PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION vs.

COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992
FACTS:
Carlitos Bautista, an enrolled third year commerce student of Philippine
School of Business Administration (PSBA), died due to a stabbing incident happened
on the 2nd floor premises of the latter by assailants who were not members of the
schools academic community but were elements from outside the school. The
parents of the deceased filed a suit against the school. PSBA sought to have the suit
dismissed, alleging that they are beyond the ambit of the complaint under Art. 2176
and Art.2180 of the Civil Code, known as Quasi-delicts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PSBA is liable under the rule of quasi- delicts of the Civil
Code?
RULING:
NO. But they could be held liable for breach of contractual obligation and for
tort, in conjunction with Art. 21 of the Civil Code, even if there is a contractual
obligation.
The law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or
inflicted by pupils or students of he educational institution sought to be held liable
for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material
situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of
Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made
liable.
ELCANO vs. HILL
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
FACTS:
Respondent Reginald Hill killed the son of the plaintiffs named Agapito Elcano. A
criminal complaint was instituted against him but he was acquitted on the ground
that his act was not criminal, because of lack of intent to kill, couple with mistake.
Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a complaint for recovery of damages against defendant
Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the
defendant Marvin Hill, with who he was living and getting subsistence, for the same
killing. A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendants.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the present civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of
Reginald in the criminal case?

Whether or not Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code may be
applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the
occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
subsistence from his father, was already legally married?
RULING:
NO. The present civil action for damages is not barred by the acquittal of
Reginald in the criminal case. Firstly, there is a distinction as regards the proof
required in acriminal case and a civil case. To find the accused guilty in a criminal
case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. The
first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further
clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a
source of obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs.
Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly
dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa
criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence
of our own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not only under the
Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Furthermore, a civil case for damages on
the basis of quasi-delict does is independently instituted from acriminal act. As such
the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for
quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
YES. While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation
of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes
place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant
to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute.
Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate
parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his
property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or
encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He
can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one
is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are

responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although
married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of
the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to
and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint
and solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is
that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to
prevent them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear
implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may
not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such
emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act
that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.)
And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the
marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that
the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money
and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor
married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
VERMEN REALTY DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No.
FACTS: Under the conditions of the so-called Offsetting Agreement, Vermen
Realty (the first party in the contract) and Seneca Hardware (the second party) were
under a reciprocal obligation. Seneca Hardware shall deliver toVermen Realty
construction materials worth P552,000.00. Vermen Realty's obligation under the
agreement is threefold: he shall pay Seneca Hardware P276,000.00 in cash; he shall
deliver possession of units 601 and 602, Phase I, Vermen Pines Condominiums (with
total value of P276,000.00) to Seneca Hardware; upon completion of Vermen Pines
Condominiums Phase II, Seneca Hardware shall be given option to transfer to similar
units therein.
As found by the appellate court and admitted by both parties, Seneca
Hardware had paid Vermen Realty the amount of P110,151.75, and at the same
time delivered construction materials worth P219,727.00. Pending completion of
Phase II of the Vermen Pines Condominiums, Vermen Realty delivered to
SenecaHardware units 601 and 602 at Phase I of the VermenPines Condominiums.
In 1982, the VermenRealty repossessed unit 602. As a consequence of the
repossession, the officers of the Seneca Hardwarecorporation had to rent another
unit for their use when they went to Baguio on April, 1982.
In its reply the Vermen Realty corporation averred that Room 602 was leased
to another tenant becauseSeneca Hardware corporation had not paid anything for

purchase of the condominium unit. Vermen Realty corporation demanded payment

of P27,848.25 representing the balance of the purchase price of Room601.
On June 21, 1985, Seneca Hardware filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City(Branch 92) for rescission of the Offsetting Agreement with
damages. In said complaint, SenecaHardware alleged that Vermen Realty Vermen
RealtyCorporation had stopped issuing purchase orders ofconstruction materials
after April, 1982, without valid reason, thus resulting in the stoppage of deliveries
ofconstruction materials on its (Seneca Hardware) part, in violation of the Offsetting
Agreement. After conducting hearings, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing
the complaint and ordering the plaintiff (Seneca Hardware in this petition) to pay
defendant (Vermen Realty in this petition) on its counterclaim in the amount of
P27,848.25 representing the balance due on the purchase price of condominium
unit 601.
On appeal, respondent court reversed the trial court's decision as adverted to
above.
ISSUE: WON there is breach that would cause for the rescission of the contract.
HELD. YES. Article 1191 of the Civil Code provides the remedy of rescission in
(more appropriately, the term is "resolution") in case of reciprocal obligations,
where one of the obligors fails to comply with that is incumbent upon him.
The general rule is that rescission of a contract will not be permitted for a
slight or causal breach, but only for such substantial and fundamental
breach as would defeat the very object of the parties in executing the
agreement. The question of whether a breach of contract is substantial
depends upon the attendant circumstances (Universal Food Corp. vs.
Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 1, [1970]).
The impossibility of fulfillment of the obligation on the part of petitioner
necessitates resolution of the contract for indeed, the non-fulfillment of
the obligation aforementioned constitutes substantial breach of the
Offsetting Agreement.The possibility of exercising the option of whether or not to
transfer to condominium units in Phase II was one of the factors which were
considered by private respondent when it entered into the agreement. Since the
construction of the Vermen Pines Condominium Phase II has stopped, petitioner
would be in no position to perform its obligation to give private respondent the
option to transfer to Phase II. It would be the height of injustice to make private
respondent wait for something that may never come.
DE GUIA VS MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD
FACTS: Manuel De Guia a physician, rode a train owned by MERALCO. 30 meters
from the point of origin, the small wheels of therear truck left the track. The train

