7 22 14 Notice of Non-Service of 4 23 14 Order and Response To SCR 117 Petition in 60975

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
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IN RE: THE MATTER OF

ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ.
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) CASE 60975
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NOTICE OF NON-SERVICE OF COURTS ORDER OF 4/23/14 AND RESPONSE TO

SCR 117 PETITION
The undersigned, Coughlin, submits this on his own behalf to apprise this
Honorable Court of the fact that he never received a copy of its Order of 4/23/14 and only
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became aware of it upon it being referenced in the attachment to an email of 7/9/14 from
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the State Bars Laura Peters, which also attached an Order of 6/30/14 in this same case.
Coughlin has confirmed with the Clerks Office that such 4/23/14 Order was
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mailed to the Washoe County Detention Center, and received as return to sender by the
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Clerks Office on May 2, 2014. Coughlins incarceration ended on 4/18/14. Coughlin
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apprised the Clerks Office and OBC of his change of address shortly after his release (see
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attached 5/7/14 correspondence to Clerks Office attached in addition to Coughlins filing
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of 5/7/14 in 65587 listing his current address therein), however, the Clerks Office did not
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remail such returned to sender 4/23/14 Order to Coughlin.
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Coughlin has made several respectful telephone calls (leaving voice mails) and
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emails to the SBN since April 18, 2014 (please see attached Coughlins correspondences
to the OBC Of 5/2/14 and 5/12/14 and one of 7/22/14 informing the OBC that Coughlin is
scheduled to be evaluated by Dr. Nielsen on 7/25/14) and received nothing in the way of a
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response other than the filing by the OBCs Machado of 6/3/14 in 62337, until Peters
email of 7/9/14. The late filed Status Report filed by the OBCs Pattee on approximately
7/11/14 indicates that this Courts Order of 4/23/14 was received by the OBCs Las Vegas
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Office, then forwarded to its Reno Office, yet not, apparently, received by the Reno
Office. Coughlin did, on July 12th, 2014, finally receive a copy of this Courts 6/30/14
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from this Court. The delay in Coughlins receiving from this Court its 6/30/14 Order in
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60975 seems to indicate that Coughlins address of record with this Court, at least as far as
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this case is concerned, had yet to be updated at the time entry of such 6/30/14 Order.
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Coughlin recognizes that he should have (if indeed he failed to) specifically
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indentified to the Clerks Office each case he is a party to and presented a more obvious
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indication that he was no longer incarcerated and that the address listed on the pleadings
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he filed following his release was then his current address. Nonetheless, had the OBC
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contacted Coughlin to inform him of the medical expert chosen by the State Bar (as
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required by this Courts 4/23/14 Order) and thereafter timely complied with its dictate that
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the OBC file a status report by 5/23/14, over two months progress in this matter, and,
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seemingly, in the companion disciplinary proceeding in 62337 could have been better
utilized.
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
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It is relevant to note that the substance of NNDB Chairman Susichs SCR 117
Petition in 60975 has been addressed by Respondents filings in 62337, and Respondent
seeks to incorporate such herein again here now. The undersigned hereby denies the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 22 of the SCR 117 Petition.

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Gist of the SCR 117 Petition is:
-numerous complaints received,
-Screening Panel believes Coughlin is either mentally ill or addicted to something,
yet they are not sure which and offer nothing in the way of evidence to support any
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accusation that Coughlin is suffering any sort of chemical dependency, much less one
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sufficient to render him incapable of practicing law. As support for the apparent
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accusation that Coughlin is incapable of practicing due to mental infirmity or illness
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the Petition makes mention of only three filings (one of 2/21/12, another of 3/5/12,a dn a
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third of 3/7/12) Coughlin submitted on his own behalf, as a pro se criminal defendant
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forced to represent himself where Coughlin had never practiced on a single criminal matter
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at any point in his career at such time.

-some unattributed hearsay alleging that Coughlins admission had been deferred,
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with some condition that he receive psychological counseling, thereafter admitting that
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Coughlin was admitted to practice law, albeit managing to incorrectly state the date of
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Coughlins admission to practice (off by some eights months).

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-some alleged refusal to cooperate with Bar Counsel regarding the investigation
and resolution of such purported grievances
-an alleged conviction for petty larceny of a candy bar and cough drops from a
Wal-Mart store, which was allegedly affirmed on appeal
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-an alleged contempt citation purporting Coughlin to have disregarded the
directives of the judge making demeaning statements such WOW and laughing during
testimony and questioning the judges authority
-another petty larceny arrest occurring 17 days prior to the Wal-Mart petty larceny
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arrest. No conviction alleged.

Neither of the filings the NNDB attached to its SCR 117 Petition establish that
Coughlin demonstrated any inability to render adequate legal service by reason of mental
or physical illness or infirmity, or addiction to, or dependence upon, intoxicants or drugs.
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They may establish that Coughlin was undergoing an adjustment reaction to a tumultuous
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period in his life (breakup of a four year long domestic partnership, extreme familial strife,
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difficulty finding employment during a period in Washoe County witnessing 15%
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unemployment, and at least two wrongful arrests) wherein he was not a very likable or
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charming fellow. Coughlin was never committed, nor ever subject to inpatient treatment
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for drug or alcohol addiction.

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One, RMC Judge Nash Holmes vacated both of the orders attached as Exhibits 4
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and 5 to such SCR 117 Petition herein by way of her attached 4/9/14 Order(s) of Dismissal
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(which begat this Courts 5/16/14 Order in 62337 in response to Coughlins attaching such
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Orders of Dismissal to his 4/22/14 filing in 62337) of such case (which Coughlin was
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never permitted to appeal nor even challenge by Writ of Mandate to whatever extent
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Pengillys proviso applies to a pro se attorney defendant found in contempt).i

CJS ATTNCLI 70: Grounds for suspension; Mental or physical
illness, alcoholism, or drug addiction 45k38; Civil Rightsk1072
Commitment for the treatment of mental illness likewise may
warrant suspension or disbarment.[2] Under some disciplinary rules, the
inability to render adequate legal service by reason of mental or physical
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illness or infirmity, or addiction to, or dependence upon, intoxicants or

