Koha Digest # 85

EDITORIAL

DYBESH'S SWIM INTO THE NEXT YEAR

by VETON SURROI

Huti ("Owl") smiled when I phoned him. Differing from the other mornings in the past thirty
years, he woke up with a smile coming out from a dream. He had dreamed that he had gone
out in town with Dybesh and that all their friends and pals were greeting him as they entered
the different cafes in town...

Dybesh got his nickname because since childhood he was good a throwing dice while playing
backgammon. And, he loved Europe since very early, and early he learned Italian in Milan;
German in Switzerland and Germany - and later, Greek too. When he had put on some
weight, he had decided that it was time to go back home, and he opened a discrete cafe near
the park.

Europe, nevertheless, attracted them. He knew the streets, short- cuts, and goat-paths. He had
even gone to visit Albanian asylum seekers in a refugee camp in Germany. There he had met
"Xhaja", the best midwife the Gynaecological Clinic in Prishtina had, an old neighbor from
Prishtina.

Dybesh started towards Europe. And after some days, he appeared in "Euronews", in the form
of a passport the Italian maritime policemen were showing the TV cameras. The motor-scuff,
he and several Albanians were riding, had drowned while attempting to get to the other shore.
This was the news of the day in a part of Europe.

During these days, many who have known Dybesh asked of his whereabouts. Apart from the
Italian salvation teams, the family also got involved in his search. The question remains
unanswered. In fact, the known elements can give one answer: the movement of the sea and
time.

The Adriatic will remain where it is, seeing off people and their occurrences with its waves.
From the year that is ending into the coming year. The enigma which a Human can't solve is
how many of us are remaining to say to this ending year: "take away all the evil from us". Not
the people.

The weekly Koha (The Times) was published in Prishtina (Kosovo) between 1994 and 1997. Edited by Veton
Surroi, a young Kosovar journalist and one of the pioneers of democratisation in former Yugoslavia, Koha
soon became a symbol of quality among the region's media. In 1997 it started to be published daily under the
name of Koha Ditorë. W ith the kind permission of Mr. Surroi, Koha digests were originally posted on
http://koha.estudiosbalcanicos.org.
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KOSOVA

DELINEATION OF THE AUTONOMY IN BONN

by FADIL GASHI / Bonn

During December, Bonn was visited by the two top Albanian

leaders: Kosova's President, Rugova and the President of Albania,
Berisha. The visits took place one after the other in a one week
frame, and the visits were at the highest levels. Dr. Rugova met
with Kinkel, while Berisha was received by the political and
statal hierarchy: he was received by President Herzog, Chancellor
Kohl and Speaker or the Parliament Ryta Sysmuth. The Kosova
problem was focused by both presidents. While Berisha's visit was
followed by quite some pomposity, Rugova's visit was followed by
silence. Deutsche Welle and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung were
the only media to inform about the visit. The explanation could
be found maybe with the lack of interest about the south while
Bosnia was burning hot. Nevertheless, there could be another
reason: the media here is alarmed only when they are convinced
that something can be a real boom. Then, they pay attention. Even
though there is not enough interest, this should not be
understood as a barometer of the political interests and postures
of, in this case, of the German state. The sole fact that Rugova
was received by Kinkel is quite enough to prove the above.

We have repeated in previous occasions that the posture of the

German policy towards the crisis in the Former Yugoslavia is and
has been principled. It had a principled posture in the case of
the northern republics and it has been so in the case of Bosnia.
There is no reason, therefore, to make an exception in Kosova's
case. With Rugova's visit to Bonn, it seems as if the German
posture became crystal clear. The German officials told Dr.
Rugova what their posture was and where are they concentrating
their efforts on. According to Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
a conservative newspaper and which follows the governmental
posture: "Kinkel promised the Kosova Albanian political leader
in occupied Kosova that he would support Rugova's attempts to
solve the conflicts in the region. He expressed his regret that
Kosova's question has not been included much in the international
conferences on the Former Yugoslavia nor the peace agreement on
Bosnia. Now, Kinkel told Rugova, we must turn the international
alarming light towards Kosova and do all we can to help the
people there. Belgrade can count on the full membership in
international instances, long-term loans, and an approximation
with the EU, only after the solution of Kosova's problem. The
German government, together with his European partners, aims at
the installation of a broad political and cultural autonomy for
Kosova and finding a modality for the rights of the Serb minority
there, within the borders of the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro)".

