Labor Law Cases

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 197539
June 2, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ANGELITA I. DAUD, HANELITA M. GALLEMIT and RODERICK GALLEMIT y
TOLENTINO, Accused.
RODERICK GALLEMIT y TOLENTINO, Accused-appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For Our consideration is an appeal from the Decision dated March 18, 2011 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03168, which affirmed the Joint Decision dated January 15, 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Paraaque City, Branch 195, in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0122 to 30,
finding accused-appellant Roderick Gallemit y Tolentino guilty of the crimes of ( 1) illegal recruitment
in large scale, as defined and penalized under Article II, Section 6, in relation to Section 7(b) of
Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995;" and (2) estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code, but modified the penalties imposed upon appellant for said crimes.
1
In an Information dated January 3, 2003, docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-0122, Angelita I. Daud
(Daud), Hanelita M. Gallemit (Hanelita), and appellant Roderick Gallemit y Tolentino were charged
before the RTC with illegal recruitment in large scale, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about or sometime during the period from February 5, 2001 to August 2001, in the City of
Paraaque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one
another, representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino
workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, for a fee,
recruit and promise employment abroad to complainants Marcelo De Guzman, Evangeline Relox,
Maricel Rayo, Brigida Rayo, Gina Decena, Nenita Policarpio, Myrna Crisostomo and Francisco
Poserio, without first securing the required license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment thus deemed committed in large scale and therefore amounting to economic sabotage.
Eight more Informations, all dated January 3, 2003, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 03-0123 to 030130, charged Daud, Hanelita, and appellant before the RTC with eight counts of Estafa, committed
separately upon eight private complainants, namely, Marcelo I. De Guzman (De Guzman),
Evangeline I. Relox, Marcelo E. Rayo, Brigada A. Rayo, Gina T. Decena (Decena), Nenita F.
Policarpio, Myrna S. Crisostomo and Francisco S. Poserio (Poserio), respectively.
The Information in Criminal Case No. 03-0123 alleged:
That on or about covering the period from February 2001 up to March 2001, in the City of
Paraaque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and all of them mutually helping and aiding one
another, did then and there willfully and feloniously defraud Marcelo de Guzman y Ignacio pertinent
to his overseas job employment if he would deliver to them the amount of P545,000.00 by means of
other similar deceit knowing it to be false and only made to induce the aforementioned complainant
to give and deliver the said amount of P545,000.00 and accused once in possession of the same,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misapply and misappropriate the said amount
to their own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the said MARCELODE
GUZMAN y IGNACIO in the aforementioned amount.
4
The seven other Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0124 to 03-0130 were similarly worded as
the aforequoted Information, except as to the name of the private complainant and the amount
purportedly collected from him/her, to wit:
Docket No.
Private Complainant
Amount Collected
Crim. Case No. 03-0124
Evangeline I. Relox,
P25,000.00
Marcelo E. Rayo
P45,000.00
Brigada A. Rayo
P28,000.00
Gina T. Decena
P70,000.00
Nenita F. Policarpio
P50,000.00
10
Myrna S. Crisostomo
P24,500.00
11
Francisco S. Poserio
P70,000.00
Only appellant was apprehended, while his co-accused Daud and Hanelita eluded arrest and
remained at large.
The nine criminal cases against appellant before the RTC were consolidated. When arraigned,
appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges against him. Thereafter, joint trial of the nine criminal
cases ensued.
The prosecution offered as evidence the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
Certification dated September 19, 2002 stating that Green Pasture Worldwide Tour and Consultancy,
with address at India St., Don Bosco, Paraaque City, set up and operated by appellant and his coaccused, is not licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment.
12
Of all the private complainants, only De Guzman, Decena, and Poserio testified against Gallem it.
The presentation of a POEA representative was dispensed with after the defense admitted the due
execution and genuineness of the POEA Certification dated September 19, 2002.
13
Evidence for the defense consisted solely of appellants testimony.

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision dated January 15, 2007 finding appellant
guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Estafa on three (3) counts. The dispositive portion of
the judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 03-0122, the Court finds accused Roderick Gallemit y
Tolentino, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principal of the crime of
Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale in violation of Section 6 in relation to Section 7 of
RA 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995 and hereby sentences him to a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
Tolentino GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principal of the crime of
Estafa under Article 315 paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentences him to suffer the Indeterminate Penalty of two (2) years and four (4)
months as minimum to thirteen (13) years as maximum which carries with it the
accessory penalty of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a
profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage. The accused is further sentenced to pay complaining witness Marcelo De
Guzman y Ignacio the amount of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00) plus twelve
percent (12%) interest from the date of the filing of the Information on February 3,
2003, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, plus the costs of suit;
(3) In Criminal Case No. 03-0127,the Court finds accused Roderick Gallemit y
sentences him to suffer the indeterminate Penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months
as minimum to nine (9) years as maximum which carries with it the accessory
penalty of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or
calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. The
accused is further sentenced to pay the costs of suit; and
sentences him to suffer the Indeterminate Penalty of two (2) years and four (4)
months as minimum to twelve (12) years and two (2) months as maximum which
carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension from public office, from the right to
follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the
right of suffrage. The accused is further sentenced to pay costs of suit.
(5) Criminal Case Nos. 03-0124, 03-0125, 03-0126, 03-0128, and 03-0129, for failure
to prosecute, are hereby ordered Dismissed, as against accused Roderick Gallemit.
Considering that accused ANGELITA I. DAUD and HANELITA M. GALLEMIT remain at large for
more than six (6) months since the issuance and delivery of the warrant of arrest to the proper police
or peace officer, the cases against them are hereby ordered ARCHIVED pursuant to Administrative
Circular No. 7-A-92. Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against them.
14
Following the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration by the RTC in an Order dated April 3, 2007,
appellant filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals.
15
The Court of Appeals summarized the private complainants testimonies against appellant, viz:
Marcelo de Guzman[(De Guzman)], a dentist by profession with a clinic in Bulacan, testified that
sometime in January 2001, he was introduced by his patient Modesta Marqueda to her cousin,
accused [Daud]. [Daud] encouraged [De Guzman] to apply for work abroad and convinced him that
she would be able to send him to Korea. To prove to [De Guzman] that she was capable of sending
workers abroad, [Daud] invited him to visit her office located at Taft Avenue, Manila.
A month later, [De Guzman] and his cousins Maricel Rayo, Brigida Rayo, Myrna Crisostomo,
Francisco Poserio, Evangeline Relox, [Decena] and Nenita Policarpio, wentto see [Daud] at the
Jemimah International Manpower Services, located at Taft Avenue, Manila where the latter was then
working as a liaison officer. The group was shown job orders and photos of [Daud] with Korean
employees to prove that she was indeed sending workers abroad. It was at this office that [De
Guzman] first met [appellant] and [Hanelita].
Meanwhile, [Daud], together with [Hanelita] and [appellant], put up their own business named Green
Pastures Worldwide Tours and Consultancy Corporation in their residence at No. 4 Sta. Maria
Apartment, India St., Better Living Subdivision, Barangay Don Bosco, Paraaque City.
Having been convinced by the documents shown to him at the Taft Avenue office, [De Guzman] paid
[Daud] the amount of P35,000[.]00 as initial payment for his placement fee at the latters office and
residence in Paraaque City on February 2, 2001. On February 5, 2001, [De Guzman] gave [Daud]
the amount of P15,000[.]00 which was witnessed by Hanelita. He gave another P15,000.00 on
February 22, 2001. However, he lost the original receipts.
On March 3, 6 and 7, 2001, [De Guzman] again gave [Daud] x x x different amounts consisting
ofP35,000.00, P30,000.00 and P15,000.00, respectively, at her office in Paraaque City (Exhibits "A"
to "C"). In [De Guzman]s presence, [Daud] counted the money, issued receipts therefor as
"processing fees of Nike applicants", affixed her signature after signing the receipts in the name of
"Nimfa Min". [Daud] explained to him that "Nimfa Min" was her contact who happened to be the wife
of a Korean national. [De Guzman] trusted [Daud] and accepted her explanation. Whenever he gave
his payment to [Daud], it was in the presence of Hanelita and [appellant] but he did not require the
two to sign as witnesses because he trusted them as they were members of the same family. [De
Guzman] was told by [Daud] and [appellant] that he and his group would be leaving in two weeks
time.
[De Guzman] and his companions were instructed to appear before the Korean Embassy and were
promised that they would be able to leave on March 11, 2001 as trainee workers in Korea where
they would earn a monthly salary of US$400, overtime pay, with benefits of free board and lodging
and 30-day leave within a year. De Guzmans group were shown photocopies of their passport and
stamped visas for Korea. However, they were not given their working permits and job contracts.
When their departure date was getting near, [Daud] postponed it thrice. Eventually, [De Guzman]
asked from accused [Daud] a photocopy of his passport with a stamped Korean Visa. Upon inquiry
with the Korean Embassy, [De Guzman] was told that it was fake. He proceeded to the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and verified the registration of Green Pastures
Worldwide Tour and Consultancy Corporation. The POEA informed them that it was not registered
with the POEA and gave[De Guzman] a certification to the effect that the said agency was not
licensed to recruit employees for abroad (Exhibit D).
Embarrassed because of the money given by his cousins, [De Guzman] verbally asked [Daud],
Hanelita and [appellant] to return the money. They promised him that they would settle the matter but
they failed to return the money. x x x.
Gina Decena, for her part testified that sometime in January 2001, she was introduced by her
cousin, Maricel Rayo, to accused [Daud], [Hanelita] and [appellant], at the Makati Medical Towers
where Maricel had her medical examination. [Decena] again met the three accused at their office at
No. 4 Sta. Maria Apartment, Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque City when Maricel obtained a copy
of her medical certificate. They enticed [Decena] to apply at their agency by showing her job orders
that offered $400 [a] month salary, 150% overtime pay, free board and lodging as well as
photographs of prospective Korean employers. [Appellant] even gave her a copy of the job order.
The three accused assured [Decena] that they had already sent several applicants for employment
abroad. Convinced, [Decena] and her husband Marcelo Rayo applied at their agency. They were
instructed to undergo medical examination, to attend a Korean Language seminar, and to
pay P70,000.00 processing fee.
Thus, on February 15, 2001, [Decena] and her husband each gave accused [Daud] the amount
ofP35,000.00 as placement fees. During trial, [Decena] presented her receipt for P35,000.00 which
was received and signed by [Daud].
Thereafter, the couple were told to wait for two weeks for the processing of their visas. As two weeks
have passed and nothing happened to their applications, [Decena] and her husband went to the
POEA to verify the status of the agency. They were informed to the effect that said agency was not
licensed to send workers abroad. [Decena] and her husband went back to the agency and tried to
look for the accused but they were all gone. They later came to know, through [De Guzman], that
[appellant] was apprehended. She identified her sworn statement in court.
Sometime in January 2001, Francisco Poserio [(Poserio)] was brought along by his cousin [De
Guzman] to No. 4 Sta. Maria Apt., India St., Better Living Subdivision, Barangay Don Bosco,
Paraaque City. While thereat, [De Guzman] introduced [Daud], Hanelita and [appellant] as the
owners of Green Pastures Worldwide Tours and Consultancy and that they were sending workers to
Korea. The three accused encouraged [Poserio] to apply for work in Korea where he could get a job
which offered a monthly salary of US$400 with free meals and housing, 150% pay on overtime work
and vacation leave of thirty (30) days in a two-year contract. To convince [Poserio] that they can
send workers to Korea, they showed him job orders from Hyundai Group and Nike requiring workers
for Korea, a copy of a Korean visa of one of their job applicants, and photos of [Daud] in Korea with
a Korean national who would be [Poserio]s prospective employer if he applied with their agency.
Further, he would be able to earn back his placement fee in three months work.
Enticed, [Poserio] mortgaged his property to get funds for his job application. [Daud] and Hanelita
informed him to undergo a medical examination and seminar and even gave him a referral. On
January 27, 2001, he gave his passport, medical examination result, seminar result and certification
for employment. He was then told to pay P100,000.00 as processing fee for his job application. On
March 3, 2001, he gave his down payment of P25,000.00 to [Daud] in the presence of Hanelita and
[appellant]. He was told to wait for two weeks for the processing of his papers. On July 2001, he was
informed that additional amount was needed to process his papers. Thus, on July 5, 2001, he
gaveP45,000.00 as additional payment to [Daud] in the presence of Hanelita. He was again told to
wait for another three weeks. He was even promised that they would return his money if he would
notbe sent abroad. A year after his payment, [Poserio] was still not able to leave the country. Upon
verification with the POEA, he and the other job applicants discovered that the said agency was not
licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment. He talked over the phone with the accused and
demanded the return of his money. When they failed to return his money, he filed a complaint with
the Paraaque police.
All three complainants positively identified [appellant] in court. (Citations omitted.)
16
The Court of Appeals similarly provided a gist of appellants testimony, thus:
Roderick Gallemit [(appellant)] denied owning the agency, undertaking any recruitment act or
receiving any amount from the complainants considering that his name did not appear in the
receipts. He admitted that he is married to co-accused [Hanelita] and that co-accused [Daud] is his
mother-in-law.
He knew private complainants [De Guzman] and [Poserio] who were introduced to him by [Daud]
who was then working as a liaison officer at Jemimah International Manpower Services located in
Taft Avenue, Manila. [Appellant] denied knowing the other complainants. He was just brought along
by [Daud] since he was also one of the job seekers applying at the Jemimah International Manpower
Services where [Daud] worked. [Daud] told him that private complainant [De Guzman] is her
business partner. [Poserio] was one of those applying for a job abroad and [De Guzman] would refer
them to [Daud]. Thus, [De Guzman] frequented their apartment in Paraaque.
He admitted that, from February 2001 to August 2001, he had been staying at the apartment in India
Street, Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque City he shared with his wife Hanelita, their child and his
mother-in-law [Daud]. He and his wife were not employed since they were applying for a job abroad.
His siblings help him out by sending him money for his job application. He was aware that his
mother-in-law [Daud] was a recruiter and owned an agency named Green Pasture Worldwide Travel
and Tours which she operated in the same apartment.
He claimed that [Daud] has only one employee, a certain Badjong, who processed documents. At
first he did not apply with [Daud] because her business was still new. He applied with her when she
convinced him that she could process his passport and papers to Korea.
He denied he was present when the complainants gave their payments to [Daud]. He insisted that
he was not involved with [Daud]s business and that he was always out of the house as he would
often go to Cavite to ask for financial help from his siblings. x x x. (Citations omitted.)
17
In its Decision dated March 18, 2011,the Court of Appeals affirmed appellants conviction by the
RTC, but modified the indeterminate penalties imposed on appellant for the three counts of estafa.
The appellate court decreed:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision finding accused-appellant RODERICK GALLEMIT y
TOLENTINO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and of Estafa is
AFFIRMED with modification with respect to the indeterminate penalties imposed on appellant for
the three counts of estafa, to wit:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 03-0123, appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional as minimum to
thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
nine (9) years of prision mayor as maximum.
twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum.
In all other respects, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED.
18
Hence, appellant comes before us via the instant appeal with the same assignment of errors which
he raised before the Court of Appeals:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
LARGE-SCALE ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT AND ESTAFA DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS
FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
ESTAFADESPITE THE ABSENCE [OF] THE ELEMENT OF DECEIT.
Illegal recruitment in large scale
Appellant anchors his bid for acquittal on the failure of the prosecution to prove that he gave private
complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send them abroad for work
such that they were convinced to part with their money. Any encouragement or promise of
employment abroad was solely made by Daud. Appellant points out that it was only his alleged
presence at the time private complainants were making their payments to Daud that led said private
complainants to believe that appellant participated in the recruitment scheme.
The Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for the appellee, insists that appellant acted in
conspiracy with his co-accused in engaging in illegal recruitment activities, specifically performing
the following acts: (1) Appellant, together with his co-accused, owned and operated Green Pasture
Worldwide Tour and Consultancy Corporation; (2) Appellant, together with his co-accused,
encouraged private complainants to apply for jobs abroad with their agency, promising private
complainants salary of US$400.00, 150% overtime pay, and free board and lodging; (3) Appellant,
together with his co-accused, assured private complainants that they could leave for Korea within a
short period after paying their placement fees; and (4) Appellant was present everytime private
complainants made payments to his co-accused Daud. In addition, private complainants De
Guzman, Decena, and Poserio positively identified and pointed to appellant in court as one of the
persons who recruited them for work abroad.
19
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as "any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers; and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or
not." In the simplest terms, illegal recruitment is committed by persons who, without authority from
the government, give the impression that they have the power to send workers abroad for
employment purposes.
20
Republic Act No. 8042 broadened the concept of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and
provided stiffer penalties, especially for those that constitute economic sabotage, i.e., Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale and Illegal Recruitment Committed by a Syndicate.
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 defined illegal recruitment as follows:
SEC. 6. Definition. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when
undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of

Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines:
Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include
the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee
or holder of authority:
xxxx
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and
processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place
without the workers fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall
be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three elements must concur: (a) the offender has no
valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and
placement of workers; (b) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of
"recruitment and placement" under Article13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34 of the said Code (now Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042); and (c) the
offender committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.
21
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals ruled that all the foregoing elements of illegal recruitment in
large scale are present in the case at bar. As the Court of Appeals discussed in detail:
First, neither the agency "Green Pastures World Wide Tours and Consultancy" nor appellant himself
had a valid license or authority to engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. This was
established by the POEA certification stating that the said agency located in that apartment was not
licensed to recruit employees for abroad. A license is a document issued by the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) authorizing a person or entity to operate a private employment agency,
while an authority is a document issued by the DOLE authorizing a person or association to engage
in recruitment and placement activities as a private recruitment entity. It is the lack of the necessary
license or authority that renders the recruitment activity, as in this case, unlawful or criminal.
Second, despite not having such authority, appellant, along with his co-accused, nevertheless
engaged in recruitment activities, offering and promising jobs to private complainants and collecting
from them various amounts as placement fees. This is substantiated by the respective testimonies of
the three private complainants who fell victim to their illegal activities. Marcelo de Guzman testified
that appellant was physically present during the time that he and his companions were being shown
job orders and while he was paying for the fees for himself and in behalf of his companions.
Francisco Poserio testified that appellant was one of those who apprised him of job benefits and
tried to convince him to apply for overseas employment through their agency. Gina Decena
mentioned that [appellant] even gave her a copy of the job order.
We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the lower court that there was conspiracy among
the accused in the commission of the offense. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime
is not necessary. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused which point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interest. Conspiracy exists where the participants performed
specific acts with such closeness and coordination as unmistakably to indicate a common purpose
or design in committing the crime.
The testimonies of the complainants on the matter are affirmative in nature and sufficiently
corroborative of each other to be less than credible. It would be contrary to human nature and
experience for several persons to conspire and accuse appellant of a crime and send him to prison
just to appease their feeling of rejection and vindicate the frustration of their dreams to work abroad
if all he did was just to reside in the same apartment where his mother-in-law [Daud] operated her
recruitment agency. It is in this light that We find any inconsistencies that accused-appellant harps
on in the tesimonines of the complainants to be inconsequential. What is important is that they have
positively identified accused-appellant as one of those who enticed them to part with their money in
exchange for promised jobs abroad.
The crime of illegal recruitment, according to the Supreme Court is committed when, among other
things, a person, who without being duly authorized according to law, represents or gives the distinct
impression that he or she has the power or the ability to provide work abroad convincing those to
whom the representation is made or to whom the impression is given to thereupon part with their
money in order to be assured of that employment. This is what obtains in this case.
Contrary to appellants mistaken notion, it is not the issuance or signing of receipts for the placement
fees that makes a case for illegal recruitment, but rather the undertaking of recruitment activities
without the necessary license or authority. The absence of receipts to evidence payment is not
necessarily fatal to the prosecutions cause. A person charged with the illegal recruitment may be
convicted on the strength of the testimony of the complainants, if found to be credible and
convincing.
Considering the evidence on record, We agree with the trial court that accused-appellant engaged in
recruitment of workers which was illegal and in large scale. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed
in large scale if committed against three or more persons individually or as a group. In this case,
three complainants testified against appellants acts of illegal recruitment. (Citations omitted.)
22
The Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals. The prosecution witnesses were positive and categorical in their testimonies that
they personally met appellant; that they knew appellant was associated with Green Pasture
Worldwide Tour and Consultancy; and that appellant had performed recruitment activities such as
promising employment abroad, encouraging job applications, and providing copies of job orders. The
private complainants testimonies are consistent and corroborate one another on material points,
such as the amount of the placement fees asked, and the purported country of destination and
nature of work.
It was not necessary for the prosecution to still prove that appellant himself received the placement
fees from private complainants and issued receipts for the same, given the finding of both the RTC
and the Court of Appeals of the existence of conspiracy among appellant and his co-accused
Hanelita and Daud, appellants wife and mother-in-law, respectively. When there is conspiracy, the
act of one is the act of all. It is not essential that there be actual proof that all the conspirators took a
direct part in every act. It is sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.
23
24
Between the categorical statements of the private complainants, on the one hand, and the bare
denial of appellant, on the other hand, the former must perforce prevail. An affirmative testimony is
far stronger than a negative testimony especially when the former comes from the mouth of a
credible witness. Denial, same as an alibi, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is
negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. It is considered with suspicion and
always received with caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also because
it is easily fabricated and concocted.
25
Furthermore, without any evidence to show that private complainants were propelled by any ill
motive to testify falsely against appellant, their testimonies deserve full faith and credit. After all, the
doctrinal rule is that findings of fact made by the trial court, which had the opportunity to directly
observe the witnesses and to determine the probative value of the other testimonies, are entitled to
great weight and respect because the trial court is in a better position to assess the same, an
opportunity not equally open to the appellate court. The absence of any showing that the trial court
plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of
the case, or that its assessment was arbitrary, impels us to defer to the trial courts determination
according credibility to the prosecution evidence. This is more true if the findings of the trial court
were affirmed by the appellate court, since it is settled that when the trial courts findings have been
affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.
26
27
Given the foregoing, we uphold the conviction of appellant for illegal recruitment in a large scale,
which constitutes economic sabotage. The penalty of life imprisonment and the fine of P500,000.00,
imposed upon appellant for the said offense by the RTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is in
accord with Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042, which provides:
Sec. 7. Penalties.
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve
(12) years and a fine of not less than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00)
nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00)
shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined
herein. (Emphasis ours.)
Estafa
We likewise affirm the conviction of appellant for three counts of estafa committed against the private
complainants in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0123, 03-0127, and 03-0130, based on the very same
evidence that proved appellants criminal liability for illegal recruitment.
It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under
Republic Act No. 8042, in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a)of
the Revised Penal Code. As we explained in People v. Cortez and Yabut :
28
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and
convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2(a) of Art.
315 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the
criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the
criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code
does not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws.
Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar
a conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that ones acquittal of the crime of
estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and
vice versa. (Citations omitted.)
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code defines estafa as:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow x x x:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by
means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the
offended party or third person.
29
Appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of estafa because the element of deceit is lacking.
He insists on the absence of proof that he made any false statement or fraudulent representation to
private complainants.
We are not persuaded. As we had previously discussed herein, private complainants were able to
establish, through their positive and credible testimonies, that appellant acted in conspiracy with his
co-accused to mislead private complainants into believing that appellant and his co-accused, for a
fee, can deploy private complainants abroad for employment. Decena testified that appellant gave
her a copy of the purported job order for Korea, while Poserio avowed that appellant encouraged
him to apply for work abroad. Daud, appellants fellow conspirator, accepted placement fees from
private complainants, even issuing receipts for some; instructed private complainants to undergo
medical examination; and took private complainants passports. The representations made by
appellant and his co-accused to private complainants were actually false and fraudulent, not only
because they were not duly authorized to undertake recruitment for overseas employment, but also
because there were no actual jobs waiting for private complainants in Korea and private
complainants never had a chance to leave for work abroad.
Appellant also argues that the second element of estafa, which is prejudice or pecuniary loss, was
not established during trial as the prosecution was unable to present any receipt signed by appellant
proving that he received money from private complainants.
We disagree once more with appellant. We reiterate that when conspiracy has been established, the
act of one conspirator is the act of all. All three private complainants testified that they paid
placement fees to Daud, who issued receipts for some amounts either in her name or in the name of
one "Nimfa Min." Moreover, the payment of placement fees to illegal recruiters is not evidenced by
receipts alone; it can also be established by testimonies of witnesses. In People v. Pabalan, we
held:
30
Although not all of the amounts testified to by complainants were covered by receipts, the fact that
there were no receipts for some of the amounts delivered to him does not mean that appellant did
not accept or receive such payments. This Court has ruled in several cases that the absence of
receipts in a criminal case for illegal recruitment does not warrant the acquittal of the accused and is
not fatal to the case of the prosecution. As long as the witnesses had positively shown through their
respective testimonies that the accused is the one involved in the prohibited recruitment, he may be
convicted of the offense despite the want of receipts.
The Statute of Frauds and the rules of evidence do not require the presentations of receipts in order
to prove the existence of a recruitment agreement and the procurement of fees in illegal recruitment
cases. The amounts may consequently be proved by the testimony of witnesses. (Citation omitted.)
Again, there is no cogent reason for us to disturb the finding of the RTC, affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, that both elements of estafa are present in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0123, 03-0127, and 030130. Thus, we sustain appellants conviction for estafa, punishable under Article 315, paragraph
2(a), of the Revised Penal Code.
The penalty for estafa depends on the amount of defraudation. Per Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code:
1wphi1
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period,
if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may
be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the
penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be[.]
The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, when the amount of
the fraud is over P12,000.00 but not exceeding P22,000.00, is prision correccional maximum to
prision mayor minimum (i.e., from 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day to 8 years). Under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, or anywhere within prision correccional minimum and
medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Consequently, the minimum terms
in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0123,03-127, and 03-0130 were correctly fixed by the RTC, and affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, at 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional.
31
The maximum term under the Indeterminate Sentence Law shall be that which, in view of attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code. To compute
the minimum, medium, and maximum periods of the prescribed penalty for estafa when the amount
of fraud exceedsP12,000.00, the time included in prision correccional maximum to prision mayor
minimum shall be divided into three equal portions, with each portion forming a period. Following this
computation, the minimum period for prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum is
from 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, and 10 days; the medium period is from 5
years, 5 months, and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, and 20 days; and the maximum period is from 6
years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years. Any incremental penalty (i.e., one year for
every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00) shall thus be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8
months, and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court, provided that the total penalty does
not exceed 20 years.
32
In Criminal Case Nos. 03-0123, 03-127, and 03-0130, the maximum term shall be taken from the
maximum period of the prescribed penalty, which is 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years. The
Court of Appeals fixed the maximum term at 8 years.
But then, since private complainants were defrauded in the amounts exceeding P22,000.00,
incremental penalty shall be imposed upon appellant, determined as follows:
1wphi1
Criminal Case
No. (Private
Complainant)
03-0123 (De Guzman)
Amount
Defrauded
P80,000.00
Difference After
Subtracting
P22,000.00
Quotient After
Dividing by
P10,000.00
Incremental
Penalty
P58,000.00
5.8
5 years
33
03-0127 (Decena)
P35,000.00
P13,000.00
1.3
1 year
03-130 (Poserio)
P70,000.00
P48,000.00
4.8
4 years
The incremental penalty shall be added to the maximum term of 8 years fixed by the Court of
Appeals. Thus, we agree with the Court of Appeals in imposing the maximum penalty in Criminal
Case No. 03-0123at thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal; in Criminal Case No. 03-0127 at nine
(9) years of prision mayor; and in Criminal Case No. 03-0130 at twelve (12) years of prision mayor.
Lastly, it is still incumbent upon appellant to indemnify private complainants for the amounts paid to
him and his conspirators, with legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum, from the time of demand,
which, in this case, shall be deemed as the same day the Informations were filed against appellant,
until the said amounts are fully paid.
34
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the Decision dated March 18, 2011 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03168, to read as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 03-0122, appellant Roderick T. Gallemit is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale, constituting economic sabotage, as
defined and penalized in Section 6, in relation to Section 7(b), of Republic Act No. 8042, for
which he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and is ordered to pay a fine
of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500.000.00);
reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, for which he is sentenced to a prison term of two (2) years
and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to thirteen years (13) of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and ordered to indemnify private complainant Marcelo I. De Guzman
in the amount of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, with legal interest
of six percent (6%) per annum from January 3, 2003, until the said amount is fully paid;
2(a) of the Revised Penal C ode, for which he is sentenced to a prison term of two (2) years
and four
(4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years of prision mayor, as
maximum, ordered to indemnify private complainant Gina T. Decena in the amount of ThirtyFive Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00) as actual damages, with legal interest of six percent
(6%) per annum from January 3, 2003, until the said amount is fully paid; and
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, for which he is sentenced to a prison term of two (2) years
and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve (12) years of prision
mayor, as maximum, and ordered to indemnify private complainant Francisco S. Poserio in
the amount of Seventy Thousand Pesos (P70,000.00) as actual damages, with legal interest
of six percent (6%) per annum from January 3, 2003, until the said amount is fully paid.
SO ORDERED
SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION et al.
480 SCRA 146 (2006)
FACTS: Respondent Divina Montehermozo is a domestic helper deployed to Taiwan by Sunace
International Management Services (Sunace) under a 12-month contract. Such employment was
made with the assistance of Taiwanese broker Edmund Wang. After the expiration of the contract,
Montehermozo continued her employment with her Taiwanese employer for another 2 years.
When Montehermozo returned to the Philippines, she filed a complaint against Sunace, Wang, and
her Taiwanese employer before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). She alleges that
she was underpaid and was jailed for three months in Taiwan. She further alleges that the 2-year
extension of her employment contract was with the consent and knowledge of Sunace. Sunace, on
the other hand, denied all the allegations.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Montehermozo and found Sunace liable thereof. The National
Labor Relations Commission and Court of Appeals affirmed the labor arbiters decision. Hence, the
filing of this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 2-year extension of Montehermozos employment was made with the
knowledge and consent of Sunace
HELD: There is an implied revocation of an agency relationship when after the termination of the
original employment contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with the employee and entered
into a new and separate employment contract.
Contrary to the Court of Appeals finding, the alleged continuous communication was with the
Taiwanese broker Wang, not with the foreign employer.
The finding of the Court of Appeals solely on the basis of the telefax message written by Wang to
Sunace, that Sunace continually communicated with the foreign "principal" (sic) and therefore was
aware of and had consented to the execution of the extension of the contract is misplaced. The
message does not provide evidence that Sunace was privy to the new contract executed after the
expiration on February 1, 1998 of the original contract. That Sunace and the Taiwanese broker
communicated regarding Montehermozos allegedly withheld savings does not necessarily mean
that Sunace ratified the extension of the contract.
As can be seen from that letter communication, it was just an information given to Sunace that
Montehermozo had taken already her savings from her foreign employer and that no deduction was
made on her salary. It contains nothing about the extension or Sunaces consent thereto.
Parenthetically, since the telefax message is dated February 21, 2000, it is safe to assume that it
was sent to enlighten Sunace who had been directed, by Summons issued on February 15, 2000, to
appear on February 28, 2000 for a mandatory conference following Montehermozos filing of the
complaint on February 14, 2000.
Respecting the decision of Court of Appeals following as agent of its foreign principal, [Sunace]
cannot profess ignorance of such an extension as obviously, the act of its principal extending
[Montehermozos] employment contract necessarily bound it, it too is a misapplication, a
misapplication of the theory of imputed knowledge.
The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent, Sunace, to the principal,
employer, not the other way around. The knowledge of the principal-foreign employer cannot,
therefore, be imputed to its agent Sunace.
There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be bound under the 2-year
employment contract extension, it cannot be said to be privy thereto. As such, it and its "owner"
cannot be held solidarily liable for any of Montehermozos claims arising from the 2-year
employment extension. As the New Civil Code provides, Contracts take effect only between the
parties, their assigns, and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the
contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. Furthermore,
as Sunace correctly points out, there was an implied revocation of its agency relationship with its
foreign principal when, after the termination of the original employment contract, the foreign principal
directly negotiated with Montehermozo and entered into a new and separate employment contract in
Taiwan. Article 1924 of the New Civil Code states that the agency is revoked if the principal directly
manages the business entrusted to the agent, dealing directly with third persons.
[G.R. No. 138193. March 5, 2003]
OSM SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION (Third Division) and FERMIN F.
GUERRERO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Rules of Court do not require that all supporting papers and
documents accompanying a petition for certiorari should be duplicate originals
or certified true copies. Furthermore, unilateral decisions to alter the use of a
vessel from overseas service to coastwise shipping will not affect the validity
of an existing employment contract validly executed. Workers should not be
prejudiced by actions done solely by employers without the formers consent
or participation.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, seeking to set aside the February 11, 1999 and the March 26, 1999
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 50667. The
assailed Resolutions dismissed a Petition filed in the CA, challenging an
adverse ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The first
Resolution disposed as follows:
[1]
We resolve to OUTRIGHTLY DISMISS the petition.
[2]
The second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