drugs warrants suspension.[5]
[FN2] Fla.The Florida Bar v. Major, 270 So. 2D 7 (Fla. 1972).
Extended hospitalization The fact that a hospitalized attorney was
suffering from a depressed state of mind and would require treatment over
an extended period of time warranted suspension, under circumstances.
Mont.In re Meyer, 141 Mont. 167, 377 P.2D 364 (1962).
Indefinite suspension permitted Under compelling facts, a
court has the power to suspend an attorney indefinitely until such
time as his or her mental competency is confirmed. N.Y.Matter of
Rochlin, 100 A.D.2D 263, 474 N.Y.S.2D 14 (1st Dep't 1984).
Personality disorder Continued suspension from practice on an
indefinite basis, subject to further order of court, is merited where an
attorney suffering from a personality disorder is continuing to undergo
treatment on a regular basis in psychoanalytical psychotherapy.
N.J.In re Fleisher, 66 N.J. 398, 331 A.2D 611 (1975). [FN5] Md.
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Cooper, 279 Md. 605, 369 A.2D 1059
(1977). Indefinite suspension appropriate (1) The appropriate sanction for
appearing in the office in an intoxicated condition, while conferring with
clients, and depositing moneys of clients in a personal account is
indefinite suspension, not disbarment. S.C.Matter of Rushton, 286 S.C.
543, 335 S.E.2D 238 (1985). CJS ATTNCLI 70
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Simply put, Coughlin has at no time been incapable of practicing law, and has not
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done anything bad enough to get disbarred for, much less to justify a suspension of the
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length to which his current temporary suspension has already run (ie, over two years).
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Coughlin has punished himself enough, it is time to let him get on with his life.
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The SCR 117 Petition her does not allege anything even close to Coughlin
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appearing in the office in an intoxicated condition while conferring with clients, much less
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misappropriating any client funds. Further, it is interesting to note that, while the SBNs
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8/23/12 SCR 105 Complaint at issue in 62337 included amongst its vague charges both of
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the filings by Coughlin attached as Exhibits 2 and 3 in the SCR 117 Petition in 60975 of
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5/30/12, come time for the disciplinary hearing, the SBN completely abandoned any
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attempt to paint such as misconduct of any sort (not even within the faux SCR 117 style
RPC 1.1 competence approach the SBN constantly took during such SCR 105,
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102/111(8) formal disciplinary hearing (versus the plural proceedingsto reference the
distinction between the process set forth in an SCR 111(8) referral and those inherent to
SCR 105 Complaints and or SCR 102 Petitions being filed).
Clearly, the SBN abandoned any attempt to paint those two filings by Coughlin as
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misconduct considering what they really revealed was that Coughlin brought to light the
fact that the Washoe County Sheriffs Office currently burglarizes tenants instead of
following the dictate of NRS 40.253 requiring a tenant be given 24 hours from receipt of
a summary removal order prior to the Sheriff effecting a summary lockout. The fact that it
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is the Washoe County District Attorneys Office (which employs the same NNDB member
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DDA Bruch Hahn that sat on Coughlins April 2012 Screening Panel) which defends the
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Washoe County Sheriffs violations of NRS 40.253 incident to the manner in which it
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conducts summary lockouts, its obviously quite troubling.
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One could go on about Washoe Legal Servicess Director Elcanos daughter also
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being an attorney employed with the WCDAs Office and DDA Kandaras (also a NNDB
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member) and WLS failing to accord Coughlin access to legal tools during a curiously
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lengthy recent incarceration (November 7th, 2013 to April 18th, 2014) (apparently a public
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officer for the purposes of an SCR 111(6) analysis is not the same as for an NRS
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169.163/NRS 193.019 inquiry, see SBNs January 30th, 2014 SCR 111 Petition in
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64903) but surely there are better ways to cultivate the access to justice in Nevada than
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to continue on with some of these losing battles.

Additionally, such trespass conviction was vacated by RMC Judge Nash Holmes as
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well, though, and only after Washoe Legal Services and its Director Elcano got the
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dismissals and waivers and withdrawals it sought, did RMC Judge Gardner purport to
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somehow undo the 4/9/14 Order of Dismissal in such trespass case entered by Judge
Holmes (please see SBNs 6/3/14 filing in 62337 and Coughlins response thereto).
Further, the IFP attached as Exhibit 6 to the SCR 117 Petition has been addressed
in 62337 at length. In summary, such was filed 12/14/11 (though an Order by Judge
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Howard contained a seeming scriveners error in according such an 11/14/11 filing
datewhich contributed to some vague sense the SBN and NNDB attempted to put
forward that Coughlin somehow failed to identify himself as an attorney either within such
filing (he did, in both the fax cover page thereto and in the email to the Reno Municipal
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Court he attached such to after RMC Clerk Ballard communicated, in writing, permission
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to submit such filings by email..never mind the fact that the trial was 11/30/11at the
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conclusion of which attorney Coughlin plead for a stay of his summary three day
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incarceration of any length at all in an attempt to avoid prejudice to his clientswhich
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RMC Judge Howard summarily dismissed, only to subsequently refuse to file the
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transcript Nevada Constit. Art 6 Sec 8 specifically allowed the Legislature to require the
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justice file per NRS 189.030(3).

This is one of the SBN and NNDBs darker moments here, this baseless IFP quasi-
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allegation. Curiously, the SCR 117 Petition fails to allege Coughlin failed to identify
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himself as an attorney prior to such IFP Motion being filed (whereas the SBNs 8/23/12
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Complaint in 62337 sort of manages to feebly allege that, whereas the Panel in 62337 free23
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styled on that by deemimg some alleged failure to identify any income from the practice
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of law be at least close to a violation of RPC 8.4(c) (despite such alleged being not pled
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in violation of Schaefer). Whichever, it is all ridiculous and grasping. Coughlin was
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making next to no money trying to practice law and do whatever else he could to make
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ends meet at such time as that IFP Motion/Declaration was signed (November 22, 2011,
which Coughlin refilled on December 14, 2011some local judges refuse to acknowledge
Buckwalter, insisting broke people with no money pay a notary $5 for every IFP
Application to have an Affidavit rather than a Declaration (very ironic this Courts fine decision in
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60302 reversing in part where Coughlins suit against WLS and its Director Elcano was dismissed based
upon a ruling that Coughlin using the 2JDCs own Declaration of Proof of Service of the Summons and
Complaint somehow was ineffective where NRCP 4 references an affidavit) despite NRS 53.045).
The court there was well aware Coughlin was then an attorney licensed in Nevada
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representing clients. To suggest that Coughlin thereafter either attempted to mislead

anyone (which is not what the SCR 117 Petition alleges) by listing his self employment as
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a Jack of All Trades making $800 a month (RMC Judge Howard cares not for ADKT
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411s dictates, finding them optional) is unsupportable.

Indeed, the SBNs 8/23/12 Complaint in 62337 (which is not at issue here, but
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since Coughlin got to litigate 60975 (or was forced to) in the setting of 62337, why not?...)
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failed to even allege Coughlin failed to identify any income from the practice of law
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(rather, the Panel threw that in in an attempt to bolster its embarrassing 12/14/12 Findings
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of Fact; Conclusions of Law and the Recommendation buried therein.

