Siege of Sevastopol (194142)

1 Background

For the Crimean War battle, see Siege of Sevastopol

(18541855).

Main article: Crimea Campaign

The Siege of Sevastopol also known as the Defence of Sevastopol (Russian: , transliteration: Oborona Sevastopolya) took place
on the Eastern Front of the Second World War. The
campaign was fought by the Axis powers of Germany,
Romania, and Italy against the Soviet Union for control
of Sevastopol, a port in the Crimea on the Black Sea.
On 22 June 1941 the Axis invaded the Soviet Union during Operation Barbarossa. Axis land forces reached the
Crimea in the autumn of 1941 and overran most of the
area. The only objective not in Axis hands was Sevastopol. Several attempts were made to secure the city
in October and November 1941. A major attack was
planned for late November, but heavy rains delayed the
Axis attack until 17 December 1941. Under the command of Erich von Manstein, Axis forces were unable
to capture Sevastopol during this rst operation. Soviet
forces launched an amphibious landing on the Crimean
peninsula at Kerch in December 1941 to relieve the siege
and force the Axis to divert forces to defend their gains.
The operation saved Sevastopol for the time being, but
the bridgehead in the eastern Crimea was eliminated in
May 1942.

The Soviet naval base at Sevastopol was one of the

strongest fortications in the world. Its site, on a deeply
eroded, bare limestone promontory at the southwestern
tip of the Crimea made an approach by land forces exceedingly dicult. The high-level clis overlooking Severnaya Bay protected the anchorage, making an amphibious landing just as dangerous. The Soviet Navy had built
upon these natural defences by modernizing the port and
installing heavy coastal defences which could re inland
and out to sea. The artillery was protected by strong concrete and armoured turrets. The port was a valuable target. Its importance as a potential naval and air base would
enable the Axis to conduct far-ranging sea and air operations against Soviet targets into and over the Caucasus
ports and mountains.[5] The Red Air Force had been using
the Crimea as a base to attack targets in Romania since
the Axis invasion in June 1941, proving its usefulness
as an air base.[6] Likewise, the Germans had launched a
bombing raid on the Sevastopol naval base at the start of
the invasion. [7]
Since the beginning of Barbarossa, the oensive against
the USSR had not really addressed the Crimea as an objective. German planners assumed the area would be captured in mopping-up operations once the bulk of the Red
Army was destroyed west of the Dnieper river. But in
June, attacks by Soviet aircraft from the Crimea against
Romanias oil reneries destroyed 11,000 tons of oil.
Hitler described the area as a oating aircraft carrier"
and ordered the conquest of Ukraine and Crimea as vital
targets in the Directive 33, dated 23 July 1941.[8]

After the failure of their rst assault on Sevastopol, the

Axis opted to conduct siege warfare until the middle
of 1942, at which point they attacked the encircled Soviet forces by land, sea, and air. On 2 June 1942, the
Axis began this operation, codenamed Strfang (Sturgeon Catch). The Soviet Red Army and Black Sea Fleet
held out for weeks under intense Axis bombardment. The
German Air Force (Luftwae) played a vital part in the
siege. The Luftwae made up for a shortage of Axis artillery, providing highly eective aerial bombardment in
support of the ground forces. Finally, on 4 July 1942, the
remaining Soviet forces surrendered and the Axis seized
the port. Both sides had suered considerable losses during the siege and attack.

The Command of the Army (OKH) issued orders that the

Crimea was to be taken as soon as possible to prevent attacks on Romanian oil supplies, vital to the German military. Hitler, impatient with obstruction to his commands
to advance in the south, repeated on 12 August his desire that the Crimea be taken immediately. Over a month
With the Soviet forces neutralised, the Axis refocused later, during the capture of Kiev, Generaloberst Erich von
their attention on the major summer campaign of that Manstein was given command of the German 11th Army
year, Operation Blue and their advance to the Caucasus on 17 September. After only a week in command, he
oil elds.
launched an assault upon the Crimea. After severe ghting, von Manstein defeated several Soviet counteroensives and destroyed two Soviet armies. By 16 November,
von Manstein had cleared the region, capturing its capital Simferopol, on 1 November. The fall of Kerch on 16
November left only Sevastopol in Soviet hands.[9]
1

3 FIRST AXIS OFFENSIVE

Fortunately for the Soviets, by the end of October 1941,

Major-General Ivan Yemovich Petrov's Independent
Coastal Army, numbering 32,000 men, had arrived at
Sevastopol by sea from Odessa further west, it having
been evacuated after heavy ghting. Petrov set about fortifying the inland approaches to Sevastopol. He aimed
to halt the Axis drive on the port by creating three defence lines inland, the outermost arc being 16 km (10
mi) from the port itself. Soviet forces, including the Soviet 51st Army and elements of the Black Sea Fleet, were
defeated in the Crimea in October and were evacuated
in December, leaving Petrovs force as Sevastopols main
defence force. Having cleared the rest of the Crimea between 26 September 16 November, the Romanian 3rd
Army and German 11th Army prepared for an attack on
the port. The German 11 Army was the weakest on the
entire front, initially containing only seven infantry divisions. The Romanians contributed a large force, but were
only lightly equipped. The weather turned against the
Axis in mid-October and torrential downpours delayed
the buildup. This gave Vice Admiral Filipp Oktyabrsky,
commander of the Black Sea Fleet, time to bring in men
and materiel from Novorossiysk. By 17 December, the
weather had cleared suciently for the Axis to begin a
major operation.[10]

2
2.1

Forces involved
Axis

The German 11th Army, commanded by Erich von

Manstein, besieged Sevastopol. At the time of the nal
assault in June 1942, 11th Army consisted of nine German infantry divisions in two Corps, and one Romanian
Corps. Signicant support was given by the Luftwae.
The Oberkommando der Luftwae dispatched Luftotte
4 's (Air Fleet 4) VIII. Fliegerkorps (8th Air Corps) for
support. It consisted of nine Geschwader (Wings) containing 600 aircraft, all coming under the command of
Generaloberst (General Colonel) Wolfram Freiherr von
Richthofen. Among this contingent was a powerful concentration of medium bomber, dive bomber, and torpedo
bomber Geschwader.[11] Naval support came from the
Italian 101st Squadron under Francesco Mimbelli. It consisted of four motor torpedo boats, ve explosive motorboats, six CB class midget submarines, and a number of 35-ton coastal submarines and MAS boats. This
force was the only Axis naval force deployed during the
siege.[12] Although Bulgaria was not technically at war
with the Soviet Union, its naval sta worked closely with
the Germans, and despite not being committed to combat,
they provided bases for the Axis naval command (Admiral Schwarzes Meer, Admiral of the Black Sea) to operate
in the Black Sea waters.[13]
The Axis order of battle:

This list is incomplete; you can help by

expanding it.