[3]
On the other hand, the NLRC Decision disposed in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from is hereby
MODIFIED in that respondents OSM Shipping Phils. Inc. and its principal, Philippine
Carrier Shipping Agency Services Co. are jointly and severally ordered to pay
complainant the sum of ELEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY NINE
and 65/100 [US dollars] (US$11,359.65) or its peso equivalent at the time of payment
representing complainants unpaid salaries, accrued fixed overtime pay, allowance,

vacation leave pay and termination pay.
[4]
The Facts
This case originated from a Complaint filed by Fermin F. Guerrero against
OSM Shipping Philippines, Inc.; and its principal, Philippine Carrier Shipping
Agency Services Co. The Complaint was for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of salaries, overtime pay and vacation pay. The facts are
summarized in the NLRC Decision as follows:
[Private respondent] was hired by [Petitioner] OSM for and in behalf of its principal,
Phil Carrier Shipping Agency Services Co. (PC-SLC) to board its vessel M/V
[Princess] Hoa as a Master Mariner for a contract period of ten (10) months. Under
the said contract, his basic monthly salary is US$1,070.00, US$220.00 allowance,
US$321.00 fixed overtime, US$89 vacation leave pay per month for x x x 44 hours f]
work per week. He boarded the vessel on July 21, 1994 and complied faithfully with
the duties assigned to him.
[Private respondent] alleged that from the start of his work with M/V Princess Hoa, he
was not paid any compensation at all and was forced to disembark the vessel
sometime in January 1995 because he cannot even buy his basic personal necessities.
For almost seven (7) months, i.e. from July 1994 to January 1995, despite the services
he rendered, no compensation or remuneration was ever paid to him. Hence, this case
for illegal dismissal, [non-payment] of salaries, overtime pay and vacation pay.
[Petitioner] OSM, for its part, alleged that on July 26, 1994, Concorde Pacific, an
American company which owns M/V Princess Hoa, then a foreign registered vessel,
appointed x x x Philippine Carrier Shipping Agency Services Co. (PC-SASCO) as
ship manager particularly to negotiate, transact and deal with any third persons,
entities or corporations in the planning of crewing selection or determination of
qualifications of Filipino Seamen. On the same date, [Petitioner] OSM entered into a
Crew Agreement with x x x PC-SASCO for the purpose of processing the documents
of crew members of M/V Princess Hoa. The initial plan of the [s]hip-owner was to use
the vessel in the overseas trade, particularly the East Asian Growth Area. Thereafter,
the contract of [private respondent] was processed before the POEA on September 20,
1994.
OSM alleged further that the shipowner changed its plans on the use of the vessel.
Instead of using it for overseas trade, it decided to use it in the coastwise trade, thus,
the crewmembers hired never left the Philippines and were merely used by the
shipowner in the coastwise trade. Considering that the M/V Princess Hoa was a
foreign registered vessel and could not be used in the coastwise trade, the shipowner
converted the vessel to Philippine registry on September 28, 1994 by way of bareboat
chartering it out to another entity named Philippine Carrier Shipping Lines Co.
(PCSLC). To do this, the shipowner through Conrado V. Tendido had to terminate its
management agreement with x x x PC-SASCO on September 28, 1994 by a letter of
termination dated September 20, 1994. In the same letter of termination, the ship
owner stated that it has bareboat chartered out the vessel to said [PCSLC] and
converted it into Philippine registry. Consequently, x x x PC-SASCO terminated its
crew agreement with OSM in a letter dated December 5, 1994. Because of the
bareboat charter of the vessel to PCSLC and its subsequent conversion to Philippine
registry and use in coastwise trade as well as to the termination of the management
agreement and crew agency agreement, a termination of contract ensued whereby
PCSLC, the bareboat charterer, became the disponent owner/employer of the crew.
As a disponent owner/employer, PCSLC is now responsible for the payment of
complainants wages. x x x.
[5]
Labor Arbiter (LA) Manuel R. Caday rendered a Decision in favor of

Private Respondent Guerrero. Petitioner and its principal, Philippine Carrier
Shipping Agency Services, Co. (PC-SASCO), were ordered to jointly and
severally pay Guerrero his unpaid salaries and allowances, accrued fixed
overtime pay, vacation leave pay and termination pay. The Decision held that
there was a constructive dismissal of private respondent, since he had not
been paid his salary for seven months. It also dismissed petitioners contention
that there was a novation of the employment contract.
[6]
On appeal, the NLRC (Third Division) affirmed the LAs Decision, with a
modification as to the amount of liability. On January 28, 1999, petitioner filed
with the CA a Petition to set aside the NLRC judgment. The petition was
dismissed, because petitioner had allegedly failed to comply with the
requirements of Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Specifically,
petitioner had attached to its Petition, not a duplicate original or a certified true
copy of the LAs Decision, but a mere machine copy thereof. Further, it had not
indicated the actual address of Private Respondent Fermin F. Guerrero.
[7]
[8]
Hence, this Petition.
[9]
The Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Courts
consideration:
1. Did not the Court of Appeals err in interpreting and applying the 1997 Rules when
it required as attachment to the Petition for Certiorari the duplicate original of another
Decision which is not-the subject of the said Petition?
it disregarded the subsequent compliance made by petitioner?
it did not consider the Notice to private respondent Guerrero through his counsel as
Notice to Guerrero himself?
[10]
The foregoing issues all refer to the question of whether, procedurally,

petitioner has complied with Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.
Additionally and in the interest of speedy justice, this Court will also resolve
the substantive issue brought before the CA: did the NLRC commit grave
abuse of discretion in ruling in favor of private respondent?
The Courts Ruling
While petitioner is procedurally correct, the case should nonetheless be
decided on the merits in favor of private respondent.
Procedural Issue:
Compliance with the Rules of Court
Petitioner puts at issue the proper interpretation of Section 3 of Rule 46 of
the Rules of Court. Specifically, was petitioner required to attach a certified
true copy of the LAs Decision to its Petition for Certiorari challenging the
NLRC judgment?
[11]
Section 3 of Rule 46 does not require that all supporting papers and
documents accompanying a petition be duplicate originals or certified true
copies. Even under Rule 65 on certiorari and prohibition, petitions need to be
accompanied only by duplicate originals or certified true copies of
the questioned judgment, order or resolution. Other relevant documents and

pleadings attached to it may be mere machine copies thereof. Numerous
decisions issued by this Court emphasize that in appeals under Rule 45 and
in original civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rules 46 and
56, what is required to be certified is the copy of the questioned judgment,
final order or resolution. Since the LAs Decision was not the questioned
ruling, it did not have to be certified. What had to be certified was the NLRC
Decision. And indeed it was.
[12]
[13]
As to the alleged missing address of private respondent, the indication by

petitioner that Guerrero could be served with process care of his counsel was
substantial compliance with the Rules.
This Court has held that the sending of pleadings to a party is not
required, provided that the party is represented by counsel. This rule is
founded on considerations of fair play, inasmuch as an attorney of record is
engaged precisely because a party does not feel competent to deal with the
intricacies of law and procedure. Both jurisprudence and the basics of
procedure provide that when a party has appeared through counsel, service
is to be made upon the latter, unless the court specifically orders that it be
upon the party.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
We also note that from the inception of the case at the LAs office, all
pleadings addressed to private respondent had always been sent to his
counsel, Atty. Danilo G. Macalino. Note that private respondent, who was
employed as a seaman, was often out of his home. The service of pleadings
and other court processes upon him personally would have been futile, as he
would not have been around to receive them.
This Court has repeatedly held that while courts should meticulously
observe the Rules, they should not be overly strict about procedural lapses
that do not impair the proper administration of justice. Rather, procedural
rules should be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.
[18]
[19]
Substantive Issue:
Liability of Petitioner for Unpaid Salaries
It is worthwhile to note that what is involved in this case is the recovery of

unpaid salaries and other monetary benefits. The Court is mindful of the plight
of private respondent and, indeed, of workers in general who are seeking to
recover wages that are being unlawfully withheld from them. Such recovery
should not be needlessly delayed at the expense of their survival. This case is
now on its ninth year since its inception at the LAs office. Its remand to the CA
will only unduly delay its disposition. In the interest of substantial justice, this
Court will decide the case on the merits based upon the records of the case,
particularly those relating to the OSM Shipping Philippines Petition before the
CA.
[20]
On behalf of its principal, PC-SASCO, petitioner does not deny hiring