was derailed and strucka concrete post. De Guia was thrown against the door
withsome violence receiving injuries.The trial court found that the motorman of the
derailed car was negligent in having maintained too rapid a speed. It is insisted for
the defendant company that the derailment was due to the presence of a stone,
somewhat larger than a goose egg, which had become accidentally lodged between
the rails at the juncture of the switch and which was unobserved by the motorman.
In this view the derailment of the car is supposed to be due to casus fortuitos and
not chargeable to the negligence of the motorman.
ISSUE: WON Defendant Company is liable to the negligence of his employee
motorman.
HELD: The relation between the parties was, therefore, of a contractual nature, and
the duty of the carrier is to be determined with reference to the principles of
contract law, that is, the company was bound to convey and deliver the
plaintiff safely and securely with reference to the degree of care which,
under the circumstances, is required by law and custom applicable to the case.
Although in case like this the defendant must answer for the consequences of
the negligence of its employee, the court has the power to moderate liability
according to the circumstances of the case (art. 1103, Civ. Code): Furthermore, we
think it obvious that an employer who has in fact displayed due diligence in
choosing and instructing his servants is entitled to be considered a debtor in good
faith, within the meaning of article 1107 of the same Code. Construing these two
provisions together, applying them to the facts of this case, it results that the
defendant's liability is limited to such damages as might, at the time of
the accident, have been reasonably foreseen as a probable consequence
of the physical injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff and which were in fact a
necessary result of those injuries.

US THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SEGUNDO BARIAS, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-7567

November 12, 1912

Facts: That on or about November 2, 1911, in the city of Manila, Philippine

Islands, the said Segundo Barias was a motorman on street car No. 9, run 7 of
the Pasay-Cervantes lines of the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company,
a corporation duly organized and doing business in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands; as a such motorman he was controlling and operating said
street car along Rizal Avenue, formerly Calle Cervantes, of this city, and as
such motorman of the said street car he was under obligation to run the

same with due care and diligence to avoid any accident that might occur to
vehicles and pedestrians who were travelling on said Rizal Avenue; said
accused, at said time and place, did willfully, with reckless imprudence and
inexcusable negligence and in violation of the regulations promulgated to
that effect, control and operate said street car, without heeding the
pedestrians crossing Rizal Avenue from one side to the other, thus knocking
down and causing by his carelessness and imprudent negligence that said
street car No. 9, operated and controlled by said accused, as hereinbefore
stated, should knock down and pass over the body and head of one Fermina
Jose, a girl 2 years old, who at said time and place was crossing the said Rizal
Avenue, the body of said girl being dragged along street-car on said Rizal
Avenue for a long distance, thus crushing and destroying her head and
causing her sudden death as a result of the injury received; that if the acts
executed by the accused had been done with malice, he would be guilty of
the serious crime of homicide.

Issue: whether the evidence shows such carelessness or want of ordinary care on
the part of the defendant as to amount to reckless negligence
Held: Yes.Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances.
It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends
upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the
circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care
is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the
circumstances. The diligence with which the law requires the individual at all the
time to govern his conduct varies with the nature of the situation in which he is
placed and with the importance of the act which he is to perform.
lawph!l.net

The evidence shows that the thoroughfare on which the incident occurred was a
public street in a densely populated section of the city. The hour was six in the
morning, or about the time when the residents of such streets begin to move about.
Under such conditions a motorman of an electric street car was clearly charged with
a high degree of diligence in the performance of his duties. He was bound to know
and to recognize that any negligence on his part in observing the track over which
he was running his car might result in fatal accidents. He had no right to assume
that the track before his car was clear. It was his duty to satisfy himself of that fact
by keeping a sharp lookout, and to do everything in his power to avoid the danger
which is necessarily incident to the operation of heavy street cars on public
thoroughfares in populous sections of the city.