Professional Documents
Culture Documents
DIVISION
[G.R.
No.
L-67888.
October
8,
1985.]
IMELDA
ONG,
ET
AL.,
petitioners,
vs.
ALFREDO
ONG,
ET
AL.,
respondents.
Faustino
Y.
Bautista
and
Fernando
M.
Mangubat
for
private
respondent.
D
E
C
I
S
I
O
N
RELOVA,
J
:
p
This
is
a
petition
for
review
on
certiorari
of
the
decision,
dated
June
20,
1984,
of
the
Intermediate
Appellate
Court,
in
AC-G.R.
No.
CV-01748,
affirming
the
judgment
of
the
Regional
Trial
Court
of
Makati,
Metro
Manila.
Petitioner
Imelda
Ong
assails
the
interpretation
given
by
respondent
Appellate
Court
to
the
questioned
Quitclaim
Deed.
Records
show
that
on
February
25,
1976
Imelda
Ong,
for
and
in
consideration
of
One
(P1.00)
Peso
and
other
valuable
considerations,
executed
in
favor
of
private
respondent
Sandra
Maruzzo,
then
a
minor,
a
Quitclaim
Deed
whereby
she
transferred,
released,
assigned
and
forever
quitclaimed
to
Sandra
Maruzzo,
her
heirs
and
assigns,
all
her
rights,
title,
interest
and
participation
in
the
ONE-HALF
(1/2)
undivided
portion
of
the
parcel
of
land,
particularly
described
as
follows:
"A
parcel
of
land
(Lot
10-B
of
the
subdivision
plan
(LRC)
Psd-157841,
being
a
portion
of
Lot
10,
Block
18,
Psd-13288,
LRC
(GLRC)
Record
No.
2029,
situated
in
the
Municipality
of
Makati,
Province
of
Rizal,
Island
of
Luzon
.
.
.
containing
an
area
of
ONE
HUNDRED
AND
TWENTY
FIVE
(125)
SQUARE
METERS,
more
or
less."
On
November
19,
1980,
Imelda
Ong
revoked
the
aforesaid
Deed
of
Quitclaim
and,
thereafter,
on
January
20,
1982
donated
the
whole
property
described
above
to
her
son,
Rex
Ong
Jimenez.
On
June
20,
1983,
Sandra
Maruzzo,
through
her
guardian
ad
litem
Alfredo
Ong,
filed
with
the
Regional
Trial
Court
of
Makati,
Metro
Manila
an
action
against
petitioners,
for
the
recovery
of
ownership/possession
and
nullification
of
the
Deed
of
Donation
over
the
portion
belonging
to
her
and
for
Accounting.
In
their
responsive
pleading,
petitioners
claimed
that
the
Quitclaim
Deed
is
null
and
void
inasmuch
as
it
is
equivalent
to
a
Deed
of
Donation,
acceptance
of
which
by
the
donee
is
necessary
to
give
it
validity.
Further,
it
is
averred
that
the
donee,
Sandra
Maruzzo,
being
a
minor,
had
no
legal
personality
and
therefore
incapable
of
accepting
the
donation.
prcd
Upon
admission
of
the
documents
involved,
the
parties
filed
their
responsive
memoranda
and
submitted
the
case
for
decision.
On
December
12,
1983,
the
trial
court
rendered
judgment
in
favor
of
respondent
Maruzzo
and
held
that
the
Quitclaim
Deed
is
equivalent
to
a
Deed
of
Sale
and,
hence,
there
was
a
valid
conveyance
in
favor
of
the
latter.
Petitioners
appealed
to
the
respondent
Intermediate
Appellate
Court.
They
reiterated
their
argument
below
and,
in
addition,
contended
that
the
One
(P1.00)
Peso
consideration
is
not
a
consideration
at
all
to
sustain
the
ruling
that
the
Deed
of
Quitclaim
is
equivalent
to
a
sale.
On
June
20,
1984,
respondent
Intermediate
Appellate
Court
promulgated
its
Decision
affirming
the
appealed
judgment
and
held
that
the
Quitclaim
Deed
is
a
conveyance
of
property
with
a
valid
cause
or
consideration;
that
the
consideration
is
the
One
(P1.00)
Peso
which
is
clearly
stated
in
the
deed
itself;
that
the
apparent
inadequacy
is
of
no
moment
since
it
is
the
usual
practice
in
deeds
of
conveyance
to
place
a
nominal
amount
although
there
is
a
more
valuable
consideration
given.
