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nableModal
Systems
I Motivation
Our dcvclopmcnt of modaLllogic has bccn ahistorical or cvcn anti-historical: modal deduction systems,eachcharacterizinga deductiveconscqucnccrelation, wcrc introduccd and studied long bclbrc possiblc
worlds semanticswas discovered.But the semanticalviewpoint providcs a supcdor pcrspcctivcfrom vr'hichto cxplain why thcrc arc many
modal systcmsof intcrcst bcsidcs5M (S5).In thjs scction,wc introducc
an cxtra componcnt into intcrprctations, whosc paramctcrs can bc sct
in dilltrent ways to generatedillerent (scmanticallydelined) systems.
In the SM semantics,if sometring is possible at one wor1d,it is so al
ovcryworld. But this excludesan idea about possibility which has somc
intuitive force, the idea that what is possible(at a world) is detcrmined
in part by how things in fact arc (at that world). Pcrhapsccrtain statcs
of al'lairs arc impossible,given the way things actually are,but if things
had been ditTerent,those statesof aflairs would havebeen possible.In
othcr words, what is possiblc may vary from world to worldThcrc arc no uncontrovcrsialcxamplcsof this phcnomcnon,but hcrc
is a conlrovcrsial onc. lt is hcld by sornc philosophcrsthat if an organism in lact dcvclops fiom a cc ain cnljty or cntitics, then tftat organ
ism could not have developedliom dif'lerent entities-[jor instance,if l{
is a human being who actually originatesfiom a sperm .s,and an egge,,
then accordingto this view H could not have originated from different
entities. Thc idea is that anlthing devcloping from diffcrcnt cntitics
would notbc H, but someoneelse,evenif very similar to H. But thc vicw
as statcd is imprecise:lhe claim may be that H cor.rldnot havc odginated from a difl'erent egg dnd a difi'erent sperm, or tbat H could not havc
originatcd from a different egg or a different sperm. Supposcwc takc
Chapter3 : First-Order-Definable
lrodal Systems
thc first rcading. Thcn it is allowcd that H could havc originatcd liom
a dillerent egg er, so long as it is sr which fertilizes er, and that H could
have originated tiom a ditTerent sperrn s2, so long as it is e1 which s,
f?rtjlizes. So given that H originates fiom s, and er, that is, that in v/o
'propagules',
these irre I{'s
a world u in which I{ originates from.sr and
, is possiblc, and a world u' in which H originatcs from.st and e, is possiblc, but a world v in which H originates from .ri and s, is impossible.
But the impossibility is from the perspectivc of the world u.,* wherc H
originates from s, and r. Assuming that the doctrine about origin is
not itsclf sensitive to how things in fact arc, thcn if wc considcr mattcrs
from the point of vicw of ll, whcrc H originatcs from s, and u,, we find
that thc world vis possiblc, sincc onc of thc entitics from which H originates (in a) is retained in v. Thus yis possiblc rclativc to u, u is possiblc
relative to )a,",but v is impossible relative to ]r": relative possibility is
not transitivc.
2 Systems
'[o
52: Systems 9 l
92
Chapter3r First-Order-Definable
ModalSystems
52: Systems 93
'DA
Thc percepuvereadermay havc noted that it sufficcs to validatc
- A' that we restrict ourselvesto just those generalinterprctations in
which R is reflexiveat w",that is, in which Rw"w*, evenif R is not 'globally' reflexive, that is, even if there is some other world n such tJrat
'Rau" We could introduce a semantic consequencerelation for this
wider class of general interpretations, and wc would obtain a somcwhat
'(Vw)Rww'
dift'ercnt system from Rf. However,global conditions like
yield systems with certain convenicnt formal featurcs-if p is a valid
formula in such a system,so is ap so in this chapterwe consider onJy
conscqucnccrelations defincd globally: wc say that a conditjon is global iff aI its terms are bound variablcs.