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This is the official German posture which was also communicated
to the Serbian side, which seems to have agreed to this solution.
It was communicated once again to Berisha (President Herzog, in
his visit to Albania had defined this option for the first time).
Seemingly, President Berisha has agreed to this option, and the
indication is his statement to Focus magazine, where he, among
others said: "Albanians must understand that democracy implies,
at the same time, willingness for compromise".

The opinion is that the German posture is in full correlation

with the American posture.

Now, when this posture is repeated constantly as a "possible-

real" solution, and a solution of compromise but also of
imposition, reactions of the Albanian political subjects should
be expected, i.e., the political parties, the government and the
President. This reaction will be interesting, because the whole
strategy of the Kosovan policy was developed on grounds of
patience and expectations from the West, while the internal
factor had almost no importance.

If the American-German solution (broad autonomy) is imposed and

is thrown on the table in front of the Albanian political factors
as a solution (path) without any alternatives ("take it or leave
it") then the problem that will arise will be related to the
institutions of the Republic of Kosova, i.e., the Presidency, the
Government as well as the highest document, the Constitution of
Kaçanik.

The westerners are always careful to refer to President Rugova

as "political leader of Kosova Albanians". How will be the rest,
the Government or the Premier, referred to as?
There are rumors that state that the West will pressure (for the
realization of the brad autonomy project for Kosova) on President
Rugova to exclude the premier and the Government from the future
negotiations between Prishtina and Belgrade, because of their
strong statehood attributes. According to a reliable source, this
process has already started. A German journalist, who wishes his
name not to be revealed says that this is so, since Rugova met
with Kinkel and didn't take Bukoshi with him, although the latter
was in Bonn at that time.

President Rugova's visit to Bonn was closely followed by the

Kosova Albanian emigration in Germany, who is "dying" to see the
solution to Kosova's problem according to the will of the
Albanian people.

Among those there are people that consider scandalous the facts
that Rugova met with Kinkel not inviting his Premier and that he
ignored Kosova's "embassy" in Bonn, where he didn't even drink

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a cup of coffee. The truth is that the majority of them are
fearing an inter-Albanian explosion within these relations. Is
this fear grounded? We'll see.

1995/1996

WHAT IS EXPECTING US?

by VETON SURROI / Prishtina

As this year is ending, we can for sure say that this will be the
last year in which we live the way we are living now. This is not
a deep philosophical thought or visionary fortune-telling, but
it is simplicity of life. Things will not be the way they were
yesterday.

This feeling of final balance can lead one to make forecasts for
the next year. What will happen with us in Kosova in 1996? I
would broaden the question, however, with other regions of all-
Albanian areas: what will happen with Albania and Macedonia? This
has to be so, because as we are approaching the descent in the
last decade of this century, as in any other historical impact,
the fates of Kosova, Albania and Macedonia will ever more be
linked than it is imagined.

What will happen? This is what has happened so far: the Balkans
have been and are being recomposed after the death of the Soviet
Union; in this process, Albania has come out from its half-
century long isolation and is being revealed as a strategic point
because of the recomposition of the Balkans; Kosova has suffered
the phase of its general degradation during the destruction of
Yugoslavia, escaping war but, nevertheless, remaining an open
political issue, while Macedonia has been converted into a state,
safeguarded by the international interest, with a process of
internal development which is on the road.

Perceiving it thus, we could say that the whole Albanian space

in the Balkans is going forward. What seems at times to be a
stagnation in the political activity of the Albanian factors in
this space, could be attributed (as it happens often) to the lack
of "an all-Albanian national project", but it would be unjust to
say that the political activity so far was lacking a head. On the
contrary, and even though many times even instinctively, the
political activity of the Albanians in the '90 was grounded on
the democratic movement of Eastern Europe - how to build a
democratic parliamentarian system of human rights and market
economy.

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In this direction, the Albanian activity so far has made
strategically different moves compared to the other national
movements in the Balkans of these times. The activity was
asymmetric towards the others and the Albanians proper. Differing
from Croats and Serbs, which were stiff in the position of
building a statehood with new territories, Albanians were forced
by the conditions, and bit, by their own choice, to
institutionalize the statehood of Albania, to strengthen their
institutional presence in Macedonia and to try a keep (or create)
a semi-institutionalized statehood in Kosova.