Not
satisfied
with
the
decision
of
the
respondent
Intermediate
Appellate
Court,
petitioners
came
to
Us
questioning
the
interpretation
given
by
the
former
to
this
particular
document.
On
March
15,
1985,
respondent
Sandra
Maruzzo,
through
her
guardian
ad
litem
Alfredo
Ong,
filed
an
Omnibus
Motion
informing
this
Court
that
she
has
reached
the
age
of
majority
as
evidenced
by
her
Birth
Certificate
and
she
prays
that
she
be
substituted
as
private
respondent
in
place
of
her
guardian
ad
litem
Alfredo
Ong.
On
April
15,
1985,
the
Court
issued
a
resolution
granting
the
same.
A
careful
perusal
of
the
subject
deed
reveals
that
the
conveyance
of
the
one-half
(1/2)
undivided
portion
of
the
above-
described
property
was
for
and
in
consideration
of
the
One
(P1.00)
Peso
and
the
other
valuable
considerations
(italics
supplied)
paid
by
private
respondent
Sandra
Maruzzo,
through
her
representative,
Alfredo
Ong,
to
petitioner
Imelda
Ong.
Stated
differently,
the
cause
or
consideration
is
not
the
One
(P1.00)
Peso
alone
but
also
the
other
valuable
considerations.
As
aptly
stated
by
the
Appellate
Court
".
.
.
although
the
cause
is
not
stated
in
the
contract
it
is
presumed
that
it
is
existing
unless
the
debtor
proves
the
contrary
(Article
1354
of
the
Civil
Code).
One
of
the
disputable
presumptions
is
that
there
is
a
sufficient
cause
of
the
contract
(Section
5,
(r),
Rule
131,
Rules
of
Court).
It
is
a
legal
presumption
of
sufficient
cause
or
consideration
supporting
a
contract
even
if
such
cause
is
not
stated
therein
(Article
1354,
New
Civil
Code
of
the
Philippines.)
This
presumption
cannot
be
overcome
by
a
simple
assertion
of
lack
of
consideration
especially
when
the
contract
itself
states
that
consideration
was
given,
and
the
same
has
been
reduced
into
a
public
instrument
with
all
due
formalities
and
solemnities.
To
overcome
the
presumption
of
consideration
the
alleged
lack
of
consideration
must
be
shown
by
preponderance
of
evidence
in
a
proper
action.
(Samanilla
vs.
Cajucom,
et
al.,
107
Phil.
432).
The
execution
of
a
deed
purporting
to
convey
ownership
of
a
realty
is
in
itself
prima
facie
evidence
of
the
existence
of
a
valuable
consideration,
the
party
alleging
lack
of
consideration
has
the
burden
of
proving
such
allegation.
(Caballero,
et
al.
vs.
Caballero,
et
al.,
(CA),
45
O.G.
2536).
Moreover,
even
granting
that
the
Quitclaim
deed
in
question
is
a
donation,
Article
741
of
the
Civil
Code
provides
that
the
requirement
of
the
acceptance
of
the
donation
in
favor
of
minor
by
parents
of
legal
representatives
applies
only
to
onerous
and
conditional
donations
where
the
donation
may
have
to
assume
certain
charges
or
burdens
(Article
726,
Civil
Code).
The
acceptance
by
a
legal
guardian
of
a
simple
or
pure
donation
does
not
seem
to
be
necessary
(Perez
vs.
Calingo,
CA-40
O.G.
53).
Thus,
Supreme
Court
ruled
in
Kapunan
vs.
Casilan
and
Court
of
Appeals,
109
Phil.
889)
that
the
donation
to
an
incapacitated
donee
does
not
need
the
acceptance
by
the
lawful
representative
if
said
donation
does
not
contain
any
condition.
In
simple
and
pure
donation,
the
formal
acceptance
is
not
important
for
the
donor
requires
no
right
to
be
protected
and
the
donee
neither
undertakes
to
do
anything
nor
assumes
any
obligation.
The
Quitclaim
now
in
question
does
not
impose
any
condition."
The
above
pronouncement
of
respondent
Appellate
Court
finds
support
in
the
ruling
of
this
Court
in
Morales
Development
Co.,
Inc.
vs.