An altcrnativc global constraint on rclativc possibility which wc
might impose is that of slmmctry: (Vw)(VuXRwu- Ruw).We have
already proved otrA FssA, and henceby the soundnessof F* for Frr,
otrA trsMA, which is also easyto seein its own right: if 'otrA' holds at
].r.,"in a sta.ndard interpretation I'l then for some world u in ty, u[trA] :
r, and so'A'holds at every worldin W, including ]r". However,if n is
not rcquired to be s)mmeuic, we can easily give a gcneral intcrprctation which relutcs this sequent-Whetheror not n is refletve makes no
difference,but we n'ill give an examplewhere it is.
Example..:].2.2:Show oaA *RrA.
LctW= {y/",u},R: {(}i/*,a),(y/",}y*),(u,u)},ta/*;A* r, u.'A * T. Wc can
give a dia$am of this interpretation in which the directed arrows indicate lines of sight, and absenceof an arrow rurrring from onc world to
anothcr indicatcs that the fi-rst cannot seethe second-So this interprctation is as Dicturedbelow:
\ ,
u
Wc havc w*[A] = r. To seethat ]v*[o nA] = T, note that by (En,,),we have
[!Al = T, since'A'is true at every world u can see(Ir cannot se w*)^
Then since w* can see a, u,"[onAl = T by (EoJ. Thus .trA FRrA, and
ipso facto otrA Fo A.
In Example:1.2.2the failurc of R tobc symmc ic is crucial. Our third
tirst-order definable sysremis the system Sym,whose semanticconsequencerelation tss,.is defined by:
chapter3: First-Order-Definable
ModalSystems
52: Systems
t ,
A* r
l )
u
A* r
Hcrc wc have w*[A] = r, and also wo[on] = 1, since u is the only other
world w" can see and u[A] = r- However,a[aA] : T sincc u can scc v
and v[A] - T. But if uloAl : T, thcn ]t"[ooA] = T since v/" can scc u. In
te.rmsof oul example,supposethat 'A' means'H originatesfrom s, and
er'; then this interpretation illustrates that if H acflrally or.iginatesfrom
s, and e], it is not possible that H odginate from .ri and e2,but it could
havc bccn possible;it is possibly possible,so to speak.Sincenon'transitivity is crucial to the interprctation, it also shows that Trn contains
a sequentthat Rf and Sym both lack. However,each of thcse systems
also contain sequentsTrn lacks, so none of the three systemswith constraints on I{ is a subsystemof any other"
lhc sequentswe haveused to illustrate djffercnccs betwecn the systems havenot been chosenat random-Thcy are in a certain sensecharactenslrcof thcir associatedscmanlic consequencerelations.
. FRroA - A, but if C is any global constraint on R which does
not entail that R is reflexive,then tscDA - A.4
. o trA Fsv.A, but if C is any global constraint on R which does
not entail that R is slanrnetric,then atrA *c A.
. oaA Fr- oA, but if C is any gklbal constraint on R which
does not cntail that n is ffansitivc, then o oA trc oA.
Wc could continuc in thc sanc vcin, using futher structural propcrties to define new semanticconsequencerelations.But the best-known
systems of modal logic are obtained by combining some of tfle proper'
ties of R we have consideredso far. There are th,reesuch systems,corresponding to the global constraints that R be (i) reflexive and
4 Thc icstriction to global constnints is essential,as alreadyindjcatcd.If Cis simply thc
constraint that Rr4,*}v,,the sct ol valid formulae is not closedundcr Necessiratron-
ModalSystems
Chapter3 : First-Order-Definable
S2:Systems
Eq
_t Y.