2.2 Soviet
The defence of Sevastopol was provided mainly by the
Black Sea Fleet and the Separate Coastal Army under
Ivan Yemovich Petrov (which had been shipped in from
the Siege of Odessa). The Black Sea Fleet sent 49,372
personnel to ght as infantry. Most were not trained for
ground combat, and the act was an ad hoc emergency
measure. The naval brigades formed had four to six battalions of 4,000 men, allowing them to absorb signicant
losses. These forces were well armed, having a variety
of artillery and mortar battalions. Almost 20 percent of
the Coastal Army were naval personnel. In the Separate Coastal Army, the strongest divisions were the 95th,
109th, 172nd, and 388th Rie Divisions. They each had
around 7,000 soldiers, the rest of the Red Army units having around 5,000 personnel. Some 5,000 reinforcements
made it into Sevastopol in May 1942. However, Petrovs
army lacked tanks and anti-aircraft guns. The garrison
also lacked food supplies and mortar ammunition, which
would severely sap Soviet strength. Poor communications
between headquarters and the front lines were also an issue. Petrov found it dicult to respond to Axis attacks
quickly.[17]

3 First Axis oensive

The German 11th Armys rst task was to break through
into the Crimea. The cities of Perekop and Ishun guarded
the narrow corridor of land which linked the Crimea to
the bulk of Ukraine. Erick-Oskar Hansen's LIV Corps,
with its 45th and 73rd Infantry Divisions, broke through
at Perekop at the cost of 2,641 casualties in six days of
ghting. The Soviets launched a counteroensive against
the 11th Armys ank at Melitopol. Von Manstein withdrew his other corps in order to deal with it. The resulting
battle ended with the destruction of two attacking Soviet Armies. By the time that this threat had been dealt
with, the Stavka had rushed in reinforcements and established another defence line at Ishun. Ordered to concentrate on the Crimea once more, von Manstein launched
his LIV Corps, this time with the support of the German
22nd Infantry Division, into the assault. The Soviets enjoyed local air superiority and armored reserves. They
also outnumbered the attacking Germans. In spite of this,
the defending Soviet 51st Army was pushed back. The
Germans suered 5,376 casualties in 12 days of combat, and the Soviets many more. By the end of October,
the 51st Army was crushed and in full retreat into the
Crimea. The situation in the air also changed. Arriving
Jagdgeschwader (Fighter Wings) won air superiority for
the Axis.[20]

3.1

Sevastopol oensive

On 22 and 23 October, Jagdgeschwader 3 (JG 3), JG 52,

and JG 77 crippled the Soviet air strength in the Crimea.
Over the two days they destroyed 33 Soviet aircraft for
one loss. In the six days from 18 to 24 October 140 Soviet aircraft were lost, 124 of them to Luftwae ghters.
Heinkel He 111s of KG 26 and KG 51 and Junkers Ju 87
Stukas of StG 77 were free to attack Soviet ground positions, contributing to the collapse of the Soviet Crimean
Front on 27 October.[21]

3.1
3.1.1

Sevastopol oensive
Initial battles

Chervona Ukraina. She was sunk by Ju 87s of StG 77 on 12

November.

With the front collapsing and the Axis closing in on Sevastopol, Vice-Admiral Oktyabrsky assumed command of
the port on 4 November 1941. The city had a civilian
population of 111,000 in 1941, and most were sent to
work on the three defence lines around the port. Only
the 7th and 8th Naval Infantry Brigades were available
for combat in the port. More naval infantry were formed
from ships in the harbor. The 8th Naval Infantry Brigade
was sent to guard the northeastern approaches near the
Mamachai-Belbek line. The 7th (5,200 men) was deployed in the center, near Mekenzyya. With only 20,000
soldiers, Oktyabrsky relied heavily on his 12 coastal battalions to slow down the Axis. The 62nd Fighter Brigade
contributed 61 ghters, which were able to achieve temporary air superiority.
On 30 October, the Soviet defences detected the spearhead of the German 132nd Infantry Division and shelled
it at 12:30 on 1 November using Battery 30s 305mm
coastal guns. This fort would later become known to the
Germans as Fort Maxim Gorky I. Von Manstein lacked
sucient air and mobile units to force a decision. Instead,
Manstein ordered Hansens LIV Corps to head east down
the Sevastopol-Simferopol rail line towards Yalta, while
the 72nd Infantry Division was to head to Balaklava, effectively encircling Sevastopol. Once there, it would attack Sevastopol from the east. The 132nd made reasonable progress, but was stopped on 2 November by the

3
8th Naval Brigade. The Germans suered 428 casualties. Manstein ordered a halt for a week, whilst bringing
up reserves. Oktyabrsky used his eet to bring in a further
23,000 men from the Caucasus. On 9 November, Petrovs
Army was brought in, bringing 19,894 soldiers, ten T-26
tanks, 152 artillery pieces, and 200 mortars. The Soviets
now had 52,000 troops in the area of the city. The Luftwae was considered weak (the bulk of it was engaged
in the Battle of Moscow), so the Soviet Navy kept the
heavy cruiser Krasny Kavkaz, light cruisers Krasny Krym
and Chervona Ukrania, and seven destroyers to protect
the port.[22]
The Luftwae did what it could to disrupt the Soviet defences. On 31 October, the destroyer Bodryy shelled
German positions along the coastline. StG 77 Ju 87s
attacked and wounded 50 of its crew with machinegun
re. On 2 November Junkers Ju 88s of KG 51 scored
several hits on the cruiser Voroshilov, and put it out of
action for months. On 7 November He 111s from KG
26 sank the liner Armeniya evacuating soldiers and civilians from Sevastopol, with only eight of the 5,000 passengers surviving. On 12 November, StG 77 sank the cruiser
Chervona Ukraina, and KG 26 damaged the destroyers
Sovershennyy and Besposhchadnyy. But with the Luftwae units being dispatched to other sectors and theatres,
the Soviets again achieved air superiority with 59 aircraft
(39 serviceable).[23]
Manstein wanted to launch an attack as soon as possible,
but his logistical lines were poor. Wanting to avoid strong
Soviet forces protecting the north of the port, including
the 95th Rie Division, Manstein chose to press the center and southern Soviet defences. He ordered the German
50th Infantry Division to probe the center of the Soviet
line east of the Chernaya river. The 132nd Infantry Division supported the probe and was able to push to within
4 kilometres of Severnaya Bay. The Soviets moved in
the 72nd Rie Division, with the support of the coastal
batteries, to stop the attack. The 72nd Infantry Division
continued towards Balaklava, and the 22nd Infantry Division joined the assault. Assisted by shelling from two
light cruisers and the battleship Parizhskaya Kommuna,
the Soviets halted this attack, and Manstein called o the
oensive on 21 November, having lost 2,000 men.[24]
3.1.2 December oensive
Manstein recognised that he could not take the port
quickly, and was going to have to organise a proper setpiece oensive. With German oensive operations suspended in December, Manstein found himself the only
commander on the Eastern Front with an oensive mission. He would not be ready to carry out his attack until 17 December. In the meantime, Oktyabrsky used the
interval to sail the 11,000 soldiers of the 388th Rie Division into Sevastopol between 713 December. Soviet
engineers began laying extensive mineelds and barbedwire belts. By the time of the Axis attack, Petrovs force

