CRIM LAW DIGESTS

1. People vs. Genosa 419 SCRA 537

2. Balunueco vs. People 401 SCRA 76
3. Intesestate Estate of Gonzales vda. De Carungcong v. People G.R. no 181409
4. People vs. Eduarte 187 SCRA 291
5. People vs. Dijan 383 SCRA 15
6. People vs. Toring et al., 191 SCRA 38
7. Ty vs. People 439 SCRA 220
8. People vs. Ricohermoso 56 SCRA 431
9. Ambil Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan 653 scra 576
10. Mamangun vs. People G.R. no 149152
11. Baxinela vs. People 485 SCRA 331

PEOPLE VS. GENOSA

G.R. No. 135981- January 15, 2004
Story: The Battered Woman Syndrome

FACTS:
On November 15, 1995 Marivic Genosa attacked and wounded his husband, which
ultimately led to his death. The appellant alleged that she did not provoke her husband
when she got home that night; it was her husband who began the provocation. Marivic
said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure
she would deliver her baby safely.
In fact, the Appellant had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was
suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on
December 1, 1995.

The Appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at
least five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The
Appellant said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night
was because he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos.
After being interviewed by specialists, Marivic has been shown to be suffering from
Battered Woman Syndrome. The appellant with a plea of self defense admitted the
killing of her husband, she was then found guilty of Parricide, with the aggravating
circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.
ISSUE/S:
1. Can Marivic Genosa be granted the justifying circumstance of self-defense and;
2. Can she be held liable for the aggravating circumstance of treachery?

RULING:
1. NO. The accused cannot invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense even
in the existence of Battered woman syndrome, which the appellant has been
shown to be suffering in the relationship. It does not in itself establish the legal
right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered
in the context of self-defense.
In the present case, however, according to the testimony of the appellant there
was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of the husband
and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his
violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During that time, he
apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence
of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that
presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

Without continuous aggression there can be no self-defense. And

absence of aggression does not warrant complete or incomplete selfdefense.
2. NO. There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to
oneself arising from the defense that the offended party might make.
The circumstances must be shown as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot
be deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the
appreciation of evidence. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a
killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated
as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been
forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.
In the present case, however it was not conclusively shown, that the appellant
intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her husband
without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the
contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at
about the same moment when she decided to kill her spouse. In the absence of
any convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the
method by which she committed the crime in order to ensure its execution,
the doubt should be resolved in her favor.

BALUNUECO VS. PEOPLE

401 SCRA 76 - April 9, 2003

FACTS:
On appeal by certiorari is the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with
modifications of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 68,
convicting accused RICARDO BALUNUECO of homicide for the death of Senando
Iguico and frustrated homicide for injuries inflicted upon his wife Amelia Iguico.
Of the five (5) original accused, [3] only petitioner Ricardo, accused Reynaldo, Juanito,
all surnamed Balunueco, and Armando Flores were indicted in two (2) Informations, the
first for homicide[4] and the second for frustrated homicide.[5] Again, of the four (4)
indictees, only Ricardo and Reynaldo were brought to the jurisdiction of the court a quo,
while Juanito and Armando have remained at large. Accused Reynaldo died on 17
November 1986. Accordingly, as against him, the criminal cases were dismissed.
Thus, only the criminal cases against petitioner Ricardo Balunueco are subject of this
appeal.
As principal witness for the prosecution, Amelia Iguico narrated that on 2 May 1982 at
around 6:00 oclock in the evening she was coddling her youngest child in front of her
house at Bagong Tanyag, Taguig, when she saw accused Reynaldo, his father Juanito
and brothers Ricardo and Ramon, all surnamed Balunueco, and one Armando Flores
chasing her brother-in-law Servando Iguico. With the five (5) individuals in hot pursuit,
Servando scampered into the safety of Amelias house.
Meanwhile, according to private complainant Amelia, her husband Senando, who was
then cooking supper, went out of the house fully unaware of the commotion going on
outside. Upon seeing Senando, Reynaldo turned his attention on him and gave chase.
Senando instinctively fled towards the fields but he was met by Armando who hit him
with a stone, causing Senando to feel dizzy. Reynaldo, Ricardo, and Armando cornered
their quarry near a canal and ganged up on him. Armando placed a can on top of
Senandos head and Ricardo repeatedly struck Senando with an ax on the head,
shoulder, and hand. At one point, Ricardo lost his hold on the ax, but somebody tossed
him a bolo and then he continued hacking the victim who fell on his knees. To shield

him from further violence, Amelia put her arms around her husband but it was not
enough to detract Ricardo from his murderous frenzy. Amelia was also hit on the leg.

The Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of accused Ricardo, giving full faith to the
direct and positive testimony of Amelia Iguico who pointed to him as the one who initially
axed her husband Senando on the head, shoulder and hand. While the appellate court
upheld the conviction of Ricardo of homicide for the death of Senando Iguico, it however
ruled that his conviction for the wounding of Amelia Iguico, although likewise upheld,
should be for attempted homicide only. On the wounding of Amelia, the appellate court
had this to say:
For while intent to kill was proven, Amelias hack wound in her left leg was not proven
to be fatal or that it could have produced her death had there been no timely medical
attention provided her, hence, the stage of execution of the felony committed would only
be attempted.
ISSUE/S:
1. Can the petitioner be granted the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives?
2. On the injuries sustained by Amelia, is an attempted felony duly established?

RULING:
1. NO. In the case at bar, petitioner Ricardo utterly failed to adduce sufficient proof
of the existence of a positively strong act of real aggression on the part of the
deceased Senando. With the exception of his self-serving allegations, there is
nothing on record that would justify his killing of Senando.

First, Ricardos theory that when he reached the crime scene he found Senando
repeatedly hacking his brother Reynaldo who thereafter retaliated by smashing
an axe on the victims head is implausible in light of the seriousness of the
wounds sustained by the deceased as compared to the minor injuries inflicted
upon petitioner and his two (2) brothers. The fact that three (3) of the
assailants suffered non-fatal injuries bolsters the fact that Senando tried
vainly to ward off the assaults of his assailants.
Second, Ricardo failed to present himself to the authorities. He may have
accompanied the injured Reynaldo to the hospital after the encounter but still he
failed to present himself to the authorities and report the matter to them. The
natural impulse of any person who has killed someone in defense of his
person or relative is to bring himself to the authorities and try to dispel any
suspicion of guilt that the authorities might have against him. This fact
assumes a more special significance considering that his co-accused, Juanito
and Armando, have remained at large.
Third, petitioner had a rather erratic recollection of people and events. He vividly
remembered how Reynaldo was injured by Senando but conveniently failed to
recall the events leading to the fatal wounding of the deceased. At another point,
he testified that Reynaldo axed Senando but later retracted his statement by
declaring that it was in fact Senando who hacked Reynaldo. We observe that
the killing occurred within or near the premises of the deceased. This
proves per adventure the falsity of petitioners claim that it was Senando,
rather than he and his kin, who had initiated the unlawful aggression.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG V. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 181409 February 11, 2010

FACTS:

William Sato, the son-in-law of Manolita Carungcong (who was already 79 years old and
blind). induced the latter to sign and thumbmark an SPA in favor of his daughter. Wendy.
The old woman believed that the SPA involved only her taxes, while in fact, it authorized
Wendy, to sell Manolitas properties.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not William should be exempt from criminal liability for reason of his
relationship to Manolita.

RULING:
NO. The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to
the felonies of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the
State condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of theft, swindling
and malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the
offender for the said crimes but leaves the private offended party with the option to hold
the offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein.
The plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies
exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not
apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another
crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through falsification.

Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold the
offender criminally liable for the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief
and considers the violation of the juridical right to property committed by the offender
against certain family members as a private matter and therefore subject only to civil
liability. The waiver does not apply when the violation of the right to property is achieved
through (and therefore inseparably intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in the
integrity and presumed authenticity of public documents. For, in the latter instance, what
is involved is no longer simply the property right of a family relation but a paramount
public interest.

PEOPLE VS. EDUARTE

187 SCRA 291 1990

FACTS:
The evidence of prosecution establishes that Fredeswindo Eduarte, suspecting that his
wife was having an illicit affair with another man, got a scissor. Upon seeing his
intention, Roberto (Fredeswindos brother -in-law) tried to pacify him. However, instead
of being appeased, Fredeswindo thrusted the scissor toRoberto. Thereafter, Roberto
drove his jeep to seek the help of policemen. On the way back, he saw Fredeswindo