Private Respondent Guerrero as master mariner. However, it argues that
since he was not deployed overseas, his employment contract became
ineffective, because its object was allegedly absent. Petitioner contends that
using the vessel in coastwise trade and subsequently chartering it to another
principal had the effect of novating the employment contract. We are not
persuaded.
As approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA),
petitioner was the legitimate manning agent of PC-SASCO. As such, it was
allowed to select, recruit, hire and deploy seamen on board the vessel M/V
Princess Hoa, which was managed by its principal, PC-SASCO. It was in this
capacity that petitioner hired private respondent as master mariner. They then
executed and agreed upon an employment contract.
[21]
[22]
An employment contract, like any other contract, is perfected at the

moment (1) the parties come to agree upon its terms; and (2) concur in the
essential elements thereof: (a) consent of the contracting parties, (b) object
certain which is the subject matter of the contract and (c) cause of the
obligation. Based on the perfected contract, Private Respondent Guerrero
complied with his obligations thereunder and rendered his services on board
the vessel. Contrary to petitioners contention, the contract had an object,
which was the rendition of service by private respondent on board the vessel.
The non-deployment of the ship overseas did not affect the validity of the
perfected employment contract. After all, the decision to use the vessel for
coastwise shipping was made by petitioner only and did not bear the written
conformity of private respondent. A contract cannot be novated by the will of
only one party. The claim of petitioner that it processed the contract of
[23]
[24]
private respondent with the POEA only after he had started working is also
without merit. Petitioner cannot use its own misfeasance to defeat his claim.
Petitioner, as manning agent, is jointly and severally liable with its
principal, PC-SASCO, for private respondents claim. This conclusion is in
accordance with Section 1 of Rule II of the POEA Rules and Regulations.
Joint and solidary liability is meant to assure aggrieved workers of
immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them. The fact that
petitioner and its principal have already terminated their agency agreement
does not relieve the former of its liability. The reason for this ruling was given
by this Court in Catan National Labor Relations Commission, which we
reproduce in part as follows:
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
This must be so, because the obligations covenanted in the [manning] agreement
between the local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminus with the term of
such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the
responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement
do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until the expiration of the,
employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the said
recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory the very purpose for
which the law governing the employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was
enacted.
[29]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions are hereby SET ASIDE, and the
September 10, 1998 NLRC Decision REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
AMELIA J. DELOS SANTOS,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 154185

Present:
PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, and
GARCIA, JJ.
- versus -
Promulgated:
JEBSEN MARITIME, INC.,
Respondent.
November 22, 2005
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Petitioner Amelia J. Delos Santos seeks in this petition for

review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to nullify
and set aside the decision and resolution dated 21 March
2002[1] and 03 July 2002[2], respectively, of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 62229.
From the petition and its annexes, the respondents comment
thereto, and the parties respective memoranda, the Court gathers
the following factual antecedents:
On 10 August 1995, or thereabout, herein respondent Jebsen

Maritime, Inc., for and in behalf of Aboitiz Shipping Co. (Aboitiz
Shipping, for short), hired petitioners husband, Gil R. Delos Santos
(hereinafter, Delos Santos) as third engineer of MV Wild Iris. The
corresponding contract of employment, as approved by the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), was for a
fixed period of one (1) month and for a specific undertaking of
conducting said vessel to and from Japan. It quoted Delos Santos
basic monthly salary and other monetary benefits in US currency.
Under POEA rules, all employers and principals are required to
adopt the POEA - standard employment contract (POEA-SEC)
without prejudice to their adoption of terms and conditions over
and above the minimum prescribed by that agency. [3]
On the vessels return to the Philippines a month after, Delos
Santos remained on board, respondent having opted to retain his
services while the vessel underwent repairs in Cebu. After its
repair, MV Wild Iris, this time renamed/registered as MV Super
RoRo 100, sailed within domestic waters, having been meanwhile
issued by the Maritime Industry Authority a Certificate of Vessel
Registry and a permit to engage in coastwise trade on the ManilaCebu-Manila-Zamboanga-General Santos-Manila route. [4] During
this period of employment, Delos Santos was paid by and
received from respondent his salary in Philippine peso thru a
payroll-deposit arrangement with the Philippine Commercial &
Industrial Bank.[5]
Some five months into the vessels inter-island voyages,
Delos Santos experienced episodes of chest pain, numbness and
body weakness which eventually left him temporarily paralyzed.
On 17 February 1996, he was brought to the Manila Doctors
Hospital a duly accredited hospital of respondent - where he
underwent a spinal column operation. Respondent shouldered all
operation-related expenses, inclusive of his post operation

confinement.
As narrated in the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals,
the following events next transpired:
1. After his discharge from the Manila Doctors, Delos Santos was made to
undergo physical therapy sessions at the same hospital, which compelled the
Batangas-based Delos Santoses to rent a room near the hospital at P3,000.00 a
month;
2. Delos Santos underwent a second spinal operation at the nonaccredited Lourdes Hospital at the cost of P119, 536.00; and
3. After Lourdes, Delos Santos was confined in a clinic in San Juan,
Batangas where P20,000.00 in hospitalization expenses was incurred.
It would appear that the spouses Delos Santos paid all the
expenses attendant the second spinal operation as well as for the
subsequent
medical treatment.
Petitioners
demand
for
reimbursement of these expenses was rejected by respondent for
the reason that all the sickness benefits of Delos Santos under the
Social Security System (SSS) Law had already been paid.
Thus, on 25 January 1997, petitioner filed a complaint [6] with
the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) against respondent and Aboitiz Shipping for recovery of
disability benefits, and sick wage allowance and reimbursement
of hospital and medical expenses. She also sought payment of
moral damages and attorneys fees.
After due proceedings, the labor arbiter rendered, on 08
January 1999,[7] judgment finding for petitioner and ordering
respondent and Aboitiz Shipping to jointly and severally pay the
former the following:
(1)
P119,536.01, representing reimbursement of medical, surgical and
hospital expenses;
(2)
P9,000, representing reasonable cost of board and lodging;
(3)
P500,000, representing moral damages;
(4)
US$60,000, representing disability benefits corresponding to Total
Permanent Disability;
(5)
US$2,452, representing Sick Wage allowance;
(6)
P62,853.60, representing attorneys fees; and,
(7)
US$6,245.20, also representing attorneys fees.
On appeal, the NLRC, in a decision [8] dated 29 August 2000,

modified that of the labor arbiter, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED to the extent
that respondents Jebsen Maritime, Inc., and Aboitiz Shipping Company are
hereby ordered jointly and severally liable to pay Gil delos Santos through Amelia
delos Santos the Philippine peso equivalent at the time of actual payment of US
DOLLARS SIXTY THOUSAND (US$60,000.00) and US DOLLARS TWO
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRD (sic) FIFTY TWO (US$2,452.00) representing
total disability compensation benefits and sickness wages, and the amount of
ONE HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND EGHT (sic) HUNDRED FOUR AND
87/100 PHILIPPINE PESOS (P103,804.87) representing reimbursement of
surgical, medical and hospital expenses, plus the equivalent of five percent (5%)
of the aggregate award as and for attorneys fees.
All other dispositions are SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Like the labor arbiter, the NLRC predicated its ruling mainly on the
theory that the POEA-approved contract of employment continued
to govern Delos Santos employment when he contracted his
illness. In specific terms, the NLRC states that the same contract
was still effective when Delos Santos fell ill, thus entitling him to
the payment of disability and like benefits provided in and
required under the POEA-SEC.
Following the denial of its motion for reconsideration per

NLRC Resolution[9] of 31 October 2000, respondent went to the
Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari, thereat docketed
as CA-G.R. No. 62229, imputing on the NLRC grave abuse of
discretion. In its petition, respondent scored the NLRC for, among
other things, extending the application of the expired POEAapproved employment contract beyond the one-month limit
stipulated therein.
On 21 March 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment[10], modifying the NLRCs decision by deleting altogether
the award of disability compensation benefits, sickness wages
and attorneys fees, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is
hereby DENIED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.
The Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated August
29, 2000 and the Resolution of October 31, 2000 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, that the
disability compensation benefits of US$60,000.00 and the sickness wages of
US$2,452.00 are hereby deleted, without prejudice to claiming the same from the
proper government agency. The award of attorneys fees is likewise deleted.
In time, petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the

appellate court denied the motion per its resolution of 03 July
2002.[11]
Hence, petitioners present recourse on the grounds that the
Court of Appeals seriously erred:[12]
I
IN DELETING THE AWARD OF US$60,000.00 REPRESENTING THE
MAXIMUM DISABILITY BENEFITS APPLYING THE PROVISIONS OF THE
POEA STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT.
(A) PRIOR TO HIS ACCIDENT, THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT OF

SEAFARER DELOS SANTOS HAS NOT YET BEEN TERMINATED, IN
RELATION TO SECTION 2, PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B) AND SECTION 18
(A), POEA STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT.
(B) THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF
SEAFARER DELOS SANTOS ACCIDENT HAS NOT YET EXPIRED
BECAUSE IT WAS MUTUALLY EXTENDED BY THE PARTIES WHEN
DELOS SANTOS WAS NOT SIGNED OFF AND REPATRIATED PRIOR TO
SAID ACCIDENT.
II
IN CONCLUDING THAT NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONTINUATION OF
DELOS SANTOS EMPLOYMENT ON BOARD THE SAME VESSEL AND
UNDER THE SAME CONTRACT, IT IS THE PROVISIONS OF THE LABOR
CODE, AS AMENDED, THAT SHALL GOVERN HIS EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS.
III
IN DELETING THE AWARD OF SICKNESS ALLOWANCE IN THE
AMOUNT OF US$2,452.00.
(A) THERE IS NO BASIS IN THE DELETION OF THE AWARD OF
SICKNESS ALOWANCE (sic) SINCE PAYMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY
SYSTEM SICK LEAVE BENEFIT IS INDEPENDENT, SEPARATE AND
DISTINCT FROM THE SICKNESS ALLOWANCE PROVIDED FOR UNDER
THE POEA STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT.
The petition is devoid of merit.

As a rule, stipulations in an employment contract not contrary to
statutes, public policy, public order or morals have the force of
law between the contracting parties. [13] An employment with a
period is generally valid, unless the term was purposely intended
to circumvent the employees right to his security of tenure.
[14]
Absent a covering specific agreement and unless otherwise
provided by law, the terms and conditions of employment of all
employees in the private sector shall be governed by the Labor
Code[15] and such rules and regulations as may be issued by the
Department of Labor and Employment and such agencies charged

with the administration and enforcement of the Code.
The differing conclusions arrived at by the NLRC, finding for
the herein petitioner, and the Court of Appeals, siding in part with
the herein respondent, on Delos Santos entitlement to disability
benefits and sickness allowance are veritably attributable to the
question of applicability, under the premises, of the POEA-SEC.
The principal issue to be resolved here, therefore, boils down to:
which, between the POEA-SEC and the Labor Code, governs the
employer-employee relationship between Delos Santos and
respondent after MV Wild Iris, as later renamed Super RoRo
100, returned to the country from its one-month conduction
voyage to and from Japan.
The Court of Appeals ruled against the governing
applicability of the POEA-SEC and, on that basis, deleted the
NLRCs award of US$60,000.00 and US$2,452.00 by way of
disability benefits and sickness allowance, respectively. An
excerpt of the appellate courts explanation:
xxx Both parties do not dispute the existence of the POEA approved
contract signed by the parties. The said contract is the law between the contracting
parties and absent any showing that its provisions are wholly or in part contrary to
law, morals, good policy, it shall be enforced to the letter by the contracting
parties (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. vs. Wong, G.R. No. 120859, June 26,
2001). The contract in question is for a duration of one (1) month. Being a valid
contract between Delos Santos and the [respondent], the provisions thereof,
specifically with respect to the one (1) month period of employment has the force
of law between them (D.M. Consunji vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 116572, December 18,
2000). Perforce, the said contract has already expired and is no longer in effect.
The fact that Delos Santos continued to work in the same vessel which
sailed within Philippine waters does not mean that the POEA standard
employment contract continues to be enforced between the parties. The
employment of Delos Santos is within the Philippines, and not on a foreign shore.
As correctly pointed out by [respondent], the provisions of the Labor Code shall
govern their employer-employee relationship. xxx. (Words in bracket added.)
The Court agrees with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals

for two (2) main reasons. First, we the start with something
elementary, i.e., POEA was created primarily to undertake a
systematic program for overseas employment of Filipino workers
and to protect their rights to fair and equitable employment
practices.[16] And to ensure that overseas workers, including
seafarers on board ocean-going vessels, are amply protected, the
POEA is authorized to formulate employment standards in
accordance with welfare objectives of the overseas employment
program.[17] Given this consideration, the Court is at a loss to
understand why the POEA-SEC should be made to continue to
apply to domestic employment, as here, involving a Filipino
seaman on board an inter-island vessel.
Just as basic as the first reason is the fact that Delos Santos
POEA-approved employment contract was for a definite term of
one (1) month only, doubtless fixed to coincide with the predetermined
one-month
long
Philippines-Japan-Philippines
conduction-voyage run. After the lapse of the said period, his
employment under the POEA-approved contract may be deemed
as functus oficio and Delos Santos employment pursuant thereto
considered automatically terminated, there being no mutuallyagreed renewal or extension of the expired contract. [18] This is as
it should be. For, as we have held in the landmark case of Millares
v. National Labor Relations Commission: [19]
From
the
foregoing
cases,
it
is
clear
that seafarers
are considered contractual employees. Their employment is governed by the
contracts they sign every time they are rehired and their employment is terminated
when the contract expires. Their employment is contractually fixed for a certain
period of time. They fall under the exception of Article 280 [of the Labor Code]
whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking . . . We
need not depart from the rulings of the Court in the two aforementioned cases
which indeed constitute stare decisis with respect to the employment status of
seafarers. (Underscoring and words in bracket added)
Petitioners posture, citing Section 2 (A) [20] in relation to

