1

FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HON. RAUL

MANGLAPUS (177 SCRA 668) Case Digest
Facts:
After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family
fled to Hawaii. Now in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order
the respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin the
implementation of the Presidents decision to bar their return to the
Philippines. Petitioners contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that
the President is without power to impair their liberty of abode because only a
court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor, according to the
petitioners, may the President impair their right to travel because no law has
authorized her to do so.
Issue:
Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines?
Ruling:
The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the
people, promote their welfare and advance national interest.
This case calls for the exercise of the Presidents power as protector of the
peace. The president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of
emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace
and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe
appears
on
the
horizon.
The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to
destabilize the country bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time
would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the state
and
instigate
more
chaos.
The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking
preemptive actions against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they
are perceived as apt to become serious and direct protection of the people is

the

essence

of

the

duty

of

the

government.

The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the
present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The
petition is DISMISSED.

David v. Arroyo
Facts:
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the
discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate GMA she declared PP
1017 and is to be implemented by GO 5. The said law was aimed to
suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the
government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate
EDSA I and at the same time revoked all
permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting.
Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, KMU head Randolf
David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later that day, the Daily
Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and
they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still,
another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On
the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was
however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his
actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the
current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 w/c
declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and
some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it
has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for
such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a
declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency
contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such
is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because
it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued
that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP
1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP
1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take care power and take
over power.

HELD:The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of

the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are
parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC
can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is
constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are
unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;

unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and

rebellion are considered harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that
overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked
against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a
spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state
regulation.

Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration

Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine

The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has factual basis in issuing
PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated
Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading
to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the
records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious
threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the
Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist
leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security
Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA
and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus,
absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President
was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the
seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms
and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty
must not stifle liberty.

On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017.
The SC considered the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary
power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting
grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP
1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a
sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these
are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for
the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary,
the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has been met.

ISSUE:Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed
for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated
cases at bar are not primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain
reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even
speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is
not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state
interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally

Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine

Pursuant to the 2ndsentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017.
David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the
Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is
vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the
laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such provision is similar
to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as
provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate
decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the

3
Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor
a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of
legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only take care of
the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-75697 June 18, 1987

Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine

The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or
institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress.
On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is
not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC
made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency
but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it
for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from
Congress must be based on the following:

VALENTIN TIO doing business under the name and style of OMI
ENTERPRISES, petitioner,
vs.
VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, MINISTER OF FINANCE,
METRO MANILA COMMISSION, CITY MAYOR and CITY TREASURER
OF MANILA, respondents.
Nelson Y. Ng for petitioner.
The City Legal Officer for respondents City Mayor and City Treasurer.

1 There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.

This petition was filed on September 1, 1986 by petitioner on his own

behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogram operators adversely
affected. It assails the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987
entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad
powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry (hereinafter
briefly referred to as the BOARD). The Decree was promulgated on
October 5, 1985 and took effect on April 10, 1986, fifteen (15) days after
completion of its publication in the Official Gazette.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not
tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president
by the president.

On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of the

abovementioned decree, Presidential Decree No. 1994 amended the
National Internal Revenue Code providing, inter alia:
SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on
each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback,

4
regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos;
Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank
video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.
On October 23, 1986, the Greater Manila Theaters Association,
Integrated Movie Producers, Importers and Distributors Association of the
Philippines, and Philippine Motion Pictures Producers Association,
hereinafter collectively referred to as the Intervenors, were permitted by
the Court to intervene in the case, over petitioner's opposition, upon the
allegations that intervention was necessary for the complete protection of
their rights and that their "survival and very existence is threatened by the
unregulated proliferation of film piracy." The Intervenors were thereafter
allowed to file their Comment in Intervention.
The rationale behind the enactment of the DECREE, is set out in its
preambular clauses as follows:
1. WHEREAS, the proliferation and unregulated
circulation of videograms including, among others,
videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical
improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced
the operations of moviehouses and theaters, and have
caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at
least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the
collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and
other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses
estimated at P450 Million annually in government
revenues;
2. WHEREAS, videogram(s) establishments collectively
earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales
and disposition of videograms, and such earnings have
not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the
Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each
year;
3. WHEREAS, the unregulated activities of videogram
establishments have also affected the viability of the

movie industry, particularly the more than 1,200 movie

houses and theaters throughout the country, and
occasioned
industry-wide
displacement
and
unemployment due to the shutdown of numerous
moviehouses and theaters;
4. "WHEREAS, in order to ensure national economic
recovery, it is imperative for the Government to create an
environment conducive to growth and development of all
business industries, including the movie industry which
has an accumulated investment of about P3 Billion;
5. WHEREAS, proper taxation of the activities of
videogram establishments will not only alleviate the dire
financial condition of the movie industry upon which more
than 75,000 families and 500,000 workers depend for
their livelihood, but also provide an additional source of
revenue for the Government, and at the same time
rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of
videograms;
6. WHEREAS, the rampant and unregulated showing of
obscene videogram features constitutes a clear and
present danger to the moral and spiritual well-being of the
youth, and impairs the mandate of the Constitution for the
State to support the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character and
promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being;
7. WHEREAS, civic-minded citizens and groups have
called for remedial measures to curb these blatant
malpractices which have flaunted our censorship and
copyright laws;
8. WHEREAS, in the face of these grave emergencies
corroding the moral values of the people and betraying
the national economic recovery program, bold emergency

