippine
courts
have
jurisdiction over a foreign vessel found
inside
Philippine
waters
for
the
enforcement of a maritime lien against
said
vessel
and/or
its
owners
and
operators;
5.
2.
6.
3.
7.
Petitioner
has
legal
capacity to sue before Philippine courts
as it is suing upon an isolated business
transaction;
8.
9.
4.
The
enforcement
of
a
maritime lien on the subject vessel is
expressly
granted
by
law.
The
Ship
Mortgage Acts as well as the Code of
Commerce provides for relief to petitioner
for its unpaid claim;
95
decision
10.
96
I.
99
[27]
principle
of
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
Trial
forum non
103
[5]
[13]
[6]
[14]
[7]
[15]
[16]
35 F. 907.
[17]
230 F. 717.
[18]
278 F. 568.
[19]
17 F.2d 308.
[20]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
Rollo, p. 315.
Id., p. 469.
104
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
Id.
[29]
[30]
[32]
105
Agbayani, p. 631.
[35]
TSN, p. 6.
[36]
[33]
[34]
in
Oklahoma,
site
of
II
At the outset, we must first determine whether we confront
"real" rather than "apparent" conflicts between the laws to
be applied.2 This requires a determination, first, of the
law regarding punitive damages in the relevant states:
Illinois, Missouri, California, Oklahoma, New York, Texas
and Hawaii. After this determination, it will then be
108
537.090
(Vernon
1979).
Damages
for
"aggravating
circumstances" have been permitted by Missouri wrongful
death statutes since 1855, and have consistently been
considered punitive or exemplary by the Missouri Supreme
Court. Parsons v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 94 Mo. 286, 6 S.W.
464, 466-67 (1888);Haehl v. Wabash Ry. Co., 119 Mo. 325, 24
S.W.
737,
741
(1893).
Damages
for
"aggravating
circumstances" in death cases depend on proof of "willful
misconduct, wantonness, recklessness, or want of care
indicative of indifference to consequences,"Wiseman v.
Missouri Pacific Railroad, 575 S.W.2d 742 (Mo.App.1978), a
standard commonly associated with the award of punitive
damages.6
III
It is now necessary
to the disallowance
no conflict at all
punitive damages in
110
IV
MDC
argues
that Jackson
v.
K.L.M., 459
F.Supp.
953 (S.D.N.Y.1978)
and Sibley
v.
KLM-Royal
Dutch
Airlines, 454 F.Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y.1978) establish the
proposition that, as between the state of misconduct and the
primary place of business, the state of misconduct is the
only state with an interest in awarding punitive damages.
Citing these cases, it argues that Missouri, as the state of
its corporate headquarters and principal place of business,
has an interest only in the decision to disallow punitive
damages but not in the decision to allow punitive damages.
But the defendants misread the Jacksonand Sibley opinions
and their argument seems comparable to "heads, I win; tails,
you lose" logic.
115
interests
in
protecting
nonresident
excessive financial liability.
defendants
from
116
B
We now apply the Illinois "most significant relationship"
test to American. The significant contacts to be examined
are the place of injury, the place of alleged misconduct,
the principal place of business, and the place where the
relationship between the parties is centered. As discussed
with regard to MDC, the place of injury is Illinois and the
place where the relationship between the parties is centered
is either Illinois or California. Neither of these states
allows punitive damages. The place of American's alleged
misconduct is Oklahoma, site of its maintenance base, which
does allow punitive damages.
But the error made by the district court on this matter must
be considered harmless for two reasons. First, plaintiffs
misunderstand the scope of the protection of Rule 56. Rule
56 provides that a defendant in a lawsuit may "at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary
judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b). Thus, even if the district court had
treated the motion as one for summary judgment, it could
have decided the question exactly as it did and there could
be no objection to the defendant's failure to provide
supporting affidavits.
Plaintiffs
next
argue
that
the
district
court's
determination that American's principal place of business on
the date of the crash was New York was made on the basis of
matters
outside
the
pleadings:
American's
unverified
assertion in its reply brief that its place of business on
the date of the crash was New York. Because the issue was
American's motion to dismiss punitive damage claims for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
the governing rule is Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b) requires that, if matters
outside the pleading are presented with regard to a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, then the motion
shall be treated as one for summary judgment and all parties
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.26
Q. Tell me about the move from New York if you will. Was it
done in steps, throughout 1979?A. No, we did the entire move
in approximately six weeks time period. The first function
moved to Dallas was the systems operations control center.