. /
RS
,/\r/\
u/^
r----.-
RT
R"ft
t
----t,/
r)n
,,-'-,
Gen
a
A*'T
B - T
i
A--L
B * T
'oB'holds at so 'oA
In this interpretation, 'aA'holds at u and v/* and
%
'!(oA v oB)'
v oB'holds at every world which ),|,'"can see,and hence
holds at )v*.But'troA'is falsc al r.v"since'oA'docs not hold at cvcry
'trcB'is
'oB'
falsc at w* sincc
world which r4.,"can scc (considcr v), and
docs not hold at cvcry world which w" can scc (considcr a). Howcvcr,
|hc lack ol' any conncction belween u and v is cruciitl Lo I his countcrcx
ample to thc scqucnt; any rcflexive fansitive counte.rexample to il will
havc at least two unconnected worlds visiblc from w".'ltrus u(oA v oB)
r=RrctroA v troB. Sincc thc.rc is no countcrcxamplc in which li is an
cquivalcncc rclation, and sincc oA FRrctr aA, wc also havc RTC a propcr
subsystem of Eq.
Wc end this discussion of first-ordcr definablc systcms with thrcc
points of intercst. First, it is natu-ral to ask what relationship thcrc is, if
any, betlvcen these systems iuld thc systcm SM (S5) of standard modal
logic which wc introduccd in Chaplcr 2" Wc arlluc that SM is Eq. Rccall
th.rl an cquivalcncc relation on a domain partitions thc domain into
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive equivalcnce classcs. So if 7 is
a gcncral intcrpretation in which R is an equivalenre relation, there is
a uniquc cquivalcncc class 4.I.,to which )v'- bclongs (in this spccial casc,
'Ilrv'can
bc rcad as'a and v can scc cxacllv thc samc worlds'). Morcovcr, thc truth-valuc of any scntencc p on'1, that is, lhe lruth-valuc ()1'
p at )v", dcpcnds only on thc lruth-valucs of scntcnccs at lhc othcr
wo.rlds in a-I,,.,,
for if wc bcgin tbc cvaluation of p at w*, thcn no mattcr
how many modal opcrators p contains, we arc ncvcr lcd outside L/-.,
sincc no world in {/., can scc any world outsidc a/.," constqucntly, thc
'discard' all
truth-valucs of all scntcnccs a[ w* rcmain thc samc if wc
worlds in W whjch arc not in [.r., and all pairs ol worlds in ii in which
some member is not in L/... lhis leaves us with a new interprctation 1;
which makes cxactly the same scntenccs truc as docs 1" llut in'1l, n is
univcrsal-(Vw)(Vu)Rwu sincc ?+'sdomain t// is just U*, and cvcry
wo.rld in a/,,,can scc cvcry othcr (as wcll as itscu). Howcvcr, whcn,R js
univcrsal, thc cvaluation clauscs (ElR) and (l1oR)ol this chaptcr arc
equivaleft to the clauses (Ur) and (Eo) of SM" lhus, for any world t,t in
ty#, thcro is a world v in llzowhich I,,can scc and at \a'hich a scntcncc O
'which
is truc iff therc is a world v in l4l+at which tf is truc
u can scc'
is rcd[ndant. Conscqucntly, if wc transform I into a standard intc{prctalion .',fby removing mcntion of R, and cvaluatc scntcnccs in .7 by thc
standard rather than thc general cvaluation clauscs, cxactly lhc same
s(:ntcnces will come out flue in J as are true in 1#,and hcncc as in ?.
lhis mcans that SM and Eq are exactly thc samc systcms. Iror whcncvcr
wc havc a gcncral intcrprctation 7 which cstablishcs pr,.,.,p,, iirq 4, thcn
by lbllowing thc proccdurc just described wc gct a stand.lrd intcrprctation J which establishcspt,...,p"*su 4. And convcrscly, if a standard
52:Systems
J cstablishcs pt,.. ,p, *su 4, thcn by adding a univcrsal i?, wc gct a gcncral ? which cstablishcs pr,...,p, *rq 4.