CA,
27
SCRA
484,
which
states
that
"the
major
premise
thereof
is
based
upon
the
fact
that
the
consideration
stated
in
the
deeds
of
sale
in
favor
of
Reyes
and
the
Abellas
is
P1.00.
It
is
not
unusual,
however,
in
deeds
of
conveyance
adhering
to
the
Anglo-Saxon
practice
of
stating
that
the
consideration
given
is
the
sum
of
P1.00,
although
the
actual
consideration
may
have
been
much
more.
Moreover,
assuming
that
said
consideration
of
P1.00
is
suspicious,
this
circumstance,
alone,
does
not
necessarily
justify
the
inference
that
Reyes
and
the
Abellas
were
not
purchasers
in
good
faith
and
for
value.
Neither
does
this
inference
warrant
the
conclusion
that
the
sales
were
null
and
void
ab
initio.
Indeed,
bad
faith
and
inadequacy
of
the
monetary
consideration
do
not
render
a
conveyance
inexistent,
for
the
assignor's
liberality
may
be
sufficient
cause
for
a
valid
contract
(Article
1350,
Civil
Code),
whereas
fraud
or
bad
faith
may
render
either
rescissible
or
voidable,
although
valid
until
annulled,
a
contract
concerning
an
object
certain
entered
into
with
a
cause
and
with
the
consent
of
the
contracting
parties,
as
in
the
case
at
bar."
WHEREFORE,
the
appealed
decision
of
the
Intermediate
Appellate
Court
should
be,
as
it
is
hereby
AFFIRMED,
with
costs
against
herein
petitioners.
cdrep
SO
ORDERED.
Teehankee
(Chairman),
Melencio-Herrera,
Plana,
De
la
Fuente
and
Patajo,
JJ.,
concur.
Gutierrez,
Jr.,
J.,
concurs
in
the
result.
(Ong
v.
Ong,
G.R.
No.
L-67888,
[October
8,
1985],
223
PHIL
351-357)
|||
FIRST
DIVISION
[G.R.
No.
14823.
December
9,
1919.]
HILARIA
AGUILAR,
plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JUAN
RUBIATO,
defendant-appellant,
and
MANUEL
GONZALEZ
VILA,
defendant-appellee.
Francisco
A.
Delgado
for
plaintiff
and
appellant.
Abaya
&
Pamatmat
for
defendant
and
appellant.
No
appearance
for
appellee.
SYLLABUS
1.
CONTRACTS;
NULLITY;
FRAUD;
INADEQUACY
OF
PRICE.
Where
the
inadequacy
of
the
price
in
an
agreement
is
so
great
that
the
mind
revolts
at
it
and
is
such
as
a
reasonable
man
would
neither
directly
nor
indirectly
be
likely
to
consent
to,
a
strong
reason
exists
for
annuling
a
contract.
2.
ID.;
ID.;
ID.;
ID.
R,
the
owner
of
land
valued
at
P26,000,
was
induced
through
the
connivance
of
two
or
three
other
men
to
sign
the
second
page
of
a
power
of
attorney
in
favor
of
one
of
them,
G,
which
purported
to
authorize
G
to
sell
the
property
with
right
of
repurchase
for
a
sum
not
to
exceed
P1,000.
G
sold
the
property
to
A
for
P800
under
a
pacto
de
retro.
R
having
failed
to
pay
the
rent,
A
endeavors
to
obtain
possession
of
the
land.Held:
That
the
so-called
power
of
attorney
was
a
sham
document,
and
that
R
is
only
liable
for
the
loan
which
he
received.
3.
ID.;
USURY;
INTEREST.
As
interest
at
the
rate
of
60
per
cent
per
annum
is
usurious,
and
as
the
loan
thus
fails
to
name
a
lawful
rate
of
interest,
on
and
after
the
date
when
the
Usury
Law
became
effective,
a
defendant
would
be
liable
for
the
legal
rate
of
interest,
which
is
6
per
cent
per
annum.
4.
ID.;
ID.;
ID.
Under
similar
circumstances,
a
defendant
would
only
be
liable
for
interest
at
the
legal
rate
of
6
per
cent
per
annum
for
a
contract
made
prior
to
the
enactment
of
a
Usury
Law.