The results so far are clearly asymmetric. Within the Albanian

space, the advance of Albania could be qualified as of first rank
(despite the incidental deviations, this a stable advance towards
parliamentarian democracy, full restructuring of the economy
towards market economy and an evident advance in the area of
human rights), that of Albanians in Macedonia of second rank (the
Albanian institutional presence is stronger than ever, but
evidently insufficient for the needs of Albanians), while in
Kosova there is evident stagnation. In fact, arguments stronger
than reality would be necessary to classify Kosova's advance as
third ranking.

The general trend, in conditions in which they are being

developed, is not expected to change. Albania will go towards its
Europeization next year, and two factors will be decisive in
Tirana's speed. On one hand, the parliamentarian elections, where
a stronger position of the left could be expected (as it happened
in Eastern Europe), but maybe within a structure of the
parliament when none of the parties will have the majority. If
this position in the parliament is reached, it will be reflected
in a need for a new consensus within the society, with further
democratization, but also with a democratic instability. The
second factor will be, at first sight, the flow of events in
Bosnia as the signs of new European defense policy. The
intervention in Bosnia, the presidential elections in Russia, the
strengthening of the former Communists in Eastern Europe, can
hasten NATO's decision to accept new members in this association,
and even though Albania does not fulfil the "outer shell" of the
conditions (contemporary and strong army, an economy which could
finance this army, democratic tradition to rule), its geo-
strategic position could influence positively Albania's
approximation towards NATO, especially having in mind the
American role in the alliance.

This whole trend has influenced Tirana's behavior towards the

Albanian developments in Macedonia and Kosova. In both, official
Tirana will support the western efforts to safeguard the
integrity of Macedonia and the establishment of self-
administration in Kosova. And in both developments, more than

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Tirana's word, the decisive factor will be the internal dynamics.
In Kosova, the Dayton Agreement could have been understood in
different ways, but it is to believe that President Rugova was
told both in Washington and in Bonn, that the one-year period the
Bosnia operation and the outer wall sanctions against Belgrade
will last, opens new political processes which include Kosova.

This space implies the new handling of Kosovan requests: it is

not important right now for Kosova to express the list of music
wishes, but the foundation of statehood. In fact, if the Helsinki
Charter proclaims the non-alteration of the borders by violence,
and if Albania and Albanians in the Balkans have adhered to it,
this only means that, right now, the borders between the former
SFRY and Albania can't be changed without Belgrade's consent. The
essence of the Kosovan problem in the past decades was not in the
relations between Belgrade and Tirana, but between Prishtina and
Belgrade, and the emphasis of the political activity in the
future will be the character of relations between Prishtina and
Belgrade. Next year, there will be talks about these relations
within a state frame, and the Albanians will be asked to be more
pragmatic, i.e., to express themselves within a broad process of
developments in the Balkans.

The key word in the future conversations Belgrade-Prishtina will

not be the form of Kosovan self-administration (autonomy or
whatever the name), but sovereignty. If the principle of non-
alteration of the borders by force is accepted, this doesn't mean
that there can't be developments of relations between the equal
and the sovereign. Both leaderships, the Serbs and the Albanian,
will have to face big challenges: Belgrade - because it needs to
get rid of the outer wall sanctions as soon as possible,
Prishtina - because it will face a game which it hasn't played
so far, that of the politics on and behind the scene.
In Macedonia, the Dayton factor should be multiplied by the post-
Gligorov factor. In fact, since the integrity of this state is
not questioned any more, after the agreement with Greece and the
future normalization with Serbia, the internal political
movements can't be treated any longer as "threat to territorial
integrity", and thus there can be a harsher political struggle.
On the other hand, the whole process of the urgency to find a
modus vivendi between the ethnic communities in Macedonia was
hastened with the attempt against Gligorov's life, and the
understanding that the architect of this model of Macedonia will
soon have to leave the scene. Therefore, the announcements for
the need to have a historical agreement between Macedonians and
Albanians, the announcements of a new Albanian policy in
Macedonia or the strengthening of the Bulgarian identity in this
state, are not that infrequent in this state.

Macedonia will face big tests, not only trying to find a modus

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vivendi between the ethnic communities, but also to keep the
politics of equidistance towards its neighbors.

But, someone will say, where is all this movement directed in a

divided and uncoordinated space? Why isn't a national strategy,
a plan prepared? The answer could be that it is being prepared
now. It's name is recomposition of the Balkans. It is trying to
find a new security system, a new model of future political and
economic cooperation, and all of this with the eyes turned
towards the West. Albanians, in their states, remain to project
themselves in it, in the future.

