ART.II SEC.

BAYAN (BagongAlyansangMakabayan), JUNK VFA MOVEMENT, BISHOP TOMAS

MILLAMENA (Iglesia Filipina Inde-pendiente), BISHOP ELMER BOLOCAN (United
Church of Christ of the Phil.), DR. REYNALDO LEGASCA, MD, KILUSANG MAMBUBUKID
NG PILIPINAS, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, GABRIELA, PROLABOR, and the PUBLIC
INTEREST LAW CENTER, petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY DOMINGO SIAZON, DEFENSE SECRETARY ORLANDO
MERCADO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, SENATE PRESIDENT MARCELO
FERNAN, SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, SENATOR BLAS OPLE, SENATOR RODOLFO
BIAZON, and SENATOR FRANCISCO TATAD, respondents.
G.R. No. 138570. October 10, 2000.*

Facts:
On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a
Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in
the Philippine territory by United States military personnel. To further strengthen
their defense and security relationship, the Philippines and the United States
entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the
parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed
forces, public vessels, and aircraft.
In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991,
the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the
military bases agreement. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected
the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect,
would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines.With the
expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the periodic military exercises
conducted between the two countries were held in abeyance. Notwithstanding, the
defense and security relationship between the Philippines and the United States of
America continued pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty.

ISSUES:

Does the VFA have binding effect upon the states concerned?

Does the VFA violate the prohibition against nuclear weapons under Article II,
Section 8?(ISSUE

FOR ART.2 SEC.8)

RULING:

Yes.
In international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive
agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the
negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. International
law continues to make no distinction between treaties and executive
agreements: they are equally binding obligations upon nations. In our
jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive agreements
even without the concurrence of the Senate or Congress.
Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, declares that the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.

No.
military bases established within the territory of another state are no
longer viable because of the alternatives offered by new means and
weapons of warfare such as nuclear weapons, guided missiles as well
as huge sea vessels that can stay afloat in the sea even for months
and years without returning to their home country. These military
warships are actually used as substitutes for a land-home base not
only of military aircraft but also of military personnel and facilities.
Besides, vessels are mobile as compared to a land-based military
headquarters.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant
petitions are hereby DISMISSED.(Ruling for section 8 also)

Lim v Executive Secretary, GR No. 151445, April 11, 2002

Facts: This case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition as well as a petition-inintervention, praying that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-called
"Balikatan 02-1" and that after due notice and hearing, that judgment be rendered issuing a
permanent writ of injunction and/or prohibition against the deployment of U.S. troops in Basilan
and Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution.
Beginning January of this year 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of
America started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in
"Balikatan 02-1." These so-called "Balikatan" exercises are the largest combined training
operations involving Filipino and American troops. In theory, they are a simulation of joint
military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered
into
by
the
Philippines
and
the
United
States
in
1951.
The entry of American troops into Philippine soil is proximately rooted in the international antiterrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the tragic events that
occurred
on
September
11,
2001.
On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for
certiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. They were joined
subsequently by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-Iist
organizations, who filed a petition-in-intervention on February 11, 2002.
Held: The Court held that no doubt that the US forces are prohibited / from engaging in an
offensive war on Philippine territory. Yet a nagging question remains: are American troops
actively engaged in combat alongside Filipino soldiers under the guise of an alleged training and
assistance exercise? The Court cannot take judicial notice of the events transpiring down south,
as reported from the saturation coverage of the media. As a rule, it does not take cognizance of
newspaper or electronic reports per se, not because of any issue as to their truth, accuracy, or
impartiality, but for the simple reason that facts must be established in accordance with the rules
of evidence. It cannot accept, in the absence of concrete proof, petitioners' allegation that the
Arroyo government is engaged in "doublespeak" in trying to pass off as a mere training exercise
an offensive effort by foreign troops on native soil. The petitions invite the Court to speculate on
what is really happening in Mindanao. Wherefore, the petition and the petition-in-intervention
were dismissed

J.B.L. Reyes vsBagatsing GR No. 65366 October 25, 1983

Facts:
Retired Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought for a permit from
the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 starting from Luneta
to the gates of the United States embassy. The objective of the rally was to peacefully protest the
removal of all foreign military bases and to present a petition containing such to a representative
of the Embassy so it may be delivered to the United States Ambassador. This petition was to
initially compel the Mayor of the City of Manila to make a decision on the application for a
permit but it was discovered that a denial has already been sent through mail. It also included a
provision that if it be held somewhere else, permit may be issued. The respondent mayor alleges
that holding the rally in front of the US Embassy is a violation of the resolutions during the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted in 1961 and of which the Philippines is a
signatory. In the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines has to comply with such generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The petitioner, on the other
hand, contends that the denial of the permit is a violation of the constitutional right of the
freedom of speech and expression.
Issue
Whether or not the Anti-Bases Coalition should be allowed to hold a peaceful protest rally in
front of the US Embassy
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled to allow the rally in front of the US Embassy to protect the exercise of
the rights to free speech and peaceful assembly and on the ground that there was no showing of
the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of the
permit. These rights are not only assured by our constitution but also provided for in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Between the two generally accepted principles of
diplomatic relations and human rights, the former takes higher ground. The right of the freedom
of expression and peaceful assembly is highly ranked in the scheme of constitutional values.