(See
art.
1255
of
the
Civil
Code.)
5.
PLEADING
AND
PRACTICE;
COMPLAINT;
DISCREPANCY
BETWEEN
DEMAND
AND
ALLEGATIONS.
"The
demand
in
the
complaint
is
no
part
of
the
statement
of
the
cause
of
action,
and
does
not
give
it
character.
The
facts
alleged
do
this,
and
the
plaintiff
is
entitled
to
so
much
relief
as
they
warrant."
(Sutherland
on
Code
Pleading,
Vol.
I,
sec.
186;
Code
of
Civil
Procedure,
sec.
126.)
D
E
C
I
S
I
O
N
MALCOLM,
J
:
p
As
certainly
as
may
be
ascertained,
the
facts
of
record
in
this
case
are
believed
to
be
the
following:
Juan
Rubiato
is
a
resident
of
the
municipality
of
Nagcarlan,
Province
of
Laguna,
of
somewhat
ordinary
intelligence
and
astuteness.
Early
in
the
year
1915,
he
was
the
owner
of
various
parcels
of
land
having
a
potential
value
of
approximately
P26,000.
Rubiato
was
desirous
of
obtaining
a
loan
of
not
to
exceed
P1,000.
Being
in
this
state
of
mind,
two
men,
Manuel
Gonzalez
Vila
a
procurador
judicial
and
one
Gregorio
Azucena,
and
possibly
another,
one
Marto
Encarnacion,
came
to
the
house
of
Rubiato
and
there
induced
him
to
sign
the
second
page
of
a
power
of
attorney
in
favor
of
Manuel
Gonzalez
Vila.
This
power
of
attorney,
introduced
in
evidence
as
Exhibit
A,
reads
as
follows:
"To
all
whom
it
may
concern:
"I,
Juan
Rubiato
e
Isles,
of
age,
married,
a
resident
of
the
barrio
of
Rizal,
municipality
of
Nagcarlan,
Province
of
Laguna,
Philippine
Islands,
do
hereby
freely
and
voluntarily
set
forth
the
following:
"First.
That
I
own
and
possess
the
full
and
absolute
dominion
over
eight
parcels
of
land
(planted
with
about
two
thousand
five
hundred
coconut
trees)
situated
in
the
aforesaid
barrio,
municipality
of
Nagcarlan,
Province
of
Laguna,
P.
I.;
that
the
description
and
boundaries
of
same
are
duly
described
in
the
possessory
title
(dated
the
15th
day
of
January,
1896)
(titulo
posesorio)
issued
to
me
by
the
former
Spanish
sovereignty;
that
same
is
inscribed
in
the
register
of
property
of
said
province
under
numbers
141,
144,
146,
148,
150,
152,
154
and
156;
that
these
facts
are
proven
by
the
certificate,
written
on
the
legal
official
papers
numbered
0.153.826,
0.460.498,
0.455.683
and
0.460.459
and
duly
authorized
by
registrar,
Sr.
Antonio
Roura,
.
.
.
"Second.
That
being
unable,
on
account
of
illness,
to
go
in
person
to
Manila,
I
hereby
declare
that
I
grant
to
Sr.
Manuel
Gonzalez
Vila,
a
resident
of
the
municipality
of
San
Pablo,
Province
of
Laguna,
P.
I.,
any
power
whatever
required
by
law
to
secure
in
said
city
a
loan
not
exceeding
one
thousand
pesos
(P1,000),
Philippine
currency;
that
he
shall
secure
same
in
my
name
and
representation;
that
he
may
secure
same
either
under
the
rate
of
interest
and
conditions
considered
most
convenient
and
beneficial
for
my
interests,
or
under
pacto
de
retro;
that
furthermore
he
has
ample
power
to
execute,
sign
and
ratify,
as
though
he
were
myself,
any
writing
necessary
for
the
mortgage
of
my
land
described
in
the
aforementioned
document;
and
that
he
holds
this
special
power
of
attorney
over
said
lands
to
the
end
that
same
may
be
used
as
a
guaranty
of
the
loan
to
be
secured."
.
.
.