This SCR 117 Petition, though, rather, seems to just point out that Coughlin was
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poor and appears to point to such as a stand in for his being crazy, mentally ill, unfit,
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whateverSusich wrote: 18. On December 14, 2011, Respondent filed an Affidavit of
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Poverty in support of his Motion to Proceed Informa Pauperis. In his Affidavit,

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Respondent alleges that he has almost no income and refers to himself as being employed
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as a 'Jack of All Trades." Funny, when was the last time Susich/OBC/NNDB filed an
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SCR 117 Petition because an attorney was making too much money? Since when is
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indicating one has almost no income (not hard to believe during the time period of
November 22nd, 2011 to December 14th, 2012, here, given the wrongful arrest of Coughlin
on 8/20/11 (the first of many), which, by the way, involved and allegedly depended upon
the warrantless search of a smart phone, something the United States Supreme Court has
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recently decided is a Fourth Amendment violationnice precedent: attorneys in Nevada
arguing for the Fourth Amendment must be SCR 117 mentally ill), a wrongful arrest by
a tribal police office on 9/9/11 (in violation of NRS 171.136 and 171.1255, never mind
that Coughlin did not steal anything) for the alleged theft of a candy bar and some cough
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drops, followed quickly by a wrongful no cause summary eviction of a commercial tenant

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in violation of NRS 40.254 served upon along with the Washoe County Sheriffs Office
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and Reno attorney Richard G. Hill, Esq. and Casey D. Baker, Esq. burglarizing Coughlins
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former home law office on 11/1/11 and again at the time of the wrongful criminal trespass
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arrest of 11/13/11 (where WCSO refuses to obey NRS 40.253s 24 hours dictate and the
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WCDA/NNDB/SBN/ and Washoe Legal Services (home of landlord tenant legal aid,
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allegedly) all just countenance such because when you are part of the in crowd, why make
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waves, right? Who wants Washoe County to have anything better than a sub-Third World
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level tenants rights landscape anyways? Never mind that Hill and Merliss had to lie to the
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police to get Coughlin arrested, alleging they warned Coughlin to leave and he refused to
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(once they sussed out that a Summary Lockout Order (particularly one executed
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prematurely, and therefore, stale, void, expired) is not tantamount to a criminal trespass
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warning (oh, I could go on for hours about all the fraud Hill, Baker and Merliss engaged in
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(lying that the term of the lease was 12 months when it plainly states not less than 12
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months and contains nothing in the way of a landlords no cause termination right
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(Coughlin submitted for filing a Petition for Writ of Mandamus in response to 61383
going under but, for some reason, it has never been accorded a case number by this
Courts Clerks Office. http://www.scribd.com/doc/233302390/10-23-13-Submission-of-
Petition-for-Cert-or-Mandamus-Re-Merliss-1708-03628-61383-Receipt-Pending-EFlex
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Mr. Whittemores defense in his disciplinary matter may have been aided by
Coughlins setting out all the arguments that Panel Chair turned attorney for Whittemore
Echeverria (whom curtly dismissed such positions when Coughlin made them and or
sought to lay them out further) later would make on his behalf at to the lack preclusive
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effect of a conviction of a crime (where Coughlin made such arguments with the caveat
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that he did not admit to any convictions existing) (or in Coughlins case in essence, a
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conviction (see p 225 of transcript in 62337, or some conviction allegedly affirmed
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with respect to the matter at issue in 60838, where the SBN and Coughlin now disagree as
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to whether such conviction was even affirmed on appeal (which conviction? The one for
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summary contempt or the petty larceny conviction, where both were allegedly entered on
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the same day, 11/30/11, such contempt conviction being attached to the SCR 117 Petition
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as Exhibit 1) ) or as to such not operating to make irrelevant a respondents intent incident
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thereto (especially for the mitigation analysis, extent of punishment calculus, and, even, as
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to whether respondent guilty of violating, say, RPC 8.4(b) (criminal act reflecting
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adversely on moral character or fitness), or 8.4(c), etc., etc.).

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To specifically address the SCR 117 Petition more clearly than did Coughlins
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6/18/12 submission, where such reads, in relevant part (Respondent hereafter excerpts the
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relevant portions of the SCR 117 Petition with his responses and arguments directed
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thereto in parentheses interspersed therealong):
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The State Bar of Nevada (State Bar), by and through 1. Thomas

Susich, Esq., Chair of the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board (NNDB),
petitions this Honorable Court, as follows:
1. The NNDB Chair has been informed that the State Bar of
Nevada has received numerous (NOTE: more than two? Again, the
OBCs coy attempts to make it appear that 2JDC Judge L. Gardner
somehow submitted a grievance or complaint attaching her vacated
4/13/09 Order After Trial in DV08-01168 brings about curious use of
terms like received and numerous) complaints and/or grievances
regarding the behavior of Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq., Bar #9473
(Respondent).
2. The State Bar designated a Screening Panel to review the
complaints and grievances concerning Respondent Coughlin. The
Screening Panel met on or about April 16, 2012
(NOTE: the Panel actually met on April 10, 2012 and told King he
needed more to get the go ahead to file an SCR 105 Complaint, so King
gathered some more alleged firepower and met again with the Panel on
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4/16/12), and made various findings and recommendations, (NOTE:

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Coughlin has repeatedly been denied access to such, and the conflict
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inherent to having WCDA Hahn sit on such NNDB Screening Panel is
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nearly as troubling as having CAAW Executive Board President 2JDC
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Judge Stephen P. Elliott preside over Coughlins lawsuit against CAAW
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and Washoe Legal Services at issue in the appeal in 60317)

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including the following: Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule

("SCR") 117(2) the Screening Panel believes that Respondent is incapable
of continuing the practice of law because of mental infirmity, illness or
addiction. The Panel recommends the filing of a petition with the Supreme
Court seeking a determination of the attorney's competency. Respondent
has been asked if he wishes to stipulate to the filing of a joint petition
and he does not.
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(NOTE: while it may not even be true to indicate that Coughlin expressed a firm
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refusal to so stipulate, any suggestion that Coughlin did not indicate a willingness to go
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on a temporary suspension of something less burden of proof shifting than the SCR 117
joint disability petition variety, is not true, as Coughlin did express an interest in such an
arrangement with the SBN and NNDB.).
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3. The NNDB Chair has reviewed various materials to evaluate the

recommendation of the Screening Panel to file a petition with the Supreme
Court regarding a mental evaluation of the Respondent under SCR 117.
4. The State Bar Office has informed the NNDB Chair that the
Respondent may have a history of mental illness. The NNDB Chair has
been informed that the Supreme Court issued an order on December 18,
2002, deferring the admission of Zachary B. Coughlin as an attorney at
law in this state. The NNDB Chair has been informed that said deferral
was at least partially based upon a condition that Mr. Coughlin receive
psychological counseling. The NNDB Chair has been informed that
Zachary B. Coughlin was finally admitted to practice law on October 1,
2004.
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(NOTE: well.Coughlin got an email from Christiansen, Esq.s (Sanft) Office

