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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
ENBANC
G.R.No.161357November30,2005
ELENAP.DYCAICO,Petitioner,
vs.
SOCIALSECURITYSYSTEMandSOCIALSECURITYCOMMISSION,Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO,SR.,J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Elena P. Dycaico which
seekstoreverseandsetasidetheDecision1datedApril15,2003oftheCourtofAppeals(CA)inCAG.R.SP
No. 69632. The assailed decision affirmed the Resolution dated February 6, 2002 of the Social Security
Commission(SSC),denyingthepetitionersclaimforsurvivorspensionaccruingfromthedeathofherhusband
BonifacioS.Dycaico,aSocialSecuritySystem(SSS)memberpensioner.Likewisesoughttobereversedandset
aside is the appellate courts Resolution dated December 15, 2003, denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Thecasearosefromthefollowingundisputedfacts:
BonifacioS.DycaicobecameamemberoftheSSSonJanuary24,1980.Inhisselfemployeddatarecord(SSS
FormRS1),henamedthepetitioner,ElenaP.Dycaico,andtheireightchildrenashisbeneficiaries.Atthattime,
BonifacioandElenalivedtogetherashusbandandwifewithoutthebenefitofmarriage.
In June 1989, Bonifacio was considered retired and began receiving his monthly pension from the SSS. He
continuedtoreceivethemonthlypensionuntilhepassedawayonJune19,1997.Afewmonthspriortohisdeath,
however,BonifaciomarriedthepetitioneronJanuary6,1997.
Shortly after Bonifacios death, the petitioner filed with the SSS an application for survivors pension. Her
application,however,wasdeniedonthegroundthatunderSection12B(d)ofRepublicAct(Rep.Act)No.8282or
the Social Security Law2 she could not be considered a primary beneficiary of Bonifacio as of the date of his
retirement.Thesaidprovisoreads:
Sec.12B.RetirementBenefits.

(d)Uponthedeathoftheretiredmember,hisprimarybeneficiariesasofthedateofhisretirementshallbeentitled
toreceivethemonthlypension.
Applyingthisproviso,thepetitionerwasinformedthatthe
Records show that the member [referring to Bonifacio] was considered retired on June 5, 1989 and monthly
pensionwascancelleduponourreceiptofareportonhisdeathonJune19,1997.Inyourdeathclaimapplication,
submitted marriage contract with the deceased member shows that you were married in 1997 or after his
retirementdatehence,youcouldnotbeconsideredhisprimarybeneficiary.
Inviewofthis,weregretthatthereisnootherbenefitdueyou.However,ifyoudonotconformwithus,youmay
fileaformalpetitionwithourSocialSecurityCommissiontodetermineyourbenefiteligibility.3
OnJuly9,2001,thepetitionerfiledwiththeSSCapetitionallegingthatthedenialofhersurvivorspensionwas
unjustified. She contended that Bonifacio designated her and their children as primary beneficiaries in his SSS
FormRS1andthatitwasnotindicatedthereinthatonlylegitimatefamilymemberscouldbemadebeneficiaries.
Section 12B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not, likewise, require that the primary beneficiaries be legitimate
relativesofthemembertobeentitledtothesurvivorspension.TheSSSislegallyboundtorespectBonifacios
designationofthemashis
beneficiaries.Further,Rep.ActNo.8282shouldbeinterpretedtopromotesocialjustice.
OnFebruary6,2002,theSSCpromulgateditsResolutionaffirmingthedenialofthepetitionersclaim.TheSSC
refutedthepetitionerscontentionthatprimarybeneficiariesneednotbelegitimatefamilymembersbycitingthe
definitionsof"primarybeneficiaries"and"dependents"inSection8ofRep.ActNo.8282.Underparagraph(k)of
thesaidprovision,"primarybeneficiaries"are"[t]hedependentspouseuntilheorsheremarries,thedependent
legitimate,legitimatedorlegallyadopted,andillegitimatechildren"Paragraph(e)ofthesameprovision,onthe
otherhand,defines"dependents"asthefollowing:"(1)[t]helegalspouseentitledbylawtoreceivesupportfrom
themember(2)[t]helegitimate,legitimatedorlegallyadopted,andillegitimatechildwhoisunmarried,notgainfully
employed and has not reached twentyone (21) years of age, or if over twentyone (21) years of age, he is
congenitallyorwhilestillaminorhasbeenpermanentlyincapacitatedandincapableofselfsupport,physicallyor
mentally and (3) [t]he parent who is receiving regular support from the member." Based on the foregoing,
according to the SSC, it has consistently ruled that entitlement to the survivors pension in ones capacity as
primary beneficiary is premised on the legitimacy of relationship with and dependency for support upon the
deceasedSSSmemberduringhislifetime.
UnderSection12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.8282,theprimarybeneficiarieswhoareentitledtosurvivorspensionare
thosewhoqualifyas
suchasofthedateofretirementofthedeceasedmember.Hence,thepetitioner,whowasnotthenthelegitimate
spouse of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement, could not be considered his primary beneficiary. The SSC
further opined that Bonifacios designation of the petitioner as one of his primary beneficiaries in his SSS Form
RS1 is void, not only on moral considerations but also for misrepresentation. Accordingly, the petitioner is not
entitledtoclaimthesurvivorspensionunderSection12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.8282.
Aggrieved,thepetitionerfiledwiththeCAapetitionforreviewoftheSSCsFebruary6,2002Resolution.Inthe
assailedDecision,datedApril15,2003,theappellatecourtdismissedthepetition.Citingthesameprovisionsin
Rep.ActNo.8282asthosecitedbytheSSC,theCAdeclaredthatsincethepetitionerwasmerelythecommon
law wife of Bonifacio at the time of his retirement in 1989, his designation of the petitioner as one of his
beneficiaries in the SSS Form RS1 in 1980 is void. The CA further observed that Bonifacios children with the
petitionercouldnolongerqualifyasprimarybeneficiariesbecausetheyhaveallreachedtwentyone(21)yearsof
age.Thedecretalportionoftheassaileddecisionreads:
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,thePetitionisDISMISSEDandtheassailed06February2002Resolutionof
respondentCommissionisherebyAFFIRMEDintoto.Nocosts.