5
measures must be adopted with dispatch; ... (Numbering
of paragraphs supplied).

construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. 4 It should be

given practical rather than technical construction. 5

Petitioner's attack on the constitutionality of the DECREE rests on the

following grounds:

Tested by the foregoing criteria, petitioner's contention that the tax

provision of the DECREE is a rider is without merit. That section
reads, inter alia:

1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the

gross receipts payable to the local government is a
RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter
thereof;

4. There is undue delegation of power and authority;

Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of

Videograms. Notwithstanding any provision of law to
the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty
percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the
case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a
videogram containing a reproduction of any motion
picture or audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of the
proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province,
and the other fifty percent (50%) shall acrrue to the
municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That
in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by
the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila
Commission.

5. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; and

xxx xxx xxx

2. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive

and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the due
process clause of the Constitution;
3. There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by
the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by
Amendment No. 6;

6. There is over regulation of the video industry as if it

were a nuisance, which it is not.
We shall consider the foregoing objections in seriatim.
1. The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" 1 is sufficiently complied with
if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve.
It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The
requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter
expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and

An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain
any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as
they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and
means of carrying out the general object." 3 The rule also is that the
constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly
title.2

The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably

necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the DECREE,
which is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram
Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not
inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for
regulation 6 it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms
scattered throughout the DECREE. The express purpose of the DECREE to
include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the
heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles
2 and 5, supra. Those preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in
presenting the measure. The title of the DECREE, which is the creation of
the Videogram Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to include the
purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions.
It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter
be an index to the body of the DECREE. 7

6
2. Petitioner also submits that the thirty percent (30%) tax imposed is
harsh and oppressive, confiscatory, and in restraint of trade. However, it
is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely
because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities
taxed. 8 The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so
searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare that it is
subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of
the authority which exercises it. 9 In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon
its constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous
and oppressive taxation. 10
The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a
revenue measure prompted by the realization that earnings of videogram
establishments of around P600 million per annum have not been
subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of an additional
source of revenue. It is an end-user tax, imposed on retailers for every
videogram they make available for public viewing. It is similar to the 30%
amusement tax imposed or borne by the movie industry which the
theater-owners pay to the government, but which is passed on to the
entire cost of the admission ticket, thus shifting the tax burden on the
buying or the viewing public. It is a tax that is imposed uniformly on all
videogram operators.
The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily
to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because
of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property
rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was
also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax
remains a valid imposition.
The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the
motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax
was to favor one industry over another. 11

It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to

select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly
held that "inequities which result from a singling out of
one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation". 12 Taxation has been made the implement of
the state's police power. 13

At bottom, the rate of tax is a matter better addressed to the taxing

legislature.
3. Petitioner argues that there was no legal nor factual basis for the
promulgation of the DECREE by the former President under Amendment
No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution providing that "whenever in the judgment
of the President ... , there exists a grave emergency or a threat or
imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the
regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any
matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he
may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders,
or letters of instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land."
In refutation, the Intervenors and the Solicitor General's Office aver that
the 8th "whereas" clause sufficiently summarizes the justification in that
grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the people and
betraying the national economic recovery program necessitated bold
emergency measures to be adopted with dispatch. Whatever the reasons
"in the judgment" of the then President, considering that the issue of the
validity of the exercise of legislative power under the said Amendment
still pends resolution in several other cases, we reserve resolution of the
question raised at the proper time.
4. Neither can it be successfully argued that the DECREE contains an
undue delegation of legislative power. The grant in Section 11 of the
DECREE of authority to the BOARD to "solicit the direct assistance of
other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and
limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to
perform enforcement functions for the Board" is not a delegation of the
power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to
its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is
between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily

7
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of
the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be
made." 14 Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such
assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to
the direction and control of the BOARD." That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft
and corruption would not stigmatize the DECREE as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the
aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.

5. The DECREE is not violative of the ex post facto principle. An ex post

facto law is, among other categories, one which "alters the legal rules of
evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than
the law required at the time of the commission of the offense." It is
petitioner's position that Section 15 of the DECREE in providing that:
All videogram establishments in the Philippines are
hereby given a period of forty-five (45) days after the
effectivity of this Decree within which to register with and
secure a permit from the BOARD to engage in the
videogram business and to register with the BOARD all
their inventories of videograms, including videotapes,
discs, cassettes or other technical improvements or
variations thereof, before they could be sold, leased, or
otherwise disposed of. Thereafter any videogram found in
the possession of any person engaged in the videogram
business without the required proof of registration by the
BOARD, shall be prima facie evidence of violation of the
Decree, whether the possession of such videogram be for
private showing and/or public exhibition.
raises immediately a prima facie evidence of violation of the DECREE
when the required proof of registration of any videogram cannot be
presented and thus partakes of the nature of an ex post facto law.
The argument is untenable. As this Court held in the recent case
of Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 15
... it is now well settled that "there is no constitutional
objection to the passage of a law providing that the
presumption of innocence may be overcome by a