lying flat on the road so he stopped and alighted to help. Just when Roberto was in the
act of extending assistance, Florentino Eduarte, Fredeswindos brother, shot him, which
caused his death. Not long after, the police authorities arrived and the place and looked
for Florentino, but failed to locate him.
On the other hand, the defense, in its counter-statement of facts, relates that when
Fredeswindo confronted his wife, Roberto butted in and berated him which resulted to
an exchange of words leading to altercation. Fredeswindo defended himself by grasping
a scissor from his back and thrusting it against his assailant. When Robertos wife saw
this, she sought the help of Robertos three brothersand they ganged up on
Fredeswindo. Julie Eduarte, Fredewindos brother, saw this and thereafter sought the
help of their other brother, Florentino Eduarte. When Florentino arrived at the place of
incident, he saw Roberto clubbing his brother who was lying, face downward and his
shirt soaked with blood.
The accused-appellant maintains that he is innocent of the crime as charged invoking
the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives. Instead of making an assignment of
errors, the accused-appellant states that the trial court was confronted with two
conflicting versions, one asserting that Roberto Trinidad was shot while assisting
Fredeswindo Eduarte and the other stating that Roberto was shot while clubbing
Fredeswindo. In both cases, the appellant states that defense of relative should be
appreciated.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the accused-appellant can validly invoke the justifying
circumstance of defense of relatives?
RULING:
NO. We find no merit in the claim that the shooting of Roberto was done in defense of a
relative. For this justifying circumstance to prosper, the evidence adduced must be
persuasive. Although it is true that the accused-appellant took no part in the provocation
that led to the killing incident, his testimony that there was unlawful aggression on the
part of Roberto was self-serving and uncorroborated. Hence, for lack of a clear unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim Roberto and of the reasonable necessity of the

means employed by the accused-appellant, the justifying circumstance of defense of

relative cannot be availed of. Accused-appellant Florentino Eduarte is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE without any aggravating or
mitigating circumstance.

PEOPLE VS. DIJAN

G.R. NO. 142682 - JUNE 5, 2002
FACTS:
Accused Crispulo Dijan y Macajiya was indicted on 15 April 1998, along with Romualdo
Paglinawan and Oliver Lizardo, for the crime of murder before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 272, of Marikina. On the evening of 11 April 1998, about ten oclock, Roderick
Silvestre and Alvaro Hilario were at a store located around the corner of Paraiso and
Sumulong Streets in Parang, Marikina City, to buy some cigarettes when they saw the
group of Crispulo Dijan, Romualdo Paglinawan and Oliver Lizardo, passing by the store.
The two groups came to an encounter when Romualdo Paglinawan suddenly
confronted Alvaro Hilario for purportedly giving him a bad stare. Silvestre apologized
to the group and, offering them some cigarettes, explained that it was the natural way
Hilario gazed at people. Dijan, Paglinawan and Lizardo then left the place while
Silvestre and Hilario who lived in the same house proceeded home. While Silvestre and
Hilario were walking, the three accused, who apparently were waiting for the duo,
suddenly ganged up on, and took turns in stabbing, Hilario. At that point, Hilario, who
was walking slightly ahead of Silvestre, cried out and told the latter to flee. Silvestre ran
away until he was able to cling to a passing passenger jeepney.
Responding policemen, soon informed of the stabbing incident through radio
communication, proceeded to the crime scene and there found the lifeless body of
Hilario sprawled on the ground. After receiving a report on the identity and the
whereabouts of the assailants, the policemen proceeded to a place about 200 meters
away from the site of the stabbing incident. Barangay tanods assisted the police in
arresting the suspected assailants. The following day, 12 April 1998, Dr. Ma. Cristina B.

Freyra, Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP), conducted an

autopsy on the victims cadaver. Hilario was found to have sustained several stab
wounds, punctured and incised wounds, and abrasion in various parts of the body which
caused his death. The medico-legal officer concluded that the wounds could have been
inflicted by two assailants with the use of two single-bladed weapons and an icepick.
ISSUE/S:
1. Can the accused validly invoked justifying circumstance of defense of a
stranger?
2. Is a qualifying circumstance of treachery present in the case at bar?
RULING:
1. NO. A party who invokes the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger
has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the exculpatory
cause that can save him from conviction. In order to successfully put up this
defense an accused must show (1) the existence of unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; (2) the reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel it; and (3) that the accused has not been induced by revenge,
resentment, or other evil motive. The unlawful aggression must be a continuing
circumstance or must have been existing at the time the defense is made. Once
unlawful aggression is found to have ceased, the one making the defense of a
stranger would likewise cease to have any justification for killing, or even just
wounding, the former aggressor.
From the defense account, it would appear that Hilario was already disarmed and
the unlawful aggression by Hilario (if indeed he was the aggressor) to have by
then been abated, when accused-appellant still delivered the fatal thrusts on the
victim.
The number of wounds sustained by the victim would itself likewise negate
accused-appellants claim of defense of a stranger. The autopsy conducted on
the corpse would show that the deceased sustained fourteen injuries consisting