INTERVIEW

MORTON ABRAMOWITZ, Chairman of the Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace

... DAYTON IS MORE JUST THAN WAR

Interviewed by DUKAGJIN GORANI / Prishtina

KOHA: What are the chances of success of the Dayton Agreement,

which is commented to be a forced choice between Peace and
Justice?

ABRAMOWITZ: There are different opinions in the USA about the

Dayton Agreement. There are many that doubt that peace can be
reached during the 12 months of truce - and that conflicts will
start as soon as NATO troops leave - with the small difference
that the Muslim forces can arm themselves during this period and
will be capable of defending themselves after the Americans
leave. Others believe that the NATO presence in Bosnia will add
a new psychological factor in Bosnia's scene and that along with
the economic reconstruction and the implementation of the
agreement, a frame for the beginning of the peace process can be
offered - which would lead towards renewed coexistence. I believe
we should have high expectations. Why?

Because, as long as there is no unique Bosnia, the separation

will again be violent and there will be no stability in the whole
of the Former Yugoslavia.

Is the Dayton Agreement unjust? Yes, but I tend to believe in

what President Izetbegovic said, that the agreement is less
unjust than war. The USA and its allies reached this agreement
with disgusting people, because the West was not willing to
impose justice through this conflict, and not only in Dayton. The
continuation of fighting would only accomplish the certain

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division, and in no way would it safeguard unique and multi-
ethnic Bosnia. It will depend on the will of the parties and the
international community during the implementation of the
agreement whether justice will be sacrificed.

KOHA: How will Bosnia influence the Presidential elections in the

USA?

ABRAMOWITZ: The Dayton Agreement is a policy of high risk for

Clinton's Administration. Even though it is something very
unpopular today, it, nevertheless, doesn't ruin Clinton's
authority. Because of the concern with the internal economic
issues, I don't see that foreign policy of the state can turn
into the main issue during the 1996 presidential campaign- unless
something very bad happens in Bosnia; in our strategic relations
with Russia; in Haiti where the turmoil could cause a new wave
of refugees towards Florida, the key electoral state.

KOHA: "Outer wall sanctions" against Yugoslavia remain. There are

claims that these can be used as means of pressure to force
Serbia to give up on repression in Kosova...

ABRAMOWITZ: I am in no position to get involved in Milosevic's

internal policy. Looked upon from here, it seems that Milosevic
has a strong control of power, despite the fact that he gave up
on the violent policy that lead to war. Nevertheless, he came to
Dayton with the desperate need to reach an agreement. It seems
that Milosevic understood that he needs peace if he wants to go
back to Europe. This offers some indications towards the fact
that the conviction the West has towards Serbia forces it towards
some calculations. Serbia continues to systematically violate the
human rights, including minority and citizens' rights. Such a
violence towards the fundamental rights is not only an internal
affair of Serbia. There will be no stability for the Southern
Balkans if there are no guarantees for equal rights for all
Albanians - and minorities in general - wherever they live. We
have seen Milosevic change his skin each time it was of his
convenience. In order to evade the conflict, the first step would
be to revitalize the comprehensive dialogue between the two
parties.

KOHA: Should there be any parallelism between the status of

Republika Srpska as foreseen by Dayton Agreement and Kosova?

ABRAMOWITZ: Ancient and contemporary history show that no issue

in the Balkans can remain isolated from the others and ignoring
any of them will harm us all. Nothing can be surpassed. The lack
of international interest and activity has contributed to the
terror in Bosnia for years, which Dayton tried to close. It is
a real great irony that Dayton, which was signed by Milosevic,

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offers Serbs effective autonomy within Bosnia - despite the fact
that Serbia suspended the autonomy of Kosova in 1989 and refused
to reinstall it.

However, while Dayton implies the realities of ethnic

separations, it also offers a frame for the development of a
multi-ethnic state and attempts to make it more than a rhetoric
farce. Something similar goes along with the aspirations of the
Kosova Albanians. I believe that the long-term solution in the
Balkans is political and ethnic pluralism, under democratic rule.

KOHA: Could you something about The Hague Tribunal and its
efficiency...