SOORDERED.4
The petitioner sought reconsideration of the said decision but in the assailed Resolution dated December 15,
2003,theappellatecourtdeniedhermotion.Hence,thepetitionersrecoursetothisCourt.
The petitioner points out that the term "primary beneficiaries" as used in Section 12B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282
doesnothaveanyqualification.Shethustheorizesthatregardlessofwhethertheprimarybeneficiarydesignated
by the member as such is legitimate or not, he or she is entitled to the survivors pension. Reliance by the
appellatecourtandtheSSConthedefinitionsof"primarybeneficiaries"and"dependents"inSection8ofRep.Act
No.8282isallegedlyunwarrantedbecausethesedefinitionscannotmodifySection12B(d)thereof.
The petitioner maintains that when she and Bonifacio got married in January 1997, a few months before he
passedaway,theymerelyintendedtolegalizetheirrelationshipandhadnointentiontocommitanyfraud.Further,
since Rep. Act No. 8282 is a social legislation, it should be construed liberally in favor of claimants like the
petitioner. She cites the Courts pronouncement that "the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its
beneficiaries,andthelaw,byitsownterms,requiresaconstructionofutmostliberalityintheirfavor."5
TheSSS,ontheotherhand,contendsthatSection12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.8282shouldbereadinconjunction
withthedefinitionoftheterms"dependents"and"primarybeneficiaries"inSection8thereof.Sincethepetitioner
wasnotasyetthelegalspouseofBonifacioatthetimeofhisretirementin1989,sheisnotentitledtoclaimthe
survivors pension accruing at the time of his death. The SSS insists that the designation by Bonifacio of the
petitionerandtheirillegitimatechildreninhisSSSFormRS1isvoid.
AccordingtotheSSS,thereisnothinginRep.ActNo.8282whichprovidesthat"shouldtherebenoprimaryor
secondarybeneficiaries,thebenefitaccruingfromthedeathofamembershouldgotohisdesignatedcommon
law spouse" and that "to rule otherwise would be to condone the designation of commonlaw spouses as
beneficiaries,aclearcaseofcircumventingtheSSLawandaviolationofpublicpolicyandmorals."6Finally,the
SSSisoftheopinionthatSection12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.8282isclearandexplicithence,thereisnoroomforits
interpretation,onlyforapplication.
IntheResolutiondatedJuly19,2005,theCourtrequiredtheparties,aswellastheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral,
to file their respective comments on the issue of whether or not the proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in
Section12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.8282violatestheequalprotectionanddueprocessclausesoftheConstitution.
The Court believes that this issue is intertwined with and indispensable to the resolution of the merits of the
petition.
In compliance therewith, in its comment, the SSC argues that the proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in
Section 12B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not run afoul of the equal protection clause of the Constitution as it
merelydeterminesthereckoningdateofqualificationandentitlementofbeneficiariestothesurvivorshippension.
Itassertsthatthisclassificationofbeneficiariesisbasedonvalidandsubstantialdistinctionsthataregermaneto
thelegislativepurposeofRep.ActNo.8282.
TheSSCalsoimpugnsthemarriageofthepetitionertoBonifacioafterhisretirementstatingthatitwascontracted
asanafterthoughttoenablehertoqualifyforthesurvivorshippensionuponthelattersdeath.Itfurtheralleges
thatthereisnoviolationofthedueprocessclauseasthepetitionerwasgivenherdayincourtandwasableto
presentherside.
The SSS filed its separate comment and therein insists that the petitioner was not the legitimate spouse of the
deceased member at the time when the contingency occurred (his retirement) and, therefore, she could not be
consideredaprimarybeneficiarywithinthecontemplationofRep.ActNo.8282.TheSSSpositsthatthestatutes
intent is to give survivorship pension only to primary beneficiaries at the time of the retirement of the deceased
member. Rep. Act No. 8282 itself ordains the persons entitled thereto and cannot be subject of change by the
SSS.
TheSolicitorGeneralagreeswiththestancetakenbytheSSSthattheproviso"asofthedateofhisretirement"
merelymarkstheperiodwhentheprimarybeneficiarymustbesotobeentitledtothebenefits.Itdoesnotviolate
the equal protection clause because the classification resulting therefrom rests on substantial distinctions.
Moreover,theconditionastotheperiodforentitlement,i.e.,asofthedateofthemembersretirement,isrelevant
asitsettheparametersforthoseavailingofthebenefitsanditappliestoallthosesimilarlysituated.TheSolicitor
Generalisalsooftheviewthatthesaidprovisodoesnotoffendthedueprocessclausebecauseclaimantsare
giventheopportunitytofiletheirclaimsandtoprovetheircasebeforetheCommission.
Forclarity,Section12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.8282isquotedanewbelow:
Sec.12B.RetirementBenefits.