around September 27th, 2004 announcing thatbut, for whatever reason (never made
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known to Coughlin), he was not admitted until May, 2005perhaps another instance of
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something like Coughlin not being served the 4/23/14 Order here, or the SBNs Patrice
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Eichman unilaterally and secretively failing to submit the Request for Consideration
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Coughlin submitted for filing at the conclusion of the deferral period in November
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2003?).
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Regardless, Coughlin does not believe he has any history of mental illness.
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Regardless, the OBC/NNDB offer absolutely nothing in the way of actual factual
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support or even anecdotal evidence to support this innuendo.
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5. The NNDB Chair has received and reviewed the multiple

grievances referred to above.
6. The NNDB Chair has been informed that Respondent has been
notified of the grievances and complaints; but, Respondent has refused
to cooperate with Bar Counsel, regarding the investigation and resolution
of same.
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(NOTE: that is not really true, as Coughlin demonstrates in 62337 (see the 665
pages of correspondence between Coughlin and the SBN prior to the filing of the formal
Complaint on 8/23/12 (nearly all of it from Coughlin to the SBN addressing the
grievances and disproving them), the OBC was quite coy about just what was a grievance,
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how many there were, how many were written by judges, whom submitted what and at
whose behest (which is problematic now that 2JDC Judge L. Gardners 4/13/09 Order
After Trial referred to in Paragraph 21 of the SCR 117 Petition has been shown to have
been vacated by way of her 6/19/09 Final Decree of Divorce (so, perhaps, Susich and
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King ought review RPC 3.1 some and apply it to their own workand perhaps RMC
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Judge William L. Gardner should not take vacated orders passed to him by his sister
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(especially where he refuses to recuse himself from the criminal trespass trial involving
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attorneys Hill and Baker here, only to then violate the mandatory competency evaluation
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stay per NRS 178.405, .415, only to the purport to speak for Judge Nash Holmes in
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answering the OBCs ex parte imploration to set aside the Order of Dismissal vacating
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such criminal trespass conviction that RMC Judge Nash Holmes entered on 4/9/14
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(attached to Coughlins 4/22/14 filing in 62337), exiting 2JDC Judge L. Gardner, three
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years after the fact, and then pass them on to his fellow RMC Judge Nash Holmes without
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mentioning that such order (which allegedly was a sanction) had been vacated by the
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6/19/09 Final Decree of Divorce (but not before WLSs Elcano managed to justify his
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firing legal aid domestic violence attorney Coughlin based solely on such alleged sanction,
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Elcano refusing to back off such decision upon such Order After Trial being vacated, then
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Elcano compounding that questionable approach by showing up to testify at Coughlins
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11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing and feigning to be unaware such had been vacated.
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Also, as to the alleged criminal trespass conviction, RJC Judge Sferrazza

(presiding over the underlying summary eviction proceeding in RCJ Rev2011-001708, see
61383) did not grant Hills Motion for Order to Show Cause pursuant to NRS 22.020, so
no such conduct by Coughlin could possibly be criminal trespass, much less an RPC
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8.4(b) violation, much less support for any SCR 117 disability finding.
The SCR 117 Petition continues:
7. The NNDB Chair has been informed that Respondent has not
requested to be placed on disability status and refuses to acknowledge
that he has any mental infirmity, illness or addiction.
(A review of Coughlins correspondence with the SBN disproves this:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/233304377/2009-to-12-24-12-0204-Emails-to-Nvbar-org925-Pages-Bate-Stamped-Needs-Attachments-With-5-14-and-7-31-RX-PrescriptionHistory
http://www.scribd.com/doc/233304379/5-14-12-Email-to-Dad-and-MelissaApology-and-Zach-Coughlin-Prescription-History
http://www.scribd.com/doc/233304378/7-31-12-0204-email-to-nvbar-orgresending-this-FW-Apology-and-Zach-Coughlin-prescription-medications-information
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It is plainly inaccurate for the OBCs King to stand before the NNDB and
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Panel and indicate Coughlin failed to acknowledge he had some issues. Worse
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still is King, during a face to face meeting with Coughlin in July 2012, imploring
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Coughlin not to provide him with things like his prescription records history,
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which plainly establish a causal correlation between Coughlins divorce from
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his domestic partner of four years in July 2011 and his being unable to afford two
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potent medication he has taken for over a decade (Adderall and Wellbuttrin) in
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August 2011, followed sharply less than two weeks later by the first of what
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would be a number of arrests on 8/20/11(the iPhone case

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(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hxOg8Z0VmuY
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wiW0vnGv6l4 ) involving the warrantless
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search of an abandoned smart phone (verboten under the fourth Amendment) the
finder thereof had given to Coughlin in lieu of following through on his threats to
thrown it in the nearby Truckee River if someone did not claim it (where
Hill/Merliss initiated the wrongful no cause summary eviction of commercial

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tenant Coughlin on 8/22/11), and the candy bar and some cough drops petty
larceny arrest of 9/9/11 at issue in 60838 and 62337).
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9
(Why is the NNDB always indicating it has been informed? Does not SCR
117(2) have any RPC 3.1 requirement? Need not the NNDB even call up a respondent
10
to say, Hey, Guy, whats going on here? Tell us why you are not incapable of
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continuing the practice of law because of mental infirmity, illness, or addiction? Nope,
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the NNDB just took a vacated sanction it attached as Exhibit 6 (2JDC Judge L. Gardners
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4/13/09 Order After Trial), (Coughlin had not even sustained the momentary and void,
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and subsequently vacated criminal trespass conviction of 6/18/12 at the time of the
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NNDBs 5/30/12 SCR 117 Petition filing here, soreally, just what was such based on,
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the allegation that Coughlin had been found trespassing at his former home law office
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during the period in which a stay of such a wrongful summary removal order was entirely
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likely, or misunderstandings incident thereto entirely plausible? Now that Coughlin has
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not been found guilty of criminal trespass, does not that mean Richard G. Hill, Esq. and
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Casey D. Baker, Esq. need to explain their breaking and entering, criminal trespass, and
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invasion of Coughlin and attorney Coughlins clients privacy rights incident to their
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multiple ill advised break ins at Coughlins former home law office and lies incident
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thereto resulting in Coughlins wrongful arrest?)
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- 15/27 -
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Just like SCR 102 requires the NNDB, not the SBN (as was de facto the case here
with King essentially being permitted to stretch out the SCR 111(6) temporary
suspension for now over two yearsEcheverria thinks three felony convictions equals
six months suspension in Whittemores case, but somehow finds over two years for an
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alleged conviction of petty larceny of a candy bar and some cough drops to be just such
that the SBN and NNDB need not actually file and win on the SCR 102 Petition for a
temporary suspension of Coughlins law license sufficient to justify this embarrassing
deprivation of Coughlins protected Fourteenth Amendment property right, his license to
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practice law? Again, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), which
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has been informed of everything involving all these various matters, has yet to suspend
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Coughlin a single day. Does not say much for what it thinks of these patently invalid
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alleged convictions and sanctions (funny how the $42K prevailing party fee award
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given Merliss receives no mention in the SCR 117 Petition where it became the SBNs
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cleanup hitter at the 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing at issue in 62337) (whether they
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were not affirmed on appeal or subsequently vacated or not)The NNDB not once
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contacted Coughlin prior to filing this SCR 117 the SBN spoon fed it from what it itself
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had been spoon fed by Hill and RMC Judge Nash Holmes. RMC Judge Nash Holmes, in
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a demonstration of her extreme character, has ameliorated this situation with her two
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Orders of Dismissal (which vacate anything to do with the alleged criminal contempt
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conviction in the traffic citation outside Hills office trial in 11 TR 26800, as well as
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vacating the criminal trespass conviction incident to the Criminal Complaint Hill signed
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shortly after he and Merliss lied to the police to get Coughlin wrongfully arrested on
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11/13/11).
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- 16/27 -
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8. Bar Counsel has reported to the NNDB Chair that the