of nine stab wounds, three punctured wounds, an incised wound and an

abrasion. Certainly, the nature and number of wounds inflicted by an accused on
the victim should be significant indicia in determining the plausibility of the
defense plea.
2. NO. The Court, however, finds the evidence of the prosecution to be wanting in
respect to the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The essence of treachery is
the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any real chance to defense himself and thereby ensuring
its commission with no risk to the aggressor. The conditions that must concur in
order that treachery may be appreciated are: (a) the employment of means of
execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and (b) that the means of execution are deliberately and consciously
adopted. These elements must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself and
cannot be deduced from conjecture. Here, it was not satisfactorily established
that the victim was unarmed at the time of the stabbing incident. On the contrary,
the stab wound on the person of Romualdo Paglinawan, a companion and coaccused of herein appellant, could indicate that the victim might have also been
armed. Neither was it made clear that there was no provocation on the part of
the victim.
Accused-appellant can thus only be convicted of the crime of homicide, the penalty for
which, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion temporal that, absent
any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, shall be imposed in its medium period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant should thus be penalized
by an indeterminate sentence of anywhere within the range of prision mayor, or from six
years and one day to 12 years, by way of minimum, and anywhere within the range of
reclusion temporal in its medium period of from fourteen years, eight months and one
day to seventeen years and four months, by way of maximum.

PEOPLE VS. TORING, ET AL

191 SCRA 38 - JULY 26, 1999

FACTS:
A benefit dance was held in one sitio in Lapu lapu City for the last canvassing of votes
for the candidates for princesses, attended by the entire family of one of the candidates.
Also present were members of the kwaknit gang, headed by Toring, noted for their birdlike way of dancing and their propensity for drunkenness and provoking trouble.
Samuel, the father of the declared winner, while answering the call of nature, was
approached by Toring and two others and was stabbed from behind by Toring using a
knife handed to him by a companion. Samuel died of stab wound he sustained on the
right side of his abdomen.

An information for MURDER was filed against Toring. The lower court rendered a
decision discrediting Toring's claim that the killing of Samuel was justified because it
was done in defense of a stranger. While Toring testified that Samuel was aiming his
shotgun at the chest of Ely Amyon (Amion), prosecution witness Joel Escobia claimed
that he was at the receiving end of Samuel's thrusts with the butt of his shotgun. To the
court, such discrepancy is fatal to the defense because in appreciating the justifying
circumstance of defense of a stranger, the court must know "with definiteness the
identity of the stranger defended by the accused.
Upon appeal, Toring seeks his exoneration by contending that his assault on Samuel
was justified because he acted in defense of his first cousin, Joel Escobia is the first
cousin of Toring their fathers being brothers, although no explanation appears on record
why they have different surnames. At any rate, this allegation on relationship was not
rebutted by the prosecution. Escobia attested that as he was about to dance with a girl,
Samuel stopped him, pointed his shotgun at him, took a bullet from his jacket pocket,
showed it to Escobia. Samuel pointed the shotgun at his chin and told him to eat the
bullet.
ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the accused can validly invoke the justifying circumstance of
defense of relative on the act of Toring in stabbing Samuel.
RULING:
1. NO. SC ruled that there was no reason to doubt Joel Escobia's assertion of
Samuel's unlawful aggression and that prosecution failed to prove that Joel
testified to favor Toring. However, the presence of unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim and the lack of proof of provocation on the part of Toring
notwithstanding, full credence cannot be given, to Toring's claim of defense of a
relative.

Toring himself admitted in court that in 1979, he was shot with a .22 caliber
revolver by Edgar Augusto, Samuel's brother. It cannot be said, therefore, that in
attacking Samuel, Toring was impelled by pure compassion or beneficence or the
lawful desire to avenge the immediate wrong inflicted on his cousin. Rather, he
was motivated by revenge, resentment or evil motive because of a "running feud"
between the Augusto and the Toring brothers. Indeed, vendetta appears to have
driven both camps to commit unlawful acts against each other.

TY VS. PEOPLE
439 SCRA 220 - SEPTEMBER 27, 2004

FACTS:
Tys mother was confined in Manila Doctor's Hospital to which a medical bill amounting
to 600,000 pesos was made to be paid to TY, after signing a contract of responsibility
with the hospital. Ty, issued 7 checks to cover the said expenses, all of which were
dishonored for being drawn against a closed a account. Manila Doctors Hospital then
instituted criminal actions against Ty for violation of BP22.
In her defense she alleged that she issued the checks involuntarily because her mother
threatened to commit suicide due to the inhumane treatment she allegedly suffered

while confined in the hospital. She further claimed that no consideration was obtained
by her because all the checks were made as payment to the medical bills.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not valuable consideration exists.

