II. Quasi-Delict, B. No Double Recovery Rule

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 170
540
8/8/15, 6:31 AM
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Joseph vs. Bautista
G.R. No. 41423. February 23, 1989.
LUIS JOSEPH, petitioner, vs. HON. CRISPIN V.

BAUTISTA, PATROCINIO PEREZ, ANTONIO SIOSON,
JACINTO PAGARIGAN, ALBERTO CARDENO and
LAZARO VILLANUEVA, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Cause of Action; When there is
only one delict or wrong, there is only one cause of action regardless
of the number of rights that may have been violated belonging to one
person.The argument that there are two causes of action
embodied in petitioners complaint, hence the judgment on the
compromise agreement under the cause of action based on quasidelict is not a bar
________________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
541
VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 23, 1989
541
Joseph vs. Bautista

to the cause of action for breach of contract of carriage, is untenable.
A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or
omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary
rights of the plaintiff. It is true that a single act or omission can be
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violative of various rights at the same time, as when the act

constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct
legal obligations. However, where there is only one delict or wrong,
there is but a single cause of action regardless of the number of
rights that may have been violated belonging to one person. The
singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the delict or
wrong violating the rights of one person. Nevertheless, if only one
injury resulted from several wrongful acts, only one cause of action
arises. In the case at bar, there is no question that the petitioner
sustained a single injury on his person. That vested in him a single
cause of action, albeit with the correlative rights of action against
the different respondents through the appropriate remedies allowed
by law.
Civil Law; Obligations and Contracts; Solidary Obligation;
Payment made by some of the solidary debtors and their subsequent
release from liability results in the release from liability of the other
solidary debtors.The respondents having been found to be
solidarily liable to petitioner, the full payment made by some of the
solidary debtors and their subsequent release from any and all
liability to petitioner inevitably resulted in the extinguishment and
release from liability of the other solidary debtors, including herein
respondent Patrocinio Perez.
APPEAL by certiorari to review the orders of the Court of

First Instance of Bulacan, Br. III. Bautista, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Jose M. Castillo for petitioner.
Arturo Z. Sioson for private respondent, Patrocinio
Perez.
Cipriano B. Farrales for private respondents except
P. Perez.
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays in this appeal by certiorari for the
annulment and setting aside of the order, dated July 8,
1975, dismissing petitioners complaint, as well as the
order, dated August 22, 1975, denying his motion for
reconsideration of said
542
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542
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Joseph vs. Bautista
dismissal, both issued by respondent Judge Crispin V.

Bautista of the former Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Branch III.
Petitioner herein is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 50-V73 entitled Luis Joseph vs. Patrocinio Perez, Domingo
Villa y de Jesus, Rosario Vargas, Antonio Sioson, Lazaro
Villanueva and Jacinto Pagarigan, filed before the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, and presided over
by respondent Judge Crispin V. Bautista; while private
respondents Patrocinio Perez, Antonio Sioson, Jacinto
Pagarigan and Lazaro Villanueva are four of the
defendants in said case. Defendant Domingo Villa y de
Jesus did not answer either the original or the amended
complaint, while defendant Rosario Vargas could not be
served with summons; and respondent Alberto Cardeno is
included herein as he was impleaded by defendant
Patrocinio Perez, one of respondents herein, in her crossclaim.
The generative facts of this case, as culled from the
written submission of the parties, are as follows:
Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo
truck with Plate No. 25-2 YT Phil. 73 for conveying cargoes
and passengers for a consideration from Dagupan City to
Manila. On January 12, 1973, said cargo truck driven by
defendant Domingo Villa was on its way to Valenzuela,
Bulacan from Pangasinan. Petitioner, with a cargo of
livestock, boarded the cargo truck at Dagupan City after
paying the sum of P9.00 as one-way fare to Valenzuela,
Bulacan. While said cargo truck was negotiating the
National Highway proceeding towards Manila, defendant
Domingo Villa tried to overtake a tricycle likewise
proceeding in the same direction. At about the same time, a
pick-up truck with Plate No. 45-95 B, supposedly owned by
respondents Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, then
driven by respondent Lazaro Villanueva, tried to overtake
the cargo truck which was then in the process of overtaking
the tricycle, thereby forcing the cargo truck to veer towards
the shoulder of the road and to ram a mango tree. As a
result, petitioner sustained a bone fracture in one of his
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legs.
_______________
1
Rollo, 5-7, 24-26.

543
543
Joseph vs. Bautista

2
The following proceedings thereafter took place:

Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against
respondent Patrocinio Perez, as owner of the cargo truck,
based on a breach of contract of carriage and against
respondents Antonio Sioson and Lazaro Villanueva, as
owner and driver, respectively, of the pick-up truck, based
on quasi-delict.
Respondent Sioson filed his answer alleging that he is
not and never was an owner of the pick-up truck and
neither would he acquire ownership thereof in the future.
On September 24, 1973, petitioner, with prior leave of
court, filed his amended complaint impleading respondents
Jacinto Pagarigan and a certain Rosario Vargas as
additional alternative defendants. Petitioner apparently
could not ascertain who the real owner of said cargo truck
was, whether respondents Patrocinio Perez or Rosario
Vargas, and who was the real owner of said pick-up truck,
whether respondents Antonio Sioson or Jacinto Pagarigan.
Respondent Perez filed her amended answer with crossclaim against her co-defendants for indemnity and
subrogation in the event she is ordered to pay petitioners
claim, and therein impleaded cross-defendant Alberto
Cardeno as additional alternative defendant.
On September 27, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva,
Alberto Cardeno, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan,
thru their insurer, Insurance Corporation of the
Philippines, paid petitioners claim for injuries sustained in
the amount of P1,300.00. By reason thereof, petitioner
executed a release of claim releasing from liability the
following parties, viz: Insurance Corporation of the
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Philippines, Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio

Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan.
On December 2, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva,
Alberto Cardeno and their insurer, the Insurance
Corporation of the Philippines, paid respondent Patrocinio
Perez claim for damages to her cargo truck in the amount
of P7,420.61.
Consequently, respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno
and Villanueva filed a Motion to Exonerate and Exclude
Defs./ Cross defs. Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva,
Antonio Si_______________
2
Ibid., 6-9, 26-27; Petitions Brief, 2.

544
544

Joseph vs. Bautista
oson and Jacinto Pagarigan on the Instant Case, alleging

that respondents Cardeno and Villanueva already paid
P7,420.61 by way of damages to respondent Perez, and
alleging further that respondents Cardeno, Villanueva,
Sioson and Pagarigan paid P1,300.00 to petitioner by way
of amicable settlement.
Thereafter, respondent Perez filed her Opposition to
Cross-defs. motion dated Dec. 2, 1974 and Counter Motion
to dismiss. The so-called counter motion to dismiss was
premised on the fact that the release of claim executed by
petitioner in favor of the other respondents inured to the
benefit of respondent Perez, considering that all the
respondents are solidarity liable to herein petitioner.
On July 8, 1975, respondent judge issued the questioned
order dismissing the case, and a motion for the
reconsideration thereof was denied. Hence, this appeal,
petitioner contending that respondent judge erred in
declaring that the release of claim executed by petitioner in
favor of respondents Sioson, Villanueva and Pagarigan
inured to the benefit of respondent Perez; ergo, it likewise
erred in dismissing the case.
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We find the present recourse devoid of merit.

The argument that there are two causes of action
embodied in petitioners complaint, hence the judgment on
the compromise agreement under the cause of action based
on quasi-delict is not a bar to the cause of action for breach
of contract of carriage, is untenable.
A cause of action is understood to be the delict or
wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant
in
3
violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. It is true
that a single act or omission can be violative of various
rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes
juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal
obligations. However, where there is only one delict or
wrong, there is but a single cause of action regardless of
the number of rights4 that may have been violated
belonging to one person.
The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness
of the delict or wrong violating the rights of one person.
Never_______________
3
Racoma vs. Fortich, et al., 39 SCRA 520 (1971).
I Moran, 1979 Ed., 129-130.

545
545
Joseph vs. Bautista

theless, if only one injury resulted from
several wrongful
5
acts, only one cause of action arises. In the case at bar,
there is no question that the petitioner sustained a single
injury on his person. That vested in him a single cause of
action, albeit with the correlative rights of action against
the different respondents through the appropriate remedies
allowed by law.
The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that
there was only one cause of action involved although the
bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against the
defendants therein were not necessarily identical since the
respondents were not identically circumstanced. However,
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a recovery by the petitioner under one remedy necessarily

bars recovery under the other. This, in essence, is the
rationale for the proscription in our law against double
recovery for the same act or omission which, obviously,
stems from the fundamental rule against unjust
enrichment.
There is no question that the respondents herein are
solidarily liable to petitioner. On the evidence presented in
the court below, the trial court found them to be so liable. It
is undisputed that petitioner, in his amended complaint,
prayed that the trial court hold respondents jointly and
severally liable. Furthermore, the allegations in the
amended complaint clearly impleaded respondents as
solidary debtors. We cannot accept the vacuous contention
of petitioner that said allegations are intended to apply
only in the event that execution be issued in his favor.
There is nothing in law or jurisprudence which would
countenance such a procedure.
The respondents having been found to be solidarily
liable to petitioner, the full payment made by some of the
solidary debtors and their subsequent release from any and
all liability to petitioner inevitably resulted in the
extinguishment and release from liability of the other
solidary debtors, including herein respondent Patrocinio
Perez.
The claim that there was an agreement entered into
between the parties during the pre-trial conference that,
after such payment made by the other respondents, the
case shall proceed as against respondent Perez is both
incredible and unsub_______________
5
Op. cit., id., 132, 136.

546
546

Reynoso vs. Court of Appeals
stantiated. There is nothing in the records to show, either

by way of a pre-trial order, minutes or a transcript of the
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notes of the alleged pre-trial hearing, that there was indeed

such as agreement.
WHEREFORE, the challenged orders of the respondent
judge are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and
Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Orders affirmed.
Note.A cause of action is an act or omission of one
party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other;
and its essential elements are a legal right of the plaintiff,
correlative obligation of the defendants and act or omission
of the defendant in violation of said legal right. (Santos vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA 238.)
o0o
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Page 8 of 8
168
8/8/15, 6:34 AM

Bermudez, Sr. vs. Melencio-Herrera
*
No. L-32055. February 26, 1988.
REYNALDO BERMUDEZ, SR., and, ADONITA YABUT

BERMUDEZ, petitioners-appellants, vs, HON. JUDGE A.
MELENCIO-HERRERA,
DOMINGO
PONTINO
y
TACORDA and CORDOVA NG SUN KWAN, respondentsappellees.
Quasi-Delict; Actions; Damages; Injured party or his heirs has
the choice between an action to enforce civil liability arising from
crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for
quasidelict under Articles 2176-2194 of the Civil Code.ln cases of
negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an
action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-delict under
Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he
may hold the employer solidarily liable for the negligence act of his
employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the
diligence of a good father of the family.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Fact that appellants reserved their
right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did not
preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict.
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for
damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that appellants reserved
their right in the criminal cases to file an independent civil action
did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasidelict.
Same; Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Even without
reservation under Section 2 of Rule ///, Rules of Court, injured party
in a criminal case which resulted in the acquittal of the accused is
allowed to recover damages based on quasi-delict.The appellant
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precisely made a reservation to file an independent civil action in

accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of Rule III, Rules of
Court. In fact, even without such a reservation, we have allowed the
injured party in the criminal case which resulted in the acquittal of
the accused to recover damages based on quasi-delict.
APPEAL from the order of the Court of First Instance of

Manila, Br. XVII.
_______________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
169
169

YAP, J.:
This is a direct appeal on pure questions of law from the
Order of March 10, 1970 of the Honorable Judge (now
Supreme Court Justice) Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera of the
defunct Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVII,
dismissing plaintiffsappellants' complaint in Civil Case No.
77188 entitled "Reynaldo Bermudez, Sr. and Adonita Yabut
Bermudez, plaintiffs, versus Domingo Pontino y Tacorda
and Cordova Ng Sun Kwan. defendants," and from the
Order of May 7, 1970 denying plaintiffsappellants' Motion
for Reconsideration.
The background facts of the case are as follows:
A cargo truck, driven by Domingo Pontino and owned by
Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, bumped a jeep on which Rogelio, a
sixyear old son of plaintiffs-appellants, was riding. The boy
sustained injuries which caused his death. As a result,
Criminal Case No. 92944 for Homicide Through Reckless
Imprudence was filed against Domingo Pontino by the
Manila City Fiscal's Office. Plaintiffs-appellants filed on
July 27, 1969 in the said criminal case "A Reservation to
File Separate Civil Action."
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On July 28,1969, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil

case for damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila
docketed as Civil Case No. 77188, entitled "Reynaldo
Bermudez, Sr.? et al., Plaintiffs, vs. Domingo Pontino y
Tacorda and Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, Defendants." Finding
that the plaintiffs instituted the action "on the assumption
that defendant Pontino's negligence in the accident of May
10,1969 constituted a quasi-delict," the trial court stated
that plaintiffs had already elected to treat the accident as a
"crime" by reserving in the criminal case their right to file a
separate civil action. That being so, the trial court decided
to order the dismissal of the complaint against defendant
Cordova Ng Sun Kwan and to suspend the hearing of the
case against Domingo Pontino until after the criminal case
for Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence is finally
terminated. From said order, plaintiffs filed the present
appeal, stating as their main reasons the following:
I. The main issue brought before this Honorable Court is
whether the present action is based on quasi-delict under
the Civil Code and therefore could proceed independently of
the criminal case for homicide
170
170

thru reckless imprudence.
II. The second question of law is whether the lower court could
properly suspend the hearing of the civil action against
Domingo Pontino and dismissed the civil case against his
employer Cordova Ng Sun Kwan by reason of the fact that a
criminal case for homicide thru reckless imprudence is
pending in the lower court against Domingo Pontino.
III. The last question of law is whether the suspension of the

civil action against Domingo Pontino and the dismissal of
the civil case against his employer Cordova Ng Sun Kwan
by reason of the pending criminal case against Domingo
Pontino for homicide thru reckless imprudence in the lower
court could be validly done considering that the civil case
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against said defendants-appellees also sought to recover

actual damages to the jeep of plaintiffs-appellants,"
We find the appeal meritorious.