n sccond point ofnolc is that il would bc wronlt to concludc lrom thc
constnrction of thc cxtcnsions of Gen that any first-order del'inable
constraint on R dctcrmincs its own systcm, Each such constraint determincs a systcm, of coursc, but it may bc thc samc as onc dctcrmincd
by a di{Tcrcnt constrajrt. Ihc discussion of Eq in thc prcvious par '
graph illustralcs this. l}]c condjtion o{' univcrsality, (Vw)(Vu)Rwu, is a
strongcr constraint on /l tllan the condition that R be an equivalence
rclation (a univcrsal rclation is an cquivalcncc rclation, bul not cvcry
cquivalcncc rclation is a univcrsal rclation)- Yet as wc havc jus{ st:cn,if
wc wcrc to usc uflivcrsality to dciinc a scmantic conscqucncc rclation,
thc rcsulting systcm would bc Eq ovcr again. Anothcr cxamplc is irrcflcxivily, (Vw)-Rww: the semantic consequence relation Fr,, in fact coin
cjdcs with Fz (this is an excrcis(r,
'fhird
'first-order d,ctinablc
and lastly, usc of thc nomcnclatura
systcm' sullgcsts that thcrc arc such things as second'order dcl'irablc systcms (somc lamiliarity with sccond ordcr logic is prcsumcd in thc ncxt
l]!vo paragraphs). Sincc first-ordcr logic is contained in sccond ordcr
lo,jic, first{rder delinable systems are ipso facto sccond order dclin
ablc, so by a sccond-t.rrdcr dcfinablc systcm wc mcan onc thal is eisendally sccond-ordcr: at lcast onc of tbc constraints on R dcfining thc
scmantic conscqucncc rolation is cxprcsscd by a formula contalining
second-ordcr quantilicrs, and no flrst-ordcr conditions capture thc
samo scmantic conscqucncc relation. Simply using sccond-order languagc to impose some constraints on li is insufficicnt to gcncratc such
a systcm, sincc tho sccond ordcr Iormulac may bc logically cquivalcnt
to lirst-ordcr oncs. It is not cvcn suificicnt to usc somc conccpt which
we know is nol. first-order cxpressible. For cxamplc, [hcrc is no way ol'
'thcrc
cxpressing
arc at most finitely many x such that' in lirsl ordcr
languagc, but it can bc cxprcsscd w'ith sccond ordc-r quantificrs. Yet il
docs not follow tiom this that thc systcm F whosc scmantic consc
qucncc rclation FF is givcn by 'pr,...,p" ,-t q rtt t'hcrcis no gcncral inLcrprcl.alion with linite t'f on which all ol pt,...,p, arc truc whilc q is l'alsc'
is essentially second-order. ln lact, FF again coincidcs with pa"
'lo
construct an (essentially) second order definable system, dcfine
an n-chain in an intcrpretation to be a sequence of worlds wo, wt, tv2...
such that I{}ro}vr, nv,,r}/r, ctc. (Wc do not -rcquirc that thc worlds in an /{chain be distinct, so any world which can scc itscll' immcdiatcly givcs
dsc to an intinitcly long R-chain.) Thc scmantic consequence rclation
\"7
u Exercises
I
II
(2) oA +z aA;
DA Fo oA;
(4) A -^ tso0-A;
trA&trBFoA-B;
*(6) trA - A Fo rlA - .A;
trA - oA tso DA * A;
(8) aaA F6 oEA;
trA tso trtrA;
(10) trA * A Fo tr(DA ' AX
oEA tso troA;
(12) A * B Fu DA - B;
D(!(A * !A) * A) tsoA;
n A - o ( B- C ) F o o ( B- ( D A - o C ) .
A FortroA;
D(nA ' A) *n, rA;
oA FRsnoA;
D(A v oB) #RsuA v oB;
EoA tsrqoEA;
tr(tr(A -- trA) - A) FRrA
FRstr(nA - B) v D(nB* A)
tr(o.A - .A)*RsflA - DDA
(2)
(4)
(6)
(8)
(10)
trA FRrtrEA;
Fsv.aA * A;
.A FRrtr.A;
Fsv.o-,r;
tr(trA ' A) FeqnA;
in semantically
definedsystems l0l
53:Deducibility
or scts of conditions uscd to dcfinc systcmsin this scction,and should
be as weak a condition or sct of conditions as possiblc:
(1) Fc D(oA * A); (2) Fc DA - oA; (3) Fc cA.