4 SECOND AXIS OFFENSIVE

held a fairly strong defensive position. The naval commander demanded that Petrov hold the coast along the
northern ank of Sevastopol on the Belbek River in order to retain Coastal Battery 10, an artillery complex near
Mamaschai. The German situation was somewhat worse.
LIV Corps had only 15,551 men in its four tired infantry
divisions (22nd, 24th, 50th, and 132nd). Over 7,000 soldiers in the German 11th Army were on the sick list at that
time. It was also short of artillery ammunition and heavy
artillery. In order to commit as many forces to the battle as possible, Manstein left the very weak XLII Corps,
containing just the 46th Infantry Division and two Romanian brigades, to protect the entire front from Yalta to
Kerch.[25]
The attack began at 06:10 on 17 December. The 22nd
Infantry Division attacked the 8th Naval Brigade on the
Belbek River, pushing west towards the coast, while the
50th and 132nd Infantry Divisions conducted xing attacks on the Soviet center. The 22nd succeeded in rolling
up the ank of the Naval Brigade after ve days of ghting. However, Oktyabrsky ordered its retirement south
towards Sevastopol, abandoning Mamaschai and forming
a new front north of Belbek city and the Belbek river. In
the south, XXX Corps tried and failed to break through
with the 72nd and 170th Infantry Divisions. Only minor gains were made against the 172nd Rie Division,
even with help from the Romanian 1st Mountain Brigade.
The Soviets brought in the 79th Naval Brigade and 345th
Rie Division by sea as reinforcements, using the long
winter nights and their naval superiority. Meanwhile, the
battleship Parizhskaya Kommuna shelled German forces
whenever they threatened a breakthrough. The oensive
came to an abrupt end when the Red Army staged an
amphibious landing at Kerch.[26]

3.2

Kerch Campaign

Main article: Battle of the Kerch Peninsula (1942)

Between 26 and 30 December 1941, the USSR launched
an amphibious assault on the Kerch peninsula to relieve
the encircled Soviet forces at Sevastopol. It succeeded
in gaining and sustaining a bridgehead for ve months.
However, a Germanled counteroensive named Operation Trappenjagd (Bustard Hunt) destroyed the bridgehead and the three Soviet Armies supporting the landing in May 1942. This allowed von Manstein to concentrate all of his resources against Sevastopol for the
rst time. The front over Sevastopol grew quiet and a
stalemate ensued. The Luftwae kept up the pressure
on Soviet sea communications and although supplies still
made it through, Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky, commanding
the Black Sea Fleet, was forced to reduce the number of
coastal bombardment missions.[27]

4 Second Axis oensive

4.1 Unternehmen Strfang
4.1.1 Soviet defence
Sevastopol was still a formidable obstacle. Its airelds
provided a base for the Red Air Force to attack the Axisheld Soviet coastline and Romania proper. It was also
home to the Black Sea Fleet. Its main fortications were
pointed seaward, while the land defences encircled the
city at a distance of 1520 km, with an inner defense belt
at a range of 5 km. Enhancing the manmade defences
was the forested, rugged terrain. To the north of Severnaya Bay there were 11 batteries and strongpoints. They
were given morale-boosting names such as Stalin, Maxim
Gorky I, Molotov, and Lenin. They were defended by the
First Coastal Army.[28] Elsewhere, the Soviets had constructed hundreds of timber bunkers with machinegun
nests and 45 mm anti-tank artillery. Along the outer belt,
concrete bunkers were less common, 19 being stretched
across its 37 km. Soviet engineers laid thousands of
mines, including PMD-6 wooden anti-personnel mines,
TMD-40 wooden anti-tank mines, and barbed-wire obstacle belts.[29]
Petrov, commanding the Independent Coastal Army, had
a powerful artillery pool. Petrov had on strength some
455 artillery pieces and howitzers. Among those were
34 152 mm and 40 122 mm Howitzers and 918 mortars. Ammunition was adequate for a battle of two weeks
for these calibers, but 82 mm mortar ammunition was in
short supply. The battles of the Crimean campaign had
taken their toll, and scarcely any tank and anti-aircraft
artillery support were available. A further force, under
Major-General Petr Morgunov, was added. The Coastal
Artillery Force was semi-independent for much of the
siege, and had an initial strength of 12 batteries and 45
guns, although more were added during 1942. By the
time of the German June oensive, the Soviets had available eight 305 mm, one 188 mm, 10 152 mm and 17
130 mm, three 120 mm, eight 100 mm, and four 45 mm
guns.[29]
4.1.2 Axis forces
By this time, the Axis was facing a serious manpower
and artillery shortage. The German 11th Armys divisions had anywhere between 35 and 75 percent of their
initial strength. The German 22nd Infantry Division was
the strongest division, and was only short 1,750 personnel, while the weakest was the 132nd Infantry Division,
which was short 2,300 men. The 170th Infantry Division
had to collapse one of its regiments to bring the others
up to strength. The German infantry force was a fragile
force at Sevastopol and von Manstein could not aord to
squander it. German doctrine stressed bypassing strongpoints, but since this was not possible, German infantry

4.1

Unternehmen Strfang

Italian Motoscafo Armato Silurante (MAS) boats.

were forced to reduce one fort after another. Some 65

Sturmgeschtz III assault guns were available to support
them.[30]
The assault was based around battalion-strength infantry
assault groups supported by a platoon of engineers and
a few assault guns. Two pioneer battalions were attached to each division to spearhead the attack and break
through xed and fortied defences. The eight battalions
of LIV Corps each contained around 386 men on average, and were equipped with 1012 ame throwers, 28
30 mine detectors, 3,000 kg of high explosives, 2,200
hand grenades, and 500 smoke grenades. The 300th
Panzer Battalion, a remote-controlled tank unit using the
Goliath tracked mine, was made available for destroying fortications.[30] The total number of artillery pieces
came to 785 German and 112 Romanian medium and
heavy guns. Most of these were under the command of
LIV Corps, the main assault force. To increase this arsenal, a number of super-heavy artillery pieces were made
available. Three 600 mm Karl-Gert guns (Thor, Odin,
and one other) and one 800 mm gun (Schwerer Gustav),
delivering 1.4 and 7 ton shells, respectively, and capable
of destroying any fortication. However, the Karl-Gert
guns only had a range of between 46,000 meters, which
made them vulnerable to counter-battery re. Moreover,
only 201 rounds of 600 mm and 48 round of 800 mm ammunition were available. Most of it was used up before
the infantry assault.[31]
More useful to the German infantry were the two 280 mm
rail guns. Two 420 mm, two 355 mm howitzers were
also available, along with four 305 mm mortars. Both of
the 420 mm guns were of First World War vintage, short
in range and with limited ammunition. Some nine 283
mm mortars were also available, but they were pre-1914
weapons and six had burst during ring. Some Czechbuilt artillery was also available. At the divisional level,
268 105 mm and 80 160 mm weapons were in service,
including 126 Nebelwerfer rocket launchers. Overall, the
German 11th Armys artillery was a collection of modern,
obsolete, and foreign-built weapons.[32] For the oensive,
183,750 rounds of 105 mm and 47,300 rounds of 150
mm ammunition were stockpiled, enough for 12 days of
ring.[33]

He 111H on a torpedo training exercise, 10 October 1941. KG

26 gave the Luftwae some striking power against the Black Sea
Fleet.