The heart of the issue involved in the present case is
whether the civil action filed by the plaintiffs-appellants is
founded on crime or on quasi-delict. The trial court treated
the case as an action based on a crime in view of the
reservation made by the offended party in the criminal case
(Criminal Case No. 92944), also pending before the court,
to file a separate civil action. Said the trial court:
"It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the
assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence in the accident of
May 10,1969 constituted a quasi-delict. The Court cannot accept the
validity of that assumption. In Criminal Case No. 92944 of this
Court, plaintiffs had already appeared as complainants. While that
case was pending, the offended parties reserved the right to institute
a separate civil action. If, in a criminal case, the right to file a
separate civil action for damages is reserved, such civil action is to
be based on crime and not on tort. That was the ruling in Joaquin
vs. Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964."
We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial

court is inapplicable to the instant case. In Joaquin vs.
Aniceto, the Court held:
"The issue in this case is: May an employee's primary civil liability
for crime and his employer's subsidiary liability therefor be proved
in a separate civil action even while the criminal case against the
employee is still pending?
171
171

To begin with, obligations arise from law, contract, quasi-contract,
crime and quasi-delict. According to appellant, her action is one to
enforce the civil liability arising from crime. With respect to
obligations arising from crimes, Article 1161 of the New Civil Code
provides:
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'Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the

penal laws, subject to the provisions of Article 2177, and of the pertinent
provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary, Title, on Human Relations, and of
Title XVIII of this book, regulating damages.'
x
It is now settled that for an employer to be subsidiarily liable,

the following requisites must be present: (1) that an employee has
committed a crime in the discharge of his duties; (2) that said
employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability; (3) that
the employer is engaged in some kind of industry. (1 Padilla,
Criminal Law, Revised Penal Code 794 [1964])
Without the conviction of the employee, the employer cannot be
subsidiarily liable."
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has

the choice between an action to enforce the civil liability
arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code and an action for quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194
of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold
the employer solidarily liable for the negligent act of his
employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of
the diligence of a good father of the family.
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant
was an
1
action for damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that
appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file
an independent civil action did not preclude them from
choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict.
The appellants invoke the provisions of Sections 1 and 2
of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which provide:
"Section 1.Institution of criminal and civil action.When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives
the civil
_______________
1
Appellant's Brief, pp. 20-21.
172
Page 5 of 7
172
8/8/15, 6:34 AM

action or reserves his right to institute it separately.

"Section 2.Independent civil action.In the cases provided for
in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is
reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence."
Article 2177 of the Civil Code, cited in Section 2, of Rule

111, provides that
"Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission
of the defendant."
The appellant precisely made a reservation to file an

independent civil action in accordance with the provisions
of Section 2 of Rule 111, Rules of Court. In fact, even
without such a reservation, we have allowed the injured
party in the criminal case which resulted in the acquittal of
the accused to recover damages based on quasi-delict. In
People vs. Ligon, G.R. No. 74041, we held:
"However, it does not follow that a person who is not criminally
liable is also free from civil liability. While the guilt of the accused
in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable
doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action
for damages (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist (Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
WHEREFORE, we grant the petition and annul and set

aside the appealed orders of the trial court, dated March
10, 1970 and May 7, 1970, and remand the case for further
proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., took no part
173
173
Republic vs. Belmonte

Petition granted, Orders set aside.
Note.Right to file a separate civil action is not
foreclosed by fact that accused on arraignment entered a
plea of guilty and sentenced to pay a fine where private
prosecutor was not afforded chance to present evidence or
make a reservation. (Reyes vs. Lempio-Dy, 141 SCRA 208.)
o0o
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VOL. 23, JUNE 27, 1968
8/8/15, 6:35 AM
1117
Singson vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands

No. L-24837. June 27, 1968.
JULIAN C. SINGSON and RAMONA DEL CASTILLO,
plaintiffs, vs. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and
SANTIAGO FREIXAS, in his capacity as President of the
said Bank, defendants.
Civil law; Tort; Damages; Existence of a contract between the
parties is not a bar to the commission of a, tort by the one against the
other.It has been repeatedly held: that the existence of a contract
between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one
against the other and the consequent recovery 01 damages therefor
(Cangco v. Manila Railroad, 38 Phil. 768; Yamada v. Manila
Railroad, 33 Phil. 8; Vasquez v. Borja, 74 Phil. 560). Indeed, this
view has been, in effect, reiterated in a comparatively recent case.
Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso, L-21438, Sept. 28, 1966,
involving an airplane passenger who, despite his first-class ticket,
had been illegally ousted from his first-class accomodation and
compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held
entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of
tort on the latters part, for, although the relation between a
passenger and a carrier is contractual both in origin and nature
the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of

Manila. Montesa, J.
Gil B. Galang for plaintiffs.
Aviado & Aranda for defendants.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
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Appeal by plaintiffs, Julian Singson and his wife, Ramona

del Castillo, from a decision of the Court of First Instance
of Manila dismissing their complaint against de1118
1118

fendants herein, the Bank of the Philippine Islands and

Santiago Freixas.
It appears that Singson, was one of the defendants in
Civil Case No. 23906 of the Court of First Instance, Manila,
in which judgment had been rendered sentencing him and
his co-defendants therein, namely, Celso Lobregat and
Villa-Abrille & Co., to pay the sum of P105,539.56 to the
plaintiff therein, Philippine Milling Co. Singson and
Lobregat had seasonably appealed from said judgment, but
not Villa-Abrille & Co., as against which said judgment,
accordingly, became final and executory. In due course, a
writ of garnishment was subsequently served upon the
Bank of the Philippine Islandsin which the Singsons had
a current accountinsofar as Villa-Abrilles credits against
the Bank were concerned. What happened thereafter is set
forth in the decision appealed from, from which we quote:
Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank
in charge of all matters of execution and garnishment, upon reading
the name of the plaintiff herein in the title of the Writ of
Garnishment as a party defendant, without further reading the
body of the said garnishment and informing himself that said
garnishment was merely intended for the deposits of defendant
Villa-Abrille & Co., Valentin Teus, Fernando F. de Villa-Abrille and
Joaquin Bona, prepared a letter for the signature of the President of
the Bank informing the plaintiff Julian C. Singson of the
garnishment of his deposits by the plaintiff in that case. Another
letter was also prepared and signed by the said President of the
Bank for the Special Sheriff dated April 17, 1963.
Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C.
Singson, one for the amount of P383 in favor of B.M. Glass Service
dated April 16, 1963 and bearing No. C-424852, and check No. C394996 for the amount of P100 in favor of the Lega Corporation,
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and drawn against the said Bank, were deposited by the said
drawees with the said bank. Believing that the plaintiff Singson,
the drawer of the check, had no more control over the balance of his
deposits in the said bank, the checks were dishonored and were
refused payment by the said bank. After the first check was
returned by the bank to the B.M. Glass Service, the latter wrote
plaintiff Julian C. Singson a letter, dated April 19, 1963, advising
him that his check for P383.00 bearing No. C-424852 was not
honored by the bank for the reason that his account therein had
already been garnished. The said B.M. Glass Service further stated
in the
1119
VOL. 23, JUNE 27, 1968
1119

said letter that they were constrained to close his credit account
with them. In view thereof, plaintiff Julian C. Singson wrote the
defendant bank a letter on April 19, 1963, claiming that his name
was not included in the Writ of Execution and Notice of
Garnishment, which was served upon the bank. The defendant
President Santiago Freixas of the said bank took steps to verify this
information and after having confirmed the same, apologized to the
plaintiff Julian C. Singson and wrote him a letter dated April 22,
1963, requesting him to disregard their letter of April 17, 1963, and
that the action of garnishment from his account had already been
removed. A similar letter was written by the said official of the bank
on April 22, 1963 to the Special Sheriff informing him that his letter
dated April 17, 1963 to the said Special Sheriff was considered
cancelled and that they had already removed the Notice of
Garnishment from plaintiff Singsons account. Thus, the defendants
lost no time to rectify the mistake that had been inadvertently
committed, resulting in the temporary freezing of the account of the
plaintiff with the said bank for a short time.
x
x
x
x
On May 8, 1963, the Singsons commenced the present

action against the Bank
and its president, Santiago
1
Freixas, for damages in consequence of said illegal
freezing of plaintiffs account.
After appropriate proceedings, the Court of First
Page 3 of 6
8/8/15, 6:35 AM
Instance of Manila rendered judgment dismissing the

complaint upon the ground that plaintiffs cannot recover
from the defendants upon the basis of a quasi-delict,
because the relation between the parties is contractual in
nature; because this case does not fall under Article 2219 of
our Civil Code, upon which plaintiffs rely; and because
plaintiffs have not established the amount of damages
allegedly sustained by them.
The lower court held that plaintiffs claim for damages
cannot be based upon a tort or quasi-delict, their relation
with the defendants being contractual in nature. We have
repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a contract
between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort
by the one against the order and the consequent recovery
____________________
1
P100,000 as moral damages, P20,000 as exemplary damages,
P20,000 as nominal damages, and P10,000 for attorneys fees and

expenses of litigation, plus the costs.
1120
1120

2
of damages therefor. Indeed, this view has been, in effect,

reiterated in a comparatively
recent case. Thus, in Air
3
France vs. Carrascoso, involving an airplane passenger
who, despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted
from his first-class accommodation and compelled to take a
seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to
recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of
tort on the latters part, for, although the relation between
a passenger and a carrier is contractual both in origin and
nature x x x the act that breaks the contract may also be a
tort.
In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at
bar, and considering, particularly, the circumstance that
the wrong done to the plaintiffs was remedied as soon as
the President of the bank realized the mistake he and his
subordinate employee had committed, the Court finds that
Page 4 of 6
8/8/15, 6:35 AM
an award of nominal
damagesthe amount of which need
4
not be proven in the sum of P1,000, in addition to
attorneys fees in the sum
of P500, would suffice to
5
vindicate plaintiff s rights.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
reversed, and another one shall be entered sentencing the
defendant Bank of the Philippine Islands to pay to the
plaintiffs said sums of P1,000, as nominal damages, and
P500, as attorneys fees, apart from the costs. It is so
ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
Judgment reversed.
Notes.The principle in the Singson case, supra, that
the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar
the commission of a tort by the one against the other and
the consequent recovery of damages therefor modifies in
______________
2
Cangco v. Manila Railroad, 38 Phil. 768; Yamada v. Manila Railroad,
33 Phil. 8; Vasquez v. Borja, 74 Phil. 560.

3
L-21438, Sept. 28, 1966.
Ventanilla v. Centeno, L-14333, January 28, 1961.
Articles 2208 and 2221 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

1121
VOL. 23, JUNE 27, 1968
1121
Domingo vs. De la Cruz

effect the rule that liability for quasi-delict arises if no preexisting contractual relation between the parties exists
(Flores v. Miranda, L-12163, March 4, 1959; Art. 2176,
N.C.C.). Noteworthy to state here is the ruling that the
definition of quasi-delict in Article 2176 of the new Civil
Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a preexisting contractual relationship between the parties
Page 5 of 6
8/8/15, 6:35 AM
(Verzosa v. Baytan, et al, L-14092, April 29, 1960). Cf.