Section 18[21] of the POEA-SEC about the POEA approved contract
still subsisting sinceDelos Santos was never signed off from the
vessel and repatriated to Manila, the point of hire, is untenable.
With the view we have of things, Delos Santos is deemed to have
been signed off when he acceded to a new employment
arrangement offered by the respondent. A seaman need not
physically disembarked from a vessel at the expiration of his
employment contract to have such contract considered
terminated. And the repatriation aspect of the contract assumes
significance only where the vessel remains in a foreign port. For,
repatriation presupposes a return to ones country of origin or
citizenship.[22] In the case at bar, however, there can be quibbling
that MV Wild Iris returned to the port of Cebu with Delos Santos
on board. Parenthetically, while the parties are agreed that their
underlying contract was executed in the country, the records do
not indicate what city or province of the Philippines is the specific
point of hire. While petitioner says it is Manila, she did not bother
to attach to her petition a copy of the contract of employment in
question.
Petitioner next submits, echoing the NLRCs holding, that the
POEA-approved contract remained in full force and effect even
after the expiry thereof owing to the interplay of the following
circumstances: 1) Delos Santos, after such contract expiration, did
not conclude another contract of employment with respondent,
but was asked to remain and work on board the same vessel just
the same; and 2) If the parties intended their employer-employee
relationship to be under the aegis of a new contract, such
intention should have been embodied in a new agreement.
Contract extension or continuation by mutual consent
appears to be petitioners thesis.
We are not persuaded.
The fact that respondent retained Delos Santos and allowed

him to remain on board the vessel cannot plausibly be
interpreted, in context, as evidencing an intention on its part to
continue with the POEA-SEC. In the practical viewpoint, there
could have been no sense in consenting to renewal since the
rationale for the execution of the POEA-approved contract had
already been served and achieved.
At any rate, factors obtain arguing against the notion that
respondent consented to contract extension under the same
terms and conditions prevailing when the original contract
expired. Stated a bit differently, there are compelling reasons to
believe that respondent retained the services of the acceding
Delos Santos, as the Court of Appeals aptly observed, but under
domestic terms and conditions. We refer first to the reduced
salary of Delos Santos payable in Philippine peso [23] which,
significantly enough, he received without so much of a protest. As
respondent stated in itsComment, without any controverting
response from petitioner, Delos Santos, for the period ending
October 31, 1995, was drawing a salary at the rate of P8,475.00 a
month, whereas the compensation package stipulated under the
POEA-approved contract provided for a US$613 basic monthly
salary and a US$184 fixed monthly overtime pay. And secondly,
MV Super RoRo 100 was no longer engaged in foreign trading as it
was no longer intended as an ocean-going ship. Accordingly, it
does not make sense why a seafarer of goodwill or a manning
agency of the same disposition would insist on being regulated by
an overseas employment agency under its standard employment
contract, which governs employment of Filipino seamen on board
ocean-going vessels.[24]
Petitioners submission about the parties not having entered into
another employment contract after the expiration of the POEAapproved employment contract, ergo, the extension of the
expired agreement, is flawed by the logic holding it together. For,
it presupposes that an agreement to do or to give does not bind,
unless it is embodied in a written instrument. It is elementary,

however, that, save in very rare instances where certain formal
requisites go into its validity, a contract, to be valid and binding
between the parties, need not be in writing. A contract is
perfected when the contracting minds agree on the object and
cause
thereof.[25] And,
as
earlier
discussed,
several
circumstantial indicia tended to prove that a new arrangement
under domestic terms was agreed upon by the principal players to
govern the employment of Delos Santos after the return of
MV Wild Iris to the country to engage in coastwise trading.
Given the foregoing perspective, the disallowance under the
decision subject of review of the petitioners claim for maximum
disability benefits and sickness allowance is legally correct. As it
were, Delos Santos right to such benefits is predicated on the
continued enforceability of POEA-SEC when he contracted his
illness, which, needless to stress, was not the case.
Likewise legally correct is the deletion of the award of attorneys
fees, the NLRC having failed to explain petitioners entitlement
thereto. As a matter of sound policy, an award of attorneys fee
remains the exception rather than the rule. It must be stressed, as
aptly observed by the appellate court, that it is necessary for the
trial court, the NLRC in this case, to make express findings of facts
and law that would bring the case within the exception. In fine,
the factual, legal or equitable justification for the award must be
set forth in the text of the decision. [26] The matter of attorneys
fees cannot be touched once and only in the fallo of the decision,
else, the award should be thrown out for being speculative and
conjectural.[27] In the absence of a stipulation, attorneys fees are
ordinarily not recoverable; otherwise a premium shall be placed
on the right to litigate.[28] They are not awarded every time a party
wins a suit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 162419
July 10, 2007
PAUL V. SANTIAGO, petitioner,

vs.
CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC., respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
At the heart of this case involving a contract between a seafarer, on one hand, and the manning
agent and the foreign principal, on the other, is this erstwhile unsettled legal quandary: whether the
seafarer, who was prevented from leaving the port of Manila and refused deployment without valid
reason but whose POEA-approved employment contract provides that the employer-employee
relationship shall commence only upon the seafarers actual departure from the port in the point of
hire, is entitled to relief?
This treats of the petition for review filed by Paul V. Santiago (petitioner) assailing the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 16 October 2003 and 19 February 2004, respectively, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 68404.1
Petitioner had been working as a seafarer for Smith Bell Management, Inc. (respondent) for about
five (5) years.2On 3 February 1998, petitioner signed a new contract of employment with respondent,
with the duration of nine (9) months. He was assured of a monthly salary of US$515.00, overtime
pay and other benefits. The following day or on 4 February 1998, the contract was approved by the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Petitioner was to be deployed on board
the "MSV Seaspread" which was scheduled to leave the port of Manila for Canada on 13 February
1998.
A week before the scheduled date of departure, Capt. Pacifico Fernandez, respondents Vice
President, sent a facsimile message to the captain of "MSV Seaspread," which reads:
I received a phone call today from the wife of Paul Santiago in Masbate asking me not to
send her husband to MSV Seaspread anymore. Other callers who did not reveal their
identity gave me some feedbacks that Paul Santiago this time if allowed to depart will jump
ship in Canada like his brother Christopher Santiago, O/S who jumped ship from the C.S.
Nexus in Kita-kyushu, Japan last December, 1997.
We do not want this to happen again and have the vessel penalized like the C.S. Nexus in
Japan.
Forewarned is forearmed like his brother when his brother when he was applying he
behaved like a Saint but in his heart he was a serpent. If you agree with me then we will
send his replacement.
Kindly advise.3
To this message the captain of "MSV Seaspread" replied:
Many thanks for your advice concerning P. Santiago, A/B. Please cancel plans for him to
return to Seaspread.4
On 9 February 1998, petitioner was thus told that he would not be leaving for Canada anymore, but
he was reassured that he might be considered for deployment at some future date.
Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, damages, and attorney's fees against respondent
and its foreign principal, Cable and Wireless (Marine) Ltd. 5 The case was raffled to Labor Arbiter
Teresita Castillon-Lora, who ruled that the employment contract remained valid but had not
commenced since petitioner was not deployed. According to her, respondent violated the rules and
regulations governing overseas employment when it did not deploy petitioner, causing petitioner to
suffer actual damages representing lost salary income for nine (9) months and fixed overtime fee, all
amounting to US$7, 209.00.
The labor arbiter held respondent liable. The dispositive portion of her Decision dated 29 January
1999 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby Ordered to pay complainant
actual damages in the amount of US$7,209.00 plus 10% attorney's fees, payable in
Philippine peso at the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment.
All the other claims are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal by respondent, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled that there is no
employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent because under the Standard
Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going
Vessels (POEA Standard Contract), the employment contract shall commence upon actual departure
of the seafarer from the airport or seaport at the point of hire and with a POEA-approved contract. In
the absence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties, the claims for illegal
dismissal, actual damages, and attorneys fees should be dismissed. 7 On the other hand, the NLRC
found respondents decision not to deploy petitioner to be a valid exercise of its management
prerogative.8 The NLRC disposed of the appeal in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the assailed Decision dated January 29, 1999 is
hereby AFFIRMED in so far as other claims are concerned and with MODIFICATION by
VACATING the award of actual damages and attorneys fees as well as excluding Pacifico
Fernandez as party respondent.
SO ORDERED.9
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the NLRCs Decision but his motion was denied for lack
of merit.10 He elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari.
In its Decision11 dated 16 October 2003, the Court of Appeals noted that there is an ambiguity in the
NLRCs Decision when it affirmed with modification the labor arbiters Decision, because by the very
modification introduced by the Commission (vacating the award of actual damages and attorneys
fees), there is nothing more left in the labor arbiters Decision to affirm.12
According to the appellate court, petitioner is not entitled to actual damages because damages are
not recoverable by a worker who was not deployed by his agency within the period prescribed in
the POEA Rules.13 It agreed with the NLRCs finding that petitioners non-deployment was a valid
exercise of respondents management prerogative.14 It added that since petitioner had not departed
from the Port of Manila, no employer-employee relationship between the parties arose and any claim
for damages against the so-called employer could have no leg to stand on. 15
Petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied on 19 February 2004. 16
The present petition is anchored on two grounds, to wit:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a serious error of law when it ignored
[S]ection 10 of Republic Act [R.A.] No. 8042 otherwise known as the Migrant Workers Act of
1995 as well as Section 29 of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels (which is deemed
incorporated under the petitioners POEA approved Employment Contract) that the claims or
disputes of the Overseas Filipino Worker by virtue of a contract fall within the jurisdiction of
the Labor Arbiter of the NLRC.
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a serious error when it disregarded the
required quantum of proof in labor cases, which is substantial evidence, thus a total
departure from established jurisprudence on the matter.17
Petitioner maintains that respondent violated the Migrant Workers Act and the POEA Rules when it
failed to deploy him within thirty (30) calendar days without a valid reason. In doing so, it had
unilaterally and arbitrarily prevented the consummation of the POEA- approved contract. Since it
prevented his deployment without valid basis, said deployment being a condition to the
consummation of the POEA contract, the contract is deemed consummated, and therefore he should
be awarded actual damages, consisting of the stipulated salary and fixed overtime pay.18 Petitioner
adds that since the contract is deemed consummated, he should be considered an employee for all
intents and purposes, and thus the labor arbiter and/or the NLRC has jurisdiction to take cognizance
of his claims.19
Petitioner additionally claims that he should be considered a regular employee, having worked for
five (5) years on board the same vessel owned by the same principal and manned by the same local
agent. He argues that respondents act of not deploying him was a scheme designed to prevent him
from attaining the status of a regular employee.20
Petitioner submits that respondent had no valid and sufficient cause to abandon the employment
contract, as it merely relied upon alleged phone calls from his wife and other unnamed callers in
arriving at the conclusion that he would jump ship like his brother. He points out that his wife had
executed an affidavit21 strongly denying having called respondent, and that the other alleged callers
did not even disclose their identities to respondent.22Thus, it was error for the Court of Appeals to
adopt the unfounded conclusion of the NLRC, as the same was not based on substantial evidence. 23
On the other hand, respondent argues that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction to award petitioners
monetary claims. His employment with respondent did not commence because his deployment was
withheld for a valid reason. Consequently, the labor arbiter and/or the NLRC cannot entertain
adjudication of petitioners case much less award damages to him. The controversy involves a
breach of contractual obligations and as such is cognizable by civil courts. 24 On another matter,
respondent claims that the second issue posed by petitioner involves a recalibration of facts which is
outside the jurisdiction of this Court.25
There is some merit in the petition.
There is no question that the parties entered into an employment contract on 3 February 1998,
whereby petitioner was contracted by respondent to render services on board "MSV Seaspread" for
the consideration of US$515.00 per month for nine (9) months, plus overtime pay. However,
respondent failed to deploy petitioner from the port of Manila to Canada. Considering that petitioner
was not able to depart from the airport or seaport in the point of hire, the employment contract did
not commence, and no employer-employee relationship was created between the parties. 26
However, a distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the
commencement of the employer-employee relationship. The perfection of the contract, which in this
case coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed
on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and conditions therein. The
commencement of the employer-employee relationship, as earlier discussed, would have taken
place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even before the start of any
employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract
was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action
against the erring party. Thus, if the reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused to
be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.
Moreover, while the POEA Standard Contract must be recognized and respected, neither the
manning agent nor the employer can simply prevent a seafarer from being deployed without a valid
reason.
Respondents act of preventing petitioner from departing the port of Manila and boarding "MSV
Seaspread" constitutes a breach of contract, giving rise to petitioners cause of action. Respondent
unilaterally and unreasonably reneged on its obligation to deploy petitioner and must therefore
answer for the actual damages he suffered.
We take exception to the Court of Appeals conclusion that damages are not recoverable by a worker
who was not deployed by his agency. The fact that the POEA Rules 27 are silent as to the payment of
damages to the affected seafarer does not mean that the seafarer is precluded from claiming the
same. The sanctions provided for non-deployment do not end with the suspension or cancellation of
license or fine and the return of all documents at no cost to the worker. They do not forfend a
seafarer from instituting an action for damages against the employer or agency which has failed to
deploy him.
The POEA Rules only provide sanctions which the POEA can impose on erring agencies. It does not
provide for damages and money claims recoverable by aggrieved employees because it is not the
POEA, but the NLRC, which has jurisdiction over such matters.
Despite the absence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent, the
Court rules that the NLRC has jurisdiction over petitioners complaint. The jurisdiction of labor
arbiters is not limited to claims arising from employer-employee relationships. Section 10 of R.A. No.
8042 (Migrant Workers Act), provides that:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor
Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of
the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any
law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for
actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages. x x x [Emphasis supplied]
Since the present petition involves the employment contract entered into by petitioner for overseas
employment, his claims are cognizable by the labor arbiters of the NLRC.
Article 2199 of the Civil Code provides that one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for
such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Respondent is thus liable to pay
petitioner actual damages in the form of the loss of nine (9) months worth of salary as provided in
the contract. He is not, however, entitled to overtime pay. While the contract indicated a fixed
overtime pay, it is not a guarantee that he would receive said amount regardless of whether or not
he rendered overtime work. Even though petitioner was "prevented without valid reason from
rendering regular much less overtime service,"28 the fact remains that there is no certainty that
petitioner will perform overtime work had he been allowed to board the vessel. The amount of
US$286.00 stipulated in the contract will be paid only if and when the employee rendered overtime
work. This has been the tenor of our rulings in the case of Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services (Phils.), Inc.
v. National Labor Relations Commission29 where we discussed the matter in this light:
The contract provision means that the fixed overtime pay of 30% would be the basis for
computing the overtime pay if and when overtime work would be rendered. Simply stated,
the rendition of overtime work and the submission of sufficient proof that said work was
actually performed are conditions to be satisfied before a seaman could be entitled to
overtime pay which should be computed on the basis of 30% of the basic monthly salary. In
short, the contract provision guarantees the right to overtime pay but the entitlement to such
benefit must first be established. Realistically speaking, a seaman, by the very nature of his
job, stays on board a ship or vessel beyond the regular eight-hour work schedule. For the
employer to give him overtime pay for the extra hours when he might be sleeping or
attending to his personal chores or even just lulling away his time would be extremely unfair
and unreasonable.30
The Court also holds that petitioner is entitled to attorneys fees in the concept of damages and
expenses of litigation. Attorney's fees are recoverable when the defendant's act or omission has
compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest. 31 We note that respondents basis for
not deploying petitioner is the belief that he will jump ship just like his brother, a mere suspicion that
is based on alleged phone calls of several persons whose identities were not even confirmed. Time
and again, this Court has upheld management prerogatives so long as they are exercised in good
faith for the advancement of the employers interest and not for the purpose of defeating or
circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid
agreements.32Respondents failure to deploy petitioner is unfounded and unreasonable, forcing
petitioner to institute the suit below. The award of attorneys fees is thus warranted.
However, moral damages cannot be awarded in this case. While respondents failure to deploy
petitioner seems baseless and unreasonable, we cannot qualify such action as being tainted with
bad faith, or done deliberately to defeat petitioners rights, as to justify the award of moral damages.
At most, respondent was being overzealous in protecting its interest when it became too hasty in
making its conclusion that petitioner will jump ship like his brother.
We likewise do not see respondents failure to deploy petitioner as an act designed to prevent the
latter from attaining the status of a regular employee. Even if petitioner was able to depart the port of
Manila, he still cannot be considered a regular employee, regardless of his previous contracts of
employment with respondent. InMillares v. National Labor Relations Commission,33 the Court ruled
that seafarers are considered contractual employees and cannot be considered as regular
employees under the Labor Code. Their employment is governed by the contracts they sign every
time they are rehired and their employment is terminated when the contract expires. The exigencies
of their work necessitates that they be employed on a contractual basis. 34
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Decision dated 16 October 2003 and the
Resolution dated 19 February 2004 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of Labor Arbiter Teresita D. Castillon-Lora dated 29 January 1999 is REINSTATED with the
MODIFICATION that respondent CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc. is ordered to pay actual or
compensatory damages in the amount of US$4,635.00
representing salary for nine (9) months as stated in the contract, and attorneys fees at the
reasonable rate of 10% of the recoverable amount.
SO ORDERED.
PAUL V. SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC., respondent.