That was about July 9th or 10th.Q. When was the decision
made to move to Dallas?A. November of '78.Q. Was anything
done to implement that move until July of '79?A. Could you
be specific? There was planning obviously going on. I am not
sure what you mean.Q. Were any departments moved down there
before July of 1979?A. No sir.
120
Finally,
the
plaintiffs,
citing Herschel
v.
Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 216 F.Supp. 347(S.D.N.Y.1963) and Clothier
v. United Airlines, Inc., 196 F.Supp. 435 (E.D.N.Y.1961),
argue that even if American's corporate headquarters was not
in Texas on the date of the crash, its operations base was
located in Texas and the operations base, not the corporate
headquarters, should determine where the principal place of
business of an airline is located. But the cases relied on
by the plaintiffs are not persuasive. First, these cases
involved a determination of principal place of business for
purposes of establishing diversity, not applicability of
punitive damages.
A
Applying California's "comparative impairment" analysis to
MDC, we begin with Missouri. We look first to the current
status of its interest in the application of its
[644 F.2d 623]
punitive damages law. Despite defendants' arguments to the
contrary, discussed and rejected in Part II, above, we find
that
Missouri
permits
recovery
in
death
cases
for
"aggravating circumstances" when there has been a showing of
beyond
the
award
for
compensatory
Thus,
the
application
of
California's
"comparative
impairment" analysis to the states with the greatest
interest in application of their laws reveals that both
states have strong commitments to their respective policies.
Both policies are clearly pertinent to the issue in this
case: Missouri would wish to punish MDC, a Missouri-based
corporation, for any wrongdoing related to the DC-10 crash;
California would want to shield MDC, a corporation doing
business in California, from excessive liability regarding
any wrongdoing committed in California related to the DC-10
crash. We do not regard the fact that, in each state, there
is a theoretical possibility that the state can vindicate
its policy by, respectively, the criminal sanction or the
126
B
We now considered the punitive damage claims sought against
American, with regard to the actions filed in California. As
discussed above, the first step in California's analysis is
to determine that there is an apparent conflict of laws
between the states having relevant interests in the
application of their laws. The states which have the
relevant interest are: the principal place of business; the
place of misconduct; and, under the unique facts of this
case, the place of injury.
a strong "fit" between the purpose of the rule and the facts
before us. The next question is whether that state's
interest can be achieved in other ways, such as through the
availability of insurance. As discussed with regard to MDC,
this factor is not of critical importance, but can add
another dimension to the analysis of a state's interest. It
is not clear whether a corporation can acquire insurance
against punitive damages in New York.39 For the foregoing
reasons, then, it does appear that the current status of New
York's law against punitive damages is strong and that there
is a good "fit" between New York's policy and the facts of
this case.
VII
129
VIII
We turn now to the actions filed in Michigan. For many
years, Michigan had followed the traditional rule that the
substantive law of the place of injury governed all issues
in tort actions. Abendschein v. Farrell,
IX
In Sweeney v. Sweeney, 402 Mich. 234, 262 N.W.2d 625 (1978),
the Michigan Supreme Court declared that the lex loci
delicti rule would not be applied when to do so would
frustrate Michigan public policy. In discussing exceptions
to
the lex
loci
delicti rule,
theSweeney court
cited
approvingly the case of Branyan v. Alpena Flying Service,
Inc., 65
Mich.App.
1, 236
N.W.2d
739 (1975).
The Branyan case held that the lex loci delicti rule did not
apply to airplane accidents and concluded that the "most
significant relationship" test should be used to resolve
X
Finally, we turn to Hawaii. Neither the parties nor the
district court have been able to identify the choice-of-law
law of Hawaii. The district court concluded that under any
of the conflicts rules it considered, the law of New York or
Illinois would apply to American. For that reason the
district court struck all punitive damage claims against
American in actions filed in Hawaii. But the district court
denied the motion to strike punitive damage claims against
MDC because it concluded that, under some conflicts rules,
punitive damages might be assessed against MDC. We must
reject the district court's reasoning.
XI
In conclusion, we agree with the district court's comments
on the problems involved in determining choice-of-law issues
in airplane crash cases. Airline corporations and airplane
manufacturers are subject to uniform federal regulation in
almost every aspect of their operations, except their
liability in tort. As recently as 1978, a bill was
introduced in Congress to establish a federal cause of
action
for
injuries
suffered
through
aviation
activity. See H.R.10917, 124 Cong.Rec.No.17 (February 14,
1978). If this bill, or any of its predecessors, had passed,
those actions would all be governed by federal law, uniform
as to liability and damages, rather than by the varying laws
of a number of states. SeeNote, 28 Vand.L.Rev. 621, 625
(1975). Along with the district court, we conclude that it
is clearly in the interests of passengers, airline
corporations, airplane manufacturers, and state
132
FootNotes
1. The cases have been transferred to the Northern District
of Illinois for pretrial purposes by order of the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.