IV Showthat RTC is a propcr subsystemof Eq (this has two parts, (a)
every RTCsequentis an Eq scquent,and (b) some Eq scquentis not an
RTC scqucnt).
V Explain why trr,,coincideswith Fo. lHint for the non-trivial direction, supposethat somegeneralintcrprctation ? cstablishcspr,...,p, tso
4. lndicate how an irleflexive interpretation J could be constructed
from 'l which wor.rldestablish pu...,p, *n 4. Considcr replacing each
world in I which can seeitself with two worlds of a certain sort.l
3 Deducibilityin semantically
definedsystems
We turn now to the question of providing rules of proof for some of the
systemsintroduced in the previous section"Ideally,what we sekis the
following: for eachfirst'order definablesystem.t with smanticconscqucncc rclation +, wc would likc to constTucta dcduction systcm .9'
with deductive consequencerelation r9 such that ry and *r coincidc.
In other words, the following two conditions should bc fulfilled:
(Sndj".J:if pr,...,p,t-s' qthenpb...,p,Esqi
(Comp.t,.r):
if p,,...,pnF=
s q r}]rcnp b...,p,,t-. q.
According to (Sndy"),thc deductivc systcm S' is sound with respectto
(or lbr) the semanticallydefined systemS,which meansthat eachprovable scquent in S' is scmantically corrcct on thc scmantics for S" And
accordingto (CompsrJ,the deductivesystemS' is completewith respect
to (or for) the semantically dcfined systcm S, which mcans that for
every sequentthat is semanticallycorrect on the semanticsof S, therc
is a proof of it using thc rulcs of S'. Wc also spcakof thc dcductivc consequencerelation ry being sound and/or completetbr,/with respect to
the semanticconsequencerelation trs.
Thcrc is no guarantcethat for eachof the systemsin 52 some sould
and completc dcductivc conscquenccrclation cxists; wc might bc pa.rticularly doubtful of finding such a relation for an csscnrially sccond-
l02
Chapter3: First-Order-Definable
ModalSystems
ordcr systcm likc G. Wc alrcady know, &ough, that thc dcductiv(: systcm 55 is sound and complclc I'or Eq, sincc Eq is lhc samc system as
SM, and wc statcd carlicr (wilhout prool) that 55 is sound and (:omplctc
for SM- ltemarkably, every system in $2 can be provided wilh sound
ilnd (:omplctc rulcs of proof. But thcre is a catch. Onc's lirst thoughl is
that Lhc rulcs lor thc othc.r systcms will bc variations on thc 55 rulcs
thc othcr scmantic conscqucncc rclations might bc capturablc simply
by adjusling thc constraints on El and ol- Ilowever, while it is possiblc
to obtain thc systcm RT in this way, tbcrc is no known way of obtaininit
any of thc othe.r systems in 52 similarly. A gcncrirl approach to dcduc
tion which works for all systems is rather diffcrcnt in naturo from nat
ural dcduction, and it is rathcr unwicldy. For that rcason, rvc wlll
d i s (u s s l h c m c l h o d I a i r l yh r i c l l y .
We definc a deductive conscqucncc rclation r* which is sound and
complete for Gen in the fbl[owing n'ay.
(i) lhe deductive system K has as non-modal basis all lhc.rulcs
of NK for thc scntcntial corincctivcs.