(d)Uponthedeathoftheretiredmember,hisprimarybeneficiariesasofthedateofhisretirementshallbeentitled
toreceivethemonthlypension.
UnderSection8(k)ofthesamelaw,the"primarybeneficiaries"are:
1.Thedependentspouseuntilheorsheremarriesand
2.Thedependentlegitimate,legitimatedorlegallyadopted,andillegitimatechildren.
Further,the"dependentspouse"and"dependentchildren"arequalifiedunderparagraph(e)ofthesamesection
asfollows:
1.Thelegalspouseentitledbylawtoreceivesupportuntilheorsheremarriesand
2. The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully
employedandhasnotreachedtwentyone(21)yearsofage,orifovertwentyoneyearsofage,heiscongenitally
orwhilestillaminorhasbeenpermanentlyincapacitatedandincapableofselfsupport,physicallyormentally.
TheSSSdeniedthepetitionersapplicationforsurvivorspensiononthesolegroundthatshewasnotthelegal
spouse of Bonifacio "as of the date of his retirement" hence, she could not be considered as his primary
beneficiaryunderSection12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.8282.
TheCourtholdsthattheproviso"asofthedateofhisretirement"inSection12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.8282,which
qualifies the term "primary beneficiaries," is unconstitutional for it violates the due process and equal protection
clausesoftheConstitution.7
Inananalogouscase,GovernmentServiceInsuranceSystemv.Montesclaros,8theCourtinvalidatedtheproviso
in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 11469 which stated that "the dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said
pensionifhismarriagewiththepensioneriscontractedwithinthreeyearsbeforethepensionerqualifiedforthe
pension."Inthesaidcase,theCourtcharacterizedretirementbenefitsaspropertyinterestofthepensioneraswell
ashisorhersurvivingspouse.Theproviso,whichdeniedadependentspousesclaimforsurvivorshippensionif
thedependentspousecontractedmarriagetothepensionerwithinthethreeyearprohibitedperiod,wasdeclared
offensivetothedueprocessclause.Therewasoutrightconfiscationofbenefitsduethesurvivingspousewithout
givinghimorheranopportunitytobeheard.Theprovisowasalsoheldtoinfringetheequalprotectionclauseas
itdiscriminatedagainstdependentspouseswhocontractedtheirrespectivemarriagestopensionerswithinthree
yearsbeforetheyqualifiedfortheirpension.