Annotation entitled Recovery of Damages Based on Quasidelict, 22 SCRA 567577.
______________
Page 6 of 6
VOL. 18, SEPTEMBER 28, 1966
8/8/15, 6:36 AM
155
Air France vs. Carrascoso

No. L-21438. September 28, 1966.
AIR FRANCE, petitioner, vs.. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and
the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Common carriers; Contracts; First class tickets.A written
document speaks a uniform language; the spoken word could be
notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations
between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the terms of a
ticket is desirable.
Same; Damages; Moral damages; Trial; Bad faith in breach of
contract of carriage.Where at the start of the trial, respondent's
counsel placed petitioner on guard that he intended to prove that,
while sitting in the plane in Bangkok, the respondent was ousted
.by petitioner's manager, who gave his seat to a white man, and
evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was
presented without objection on the part of the petitioner, it is
therefore unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is
sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral
damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the
evidence.
Same; Exemplary damages.The New Civil Code gives the
court ample power to grant exemplary damages in contracts and
quasi-contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner. The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from
his first class seat fits into this legal precept.
Same; Attorney's fees.The right to attorney's fees is fully
established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar
judgment for attorney's fees. The least that can be said is that the
courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that attorneys fees
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000014f0a4e7adf314410dd000a0094004f00ee/p/AMG863/?username=Guest
Page 1 of 21
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be given. We do not intend to break tradition that discretion well

exercisedas it was hereshould not be disturbed.
156
156

PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
Lichauco, Picazo & Agcaoili for petitioner.
Bengzon, Villegas & Zarraga for respondent R.
Carrascoso.
SANCHEZ, J.:
1
The Court of First Instance of Manila sentenced petitioner

to' pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of
moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first
class and tourist class for the portion of the trip BangkokRome, these various amounts with interest at the legal
rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid;
plus P3,000.002 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the
amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from
P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed
decision "in all other respects'', with costs against
petitioner.
The case is now before us for review on certiorari.
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as "fully
supported by the evidence of record", are:
"Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino
pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958:
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its
authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a
'first class' round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From
Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in 'first class', but at
Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to
vacate the 'first class' seat that he was occupying because, in the
Page 2 of 21
8/8/15, 6:36 AM
words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a 'white man',

who, the Manager alleged, had a 'better right' to the seat. When
asked to vacate his 'first class' seat, the plaintiff, as was to be
expected, refused, and
_______________
1
Civil Case No. 38810, "Rafael Carrascoso, plaintiff, vs. Air France,
defendant," R.A., pp. 79-80.

2
C.A.-G.R. No. 26522-R, "Rafael Carrascoso, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Air
France, defendant-appellant."
157
157

told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his
dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G,
Cuento, 'many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist
class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot
discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to
Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the
white man' (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and
3
plaintiff reluctantly gave his 'first class' seat. in the plane."
1. The trust of the relief4 petitioner now seeks is that we

review "all the findings" of respondent Court of Appeals.
Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to make
complete findings of fact on all the issues properly laid
before it. We are asked to consider- facts favorable to
petitioner, and then, to overturn the appellate court's
decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that
"No decision shall be rendered by any court of record
without expressing therein clearly 5and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based". This is echoed in the
statutory demand that a judgment determining the merits
of the case shall state "clearly6 and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based" ; and that "Every decision of
the Court of Appeals shall contain complete
findings of fact
7
on all issues properly raised before it".
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
Page 3 of 21
8/8/15, 6:36 AM
nullity. It is open to direct attack. The law, however, solely

insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate
facts"
9
upon which the court's conclusion is drawn, A court of
justice is not hidebound
to write in its decision every bit
10
and piece of evidence presented by one party
________________
3
Appendix A, petitioner's brief, pp. 146-147. See also R.A., pp. 66-67.
Petitioner's brief, p. 142.
Section 12, Article VIII, Constitution.
Section 1, Rule 36, Rules of Court. See also Section 2, Rule 120, in
reference to judgments in criminal cases.

7
Sec. 4, Rule 51; Sec. 33(2), Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.

Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil. 598, 601; Yangco vs. Court of First
Instance of Manila, et al., 29 Phil. 183, 191.

9
Braga vs. Millora, 3) Phil. 458, 465.
10
Id.
158
158

and the other upon the issues raised. Neither is it to be

burdened with the obligation "to specify in the
sentence the
11
facts" which a party "considered as proved". This is but a
part of the mental process from which the Court draws the
essential ultimate facts. A decision is not to be so clogged
with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may
result. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals
contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is
no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the
defense". Because, as 12
this Court well observed, "There is no
law that so requires". Indeed, "the mere failure to specify
(in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the
reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold
the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of
law and the Constitution". It is in this setting. that in
Manigque, it was held that the mere fact that the findings
Page 4 of 21
8/8/15, 6:36 AM
"were based entirely on the evidence for the prosecution

without taking into consideration or even mentioning the
appellant's side in the controversy as shown
by his own
13
testimony", would not vitiate the judgment. If the court
did not recite in the decision the testimony of each witness
for, or each item of evidence presented by, the defeated
party, it does not mean that the court
has overlooked such
14
testimony or such item of evidence. At any rate, the legal
presumptions are that official duty has been regularly
performed, and that all the matters within an issue
in a
15
case were laid before the court and passed upon by it.
Findings of fact,
which the Court of Appeals is required
*
to make, maybe defined as "the written statement of the
ultimate facts as found by the court 'x 'x 'x and essential to
support the decision and judgment rendered
_______________
11
Aringo vs. Arena, 14 Phil. 263, 266; emphasis supplied.
12
Reyes vs. People, 71 Phil. 598, 600.
13
People vs. Manigque, 35 O.G., No. 94, pp. 1682, 1683, citing Section
133 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 12, Art. VIII,
Constitution, supra.
14
Badger, et al. vs. Boyd, 65 S.W. (2d), pp. 601, 610.
15
Section 5, (m) and (o), Rule 131, Rules of Court
*Editor's
Note: Should read may be.

159
159

16
thereon". They consist of the court's "conclusions"

with
17
respect to the determinative facts in issue". A question of
law, upon the other hand. has been declared as "one which
does not call for an examination of the
probative value of
18
the evidence presented by the parties."
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in
an appeal
by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of
19
Appeals. That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is
not appropriately the business of this
Court to alter the
20
facts or to review the questions of fact.
Page 5 of 21
8/8/15, 6:36 AM
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of

whether the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals support
its judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he
claims?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he
paid to and received from petitioner a first class ticket. But
petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the
true and complete intent and agreement of the parties; that
said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed
reservations for first class on any specific flight, although
he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the
issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he
would have a first class ride, but that such would depend
upon the availability of first class seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly
presented and discussed in its brief before the Court of
Appeals under its third assignment of error, which reads:
"The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff had
confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class seats
on the 'definite' segments of his journey, particularly
_______________
16
In re Good's Estate, 266 P. (2d), pp. 719, 729.
17
Badger, et al. vs. Boyd, supra.
18
Goduco vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17647, February 28, 1964,
19
Section 2, Rule 45, Rules of Court, formerly Section 2, Rule 46 of the
Rules of Court.
20
Medel, et al. vs. Calasanz, et al., L-14835, August 31, 1960;
Astraquillo, et al. vs. Javier, et al., L-20034, January 30, 1965.

160
160

21
that from Saigon to Beirut".

And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention
thus:
"Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of
Page 6 of 21
8/8/15, 6:36 AM
a first-class ticket was no guarantee that the passenger to whom

the same had been issued, would be accommodated in the first-class
compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to make
arrangements upon arrival at every station for the necessary firstclass reservation. We are not impressed by such a reasoning. We
cannot understand how a reputable firm like defendant airplane
company could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never
meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in
payment of first-class tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be
at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the
ordinary course of business that the company should know whether
22
or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not."
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court

similarly disposed of petitioner's contention, thus:
"On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a
'First class' ticket, there can be no question. Apart from his
testimony, see plaintiff's Exhibits 'A, 'A-1', 'B', 'B-1', 'B-2',
'C' and 'C-1', and defendant's own witness. Rafael Altonaga,
confirmed plaintiff's testimony and testified as follows:
Q. In these tickets there are marks 'O.K.' From what you
know, what does this O.K. mean?
A. That the space is confirmed.
Q. Confirmed for first class?
A, Yes, 'first class'. (Transcript, p. 169)
x
"Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses

Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that although
plaintiff paid for, and was issued a 'first class' airplane
ticket, the ticket was subject to confirmation in Hongkong.
The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said
witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over written
evidence. and plaintiffs Exhibits 'A', 'A-1', 'B', 'B-1' 'C' and
'C-1' belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show
that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class
ticket without any reservation whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own
wit-
Page 7 of 21
8/8/15, 6:36 AM
_______________
21
Petitioner's brief in the Court of Appeals, pp, 82-98.
22
Decision of the Court of Appeals, Appendix A, petitioner's brief, pp.
148-149,
161
161

ness Rafael Altonaga testified that the reservation for a
'first class' accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed.
The court cannot believe that after such confirmation
defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that
the 'first class' ticket issued to him by23defendant wouild be
subject to confirmation in Hongkong."
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a
slight difference of a few pesos in the amount refunded on
Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of the Court of First
Instance was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in all other
respects. We hold the view that such a judgment of
24
affirmance has merged the judgment of the lower court.
Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by the Court
of Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of Firts
Instance was free from prejudicial error and "all questions
raised by the assignments of error and all questions that
might have been raised are to be regarded as finally
adjudicated against the appellant". So also, the judgment
25
affirmed "must be regarded as free from all error". We
reached this policy construction because nothing in the
decision of the Court of Appeals on this point would suggest
that its findings of fact are in any way at war with those of
the trial court. Nor was said affirmance by the Court of
Appeals upon a ground or grounds different from those
which26were made the basis of the conclusions of the trial
court.
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is
not entitled to a first class set, nothwithstanding the fact
that seat availability in apecific flights is therein
confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of
the hands of an airline. What security then can a passenger
Page 8 of 21
8/8/15, 6:36 AM
have? it will always be an easy matter for an airline aided

by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the
ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to the
contrary. What if the passenger hada a
_______________
23
R.A., pp. 67, 73
24
5 B C.J.S., p. 295 ; 3 Am. Jur. 678.
25
3 Am. Jur., pp. 677-678.
26
See Garcia Valdez vs. Seteraa Tuason, 40 Phil. 943, 951.

162
162

schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a

written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken
word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve
stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier,
adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the
case here. The lower courts refused to believe the oral
evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the
conclusion that there are facts upon which the Court of
Appeals predicated the finding that respondent Carrascoso
had a first class ticket and was entitled to a first class seat
at Bangkok, 27
which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg
of the flight. We perceive no "welter of distortions by the
Court of Appeals of petitioner's
statement of Its position",
28
as charged by petitioner.
Nor do we subscribe to
petitioner's accusation that respondent Carrascoso
"surreptitiously
took a first class seat to provoke an
29
issue". And this because, as petitioner states, Carrascoso
went to see the Manager at his office in Bangkok "to
confirm my seat and 30because from Saigon I) was told again
to see the Manager". Why, then, was he allowed to take a
first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat?
Or, if another had a better right to the seat?
4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral
damages. Petitioner's trenchant claim is that Carrascoso's
Page 9 of 21
8/8/15, 6:36 AM
action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize

an award for moral damages there must be
______________
27
Carrascosos ticket, according to petitioner (brief, pp. 7-8), shows:
Segment or leg
Carrier
1. Manila to Hongkong
PAL
2. Hongkong to Saigon
3. Saigon to Beirut
Flight No. Date of Departure

300A
March 30
VN(Air Vietnam)
693
March 31
AF (Air France)
245
March 31
28
Petitioner's brief, p. 50; see also id., pp. 37 and 46.
29
Id., p. 103.
30
Ibid., p. 102.
163
163

31
an averment of fraud or bad 'f aith ; and that the decision

of the Court of Appeals fails to make a finding of bad faith.
The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on this
issue are:
"3. That x x x plaintiff entered into a contract of air
carriage with the Philippine Air Lines for a
valuable consideration, the latter acting as general
agents for and in behalf of the defendant, under
which said contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as
defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff, First Class
passage on defendant's plane during the entire
duration of plaintiff's tour of Europe with
Hongkong as starting point up to and until
plaintiffs return trip to Manila, x x x.
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from
Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to Bangkok,
defendant furnished to the plaintiff First Class
accommodation but only after protestations,
arguments and/or insistence were made by the
plaintiff with defendant's employees.
Page 10 of 21
8/8/15, 6:36 AM
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class

passage, but instead furnished plaintiff only Tourist
Class accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran
and/or Casablanca, x x x the plaintiff has been
compelled by defendant's employees to leave the
First Class accommodation berths at Bangkok after
he was already seated.
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no
repetition
of
the
inconvenience
and
embarrassments brought by defendant's breach of
contract was forced to take a Pan American World
Airways32 plane on his return trip from Madrid to
Manila.
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to
furnish First Class accommodations aforesaid.
plaintiff suffered inconveniences, embarrassments,
and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social
humiliation, and the like injury, resulting
in moral
33
damages in the amount of P30,000.00."
x
The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First,

That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first
_______________
31
Article 2220, Civil Code reads: "Willful injury to property may be a
legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that,
under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule
applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted 'f raudulently
or in bad faith."
32
R.A., p. 2-4; italics supplied.
33
R.A., p. 5; second cause of action.

164
164

Page 11 of 21
8/8/15, 6:36 AM
class
passage
covering,
amongst
others,
the
BangkokTeheran leg; Second, That said contract was
breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class
transportation at Bangkok; and Third, That there was bad
faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to
leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was
already seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by
reason
of
which
he
suffered
inconvenience,
embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him
mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and
social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true
that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in
the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it
may be 34drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth
therein. The contract was averred to establish the relation
between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on
wrongf ul expulsion.
Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right at the
start of the trial, respondent's counsel placed petitioner on
guard on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while
sitting in the plane in Bangkok, Carrascoso was ousted by
35
petitioner's manager who gave his seat to a white man;
and (b) evidence of bad faith' in the fulfillment of the
contract was presented without objection on the part of the
petitioner. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to
whether or not there is sufficient averment in the
complaint to justify an award for moral damages.
Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the
evidence. An amendment
thereof to conform to the evidence
36
is not even required. On the question of bad
_______________
34
Copeland vs, Dunehoo, et al., 138 S.E., 267, 270. See also 25 C.J.S.,
pp. 758-759; 15 Am. Jur., pp. 766-767.