To reinforce the 11th Army, the Romanians were committed to the assault. The Romanian 18th Infantry Division was at full strength, and plenty of Romanian infantry
were available. However, the 18th Division was inexperienced and made up of reservists. The Romanian 1st
Mountain Division was considered an elite force, and its
addition was to prove useful. They had 112 guns available, but virtually no engineers. The weakness of their artillery and supporting arms made the Romanian X Corps
reliant on the Germans for anything other than set-piece
infantry attacks.[33]
The Luftwae had to compensate for the Axis artillery
limitations. A powerful air armada was brought together. Under Fliegerkorps VIII, von Richthofen assembled six Kampfgruppen (Bomber Groups) from six
Kampfgeschwader (Bomber Wings): KG 51 Edelwei,
KG 76, KG 100, and III.Gruppe/LG 1. Dive-bomber
support from StG 77 was also given to Richthofen. He
could call upon three gruppen of Ju 87s. Jagdgeschwader
(Fighter Wings) JG 3 Udet and JG 77 Herz As were
available for air superiority operations. II.Gruppe/KG 26
Lwe was also available for anti-shipping operations, in
addition to the air-land eort carried out by Fliegerkorps
VIII.[11]
The Luftwae could not support the land assault and

4 SECOND AXIS OFFENSIVE

maintain pressure on Soviet sea communications alone.

With only KG 26 engaged in anti-shipping operations
against Soviet sea communications, the OKW looked to
the Kriegsmarine to supply Schnellboot (S-Boat) motor
torpedo boats to help eliminate Soviet shipping supplying and evacuating the port. The time it took to dismantle and move the 92-ton boats by rail to Romanian ports
was going to be too long. In a rare appeal for help, the
Germans turned to their Italian allies, aware of their expertise with motor torpedo boat operations. The Regia
Marina sent the 101st Naval Squadron, which brought
nine torpedo boats and nine coastal submarines under the
command of the highly competent Capitano di Fregata
Francesco Mimbelli. The Italian boats were only 24 tons
and the submarines were 35 tons, which made them easier
to transport by truck and barge. The squadron was based
at Feodosiya and Yalta, which made it the only Axis naval
force to participate in the siege.[34]

4.2
4.2.1

came in, wave after wave, and literally ploughed up the

earth throughout our defence area.[36] From 3 to 6 June,
the Luftwae carried out 2,355 operations.[35]
On 7 June, von Manstein ordered the ground assault. The
Luftwae carried out 1,368 sorties and dropped 1,300
tons of bombs on Soviet positions, but the Soviet infantry
clung on.[36]
4.2.2 Ground ghting: 710 June

Battle
Air oensive

Von Manstein demanded an all-out assault by the Luftwae before the main ground action began. Situated
only 70 km from Sevastopol, the German formations
had barely enough time to reach altitude before reaching
their targets. Fliegerkorps VIII began its bombing campaign along the north and southeast of the city. At the
same time, German medium bombers conducted rolling
attacks on the city, which included all units except LG
1, which engaged in suppressing anti-aircraft installations. Oil, electricity, water pumps, harbor facilities, and
submarine bases were attacked by StG 77 Ju 87s. Von
Richthofen watched the bombing from an observation
post close to the front. The targets were badly damaged,
and res broke out all over the port city. The Luftwae
ew 723 missions and dropped 525 tons of high explosive
on the rst day. Despite heavy anti-aircraft re, just one
Ju 87 was lost.[35]
While the bulk of the Luftwae was busy with the land
battle, III./KG 26 sought to break Soviet sea communications. They sank the tanker Mikhail Gromov, but the
otilla leader Tashkent, the destroyer Bezuprechnyy, and
transport Abkhaziya escaped to bring 2,785 soldiers into
the fortress. Air support continued with 643 sorties on 3
June 585 on 4 June, and 555 on 5 June, with some German crews ying daily averages of 18 missions.[36] By
the start of the ground attack on 7 June, the Luftwae
had own 3,069 sorties and 2,264 tons of high explosive
and 23,800 incendiary bombs were dropped. Many of
the bombs dropped were 1,000 kg SC 1000, 1,400 kg
SC 1400, and 2,500 kg SC 2500 bombs. The heavycaliber weapons were aimed at Soviet concrete bunkers.
Ivan Laskin, commanding the 172nd Rie Division in the
northern sector recalled, Bombers in groups of twenty to
thirty attacked us without caring for their targets. They

Satellite image of the Sevastopol area. Note the dense forest terrain situated on high ground and valleys to the east of the port.

LIV Corps was to strike the main blow. Situated on the

northeast edge of the city, they struck along the lines of
least resistance, across the Belbek river while the German
XXX and Romanian Mountain Corps conducted holding
attacks in the south and center, respectively. Both the
latter corps did not start major operations until 8 June.
The artillery bombardment targeted bunkers with 105
mm re, which usually received 1025 rounds. German
36 and 37 mm guns also did an eective job of eliminating machinegun nests. The Germans were also quick to
bring up 88 mm artillery guns to re directly into bunker
apertures. Between 2 and 6 June, the German 11th Army
expended nine percent of its munitions (42,595 rounds,
amounting to 2,449 tons of munitions) on pre-advance
shelling. The railway guns also red a few rounds at the
main fortications and rail lines, but most missed by some
distance. The closest shell landed 80 meters away from
its target. Soviet ammunition dumps were also targeted
by these weapons, with no eect. The main fortica-

4.2

Battle

tions, forts Stalin, Molotov, and Maxim Gorky (which lay

in the path of LIV Corps) remained active. It was not
until the afternoon of 6 June when one shell from 'Thor'
knocked out Maxim Gorkys second turret, damaging the
weapon. This was the only success of the German superheavy guns, which did not have an impact commensurate
with their expense. The Luftwae had a greater impact,
using its Ju 87s to knock out the communications systems
of the fort.
On the morning of 7 June 1942, the German infantry
began advancing cautiously. XXX Corps attacked the
southern positions held by the 7th Naval Brigade and
388th Rie Division. The German infantry advanced behind air and artillery support. The infantry seemed afraid
of their re support and did not advance close enough
behind it. The bombardment also failed to have enough
of an eect. The Soviets held their re until the Germans were well within range before opening re, and
little progress was made. Von Richthofen was angered
by the fear of the infantry and called the day a real
disappointment.[37] The next few days were not much
better, despite the Luftwae ying 1,200 sorties. The
pace of operations exhausted the machines and men. Often crews did not get out of their aircraft and made three
or four sorties without rest.[38]
LIV Corps began its assault in the north on the seam of
the Soviet defence sectors III and IV. The 'Schwerer Gustav' weapon continued to re against ammunition dumps,
which produced no eect. Nevertheless, the 132nd Infantry Division was able to work its way up to the river.
The 600 mm guns concentrated on the coastal batteries
and Maxim Gorky fortress. Meanwhile, the German 22nd
Infantry Division attacked further to the east. Some 200
Soviet reinforcements of the 79th Naval Infantry Brigade,
protecting this sector, were lost in the bombardment, but
the main defences held out. The brigade held most of its
forces in reserve, while committing only a single company to cover the hilly terrain on the Belbek river front.
German assault groups breached the rst and reserve lines
by 08:15. The Germans had to negotiate heavily mined
areas, slowing them down and allowing the Soviets to
make a partial recovery.[39] Supporting operations by the
50th and 24th German Infantry Divisions failed, which
cost the Germans 12 StuG assault guns. The remotecontrol demolition units were not eective as the terrain
was unsuitable.[40]

A burning Soviet position.

