Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Romulo)
would send a wrong signal that an act may be justified when based on an
unconstitutional provision of law.
COCOFED vs Republic
Facts: (kayo na guys, di ko magets ang facts pero sure ko sa held)
Held:
The Operative Fact Doctrine
does not apply
Petitioners assert that the Sandiganbayans refusal to recognize the vested
rights purportedly created under the coconut levy laws constitutes taking of
private property without due process of law. They reason out that to accord
retroactive application to a declaration of unconstitutionality would be
unfair inasmuch as such approach would penalize the farmers who merely
obeyed then valid laws.
This contention is specious.
In Yap v. Thenamaris Ships Management,[170] the Operative Fact
Doctrine was discussed in that:
As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a
law. The doctrine of operative fact serves as an exception
to the aforementioned general rule. In Planters Products,
Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, we held:
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only
applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration.
In that case, this Court further held that the Operative Fact Doctrine will not
be applied as an exception when to rule otherwise would be iniquitous and
traders who got the receipts and the corresponding UCPB shares. In
addition, some uninformed coconut farmers who actually got the
COCOFUND receipts, not appreciating the importance and value of
said receipts, have already sold said receipts to non-coconut farmers,
thereby depriving them of the benefits under the coconut levy
laws. Ergo, the coconut farmers are the ones who will not be benefited
by the distribution of the UCPB shares contrary to the policy behind the
coconut levy laws. The nullification of the distribution of the UCPB
shares and their transfer to the government for the coconut industry
will, therefore, ensure that the benefits to be deprived from the UCPB
shares will actually accrue to the intended beneficiaries the genuine
coconut farmers.
From the foregoing, it is highly inappropriate to apply the
operative fact doctrine to the UCPB shares. Public funds, which
were supposedly given utmost safeguard, were haphazardly
distributed to private individuals based on statutory provisions that
are found to be constitutionally infirm on not only one but on a
variety of grounds. Worse still, the recipients of the UCPB shares
may not actually be the intended beneficiaries of said
benefit. Clearly, applying the Operative Fact Doctrine would not
only be iniquitous but would also serve injustice to the
Government, to the coconut industry, and to the people, who,
whether willingly or unwillingly, contributed to the public funds,
and therefore expect that their Government would take utmost care
of them and that they would be used no less, than for public
purpose.
CIR vs San Roque
Facts:
This Resolution resolves the Motion for Reconsideration and the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed by San Roque Power
Corporation (San Roque) in G.R. No. 187485, the Comment to the Motion
for Reconsideration filed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR)
in G.R. No. 187485, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the CIR in
G.R.No. 196113, and the Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by Taganito Mining Corporation (Taganito) in G.R. No. 196113.
San Roque prays that the rule established in our 12 February 2013 Decision
be given only a prospective effect, arguing that "the manner by which the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Court of Tax Appeals(CTA)
actually treated the 120 + 30 day periods constitutes an operative fact the
effects and consequences of which cannot be erased or undone."1
The CIR, on the other hand, asserts that Taganito Mining Corporation's
(Taganito) judicial claim for tax credit or refund was prematurely filed
before the CTA and should be disallowed because BIR Ruling No. DA-48903 was issued by a Deputy Commissioner, not by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue.
Held:
We deny both motions.
The Doctrine of Operative Fact
The general rule is that a void law or administrative act cannot be the source
of legal rights or duties. Article 7 of the Civil Code enunciates this general
rule, as well as its exception: "Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones,
and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or
custom or practice to the contrary. When the courts declared a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter
shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall
be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution."
The doctrine of operative fact is an exception to the general rule, such that a
judicial declaration of invalidity may not necessarily obliterate all the
effects and consequences of a void act prior to such declaration.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It
may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that
prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive
act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until
after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled
to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have
changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a
subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such
Spurred in large part by findings contained in the COA report and Napoles controversy,
several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the Pork Barrel be
declared unconstitutional.
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the
General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby
appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Held:
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not
only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some nonExecutive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA
(Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro
National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M
for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various
petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP.
Among their contentions was:
-The petitioner filed a Motion to dismiss before the trial court owing to
the fact that alleged that the questioned SJS Petition did not state a cause of
action and that there was no justiciable controversy.
-The trial courts junked the Velarde petitions under certain reasons:
1. It said that it had jurisdiction over the SJS petition, because in praying
for a determination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents
were violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, the petition
hasraised only a question of law.
2. It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the
Petition the separation of church and state even tracing, to some extent,
the historical background of the principle. Through its discourse, the court
quipped at some point that the "endorsement of specific candidates in an
election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause."
-The trial courts essay did not contain a statement of facts and a
dispositive portion, however. Due to this aberration, Velarde and Soriano
filed separate Motions for Reconsideration before the trial court owing to
these facts.
-The lower court denied these Motions. Hence, this petition for review.
On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc conducted an Oral Argument.14
-In his Petition, Brother Mike Velarde submits the following issues for
this Courts resolution:
1. Whether or not the Decision dated 12 June 2003 rendered by the court
a quo was proper and valid;
2. Whether or not there exists justiciable controversy in herein
respondents Petition for declaratory relief;
3. Whether or not herein respondent has legal interest in filing the Petition
for declaratory relief;
4. Whether or not the constitutional question sought to be resolved by
herein respondent is ripe for judicial determination;
5. Whether or not there is adequate remedy other than the declaratory
relief; and,
6. Whether or not the court a quo has jurisdiction over the Petition for
declaratory relief of herein respondent.
Issue:
Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy?
Held:
NO. A justiciable controversy to an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is