35
Statement of Attorney Villegas for respondent Carrascoso in open
court, Respondent's brief, p. 33.

36
Section 5, Rule 10, Rules of Court, in part reads: ''SEC. 5.
Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence.When

issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent
of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects, as if they had been
raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be
Page 12 of 21
8/8/15, 6:36 AM
necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these

issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after
judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect
165
165

faith, the Court of Appeals declared:
"That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class
compartment of the plane belonging to the defendant Air France
while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist class not only
without his consent but against his will, has been sufficiently
established by plaintiff in his testimony before the court,
corroborated by the corresponding entry made by the purser of the
plane in his notebook which notation reads as follows:
'First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his
will, and that the captain refused to intervene',
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who

was a co-passenger. The captain of the plane who was asked by the
manager of defendant company at Bangkok to intervene even
refused to do so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant
ever contradicted or denied this evidence for the plaintiff. It could
have been easy for defendant to present its manager at Bangkok to
testify at the trial of the case, or yet to secure his disposition; but
37
defendant did neither.
The Court of Appeals further stated

"Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation
was made by the white man. Hence, if the employees of the
defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him when all the
seats had already been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have
been picked out as the one to suffer the consequences and to be
subjected to the humiliation and indignity of being ejected from his
seat in the presence of others. Instead of explaining to the white
man the improvidence committed by defendant's employees, the
manager adopted the more drastic step of ousting the plaintiff who
was then safely ensconsced in his rightful seat. We are
Page 13 of 21
8/8/15, 6:36 AM
strengthened in our belief that this probably was what happened

there, by the testimony of defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga who,
when asked to explain the meaning of the letters 'O.K.' appearing
on the tickets of plaintiff, said 'that the space is confirmed' for first
class. Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another witness for defendant,
who was the chief of the Reservation Office of defendant, testified
as follows:
'Q. How does the person in the ticket-issuing office
_______________
the result of the trial of these issues. 'x x x"; Co Tiamco vs. Diaz, etc., et al.,
75 Phil. 672, 679; J.M. Tuason ,& Co., Inc., etc. vs. Bolaos, 95 Phil. 106, 110.
37
Decision, Court of Appeals, Appendix A of petitioner's brief, pp, 147-148.
166
166

know what reservation the passenger has arranged with you ?

A. They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation.' (t.s.n., p.
247, June 19, 1959)
In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial

Judge has said on this point:
'Why did the, using the .words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, 'white
man' have a 'better right' to the seat occupied by Mr. Carrascoso ?
The record is silent. The defendant airline did not prove 'any better',
nay, any right on the part of the 'white man' to the 'First class' seat
that the plaintiff was occupying and for which he paid and was
issued a corresponding 'first class' ticket.
'lf there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's
Manager in Bangkok, the defendant could have easily proven it by
having taken the testimony of the said Manager by deposition, but
defendant did not do so; the presumption is that evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules of
Court] ; and, under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to
find, as it does find. that the Manager of the defendant airline in
Bangkok not merely asked but threatened the plaintiff to throw him
out of the plane if he did not give up his 'first class seat because the
Page 14 of 21
8/8/15, 6:36 AM
said Manager wanted to accommodate, using the words of the

38
witness Ernesto G. Cuento, the 'white man'."
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the

quoted portion first transcribed did not use the term "bad
faith". But can it be doubted that the recital of facts therein
points to bad faith ? The manager not only prevented
Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat;
worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him
from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to
go to the tourist class compartmentjust to give way to
another passenger whose right thereto has not been
established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course,
bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is
understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with
some motive of self_______________
38
Decision of the Court of Appeals, Appendix A of petitioner's brief,
pp. 147-151.
167
167

39
interest or ill will or for ulterior purpose, "

And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the
express finding of bad faith in the judgment of the Court of
First Instance, thus:
"The evidence shows that defendant violated its contract of
transportation with plaintiff in bad faith, with the aggravating
circumstances that defendant's Manager in Bangkok went to the
extent of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many
passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane to give the 'first
class' seat that he was occupying to, again using the words of the
witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a 'white man' whom he (defendant's
Manager) wished to accommodate, and the defendant has not
proven that this 'white man' had any 'better right' to occupy the
Page 15 of 21
8/8/15, 6:36 AM
'first class' seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and
for which the corresponding 'first class' ticket was issued by the
40
defendant to him."
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of

41
its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law.
For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager,
petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the
Civil Code says:
"ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal

precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of Article
42
2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable.
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different
in
43
kind and degree from any other contractual relation. And
this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains
with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling
public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and
advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore,
generates a relation attended with
_______________
39
Words ,& Phrases, Perm. Ed., Vol. 5, p. 13, citing Warfield Natural
Gas Co. vs. Allen, 59 S.W. (2d) 534, 538.

40
R.A., p. 74; italics supplied.
41
Article 2180, Civil Code.
42
Philippine Refining Co. vs. Garcia, et al., L-21871 and L-21962,
September 27, 1966.

43
See Section 4, Chapter 3, Title VIII, Civil Code.

168
168

a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's

employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for
damages.
Page 16 of 21
8/8/15, 6:36 AM
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation.

They have a right to be treated by the carriers employees
with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.
They are entitled to be protected against personal
misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses
from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger
gives
44
the latter an action for damages against the
carrier.
45
Thus, "Where a steamship company had accepted a
passenger's check, it was a breach of contract and a tort,
giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third
persons to falsely notify her that the check was worthless
and demand payment under threat of ejection, though the
46
language used was not insulting and she was not ejected."
And this, because, altho the relation of passenger and
carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature"
nevertheless
"the act that breaks the contract may be also
47
a tort". And in another case, "Where a passenger on a
railroad train, when the conductor came to collect his fare
tendered him the cash fare to a point where the train was
scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the
train reached such point he would pay the cash fare from
that point to destination, there was nothing in the conduct
of the passenger which justified the conductor in using
48
insulting language to him, as by calling him a lunatic."
and the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the
carrier liable for the mental suffering of said passenger.
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended
_______________
44
4. R.C.L., pp. 1174-1175.
45
An air carrier is a common carrier; and air transportation is similar
or analogous to land and water transportation. Mendoza vs. Philippine

Air Lines, Inc., 90 Phil. 836, 841-842.
46
Austro-American S.S. Co. vs. Thomas, 248 F. 231.
47
Id., p. 233.
48
Lipman vs. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 93 S.E. 714, 716.

169
169
Page 17 of 21
8/8/15, 6:36 AM

with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as we
have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a
violation of public duty by the petitioner air carriera case
of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent
Carrascoso's testimony, thus
"Q. You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that
attendant and purser?
A.
When we left alreadythat was already in the tripI

could not help it. So one of the flight attendants
approached me and requested 'f rom me my ticket and
I said, What for? and she said, "We will note that you
transferred to the tourist class'. I said, 'Nothing of
that kind. That is tantamount to acc epting my
transfer.' And I also said, 'You are not going to note
anything there because I am protesting to this
transfer'.
Q.
Was she able to note it?
A.
No, because I) did not give my ticket.
Q.
About that purser ?
A.
Well, the seats there are so close that you feel

uncomfortable and you don't have enough leg room, I
stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to me
and the purser was there. He told me, 'I have recorded
the incident in my notebook.' He read it and
translated it to mebecause it was recorded in
French'First class passenger was forced to go to the
tourist class against his will, and that the captain
refused to intervene.'
Mr. VALTE
'I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of
the witness because the best evidence would be the
notes. Your Honor.
COURT
'I will allow that as part of his testimony."
49
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals

Page 18 of 21
8/8/15, 6:36 AM
that the purser made an entry in his notebook reading

"First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class
against his will, and that the captain ref used to intervene
is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above]
which is incompetent. We do not think
_______________
49
Petitioner's brief, pp. 104-105.

170
170

so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster
incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the
proscription49aof the best evidence rule. Such testimony is
admissible.
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted,
when the dialogue happened, the impact of the startling
occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The
excitement had not as yet died down, Statements then, in
this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae.50
For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement
and mental
51
and physical condition of the declarant". The utterance of
the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was
spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the
ouster
52
incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus
escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of
the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the
Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It would
have been an easy matter for petitioner to have
contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true
that no such entry was made, the deposition of the purser
could have cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of
Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code
gives the court ample power to grant exemplary damages
. in contracts and quasi-contracts. The only condition is
Page 19 of 21
8/8/15, 6:36 AM
that defendant should have "acted in a wanton,

fraudulent,
53
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner". The manner
of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class
seat fits into this
legal precept. And this, in addition to
54
moral damages.
9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The
_______________
49a
V Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 76.
50
Section 36, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
51
IV Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines/ 1963 ed., 324.
52
Ibid.
53
54

171
171
Mercy's Inc. vs. Verde

grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment
for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the
courts below felt that it
is but just and equitable that
55
attorneys' fees be given. We do not intend to break faith
with the tradition that discretion well exercisedas it was
hereshould not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus:
P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of
exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees. The
task of
fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial
56
court. The Court of Appeals did not interfere with the
same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our
imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts
and circumstances
57
point to the reasonableness thereof.
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of
Appeals does not suffer from reversible error. We
accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against
petitioner. So ordered,
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon,
Page 20 of 21
8/8/15, 6:36 AM
Regala. Makalintal, Zaldivar and Castro. JJ. concur.

Bengzon, J.P., J., did not take part.
Decision affirmed.
Note.See Northwest Airlines, Inc. vs. Cuenca, L-22424,
Aug. 31, 1965 and the annotation under Lopez vs. Pan
American World Airways, L-22415, March 30, 1966, 16
Supreme Court Reports Annotated 431, 445.
______________
Page 21 of 21
600
8/8/15, 6:37 AM

Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation vs. People
*
G.R. No. 129029. April 3, 2000.
RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ROSARIO P. DY
(for herself and on behalf of the minors Maria Luisa,
Francis Edward, Francis Mark and Francis Rafael, all
surnamed Dy), respondents.
Civil Law; Negligence; Damages; In negligence cases, the same
act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the
offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi
delicto but the offended party can not recover damages under both
types of liability.In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the
choice between (1) an action to enforce civil liability arising from
crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) a
separate action for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines. Once the choice is made, the injured party can
not avail himself of any other remedy because he may not recover
damages twice for the same negligent act or omission of the
accused. This is the rule against double recovery. In other words,
the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the
part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto, and civil
liability quasi delicto either of which may be enforced against the
culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code
that the offended party can not recover damages under both types
of liability.
_______________
*
EN BANC.
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000014f0a4f461d3dcaaea4000a0094004f00ee/p/ALB773/?username=Guest
Page 1 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
601
VOL. 329, APRIL 3, 2000
601

Same; Same; Same; Vicarious liability of the employee is
founded in Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code
and on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code; Under Article 2176 the
liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of the subordinate
is direct and primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the employee; Enforcement of the
judgment against the employer does not require the employee to be
insolvent since the nature of the liability of the employer with that of
the employee, the two being statutorily considered joint tortfeasors, is
solidary.Private respondents sued petitioner Rafael Reyes
Trucking Corporation, as the employer of the accused, to be
vicariously liable for the fault or negligence of the latter. Under the
law, this vicarious liability of the employer is founded on at least
two specific provisions of law. The first is expressed in Article 2176
in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which would allow an
action predicated on quasi-delict to be instituted by the injured
party against the employer for an act or omission of the employee
and would necessitate only a preponderance of evidence to prevail.
Here, the liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of the
subordinate is direct and primary, subject to the defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. The
enforcement of the judgment against the employer in an action
based on Article 2176 does not require the employee to be insolvent
since the nature of the liability of the employer with that of the
employee, the two being statutorily considered joint tortfeasors, is
solidary. The second, predicated on Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, provides that an employer may be held subsidiarily civilly
liable for a felony committed by his employee in the discharge of his
duty. This liability attaches when the employee is convicted of a
crime done in the performance of his work and is found to be
insolvent that renders him unable to properly respond to the civil
liability adjudged.
Same; Same; Same; Reservation of the right to file the separate
civil action waives other available civil actions predicated on the
Page 2 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
same act or omission of the accused-driver.Pursuant to the

provision of Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, when private respondents, as complainants in
the criminal action, reserved the right to file the separate civil
action, they waived other available civil actions predicated on the
same act or omission of the accused-driver. Such civil action
includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code,
and damages under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
602
602