Forreasonswhichshallbediscussedshortly,theproviso"asofthedateofhisretirement"inSection12B(d)of
Rep.ActNo.8282similarlyviolatesthedueprocessandequalprotectionclausesoftheConstitution.
Theprovisoinfringestheequalprotectionclause
Asillustratedbythepetitionerscase,theproviso"asofthedateofhisretirement"inSection12B(d)ofRep.Act
No. 8282 which qualifies the term "primary beneficiaries" results in the classification of dependent spouses as
primarybeneficiariesintotwogroups:
(1)ThosedependentspouseswhoserespectivemarriagestoSSSmemberswerecontractedpriortothelatters
retirementand
(2) Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were contracted after the latters
retirement.
Underlying these two classifications of dependent spouses is that their respective marriages are valid. In other
words, both groups are legitimate or legal spouses. The distinction between them lies solely on the date the
marriagewascontracted.Thepetitionerbelongstothesecondgroupofdependentspouses,i.e.,hermarriageto
Bonifaciowascontractedafterhisretirement.Assuch,sheandthosesimilarlysituateddonotqualifyas"primary
beneficiaries" under Section 12B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 and, therefore, are not entitled to survivors pension
underthesameprovisionbyreasonofthesubjectproviso.
Itisnotedthattheeligibilityof"dependentchildren"whoarebiologicaloffspringsofaretiredSSSmembertobe
consideredashisprimarybeneficiariesunderSection12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.8282isnotsubstantiallyaffectedby
the proviso "as of the date of his retirement." A biological child, whether legitimate, legitimated or illegitimate, is
entitledtosurvivorspensionuponthedeathofaretiredSSSmembersolongasthesaidchildisunmarried,not
gainfullyemployedandhasnotreachedtwentyone(21)yearsofage,orifovertwentyone(21)yearsofage,he
or she is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of selfsupport,
physicallyormentally.
Ontheotherhand,theeligibilityoflegallyadoptedchildrentobeconsidered"primarybeneficiaries"underSection
12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.8282isaffectedbytheproviso"asofthedateofhisretirement"inthesamemanneras
the dependent spouses. A legally adopted child who satisfies the requirements in Section 8(e)(2)10 thereof is
consideredaprimarybeneficiaryofaretiredSSSmemberuponthelattersdeathonlyifthesaidchildhadbeen
legallyadoptedpriortothemembersretirement.OnewhowaslegallyadoptedbytheSSSmemberafterhisorher
retirement does not qualify as a primary beneficiary for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension under
Section12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.8282.
Inanycase,theissuethatnowconfrontstheCourtinvolvesadependentspousewhoclaimstohavebeenunjustly
deprivedofhersurvivorspensionunderSection12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.8282.Hence,thesubsequentdiscussion
will focus on the resultant classification of the dependent spouses as primary beneficiaries under the said
provision.
Asearlierstated,thepetitionerbelongstothesecondgroupofdependentspouses,i.e.,hermarriagetoBonifacio
wascontractedafterhisretirement.Sheandthosesimilarlysituatedareundoubtedlydiscriminatedagainstasthe
proviso "as of the date of his retirement" disqualifies them from being considered "primary beneficiaries" for the
purposeofentitlementtosurvivorspension.
Generally, a statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal
protection clause of the law.11 With respect to Rep. Act No. 8282, in particular, as a social security law, it is
recognized that it "is permeated with provisions that draw lines in classifying those who are to receive benefits.
Congressional decisions in this regard are entitled to deference as those of the institution charged under our
schemeofgovernmentwiththeprimaryresponsibilityformakingsuchjudgmentsinlightofcompetingpoliciesand
interests."12
However,asinotherstatutes,theclassificationinRep.ActNo.8282withrespecttoentitlementtobenefits,tobe