(ii) K has a nrlc callcd Neces'sitation,which is a rcstdctcd vcrsion
of trI; whcn a formula p at linc j in a proof has been inferred
Irom prcvious lincs in such a way [h:rt iL dcpcnds on no
assumptions or prcmiscs at j, or if it occurs at .i by fl, thcn
at a latcr linc k wc may add 'np', also dcpcnding on no prcmiscs or assumptions. k is labcld l, Ncc'.
(iii) K has a rulc I)fo, likc thc NK-rulc Df lbr'*', n'hich allows us
lo add a new line k to a proof by rcplacing any occurrcncc ol'
'-r-'
in a fbrmula at line i with'o', or in the ofher dircdion,
'o'
'-tr-'- k is labehd 'j, Dfo',
any occurrcncc of
with
and
dcpcnds on whatcvcr k dcpcnds on. Notc ttat, lor <rrnvcniencc, we do not restrict applications of Dfo to cascs whcrc
'-'
'-tr-'
thc Iirst
bcing abbrcviatcd is thc main conof thc
'-r-l-'
ncctivc of thc formula: drll occurrcncc o1
may bc
'o'
abbrcviatcd, and any
may bc cxpiuded.
(iv) K has a spccial cxtcnsion of Scqucnt Introduction: wc arc
allowcd to usc thc scqucnt n(A -' B) F LrA ' nB (Examplc
2.4.2 on page 82) lbr SI.what makcs this cxtcnsion spccial is
that wc do nol prove thc scqucnt first, belbre using it in SI
later. I{ather, making this sequcnt avallablc to oursclvcs is
what !!cts thc systcm K off thc ground. Equivalently, wc can
use thc scqucnt F u(A - B) - (LrA - lfB) in any application
of TI- Thc prmisc,/conclusion vcrsion is slightly morc convcnicnt, but thc thcorcm vrrsion is morc common in prcscn-
in semantically
definedsystems 103
53:Deducibiliry
"
'
These four items define the deductive system K and the deducibility
rclation L-K,
which coincidcswith tso.Thc proofs of this and subsequent
claims about which deducibiliw rclations match which scmanticcolrsequcncc rclations a-repostponcd until Chaptcr 5. But we will illustrate
the proof systemswith sampledeductions,such as the follow:ingproof
of a basic scqucnt of modal logic. In it, we use 'NK' as a labcl for any
stcp justificd by a scqucnt of non-modal scntential logic which does
not havc its own namc.
Example3.3.1:Showtr(A & B) FKtrA & nB
1 (1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1 (s)
(t)
(7)
(8)
1 (9)
1 (10)
D(A& B)
(A&B)-A
tr(A & B) - A)
tr(A & B) * trA
trA
(A&B)-B
tr(A & B) - B)
tr(A & B) - uB
aB
trA & DB
Prcmisc
TI (NK)
2 Ncc
:ISIK
4 1 - F
TI (NK)
6 Nec
TSIK
8,r -E
5,9 &I '
l04 Chapter
3: First-Order-Definable
ModalSystems
. Thc systcm KT, T for short, is obtaincd by adding thc axiom-sequent
r- rA * A, equivalentlyaA F A, to K. So a proof in KT is the same as a
proof in K cxccpt that lines may be justified by appeal to SIusing !A F
A or F trA - A; such a line will be labeled'TI (T)' or 'j SIO)'. KT is sound
and completewith respect to Rf; that is, FKrand trRtcoincide,Here is a
samplc proof in KT; noticc that though line :l contains a modal opcrator, its justification is non-modal:wc usc a modal formula in a substitution-instanceof a sequentof non-modallogic.
F;<ample.
l)-3-2:ShowA FKTaA"
1 (1)
(2)
I (3)
1 (4)
A
tr-A - -A
-tr-A
.A
Premise
TI (T}
2,r sr(cMT)
3 Dfo
1 (r)
(2)
1
1
I
1
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
A
on-A - -A
Premise
-o!-A
-^!-D*A
2,1 SI (CMT)
4 Dfo
5DN
a
6 Dfo
tr-tr-A
roA
n (B)
'A'
'-A'.