Same; Same; Same; Award of damages in the criminal case was

improper because the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
was waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate civil
action against the employer.With regard to the second issue, the
award of damages in the criminal case was improper because the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability was waived in the
criminal action by the filing of a separate civil action against the
employer. As enunciated in Ramos vs. Gonong, civil indemnity is
not part of the penalty for the crime committed. The only issue
brought before the trial court in the criminal action is whether
accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol is guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and damage to property. The action for
recovery of civil liability is not included therein, but is covered by
the separate civil action filed against the petitioner as employer of
the accused truckdriver.
Criminal Law; Information; Penalty; No offense of Double
Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor
Vehicle Law under the Revised Penal Code; In reckless imprudence
cases, the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to
the individual willful crime or crimes committed, but is set in
relation to a whole class, or series of crimes.Parenthetically, the
trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Double Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence with
violation of the Motor Vehicle Law (Rep. Act No. 4136). There is no
such nomenclature of an offense under the Revised Penal Code.
Page 3 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
Thus, the trial court was misled to sentence the accused to suffer
two (2) indeterminate penalties of four (4) months and one (1) day of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and
twenty (20) days of prision correccional, as maximum. This is
erroneous because in reckless imprudence cases, the actual penalty
for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful
crime or crimes committed, but is set in relation to a whole class, or
series of crimes.
VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:
Civil Law; Negligence; Damages; Notwithstanding the
independent nature of civil actions falling under Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code, the right to institute the action must still
have to be reserved.In the recently decided case of San Ildefonso
Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., the Supreme Court has ruled
that, notwithstanding the independent nature of civil actions falling
603
VOL. 329, APRIL 3, 2000
603

under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the right to
institute the action must still have to be reserved. In the stern
words of the Court: The past pronouncements that view the
reservation requirement as an unauthorized amendment to
substantive law, i.e., the Civil Code, should no longer be
controlling.
Same; Same; Same; The requirement of reservation is not
incompatible with the distinct and separate character of
independent civil actions.In Maniago vs. Court of Appeals, the
Court has said that the requirement of reservation is not
independent civil actions. Indeed, there is no incongruence between
allowing the trial of civil actions to proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution and mandating that, before so proceeding, a
reservation to do so should first be made.
Same; Same; Same; Reservation should be made at the
Page 4 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
institution of the criminal case.The civil action is deemed

instituted together with the criminal case except when the civil
action is reserved. The reservation should be made at the
institution of the criminal case. In independent civil actions, not
being dependent op the criminal case, such reservation would be
required not for preserving the cause of action but in order to allow
the civil action to proceed separately from the criminal case in
interest of good order and procedure. Indeed, independent civil
actions already filed and pending may still be sought to be
consolidated in the criminal case before final judgment is rendered
in the latter case. When no criminal proceedings are instituted, a
separate civil action may be brought to demand the civil liability,
and a preponderance of evidence is sufficient to warrant a favorable
judgment therefor. The same rule applies if the information were to
be dismissed upon motion of the fiscal.
MENDOZA, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Civil Law; Negligence; Damages; The reservation of the right to
file a separate civil action ex delicto against the driver was a waiver
of the offended parties right to institute a civil action based on quasi
delict against petitioner.Following Rule 111, 1, the reservation of
the right to file a separate civil action ex delioto against the driver
was a waiver of the offended parties right to institute a civil action
based on quasi delict against petitioner. The filing of Civil Case No.
Br. 19-424 against petitioner was, therefore, without basis, and its
604
604

dismissal by the trial court in its decision was in order. On the other
hand, as the offended parties had withdrawn their reservation of
the right to file a separate civil action against the driver so that
they can pursue their action in the criminal case, the trial court
correctly determined petitioners subsidiary civil liability for its
drivers negligence in the criminal case.
Same; Same; Same; The award of damages by the trial court
Page 5 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
simply constitutes an error of judgment.Even assuming that the

right of the offended parties to recover damages ex delicto had been
waived, the award of such damages by the trial court simply
constitutes an error of judgment. Hence, the award of damages ex
delicto to the offended parties is not void and is now final. The
Court has not only set aside a final disposition by declaring it void;
it has likewise ordered the reopening of a case already dismissed
with finality on the simplistic reasoning that rules of procedure may
be relaxed in order to promote their objectives and assist the
parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action or proceedings. There is no reason for doing so in this
case since, as already stated, all the parties herein had been duly
heard before the trial court rendered its decision.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
Perpetuo G. Paner for petitioner.
Law Firm of Reyes, Martinez & Associates for private
respondents.
PARDO, J.:
The case
is an appeal via certiorari
from the amended
1
2
decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
the decision
3
and supplemental decision of the trial court, as follows:
_________________
1
2
In CA-G.R. CR No. 14448, promulgated on January 6, 1997.

Ibay-Somera,
J.,
ponente,
Lipana-Reyes
and
Vasquez,
JJ.,
concurring.
3
Dated June 6, 1992, and October 26, 1992, respectively, in
Consolidated Criminal Case No. Br. 19-311 and Civil Case No. Br.
605
VOL. 329, APRIL 3, 2000
605

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
dismissing the appeals interposed by both accused and Reyes
Page 6 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
Trucking Corporation and affirming the Decision and Supplemental

Decision dated June 6, 1992 and October 26, 1992 respectively.
4
SO ORDERED.
The facts are as follows:

On October 10, 1989, Provincial Prosecutor Patricio T.
Durian of Isabela filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan an amended information
charging Romeo Dunca y de Tumol with reckless
imprudence resulting in double homicide and damage to
property, reading as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of
Cauayan, Province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused being the
driver and person-in-charge of a Trailer Truck Tractor bearing Plate
No. N2A-867 registered in the name of Rafael Reyes Trucking
Corporation, with a load of 2,000 cases of empty bottles of beer
grande, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drove and operated the
same while along the National Highway of Barangay Tagaran, in
said Municipality, in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner,
without due regard to traffic laws, rules and ordinances and
without taking the necessary precautions to prevent injuries to
persons and damage to property, causing by such negligence,
carelessness and imprudence the said trailer truck to hit and bump
a Nissan Pick-up bearing Plate No. BBG-957 driven by Feliciano
Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr., @ Pacquing, due to irreversible shock,
internal and external hemorrhage and multiple injuries, open
wounds, abrasions, and further causing damages to the heirs of
Feliciano Balcita in the amount of P100,000.00 and to the death of
Francisco Dy, Jr.; @ Pacquing and damages to his Nissan Pick-Up
bearing Plate No. BBG-957 in the total amount of P2,000,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Cauayan, Isabela, October 10, 1989.
_____________
19-424, Regional Trial Court, Cauayan, Isabela, Judge Artemio R.
Alivia, presiding.
4
Rollo, pp. 35-43.

606
Page 7 of 43
606
8/8/15, 6:37 AM

(Sgd.) FAUSTO C. CABANTAC

Third Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Upon arraignment on October 23, 1989, the accused
entered a plea of not guilty. On the same occasion, the
offended parties (Rosario P. Dy and minor children and
Angelina M. Balcita and minor son Paolo) made a
reservation to file a separate civil action
against the
5
accused arising from the offence charged. On November
29, 1989, the offended parties actually filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan a
complaint against petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking
Corporation, as employer of driver Romeo Dunca y de
Tumol, based on quasi delict. The petitioner settled the
claim of the heirs of Feliciano Balcita (the driver of the
other vehicle involved in the accident). The private
respondents opted to pursue the criminal action but did not
withdraw the civil case quasi ex delicto they filed against
petitioner. On December 15, 1989, private respondents
withdrew the reservation to file a separate civil action
against the accused and manifested that they would6
prosecute the civil aspect ex delicto in the criminal action.
However, they did not withdraw the separate civil action
based on quasi delict against petitioner as employer7 arising
from the same act or omission of the accused driver.
Upon agreement of the parties, the trial court
consolidated both criminal and civil cases and conducted a
joint trial of the same.
The facts, as found by the trial court, which appear to be
undisputed, are as follows:
The defendant Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation is a domestic
corporation engaged in the business of transporting beer products
for the San Miguel Corporation (SMC for short) from the latters
San Fernando, Pampanga plant to its various sales outlets in
Luzon. Among its fleets of vehicles for hire is the white truck trailer
de_______________
Page 8 of 43
See Manifestation, Rollo, p. 55.
Ibid., pp. 55-56.
Civil Case No. Br. 19-424.
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
607
VOL. 329, APRIL 3, 2000
607

scribed above driven by Romeo Dunca y Tumol, a duly licensed
driver. Aside from the Corporations memorandum to all its drivers
and helpers to physically inspect their vehicles before each trip
(Exh. 15, pars. 4 & 5), the SMCs Traffic Investigator-Inspector
certified the roadworthiness of this White Truck trailer prior to
June 20, 1989 (Exh. 17). In addition to a professional drivers
license, it also conducts a rigid examination of all driver applicants
before they are hired.
In the early morning of June 20, 1989, the White Truck driven
by Dunca left Tuguegarao, Cagayan bound to San Fernando,
Pampanga loaded with 2,000 cases of empty beer Grande bottles.
Seated at the front right seat beside him was Ferdinand Domingo,
his truck helper (pahinante in Pilipino). At around 4:00 oclock
that same morning while the truck was descending at a slight
downgrade along the national road at Tagaran, Cauayan, Isabela, it
approached a damaged portion of the road covering the full width of
the trucks right lane going south and about six meters in length.
These made the surface of the road uneven because the potholes
were about five to six inches deep. The left lane parallel to this
damaged portion is smooth. As narrated by Ferdinand Domingo,
before approaching the potholes, he and Dunca saw the Nissan with
its headlights on coming from the opposite direction. They used to
evade this damaged road by taking the left lance but at that
particular moment, because of the incoming vehicle, they had to run
over it. This caused the truck to bounce wildly. Dunca lost control of
the wheels and the truck swerved to the left invading the lane of
the Nissan. As a result, Duncas vehicle rammed the incoming
Nissan dragging it to the left shoulder of the road and climbed a
ridge above said shoulder where it finally stopped, (see Exh. A-5, p.
8, record). The Nissan was severely damaged (Exhs. A-7, A-8, A-9
and A-14, pp. 9-11, record), and its two passengers, namely:
Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr. died instantly (Exh. A-19)
from external and internal hemorrhage and multiple fractures (pp.
Page 9 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
15 and 16, record).

For the funeral expenses of Francisco Dy, Jr. her widow spent
P651,360.00 (Exh. 1-3). At the time of his death he was 45 years old.
He was the President and Chairman of the Board of the Dynamic
Wood Products and Development Corporation (DWPC), a wood
processing establishment, from which he was receiving an income of
P10,000.00 a month (Exh. D). In the Articles of Incorporation of the
DWPC, the spouses Francisco Dy, Jr. and Rosario Perez Dy appear
to be stockholders of 10,000 shares each with par value of P100.00
per share out of its outstanding and subscribed capital stock of
608
608

60,000 shares valued at P6,000,000.00 (Exhs. K-1 & 10-B). Under

its 1988 Income Tax Returns (Exh. J) the DWPC had a taxable net
income of P78,499.30 (Exh. J). Francisco Dy, Jr. was a La Salle
University graduate in Business Administration, past president of
the Pasay Jaycees, National Treasurer and President of the
Philippine Jaycees in 1971 and 1976, respectively, and World
VicePresident of Jaycees International in 1979. He was also the
recipient of numerous awards as a civic leader (Exh. C). His
children were all studying in prestigious schools and spent about
P180,000.00 for their education in 1988 alone (Exh. H-4).
As stated earlier, the plaintiffs procurement of a writ of
attachment of the properties of the Corporation was declared illegal
by the Court of Appeals. It was shown that on December 26, 1989,
Deputy Sheriff Edgardo Zabat of the RTC at San Fernando,
Pampanga, attached six units of Truck Tractors and trailers of the
Corporation at its garage at San Fernando, Pampanga. These
vehicles were kept under PC guard by the plaintiffs in said garage
thus preventing the Corporation to operate them. However, on
December 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals dissolved the writ (p. 30,
record) and on December 29, 1989, said Sheriff reported to this
Court that the attached vehicles were taken by the defendants
representative, Melita Manapil (Exh. O, p. 31, record). The
defendants general Manager declared that it lost P21,000.00 per
day for the nonoperation of the six units during their attachment (p.
31, t.s.n., Natividad C. Babaran, proceedings on December 10,
8
1990).
Page 10 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
On June 6, 1992, the trial court rendered a joint decision,

the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations judgment is
hereby rendered:
1. Finding the accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Homicide through
Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle
Law (Rep. Act No. 4136), and appreciating in his favor the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any
aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the Court
hereby sentences him to suffer two (2) indeterminate
penalties of four months and one day of arresto mayor as
minimum to three years, six months and twenty days as
______________
8
Petition, Annex F, Rollo, pp. 64-80, at pp. 67-69.
609
VOL. 329, APRIL 3, 2000
609

maximum; to indemnify the Heirs of Francisco Dy, Jr. in the
amount of P3,000,000.00 as compensatory damages,
P1,000,000.00 as moral damages, and P1,030,000.00 as
funeral expenses;
2. Ordering the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Br. 19-424 to pay
the defendant therein actual damages in the amount of
P84,000.00; and
3. Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No.
Br. 19-424.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cauayan, Isabela, June 6, 1992.
(Sgd.) ARTEMIO R. ALIVIA
9
Regional Trial Judge
On September 3, 1992, petitioner and 10

the accused filed a
notice of appeal from the joint decision.
Page 11 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
On the other hand, private respondents moved for

amendment of the dispositive portion of the joint decision
so as to hold petitioner subsidiarily liable for the damages
awarded to the private11 respondents in the event of
insolvency of the accused.
On October 26, 1992, the trial court rendered a
supplemental decision amending the dispositive portion by
inserting an additional paragraph reading as follows:
2:AOrdering the defendant Reyes Trucking Corporation
subsidiarily liable for all the damages awarded to the heirs of
Francisco Dy, Jr., in the event of insolvency of the accused but
deducting therefrom the damages of P84,000.00 awarded to said
12
defendant in the next preceding paragraph; and x x x
_______________
9
Petition, Annex F, Rollo, pp. 64-80.
10
Rollo, pp. 81-82.
11
It is not indicated when the motion for amendment of the trial
courts decision was filed, but this fact is mentioned in the trial courts
supplemental decision of October 26, 1992.
12
Rollo, pp. 83-84.