Divisions, to trap its defenders against the coast. The

132nd pushed into the 95th Rie Divisions positions
north of the fort, while the other two divisions attacked in
a anking move. While the Germans did make progress,
nearing the main railway station just southeast of Maxim
Gorky, they were stopped from achieving a full-scale
breakthrough by the 172nd Rie Division. The 22nd and
50th Infantry Divisions had been heavily shelled by mortar re from the 25th Rie Division facing them east of
the Haccius Ridge, which caused heavy casualties. By
18:00 hours, the German attack was spent.[42]
LIV Corps losses on 7 June amounted to 2,357 casualties in four divisions, including 340 killed. It had also
expended 3,939 tons of ammunition. The 132nd Division had exhausted all of its basic munitions load by midday. On the other side, the formidable Soviet defence
lines east and southeast of Belbek had been overrun, and
the Germans succeeded in advancing 2 km through dense
Soviet defences. The Soviet casualties had also been severe. It is estimated that three battalions were eectively
destroyed.[42]

By 17:15 the town of Belbek was secured. The 22nd Infantry Division made considerable progress in breaking
through the defenses of the 25th Rie Division. The 50th
Infantry Division supported the 22nds left ank. Now
facing the Germans was the Haccius Ridge, on which the
fortress Maxim Gorky was located. It was anked by sev- Von Manstein recognised the seriousness of the failure on
eral smaller forts to the east.[41]
8 June. He was worried that the 132nd Infantry Division,
Now the 132nd Infantry Divisions was ordered to con- locked in combat with the 79th Naval Brigade and 95th
duct a converging pincer movement on the Maxim Gorky and 172nd Rie Divisions north of the city on the Belbek
[36]
fortress in conjunction with the 22nd and 50th Infantry river front, was approaching the end of its strength.
Once again, the army turned to the Luftwae for support.

4 SECOND AXIS OFFENSIVE

Richthofen responded by ordering attacks against Soviet

supply lines. The same day, German bombers, including
KG 100, began attacks on Soviet shipping. They sank the
destroyer Sovershennyy and the survey vessel Gyuys, with
the 4,727 ton transport Abkhaziya and destroyer Svobodnyy following them on 10 June.[36]
The period between 812 June descended into a battle
of attrition. Several Soviet counterattacks were repulsed
with heavy losses. The German LIV Corps extended the
salient on the seam of the III and IV sector to 3 km, determined to break through before Petrov could reinforce his
lines. The 132nd Infantry Division cleared the Haccius
Ridge while the 22nd Infantry Division overran most of
the Soviet 79th Naval Infantry Brigade. The Soviet unit
tried counterattacking on 10 June, but was repulsed. The
Soviet formation was eectively destroyed, with the support of the Luftwae, which used anti-personnel bombs
against Soviet infantry caught in the open. Only one battalion (the Soviet 1st Batt./241st Rie Regiment) was in a
position to block the Germans from encircling the Maxim
Gorky fort. Still, on 8 June LIV Corps had lost 1,700 men.
In return, the lodgement in Soviet lines was extended to
3 km deep and 5 km wide.[43]
In the south, XXX Corps made no progress in four days
of attacks. They suered 496 casualties at the hands of
the 109th Rie Division. The 28th Light and 72nd Infantry Divisions had succeeded in puncturing the Soviet
lines opposite the 109th and 388th Rie Divisions. The
outer defences were broken in some parts, but the most
were still in Soviet hands on 12 June. The main belt on
the Sapun Ridge (Sapun-gora) was unbroken. Soviet casualties amounted to 2,500, including 700 captured. By
13 June, XXX Corps had lost 2,659 men, including 394
killed.[44]
4.2.3

Air-land operations: 1115 June

95th Rie Division halted the 132nd Divisions progress

in the north. Although a relatively quiet day, 10 June
saw the elimination of the Soviet 79th Naval Brigade and
LIV Corps lost 2,772 men. Counterattacks by the Soviet 345th Division aimed at the hinge between the German 132nd and 50th Divisions were repulsed by the Luftwae. On 1112 June, LIV Corps lost another 1,957
men. The Soviets had committed all of their reserves and
were stretched dangerously thin. One more push might
collapse the northern sector. But at this time, the tired
German infantry were running short on reinforcements
and ammunition.[45]
In contrast, the Black Sea Fleet was bringing in reinforcements in spite of the Luftwae. On 12 June the cruiser
Molotov and destroyer Bditel'nyy brought in 2,314 soldiers, 190 tons of ammunition and 28 artillery pieces.
The Luftwae turned its attentions to these convoys. On
13 June it sank the transports Gruzyia, TSch-27, patrol
boat SKA-092, motor boat SP-40, ve barges and a oating crane. On 15 June another 3,400 soldiers, 442 tons
of ammunition, 30 tons of fuel and 12 tons of provisions
reinforced the Soviets.[36]
The Luftwae had own 1,044 sorties on 11 June, dropping 954 tons of bombs. The consumption rate of ammunition was putting von Richthofens logistical network
under strain and he could no longer aord to y massed
bombing raids. On 11 June, he surmised there was less
than two days worth of munitions left, requiring a change
of tactics. Instead of carpet bombing, fewer targets would
be attacked simultaneously, and aircraft would strike at
designated targets in long and narrow lines. This was
designed to maintain accurate pressure without wasting
ordnance. Even this failed to alleviate shortages in the
long term. By 17 June, scarcity of aviation fuel meant
the Luftwae dropped only 800 instead of the planned
1,000 tons of bombs. Adding to the Luftwaes troubles
in the sector, von Richthofen was transferred to prepare
the Corps Headquarters near Kursk support the nearing
Operation Blue. He retained formal command, at least
until given control of Luftotte 4, but Wolfgang von Wild
took over air operations over Sevastopol.[46]

The primary objective for the 22nd Infantry Division on

13 June was Fort Stalin, blocking the advance to Severnaya Bay. It was a tough position. The fortications allowed the Soviets to concentrate artillery against breakthroughs and machine gun posts protected the fort from
southern and eastern attacks, but it was vulnerable from
a northern assault. In addition, only 200 men from the
345th Rie Division were stationed there. The Germans
launched their assault on the position at 03:00 on 13 June
with just 813 men. The 3rd Battalion was assigned to suppress Soviet machine gun and mortar positions located on
the southeast as a diversion. The 1st Battalion, supported
A StuGIII. These vehicles helped knock out Fort Stalin.
by ve StuG assault guns, two 37mm guns and an EngiAs the Germans made slow progress toward the main neer Company were to serve as the main eort. Some
and 110 men were committed respectively in each
train station, Petrov withdrew the battered 172nd Rie 200 [47]
unit.
Division and replaced it with 345th Rie Division. The