ABRAMOWITZ: Clinton has always insisted that achieving peace in

Bosnia and persecute war criminals have the same purpose. I
believe that it the governments make the efforts, both can be
achieved. Really, the determination of a piece of justice through
the determination of personal responsibility - which opposes the
collective blame for the crimes committed - is the only way that
can break the terrible cycle of violence and vengeance.

Governments must offer political and financial support to the

Tribunal, so it can operate.

I am impressed by Judge Goldstone's seriousness, professionalism

and independence. I do not doubt that he will go on processing
the proofs, regardless of how up can they take him. The
indictments of the Tribunal were essential for the exclusion of
Karadzic and Mladic from Dayton, which indirectly lead towards
their exclusion from the Bosnian Serb leadership. No one could
have imagined this even six months ago. Dayton started the type
of dynamics that not even the parties that signed it could have
foreseen. Even if some of the accused are not handed over to the
Tribunal, despite the provisions of the agreement, they will
become international highwaymen: as such, they will always remain
an obstacle in the development of their compatriots and their
future. This process is extremely important.

KOHA: Do you think the actual political situation in Kosova can

escalate to war?

ABRAMOWITZ: Rugova and the other Albanian leaders have applied

a rational and moderate non-violent attitude towards the solution
of Kosova's problem - regardless of the harsh repression the
Albanians are exposed to. Many things will depend on the right
implementation of the Dayton Agreement which will lead towards
unique Bosnia. If the West fails to make a unique Bosnia during
this year - if, when NATO leaves, the Bosnian Croats and Serbs
remain in the same secessionist positions and only one small

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Muslim state remains in the middle of the Zagreb-Belgrade road -
I fear that the total violence will erupt throughout Yugoslavia.
Let's see what will happen.

KOHA: Kosova Albanians voted for independence. What are the

chances for the realization of this declaration after the Dayton
agreement, taking into account that this agreement just verified
the theory that no state was created or recognized without war?

ABRAMOWITZ: I do not agree with the last thesis: that no state

was created without the use of violence. Let's take an example
of the present times: take a look at Slovakia and the division
of the previous Czechoslovak state - even though, naturally,
Milosevic is not Vaclav Havel. Dayton, as I said previously, has
generated a new dynamics in the region. My hope is that this will
be decisive in the revitalization of the dialogue between the
parties in conflict, despite the problems and difficulties there.
They must start the process of mutual life again. Regional
reconstruction, investments and development - all of these so
important for the Southern Balkans - can not be achieved in
unstable situations. If something of the kind appears, the
possibility of the increase of chances for the vitalization of
the independence of Kosova, remains, to me, something
unforeseeable.

KOHA: Any chances for UN trusteeship on Kosova -- an infrequent

model? Trusteeship remains also as one of the Kosova Albanians'
requests, which, it is thought, can evade the conflict.

ABRAMOWITZ: You said that this is a rare model. In general, I

believe that the attention the international community is giving
Kosova is important and the continuous attention would be of
great help. Something similar helped Macedonia, where OSCE and
UN have been present for several years in a row. Both
organizations are helping in different ways the implementation
of the Dayton conditions aiming at its application through the
inauguration of the general stability in the region. The
cooperation with these organizations is in the interest of
Serbia. But, I don't see a real possibility for a UN trusteeship.
I hope that there will be no war in Kosova, I tend to believe
that the more of Dayton is implemented, the chances for a
conflict will be reduced. I hope that Serbia will insist more on
its return to the international community. What Belgrade will
decide about Kosova will be a test which will illustrate the
willingness of Serbia to join Europe. The question of Kosova
should be solved in phases. And the stability of Macedonia
depends on it.

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MACEDONIA

ABDURRAHMAN ALITI, Chairman of the PPD:

THE GLOBAL SOLUTION IS THE MOST JUST

Interviewed by ISO RUSI & SELADIN XHEZAIRI / Tetova

At the beginning of this year, Abdurrahman Aliti had declared to

KOHA that if the Macedonian authorities do not respect the
requests of Albanians, then the latter will be forced to "revise
their political course". He says that none of the sides have
changed anything in this year, but warns that: "Then I had said
that if the Parliament of Macedonia doesn't fulfil our requests,
it will remain without any Albanian MPs. I believe time has come
for me to revise this posture: I will say it clear and loud, that
it will remain without PPD's MPs."

KOHA: Sorry, but the latest information is that the government

too, may remain without your representatives, without the
Albanian ministers?