610
610

On November 12, 1992, petitioner filed with the trial court

a supplemental
notice of appeal from the supplemental
13
decision.
During the pendency of the appeal, the accused jumped
bail and fled to a foreign country. By resolution dated
December 29, 1994, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the
14
appeal of the accused in the criminal case.
On January 6, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered an
amended decision affirming that of the trial15 court, as set
out in the opening paragraph of this decision.
On January 31, 1997, petitioner filed
a motion for
16
reconsideration of the amended decision.
On April 21, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied
Page 12 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
17
petitioners motion for reconsideration

for lack of merit.
18
Hence, this petition for review.
On July 21, 1997, the Court required respondents 19to
comment on the petition within ten (10) days from notice.
On January
27, 1998, the Solicitor General filed his
20
comment. On April 13, 1998, the Court granted leave to
petitioner to file
a reply and noted the reply it filed on
21
March 11, 1998.
We now resolve to give due course to the petition and
decide the case.
Petitioner raises three (3) grounds for allowance of the
petition, which, however, boil down to two (2) basic issues,
namely:
______________
13
Rollo, pp. 85-86.
14
CA Record, pp. 92-94.
15
Rollo, pp. 35-43.
16
Petition, Annex J, Rollo, pp. 87-91.
17
Rollo, p. 45.
18
Filed on June 13, 1997, Rollo, pp. 11-33.
19
Rollo, p. 96.
20
Rollo, pp. 114-120.
21
Rollo, p. 133.
611
VOL. 329, APRIL 3, 2000
611

1. May petitioner as owner of the truck involved in the
accident be held subsidiarily liable for the damages
awarded to the offended parties in the criminal
action against the truck driver despite the filing of
a separate civil action by the offended parties
against the employer of the truck driver?
2. May the Court award damages to the offended
parties in the criminal case despite the filing of a
civil action against the employer of the truck driver;
and in amounts exceeding that alleged in the
Page 13 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
information for reckless imprudence

resulting in
22
homicide and damage to property?
We grant the petition, resolving under the circumstances
pro hac vice to remand the cases to the trial court for
determination of the civil liability of petitioner as employer
of the accused driver in the civil action quasi ex delicto reopened for the purpose.
In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice
between (1) an action to enforce civil liability arising from
crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2)
a separate action for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Once the choice is made, the
injured party can not avail himself of any other remedy
because he may not recover damages twice
for the same
23
negligent act or omission of the accused. This is the rule
against double recovery.
In other words, the same act or omission can create two
kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil
liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi delicto either of
which may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the
caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the
offended 24
party can not recover damages under both types of
liability.
_________________
22
23
Petition, par. V, Rollo, pp. 11-33, at p. 19.

Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 5, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure; Article 2177, Civil Code; Virata vs. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472
[1978].
24
Jarantilla vs. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 429, 436 [1989].

612
612

In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a

separate civil action for damages against petitioner as
employer of the accused, based on quasi delict, under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Private
Page 14 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
respondents sued petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking

Corporation, as the employer of the accused, to be
vicariously liable for the fault or negligence of the latter.
Under the law, this vicarious liability of the employer is
founded on at least two specific provisions of law.
The first is expressed in Article 2176 in relation to
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which would allow an action
predicated on quasi-delict to be instituted by the injured
party against the employer for an act or omission of the
employee and would necessitate only a preponderance of
evidence to prevail. Here, the liability of the employer for
the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and
primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the employee. The enforcement
of the judgment against the employer in an action based on
Article 2176 does not require the employee to be insolvent
since the nature of the liability of the employer with that of
the employee, the two25 being statutorily considered joint
tortfeasors, is solidary. The second, predicated on Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that an employer
may be held subsidiarily civilly liable for a felony
committed by his employee in the discharge of his duty.
This liability attaches when the employee is convicted of a
crime done in the performance of his work and is found to
be insolvent that renders him
unable to properly respond to
26
the civil liability adjudged.
As regards the first issue, the answer is in the negative.
Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of the
accused who has been adjudged guilty in the criminal case
for reckless imprudence, can not be held subsidiarily liable
be cause of the filing of the separate civil action based on
quasi
______________
25
Article 2194, Civil Code of the Philippines.
26
Franco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 331, 338 [1989].
613
VOL. 329, APRIL 3, 2000
613

Page 15 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
delict against it. In view of the reservation to file, and the

subsequent filing of the civil action for recovery of civil
liability, the same was not instituted with the criminal
action. Such separate civil action was for recovery of
damages under Article 2176 of the Civil27Code, arising from
the same act or omission of the accused.
Pursuant to the provision of Rule 111, Section 1,
paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
when private respondents, as complainants in the criminal
action, reserved the right to file the separate civil action,
they waived other available civil actions predicated on the
same act or omission of the accused-driver. Such civil action
includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal
Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or
28
omission of the accused.
The intention of private respondents to proceed
primarily and directly against petitioner as employer of
accused truck driver became clearer when they did not ask
for the dismissal of the civil action against the latter based
on quasi delict.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals and the trial court
erred in holding the accused civilly liable, and
petitioneremployer of the accused subsidiarily liable for
damages arising from crime (ex delicto) in the criminal
action as the offended parties in fact filed a separate civil
action against the employer based on quasi delict resulting
in the waiver of the civil action ex delicto.
It might be argued that private respondents as
complainants in the criminal case withdrew the reservation
to file a civil action against the driver (accused) and
manifested that they would pursue the civil liability of the
driver in the criminal action. However, the withdrawal is
ineffective to reverse the effect of the reservation earlier
made because private respondents did not withdraw the
civil action against peti_______________
27
28
Maniago vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 674, 681 [1996].

Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 2, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
Page 16 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
614
614

tioner based on quasi delict. In such a case, the provision of

Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure is clear that the reservation to file or
the filing of a separate civil action results in a waiver of
other available civil actions arising from the same act or
omission of the accused. Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 2
enumerated what are the civil actions deemed waived upon
such reservation or filing, and one of which is the civil
indemnity under the Revised Penal Code. Rule 111, Section
1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
specifically provides:
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The
institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil
actions separately waives the others.
The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple

suits between the same litigants arising out of the same act
or omission of the offender. The restrictive phraseology of
the section under consideration is meant to cover all kinds
of civil actions, regardless of their source in law, provided
that the action
has for its basis the same act or omission of
29
the offender.
However, petitioner as defendant in the separate civil
action for damages filed against it, based on quasi delict,
may be held liable thereon. Thus, the trial court grievously
erred in dismissing plaintiffs civil complaint. And the
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts
decision. Unfortunately private respondents did not appeal
from such
dismissal and could not be granted affirmative
30
relief.
The Court, however, in exceptional cases has relaxed the
rules in order to promote their objectives and assist the
parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination
_______________
Page 17 of 43
29
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
Pamaran, The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure Annotated, 19 98
edition, pp. 128-129.

30
Policarpio vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 344, 357 [1997].

615
VOL. 329, APRIL 3, 2000
615

31
of every action or proceeding or exempted

a particular
32
case from the operation of the rules.
Invoking this principle, we rule that the trial court erred
in awarding civil damages in the criminal case and in
dismissing the civil action. Apparently satisfied with such
award, private respondent did not appeal from the
dismissal of the civil case. However, petitioner did appeal.
Hence, this case should be remanded to the trial court so
that it may render decision in the civil case
awarding
33
damages as may be warranted by the evidence.
With regard to the second issue, the award of damages
in the criminal case was improper because the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal
action by the filing of a separate civil action against
the
34
employer. As enunciated in Ramos vs. Gonong, civil
indemnity is not part of the penalty for the crime
committed. The only issue brought before the trial court in
the criminal action is whether accused Romeo Dunca y de
Tumol is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and damage to property. The action for recovery
of civil liability is not included therein, but is covered by
the separate civil action filed against the petitioner as
employer of the accused truck-driver.
In this case, accused-driver jumped bail pending his
appeal from his conviction. Thus, the judgment convicting
the accused became final and executory, but only insofar as
the penalty in the criminal action is concerned. The
damages awarded in the criminal action was invalid
because of its effective waiver. The pronouncement was
void because the action for recovery of the civil liability
arising from the crime has been waived in said criminal
action.
With respect to the issue that the award of damages in
Page 18 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
the criminal action exceeded the amount of damages

alleged in
__________________
31
Nerves vs. Civil Service Commission, 276 SCRA 610, 617 [19971.
32
Blanco vs. Bernabe, 63 Phil. 124 [19361.
33
Guaring, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 274, 283 [1997].
34
72 SCRA 562, 566 [1976].

616
616

the amended information, the issue is de minimis. At any

rate, the trial court erred in awarding damages in the
criminal case because by virtue of the reservation of the
right to bring a separate civil action or the filing thereof,
there would be no possibility that the employer would be
held liable because in such a case there would 35be no
pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused.
As a final note, we reiterate that the policy against
double recovery requires that only one action be
maintained for the same act or omission whether the action
36
is brought against the employee or against his employer.
The injured party must choose which 37of the available
causes of action for damages he will bring.
Parenthetically, the trial court found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Homicide
Through Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor
Vehicle Law (Rep. Act No. 4136). There is no such
nomenclature of an offense under the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, the trial court was misled to sentence the accused to
suffer two (2) indeterminate penalties of four (4) months
and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3)
years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of prision
correccional, as maximum. This is erroneous because in
reckless imprudence cases, the actual penalty for criminal
negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime
or crimes committed,
but is set in relation to a whole class,
38
or series of crimes.
Page 19 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
Unfortunately, we can no longer correct this judgment

even if erroneous, as it is, because it has become final and
executory.
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal
negligence is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt
with
_______________
35
Maniago vs. Court of Appeals, supra, at p. 686.
36
Maniago vs. Court of Appeals, supra, at p. 687.
37
Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 [1942], reiter ted in Maniago vs.
Court of Appeals, supra.

38
Quizon vs. The Justice of the Peace of Pampanga, 97 Phil. 342, 346
[1955].
617
VOL. 329, APRIL 3, 2000
617

separately from willful offenses. It is not a question of
classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act
itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is
principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight, the imprudencia punible. Much of the confusion
has arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrase
as homicide through reckless imprudence, and the like;
when the strict technical sense is, more accurately,
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide;
or simple
39
imprudence causing damages to property.
There is need, therefore, to rectify the designation of the
offense without disturbing the imposed penalty for the
guidance of bench and bar in strict adherence to precedent.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and
SETS ASIDE the amended decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14448, promulgated on
January 6, 1997, and the joint decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan, in Criminal Case
No. Br. 19-311 and Civil Case No. Br. 19-424, dated June 6,
1992.
Page 20 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
IN LIEU THEREOF, the Court renders judgment as

follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. Br. 19-311, the Court declares
the accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide and damage to property, defined and
penalized under Article 365, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, with violation of the
automobile law (R.A. No. 4136, as amended), and
sentences him to suffer two (2) indeterminate
penalties of four (4) months and one (1) day of
arrest o mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six
(6) months and twenty40 (20) days of prision
correccional, as maximum, without indemnity, and
to pay the costs, and
_______________
39
Quizon vs. The Justice of the Peace of Pampanga, supra, at p. 345.
40
This was the penalty imposed by the trial court, which has become
final and executory.

618
618

(2) In Civil Case No. Br. 19-424, the Court orders the
case reopened to determine the liability of the
defendant Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation to
plaintiffs and that of plaintiffs on defendants
counterclaim.
No costs in this instance.

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes,
Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Please see dissenting opinion.
Puno, J., I concur but pro hac vice.
Vitug, J., Please see separate opinion.
Page 21 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
Mendoza, J., Please see my dissent.