4.2

Battle

German bombardment began on 12 June. Artillery re

from 'Dora' had failed to neutralise the fort. Nevertheless a combined arms attack from eleven 420 mm mortars
and dive-bombing by Ju 87s of StG 77 knocked out the
forts main armament (three of the four 76.2 mm guns).
At 19:00 the 22nds divisional artillery began shelling the
fort and its smaller supporting fortress, Volga, located to
Stalins rear, with 210, 280 and 305 mm weapons. At
03:00 the German infantry attacked. The fog of war intervened. The Soviet mortar teams were not suppressed, and
a erce battle developed which lasted until 05:30. The
Germans, with the support of ve assault guns and a few
37 mm weapons, silenced the fort, bunker by bunker. In The harbour after the battle (July 1942)
the heavy ghting a large number of company commanders were killed.[47]
reached its outer defences and the Sapun Ridge to the east
As the Germans seized this vital fort, the neighbouring of the town was still under Soviet control . By 15 June,
Volga fort realised it had fallen and shelled the position. some 1,000 Soviet soldiers and 1,500 mortar bombs had
A company-sized counterattack by the Soviets was wiped been captured indicating the Soviets had plenty of amout by German small arms re. The Germans declared munition after two weeks of battle.[49]
the position secured at 07:00, though some bunkers held
out until 15:00. German casualties amounted to 32 dead, Despite shortages of aviation fuel and ordnance, the Luft126 wounded and two missing half of the force com- wae had played a signicant part in the success of the
mitted. Soviet casualties amounted to 20 captured, the German operations. From 13 June, up until 17 June, it
remainder were killed.[48] With only 91 men left near the ew 3,899 sorties and dropped 3,086 tons of bombs. This
fort, Petrov did not order a recovery attempt a grave average of 780 sorties per day was only a slight drop from
the opening 11 days.[50] Massed sorties were made on the
mistake.[48]
city of Sevastopol itself. Bombing targeted hangars, port
The fall of Fort Stalin meant the Soviet defences in the facilities, ak and artillery batteries, barracks, supply denorth were on the verge of collapse. Hansen ordered LIV pots with high explosive bombs. Most of the city was
Corps to divert its attention to Fort Maxim Gorky and engulfed in ames. The smoke rose to 1,500 metres and
the elimination of the Soviet 95th Rie Division. The stretched to Feodosiya, 150 kilometres away.[51]
95th Rie Division had been halting the 132nd Infantry
Divisions progress since the start of the oensive. The
132nd was reinforced by one Regiment from the idle 46th 4.2.4 Ground ghting: 1628 June
Infantry Division near Kerch. The German 24th, 50th
and Romanian 4th Mountain Divisions were to maintain
pressure in the central sector while they pushed towards
the Mekensia and Gatani Valley and the Chernaya River
opening at Severnaya Bay. For three days, 1416 June,
the battle continued as the Axis advanced towards Sevastopol in the face of Soviet resistance. On 15 June the
132nd was within 900 metres of the Maxim Gorkys outer
bastion (Bastion I). The front opposite the 25th Soviet Ries was still strong, but the northern ank was giving way.
The 79th Naval Brigade had only 35 percent of its ghting
strength remaining. Blocking the way to Maxim Gorky
was just 1,000 men of the 95th Rie Division and 7th
Naval Brigade.
In the south the Soviet 109th and 388th Rie Divisions
were forced back along the coast by the German 72nd
and 170th Infantry Divisions while the Romanian Corps
18th Mountain Division dislodged the Soviet 386th Rie
Division threatening XXX Corps right ank. The battles
continued to grind on until 20 June. In six days, XXX
Corps had lost 2,646 men. In exchange the outer defences
of the 388th Rie Division had been broken and the formation eectively destroyed. Still, the German advance
on Balaklava had been halted. The Germans had not yet

Destroyed Soviet Maxim Gorky naval artillery

As Hansen poised his corps for the breakthrough against

the 95th Rie Division, 27 Ju 87s of II./StG 77 attacked
Maxim Gorkys main battery. The Germans believed the
strike had knocked it out as it stopped ring its artillery.
The Soviets claimed the fort withstood the bombing, and
the fort ran out of ammunition. Still, the artillery bombardment began on 16 June. In the morning the attack
by the reinforced 132nd Division collapsed the line. The

10

5 AFTERMATH

Soviet garrison held out in underground tunnels, capitu- out of ammunition, surrendering quickly. Others made
lating only on 20 June.
attempts at a last stand. Some tried to evacuate across
by boat, but they were picked o by
The 22nd and 24th Infantry Divisions advanced from to the southern side
[54]
German
artillery.
the northeast. They employed their Goliath remote control demolition vehicles with success against the timber bunkers. One exploded prematurely and two were
knocked out by a mineeld. Two Panzer III control vehicles were knocked out by Soviet anti-tank re. By
19:30, Forts Maxim Gorky, Molotov, Schishkova, Volga
and Siberia were overrun. The 24th Infantry Division in
particular made extensive use of its Nebelwerfer rockets. The 95th and 172nd Rie Divisions had been lost,
as well as the majority of the forties defences. Only
the 25th Rie remained in the line. Petrov rushed up the
138th Naval Brigade with an extra 2,600 men, which was
landed on the 1213 June. It prevented German forces
reaching Severnaya Bay that day.[52]

While the main actions were playing out in the north,

XXX Corps alternated between attack and defence. The
Soviets held the Sapun Ridge and could observe German
movements. On occasion they could deliver eective
counter battery re. Between the 2128 June, the Germans lost 10 artillery pieces, including ve 150 mm s.FH
18 medium howitzers. In the centre, the Romanians took
up the slack. The 18th Infantry, 1st, and 4th Mountain
Divisions, supported by 100 guns, gradually advanced up
the Chernaya River towards the mouth of the river and
Severnaya Bay. With support from LIV Corps on its left,
the Axis captured all the Soviet defensive lines east of the
Chernaya River.[55]

The Luftwae was also engaged in applying pressure to

Soviet naval forces. On 18 June the cruiser Kharkov was
severely damaged. Attacks on 19 June by KG 51 destroyed the anti-aircraft platform in Severnaya Bay, allowing air operations to continue unopposed. The lack
of anti-aircraft cover made it impossible for the minelayer
Komintern to enter the harbour with reinforcements. The
lack of supplies ensured Soviet ammunition and fuel supplies to slip to critical levels on 20 June. The Luftwae
was experiencing shortages of its own. The daily average
of sorties was now reduced by 40 percent. Due to the
shortages of bombs, all ordnance had to be dropped individually to minimise wastage. Some experienced crews
had to conduct dive-bombing attacks 2530 times a day.
KG 51s Ju 88 crews in particular had felt the strain.[36]