G.R. No. 162419
July 10, 2007
TINGA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner had been working as a seafarer for Smith Bell Management, Inc.
(respondent) for about five (5) years. He signed a new contract of employment with
the duration of 9 months on Feb 3 1998 and he was to be deployed 10 days after.
This contract was approved by POEA. A week before the date of departure, the
respondent received a phone call from petitioners wife and some unknown callers
asking not to send the latter off because if allowed, he will jump ship in Canada.
Because of the said information, petitioner was told that he would not be leaving for
Canada anymore. This prompted him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal against
the respondent. The LA held the latter responsible. On appeal, the NLRC ruled that
there is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent,
hence, the claims should be dismissed. The CA agreed with the NLRCs finding that
since petitioner had not departed from the Port of Manila, no employer-employee
relationship between the parties arose and any claim for damages against the socalled employer could have no leg to stand on.
ISSUE: When does the employer-employee relationship involving seafarers
commence?
RULING:
A distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and
the commencement of the employer-employee relationship. The perfection of the
contract, which in this case coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred
when petitioner and respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the
rest of the terms and conditions therein. The commencement of the employeremployee relationship, as earlier discussed, would have taken place had petitioner
been actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even before the start of any
employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the
employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of
which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party. Thus, if the
reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused to be deployed as
agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.
Respondents act of preventing petitioner from departing the port of Manila and
boarding "MSV Seaspread" constitutes a breach of contract, giving rise to
petitioners cause of action. Respondent unilaterally and unreasonably reneged on
its obligation to deploy petitioner and must therefore answer for the actual
damages he suffered.
ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC
HEALTH-KUWAIT vs. MA. JOSEFA ECHIN,
(G.R. No. 178551,October 11, 2010)
Doctrine of Procesual Presumption: The party invoking the application of a foreign

