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Abstract
This paper explores how theories of the planning fallacy and the outside view may be used to conduct quality control and due diligence in
project management. First, a much-neglected issue in project management is identied, namely that the front-end estimates of costs and benets
used in the business cases, costbenet analyses, and social and environmental impact assessments that typically support decisions on projects
are commonly signicantly different from actual ex post costs and benets, and are therefore poor predictors of the actual value and viability of
projects. Second, it is discussed how Kahneman and Tversky's theories of the planning fallacy and the outside view may help explain and remedy
this situation through quality control of decisions. Third, it is described what quality control and due diligence are in the context of project
management, and an eight-step procedure is outlined for due diligence based on the outside view. Fourth, the procedure is tested on a real-life,
multibillion-dollar project, organized as a publicprivate partnership. Finally, Akerlof and Shiller's recent discussion in economics of ring the
forecaster is discussed together with its relevance to project management. In sum, the paper demonstrates the need, the theoretical basis, a practical
methodology, and a real-life example for how to de-bias project management using quality control and due diligence based on the outside view.
2012 Elsevier Ltd. APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Quality control; Due diligence; Front-end management; Planning fallacy; Outside view; Forecasting; Costbenet analysis; Ex-post analysis; Daniel
Kahneman
1. Introduction
1.1. Third Wave research
The 2011 Oxford Handbook of Project Management identifies
a third wave in project management research characterized by a
positioning of the management of projects as a vital part of general
management (Morris et al., 2011:3). With projects taking center
stage as delivery model for products and services in most
The author wishes to thank Daniel Kahneman for generously taking the time
to discuss in several meetings and correspondence the idea of quality control
and due diligence of decision making, based on theories of the planning fallacy
and the outside view. The author also wishes to thank Alexander Budzier, Ole
Jonny Klakegg, Jens Krause, Jrgen Laartz, Petter Nss, and Martin Wachs for
their valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper. Research for the paper
was supported in part by The Danish Council for Strategic Research.
E-mail address: bent.yvbjerg@sbs.ox.ac.uk.
0263-7863/$36.00 2012 Elsevier Ltd. APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2012.10.007
in a given project is a key activity, and maybe the most consequential one, because ideally estimates inform the decision of
whether projects will go ahead or not. 1 Furthermore, the quality
of estimates will highly influence whether a project is deemed
successful or not in meeting its objectives. Yet, as pointed out by
Edkins et al. (2012:6) there is little about this in the research
literature, nor about how the quality of estimation may be improved. It is the purpose of the present paper to help fill this gap in
the literature.
Specifically, the paper brings Nobel prize-winning economic
theory about the planning fallacy and the outside view, developed
by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, to bear upon quality
control and due diligence in the management of projects.
Previous studies have documented a much-neglected topic in
research and practice, namely that ex ante estimates of costs and
benefits used in the business cases, costbenefit analyses, and
social and environmental impact assessments that typically
support decisions on projects are often significantly different
from actual ex post costs and benefits (Flyvbjerg, 2009). As a
result, such business cases, costbenefit analyses, and social and
environmental impact assessments are typically poor predictors
of the actual value and viability of projects and cannot be trusted
as a basis for informed decision making. The idea proposed in the
present article is:
1. to develop quality control and due diligence to establish just
how reliable, or unreliable, the business case, costbenefit
analysis, and social and environmental impact assessment are
for a given project, and
2. to decide the implications of this for the project go-ahead.
Kahneman and Tversky did not develop their theories with
these purposes in mind. The thesis is, however, that their theories
will be highly effective in quality control and due diligence
of planned projects and thus in improving decision making on
projects. The existing literature on quality control, due diligence,
and risk assessment in project management does not cover this
particular approach to improved decision making (Breakwell,
2007; De Meyer et al., 2002; Fischoff, 2002; Perminova et al.,
2008; Winch, 2010).
Due diligence is generally an evaluation of the assets of a
company, an investment, or a person. Here, due diligence is
specifically understood as an evaluation of the costs and benefits
deriving from investing in a given project, and especially whether
the estimated costs and benefits for that project are likely to
materialize. Due diligence is thus developed to be used as quality
control of business cases, costbenefit analyses, and the
go-decision in projects. Data to test the thesis are drawn from a
large database on estimated and actual costs and benefits in major
projects and programs. Theory and methodology are developed at
a level of generalization sufficiently high to allow their use, not
1
This is assuming that the project has not fallen victim to lock-in at an earlier
stage and that promoters are genuinely interested in understanding outcomes,
which is not always the case, for instance where promoters have locked in on a
certain design or construction interests dominate operations interests (Cantarelli
et al., 2010).