Tanadavs.angara

Facts:
On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of the Department of Trade and
Industry (Secretary Navarro, for brevity), representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act, for brevity).(for section 19)

Issue:
WTO intrudes, limits and/or impairs the constitutional powers of both Congress and the
Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating
the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos(for section 19)
Does the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the Constitution specially Section 19,Article
II?

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque III, 535 SCRA
265(2007)
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
nullify Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 2006-0012 entitled, Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Executive Order No. 51, Otherwise Known as The Milk Code, Relevant
International Agreements, Penalizing Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes (RIRR).
Petitioner posits that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional and
go beyond the law it is supposed to implement.

Issue:
whether respondents officers of the DOH acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and in violation of the provisions
of the Constitution in promulgating the RIRR

Ruling:
The Court notes that the following international instruments invoked by respondents, namely: (1)
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; (2) The International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and (3) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, only provide in general terms that steps must be taken by
State Parties to diminish infant and child mortality and inform society of the advantages of
breastfeeding, ensure the health and well-being of families, and ensure that women are provided
with services and nutrition in connection with pregnancy and lactation. Said instruments do not
contain specific provisions regarding the use or marketing of breast milk substitutes.

The definition in the RIRR merely merged together under the term "milk company" the entities
defined separately under the Milk Code as "distributor" and "manufacturer." The RIRR also
enumerated in Section 5(w) the products manufactured or distributed by an entity that would

qualify it as a "milk company," whereas in the Milk Code, what is used is the phrase "products
within the scope of this Code." Those are the only differences between the definitions given in
the Milk Code and the definition as re-stated in the RIRR.
Since all the regulatory provisions under the Milk Code apply equally to both manufacturers and
distributors, the Court sees no harm in the RIRR providing for just one term to encompass both
entities. The definition of "milk company" in the RIRR and the definitions of "distributor" and
"manufacturer" provided for under the Milk Code are practically the same.
The Court is not convinced that the definition of "milk company" provided in the RIRR would
bring about any change in the treatment or regulation of "distributors" and "manufacturers" of
breastmilk substitutes, as defined under the Milk Code.
Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with
the objective, purpose and intent of the Milk Code, constituting reasonable regulation of an
industry which affects public health and welfare and, as such, the rest of the RIRR do not
constitute illegal restraint of trade nor are they violative of the due process clause of the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLYGRANTED. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of
Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and VOID for
being ultra vires. The Department of Health and respondents are PROHIBITED from
implementing said provisions.

Shangri-la

Before the Court is this Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Developers
Group of Companies, Inc. (DGCI) praying for the reversal of this Courts Decision of
March 31, 2006.
The certification of non-forum shopping submitted by petitioners is insufficient;
2. The word Shangri-La and S logo were adopted and used by the Kuok Group
as part of their corporate names and the names of their hotels;
3. Petitioners claim of legal and beneficial ownership of mark and logo is
baseless and unwarranted;
4. Change of theory from owner to one who may be damaged as entitled to relief
is not allowable;
5. Finding of registration in patent offices in different countries around the world
is inaccurate;
6. DGCIs registration of the Shangri-La mark and the S logo is valid because
there was at least two months use thereof prior to application;
7. Section 2-A of R.A. No. 166 requires the actual commercial use of trademarks
in the Philippines pursuant to the principle of territoriality applicable to trademarks.
Hence, petitioners use of subject marks outside of Philippine territory did not confer
on them any ownership rights thereto under Philippine laws;
8. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals failure to find any bad faith
on the part of DGCI is conclusive on the Supreme Court;
9. DGCIs use of the subject marks in the Philippines is entitled to protection
under the territoriality principle of trademarks.

Ruling:

It would be a great injustice to adjudge the petitioners guilty of infringing a mark

when they are actually the originator and creator thereof.
Nor can the petitioners separate personalities from their mother corporation be an
obstacle in the enforcement of their rights as part of the Kuok Group of Companies
and as official repository, manager and operator of the subject mark and logo.
Besides, R.A. No. 166 did not require the party seeking relief to be the owner of the
mark but any person who believes that he is or will be damaged by the registration
of a mark or trade name.