ALITI: Yes, the things are going in that direction. Especially

having in mind that the Law on Superior Education is in procedure
of adoption. It contains one provision which is very much
disputable: it foresees that education should take place
obligatorily in Macedonian, although it gives the possibility to
the institutions that prepare teachers for elementary schools,
to organize lessons in the languages of the nationalities.

According to our evaluations, this is completely unacceptable

wording. This is why we reaffirmed our posture that if the
Government and Parliament do not change their posture in regard
to this act which regulates the juridical position of the
languages in superior education, and if our right to use our
mother tongue in the Parliament is not legitimized in the Rules
and Regulations, we may reach the situation to ascertain that our
coalition partners are not in favor of further cooperation with
us. In fact, I have informed the highest officials and the
diplomatic circles about our dissatisfaction. I can say that this
disposition is dominant, even unanimous among all our party
structures, and ignoring our efforts is the maximum we can take
and any compromise in this direction would not only be a
deviation from the program orientations of the party, but would
be a flagrant violation of the individual determinations of all
PPD members and its leadership. It is also a matter of human
dignity of the bearers of party, parliamentarian or governmental
posts.

KOHA: But the Macedonian side could easily say that you have been

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repeating this posture for one year, and done nothing in that
respect?

ALITI: The issue can also be discussed thus, but the explanation
is simple: we warned the public in times when the Rules and
Regulations were in procedure, and I may say that this statement
forced this document out of the procedure in the Parliament.
Therefore, our statement was conditioned "if it happens...", but
it didn't. The same thing goes for the Law on Superior Education.
We are saying this while the act is still in procedure and we
don't know the results. We will know what will happen once the
procedure is over. The PPD strongly stands in its determination
to solve the problems within the institutions of the system.

KOHA: But, if these two documents are not discussed or adopted?

This for sure will not solve the problems.

ALITI: This is also a very practical situation: there is no Law

on Superior Education in Macedonia, and its adoption is a "must".
You're right to say that their adoption could be stalled and that
this will not solve the problems, however, I believe that the
Macedonian government has it clear that this is a matter of the
determined will of the Albanian people and that it didn't do much
to improve the situation in education. In brief, this is
something that needs a solution - a solution which will be
acceptable and durable in this political environment and in this
level of development of the democratic processes in Macedonia.
I can't accept that there is no attention for the high school
teaching staff. They too need to be educated in their mother
tongue. 80% of the faculties of the University of Tetova have
started preparing this category of teachers. This is an
obligation of the state, it should cover this gap, for we are
living in a situation where it is completely absurd to claim that
all citizens are equal and that no one is discriminated
against...

KOHA: Then how do you explain the lack of will on the Macedonian
side to solve these modest requests by dialogue?

ALITI: We are conscious that we have been very patient. But we

do this in order to have the arguments in our hands: that we
showed good will and patience for the solution of the problems,
but we have found no cooperation. The issues that we have started
are conditio sine non qua. And, then we will be able to say "we
are forced to ascertain that you are not willing to cooperate".

Thus we will discover the guilty, because we are trying not to

leave any space for such an accusation. Cooperation implies
compromise, respecting the interests and peculiarities of one-
another. Unfortunately, we haven't found this so far in the

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Macedonian establishment.

KOHA: You are accused by your political opponents that you don't
respect the interests of the Albanian population and that your
participation in the government is, in fact, finding a solution
for the status of some of the ministers.

ALITI: I have heard and read those accusations. It is immature

to say that PPD entered the coalition only to get four ministers
and thus harmed the Albanian question. This claim is political
dilettantism because the Albanian interests can't be articulated
by these kind of people. So far, I haven't heard any relevant
political factor, including Albanians, stating that safeguarding
peace and stability in Macedonia is a direct harm for the
interests of the Albanian people in Macedonia. On the contrary.
Our policy is constructed in the way that our proposals are
acceptable for the majority, which is of general interest, after
all.

KOHA: Could you evaluate the effects of participation in

government?

ALITI: I can't do it right now. You will soon get this answer in
the meeting of PPD's Central Board to be celebrated at the
beginning of the coming year.

KOHA: How would you define, then, the government coalition?

ALITI: As an agreement where the weakest always, or in the

majority of the cases, is sentenced to lose.

KOHA: You spoke of the possibility to conditionally leave the

Parliament and Government. The University of Tetova and the fact
that it is ignored by the Macedonian Government seem not to leave
much manoeuvring space. What if you do leave?