761
762
763
methods alone will not solve the problem, because any method
can be gamed (Winch and Maytorena, 2011:354). Better
methods need to go hand in hand with better incentives. 3
Finally, promoters' forecasts should be made subject to quality
control and due diligence by other parties, including banks and
independent bodies such as national auditors or independent
analysts. Such bodies would need the outside view or similar
methodology to do their work. Projects that were shown to have
inflated benefit-cost ratios would not receive funding or would
be placed on hold. The higher the stakes, and the higher the
level of political and organizational pressures, the more pronounced will be the need for measures like these. In the next
section we will see what quality control and due diligence
based on the outside view might look like in practice. 4
4. What is due diligence?
Due diligence is a term used for the performance of an
investigation of a business, an investment, or a person with a
certain standard of care. Due diligence may be a legal obligation,
but the term more commonly applies to voluntary investigations.
Common examples of due diligence are the process through
which a potential buyer evaluates a target company or its assets
for acquisition or the process through which a potential investor
evaluates a major investment for its costs and benefits. The theory
behind due diligence holds that performing this type of investigation contributes significantly to informed decision making by
enhancing the amount and quality of information available to
decision makers and by ensuring that this information is systematically used to deliberate in a reflexive manner on the
decision at hand and all its costs, benefits, and risks (Bing, 2007;
Chapman, 2006).
Here, focus will be on the process through which a potential
investor, public or private, may evaluate a major planned investment for its costs, benefits, and risks. To perform due
diligence of the estimated costs and benefits for a planned project
involves an evaluation of whether the cost and benefit forecasts in
the project's business case are likely to be over- or underestimated and by how much. Like other forecasters, cost and
benefit forecasters are faced with the following two basic
questions:
1. What is the expected value of the variable being forecasted
(here costs and benefits of the project in question)?
2. What is the variance of the expected value, i.e., the likelihood
that the value will be, say, 5, 10 or 50% lower or higher than
the expected value?
3
The wider issue of the politics of business case development are detailed in
Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter (2003) and Flyvbjerg et al. (2005),
including the design and implementation of incentive structures that would
make decision making well-informed and accountable.
4
The existence of strategic misrepresentation does not exclude the
simultaneous existence of optimism bias, and vice versa. In fact, it is realistic
to expect such co-existence in forecasting in large and complex ventures and
organizations. This again underscores the point that improved methods and
measures of accountability must go hand in hand if the attempt to arrive at more
accurate forecasts is to be effective.
764
Table 2
Accuracy in 27 rail demand forecasts. Accuracy is measured as actual divided by
forecast demand for the first year of operations. The standard deviation is
measured for actual divided by forecast demand. (Source: Flyvbjerg et al., 2005).
Forecast
765
27 rail projects
25 rail projects, excluding
statistical outliers
Average accuracy
Standard deviation
0.61
0.49
0.52
0.28
Table 3
Accuracy in 62 rail demand forecasts. Accuracy is measured as actual divided
by forecast demand for the first year of operations. The standard deviation is
measured for actual divided by forecast demand. (Source: Flyvbjerg database).
62 rail projects
61 rail projects, excluding
statistical outlier
Average accuracy
Standard deviation
0.63
0.59
0.41
0.33
766
that is, the overestimate was 100% on average and half the
forecasted passengers never showed up on the trains. Accuracy
in the new, larger sample of forecasts is approximately the same
as in the earlier, smaller sample. Without statistical outliers,
accuracy is 10 percentage points higher in the larger sample
than in the smaller one, although accuracy is still low with
actual demand being 41% lower than forecast demand on
average. This is equivalent to rail demand forecasts being
overestimated by 69% on average. Again standard deviations
are high indicating high risks of large errors in rail demand
forecasting.
Table 4 shows the quartiles for the expanded study with and
without the statistical outlier. The difference between including
and excluding the outlier is small. In what follows the figures
without the outlier are used, taking into account the possibility
that the outlier may be caused by measurement error.
The table shows that for 25% of rail projects actual demand
is 65% lower or more than forecast demand, equal to an
overestimate in forecasts of 186% or more in a quarter of cases.
For half the projects in the sample actual demand is 49% lower
or more than that forecast, equal to a overestimate of 96% or
more. Finally, the table shows that for 75% of rail projects
actual demand is 22% lower or more than forecast, equal to an
overestimate in demand forecasts of 28% or more for these
projects.
The numbers show that the risk of overestimates in rail
demand forecasts is high. For instance the risk is 50:50 of an
overestimate of 96% or more. It is the data for these 62 rail
demand forecasts that are used as a benchmark against which
other rail demand forecasts may be measured, including the
A-Train forecast.
Table 5
Main results from benchmarking of A-Train downside case against outcomes of
61 actual rail demand forecasts.