Panganiban, J., In the result.
Quisumbing, J., Concurs in separate opinion of J.
Vitug.
Purisima, J., I join in the dissent of Mr. Justice
Mendoza.
DISSENTING OPINION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J..
I understand that this is an appeal by an employer from a
decision holding it subsidiarily liable with the driver. The
drivers appeal from the judgment of conviction was
dismissed because the driver jumped bail. Hence, the
decision in the criminal case insofar as the criminal
liability is concerned is already firm and final. Accordingly,
for this reason alone we cannot modify the decision as to
him. The modifications introduced in the ponencia is very
substantial for it deletes the award of indemnity.
Also, the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Br. 19-424the
action for damages based on quasi-delictdid not appeal
from the
619
VOL. 329, APRIL 3, 2000
619

decision of the Regional Trial Court dismissing the case.
That decision had long become final and executory.
Since there was no appeal from the dismissal of the civil
case to the Court of Appeals, it logically follows that it was
not brought to that Court. Obviously, too, it was never
brought to our jurisdiction. Accordingly, there is nothing to
remand to the court of origin for further proceedings.
I believe that we cannot even suspend the rules to
accommodate the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Br. 19-424.
Such suspension would do much violence to the rules and
open floodgates to dangerous precedents.
Page 22 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
The simple solution in this case is to sustain the

judgment of the trial court, affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, holding petitioner, as employer of the offending
driver, subsidiarily liable for the damages adjudged.
It is settled that every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable. (Article 100, Revised Penal
Code). Employers are subsidiarily civilly liable for felonies
committed by their employees. (Article 103, id.).
The aggrieved parties in criminal cases may pursue
their claims for damages either as delictual damages, or
quasidelictual damages under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, which the Code considers as entirely distinct and
separate from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Revised Penal Code. However, Article 2177 of
the Civil Code expressly provides that the plaintiffs cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.
The offended parties filed a separate action for damages
under Article 2176. It must, however, be pointed out that, as
can be gathered from the ponencia, only petitioner was
made as defendant in that civil case. Part of the first
paragraph of page three of the ponencia reads:
On November 29, 1989, the offended parties actually filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan, a complaint
against petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer
of driver Romeo Dunca y de Tumol, based on quasi-delicts.
620
620

Obviously then there was no separate civil action for

damages arising from the felony. It was then deemed
impliedly instituted in the criminal action against the
driver.
The civil case against petitioner alone was consolidated
with the criminal case where the civil aspect arising from
the delict was impliedly instituted against the driver.
Hence, there was no legal obstacle for the trial court to
award damages therein, such as indemnity for the death,
Page 23 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
etc. and pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,

to make petitioner subsidiarily liable for the awards.
Considering, however, the abovestated proscription in
Article 2177 of the Civil Code, the trial court had dismissed
the civil case for damages against petitioner, which was
already made subsidiarily liable for the damages in the
criminal case.
To recapitulate, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals committed no error.
I vote to DENY the petition.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
An early established rule under our law is that an act or
omission, extra-contractual in nature, causing damage to
another, there being fault or negligence can create two
separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. Either
one of these two possible liabilities may be sought to be
enforced against the offender subject, however, to the
caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the
offended party cannot recover damages twice
for the same
1
act or omission or under both causes. Outside of this
proscription, the two civil liabilities are distinct and
independent of each other; thus, and conversely against the
rule on double recovery, the failure of
______________
1
Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607; Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113;
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558.

621
VOL. 329, APRIL 3, 2000
621

recovery in one will not necessarily preclude recovery in the
other.
Page 24 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
Procedurally, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,

while reiterating that a civil action under the Civil Code
may be brought separately from the criminal action,
provides, nevertheless, that the right to bring it must be
reserved. Rule 111 reads in full:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute
it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act
or omission of the accused.
actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions
shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence
and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the accused.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against
the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these
Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an
award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is
alleged in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing
fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in
court for trial.
Sec. 2. Institution of separate civil action.Except in the cases
provided for in Section 3 hereof, after the criminal action has been
commenced, the civil action which has been reserved cannot be
622
622

Page 25 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal

action.
(a) Whenever the offended party shall have instituted the civil
action as provided for in the first paragraph of Section 1 hereof
before the filing of the criminal action and the criminal action is
subsequently commenced, the pending civil action shall be
suspended, in whatever stage before final judgment it may be
found, until final judgment in the criminal action has been
rendered. However, if no final judgment has been rendered by the
trial court in the civil action, the same may be consolidated with the
criminal action upon application with the court trying the. criminal
action. If the application is granted, the evidence presented and
admitted in the civil action shall be deemed automatically
reproduced in the criminal action, without prejudice to the
admission of additional evidence that any party may wish to
present. In case of consolidation, both the criminal and the civil
actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist.
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.In the
cases provided for in articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, the independent civil action which has been
reserved may be brought by the offended party, shall proceed
independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
In the recently decided 2case of San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. vs.

Court of Appeals, et al., the Supreme Court has ruled that,
notwithstanding the independent nature of civil actions
falling under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code,
the right to institute the action must still have to be
reserved. In the stern words of the Court: The past
pronouncements that view the reservation requirement as
an unauthorized amendment to substantive law, i.e., the
Civil Code, should no longer be controlling. Essentially, I
share this view although I also understand San Ildefonso
as merely fortifying a procedural rule that unless a
reservation is made, the court trying the
______________
Page 26 of 43
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289 SCRA 568.

623
VOL. 329, APRIL 3, 2000
623

criminal case would not, for instance, be precluded from
taking cognizance of the civil aspect of the litigation and
that, upon the other hand, the other court in the civil case
might, motu proprio or at the instance of a party, hold in
abeyance the consideration thereof pending the outcome
of
3
the criminal case. In Maniago vs. Court of Appeals, the
Court has said that the requirement of reservation is not
independent civil actions. Indeed, there is no incongruence
between allowing the trial of civil actions to proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution and mandating
that, before so proceeding, a reservation to do so should
first be made.
In fine
FirstThe civil action is deemed instituted together
with the4 criminal case except when the civil action is
reserved. The reservation should
be made at the
5
institution of the criminal case. In independent civil
actions, not being dependent on the criminal case, such
reservation would be required not for preserving the cause
of action but in order to allow the civil action to proceed
separately from6 the criminal case in interest of good order
and procedure. Indeed, independent civil actions already
filed and pending may still be sought to be consolidated in
the criminal
case before final judgment is rendered in the
7
latter case. When no criminal proceedings are instituted, a
separate civil action may be brought to demand the civil
liability, and a preponderance of evidence
is sufficient to
8
warrant a favorable judgment therefor. The
_________________
3
253 SCRA 674; Emerencia vs. Gonzales, 104 Phil. 1059.
Sec. 1, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court; see also Art. 100, Revised
Penal Code.
Page 27 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
Abellana vs. Marave, 57 SCRA 106.
See Reyes vs. Sempio-Diy, 141 SCRA 208; Jarantilla vs. Court of
Appeals, 171 SCRA 429; Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 591.
7
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. CA, 203 SCRA 619.

Art. 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil
liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal pro624
624

same rule applies if the 9information were to be dismissed

upon motion of the fiscal.
SecondThe pendency of the criminal case suspends the
civil action, except
(1) When properly reserved, in independent civil actions,
such as those cases (a) not arising from the act or omission
complained
of as a felony (e.g. culpa 11contractual under Art.
10
31, intentional torts under Arts. 32
_______________
ceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a
preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act
complaint of.
9
See Calalang vs. IAC, 194 SCRA 514.
10
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter.
11
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual,
who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner

impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical
publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
Page 28 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
(5) Freedom of suffrage;

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of
law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken
for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in ones person, house, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the
Government for redress of grievances;
625
VOL. 329, APRIL 3, 2000
625

12
and 34, and culpa acquiliana under Art. 2176

Civil Code); or
13
of the
_______________
(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to
face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against ones self,
or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a
promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except
when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment,
unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a
statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional;
and
Page 29 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the
defendants act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved
party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil
action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted),
and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may
also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge
unless his act or omission constitutes a Violation of the Penal Code or the
penal statute.
12
ART. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses
or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life

or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and
the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The
civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal
proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support
such action.
13
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the

626
626

(b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an

action independent
and separate from the criminal action
14
(e.g. Art. 33, Civil Code); and
(2) In the case of pre-judicial questions which must be
decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted
or may proceed (Art. 36, Civil Code). In the above
instances, the civil case may proceed independently and
regardless of the outcome of the criminal case.
ThirdAn acquittal in the criminal case may bar any
further separate civil action, except
(1) In independent civil actions, unless the complainant,
not having reserved a separate action, has actively
15
participated and intervened in the criminal case. Such
active participation and intervention can only be deemed to
Page 30 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
be an unequivocal election by the complainant to sue under

ex-delictu rather than on another cause of action (arising
from the same act or omission complained of as being exdelictu). If, however, the acquittal is predicated on the
ground that guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt, and not upon a finding that the fact from which the
civil (action) might arise did16 not exist, an action for
damages can still be instituted.
_______________
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
14
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only
a preponderance of evidence.
15
Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113; Ruiz vs. Ucol, 153 SCRA 14; see
also Diong Bi Chu vs. CA, 192 SCRA 554.

16
ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on
the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a
civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted.
Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of
the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer
for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
627
VOL. 329, APRIL 3, 2000
627

(2) In dependent civil actions where the acquittal is
premised on a failure of proof beyond reasonable doubt,
which the court shall so declare as its basis, a civil action
for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted.
Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence.
Where acquittal is thus based on the fact that the crime did
not exist or that the offender did not commit the crime, and
not on mere quantum of proof, a civil action based on such
ex delictu of which the accused is already acquitted would
Page 31 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
17
be improper.
The vicarious liability of an employer for the fault or
negligence of an employee is founded on at least two
specific provisions of law. The first is expressed in Article
2176, in relation to Article 2180, of the Civil Code which
would allow an action predicated on quasi-delict to be
instituted by the injured party against the employer for an
act or omission of the employee and would necessitate only
a preponderance of evidence in order to prevail. Here, the
liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of the
subordinate is direct and primary subject to the defense of
due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee. The enforcement of the judgment against the
employer for an action based on Article 2176 does not
require the employee to be insolvent since the nature of the
liability of the employer with that of the employee, the two
18
being statutorily considered joint tortfeasors, is solidary.
The second, predicated on Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, provides that an employer may be held subsidiarily
liable for a felony committed by his employee in the
discharge of his duty. This liability attaches when the
employee is convicted of a crime done in the performance of
his work and is
_________________
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any
declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision
whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground. See also Art. 31, Civil
Code; Guia vs. Dianala, et al., 132 SCRA 245.
17
People vs. Amistad, 108 SCRA 601.
18
Article 2194, Civil Code of the Philippines.

628
628

found to be insolvent that renders him

unable to properly
19
respond to the civil liability adjudged.
Page 32 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
Normally, the judgment in the criminal case concludes

the employer not only with regard to the civil liability but
likewise with regard to its amount since
the liability of an
20
employer follows that of the employee. Nevertheless, due
process demands that the employer be accorded full
opportunity to be heard to dispute the basic thesis upon
which that liability is premised, i.e., the existence of an
employer-employee relationship engagement in an industry
by the employer, and commission of the felony by the
employee in carrying on his tasks. In highly meritorious
cases, the extent of the liability of the employer himself,
including the amount of damages, although final and
conclusive on the accused, may be shown by the employer
to be clearly unwarranted or unconscionable to be a valid
measure of his own subsidiary liability. In such an
instance, there is little excuse for not allowing the
employer due process and to be given a chance to be heard
thereon. The right of the employer to his own day in court,
in no way, would amend or nullify the final judgment
rendered by the court which stands unaffected insofar as
the accused himself is concerned. It bears stressing that
the employer takes no active role in the criminal
proceedings, nor entitled to take such role, up until he
suddenly finds himself open to a possible subsidiary
liability following the judgment of conviction.
Finally, it may not be amiss to repeat that in
independent civil actions only a successful recourse in one
would foreclose recovery in the other.
I concur, therefore, with the majority in remanding the
case to the court a quo for the determination and extent of
the subsidiary liability of the employer conformably with
the foregoing opinion.
______________
19
Franco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 333.
20
Miranda vs. Malate Garage and Taxicab, Inc., 99 Phil. 670.