The Luftwae had contributed 4,700 sorties in seven days

up until 26 June. They dropped 3,984 tons of bombs. The
daily average sorties had decreased 15 percent from the
week before and 10 percent the week before that. The increasing operational readiness (49.8 to 64.5 percent) revealed the severity of bomb and fuel shortages.[56] Von
Wild, despite the withdrawal of some Geschwader for
Operation Blue, did succeed in bringing in much needed
reinforcements to bring the strength levels up to a standard not seen since the start of the oensive. The Luftwae continued the intense bombardment. On 26 June,
its attacks supporting XXX Corps, devastated Soviet defences on the Sapun Ridge. It was the last Soviet defensive line between the Axis and Sevastopol.[57]

The pressure tolled, and between the 1823 June, the

entire Soviet defence line in the north collapsed. The
remnants of the 95th Rie Division was huddled into a
2 km square portion of coast line near Coastal Battery
12, north of the Bay. At 09:00 the battery and the division surrendered to the 132nd Infantry Division. Further
south the 24th Infantry Division captured Bartenyevka,
on the mouth of the Bay. The 22nd Infantry Division
had reached the north of the Bay on the same day. The
Soviet 138th Naval Brigade counterattacked, but it was
destroyed without artillery and air support. On 20 June,
the 24th Infantry Division tackled the main obstacle remaining on the north side of the Bay. The Lenin antiaircraft position protected by the Northern Fort, a position which had 5 metres wide anti-tank ditched, 1,000
mines, 32 concrete bunkers, seven armoured cupolas, and
70 earth-and-timber bunkers making it a formidable defensive position. The Lenin defences surrendered, having
already lost three of their four 76 mm weapons. The Germans tried to use the remote-controlled mines to break
into the North Fort, but they were knocked out. At 11:30
on 21 June the Fort fell after a sustained infantry attack. Around 182 Soviet prisoners were taken.[53] The
Germans began mopping up operations and clearing the
northern shore. Most Soviet units were exhausted and

4.2.5 Axis land, sea and air oensive: 29 June

4.2.6 Fall of Sevastopol: 30 June 4 July
As the German 11th Army closed in, Stalin himself made
it categorically clear that the top commanders, Party
and administrative ocials be brought out by submarine . Oktyabrskii and Petrov were own out at the last
moment.[58] On 30 June, LIV Corps launched a heavy
assault, supported by heavy Luftwae bombardment and
several dozen guns. Heavy ghting took place for the
next three days, but it was becoming clear that the Soviets
could not hold their increasingly untenable positions for
more than a day, at most. On 3 July, the Soviets last line
of defense was breached. The following day, the last of
the Soviet defenses were overrun, and with the city nally
under German control, all organised resistance collapsed.
The few remaining Red Army units continued to put up
scattered resistance to the south of the city, which lasted
until 9 July.

11

5 Aftermath
The Germans claimed that over 90,000 Red Army soldiers had been taken prisoner, and an even greater number killed. However, this claim appears to be overstated as, according to Soviet sources, the Soviet garrison defending Sevastopol totalled 106,000 men beforehand (and received only 3,000 reinforcements during the
attack), while it is known that 25,157 persons were evacuated, the overwhelming majority being either wounded
soldiers or ocers evacuated on Stalins orders.
An interesting and brutal observation about the siege and
its aftermath was given by Lt. Joseph Avokian, an Armenian who was ghting with the Soviet forces at Sevastopol. This account was given to Lt. Carl A. Keyser,
USNR, and was recorded in Lt. Keysers diary: He was
captured at Sevastopol after 83 days of bombardment.
He had fought in Odessa and Kiev. He reported that they
ate their own comrades in Sevastopol and in the prison
camps.

Russian President Vladimir Putin laying wreaths at a monument

to the defenders of Sevastopol, April 2000

Lt. Avokian and some of his fellow Armenian prisoners

were then pressed into service by the Germans and were
later captured by the crew of the USS Eberle (DD 430)
on Monday, 21 August 1944 at the le de Porquerolles.
Avokian stated that the Germans told them to ght for
us or starve. The Armenians were eventually turned over
to Soviet authorities and may have been transported to the
Soviet Gulag .
Soviet accounts claim that there were very few Soviet
troops who survived the German onslaught; von Manstein
himself records that the Soviets preferred to blow themselves up along with the German soldiers closing in on
their positions rather than surrender. von Manstein ascribed this behavior to the ruthlessness of the commissars and to the basic contempt for human life of this
Asiatic power . Another explanation for the Soviet unwillingness to surrender was the understandable fear Soviet servicemen had for their treatment if they were taken
as prisoners of war by the Wehrmacht.
Although a success in the end, the operation had taken
much longer than the Germans had imagined. Operation
Blau, Army Group South's advance towards Stalingrad
and the Caucasus was just beginning, and the German
oensive would not have the 11th Army to support them.
Instead of having the 11th Army to help it on its quest to
capture Stalingrad, the German 6th Army under Paulus
would be without crucial support that ultimately contributed to its defeat.

6 References
The Mount Sapun memorial

Citations
[1] Hayward 1998, pp. 5051: Allowed German and Italian
warships to use Bulgarian ports for operations in the Black

12

Sea.
[2] Human losses in World War II. German Statistics and
Documentes

[37] Hayward 2001, pp. 9899

[38] Hayward 2001, p. 99.
[39] Forzcyk 2008, p. 51.

[3] Human losses in World War II. German Statistics and

Documentes

[40] Forczyk 2008, p. 54.

[4] Forczyk 2008, p. 90.

[41] Forzcyk 2008, p. 53.

[5] Dear and Foot 2005, p. 774.

[6] Bergstrom 2007, p. 43.
[7] Beevor 2012, p. 191.
[8] Forczyk 2008, p. 6.
[9] Forczyk 2008, p. 89.
[10] Dear and Foot 2005, p. 775.

[42] Forzcyk 2008, p. 55.

[43] Forzcyk 2008, pp. 5859.
[44] Forzcyk 2008, p. 61.
[45] Forzcyk 2008, pp. 6061 and Bergstrom 2007, p. 43.
Stalingrad
[46] Hayward 2001, p. 101.
[47] Forzcyk 2008, pp. 6263.

[11] Bergstrom 2007, p. 42.

[48] Forzcyk 2008, p. 66.

[12] Forczyk 2008, p. 48.

[49] Forzcyk 2008, p. 67.

[13] Hayward 1998, pp. 5051.

[50] Hayward 2001, p. 108.

[14] Gerhard Taube (1995). Festung Sewastopol. Mittler E.S.

+ Sohn GmbH. p. 38. ISBN 978-3-8132-0485-8.

[51] Hayward 2001, p. 109.

[15] Forzcyk 2008, p. 32.

[16] Forzcyk 2008, p. 29.
[17] Forzcyk 2008, pp. 3031.
[18] Forzcyk 2008, pp. 3334.

REFERENCES

[52] Forzcyk 2008, p. 70.

[53] Forzcyk 2008, p. 71.
[54] Forzcyk 2008, p. 75.
[55] Forzcyk 2008, pp. 7677.
[56] Hayward 2001, p. 110.