investigation of the grievances against Respondent show a serious pattern
of misconduct and bizarre behavior.
(NOTE: what is bizarre is getting fired from legal aid as though it was a summer
job at Hot Dog on A Stick over an alleged sanction that was quickly vacated shortly
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after the firing, but thats Paul, and thats Renoand thats me. I get it. I am difficult, a
little weird, could stand to take a refresher course at charm school, and just plain do not
always do that which is most likely to result in me getting paid more and more money
and becoming more and more popular in legal circles. How awful. But, please know
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this. This has been an awful, awful time for me, and I do not have any interest in being
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this much of a sore thumb ever again.)

9. Bar Counsel reports that on November 30, 2011, Respondent
was found guilty, after a trial, of the offense of Petit Larceny, a violation
of RMC 8.10.040, in the Municipal Court for the City of Reno. Said
conviction was based on an incident occurring on September 9, 2011.
Respondent shoplifted a candy bar and cough drops with a value of
approximately fourteen dollars ($14.00) from Wal-Mart. Respondent
appealed the judgment of conviction. The judgment of conviction was
affirmed on appeal.
(NOTE: please see Coughlins filings in 62337 and 65587 of 6/6/14 for
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explication of why such conviction was not affirmed on appeal). Funny how
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neither the SBN, City of Reno, nor NNDB ever manage to copy and past the
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actual language of the Order they are purporting affirmed a petty larceny
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conviction where such actually speaks to a ruling and could just as well be
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affirming the summary contempt ruling Coughlin also specified as being appeal
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in his notice of appeal and associated petitions for writ of mandamus to whatever
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extent Pengilly limits such to be the only avenue of review availing to a pro se
attorney criminal defendant denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel where
- 17/27 -
ADKT 411 was also violated. Regardless, the SBN failed to receive a ruling from
the Panel that such alleged conviction was tantamount to an RPC 8.4(b) criminal
act reflecting adversely on Coughlins fitness, as such, there ought be some
preclusive effect from the Panels 12/14/12 FOFCOL and Recommendation

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preventing such from being relitigated here). If such alleged behavior is such a
fitness issue, rather than one involving honesty or trustworthiness, than why
no mental health court and how is it that RMC Judge Howard was able to hold a
trial on 11/30/11 after deciding not to bring Coughlin in to the courtroom for the
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original trial date of 11/14/11 where Coughlin was brought to Howards court in
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custody in the red jail clothing associated with one placed in mental
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administrative segregation, all without Howard ever ordering a competency
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evaluation or suspending the proceedings pursuant to NRS 178.405. Oh, wait,
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that would require paying an evaluator.).
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10. On November 30, 2011, Respondent was found to be in

contempt of the Reno Municipal. Court, Department 4, for "disorderly,
contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge...." The Respondent
was found to have disregarded the directives of the judge and of making
demeaning statements such as stating "WOW" when the court made
rulings. The Respondent was also cited for "laughing during testimony"
and questioning the judge's authority. A copy of the contempt citation is
attached as Exhibit 1 and incorporated herein by this reference.
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(NOTE: while note Respondents finest hour, no doubt, a review of the audio
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recording (better than a written transcript in some ways) reveals Coughlin to be quite
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professional throughout such trial (if saying WOW once is all Judge Howard could
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think to add as a criticism along with continuing lines of inquiry after being instructed
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not to do so, then, really, how bad could Respondents conduct have been? Complete
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audio of trial purchased from RMC with no changes whatsoever:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J7C_3JzIoL4 ).
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11. On August 20, 2011, Respondent was arrested and charged

with Petit Larceny and Possession of Stolen Property, misdemeanor for
stealing a cell phone. Respondent recorded his arrest and has posted the
video on You-Tube. The video was publicly posted by Respondent and
may be viewed at the following internet address:
http://www.Youtube.com/watch?V=5PR7q4OI5b0
12. On January 14, 2012, Respondent was arrested and charged
with Abusing 911 Emergency Services, a gross misdemeanor. Respondent
recorded his arrest and posted the video on You-Tube. The video is posted
at the following internet address:
http://www.Youtube.Com/watch?V=CvK6kvJrwFA
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(NOTE: Respondent is not sure that the links in such as the above
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in the SCR 117 Petition ever worked, but a video of such arrest can be
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found here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oU3t_kRR0RA The
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police department audio of the arrest along with a slideshow of pictures
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from the events surrounding is available here:
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w_dxbsEXsBY )
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13. Concerning the criminal proceedings involving the charge

referenced in paragraph 12, above, Respondent filed a document in the
Reno Justice Court, Case No. RCR2012-065630, entitled, "Notice of
Appearance, Entry of Plea of Not Guilty, Waiver of Right to Arraignment,
Motion to Dismiss.' This document is attached as Exhibit 2 and
incorporated herein by this reference. The document commences with the
following statement: To all those in Reno, Washoe County, and beyond
who want to perpetuate this chicanery: `Okay, you're A goon, but what's a
goon to a goblin? The document contains a rambling and essentially
incoherent recitation of arguments and alleged facts. It also contains
disparaging remarks about various court officers and officials.
Noting what Judge Schroeder stated to Respondent at the conclusion of the
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hearing wherein Hill voluntarily dropped his TPO against Coughlin, is hardly
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disparaging. Coughlin could have done a bit better at page 5 thereof by pointing out
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- 19/27 -
how DDA Youngs criminal complaint ignored Shepp and Staab in failing to specify
which another or other person it was whom Coughlin allegedly received such
stolen property from (ie, the existence, much less the identity of the Finder of such
iPhone whom thereafter threatened to throw it in the river nearby unless someone
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claimed it) is noticeably not mentioned in any way in such Criminal Complaint criticized
justifiably in such filing by Coughlin attached as Exhibit 2 to the SCR 117 Petition.
14. On November 13, 2011, Respondent was arrested by Reno