Standard deviation
95% confidence level
Likelihood of demand shortfall
of 15% or more
A-Train
downside case
Benchmark
(61 forecasts)
9.1%
15% shortfall
5%
33%
85% shortfall
80%
Table 4
Quartiles for accuracy in 62 rail demand forecasts. Accuracy is measured as
actual divided by forecast demand for the first year of operations (source:
Flyvbjerg database).
62 rail projects
61 rail projects, excluding statistical outlier
25%
50%
75%
0.36
0.35
0.54
0.51
0.79
0.78
A-Train (planned)
1
2
3
4
5
60
75
85
95
100
41
49
68
51
55
767
First-year
demand
overestimate,
%
Later-year
demand
overestimate,
%
Mode share
for rail
overestimate,
%
Comment by
National Audit
Office
Project 1
Project 2
500
175
350
n.a.
n.a.
completely
failed grossly
overestimated"
768
Table 8
Expected outcome and confidence intervals for A-Train demand, provided the
A-Train forecast is neither more nor less accurate than demand forecasts in the
benchmark.
Expected outcome
With 90% confidence
With 80% confidence
With 50% confidence
Actual/forecast
demand
First-year
passengers, mio
0.59
0.151.10
0.231.01
0.350.78
8.3
2.115.5
3.214.2
4.911.0
769
Table 9
Accuracy of demand forecasts for privately funded rail projects, first-year demand.
Project type
Actual/forecast demand
5 private projects
56 public projects
All projects (61)
0.30
0.62
0.59
770
their own forecasts, or (b) they knew and misinformed about it.
Either way, these unfounded claims, contradicted by the data,
eroded trust in the forecaster and their forecast.
For the above reasons, the forecaster's claim was rejected
that because the A-Train involves private funding the A-Train
demand forecast is likely to be more accurate than the forecasts
in the benchmark.
14. Are projects unique?
The second claim made by the A-Train forecasters under
step seven of the due diligence was that projects are unique and
therefore cannot be compared, including to benchmarks. This is
a claim often made by forecasters and project managers.
Nevertheless, the claim is wrong. 5
It is correct that infrastructure projects typically have physical,
locational, or other characteristics that are unique. The claim is
incorrect, however, in the sense that research shows, with a very
high level of statistical significance, that despite physical or other
uniqueness rail and other infrastructure schemes are statistically
similar in the sense that they are highly likely to have large
demand shortfalls and large cost overruns (Flyvbjerg, 2007a,
2007b). Statistical similarity is all that is needed for statistical
prediction, and statistical prediction based on the outside view is
an effective means to improve accuracy in forecasts as demonstrated by Flyvbjerg (2006).
This is the approach taken by the UK Treasury (2003:1),
when they observe about project appraisal:
There is a demonstrated, systematic, tendency for project
appraisers to be overly optimistic. To redress this tendency
appraisers should make explicit, empirically based adjustments to the estimates of a project's costs, benets, and
duration it is recommended that these adjustments be based
on data from past projects or similar projects elsewhere.
Similar here means statistically similar and although the
type of adjustments recommended by the UK Treasury were
neglected by the A-Train forecaster such adjustments appear to
be exactly what would be needed to produce a more reliable
demand forecast for the A-Train. The data from past projects and
similar projects elsewhere, mentioned by the UK Treasury, are
data like those presented above in the benchmark. The use of such
data has been made mandatory in the UK by the UK Treasury
and the UK Department for Transport (2006) to adjust for
optimism bias in UK transportation cost forecasts following
the methodology described in Flyvbjerg (2006). The Danish and
5
Recent research on major ICT projects shows that one of the most reliable
predictors of larger-than-normal cost overrun is project management seeing
their project as unique (Budzier and Flyvbjerg, 2011; Flyvbjerg and Budzier,
2011). This is easy to understand. Managers who see their projects as unique
believe they have little to learn from other projects. They therefore accumulate
less knowledge and experience to inform their decisions. This, in turn, may
prove ruinous, especially in analyzing and managing risk, which, per denition,
requires knowledge of variation across projects and thus a view of projects as
non-unique, at least in a statistical sense.
771
6
Most likely, the forecast will prove to be less accurate than the benchmark,
as explained above, but the forecast is unlikely to be a statistical outlier.
772
7
A gray area exists between deliberate misrepresentation and innocent
optimism. Forecasters may know, or have a hunch, that their forecasts are likely
to be optimistic. However, they may decide not to investigate further and not to
correct for possible optimism, because they assume, often for good reason, that
optimistic forecasts are more likely to get projects approved than realistic ones.
Such behavior has been called the "conspiracy of optimism" (Gardener and
Moffat, 2008; Hirt, 1994; Weston et al., 2007). But this term is an oxymoron, of
course. Per denition, optimism is non-deliberate, unintentional, and thus
innocent. People who deliberately decide or conspire to be optimistic, are not
optimistic; they are practicing strategic misrepresentation and are thus lying.
773
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