[19] Forzcyk 2008, p. 34.

[57] Bergstrom 2007, p. 45. Stalingrad
[20] Forczyk 2008, pp. 89.
[21] Bergstrom 2007, p. 103.
[22] Forczyk 2008, pp. 1011.

[58] Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 2003 Cassel Military Paperbacks Edition, p. 351

Bibliography

[23] Bergstrom 2007, p. 104.

[24] Forczyk 2008, p. 11.
[25] Forczyk 2008, p. 12.
[26] Forczyk 2008, p. 13.
[27] Hayward 2001, p. 102.
[28] Brookes 2003, p. 80.
[29] Forczyk 2008, p. 31.
[30] Forczyk 2008, p. 26.
[31] Forczyk 2008, pp. 2728.
[32] Forczyk 2008, p. 28.
[33] Forczyk 2008, p. 29.
[34] Forczyk 2008, p. 41.
[35] Hayward 2001, p. 96.
[36] Bergstrom 2007, p. 43. Stalingrad.

Beevor, Antony. The Second World War. Back Bay

Books, 2012. ISBN 978-0-316-02375-7.
Bergstrm, Christer. Barbarossa The Air Battle:
JulyDecember 1941. London: Chervron/Ian Allen.
ISBN 978-1-85780-270-2.
Bergstrm, Christer. Stalingrad The Air Battle:
1942 through January 1943. Midland Puplishing,
Hinkley, 2007. ISBN 978-1-85780-276-4
Brookes, Andrew. Air War Over Russia. Ian Allen
Publishing. 2003. ISBN 978-0-7110-2890-6
Forczyk, Robert. Sevastopol 1942: Von Mansteins
Triumph. Osprey, Oxford, 2008. ISBN 978-184603-221-9
Hayward, Joel S.A. Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwae and Hitlers Defeat in the East, 19421943.
University Press of Kansas, 1998. ISBN 978-07006-1146-1

13
Hooton, E.R.. Eagle in Flames: The Fall of the Luftwae. Arms & Armour Press. 1997. ISBN 978-186019-995-0
Keyser, Carl A. WWll Diary held by the authors
family.

External links

14

8 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

8.1

Text

Siege of Sevastopol (194142) Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Sevastopol_(1941%E2%80%9342)?oldid=672149944

Contributors: Bryan Derksen, Gsl, Stevertigo, Bobby D. Bryant, Dimadick, PBS, Altenmann, Halibutt, Oberiko, Wwoods, Svennex, Sca, LiDaobing, Loopy, Klemen Kocjancic, SpookyMulder, Art LaPella, Weiwensg, Cmdrjameson, Russ3Z, Giraedata, Darwinek, King nothing,
Polylerus, Wendell, Andrew Gray, Cdc, Hohum, Saga City, Skyring, Ghirlandajo, Dachspmg, Woohookitty, Pol098, Abel29a, Tim!, Koavf,
Valip, Ian Pitchford, Luneraako, Goudzovski, Benlisquare, Roboto de Ajvol, Kummi, YurikBot, Noclador, Brandmeister (old), Bleakcomb,
Kurt Leyman, Dysmorodrepanis~enwiki, Semolo75, Welsh, Arima, Neumeier, Mr. Know-It-All, Poppy, Nixer, KnightRider~enwiki,
SmackBot, David Kernow, CMD Beaker, Betacommand, Chris the speller, EncMstr, Rcbutcher, Tswold@msn.com, Cplakidas, Txinviolet,
SuperDeng, General Grievous, Valenciano, Andreas1968, PokeTIJeremy, AlexeySmirnov, The PIPE, Ohconfucius, Khazar, Dumelow,
Ocatecir, Nobunaga24, Volker89, Beetstra, Neddyseagoon, Drogo Underburrow, Vanisaac, Ehistory, Robotsintrouble, Basawala, Neelix,
Hemlock Martinis, Cydebot, Blackmissionary, PDTantisocial, Pascal.Tesson, TheCheeseManCan, Thijs!bot, Biruitorul, SGGH, Nick
Number, Big Bird, PaulVIF, RabbitHead, Bookworm308, Dimawik, DagosNavy, Igodard, Dodo19~enwiki, VoABot II, Madshaolin, Buckshot06, MetsBot, Semper-Fi 2006, Dapi89, CommonsDelinker, Sweetbluewe, Tgeairn, Cybersquire, Bad Night, Mrg3105, Russianname,
Boothferry, MisterBee1966, VolkovBot, TXiKiBoT, DyceBot, Broadbot, Snowbot, HansHermans, SieBot, Beingalert, WereSpielChequers,
JuanFox, Chrzanko, Afernand74, MBK004, Gits (Neo), AlasdairGreen27, Hoursdaily1, Socrates2008, Noneforall, PixelBot, Asmaybe,
Leonard^Bloom, Paththeir00, Thingg, Zaledin, A.h. king, LordJesseD, SilvonenBot, Triptools11, HerkusMonte, Cmr08, Snapperman2,
Jim Sweeney, Addbot, Mckinley99, SuperSmashBros.Brawl777, Keepback99, Pelex, Ferroequus, Tsange, Zorrobot, Tobi, Luckas-bot,
Yobot, Paul Siebert, AnomieBOT, Tavrian, Diemon.ukr, Eumolpo, LilHelpa, Obersachsebot, Xqbot, Jun Kayama, Anotherclown, Mark
Schierbecker, StoneProphet, CaptainFugu, Brunocip, Tobby72, Ahnoneemoos, Twotwo2019, Full-date unlinking bot, Rausch, White
Shadows, DocYako, Flavius T, TobeBot, Ryan.opel, Updatehelper, EmausBot, WikitanvirBot, Ai6z83xl3g, AmericaHistory, Muta112,
Bermanya, Diego Grez Bot, , Chris857, WorldWarTwoEditor, HansWinther, Slayerdragon888, MartinZwirlein, Hamish59, Aieieprazu,
Franz Brod, Kelberton, JamesRussels, YiFeiBot, Someone not using his real name, Spilarongi, Ruddah, Leftcry, Uspzor, LePeej, Chingchongfoo, Lutie, Sovitalii and Anonymous: 119

8.2

Images

File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-L20414,_Torpedoangriff_mit_Heinkel_He_111.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/

commons/f/fb/Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-L20414%2C_Torpedoangriff_mit_Heinkel_He_111.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors:
This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperation
project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic representation only using the originals (negative and/or positive), resp. the
digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Stcker
File:Bundesarchiv_N_1603_Bild-117,_Russland,_Sewastopol,_zerstrte_Festung_Maxim_Gorki.jpg
Source:
https:
//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/55/Bundesarchiv_N_1603_Bild-117%2C_Russland%2C_Sewastopol%2C_zerst%
C3%B6rte_Festung_Maxim_Gorki.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the
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Archive. Original artist: Horst Grund
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wikipedia/commons/5/51/Bundesarchiv_N_1603_Bild-120%2C_Russland%2C_Sewastopol%2C_zerst%C3%B6rter_Hafen.jpg
License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches
Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic representation only using the
originals (negative and/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Horst
Grund
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