629
VOL. 329, APRIL 3, 2000
629

Page 33 of 43
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DISSENTING OPINION
MENDOZA, J.:
The question in this case is whether petitioner, as employer
of the driver found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide and damage to property, can be held
subsidiarily liable for damages awarded in the criminal
case considering that a separate civil action for quasi-delict
had been filed against said petitioner, although the case
was later dismissed. Based on the facts as stated in the
majority opinion, the answer is yes. My reasons are
twofold: first, because the filing of the case for quasi-delict
against petitioner was without basis, the same being
contrary to the reservation earlier made by the offended
parties of their right to file a separate civil action arising
from the crime against the driver, and, second, because the
action for quasi-delict against petitioner was dismissed
precisely because the civil action against petitioners driver
had been reinstituted in the criminal case against him. Let
me explain.
As the records show, at the arraignment on October 23,
1989 of the driver Romeo Dunca, the heirs of Francisco Dy,
Jr. and Feliciano Balcita reserved in Criminal Case No. Br.
19-311 their right to institute a separate civil action
arising from
the offense charged against the herein
1
accused. In accordance with
Rule 111, 1 of the 1985
2
Rules on Criminal Procedure, such reservation of the right
to file a civil action
______________
1
Rollo, p. 55.
Rule 111, 1 provides in pertinent parts: Institution of criminal and
civil actions,When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for

the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action. Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under
the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
Page 34 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission
of the accused.
630
630

ex delicto was a waiver of the right to file any other civil

action under Arts. 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code for
recovery of damages for the same act or omission of the
accused. Hence, the subsequent filing by private
respondent Rosario P. Dy of a civil action for quasi-delict,
based on Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, against
petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation was without
any basis, the same having been waived by the reservation
earlier made by her of the right to file a separate civil
action arising from crime.
Be that as it may, the records further show that on
December 15, 1989, private respondent filed a
manifestation in the criminal case that she was
withdrawing the previous reservation made by her to
institute a separate civil action and that she was instead
going to prosecute the civil action in the criminal case.
Hence, she prayed that the reservation to institute
separate civil action in this case be ordered withdrawn and
the Heirs of the victims be allowed to present evidence in3
support of the civil liability to the accused in this case.
The trial court granted private respondents motion and
allowed her to intervene in the criminal case.
Consequently, the civil action ex delicto was merged with
the criminal prosecution.
The civil action for quasi-delict against petitioner, which
had been docketed as Civil Case No. Br. 19-424, was
subsequently consolidated and jointly tried with the
criminal case (Criminal Case No. Br. 19-311) against the
driver. Then, on June 6, 1992, the trial court rendered
judgment, which was amended on October 26, 1992
(1) finding the driver Romeo Dunca guilty of double
homicide through reckless imprudence and
violation of the Motor Vehicle Law and sentencing
Page 35 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
him to two indeterminate penalties of 4 months and

1 day of arresto mayor to 3 years, 6
_______________
actions separately waives the others . . . .
3
Rollo, p. 55.
631
VOL. 329, APRIL 3, 2000
631

months and 20 days and to pay the heirs of
Francisco Dy, Jr. in the total amount of
P5,030,000.00;
(2) ordering private respondent to pay P84,000.00 as
damages for wrongful attachment of petitioners
trucks; and
(3) dismissing Civil Case No. Br. 19-424 but declaring
petitioner subsidiarily liable to private respondent
heirs of Francisco Dy, Jr. in the event of insolvency
of the accused driver.
It is contended that, as the trial court had dismissed the
action for quasi-delict (Civil Case No. Br. 19-424) and
private respondent did not appeal, no award of damages
can be made in her favor. This contention has no merit. The
civil action for quasi-delict was dismissed precisely so that
petitioners liability for its drivers negligence could be
determined in the criminal case. Thus, the trial court
stated:
Since Civil Case No. Br. 19-424 was admittedly instituted after the
criminal case was filed, the Court believes that the waiver made by
the Heirs of Francisco Dy, Jr. on December 15, 1969 included their
right to file a separate civil action against the Rafael Reyes
Trucking Corporation, the accuseds employer, for the reason that
under Section 1, Rule 111, actions arising from Article 2176 of the
Page 36 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
Civil Code or quasi-delicts are deemed included in the waiver. As

such, since the latter raised as an affirmative defense the defense
that the plaintiffs cannot maintain Civil Case No. [Br.] 19-424, this
Court must have to rule that the filing of said case was not proper.
Nevertheless, inasmuch as the plaintiffs cannot recover damages
twice for the offense committed by the accused, under Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code, in the event the accused will be insolvent,
the Corporation could be held subsidiarily liable for the same
4
damages.
On the other hand, because of the subsequent withdrawal

of the reservation to file a separate civil action the same
was reinstituted in the criminal case, as though no
reservation to file it separately had ever been made. The
trial court, therefore, properly included in its decision in
the criminal case a
_____________
4
Emphasis added.
632
632

finding of the drivers civil liability, in addition to his

criminal liability.
Petitioner and its driver, Romeo Dunca, appealed to the
Court of Appeals. However, while the appeal was thus
pending, Dunca jumped bail. The decision convicting him
and imposing on him civil liability ex delicto thereby
became final and executory. This circumstance allows for
the application of Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
which provides:
Subsidiary civil liability of other persons.The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall also apply to
employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind
of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils,
workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
To establish the subsidiary civil liability of the petitioner,

Page 37 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
the following must be shown: (1) that petitioner is engaged

in an industry; (2) that its employee (Romeo Dunca)
committed the offense in the discharge
of his duties; and (3)
5
that the employee is insolvent.
The first requisite has already been established
considering that petitioner admitted in its answer in the
trial court that it is engaged in an industry and
that Dunca
6
was its employee at the time of the accident.
The second requisite must likewise be deemed to have
been established since it is settled that, in the absence of
any collusion between the accused employee and the
offended party, a judgment convicting the 7 former is
conclusive upon the party subsidiarily liable. Petitioner
cannot claim that he has been deprived of due process on
the ground that it was not a party to the suit. For as held
in Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc.:
______________
5
Baza Marketing Corp. v. Bolinao Security and Investigation Service,
Inc., 117 SCRA 156 (1982).

6
Rollo, p. 57.
Manalo v. Robles Trans. Co., Inc., 99 Phil. 729 (1956).

633
VOL. 329, APRIL 3, 2000
633

It is true that an employer, strictly speaking, is not a party to the
criminal case instituted against his employee but in substance and
in effect he is, considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him
by law. It is his concern, as well as of his employee, to see to it that
his interest be protected in the criminal case by taking virtual
participation in the defense of his employee. He cannot leave him to
his own fate because his failure is also his. And if because of his
indifference or inaction the employee is convicted and damages are
awarded against him, he cannot later be heard to complain, if
brought to court for the enforcement of his subsidiary liability, that
8
he was not given his day in court. . . .
Indeed, Civil Case No. Br. 19-424 and Criminal Case No.
Page 38 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
Br. 19-311 were jointly tried. All the parties in the two
casesthe prosecution and the defense in the criminal
case, and the Dys and petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking
Corporation in the civil casewere duly heard before the
trial court, in its joint decision, rendered judgment
dismissing the civil action for quasi delict against
petitioner and finding it instead subsidiarily liable in the
criminal case. Petitioner and its driver were in fact
represented by the same counsel, who
raised all possible
9
defenses that petitioner could raise. The remand of this
case to the trial court should, therefore, be solely for the
purpose of determining, in the execution of the decision,
whether Dunca, the accused driver, is insolvent.
The Court holds, however, that petitioner cannot be held
liable in the criminal case on the ground that the right to
file a civil action ex delicto has been waived and that
instead its liability for its drivers negligence must be
determined under Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, the Court orders the reopening of the
action for quasi delict (Civil Case No. Br. 19-424). As basis
for its decision, the Court states:
In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate
civil action for damages against petitioner as employer of the
_____________
8
99 Phil. 670, 675 (1956).
Rollo, p. 69.
634
634

accused, based on quasi delict, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines . . . Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as
employer of the accused who has been adjudged guilty in the
criminal case for reckless imprudence, can not be held subsidiarily
liable because of the filing of the separate civil action based on
quasi delict against it. In view of the reservation to file, and the
subsequent filing of the civil action for recovery of civil liability, the
Page 39 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
same was not instituted with the criminal action. Such separate
civil action was for recovery of damages under Article 2176 of the
10
Civil Code, arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
With due respect, it is not true that private respondent

reserved the right to file a separate civil action based on
quasi delict and thereby waived the right to recover from
petitioner civil liability ex delicto in the event of the
insolvency of the driver. The offended parties stated very
clearly that what they were reserving was the right to
institute a separate civil action arising from the offense
charged against the herein accused. It is, therefore, error
to say that what was reserved was the right to bring a civil
action based on quasi delict.
Following Rule 111, 1, the reservation of the right to
file a separate civil action ex delicto against the driver was
a waiver of the offended parties right to institute a civil
action based on quasi delict against petitioner. The filing of
Civil Case No. Br. 19-424 against petitioner was, therefore,
without basis, and its dismissal by the trial court in its
decision was in order. On the other hand, as the offended
parties had withdrawn their reservation of the right to file
a separate civil action against the driver so that they can
pursue their action in the criminal case, the trial court
correctly determined petitioners subsidiary civil liability
for its drivers negligence in the criminal case.
It is contended that the offended parties did not appeal
from the decision of the trial court insofar as it dismissed
their complaint for quasi delict. That is because, as they
had previously manifested in withdrawing their
reservation of the
______________
10
Citing Maniago v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 674 (1996).

635
VOL. 329, APRIL 3, 2000
635

right to file a separate civil action against the driver, they
Page 40 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
intended to pursue their action in the criminal case. That

included the action to enforce the subsidiary civil liability
of petitioner, as employer, in the event of the drivers
insolvency.
To relieve petitioner from its subsidiary liability, the
Court has to declare the award of damages ex delicto void
because, by filing a civil action based on quasi delict, the
offended parties allegedly waived the right to bring action
ex delicto. As already stated, it was the right to bring an
action for quasi delict which was waived as a result of the
reservation to file a civil action ex delicto. Hence, as a
consequence of the drivers jumping bail, the judgment
finding him liable not only criminally but also civilly
became final. As under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code
the employer is subsidiarily liable, there is no way by
which petitioner may be absolved from such liability except
upon a showing that the driver is not insolvent.
Even assuming that the right of the offended parties to
recover damages ex delicto had been waived, the award of
such damages by the trial court simply constitutes an error
of judgment. Hence, the award of damages ex delicto to the
offended parties is not void and is now final. The Court has
not only set aside a final disposition by declaring it void; it
has likewise ordered the reopening of a case already
dismissed with finality on the simplistic reasoning that
rules of procedure may be relaxed in order to promote
their objectives and assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action or
proceedings. There is no reason for doing so in this case
since, as already stated, all the parties herein had been
duly heard before the trial court rendered its decision.
Indeed, for what purpose is this case to be remanded to
the trial court? So that petitioner can present evidence in
its defense? But it has already done so. For the trial court
to redetermine the amount of damages? But even under
Arts. 2176 and 2180, the employer is liable for the same
amount the employee is liable, as the only difference
between its liability
636
636
Page 41 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM

ex delicto and its liability based on quasi delict is that the
former is subsidiary or secondary to that of the driver while
its liability for quasi delict is primary.
I do not think it is worth sacrificing legal rules to reach
the judgment the majority arrives at in this case. The
award of damages ex delicto in the decision of the trial
court is final, just as the dismissal of the case for quasi
delict is final. To ignore this fact is to set at naught the
policy behind the finality of judicial decisions and deprive
adjudication of stability.
Apparently realizing the cost to basic rules of its
decision today, the majority says that it is ordering the
determination of petitioners liability for quasi delict only
pro hac vice. Apparently, the majority is not willing to
apply its ruling in this case to similar situations should
they arise in the future. For that is what pro hac vice
meansfor
this turn; for this one particular occasion
11
only. But adjudication cannot be limited to the immediate
parties and declared to have no precedential value.
Adjudication, such as this, is like a restricted12 or oneway
railroad ticket, good for this day and train only.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent and vote to affirm
the decision of the Court of Appeals with the modification
that this case should be remanded to the trial court for the
sole purpose of determining the subsidiary civil liability of
petitioner in the event of insolvency of its driver, the
accused Romeo Dunca.
Petition granted, amended judgment and resolution set
aside.
Note.The liability of the registered owner of a public
service vehicle like petitioner Philtranco for damages
arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary,
direct and joint
_______________
11
12
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1212 (6th ed., 1990).

Compare CIVIL CODE, ART. 8: Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal
Page 42 of 43
8/8/15, 6:37 AM
system of the Philippines.

637
VOL. 329, APRIL 5, 2000
637
Cases Submitted For Decision Before Retired Judge

Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., RTC-Br. 53, Manila
and several or solidary with the driver. (Philtranco Service
Enterprises Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA 562 [1997])
o0o
Page 43 of 43

II. Quasi-Delict, B. No Double Recovery Rule

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II. Quasi-Delict, B. No Double Recovery Rule

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 170

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

LUIS JOSEPH, petitioner, vs. HON. CRISPIN V.

VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 23, 1989

Joseph vs. Bautista

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 170

violative of various rights at the same time, as when the act

APPEAL by certiorari to review the orders of the Court of

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 170

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

dismissal, both issued by respondent Judge Crispin V.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 170

Rollo, 5-7, 24-26.

VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 23, 1989

Joseph vs. Bautista

The following proceedings thereafter took place:

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 170

Philippines, Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio

Ibid., 6-9, 26-27; Petitions Brief, 2.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

oson and Jacinto Pagarigan on the Instant Case, alleging

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 170

We find the present recourse devoid of merit.

Racoma vs. Fortich, et al., 39 SCRA 520 (1971).

I Moran, 1979 Ed., 129-130.

VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 23, 1989

Joseph vs. Bautista

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 170

a recovery by the petitioner under one remedy necessarily

Op. cit., id., 132, 136.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

stantiated. There is nothing in the records to show, either

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 170

notes of the alleged pre-trial hearing, that there was indeed

Copyright 2015 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 158

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

No. L-32055. February 26, 1988.

REYNALDO BERMUDEZ, SR., and, ADONITA YABUT

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 158

precisely made a reservation to file an independent civil action in

APPEAL from the order of the Court of First Instance of

VOL. 158, FEBRUARY 26, 1988

Bermudez, Sr. vs. Melencio-Herrera

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 158

On July 28,1969, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

III. The last question of law is whether the suspension of the

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 158

against said defendants-appellees also sought to recover

We find the appeal meritorious.

We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial

VOL. 158, FEBRUARY 26, 1988

Bermudez, Sr. vs. Melencio-Herrera

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 158

'Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the

It is now settled that for an employer to be subsidiarily liable,

In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has

Appellant's Brief, pp. 20-21.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 158

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

action or reserves his right to institute it separately.

Article 2177 of the Civil Code, cited in Section 2, of Rule

The appellant precisely made a reservation to file an