Professional Documents
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FACTS
On September 6, 1972, the herein private
respondent Eliseo Palatino filed with the
respondent court an application for registration
of title under the Land Registration Law, of a
parcel of land situated in Bataan Province.
Notice of initial hearing was duly issued by the
Commissioner of Land Registration.
However, respondent trial court issued an
order of general default against all persons,
including herein petitioner the Director of
Lands, for the failure of anyone, including the
said Director of Lands or his representative, to
appear and oppose the application.
Consequently, notice of this order of general
default was received by petitioners.
On January 5, 1973, respondent court issued its
order granting the application for registration.
Notice of the order was received by herein
petitioners.
Petitioners filed with the trial court a motion to
life order of general default and for
reconsideration of the order on the ground that
adjudicating the lot applied for by the
applicant, respondent Palatino, is without basis
in fact because the applicant could not have
possessed the land applied for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the application
for the reason that the land was originally part
of the United States Military Reservation
reserved by the then Governor General under
Proclamation No. 10 dated February 16, 1925
and it was only on June 10, 1967 that the
President of the Philippines by Proclamation No.
210-B revoked Proclamation No. 10 and
declared such portion of the area therein
embraced including the land applied for, as are
classified as alienable and disposable, opened
for disposition under the provisions of the
Public Land Act.
Trial court denied the petitioners' motion to lift
the order of general default and for
reconsideration of the order.
ISSUE
Whether petitioners contention is tenable
RULING
The Court had reviewed the records of this
case and it is convinced that certain essential
requisites of procedural law were not complied
with by the herein petitioners. There was a
failure to perfect an appeal and consequently
this failure had the effect of rendering final and
executory the judgment or final order of the
trial court. This fact certainly deprives the
appellate court, the Court, of jurisdiction to
entertain the appeal. By actual reckoning of
time, it will be seen that the period for filing
and perfecting an appeal had been past
overdue. Petitioners herein have procrastinated
too long on their rights and on the duties
imposed on them that the Court is now
prevented from extending to them the relief
they are now seeking. Through inexcusable
neglect and laches, the Government lost its
case Section 13 of the aforecited Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court is crystal clear in its language
and tenor: Where the notice of appeal, appeal
bond or record on appeal is not filed within the
period so prescribed, the appeal shall be
dismissed.
ISSUE
Whether the patent and title issued to Du
Timbol is null and void.
FACTS
The land covered by the free patent and title in
question was originally applied for by Precila
Soria, who transferred her rights to the land
and its improvements to defendant Isagani Du
Timbol. On December 12, 1969, free Patent No.
V-466102 was issued by the President of the
Philippines for the land in question, and on July
20, 1970, after transmittal of the patent to the
Register of Deeds of General Santos City,
Original Certificate of Title was issued in the
name of defendant.
On August 5, 1971, the Republic of the
Philippines, at the instance of the Bureau of
Forestry, filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Cotabato to declare subject free
patent and OCT in the name of the defendant
null and void ab initio and to order the
reversion of the land in question to the mass of
public domain on the ground that the land
covered thereby is a forest or timber land
which is not disposable under the Public Land
Act. In the reclassification of the public lands in
the vicinity where the land in question is
situated made by the Bureau of Forestry on
March 7, 1958, the said land was plotted on
Bureau of Forestry map.
The application for free patent by defendant
was filed on June 3, 1969, or more than eleven
years thereafter, thus, alleging that said patent
and title were obtained fraudulently as Du
Timbol never occupied and cultivated the land
applied for.
The respondent court dismissed the complaint
on the ground that Certificate of Title based on
the patent had became indefeasible in view of
the lapse of the one-year period prescribed
under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act
RULING
Yes. The area covered by the patent and title is
not disposable public land, it being a part of
the forest zone, hence the patent and title
thereto are null and void.
The defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of
title issued pursuant to a free patent does not
lie against the state in an action for reversion
of the land covered thereby when such land is
a part of a public forest or of a forest
reservation. As a general rule, timber or forest
lands are not alienable or disposable. Although
the Director of Lands has jurisdiction over
public lands classified as agricultural under the
constitution, or alienable or disposable under
the Public Land Act, and is charged with the
administration of all laws relative thereto,
mineral and timber lands are beyond his
jurisdiction. It is the Bureau of Forestry that has
jurisdiction and authority over the
demarcation, protection, management,
reproduction, occupancy and use of all public
forests and forest reservations and over the
granting of licenses for the taking of products
therefrom, including stone and earth.
The area in question is a forest or timber land,
hence it is clearly established by the
certification made by the Bureau of Forest
Development that it is within the portion of the
area which was reverted to the category of
forest land and approved by the President.
When the defendant Isagani Du Timbol filed his
application for free patent over the land in
question, the area in question was not a
disposable or alienable public land but a public
forest. Titles issued to private parties by the
Bureau of Lands when the land covered
thereby is not disposable public land but forest
land are void ab initio.
The complaint alleges that applicant Isagani Du
Timbol was never in possession of the property
prior to his filing the application, contrary to
the provisions of law that the applicant must
have been in possession or cultivation thereof
for at least 30 years. After diligent search of
the Acting Chief of the Survey-Party, alleged
circumstances are indicative of fraud in the
filing of the application and obtaining title to
the land, and if proven would override
respondent Judge's order dismissing the case
without hearing. The misrepresentations of the
FACTS
It was alleged that on September 30, 1911,
plaintiff acquired at a public sale held in
execution of a judgment rendered against
Ricardo Pardo y Pujol, a piece of property
situated in the municipality of Guinobatan,
consisting of a frame building of strong
materials with a galvanized-iron roof, erected
on a parcel of land belonging to that
municipality and intended for a public market.
The plaintiff also acquired at the sale all the
right, interest, title, and participation in the
said property that appertained or might
appertain to Pardo y Pujol. The said building
was constructed by virtue of a concession
granted by the former Spanish government to
Ricardo Pardo y Cabaas, father of the
judgment debtor.
On January 2, 1912, the said building was
totally destroyed by an accidental fire. For
several months thereafter the municipal
council of Guinobatan negotiated with plaintiff
for the purchase of his rights in the said
concession but such could not be brought to a
conclusion because the municipal council had
allegedly acted deceitfully, fraudulently, and in
bad faith for the sole purpose of beguiling,
deceiving, and prejudicing plaintiff in order to
prevent him from exercising his right to
reconstruct the burned market building and
utilize it in accordance with the terms of the
said concession. The defendant municipal
council with the other defendant, Francisco
Olaguera, had authorized the latter to take
possession of all the land and to occupy the
FACTS
The Attorney-General filed a written complaint
in the CFI of Surigao against the firm of
Aldecoa & Co., alleging that the defendant, a
mercantile copartnership company with a
branch office in Surigao, continues to operate
as such mercantile copartnership company
under the name of Aldecoa & Co.,; that the said
defendant, knowing that it had no title or right
whatever to two adjoining parcels of land has
been occupying them illegally for the past
seventeen years, more or less, having
constructed on the land a wharf, located along
the railroad, and built warehouses of light
material for the storage of coal all for its
exclusive use and benefit. These lands,
situated in Surigao, belonged to the late
Spanish Government in the Philippines and are
now the property of the Government of the
United States and were placed under the
control of the Insular Government
Since the year 1901, the defendant has been
requested repeatedly by the Attorney-General,
in representation of the Insular Government, to
recognize the latter's right of dominion over
the same and to deliver to it the said property,
and that, by reason of such demands, Aldecoa
& Co. agreed to return the land, but that later,
after several delays, it concluded by persisting
in its attempt illegally to continue occupying
the said land and refused to return it to the
Insular Government.
The defendant alleged that it held and
possessed, as owner, and had full and absolute
dominion over, the lands claimed by the
plaintiff.
CFI rendered judgment and found that the land
in question was public land and belonged to
the State, and ordered the defendant to return
it to the plaintiff.
ISSUE
Whether the subject lands as claimed by the
defendant is a part of the public dominion.
RULING
Yes. It is incontrovertible that the land in
question is of the public domain and belongs to
the State, inasmuch as at the present time it is
partly shore land and in part, was such
formerly, and now is land formed by the action
of the sea.