validandreasonable,mustsatisfythefollowingrequirements:(1)itmustrestonsubstantialdistinctions(2)itmust
begermanetothepurposeofthelaw(3)itmustnotbelimitedtoexistingconditionsonlyand(4)itmustapply
equallytoallmembersofthesameclass.13
ThelegislativehistoryofRep.ActNo.8282doesnotbearoutthepurposeofCongressininsertingtheproviso"as
ofthedateofhisretirement"toqualifytheterm"primarybeneficiaries"inSection12B(d)thereof.TotheCourts
mind,however,itreflectscongressionalconcernwiththepossibilityofrelationshipsenteredafterretirementforthe
purpose of obtaining benefits. In particular, the proviso was apparently intended to prevent sham marriages or
thosecontractedbypersonssolelytoenableonespousetoclaimbenefitsupontheanticipateddeathoftheother
spouse.
This concern is concededly valid. However, classifying dependent spouses and determining their entitlement to
survivors pension based on whether the marriage was contracted before or after the retirement of the other
spouse, regardless of the duration of the said marriage, bears no relation to the achievement of the policy
objectiveofthelaw,i.e.,"providemeaningfulprotectiontomembersandtheirbeneficiariesagainstthehazardof
disability,sickness,maternity,oldage,deathandothercontingencies
resultinginlossofincomeorfinancialburden."14Thenexusoftheclassificationtothepolicyobjectiveisvague
and flimsy. Put differently, such classification of dependent spouses is not germane to the aforesaid policy
objective.
ForifitweretheintentionofCongresstopreventshammarriagesorthoseenteredincontemplationofimminent
death, then it should have prescribed a definite "durationofrelationship" or durational period of relationship as
oneoftherequirementsforentitlementtosurvivorspension.Forexample,intheUnitedStates,aprovisionintheir
social security law which excludes from social security benefits the surviving wife and stepchild of a deceased
wage earner who had their respective relationships to the wage earner for less than nine months prior to his
death,wasdeclaredvalid.15Thus,ninemonthsisrecognizedintheUnitedStatesastheminimumdurationofa
marriage to consider it as having been contracted in good faith for the purpose of entitlement to survivorship
pension.
In contrast, the proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12B(d) in Rep. Act No. 8282 effectively
disqualifies from entitlement to survivors pension all those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to
retired SSS members were contracted after the latters retirement. The duration of the marriage is not even
considered.Itisobservedthat,incertaininstances,theretirementageunderRep.ActNo.8282issixty(60)
yearsold.16 A marriage contracted by a retired SSS member after the said age may still last for more than ten
years, assuming the member lives up to over seventy (70) years old. In such a case, it cannot be said that the
marriage was a sham or was entered into solely for the purpose of enabling one spouse to obtain the financial
benefits due upon the death of the other spouse. Nonetheless, the said surviving spouse is not entitled to
survivorspensionbecauseheorsheisnotaprimarybeneficiaryasofthedateofretirementoftheSSSmember
followingSection12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.8282.
Further, the classification of dependent spouses on the basis of whether their respective marriages to the SSS
memberwerecontractedpriortoorafterthelattersretirementforthepurposeofentitlementtosurvivorspension
doesnotrestonrealandsubstantialdistinctions.Itisarbitraryanddiscriminatory.Itistoosweepingbecausethe
proviso"asofthedateofhisretirement,"whicheffectivelydisqualifiesthedependentspouseswhoserespective
marriagestotheretiredSSSmemberwerecontractedafterthelattersretirementasprimarybeneficiaries,unfairly
lumps all these marriages as sham relationships or were contracted solely for the purpose of acquiring benefits
accruinguponthedeathoftheotherspouse.Theprovisothusundulyprejudicestherightsofthelegalsurviving
spouse,likethepetitioner,anddefeatstheavowedpolicyofthelaw"toprovidemeaningfulprotectiontomembers