RULING:
Under Section 24 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, it is presumed that valuable
consideration exist upon the issuance of a check in the absence of evidence to the
contrary. Valuable consideration is any benefit, interest or profit accruing to the party.
The use of the hospital facilities and services may be deemed as such.

PEOPLE VS. RICOHERMOSO

56 SCRA 431 - MARCH 29, 1974
Story: Avoiding Evil or Greater Injury
FACTS:
Geminiano de Leon, together with his common-law wife, son Marianito de Leon and one
Rizal Rosales, chanced upon Pio Ricohermoso. Owning a parcel of land, which
Ricohermoso cultivated as kaingin, Geminiano asked about his share of palay harvest
and added that she should be allowed to taste the palay harvested from his land.
Ricohermoso said Geminiano could collect the palay anytime.
Upon returning from his trip to Barrio Bagobasin, Geminiano dropped by Ricohermosos
house and asked him about the palay, to which the latter answered defiantly that he will
not give him the palay, whatever happens. Geminiano remonstrated and that point (as if
by prearrangement), Ricohermoso unsheathed his bolo, while his father-in-law Severo
Padernal got an axe, and attacked Geminiano. At the same time and place,
Ricohermosos brother-in-law Juan Padernal suddenly embraced Marianito. They
grappled and rolled down the hill, at which point Marianito passed out. When he
regained consciousness, he discovered that the rifle he carried beforehand was gone
and that his father was mortally wounded.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not appellant Juan Padernal can invoke the justifying circumstance of
avoidance of a greater evil or injury.
RULING:
NO. Juan Padernals reliance on the justifying circumstance is erroneous because his
act in preventing Marianito from shooting Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal, the
aggressors in this case, was designed to insure the killing of Geminiano de Leon
without any risk to the assailants and not an act to prevent infliction of greater evil or
injury. His intention was to forestall any interference in the assault.
Treachery was also appreciated in the case. The trial court convicted the appellants with
lesiones leves, from an attempted murder charge with respect to Marianito de Leon.
Judgment as to Juan Padernal affirmed.
(Note: Severo Padernal withdrew his appeal, thus, in effect, accepted the prosecutions
version of the case and trial courts finding of guilt.)
The defendants shifted the responsibility of killing in their version of the case.

AMBIL JR. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

653 SCRA 576 JULY 6, 2011
FACTS:
Eastern Samar Governor Ruperto Ambil and Provincial warden Alexandrino Apelado
were found guilty before the Sandiganbayan for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act after Governor
Ambil, conspiring with Apelado, ordered the release of then criminally-charged and
detained mayor Francisco Adalim and had the latter transferred from the provincial jail
to the the governors residence.
ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over a suit where one of the 2
accused has a Salary Grade classified to be cognizable before the lower courts.

2. Whether or not the transfer of the detainee, who was a mayor, by the governor
was a violation in contemplation of Sec3(e) of RA 3019 in relation to sec2(b) of
the same act.
RULING:
1. The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the suit where one of the 2 accused
held a position with a classification of Salary Grade 27. Only when none of the
numerous accused occupies a position with a salary grade 27 or higher can
exclusive jurisdiction befall in the lower courts. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over Ambil as provincial governor and so as with Apelado for being a co-principal
in the perpetration of the offense although he had a salary grade of 22.

2. The power of control and supervision granted to by the Local Government Code
and Administrative Code of 1917 does not include nor permit the usurpation of
power duly vested before the courts. Facts showed that transfer by Ambil of
Adalim was attended by evident bias and bad faith. Section 3(e) still applies to
the case at hand even if the act was not one relative to the granting of licenses
and concessions. The provision was meant to include officers with such duty to
the list already enumerated therein and not necessarily to provide exclusivity.
Furthermore, the fact that Andalim, as the recipient of the benefit, was a public
officer, did not preclude application. The act employs the phrase private party,
which is more comprehensive in scope to mean either a private person or a
public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest. Thus the
verdict by the Sandiganbayan, finding the accused guilty of violating RA 3019
was proper.