ALITI: Maybe we will see ourselves forced to activate our

defending mechanisms. But, not wanting to prejudge things, our
future political action will depend on the conditions and
circumstances to follow. And this only refers to the PPD and not
the others.

KOHA: Some say that the solution would be to cause a political

crisis and establish a parallel system!

ALITI: In essence, no one has ever explained what this notion

means. In essence, we don't base our actions on what some, who
are where they are by chance, say. We have a political program
and structure which judges our activities competently.

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KOHA: Your party was one of the three parties that addressed a
letter to President Clinton, before Dayton. The Macedonian
authorities even accused you of not knowing what to request -
that you were ranging from the global solution to the individual
and tiny things.

ALITI: Albanians best know what they want, therefore the

statements of Macedonian officials are groundless. But, in
politics, it happens very often that one can't choose only the
good things, at times one has to choose between the less worst.
Therefore, this would be this gradation, and things should not
be confused. I am not competent to talk about the solution of
Kosova's problem, because this is defined by their political
subject. According to the information at my disposal and the
contacts with the accredited diplomats in Shkup, I tend to
believe that Kosova's problem will be soon on the agenda. But,
there should not be any illusions that this will mean the final
solution of the Albanian question in general. I believe if the
question of Albanians in Kosova and in Macedonia is not set
properly, these two will always represent focus of future
explosive crisis. And this is not only my ascertainment.

MENDUH THAÇI, Vice-Chairman of PPDSH:

A NEW PHASE IN 1996

FYROM entered the period of democracy with a spiritual luggage

described with Communist exclusiveness, pathetic rhetoric,
endless disposition to manipulate with unrealistic projects,
unsolved economic, inter-ethnic and diplomatic problems with the
neighbors.

In this state of a disputable name, it happened that the Slavic-

Macedonians usurped all societal structures with all institutions
and staff, i.e., the instrument they used to accomplish political
projects and ideas, meanwhile Albanians, on the other side, with
a big energy to separate from the bitter past, including projects
and staff, but without experience, without standards, without
structure.

The first managed to easily manipulate with this energy putting

it under the control of the system.

With this trot towards the political awareness, in the first

phase, the Albanian political rookies ascertained that our
political projects do not suit the climate of the Slavic-
Macedonian institutions and agave up on them so easily, meanwhile
in the second phase in 1994 and especially in 1995, this

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deviation was publicly ascertained.

1995 for the Albanians in FYROM means a new phase to dimension

bigger requests (the University of Tetova), in the unconcealed
evaluation of political thoughts and actions, the national and
political awareness and finally the productive installation of
the relation between the position and opposition. The Albanian
position has lost that idiotic relaxation in posts, it is
fighting with all it has with that bit of remaining power, for
the executive chairs full of thorns, for a bit of self-respect
by courting Albania and Kosova which they once arrogantly
ignored, meanwhile on the other side the opposition, by following
closely the position made it more important in the system, it is
creating it more space in the system to slowly tear down the
obstacles which go down as the rope around the neck loosens,
frees the energies, makes the emancipation from collective
frustrations possible, etc.

In 1996, the Albanian political subject will pass onto the third
phase, it will elaborate and realize jointly the political
projects.

The precondition for this is the rejection to the system that

deforms our being, our projects, where are force is weakened.
Rejecting something that causes pain and deformation will force
the establishment which continues to recycle the Communist
exclusiveness and the Rankovic-type anti-Albanianism, to give up
on the project to tame Albanians.

When this phase will end, the institutional structuring of

Albanians will start, and we will gain a democratically chosen
post which will elaborate and realize the projects. This will
help eliminate all marginal energies, all those black holes which
aim at disappearing our political, education and other projects.

ETEM AZIRI, Vice-Chairman of the PDP:

NATURAL AND REAL HOMOGENIZATION OF THE ALBANIAN POLITICAL

SUBJECT

1995 is characterized by e serious engagement of the

International Community, especially the USA, to solve the crisis
in B&H and wider in the former Yugoslavia. These efforts ended
up with the Dayton Agreement and the Paris Treaty.
It can also be ascertained that the efforts of the international
community in the solution of the crisis in the Former Yugoslavia
have been discriminating against the Albanian people, for only
the solution of the problems of the warring people was given

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priority.