By
reason
of
the
power
thus
given,
Manuel
Gonzalez
Vila
on
April
29,
1915,
formulated
the
document
introduced
in
evidence
as
Exhibit
C,
by
which
the
lands
of
Rubiato
were
sold
to
Hilaria
Aguilar
of
Manila,
for
the
sum
of
P800,
with
right
of
repurchase
within
one
year,
Rubiato
to
remain
in
possession
of
the
land
as
lessee
and
to
pay
P120
every
three
months
as
lease
rent.
Hilaria
Aguilar
never
saw
the
lands
in
question
and
did
not
know,
until
after
she
had
consulted
her
attorney,
exactly
what
her
rights
were.
Manuel
Gonzalez
Vila
received
from
Hilaria
Aguilar
the
P800
mentioned
in
Exhibit
C
as
the
selling
price
of
the
land.
Whether
this
money
was
then
passed
on
to
Juan
Rubiato
is
uncertain,
although
it
is
undeniable
that
Hilaria
Aguilar
has
never
been
paid
the
money
she
advanced.
The
one
year
mentioned
in
the
pacto
de
retro
having
expired
without
Hilaria
Aguilar
having
received
the
principal
nor
any
part
of
the
lease
rent,
she
began
action
against
Juan
Rubiato
and
Manuel
Gonzalez
Vila
to
consolidate
the
eight
parcels
of
land
in
her
name.
After
due
trial,
the
trial
judge,
the
Hon.
Manuel
Camus,
rendered
a
decision
in
which
he
recited
the
facts
somewhat,
although
not
exactly,
as
hereinbefore
set
forth.
The
court
found
that
the
power
of
attorney
only
authorized
Manuel
Gonzalez
Vila
to
obtain
a
loan
subject
to
a
mortgage,
and
not
to
sell
the
property.
The
judgment
handed
down
was
to
the
effect
that
the
plaintiff
Hilaria
Aguilar
recover
from
the
defendant
Juan
Rubiato
the
sum
of
P800
with
interest
at
the
rate
of
60
per
cent
per
annum
from
April
29,
1915
until
May
1,
1916,
and
with
interest
at
the
rate
of
12
per
cent
per
annum
from
May
1,
1916,
until
the
payment
of
the
principal,
with
the
costs
against
the
defendant.
Both
parties
appealed.
The
points
raised
by
the
plaintiff-appellant
going
as
they
do
to
the
facts
and
these
being
as
hereinbefore
stated,
no
lengthy
discussion
of
plaintiff's
five
assignments
of
error
need
be
indulged
in.
The
issue
is
not
precisely
relative
to
an
interpretation
of
the
power
of
attorney.
The
court
is
under
no
necessity
of
seizing
on
inexact
language
in
order
to
hold
that
the
document
authorized
a
mortgage
and
not
a
sale.
The
so-called
power
of
attorney
might
indeed
be
construed
as
authorizing
Vila
to
sell
the
property
of
Rubiato.
And
it
might
indeed
be
construed
under
a
conception
similar
to
that
of
the
trial
court's
as
a
loan
guaranteed
by
a
mortgage.
But
the
controlling
fact
is,
that
the
power
of
attorney
was
in
reality
no
power
of
attorney
but
a
sham
document.
In
addition
to
the
evidence,
there
is
one
very
cogent
reason
which
impels
us
to
the
conclusion
that
Rubiato
is
only
responsible
to
the
plaintiff
for
a
loan.
It
is
that
the
inadequacy
of
the
price
which
Vila
obtained
for
the
eight
parcels
of
land
belonging
to
Rubiato
is
so
great
that
the
mind
revolts
at
it.
It
is
an
agreement
which
a
reasonable
man
would
neither
directly
nor
indirectly
be
likely
to
enter
into
or
to
consent
to.
To
hold
that
the
power
of
attorney
signed
by
Rubiato
authorized
Vila
to
enter
into
the
instant
contract
of
sale
would
be
equivalent
to
holding,
if
we
may
be
permitted
to
use
the
language
of
Lord
Hardwicke,
that
"a
man
in
his
senses
and
not
under
delusion"
would
dispose
of
lands
worth
P26,000
for
P1,000,
and
would
pay
interest
thereon
at
the
rate
of
60
per
cent
per
annum.
(See
6
R.
C.
L.,
679,
841.)
The
members
of
this
t
after
most
particular
and
cautious
consideration,
having
in
view
all
the
facts
and
all
the
natural
tendencies
of
mankind,
consider
that
Rubiato
is
only
responsible
to
the
plaintiff
for
the
loan
of
P800.
