G.R. No.

183533 September 25, 2012

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND

THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF FRANCIS SAEZ

The petition conforms to the requirements of the Rules on the Writs of

Amparo and Habeas Data
The Court notes that the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the
writs of amparo and habeas data is sufficient as to its contents. The
petitioner made specific allegations relative to his personal circumstances
and those of the respondents. The petitioner likewise indicated particular
acts, which are allegedly violative of his rights and the participation of some
of the respondents in their commission. As to the prerequisite conduct and
result of an investigation prior to the filing of the petition, it was explained
that the petitioner expected no relief from the military, which he perceived
as his oppressors, hence, his request for assistance from a human rights
organization, then a direct resort to the court. Anent the documents sought
to be the subject of the writ of habeas data prayed for, the Court finds the
requirement of specificity to have been satisfied. The documents subject of
the petition include the order of battle, those linking the petitioner to the CPP
and those he signed involuntarily, and military intelligence reports making
references to him. Although the exact locations and the custodians of the
documents were not identified, this does not render the petition insufficient.
Section 6(d) of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is clear that the
requirement of specificity arises only when the exact locations and identities
of the custodians are known. The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with the
intent to make it a token gesture of concern for constitutional rights. Thus,
despite the lack of certain contents, which the Rules on the Writs of Amparo
and Habeas Data generally require, for as long as their absence under
exceptional circumstances can be reasonably justified, a petition should not
be susceptible to outright dismissal. From the foregoing, the Court holds that
the allegations stated in the petition for the privilege of the writs of amparo
and habeas data filed conform to the rules. However, they are mere
allegations, which the Court cannot accept hook, line and sinker, so to
speak, and whether substantial evidence exist to warrant the granting of the
petition is a different matter altogether.

G.R. No. 193636 July 24, 2012

MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA V. P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy
designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones right to
the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a persons right to
control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the
writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on
the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
Considering that even the Latin American habeas data, on which our
own Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins from the
European tradition of data protection, this Court can be guided by cases on
the protection of personal data decided by the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR). Of particular note is Leander v. Sweden, in which the ECHR
balanced the right of citizens to be free from interference in their private
affairs with the right of the state to protect its national security. In this case,
Torsten Leander (Leander), a Swedish citizen, worked as a temporary
replacement museum technician at the Naval Museum, which was adjacent
to a restricted military security zone. He was refused employment when the
requisite personnel control resulted in an unfavorable outcome on the basis
of information in the secret police register, which was kept in accordance
with the Personnel Control Ordinance and to which he was prevented access.
He claimed, among others, that this procedure of security control violated
Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights on the right to
privacy, as nothing in his personal or political background would warrant his
classification in the register as a security risk