Police Department and charged with Trespassing, a misdemeanor.
Respondent recorded his arrest and has posted the arrest video on YouTube. The Internet address of the video is:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ssE0FWHFNEY
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(NOTE: for whatever reasons (not sure) that link does not work, but
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Respondent has gone to great lengths to transcribe and make available to actual
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videos Hill and Merliss themselves filmed, which show Hills testimony at
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Coughlins 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing to be fraudulent (wherein Hill
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departed from what is clearly conveyed on not only these videos, but in his
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testimony during the trespass trial itself, in suddenly alleging that he heard the police
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communicate to Coughlin not only that they were the police, but also that Coughlin
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had to leave, upon Hill sensing that trespass requires a failure to leave after being
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warned to do so and that a summary removal orders (especially one prematurely
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executed and during the pendency of a stay thereof) is not tantamount to a criminal
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trespass warning. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V6I3t7tTlPI

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eh2xyc-9cg0
15. Respondent's trespass arrest arose after an eviction hearing
before Justice of the Peace Peter Sferrazza. Respondent was evicted from
his residence per order of the court effective November 1, 2011. After
being evicted, Respondent was later found living in the basement of the
- 20/27 -
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residence. The locks on the residence had been broken. (NOTE: this is
not true and has never been supported by any testimony or evidence. Hill
merely testified that the locks were unlocked, not broken. Regardless,
Coughlin had every right to be at his former home law office, it was Hill
and Baker whom, along with the WCSO, did the breaking and entering)
The Reno Police tried to convince Respondent to Leave the premises, but
he would not voluntarily leave.
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(NOTE: add to this language the SBN and Hills curious use of the term coax,
as in the police attempted to coax Coughlin out of the basement and Hills subsequent
remixing of these events to sound like an actual order/warning by anyone whom had
identified themselves as having the authority to issue such a warning to leave, plays as
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extremely suspect. The police do not try to convince one they are ordering to leave a
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premises of anything. They issue and if it is not complied with they arrest the suspect.
Regardless, and this is proven by the videos (which NNDB Susich obviously did
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not watch, Coughlin is seen and heard in the videos asking the police why they do not
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just order him to leave and provide him an opportunity to do so if they feel he is
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trespassing, whereupon the police fail to do anything of the sort, but rather, take the fraud
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Hill and Merliss feed them and run with it (all dissected in excruciating detail in 61901
and 62337).
The owner kicked a door open and Respondent was arrested
thereafter. Respondent filed a 36-page "Notice of Appearance as CoCounsel, and Motion to Dismiss" the trespass charge on March 5 2012, in
the Second judicial District Court, bearing Case No: 11 CR 26405. A copy
of the "motion" is attached as Exhibit 3 and incorporated by this reference.
The document is incoherent, confused and rambling.
Paragraphs 16 to 17 of the SCR 117 Petition have been addressed by
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Judge Nash Holmes vacating such orders referenced therein.

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19. On March 22, 2012, Respondent arrived at the Reno

Municipal. Court. He spoke with a clerk of the court and with the clerk's
supervisor. His conduct became so disruptive that security had to be
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called to remove him from the courthouse. The claimant was wearing
smiley face flannel pajama bottoms and a white tee shirt. Underneath the
tee shirt, the claimant was wearing a dress shirt and a tie. See, Affidavit of
Officer Scott Coppa, attached hereto as Exhibit 7.
RMC Filing Office Supervisor Ballards own attached Affidavit admits that no one
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asked Coughlin to or directed Coughlin to leave prior to Ballard summoning the RMC
Marshals over to ask Coughlin to leave. The entire incident revolved around the RMC
refusing to turn over/allow Coughlin to purchase the audio of the 2/27/12 and 3/12/12
traffic citation outside Hills office trial before Judge Holmes.
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Regardless, all orders from and that entire case has been dismissed.
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Further, NNDB Susichs characterization here is incredibly misleading, as it sounds as
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though Coughlin had to be physically removed from the court house, perhaps even after
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refusing to leave.rightlike that would not have resulting in yet another trespass
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arrest. This was simply a case of the RMC Marshals walked over to Coughlin out of the
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blue while Coughlin was asking the filing office counter clerk questions relative to
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obtaining an audio recording of a trial that he had/has every right to obtain, and telling
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Coughlin to leave, whereupon, at which point, Coughlin immediately did without
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incident. Hardly worthy of sicking the NNDB on some poor solo practitioner. Here is
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how the RMCs Supervisor Ballard put it herself in her 4/11/12 Affidavit that the NNDB
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conveniently omitted from its Petition: This type of conversation went on until I could
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no longer help him and felt we had done everything we could at this point. I walked back
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to my desk and heard him asking Daniel what the docket said. I could see that he was
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writing down what Daniel told him and at this point I contacted Bill Williams in the
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security office and told him we have had enough of Mr. Coughlin and he needs to leave.
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Marshal Thompson arrived with another Marshal and Mr. Coughlin left. See:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/233318487/4-11-12-0204-62337-26800-26405-00696-RMC-
Donna-Ballard-Affidavit-to-the-SBN-Bates-1865
Such is typical of the RMC and Ballard. Refuse the public that to which they are
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entitled, then passive aggressively attempt to manufacture some situation allegedly
calling for bringing in armed guards prior to anyone from the RMC or even Ballard
herself communicating anything to Coughlin in the way of a warning or order to leave, or
even any indication that the RMC counter clerks would no further address Coughlins
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inquiries. Just skip straight to send over the armed guards commanding the indigent
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defendant seeking a copy of the audio of a trial completely necessary to the defense of his
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law license to leave without anything in the way of an explanation as to how the RMC
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can possibly get away with such a thing or justify it.
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20. Respondent has posted on You-Tube and on his Law practice

webpage, Under the moniker: 25TeddyJames, several videos. In the
videos, Respondent is seen driving in his car or sitting in pajamas
discussing both the court and its staff. In the videos, he states that a
named police detective admitted taking bribes from a named local
attorney. He also discusses court staff and states how much income they
make.
20
Respondent has demonstrated, in excruciating detail in 62337, that, not only did
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the officer or detective referenced say, verbatim what Coughlin has repeatedly quoted
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him as saying as to attorney Hill, but, further, that Respondent has always gone out of his
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way to point out such was likely poorly chosen moment of sarcasm by the officer rather
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than an actual admission of having taking bribes. Even Hill had to admit in his testimony
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that such had been so couched during Coughlins invocation of such statements by the
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officer involved.
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- 23/27 -
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Paragraph 21 of the SCR 117 Petition is irrelevant in light of such 4/13/09 Order
After Trial being vacated by the 6/19/09 Final Decree of Divorce, which did not sanction
Coughlin and which did, actually, award the very alimony Coughlin was previously
criticized for pursuing for his victim of domestic violence legal aid client.
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DECLARATION
The assertions herein are made, pursuant to NRS 53.045 under penalty of perjury
and based upon my first hand knowledge of these matters, and all the documents linked to
herein are true, correct, and complete copies thereof.
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Dated this 7/22/14
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/s/ Zach Coughlin, signed electronically
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Zach Coughlin
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Respondent
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1471 E. 9th St.

Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
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- 24/27 -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE:
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Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I do hereby certify that, on this date, I, Zach Coughlin I
placed in the USPS mail a copy hereof to the STATE BAR OF NEVADA
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PATRICK O. KING
DAVID CLARK/ GLENN MACHADO/ PHIL PATTEE
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7
600 E. Charleston Blvd Las Vegas, NV 89104

Also email to all four OBC attorneys
DATED THIS: Dated this 7/22/14

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/s/ Zach Coughlin
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Zah Coughlin
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Respondent
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Index to Exhibits:
100 pages of relevant materials
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Which is/was, apparently, the fate of Coughlins attempts to appeal or challenge by writ
of mandate RMC Judge Howards Order For Summary Punishment of Contempt attached
as Exhibit 1 to the SCR 117 Petition (please see debate over Judge Elliotts 3/15/12 Order
in the appeal/petition for writ challenging both the candy bar/cough medication petty
larceny conviction (see 60838 as well) in SBNs filings of 6/3/14 in 62337 and Coughlins
response thereto)
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7/22/2014
Outlook.com Print Message
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Request for consideration of stipulated resolution of appeal in

62337
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 5/02/14 2:26 PM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org (patrickk@nvbar.org); je@eloreno.com (je@eloreno.com)
2 attachments
4 22 14 Notice of Orders of Dismissal of trespass and contempt conviction in 62337 1412934.pdf (301.2 KB) , Order Reinstating Beckett were conviction was dismissed 11-09965.pdf
(1138.4 KB)
Dear Chair Echeverria and Asst. Bar Counsel King,

I hope you both are well and do not mind me writing to you.
In Re Beckett case 57763 reveals that the Nevada Supreme Court (SCR 123(3) allows for citing to such)
views the dismissal of a conviction as a basis for dissolving a temporary suspension under SCR 111(10), as the
4/4/11 Order in such case held: "SCR 111(10) gives us discretion to reinstate an attorney whose underlying
conviction has been reversed. The petition is accompanied by a certified copy of a February 2, 2011, order
from the Pahrump Township Justice Court dismissing Case No. 10CR01587 with prejudice. In light of the fact
that the charge underlying our order of temporary suspension has been dismissed with prejudice, and our
previous determination that Beckett's California misdemeanor conviction did not warrant imposition of a
temporary suspension, we conclude that there is no longer a basis for Beckett being temporarily suspended
pending the outcome of his disciplinary proceedings. We therefore grant the petition. Attorney Robert S.
Beckett, Bar No. 3383, is hereby reinstated to the practice of law pending the outcome of his disciplinary
proceedings."
http://caseinfo.nvsupremecourt.us/public/caseView.do?csIID=25910
Please note that in the appeal of the Recommendation to irrevocably disbar me, on 4/22/14 I attached to my
filing two Orders of Dismissal by RMC Judge Nash Holmes vacating the criminal trespass conviction (11 CR
26405) and the contempt conviction that was characterized by the Panel as "criminal contempt" (11 TR
26800): http://caseinfo.nvsupremecourt.us/public/caseView.do?csIID=30514
Further, both the summary contempt order of 11/30/11 and the 11/30/11 conviction for petty larceny of "a
candy bar and some cough drops" (where such "cough drops" were a potentially lethal dose of
Dextromethorphan, which acts as a halucinogenic as such levels) underpinning the current temporary
suspension of my law license in 60838 were remanded back to the RMC "for all further proceedings" via the
3/15/12 Order in CR11-2064, which notes that only in a civil case does NRS 4.410(2)(a) apply, and
https://bay176.mail.live.com/ol/mail.mvc/PrintMessages?mkt=en-us
1/2
7/22/2014
references NRS 189.030(1), which required the RMC to file the transcript of the trial, which the RMC failed to
ever do. NRS 189.035 provides that a remand for a new trial is required under such circumstances. As such,
that conviction has been vacated as well. http://caseinfo.nvsupremecourt.us/public/caseView.do?csIID=30514
I respectfully request that consideration be given to some stipulated resolution of the appeal in 62337. I do
not believe the Panel has technically been divested of jurisdiction in light of the 12/14/12 FOFCOL not being
titled a "Decision" as required by SCR 105(3) and the fact that I did file a tolling motion on 1/3/13,
supplemented on 1/16/13. I have recently been release from Washoe jail after serving 5.5 months there and
hope it is evident to all that I am a humbled, changed man, and that being reinstated to slowly begin practicing
law in baby steps is in my best interest, and presents no threat of harm to anyone.
Further, I know that such an approach would greatly assist Washoe Legal Services and its Executive
Director Paul Elcano in their efforts to help me move on with my career and in life.
The attorney fee award at issue in formal hearing exhibit 2 (the NRS 69.050 prevailing party fee award to
Hill's client, Merliss, which Judge Flanagan expressly characterized as not a sanction) has been satisfied.
Further, the 4/13/09 "sanction" in formal hearing exhibit 3 that Mr. Elcano testified with regard to in the Joshi
divorce trial in DV08-01168 was vacated by way of 2JDC Judge L. Gardner's 6/19/09 Final Decree of
Divorce.
Washoe Legal Services assisted me in satisfying the judgment owed Merliss, and I would like to repay WLS
via working pro bono on its behalf, but I need to be reinstated to do so. If you do not feel a stipulated
resolution of the entire matter in 62337 is appropriate at this juncture, I ask that you consider stipulating to
dissolve my current 23 month temporary suspension incident to the referral in 60838 for a conviction that is no
more, consistent with SCR 111(10) and the approach detailed above from In Re Beckett.
Sincerely and Respectfully Submitted,
Zachary Barker Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and Fax: 949 667
7402 ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
2/2
7/22/2014
Print
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substitution of counsel
Sent: Mon 5/12/14 9:02 AM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org (patrickk@nvbar.org)
Cc: laurap@nvbar.org (laurap@nvbar.org)
1/2
7/22/2014
Dear Mr. King,

