Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Co vs NLRC (1997) G.R.

118978
Facts:
Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, petitioner Philippine Telegraph
and Telephone Company (hereafter, PT&T) invokes the alleged concealment of civil
status and defalcation of company funds as grounds to terminate the services of an
employee. That employee, herein private respondent Grace de Guzman, contrarily
argues that what really motivated PT&T to terminate her services was her having
contracted marriage during her employment, which is prohibited by petitioner in its
company policies. She thus claims that she was discriminated against in gross violation
of law, such a proscription by an employer being outlawed by Article 136 of the Labor
Code.
Issue: WON the policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any
woman worker who contracts marriage is valid?
Held: Petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any
woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against,
discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the
Constitution.
The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost
all phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions.
Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional guarantee
of protection to labor and security of tenure. Thus, an employer is required, as a
condition sine qua non prior to severance of the employment ties of an individual under
his employ, to convincingly establish, through substantial evidence, the existence of a
valid and just cause in dispensing with the services of such employee, ones labor being
regarded as constitutionally protected property. The government, to repeat, abhors any
stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted by petitioner PT&T. The Labor Code
states, in no uncertain terms, as follows:
ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. - It shall be unlawful for an employer to
require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman
shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a
woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason
of marriage.

In the case at bar, it can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private
respondent by the branch supervisor of the company, with the reminder, that youre
fully aware that the company is not accepting married women employee (sic), as it was
verbally instructed to you. Again, in the termination notice sent to her by the same
branch supervisor, private respondent was made to understand that her severance from

the service was not only by reason of her concealment of her married status but, over
and on top of that, was her violation of the companys policy against marriage (and
even told you that married women employees are not applicable [sic] or accepted in our
company.
Petitioners policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor
Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in
connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy,
tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege
that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable
right. Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any
agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient, the same should
not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Carried to
its logical consequences, it may even be said that petitioners policy against legitimate
marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the
sacrament of marriage.