On the supposition that Aldecoa & Co.
commenced to occupy the land and shore
March 1, 1934
ISSUE
Whether the subject property belong to
Eufemia Mercado.
RULING
No. Articles 339 of the Spanish Civil Code of
1889 provides that property of public
ownership includes that devoted to public use,
such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State,
riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a
similar character. Article 407 of the same
Code provides that (1) Rivers and their natural
channels; (2) Continuous or intermittent waters
from springs or brooks running in then natural
channels and the channels themselves; (3)
Waters rising continuously or intermittently on
lands of public; xxx (8) Waters which flow
continuously or intermittently from lands
belonging to private persons, to the State, to
provinces, or to towns from the moment they
leave such lands; xxx are of public ownership.
Article 408 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889
provides that (1) Waters, either continuous or
intermittent rising on private estates, while
they run through them; (2) Lakes and ponds
and their beds when formed by nature on such
estates; (3) Subterranean waters found therein;
(4) Rain waters falling thereon as long as they
remain within their boundaries; and (5) The
channels of flowing streams, continuous or
intermittent formed by rain water, and those of
brooks crossing estates which are not of public
ownership are of private ownership. Further,
the water, bed, banks, and floodgates of a
ditch or aqueduct are deemed to be an integral
part of the estate or building for which the
waters are intended. The owners of estates
through or along the boundaries of which the
aqueduct passes can assert no ownership over
it, nor any right to make use of its beds or
banks, unless they base their claim on title
deed which specify the right or the ownership
claimed.
Appellant cannot invoke in her favor the Article
408 (5) on the ground that although it is true
that the BatasanLimasan or Pinac Bugalun
creek passes through her hacienda, it is none
the less true that it is not included in any of the
kinds of private property therein enumerated.
The appellant and her predecessors in interest,
in closing the two openings of the said creek
and converting it into a fish pond, not only
FACTS
Private respondent spouses Diosdado and
Lolita Acebo Azarraga owned a house and lot
located at Las Pias, Metro Manila. Lolita
obtained a loan from petitioner Teofilo Villarico
and as security, she mortgaged the subject
house and lot.
Lolita failed to pay the loan. Consequently,
Teofilo
extrajudicially
foreclosed
the
mortgage. Being the highest bidder in the
public auction, Teofilo was issued a Sheriffs
Certificate of Sale, which he registered in the
Register of Deeds of Rizal. The title over the
subject property was subsequently transferred
to Teofilos name.
When the period for redemption lapsed without
the property being redeemed, Teofilo filed
an ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession. This caused Diosdado to institute
civil case for nullification of real estate
mortgage, alleging that the real estate
mortgage
extrajudicially
foreclosed
was
simulated because he did not sign the
same. He was in Malaysia on the date of its
alleged execution. He also alleged irregularities
in the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings.
The trial court rendered its judgment declaring
the real estate mortgage null and void.
Aggrieved, petitioner Teofilo interposed an
appeal before the CA which later affirmed the
lower courts decision.
ISSUE
Whether petitioner Teofilo is a mortgageepurchaser in good faith for value of the subject
property.
RULING
Petitioner Teofilo claims that he is a mortgageepurchaser in good faith and for value because
before he entered into the contract of
mortgage, he verified first the genuineness of
private respondents title. When petitioner
learned that the title was in the name of
Diosdado Azarraga, petitioner agreed to
contract with Lolita Azarraga only upon the
latters assurance that Diosdado will sign the
deed. On the date of signing the deed, Lolita
introduced to him a man who claimed to be
Diosdado, and the man signed the deed. When
Lolita failed to redeem the property after
several demands, he caused the foreclosure of
the mortgage. According to petitioner, all
these show that he was a mortgagee-purchaser
in good faith and for value who is not required
to look beyond the face of the title covering the
property. Additionally, according to petitioner,
it was Diosdados negligence which made
possible Lolitas commission of fraud. For
Diosdado allowed Lolita to keep the title over
the mortgaged property even though they had
long been separated from each other.