The
points
advanced
by
defendant-appellant
likewise
necessitate
only
brief
consideration.
While
entertaining
some
doubt
as
to
the
justice
of
requiring
Rubiato
to
pay
back
the
amount
of
P800,
we
do
not
feel
authorized
in
disturbing
this
finding
of
the
trial
court.
It
may
well
be
that
Vila
and
his
partners,
acting
as
middlemen,
fabricated
the
document
which
Rubiato
signed,
secured
the
money
from
Hilaria
Aguilar,
and
then
pocketed
the
same.
Yet
as
minor
details
somewhat
corroborative
of
the
result
reached
by
the
trial
court,
are
the
undeniable
facts
that
Rubiato
admitted
his
desire
to
obtain
a
loan,
that
Hilaria
Aguilar
made
such
a
loan,
and
that
while
the
testimony
of
Vila
is
not
overly
truthful,
in
this
one
respect
we
do
have
his
forceful
statement
that
the
money
was
paid
over
to
Rubiato.
That
payment
of
the
sum
of
P800
was
not
explicitly
prayed
for
in
the
complaint,
does
not
deprive
the
court
of
power
to
render
judgment
for
this
amount,
because
it
is
a
rule
of
good
pleading
that
"the
demand
in
the
complaint
is
no
part
of
the
statement
of
the
cause
of
action,
and
does
not
give
it
character.
The
facts
alleged
do
this,
and
the
plaintiff
is
entitled
to
so
much
relief
as
they
warrant."
(Sutherland
on
Code
Pleading,
Vol.
I,
sec.
186;
Code
of
Civil
Procedure,
sec.
126.)
The
only
remaining
question
which
merits
resolution,
on
which
the
plaintiff
and
defendants
flatly
disagree,
relates
to
the
interest
which
should
be
allowed.
The
trial
court,
it
will
be
remembered,
permitted
the
plaintiff
to
recover
interest
at
the
rate
of
60
per
cent
per
annum
from
April
29,
1915,
when
the
pacto
de
retro
was
formulated,
until
May
1,
1916,
the
date
when
the
Usury
Law,
Act
No.
2655,
went
into
effect,
and
interest
at
the
rate
of
12
per
cent
per
annum
after
that
date.
It
is,
of
course,
true,
as
previously
decided
by
this
court
in
United
States
vs.
Constantino
Tan
Quingco
Chua
(
[1919],
39
Phil.,
552),
that
usury
laws,
such
as
that
in
force
in
the
Philippines,
are
to
be
construed
prospectively
and
not
retrospectively.
As
stated
in
the
decision
just
cited,
"The
reason
is,
that
if
the
contract
is
legal
at
its
inception,
it
cannot
be
rendered
illegal
by
any
subsequent
legislation,
for
this
would
be
tantamount
to
the
impairment
of
the
obligation
of
the
contract."
As
we
have
held
that
the
defendant
is
under
obligation
to
the
plaintiff
for
a
mere
loan,
as
this
loan
fails
to
name
a
lawful
rate
of
interest,
and
as
interest
at
the
rate
of
60
per
cent
per
annum
is
unquestionably
exorbitant
and
usurious
under
the
Usury
Law,
on
and
after
the
date
when
this
law
became
effective,
the
defendant
would
be
liable
for
the
legal
rate
of
interest,
which
is
6
per
cent
per
annum.
We
would
even
go
further
and
hold
that
he-would
be
liable
only
for
such
interest
prior
to
the
enactment
of
the
Usury
Law.
This
we
can
do
under
the
sanction
of
article
1255
of
the
Civil
Code
which
condemns
agreements
contrary
to
morals
and
public
policy.
Judgment
is
affirmed,
with
the
sole
modification
that
the
plaintiff
shall
only
recover
interest
at
the
rate
of
6
per
cent
per
annum
on
the
sum
of
P800
from
April
29,
1915
until
paid,
without
special
finding
as
to
costs
in
this
instance.
So
ordered.
Arellano,
C.
J.,
Torres,
Araullo,
Street
and
Avancea,
JJ.,
concur.
|||
(Aguilar
v.
Rubiato,
G.R.
No.
14823,
[December
9,
1919],
40
PHIL
570-575)