2. See Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 L. &
Contemp.Prob. 754, 757-58 (1963). Professor Currie's use of
the terms "true conflict," "false conflict" and "apparent
true conflict" refers specifically to his theory of
government interest analysis. See generally Kay, The Use of
Comparative Impairment To Resolve True Conflicts: An
Evaluation of the California Experience, 68 Cal.L.Rev. 577
(1980)
[hereinafter
referred
to
as
Kay, Comparative
Impairment]. Our use of this terminology will not be so
narrow. All laws must be carefully examined to determine
that a conflict actually exists, under any choice-of-law
theory, before application of the theory.
3. The Public Utilities Act, Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 111 2/3,
77 provides:[I]f the court shall find that the act or
omission was willful, the court may in addition to the
actual damages, award damages for the sake of example and by
way of punishment.
4. The Illinois Supreme Court stated:In Mattyasovszky, where
the decedent died instantly, his estate sought to recover
punitive damages which the decedent, under the common
law, might have recovered had he survived. The court
summarily denied recovery of punitive damages because the
Survival Act itself has "never been thought to authorize the
award of punitive damages." ... The court, however, did not
base its denial of common law punitive damages on the broad
proposition that punitive damages are unrecoverable when
injury
results
in
death
....Here,
in
contrast
to Mattyasovszky, punitive recovery was sought, not under
133
Reyno, at 167.
15. See Reese, Depecage, id.; Leflar, American Conflicts
Law, 109, pp. 221-22 (3d ed. 1977)citing Wilde, Depecage
in the Choice of Tort Law, 41 S.Cal.L.Rev. 329 (1968).
16. The Restatement (Second) 175, 178 (1971) provides as
follows: 175. Right of Action for Death. In an action for
wrongful death the local law of the state where the injury
occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the
parties unless, with respect to the particular issue, some
other state has a more significant relationship under the
24.
Kay, Comparative
Impairment,
supra note
2,
at
578, quoting W. Reese & M. Rosenberg, Cases and Materials on
Conflict of Laws 470 (7th ed. 1978). Also, we are unable to
fathom a procedural compromise, such as a shift in the
burden
of
proof,
which
could
accommodate
both
policies. SeeTwerski & Mayer, Toward a Pragmatic Solution
of Choice of Law Problems At the Interface of Substance
and Procedure, 74 Nw.L.Rev. 781 (1979); Sedler, On Choice
of Law and the Great Quest: A Critique of Special
Multistate Solutions to Choice-of-Law Problems, 7 Hofstra
L.Rev. 807 (1979). Nor are we able to determine a consensus
on shared values or policies which could lead to a
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b).
27. The deposition of Mr. Lloyd-Jones continued:Q. Was any
space taken down here before July '79?Mr. Long: Do you mean
138
We
do
not
decide
the
the
an
its
or
12 N.Y.2d at 481-82, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749, 191 N.E.2d at 28384 (citations omitted).
44. Defendants argue that the New York Court of Appeals
apparently abandoned the Restatement (Second) approach
in Tooker. But the defendants misread the Tooker opinion. In
outlining the history of choice-of-law decisions in New
York, the Tooker court emphasized that the court had
rejected the lex loci delicti rule in favor of the "greatest
interest" rule of Babcock, supra, and Dym, supra. Then,
referring to the case of Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289,
274 N.Y.S.2d 591, 221 N.E.2d 380 (1966), the Tooker court
criticized
the Macey decision.
Referring
to
the Macey decision, the court said that:[s]ubstituted for a
rational choice-of-law rule was a method of decision based
in Cousins v.
N.Y.S.2d 441,
York Court now
rule in tort
problems with
Milliken
&
others
across the boundary line between the two states. As was said
by Lord Lyndhurst, "If I, residing in England, send down my
agent to Scotland, and he makes contracts for me there, it
is the same as if I myself went there and made
them." Pattison v. Mills, 1 Dow & Cl. 342, 363. So if a
person residing in this state signs and transmits, either by
a messenger or through the post-office, to a person in
another state, a written contract, which requires no special
forms or solemnities in its execution, and no signature of
the person to whom it is addressed, and is assented to and
acted on by him there, the contract is made there, just as
if the writer personally took the executed contract into the
other state, or wrote and signed it there; and it is no
objection to the maintenance of an action thereon here, that
such a contract is prohibited by the law of this
Commonwealth. M'Intyre v. Parks, above cited.
152