contrary presumption founded upon the experience of

human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be
sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence"
(People vs. Mingoa 92 Phil. 856 [1953] at 858-59, citing 1
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS, 639-641). And the "legislature may enact
that when certain facts have been proved that they shall
be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the
accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be a
rational connection between the facts proved and the
ultimate facts presumed so that the inference of the one
from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary
because of lack of connection between the two in
common experience". 16
Applied to the challenged provision, there is no question that there is a
rational connection between the fact proved, which is non-registration,
and the ultimate fact presumed which is violation of the DECREE,
besides the fact that the prima facie presumption of violation of the
DECREE attaches only after a forty-five-day period counted from its
effectivity and is, therefore, neither retrospective in character.
6. We do not share petitioner's fears that the video industry is being overregulated and being eased out of existence as if it were a nuisance.
Being a relatively new industry, the need for its regulation was apparent.
While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund
movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its
enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film
piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about
by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing
pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses
in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to
mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually
untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license
fees are required to engage in business. 17
The enactment of the Decree since April 10, 1986 has not brought about
the "demise" of the video industry. On the contrary, video establishments

8
are seen to have proliferated in many places notwithstanding the 30% tax
imposed.
Footnotes
In the last analysis, what petitioner basically questions is the necessity,
wisdom and expediency of the DECREE. These considerations, however,
are primarily and exclusively a matter of legislative concern.
Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom
of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a
statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of
separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the
respective authority of each department and confined its
jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be
intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a
matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the
judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to
the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender
should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit
their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the
supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack
on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar
as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent on its
wisdom cannot be sustained. 18

1 Section 19[1], Article VIII, 1973 Constitution; Section

26[l] Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
2 Sumulong vs. COMELEC, No. 48609, October 10,
1941, 73 Phil. 288; Cordero vs. Hon. Jose Cabatuando, et
al., L-14542, Oct. 31, 1962,6 SCRA 418.
3 Public Service Co., Recktenwald, 290 III. 314, 8 ALR
466, 470.
4 Government vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation, No. 44257, November 22, 1938, 66 Phil.
483; Cordero vs. Cabatuando, et al., supra.
5 Sumulong vs. Commission on Elections, supra.
6 United States vs. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44, 1950, cited
in Bernas, Philippines Constitutional Law, p. 594.
7 People vs. Carlos, L-239, June 30, 1947, 78 Phil. 535.

In fine, petitioner has not overcome the presumption of validity which

attaches to a challenged statute. We find no clear violation of the
Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree
No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void.

8 U.S. vs. Sanchez, supra.

9 II Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, p.
986.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed.

10 ibid., p. 987.
No costs.
11 Magnano Co. vs. Hamilton, 292, U.S. 40.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (C.J.), Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

12 Lutz vs. Araneta, L-7859, December 22, 1955, 98 Phil.

148, citing Carmichael vs. Southern Coal and Coke Co.,
301 U.S. 495, 81 L. Ed. 1245.

9
13 ibid., citing Great Atl. and Pacific Tea Co. vs. Grosjean,
301 U.S. 412, 81 L. Ed. 1193; U.S. vs. Butler, 297 U.S. 1,
80 L. Ed. 477; M'Culloch vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat, 316,4 L.
Ed. 579.

supervise the videogram industry. The Decree promulgated on

October 5, 1985, took effect on April 10, 1986, fifteen (15) days
after completion of its publication in the Official Gazette.

14 Cincinnati, W & Z.R. Co. vs. Clinton County Comrs

(1852) 1 Ohio St. 88.

PD 1994 issued a month thereafter reinforced PD 1987 and in

effect
amended
the
National
Internal
Revenue
Code
(NIRC). Petitioner contended among others that the tax provision
of the decree is a rider.

15 G. R. No. L-40195, May 29, 1987.

ISSUE: Whether or not the PD 1987 is unconstitutional due

to the tax provision included

16 ibid., citing People vs. Mingoa, supra, See also U.S.

vs. Luling No. 11162, August 12, 1916,34 Phil. 725.
17 Solicitor General's Comments, p. 102, Rollo.
18 Morfe vs. Mutuc, L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA
424, 450-451.

Tio v Videogram
G.R. No. L-75697 June 18, 1987
Melencio-Herrera, J.:
Facts:
1. Petitioner on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of other
videogram
operators
adversely
affected
assailed
the
constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and

2.

RULING: PD 1987 is constitutional.

1. The title of the decree, which calls for the creation of the VRB is
comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its
Preamble and reasonably covered in all its provisions. It is
unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the
latter be an index to the body of the decree.
2. The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the general object of the
decree, which is the regulation of the video industry through the
VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent
with nor foreign to the general subject and title. As a tool for
regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control
mechanisms scattered throughout the decree.
3. The express purpose of PD 1987 to include taxation of the video
industry in order to regulate and rationalize the heretofore
uncontrolled distribution of videos is evident from Preambles 2 and
5. Those preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in
presenting the measure.