Linc 2 uses the axiom-sequentB, replacing with
The system K4 is obtained by adding to K either the axiom-sequcnt
ooA F oA (equivalently,F ooA .* oA), or else the sequent !A F !trA
(cquivalently,F trA - !!A), known as 4. Wc fcaturcd thc 'o'vcrsion as
Exuunplc3.2.:l(pagc95),but in thc proof systcm for Trn it is morc com'o'vcrmon to usc the'tr'version as the axiom sequentand derive thc
sion, which is the approachwe shall adopt. K4 is sound and complete
with respect to Trn; that is, FK4and trr," coincide-In K4 we have the following proof.
definedsystems l05
S3:Deducibilityin semantically
I
I
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
ooA
-!--!-A
!-A * n!-A
!-A .' --D-A
(s)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
!-A * tr--!-A
-E-A
oA
Prcmisc
1 Dtlo
Tr(4)
TI (NK)
4 Ncc
5 SI(K)
3,6 Sr (NK)
7,2 SI (tfl)
a
B Dfo
Line ti uses K, putting 'D-A' for 'A' and '--E-A' for 'B'.
From this point it is straightforward to obtain sound and complcte
systemsof proof lbr RS,RT and Eq, simply by adding axiom-sequents
tO KT:
. The system KTB, usually known simply as B, is KT plus the
. axiom sequent B. (KT)Bis sound and complete for Rs.
. The system KT4, usually known as 54, is KT plus thc axiom
sequent4. 54 is sormd and completefor RT.
. The system KTs, whcre 5 is the axiom sequent oA F troA, is
usually called 55. 55 is sound and completc for Eq.
It is a consequenceof thes results that tJIesubsystemdiagram of thc
previous section could be dupucatedhere, with the appropriate proof
systems replacing the semantic systems in that diagram. We understand the semantic inclusions as resu.ltingfrom a restdction in the
classof interprctations: a semanticsystem.t is a subsystcmof a semantic system S' when the interpretations for S' are a subset of those for
S. On the derivation side, one proof systemS' includes another S when
the rules of S are available in S', and when all the axiom sequcnts and
definitions of S are availablcin .t'; for propcr inclusion, some axiomsequent or mle or definition must be available in S' and not in S.
Finalfy, therc is the qucstion of whether an essentiaw second-order
semantic system can have a matching proof systcm similar to thosc
just described"The answeris that this is possible,and the system G is
an example-The proof system KL js obtainedby addjng to K the axiom
sequentL, which is tr(trA - A) F trA or equivalcntly F tr(lA - A) - trA,
bascd on Lijb's Formula 'tr(trA - A) - trA'. KL is sound and completc
for G-
106 Chapter
3: First-Order-Definable
ModalSystems
. Wc cnd this discussionof dcducibility in various systcmsby remarking that lie unwieldy nature of this kind of approach to prool mcans
that thcoretically significant scquents can require proofs which even
those on the forefront of developmentof modal logic have some difficulty discovcring.Thc problem of showing that 4 is derivablein KL is
an cxampleof this phcnomcnon,but thc following proof was evcntlal
ly discovcrcd(indcpcndcntly)by Kripkc, dc Jongh and S.filbin. In it wc
assumethc sequent tr&, FKL(nA & trB) - tr(A & B);we have ahcady (ir
eilect) proved one half of this; the otler is an exerciseExample.1.:1.5:
S}J.ow
FKL!A - trlA
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(s)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
in semantically
definedsystems l07
53:Deducibility
likc lhcsc betweensemanticsystemsand proof systcmsis rathcr complicatcd; we make a start on it in Chapter 5.
t-JExercises
I Show the follow.ing (in thcsc problems you may not use the natural
deducdon rules for n and o from Chapter 2):
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
*(7)
(8)
(9)
*(l0)
(11)
(12)
{l:l)
*(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
l08
Chapter3: First-Order'Definable
ModalSystems