law has the burden proving the law, otherwise the same shall be presumed as
similar to ours.
FACTS: Echin was hired by ATCI in behalf of its principal co-petitioner, Ministry of
Public Health of Kuwait, for the position of medical technologist under a two-year
contract with a monthly salary of US$1,200.00.Within a year, Respondent was
terminated for not passing the probationary period which was under the
Memorandum of Agreement. Ministry denied respondents request and she returned
to the Philippines shouldering her own fair. Respondent filed with the NLRC a
complaint against ATCI for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in
favor of respondent and ordered ATCI to pay her $3,600.00, her salary for the three
months unexpired portion of the contract. ATCI appealed Labor Arbiters decision,
however, NLRC affirmed the latters decision and denied petitioner ATCIs motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable because respondents
employment contract specifically stipulates that her employment shall be governed
by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners be held liable considering that the contract
specifically stipulates that
respondents employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and
Regulations of Kuwait. Ruling: Court denied the petition. According to RA 8042: It is
hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law
has the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption
which, in this case, petitioners failed to discharge. The Courts ruling in EDIStaffbuilders Intl., v. NLRC illuminates: In the present case, the employment contract
signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not
provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for termination, termination
procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to
apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the
termination of the employment of Gran. In international law, the party who wants to
have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the
foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded
and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law.
He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law. Unfortunately for petitioner, it
did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Law
doctrine of presumed-identity approach or procesual presumption comes into play.
Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the
presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor
laws in determining the issues presented before us. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied) The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they
must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party
invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads: SEC. 24.
Proof of official record.
The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept
is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer
in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (emphasis supplied)
G.R. No. 152616
March 31, 2006
PHILEMPLOY SERVICES AND RESOURCES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
ANITA RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 to annul the Decision2 dated 15 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 54386. The Court of Appeals reversed the 11 June 1998 Decision 3 and the 3
February 1999 Resolution4 of the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") in NLRC NCR
Case No. ADJ(L)-95-01-0306. The Court of Appeals reinstated the 26 December 1996 Decision of
Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday.
The Facts
The facts, as summarized by the Labor Arbiter and adopted in toto by the Court of Appeals and the
NLRC, are as follows:
In March 1994, complainant Anita Rodriguez applied with respondent Philempl[o]y Services and
Resources, Inc. at 36 Main Ave. cor. 8th Ave., Cubao, Quezon City for deployment abroad as a
factory worker.
After her interview, complainant secured the necessary documentation for her travel, such as
passport, medical certificate, NBI clearance, among others, to which she expended the sum
of P2,000.00.
In December 1994, she set out from Cotabato to Manila to report to the office of respondent after
she had received a telegram (Annex "A") requiring her to report.
Ms. Brenda Castro, an official of respondent, demanded from complainant the sum of P60,000.00 as
placement fee. Since she could not afford such amount, they agreed that she would have to pay
initially the amount ofP30,000.00 as downpayment and the balance of P30,000.00, plus 7% interest
every month thereafter through salary deductions.
After she had pledged her motorcycle and a necklace, she paid Ms. Castro the amount
of P30,000.00 plus 10% interest on December 29, 1994, but she was not issued any receipt.
Thereafter, she executed a contract of employment as a domestic helper of one Chao Hung Ching of
Taipei, Taiwan with a monthly salary of NT$14,010, plus free food and accommodation for a period
of one (1) year. (Annexes "A" and "B")
On January 11, 1995, she again reported to the office of respondent where another sum of P900.00
for Medicare was required on complainant. After she had pledged her College ring, she paid
respondent said amount.
On January 13, 1995, she was deployed by respondent to the latters principal arriving in Taiwan
later that day. (Annex "D")
As such domestic helper, she worked from 5:00 a.m. until 10:00 p.m. Among her chores were to
carwash the vehicle of her master, cook the meals, housecleaning and babysitting.
For her desire to improve her lot, as well as those she left behind, she weathered all the hardships
and loneliness working abroad.
In the morning of January 24, 1995, she wrote her family in the Philippines of her difficulties as a DH
in Taiwan and of her desire to return home after her one-year contract. She requested the wife of
[her] master to mail said letter. Later that evening, she had a talk with her master where she was told
that she is sending her home on account of certain problems. Complainant pleaded that she
continue her employment, confronted as she was with the debts she had to pay.
On January 25, 1995, complainant was accompanied to the airport by a certain Ms. Go to whom she
inquired why she was being repatriated to the Philippines. All that Ms. Go answered was that there
was some kind of a problem. While at the airport, Ms. Go forced complainant to sign an Affidavit
where it stated, among others, that her leaving as a DH was voluntary and that she would assume
all the obligations for her travel back to the Philippines. Since complainant did not want to sign said
Affidavit, Ms. Go took complainant to the Office of the Foreign Affairs where, through an immigration
police, complainants passport and plane ticket were given to her. Two policemen accompanied
complainant board the plane bound for the Philippines.
From January 13 to 24, 1995 or a period of twelve (12) days, complainant was only paid the sum of
NT$1,931.00.
In resisting complainants allegations, respondent, in its Position Paper with an accompanying
Affidavit of Bayani Fontanilla, Jr. and annexes, asserted the following material averments, to wit:
Complainant was hired and deployed for Taiwan as a domestic helper for a one-year contract with
principal Chao Hung Ching in Taiwan with a monthly salary of NT$14,010.00. Among other
stipulations of the contract, it was agreed that she would undergo a forty (40) days probationary
period before she becomes a regular domestic helper.
In the course of her recruitment, complainant was personally interviewed through telephone calls by
her principal and apprised of the terms and conditions of her employment as a domestic helper in
Taiwan.
Complainant was charged of her placement fees as allowed by law and by the POEA rules and
regulations.
On January 13, 1995, complainant departed for Taiwan. It was only on January 15, 1995 when she
actually performed her work as a domestic helper after she had undergone an orientation.
During the first ten (10) days of her probationary period, complainant was observed to be inattentive
and incompetent to perform her duties and responsibilities. She could not cook and do simple things
as washing clothes. It was the principals mother-in-law who did most of the household chores, like
babysitting of the child. Worse, complainant was already complaining of the cold weather. However,
the principal was nonetheless optimistic that complainant would improve her chores, but to no avail
as complainant kept insisting that she be allowed to go home on account of her incapability to
perform her job. The complainant even told her foreign employer that "she had hired a housemaid in
their house for more than ten years to do the task."
After the first ten (10) days work with the principal employer, complainant returned to the
Philippines.5
On 26 December 1996, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents jointly and
severally to pay complainant the sum of P10,900.00 representing the excess placement fee paid by
her; the amount of NT$161,115.00 or its peso equivalent in the amount of P155,411.15 representing
her unearned wages corresponding to the unexpired portion of her contract; NT$3,492.22 or its peso
equivalent in the amount ofP3,368.59 representing salary differentials; and ten percent (10%) of the
total monetary award due complainant as attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.6
Philemploy Services and Resources, Inc. ("petitioner") and Chao Hung Ching appealed to the
NLRC. The NLRC rendered its decision on 11 June 1998. The pertinent parts of the decision read as
follows:
Right from the time complainant was accepted as an applicant for the position of
Caretaker/Domestic helper, she has already a second thought about said position. Her reason is that
it is not the position she applied for. (see No. 7 of complainants Sinumpaang Salaysay, page 30,
record). This statement is not found in the Arbiters translation into English of such Sinumpaang
Salaysay which was adopted by complainant as part of her position paper, and upon which the
Labor Arbiters a quo factual antecedents have been derived.
Indeed, such omitted material facts coming from complainant herself, is pregnant of bold
manifestation that in fact she had difficulty in adjusting herself to the nature of her accepted position
different from what was intended. It reinforces thus, respondents observation that complainant
misrepresented herself to her foreign employer that she knows the household chores.
Yet, despite all of these misgivings shown by complainant, her foreign employer was willing to give
her time to organize and learn herself the duties and responsibilities attendant to the position of
house helper. But the same becomes naught when she insisted to be repatriated before the end of
the one-year contract.
Normally, this Commission does not disturb the factual finding of the Labor Arbiter a quo when
supported by substantial evidence. (Union of Filipino Workers vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 98111, April 7,
1993).
But in this case, We find it more prudent to deviate from said decisional rule to avoid injustice.
We sympathize with the misfortune of complainant, but factual as well as corroborative
circumstances speak loudly against the charge of dismissal. Complainant preferred to go back home
earlier than expected. As such, she should not be allowed to utilize this forum as a convenient
avenue to enforce a claim which is devoid of factual or legal basis.7
The dispositive portion of the decision of the NLRC reads:
WHEREFORE, in view thereof, the appealed decision is hereby modified deleting the award
of P155,411.15 representing unearned wages corresponding to the unexpired portion of the contract,
there being no illegal dismissal that took place.
In all other respects, the decision is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.8
Anita Rodriguez ("Anita") filed a motion for reconsideration on 3 September 1998. 9
On 15 September 1998, Anita filed before the NLRC a Manifestation10 asserting, inter alia, that
While it is conceded that respondents had filed their appeal within the period permitted by law yet, it
is submitted that the said appeal should not have been entertained on the very simple ground that
the surety bond it submitted to perfect their appeal is a "FAKE" and "FORGERIES" as certified to by
no less than NORMA A. VILLANO, Assistant Vice President of the Eastern Assurance & Surety
Corporation in her letter dated September 11 and 14, 1998 regarding the surety bonds Nos.
G(16)54276 B-2772 in the amount of P118,779.69 and G(16)54194/B-2691 in the amount
of P50,000.00, respectively.11
Anita asserted that since petitioner failed to comply with the requirements for perfecting an appeal,
no appeal was perfected from the decision of the Labor Arbiter and petitioners appeal should have
been "outrightly dismissed."12
The NLRC denied Anitas motion for reconsideration in its assailed 3 February 1999 Resolution. 13
On 17 August 1999, Anita filed a petition for certiorari14 before the Court of Appeals assailing the
decision and resolution of the NLRC. On 23 August 1999, the Court of Appeals issued the following
resolution:
Before We act on the instant petition for certiorari, the petitioner is directed to inform this Court in
writing, within five (5) days from receipt hereof, the date when C. S. Cruz and Associates, her
counsel, received a copy of the Resolution dated February 3, 1999 in the case before the National
Labor Relations Commission.
SO ORDERED.15
On 17 April 2000, Anitas new counsel, Emerson C. Tumanon ("Atty. Tumanon"), filed with the Court
of Appeals his Entry of Appearance and Compliance.16 Atty. Tumanon asserted that Anita engaged
his services as counsel in the present case in view of the death of Anitas former counsel, Ciriaco S.
Cruz ("Atty. Cruz"), on 26 June 1999. Atty. Tumanon stated that upon verification with the records of
the NLRC, he found out that Atty. Cruz never received a copy of the assailed 3 February 1999
Resolution.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On 15 March 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the NLRC dated June 11, 1998, as well as its
Resolution of February 3, 1999 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the decision
of the Labor Arbiter dated December 26, 1996 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.17
The Court of Appeals ruled that, contrary to the view of the NLRC, the fact that Anita "had a second
thought about her position as a caretaker or domestic helper as it was not the position she applied
for, was not pregnant of bold manifestation that in fact she had difficulty in adjusting herself to the
nature of her accepted position." The Court of Appeals stated that neither would Anitas "second
thoughts" bolster petitioners allegation that Anita "misrepresented to her foreign employer that she
knows the house chores."
The Court of Appeals held that petitioners allegation that Anita did not know her job was incredible.
The Court of Appeals stated that the nature of the work given to Anita "such as car-washing the
vehicle of her master, cooking the meals, housecleaning and babysitting, was too simple and menial
for an ordinary person of average intelligence to easily learn, especially so for Anita, who is a
registered midwife and a family woman." The Court of Appeals ruled that even granting that Anita did
not know her job, petitioner, who had the duty to evaluate her qualification, should have rejected her
application outright.
The Court of Appeals also ruled that if there is doubt on the credibility of the evidence presented by
the parties, the doubt should be resolved in Anitas favor. The Court of Appeals stated that it is a
settled rule that in case of doubt, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the employee.
On petitioners claim that the petition for certiorari was filed out of time, the Court of Appeals ruled
that the provisions of law pertinent to the issue were Sections 9 and 10, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.
The Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to prove that Anitas counsel received the first notice
of service of the 3 February 1999 resolution of the NLRC. The Court of Appeals stated that except
for petitioners allegation that Anitas counsel received the first, second, and third notices, and the
presentation of the certified true copy of the second notice, there is no sufficient proof that Anitas
counsel received the first notice.
The Court of Appeals also stated that petitioner should have presented the postmasters certification
on the sending of the first notice, which should include the data not only on whether the
corresponding notice was issued or sent but also on how, when and to whom delivery of the notice
was made. The Court of Appeals held that with petitioners failure to adduce the required conclusive
proof that the postmaster sent the first notice to Anitas counsel, the conclusion was ineluctable that
Anitas counsel did not receive the first notice. The Court of Appeals held that there was no way in
this case to determine the reckoning date of the period for the filing of the petition for certiorari.
Hence, petitioner filed the present petition.
The Issues
In assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner contends that:
1. The Petition for Certiorari filed by respondent before the Court of Appeals docketed as CAG.R. No. Sp-54386 was out of time, hence, the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to
entertain the same; and
2. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the National Labor
Relations Commission in NLRC Case No. Adj. (L) 95-01-0306. 18
The Ruling of the Court
We find merit in the petition.
Petitioner has raised a factual issue, i.e., whether Anita was illegally dismissed, which is not proper
in a petition for review. We have consistently ruled that it is not the function of this Court to assess
and evaluate the facts and the evidence again, our jurisdiction being generally limited to reviewing
errors of law that might have been committed by the trial court or administrative
agency.19 Nevertheless, since the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the Labor Arbiter are at
variance with those of the NLRC, we resolve to review the records and the evidence presented by
the parties.20
This Court generally accords respect to the factual findings of the NLRC. However, the rule is
equally settled that this Court will not uphold erroneous conclusions of the NLRC if the NLRCs
findings of fact on which its conclusions are based are not supported by substantial
evidence.21 Substantial evidence, which is the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact in
cases before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, is that level of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 22 Factual findings of
administrative agencies will be set aside if found arbitrary.23
Petitioner assails the appellate courts finding that it was incredible for Anita not to know her job
because the nature of work of a domestic helper was easy. Petitioner asserts that the Court of
Appeals "completely overlooked that it was not a matter of learning the job, but it was more on the
psychological preparedness of Anita to do menial job, which way back home were being done by her
own househelpers." Petitioner asserts that it did not say that Anita did not know her job as even
petitioners evaluation of Anitas qualifications was outstanding. Petitioner stresses that Anitas
repatriation was of her own accord.
On the other hand, Anita asserts that all that petitioner has presented were mere self-serving
allegations, such as (1) she was not doing her job as domestic helper; (2) she did not know how to
wash clothes; (3) she had broken several glasswares of her foreign employer; and (4) when her
foreign employer called her attention, she allegedly answered that she used to have her own
househelper at home to do the housekeeping chores for her. Anita asserts that petitioner has not
adduced any substantial evidence to support its allegations.
Anita also asserts that she did not have second thoughts about accepting the job of domestic helper
because she knew how to do the job of a domestic helper.
We note that in its Position Paper filed before the Labor Arbiter, petitioner pointed out that they had
agreed in their employment contract that Anitas placement was subject to a 40-day probationary
period.24 Anita is deemed to have admitted the existence of this stipulation in the employment
contract as she never disputed petitioners assertion in all the pleadings that she submitted to the
NLRC, the Court of Appeals, and this Court. Hence, even if it were true that Anitas foreign
employer terminated her services after 10 days of her employment, there could be no illegal
dismissal as the termination was effected during the agreed probationary period.
The law in point is Section 6, Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code,
thus
Probationary employment. There is probationary employment where the employee, upon his
engagement, is made to undergo a trial period during which the employer determines his fitness to
qualify for regular employment, based on reasonable standards made known to him at the time of
engagement.
Probationary employment shall be governed by the following rules:
xxxx
(c) The services of any employee who has been engaged on probationary basis may be terminated
only for a just or authorized cause, when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with
reasonable standards prescribed by the employer.
(d) In all cases of probationary employment, the employer shall make known to the employee the
standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee at the time of his engagement. Where
no standards are made known to the employee at that time, he shall be deemed a regular employee.
Indeed, an employer, in the exercise of its management prerogative, may hire an employee on a
probationary basis in order to determine his fitness to perform his work. The employees services
may be terminated for a just cause or for his failure to qualify as a regular employee based on
reasonable standards made known to him at the time of his engagement. 25
Anita was employed as a domestic helper on a probationary basis. Her foreign employer interviewed
her through telephone calls and apprised her of the terms and conditions of her employment as
househelper. Upon her arrival at her employers house in Taiwan, her employer apprised her again
of her duties as househelper.26
The findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter which the NLRC and the Court Appeals adopted reveal that
Anitas foreign employer was dissatisfied with her performance.
The law in protecting the rights of the laborer authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of
the employer. While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of
the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute would automatically be decided
in favor of labor.27
However, although Anitas employment was terminated because she failed to meet the standards of
her foreign employer, still it is necessary and obligatory to afford Anita her basic right to notice.
Section 2, Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides:
Security of tenure. (a) In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services
of an employee except for just or authorized causes as provided by law, and subject to the
requirements of due process.
(b) The foregoing shall also apply in cases of probationary employment; provided, however,
that in such cases, termination of employment due to failure of the employee to qualify in
accordance with the standards of the employer made known to the former at the time of engagement
may also be a ground for termination of employment.
xxxx
(d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due process shall be
substantially observed:
xxxx
If the termination is brought about by the completion of a contract or phase thereof, or by failure of
an employee to meet the standards of the employer in the case of probationary employment,
it shall be sufficient that a written notice is served the employee within a reasonable time
from the effective date of termination. (Emphasis supplied)
Records disclose that Anita was repatriated to the Philippines on 25 January 1995. On the night
before her departure, her employers wife merely told her that she was sending her home "on
account of some problem." When Anita asked Ms. Go, who accompanied her to the airport the
following day, why she was being repatriated, Ms. Go merely answered that "there was some kind of
a problem."28
The information given to Anita cannot be considered as equivalent to the written notice required by
law to be served on the employee. The notice should inform the employee of the ground or grounds
for his termination and that his dismissal is being sought.
The absence of notice in the present case makes Anitas termination defective for which petitioner
must be sanctioned for its non-compliance with the requirements of or for failure to observe due
process. Not being a mere technicality but part of procedural due process, to which every employee
is entitled to ensure that the employers prerogative to dismiss is not exercised arbitrarily, this
requisite notice must be complied with strictly.29
Hence, it was incumbent upon Anitas foreign employer to comply with this requirement. This, her
employer failed to do, entitling Anita to nominal damages30 of P30,000 in accordance with recent
jurisprudence,31 to vindicate or recognize her right to procedural due process which was violated by
her employer.
In Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission,32 this Court held:
Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due process
should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should
indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights, as ruled in Reta v. National Labor
Relations Commission. The indemnity to be imposed should be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent
practice of "dismiss now, pay later," which we sought to deter in the Serrano ruling. The sanction
should be in the nature of indemnification or penalty and should depend on the facts of each case,
taking into special consideration the gravity of the due process violation of the employer.
Under the Civil Code, nominal damages is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has
been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose
of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
As enunciated by this Court in Viernes v. National Labor Relations Commission, an employer is
liable to pay indemnity in the form of nominal damages to an employee who has been dismissed if,
in effecting such dismissal, the employer fails to comply with the requirements of due process. The
Court, after considering the circumstances therein, fixed the indemnity at P2,590.50, which was
equivalent to the employees one month salary. This indemnity is intended not to penalize the
employer but to vindicate or recognize the employees right to statutory due process which was
violated by the employer.
The violation of the petitioners right to statutory due process by the private respondent warrants the
payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount of such damages is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant circumstances. Considering the
prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, we deem it proper to fix it at P30,000.00. We believe this
form of damages would serve to deter employers from future violations of the statutory due process
rights of employees. At the very least, it provides a vindication or recognition of this fundamental
right granted to the latter under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.
While it is no longer necessary to resolve the other issues presented in this petition, still we opt to
discuss them one by one.
Petitioner asserts that Anita filed her petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals out of time.
According to petitioner, on the envelope containing the assailed 3 February 1999 Resolution are
annotations consisting of: (a) Atty. Ciriaco S. Cruz, C. S. Cruz & Associates, Counsel for
Complainant, 1801 Int. J. P. Laurel St., San Miguel, Manila; (b) First Notice; (c) Second Notice; (d)
Third Notice; and (e) Return to Sender Unclaimed. Petitioner asserts that these annotations reveal
how, when, and to whom delivery of the mail was made.
Petitioner contends that since only the date of the second notice of the postmaster 23 February
1999 is readable, it can be deduced from this that Atty. Cruz constructively received the 3 February
1999 Resolution on 28 February 1999 or five days from 23 February 1999.
Petitioner also argues that it is not necessary to present the postmasters certification. Petitioner
maintains that the annotations on the mail envelope "can stand on equal footing with and have
similar evidentiary value as a postmasters certification."
Petitioner stresses that since Anitas counsel filed the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
only on 17 August 1999 or more than 60 days from 28 February 1999, the Resolution "has already
assumed finality and the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over that petition."
These arguments are erroneous. Section 9, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions. Judgments, final orders or resolutions shall be
served either personally or by registered mail. x x x
Section 10 of the same Rule provides:

Completeness of service. Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary
mail is complete upon the expiration of ten (10) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise
provides. Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or after five
(5) days from the date he received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever date is earlier.
The rule on service by registered mail contemplates two situations: (1) actual service the
completeness of which is determined upon receipt by the addressee of the registered mail and (2)
constructive service the completeness of which is determined upon expiration of five days from the
date the addressee received the first notice of the postmaster.
In the present case, there is no proof of actual receipt of the notice of the registered mail by Anitas
counsel. Petitioner merely relied on the envelope which bore the notations "Return to Sender
Unclaimed," "Second Notice 2-23," and "Third Notice"33 tending to indicate that the registered mail
was returned to sender because it was unclaimed despite the notices sent by the postmaster to the
addressee. Petitioner should not have relied on these notations to support the presumption of
constructive service.34 The envelope does not constitute sufficient proof that a first notice was sent by
the postmaster, much less, that there was completeness of service.35
A party who relies on constructive service or who contends that his adversary has received a copy of
a final order or judgment upon the expiration of five days from the date the addressee received the
first notice sent by the postmaster must prove that the first notice was actually received by the
addressee.36
For completeness of constructive service, there must be conclusive proof that Anitas former counsel
had actually received the notice.37 Such proof requires a certified or sworn copy of the notice given
by the postmaster to the addressee. Thus, Section 13 of Rule 13 provides:
Proof of service. x x x If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit
and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed
immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof of the unclaimed letter together with the
certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee. (Emphasis supplied)
There must be compliance with Section 13 of Rule 13 on proof of service by registered mail. As the
Court ruled inDela Cruz v. Dela Cruz:38
In the present case there is no proof of the actual receipt of the notice of the registered mail by
counsel for the defendants, Atty. Belen. The trial court merely relied on the notations on the wrapper
or envelope of the returned order of September 21, 1965 consisting of "R & S", "unclaimed" and the
stamped box with the wordings "2nd notice" and "last notice" tending to indicate that the registered
mail was returned to sender because it was unclaimed inspite of the notices sent by the postmaster
to the addressee therein. The trial court, on the basis of said notations, assumed that the first notice
of the postmaster must have been received by defendants on or before November 3, 1965, the date
when the order in the envelope was returned to the Urdaneta Post Office. This finding of the court a
quo is untenable.
In Barrameda vs. Castillo, this Court held:
Therefore, to obviate injustice, it is incumbent upon a party, who relies on constructive service or
who contends that his adversary was served with a copy of a final order or judgment upon the
expiration of five days from the first notice of registered mail sent by the postmaster to prove that the
first notice was sent and delivered to the addressee. A certification from the postmaster would be the
best evidence of that fact (Grafil vs. Feliciano, L-27156, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 616). The
mailmans testimony may also be adduced to prove that fact, as was done in Aldecoa vs. Hon.
Arellano and Siguenza, 113 Phil. 75, 78.
The postmasters certification as to the sending of the first notice should include the data not only as
to whether or not the corresponding notices were issued or sent but also as to how, when and to
whom the delivery thereof was made. (Hernandez vs. Navarro, L-28296, November 24, 1972, 48
SCRA 44, 64, per Barredo, J.).
As stressed by Justice Barredo in a recent case, there must be clear proof of compliance with the
postal regulations governing the sending and receipt of the notice referred to in section 8 of Rule 13
(Vecino vs. Court of Appeals, L-38612, March 29, 1977). The mere exhibition in court of the
envelope containing the unclaimed mail is not sufficient proof that a first notice was sent.
Note that in a certain case a first notice was sent but it was received by the addressees eleven-year
old child who did not deliver it to the addressee himself. It was held that to apply the presumption in
that case and to insist on constructive service would work an injustice rather than promote justice
(Cabuang vs. Hon. Bello, 105 Phil. 1135, 1138).
In the instant case, there is no evidence that the first notice was sent to Barramedas lawyer and that
it was delivered to him or should have been received by him. The envelope containing the unclaimed
mail was presented in court. The face of the envelope contains the notation Returned to sender.
Reason: Unclaimed. Above the stamp, on the back of the envelope, with the legend City of San
Pablo, Philippines, Jan. 29, 1966, are written the dates, 2-3-66 and 2-9-66. Written also on the
back of the envelope are the following: R to S, notified 3/3/66.
Relying on those notations on the envelope, the trial court literally and rigidly applied the
presumption as to constructive service. It did not require appellee Castillo to present the
postmasters certification that a first notice was sent to Barramedas lawyer and that the notice was
received by the latter.
Under those circumstances, the trial courts order dismissing Barramedas appeal is fraught with
injustice. (Emphasis supplied)
Here, there is no postmasters certification that the registered mail was unclaimed by Atty. Cruz,
Anitas former counsel, and thus returned to sender after the first notice was sent to and actually
received by him on a specified date. Absent such notice, the disputable presumption of
completeness of service does not arise and by implication, petitioner could not presume actual
receipt by Atty. Cruz.39
Under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the special civil action for certiorari
should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution
sought to be assailed.40 As there is no conclusive proof of service of the resolution dated 3 February
1999 denying Anitas motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision, the resolution cannot be
deemed to have become final and executory. There is no way in the instant case to determine the
reckoning date of the period provided by law for the filing of the special civil action for certiorari.
Hence, the Court of Appeals did not lose jurisdiction over Anitas petition for certiorari filed before it.
That Anita herself received a copy of the assailed resolution is of no moment. Section 5(a), Rule III
of The New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides:
xxxx
For the purpose of computing the period of appeal, the same shall be counted from receipt of such
decisions, awards or orders by the counsel/representative of record.
Moreover, jurisprudence teaches that when a party is represented by counsel, notice should be
made upon the counsel of record at his given address to which notices of all kinds emanating from
the court should be sent in the absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of
address.41
The service of the courts order upon any person other than the counsel of record is not legally
effective and binding upon the party. Neither may it start the corresponding reglementary period for
the subsequent procedural steps that may be taken by the attorney. This is because it is the lawyer
who is supposed to know the next procedural steps or what ought to be done in law for the
protection of the rights of the client, and not the latter.42The sending of the copy of the assailed
resolution to Anita was not even necessary.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals.
However, petitioner Philemploy Services and Resources, Inc. shall pay respondent Anita
Rodriguez P30,000 as nominal damages. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
15. Skippers United Pacific, Inc. vs. Doza, G.R. No. 175558, February 8, 2012
Facts: Petitioner deployed De Gracia, Lata and Aprosta to work on board the vessel MV Wisdom
Star. On December 3 1998, Skippers alleges that De Garcia smelling strongly of alcohol, went to the
cabin of Gabriel Oleszek, MV Wisdom Stars Master. Skippers claims that he was rude and shouted
noisily to the master. De Gracia left the masters cabin after a few minutes and was heard shouting
very loudly somewhere down the corridors. The incident was evidenced by the Captains Report sent
on said date.
Furthermore, Skippers also claim that on January 22, 1999, Aprosta, De Gracia, Lata and Daza
arrived in the masters cabin and demanded immediate repatriation because they were not satisfied
with the ship. De Gracia, et al. threatened that they may become crazy any moment and demanded
for all outstanding payments due to them. The incident is evidenced by a telex of Cosmoship MV
Wisdom to skippers but had conflicting dates. De Gracia claims that Skippers failed to remit their
respective allotments, compelling them to vent their grievances with the Romanian Seafarers Union.
On January 28, 1999, the Filipino seafarers were unceremoniously discharged and immediately
repatriated. Upon arrival in the Philippines, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the LA.
The LA dismissed the seafarers complaint as the seafarers demand for immediate repatriation due
to the dissatisfaction with the ship is considered a voluntary pre-termination of employment. Such act
was deemed akin to resignation recognized under Article 285 of the LC. The LA gave credence to
the telex of the masters report that the seafarers indeed demanded immediate repatriation.
The NLRC agreed with the LAs decision.

The CA however reversed the LAs and the NLRCs decision.
The Court deemed the telex message as a self-serving document that does not satisfy the
requirement of substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify the conclusion that petitioners indeed voluntarily demanded their
immediate repatriation. Aggrieved, Skippers appeals the case with the Supreme Court. Issue:
Whether or not the seafarers demand for immediate repatriation can be considered an act of
voluntary resignation.
Held:
For a worker's dismissal to be considered valid, it must comply with both procedural and substantive
due process. The legality of the manner of dismissal constitutes procedural due process, while the
legality of the act of dismissal constitutes substantive due process. Procedural due process in
dismissal cases consists of the twin requirements of notice and hearing. The employer must furnish
the employee with two written notices before the termination of employment can be effected: (1) the
first notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is
sought; and (2) the second notice informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him.
Before the issuance of the second notice, the requirement of a hearing must be complied with by
giving the worker an opportunity to be heard. It is not necessary that an actual hearing be
conducted. Substantive due process, on the other hand, requires that dismissal by the employer be
made under a just or authorized cause under Articles 282 to 284 of the Labor Code. In this case,
there was no written notice furnished to De Gracia, et al., regarding the cause of their dismissal.
Cosmoship furnished a written notice (telex) to Skippers, the local manning agency, claiming that De
Gracia, et al., were repatriated because the latter voluntarily pre-terminated their contracts. This
telex was given credibility and weight by the Labor Arbiter and NLRC in deciding that there was pretermination of the employment contract "akin to resignation" and no illegal dismissal. However, as
correctly ruled by the CA, the telex message is "a biased and self-serving document that does not
satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence." If, indeed, De Gracia, et al., voluntarily preterminated their contracts, then De Gracia, et al., should have submitted their written resignations.
Article 285 of the Labor Code recognizes termination by the employee of the employment contract
by "serving written notice on the employer at least one (1) month in advance." Given that provision,
the law contemplates the requirement of a written notice of resignation. In the absence of a written
resignation, it is safe to presume that the employer terminated the seafarers. In addition, the telex
message relied upon by the Labor Arbiter and NLRC bore conflicting dates of 22 January 1998 and
22 January 1999, giving doubt to the veracity and authenticity of the document. In 22 January 1998,
De Gracia, et al., were not even employed yet by the foreign principal.
ERT/CPM v. Vinuya, G.R. No. 197528, Sept. 5, 2012

FACTS: Respondents were contracted by the agency for deployment to work as aluminum
fabricator/installer in Modern Metal in Dubai, UAE. The contract was for 2 years, approved by POEA,
providing 9 working hours a day, a salary of 1,350 AED with overtime pay, food allowance, free and
suitable housing, free transportation, free laundry, free medical and dental services. However, in
Dubai, Modern Metals gave them appointment letters with terms different from those they signed in
the Philippines increasing their employment terms, reducing salaries, allowances, and benefits.
The working conditions were also not as promised. They complained to their agency but to no avail.
Due to unbearable living and working condition, they resigned from their job and indicated
personal/family problems as their reasons. (except for Era who mentioned real reason). On March
15, 2008, respondents file a complaint for illegal dismissal against PERT CPM. They agency alleged
that they were not illegally dismissed because they resigned voluntarily. Labor Arbiter dismissed the
complaint finding that they voluntarily resigned. Respondents appealed to NLRC which reversed the
decision of Labor Arbiter. NLRC pointed out that signing of different contract in Dubai is illegal. NLRC
ordered the payment of agency to pay the salary, placement fee, and exemplary damages to
respondents. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by NLRC, but modified
their judgment adjusting the awards, particularly their salaries, in light of courts ruling in Serrano
striking down the clause in Sec 10, par 5, RA 8042 which limits the entitlement of illegally dismissed
OFW. Petitioner moved for reconsideration and questioned the applicability of Serrano ruling. This
was denied. CA upheld NLRCs decision.
ISSUE: W/N RA 10022, which was enacted on March 8, 2010, restoring the subject clause in Sec 10
of RA 8042 being amendatory in nature can be applied retroactively
HELD: No. Amendment introduced by RA 10022 cant be given retroactive application because it will
result in an impairment of right that had accrued to the respondents by virtue of Serrano ruling.

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Republic of the Philippines

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

Crim. Case No. 03-0124

Crim. Case No. 03-0125

Crim. Case No. 03-0126

Crim. Case No. 03-0127

Crim. Case No. 03-0128

Crim. Case No. 03-0129

Crim. Case No. 03-0130

Evidence for the defense consisted solely of appellants testimony.

The Court of Appeals similarly provided a gist of appellants testimony, thus:

undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of

SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR

[G.R. No. 138193. March 5, 2003]

OSM SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR

We resolve to OUTRIGHTLY DISMISS the petition.

The second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

On the other hand, the NLRC Decision disposed in this wise:

representing complainants unpaid salaries, accrued fixed overtime pay, allowance,

Labor Arbiter (LA) Manuel R. Caday rendered a Decision in favor of

Hence, this Petition.

The foregoing issues all refer to the question of whether, procedurally,

the questioned judgment, order or resolution. Other relevant documents and

As to the alleged missing address of private respondent, the indication by

It is worthwhile to note that what is involved in this case is the recovery of

On behalf of its principal, PC-SASCO, petitioner does not deny hiring

An employment contract, like any other contract, is perfected at the

G.R. No. 154185

November 22, 2005

Petitioner Amelia J. Delos Santos seeks in this petition for

On 10 August 1995, or thereabout, herein respondent Jebsen

operation-related expenses, inclusive of his post operation

P9,000, representing reasonable cost of board and lodging;

P500,000, representing moral damages;

US$2,452, representing Sick Wage allowance;

P62,853.60, representing attorneys fees; and,

US$6,245.20, also representing attorneys fees.

On appeal, the NLRC, in a decision [8] dated 29 August 2000,

Following the denial of its motion for reconsideration per

In time, petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the

(A) PRIOR TO HIS ACCIDENT, THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT OF

The petition is devoid of merit.

Department of Labor and Employment and such agencies charged

The Court agrees with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals

Petitioners posture, citing Section 2 (A) [20] in relation to

The fact that respondent retained Delos Santos and allowed

unless it is embodied in a written instrument. It is elementary,

G.R. No. 162419

July 10, 2007

PAUL V. SANTIAGO, petitioner,

PAUL V. SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC., respondent.

Doctrine of Procesual Presumption: The party invoking the application of a foreign

G.R. No. 152616

March 31, 2006

PHILEMPLOY SERVICES AND RESOURCES, INC., Petitioner,

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Section 10 of the same Rule provides:

The NLRC agreed with the LAs decision.

ERT/CPM v. Vinuya, G.R. No. 197528, Sept. 5, 2012

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