and their beneficiaries against the hazards of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death, and other
contingenciesresultinginlossofincomeorfinancialburden."17
Theprovisoinfringesthedueprocessclause
Asearlieropined,inGovernmentServiceInsuranceSystemv.Montesclaros,18theCourtcharacterizedretirement
benefitsasapropertyinterestofaretiree.Weheldthereinthat"[i]napensionplanwhereemployeeparticipation
is mandatory, the prevailing view is that employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension where the
pensionispartofthetermsofemployment."19Thus,itwasruledthat,"wheretheemployeeretiresandmeetsthe
eligibilityrequirements,heacquiresavestedrighttobenefitsthatisprotectedbythedueprocessclause"and"
[r]etirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre
existing law."20 Further, since pursuant to the pertinent law therein, the dependent spouse is entitled to
survivorshippension,"awidowsrighttoreceivepensionfollowingthedemiseofherhusbandisalsopartofthe
husbandscontractualcompensation."21
AlthoughthesubjectmatterintheabovecitedcaseinvolvedtheretirementbenefitsunderP.D.No.1146orthe
Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 197722 covering government employees, the pronouncement
thereinthatretireesenjoyaprotectedpropertyinterestintheirretirementbenefitsappliessquarelytothoseinthe
privatesectorunderRep.ActNo.8282.Thisissobecausethemandatorycontributionsofboththeemployers23
and the employees24 to the SSS do not, likewise, make the retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 8282 mere
gratuitybutformpartofthelatterscompensation.Eventheretirementbenefitsofselfemployedindividuals,like
Bonifacio, who have been included in the compulsory coverage of Rep. Act No. 828225 are not mere gratuity
becausetheyarerequiredtopayboththeemployerandemployeecontributions.26Further,underRep.ActNo.
8282, the surviving spouse is entitled to survivors pension accruing on the death of the member hence, the
survivingspousesrighttoreceivesuchbenefitfollowingthedemiseofthewifeorhusband,asthecasemaybe,is
alsopartofthelatterscontractualcompensation.
The proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 runs afoul of the due
process clause as it outrightly deprives the surviving spouses whose respective marriages to the retired SSS
memberswerecontractedafterthelattersretirementoftheirsurvivorsbenefits.Thereisoutrightconfiscationof
benefitsduesuchsurvivingspouseswithoutgivingthemanopportunitytobeheard.
By this outright disqualification of the surviving spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were
contractedafterthelattersretirement,theproviso"asofthedateofhisretirement"qualifyingtheterm"primary
beneficiaries" for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension has created the presumption that marriages
contractedaftertheretirementdateofSSSmemberswereenteredintoforthepurposeofsecuringthebenefits
underRep.ActNo.8282.Thispresumption,moreover,isconclusivebecausethesaidsurvivingspousesarenot
affordedanyopportunitytodisprovethepresenceoftheillicitpurpose.Theproviso,asitcreatesthisconclusive
presumption, is unconstitutional because it presumes a fact which is not necessarily or universally true. In the
United States, this kind of presumption is characterized as an "irrebuttable presumption" and statutes creating
permanentandirrebutablepresumptionshavelongbeendisfavoredunderthedueprocessclause.27
Inthepetitionerscase,forexample,sheassertedthatwhensheandBonifaciogotmarriedin1997,itwasmerely
tolegalizetheirrelationshipandnottocommitfraud.Thisclaimisquitebelievable.Afterall,theyhadbeenliving
together since 1980 and, in fact, during that time their eldest child was already twentyfour (24) years old.
However,thepetitionerwasnotgivenanyopportunitytoproveherclaimthatshewasBonifaciosbonafidelegal
spouse as she was automatically disqualified from being considered as his primary beneficiary. In effect, the
petitionerwasdeprivedofthesurvivorsbenefits,apropertyinterest,accruingfromthedeathofBonifaciowithout
anyopportunitytobeheard.Standardsofdueprocessrequirethatthepetitionerbeallowedtopresentevidence
toprovethathermarriagetoBonifaciowascontractedingoodfaithandashisbonafidespousesheisentitledto
thesurvivorspensionaccruinguponhisdeath.28Hence,theproviso"asofthedateofhisretirement"inSection
12B(d)whichdeprivesthepetitionerandthosesimilarlysituateddependentspousesofretiredSSSmembersthis
opportunitytobeheardmustbestruckdown.
Conclusion
Even as the proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12B(d) is nullified, the enumeration of primary
beneficiaries for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension is not substantially affected since the following
personsareconsideredassuchunderSection8(k)ofRep.ActNo.8282:
(1)Thedependentspouseuntilheorsheremarriesand
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(2)Thedependentlegitimate,legitimatedorlegallyadopted,andillegitimatechildren.
Inrelationthereto,Section8(e)thereofqualifiesthedependentspouseanddependentchildrenasfollows:

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(1)Thelegalspouseentitledbylawtoreceivesupportfromthemember

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(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed
andhasnotreachedtwentyoneyears(21)ofage,orifovertwentyone(21)yearsofage,heiscongenitallyor
whilestillaminorhasbeenpermanentlyincapacitatedandincapableofselfsupport,physicallyormentally.
Finally,theCourtconcedesthatthepetitionerdidnotraisetheissueofthevalidityoftheproviso"asofthedateof
hisretirement"inSection12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.8282.TheruleisthattheCourtdoesnotdecidequestionsofa
constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.29 However, the question of the
constitutionalityoftheprovisoisabsolutelynecessaryfortheproperresolutionofthepresentcase.Accordingly,
theCourtrequiredthepartiestopresenttheirargumentsonthisissueandproceededtopassuponthesamein
theexerciseofitsequityjurisdictionandinordertorendersubstantialjusticetothepetitionerwho,presumablyin
her advanced age by now, deserves to receive forthwith the survivors pension accruing upon the death of her
husband.
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisGRANTED.TheDecisiondatedApril15,2003andResolutiondatedDecember15,
2003oftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.SPNo.69632areREVERSEDandSETASIDE.Theproviso"asofthe
dateofhisretirement"inSection12B(d)ofRep.ActNo.8282isdeclaredVOIDforbeingcontrarytothedue
processandequalprotectionclausesoftheConstitution.TheSocialSecuritySystemcannotdenytheclaimof
petitionerElenaP.Dycaicoforsurvivorspensiononthebasisofthisinvalidproviso.
SOORDERED.
ROMEOJ.CALLEJO,SR.
AssociateJustice

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HILARIOG.DAVIDE,JR.
ChiefJustice
REYNATOS.PUNO,ARTEMIOV.PANGANIBAN

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AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice
LEONARDOA.QUISUMBING,CONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGO
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ANGELINASANDOVALGUTIERREZ,ANTONIOT.CARPIO
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice
MA.ALICIAAUSTRIAMARTINEZ,RENATOC.CORONA
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CONCHITACARPIO,MORALESADOLFOS.AZCUNA
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice
Onleave
DANTEO.TINGA,MINITACHICONAZARIO
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice
CANCIOC.GARCIA
AssociateJustice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
decisionwerereachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt.
HILARIOG.DAVIDE,JR.
ChiefJustice

Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De GuiaSalvador, with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and

RosmariD.Carandang,concurringRollo,pp.2228.
2AnActFurtherStrengtheningtheSocialSecuritySystemTherebyAmendingforthisPurposeRepublicAct

No.1161,asAmended,OtherwiseKnownastheSocialSecurityLaw.ThelawtookeffectonMay23,1997.
3CARollo,p.26.
4Rollo,p.28.
5Employees Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115858, 28 July 1996, 257 SCRA

717.
6Comment,p.5Rollo,p.37.
7SECTION1,ARTICLEIII,CONSTITUTIONreads:

Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any
personbedeniedtheequalprotectionofthelaws.
8G.R.No.146494,14July2004,434SCRA441.
9 Entitled The Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977. This law has been superseded by

RepublicActNo.8291oftheGovernmentServiceInsuranceActof1997.
10Supra.
11Fariasv.TheExecutiveSecretary,G.R.No.147387,10December2003,417SCRA503.
12Califano,Jr.v.Goldfarb,430US199,51L.Ed.2d270(1977).
13GovernmentServiceInsuranceSystemv.Montesclaros,supra.
14Section2ofRep.ActNo.1161,asamendedbyRep.ActNo.8282.
15Weinbergerv.Salfi,422US749,45L.Ed.2d522.
16Section12Breadsinpart:

Sec.12B.RetirementBenefits. (a) A member who has paid at least one hundred twenty (120) monthly
contributionspriortothesemesterofretirementandwho(1)hasreachedtheageofsixty(60)yearsandis
alreadyseparatedfromemploymentorhasceasedtobeselfemployedor(2)hasreachedtheageofsixty
five(65)years,shallbeentitledforaslongashelivestothemonthlypension:Provided,Thatheshallhave
theoptiontoreceivehisfirsteighteen(18)monthlypensionsinlumpsumdiscountedatapreferentialrate
ofinteresttobedeterminedbytheSSS.
17Supra.
18Supra.
19Id.at448.
20Id.at449.
21Id.
22ThishasbeensupersededbyRep.ActNo.8291otherwiseknownasTheGovernmentServiceInsurance