MAMANGUN VS. PEOPLE

G.R. NO.149152 FEBRUARY 2, 2007

Story: Fulfillment of Duty/Lawful Exercise of Right

FACTS:
Policeman (PO2) Rufino Mamangun was responding to a robbery-holdup call, with his
fellow police officers, at Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan. A certain Liberty
Contreras was heard shouting, which prompted residents to respond and chase the
suspect, who entered the yard and proceeded to the rooftop of Antonio Abacan.
Mamangun, with PO2 Diaz and Cruz, each armed with a drawn handgun, searched the
rooftop and saw a man who they thought was the robbery suspect. Mamangun, who
was ahead of the group, fired his gun once and hit the man, who turned out to be Gener
Contreras (not the suspect) Contreras died of the gunshot wound.

According to the lone witness Crisanto Ayson, he accompanied the policemen to the
lighted rooftop. He was beside Mamangun when he (Ayson) recognized the deceased.
According to Ayson, Mamangun pointed his gun at the man, who instantly exclaimed
Hindi ako, hindi ako! to which Mamangun replied, Anong hindi ako? and shot him.

The defense rejects this testimony, alleging that they were the only ones at the dark
rooftop when Mamangun noticed a crouching man who suddenly continued to run.
Mamangun shouted Pulis, tigil! whereupon the person stopped and raised a steel pipe
towards Mamanguns head. This prompted Mamangun to shoot the person. The three
police claim that Contreras only said Hindi ako, hindi ako only when they approached
him. Mamangun then asked Why did you go to the rooftop? You know there are
policemen here. Mamangun reported the incident to the desk officer who directed

investigator Hernando Banez to investigate the incident. Banez later on found a steel
pipe on the roof.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the death of the victim was the necessary consequence of the
petitioners fulfillment of his duty.
RULING:
No. The Court denies the instant petition and affirms Sandiganbayans decision after
finding the petitioners testimony to be nothing but a concocted story designed to evade
criminal liability. Per Sandiganbayans observations, the defense was self-serving for the
accused and biased with respect to his co-policemen-witnesses because:
1. After supposed introductions and forewarnings uttered allegedly by Mamangun, it
is contrary to human experience for a man (who is not the suspect) to attack one
of three policemen with drawn guns
2. Mamanguns admission that he did not ask the victim Why did you try to hit me,
if you are not the one? clearly belies their claim
3. The location of the entry of bullet belies their claim because it appears that the
victim instinctively shielded himself instead.
Additionally, petitioners pretense that Contreras struck him was not initially reported to
the desk and was only conveniently remembered when the investigator found a pipe in
the crime scene.
Acts in the fulfillment of duty and self-defense does not completely justify the petitioners
firing the fatal gunshot. The element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim was
absent, which leads to the failure of the petitioners plea. Also, there can only be
incomplete justification (a privileged mitigating circumstance) in the absence of a
necessary justifying circumstance the injury was caused by necessary consequence of
due performance of duty.

BAXINELA VS. PEOPLE

485 SCRA 331 MARCH 24, 2006
FACTS:
At around 12:00 a.m. to 12:30 a.m. there was a minor altercation between the deceased
Sgt. Lajo and another customer at the pub but eventually the two were able to patch
things up. Lajo was then on his way out when Baxinela followed Lajo with a gun already
drawn out. Then, from behind, Baxinela held Lajos left arm and said "Ano ka hay?
Mam-an may baril ka?"12 He then heard Lajo respond "I am a MIG, Pare" after that
Alvarez heard an explosion coming from Baxinelas gun. Baxinela then got a gun from
Lajos waist and handed it over to Regimen. Afterwards Baxinela held both of Lajos
arms, who was still standing, and pushed him against the wall and repeated his
question. Lajo answered "Why did you shoot me? I am also a military." At this point Lajo
got out his wallet and gave it to Baxinela. Baxinela opened the wallet and looked at an
ID. Afterwards Baxinela and Regimen just left and did nothing to aid Lajo.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Baxinela acted in lawful performance of official duty.
RULING:
In order to avail of this justifying circumstance it must be shown that: 1) the accused
acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and 2) the
injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due
performance of duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office.

While the first condition is present, the second is clearly lacking. Baxinelas duty was
to investigate the reason why Lajo had a gun tucked behind his waist in a public place.
This was what Baxinela was doing when he confronted Lajo at the entrance, but
perhaps through anxiety, edginess or the desire to take no chances, Baxinela exceeded
his duty by firing upon Lajo who was not at all resisting. The shooting of Lajo cannot be
considered due performance of a duty if at that time Lajo posed no serious threat or
harm to Baxinela or to the civilians in the pub.