The going year, in regard to the Albanian people in general, is

characterized by:

- the results that the diplomacy of the Albanian state achieved

in the consolidation and development of the democratic and
economic processes in Albania;

- the permanent engagement of the leadership of the Republic of

Kosova and other structures for the just solution of the question
of Kosova based on the expressed political will of the Albanian
people in Kosova;

- and the political engagement of Albanians in Macedonia which

almost offered nothing new. Albanian political subjects continued
with their old tradition and the initiatives for the coordination
of issues of national interest didn't give the expected results.

We hope that in 1996 the International Community will approach

more seriously the solution of the Albanian question, for without
the just solution of this issue, the Dayton agreement certified
in Paris, can't provide the peace in the territories of the
Former Yugoslavia and wider.

In respect to the political organization of the Albanians in

Macedonia, the last movements revive the hope that everything
will be heading towards a natural and real homogenization of this
subject.

VIOLENCE

SANTA CLAUS IN TORTURELAND

by ILAZ THAÇI / Prishtina

It has almost become a tradition to see off each year with a

black chronicle of violence applied against the Albanian people
in Kosova. The evidenced cases and their number speak of a wide
spectre of violence and about the unwillingness of the Serbian
government to, at least, start a process which could advance the
mechanisms towards a solution through dialogue and agreement with
Albanians. Milosevic's speech in Mitrovica, interpreted as an
attempt of the Serbian government to involve Albanians in its
system by bringing them back to work, seems to be an empty
phrase, based on the actual situation. Not only that Albanians
didn't go back to work, but there are even cases of dismissals,
although of minor intensity than before. In eleven (December
missing) months of this year, 226 Albanians were dismissed.

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On the other hand, there is data regarding the most serious
manifestation of violence: killings, tortures, mistreatment and
hostages. During 1995, a total of 2.144 people were tortured and
mistreated, and this number includes a quite significant number
of children and women. The number of the mistreated is very hard
to evidence in a precise way, for forms of violence are often
accompanied by a combination of mistreatment and torture.

Therefore, the data is incomplete, because the final account has

not been made yet. But, compared to last year, we can say that
the figures are more or less the same (in 1994, there were a
total of 2.157 cases). In 1994, 18 people were killed, while this
year there are only (!!) 9. However, the institutional violence
in this case seems to be the same if we compare the way people
were murdered. In this year, 5 people died as a consequence of
direct torture by the state and secret police, while last year
there were 6 cases. The police treatment people undergo remains
unchanged. In the majority of the cases the police interventions,
be it detention for interrogations or searches are done
violently.

"Informative talks" remains one of the most often forms of police

activity in Kosova. During 1994, 2.729 cases were evidenced, in
1995, there is a total of 1.916. This number doesn't include the
number of the arbitrarily arrested people: in this year, there
were a total of 2.809 people detained by the police, last year
the figures reached 3.160. These are only the arrested, meanwhile
persons serving prison terms as of this year, make up a total of
183 people. 150 of them were condemned for having allegedly
created the "Ministry of Interior of Kosova", and got a total of
375 years in prison.

There is evidence on 2.373 cases of weapons' searches, which

compared to last year (a total of 6.394), is quite less, but
still quite much. Raids (1.862 in 1995) have also decreased
compared to last year (3.553). Finally, another category: people
being taken hostage, as the harshest form of repression applied
lately, has also been present this year. Until the end of
November 1995, a total of 25 people were taken hostage. This
category is usually comprised of children, women and elder
people.

These three categories, are also subjected to torture. The

incomplete figures (lacking data for the last month of the year)
of the CDHRF, 149 women, 151 children and 21 elderly were
tortured. Looking at the participation of children in categories
of violence, they have much to ask Santa Claus for. But his bag
will be too small to carry all gifts that Albanian children in
Kosova wish for.

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The presented data contains no facts on the persecutions of the
youth and their forcible mobilization in the Yugoslav Army. They
don't contain any data on threats and other forms of violence
either. And even the presented ones, are incomplete, as the
annual report for 1995 will soon be completed and published.
Violence in Kosova is still present in forms it is applied, space
and spectre, and this is why this short chronicle, or rather
recapitulation, doesn't differ much from the past years.

If the data collected by the Council for the Defence of Human

Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF) can serve as a political indicator,
then the forecast for the coming year will not be full of hope.
The coming year will probably be characterized by CDHRF's monthly
reports. Too much work for this HR organization, many tortures
for Albanians and not too much hope that this situation in Kosova
will be surpassed.

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