Actof1997.
23Section19readsinpart:

Sec. 19. Employers Contributions. (a) Beginning as of the last day of the month when an employees
compulsory coverage takes effect and every month thereafter during his employment, his employer shall
pay, with respect to such covered employee, the employers contribution in accordance with the schedule
indicatedinSectionEighteenofthisAct.Notwithstandinganycontracttothecontrary,anemployershallnot
deduct, directly or indirectly, from the compensation of his employees covered by the SSS or otherwise
recoverfromthemtheemployerscontributionswithrespecttosuchemployees.

24Section18readsinpart:

Sec. 18. Employees Contribution. (a) Beginning as of the last day of the calendar month when an
employees compulsory coverage takes effect and every month thereafter during his employment, the
employershalldeductandwithholdfromsuchemployeesmonthlysalary,wage,compensationorearnings,
the employees contribution in an amount corresponding to his salary, wage, compensation or earnings
duringthemonthinaccordancewiththefollowingschedule.
25Section9Areads:

Sec. 9A. Compulsory Coverage of the Selfemployed. Coverage in the SSS shall be compulsory upon
suchselfemployedpersonsasmaybedeterminedbytheCommissionundersuchrulesandregulationsas
itmayprescribe,includingbutnotlimitedtothefollowing:
1.Allselfemployedprofessionals
2.Partnersandsingleproprietorsofbusinesses
3. Actors and actresses, directors, scriptwriters and news correspondents who do not fall within the
definitionoftheterm"employee"inSec.8(d)ofthisAct
4.Professionalathletes,coaches,trainersandjockeysand
5.Individualfarmersandfishermen.
Unless otherwise specified herein, all provisions of this Act applicable to covered employees shall also be
applicabletothecoveredselfemployedpersons.
26Section19Areads:

Sec.19A.ContributionoftheSelfemployedMember.ThecontributionstotheSSSoftheselfemployed
member shall be determined in accordance with Section Eighteen of this Act Provided, That the monthly
earnings declared by the selfemployed member at the time of his registration with the SSS shall be
consideredashismonthlycompensationandheshallpayboththeemployerandemployeecontributions:
Provided, further, That the contributions of selfemployed persons earning One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00)monthlyorbelowmaybereducedbytheCommission.
Themonthlyearningsdeclaredbytheselfemployedmemberatthetimeofhisregistrationshallremainthe
basis of his monthly salary credit, unless he makes another declaration of his monthly earnings, in which
casesuchlatestdeclarationbecomesthenewbasisofhismonthlysalarycredit.
27See,forexample,Jimenezv.Weinberger,417US628,41L.Ed.2d363U.S.DepartmentofAgriculturev.

Murry,413US508,37L.Ed.2d767Vlandisv.Kline,412US441,37L.Ed.2d63.
28 In this connection, it is well to note that, as discussed in Government Service Insurance System v.

Montesclaros,supra,underSection10.4.1oftheImplementingRulesandRegulationsofRep.ActNo.8291
(the present GSIS Law), the surviving spouse who married the member immediately before the members
death is still qualified to receive survivorship pension unless the GSIS proves that the surviving spouse
contracted the marriage solely to receive the benefit. The said Rules acknowledge that whether the
surviving spouse contracted the marriage mainly to receive survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence.
ThesaidSectionreads:
Sec.10.4.AllocationoftheSurvivorshipPensionAmongBeneficiaries.Thesurvivorshippensionshallbe
paidasfollows:
10.4.1. When the dependent spouse is the only survivor, he/she shall receive the basic survivorship
pensionforlifeoruntilhe/sheremarries.Forpurposesofthissection,themarriageofthesurvivingspouse
immediatelypriortothedeathofthememberorpensionershallbeacceptable,unlessitisproventhatthe
marriagewassolemnizedsolelyforpurposesofreceivingthebenefit.
29AlgerElectric,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.L34298,28February1985,135SCRA37.

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