I've got new representation...my new chihuahua, Lupita. Just kidding. But, she is watching out for and taking
care of me. I know you are a dog person, so you can appreciate that. I am trying to get an attorney to
represent me in these bar matters as I feel that I have been so terrible towards you and Ms. Peters that the
most considerate thing to do would be to limit the amount you have to interact with me. I am hoping to get a
remand of the sort Mr. Briggs has benefited from, and am writing to see if you are amenable to such, and, if
not, if there is anything I can do or show to get back in your good graces. I met Coe Swobe's replacement,
Mitch Cobeaga, at last Thursday's Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers meeting. I saw my psychiatrist Dr.
Stepanova last week, and will see my psychologist Bill Jackson, Ph.D. on May 15th, 2014, both of Northern
Nevada Adult Mental Health. Please consider this a full release to speak with either of them about anything
you wish to, and I have provided a release to both assenting to as much as well.
I've got a home group for my twelve step program, the 6:45 am Beginner's Are Winners meeting, my sponsor is
Bubba, and Mary K. can keep close tabs on me that way.
Respectfully,
Zachary Barker Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel 775 338 5334 and Fax: 949 667
2/2
7/22/2014
Print
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RE: SC Case 60975

Sent: Tue 7/22/14 11:48 AM
To: Phillip Pattee (philp@nvbar.org)
Dear Mr. Patee,

I am now scheduled to be evaluated on Friday, July 25th, by Dr. Nielsen at his office on Willow St.
Sincerely,
Zachary Barker Coughlin, Esq. (USPTO) 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel 775 338 5334 Fax: 949 667
From: philp@nvbar.org
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Subject: RE: SC Case 60975
Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 15:46:40 +0000
Zach,
Thank you for your message, and for your efforts. I shall keep the Supreme Court
informed.
Phil
1/3
7/22/2014
Phillip J. Pattee
Assistant Bar Counsel
600 E. Charleston Boulevard

Las Vegas, NV 89104
Office: (702) 382-2200
Fax: (702) 382-8747
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]

Sent: Monday, July 21, 2014 9:30 PM
To: Laura Peters; Patrick King; Phillip Pattee
Cc: aingersoll@nvcourts.nv.gov; tlindemann@nvcourts.nv.gov
Subject: RE: SC Case 60975
Dear NV Bar,
I have been trading voice mails with Dr. Nielsen and finally just asked him to tell
me a date and time and indicated I would be sure to show up for such for the
evaluation, and asked if he would let me know of any releases or records he
2/3
7/22/2014
would like to have in connection with the evaluation. I left him another message
today.
Sincerely,
Zachary Barker Coughlin, Esq. (USPTO) 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel 775 338 5334 Fax: 949 667
From: laurap@nvbar.org
To: ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Subject: SC Case 60975
Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2014 19:14:31 +0000
Please see attachment
Laura Peters
Paralegal
Office of Bar Counsel
3/3
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Apology and Zach Coughlin prescription medications

information
Sent: Mon 5/14/12 12:37 PM
To: tcoughlinmd@hotmail.com; davidc@nvbar.org; patrickk@nvbar.org; glennm@nvbar.org;
marybarkbark@yahoo.com
1 attachment
Zach Coughlin rx history since February 2008.pdf (1163.3 KB)
D ear
Dad, Bar Counsel, Mom and Melissa,
I am sorry for all the hurtful things I have said and done in the last
year. I haven't been on my Wellbutrin/Buproprion antidepressant
for quite awhile (I pulled my pharmacy records recently to try to
learn from some things). I have taken anti-depressants since I was
18 years old. I wasn't on either my Wellbutrin or Adderall for all of
August 2011 until September 14, 2011. I was arrested on August
20th, 2011 and September 9th, 2011. The Walmart arrest involved
chocolate and cough drops. The cough drops have
dextromethorphan in them, which is a dissociative in high enough
doses. Chocolate (sugar) is, of course, an old time palliative. The
banned cough drop (the melt or dissolve very quickly and contain
30 mg in each one...so rather than powering through a whole bottle
of cough syrup to take 300 mg of DM, one could eat 10 cough drop
melts rather easily and quickly). These drops were pulled from
shelfs for awhile when they first came out a few years ago, I believe
because of the abuse potential or dangers of being able to ingest
that high a quantity of a powerful dissociative so quickly (the cough
syrup version of dextromethorpan is extremely difficult to just drink
a whole bottle of, whereas the sugary cough melts are pretty much
similar to candy). I went off the Adderall on approximately
August 2, 2011. I went of the Wellbutrin in July 2011, right after
the breakup of a four and half year. Okay, I went and found the
records and am attaching them to this email. I wondered whether
the switch from Vyvanse to Adderall coincided with my getting
fired from Washoe Legal Services, but actually, it does not appear
to have. I was suspended on April 20th, 2009 from WLS. Then,
my termination date was May 12th, 2009. I only started taking
Adderall instead of Vyvanse on June 13th, 2009. I was wondering
if I became more irritable upon starting Adderall instead of
Vyvanse and though maybe that cause the problems with the family
court Judge during the March 2009 trial and then with Washoe
Legal Services. I am actually kind of relieved to see their does not
appear to be a causal connection given the chronology. I think I
just felt WLS was a bit of a dead end job for me, was ruining my
work ethic and motivation, and was, perhaps, an environment where
white males had to conform to a certain prototype to fit in, one
which I was not entirely at home with.
You can see I filled one prescription for Campral. See this forum
for evidence that tolerance to Adderall is sometimes thought to be
counteracted by a class of medications that includes Campral,
Dextormethorphan (DM is also being used to treat chronic pain
patients in some experimental studies), etc.:
http://addforums.com/forums/showthread.php?t=36078
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10875724
I recall researching this in an attempt to be ultra cautious in
my use of Adderall.

My chronic pain levels seem to be much, much, more manageable
when I am taking Wellbutrin and Adderall. I believe that the
chronic upper back pain I dealt with for years was due, in part, to
emotional/mental stress related to not appropriately addressing my
ADHD and the spotty use of antidepressants I exhibited during
those years (if my Dad and I were getting along, I would get
Wellbutrin from him for free, if we weren't, I would rarely secure
my own health insurance or pay out of pocket for that
antidepressant, but would rather "rough it" to save money). When I
went off the Wellbutrin and Adderall, the chronic pain returned,
plus, I was basically in the early stages of a "divorce" from Melissa
(whom I dated and lived with since April-ish 2007 until May 17th,
2011. Melissa and I had been fighting since we moved into the
home/office on River Rock on February 20th, 2010. From probably
June 2010 until she moved out on May 17th, 2011, we fought
almost daily, sometimes in a fairly hostile way (I was never
physically violent with her, but she got a bit with me). I was
existing on $400 a week in unemployment benefits, receiving them
for 99 weeks. I actually worked quite hard the entire time. I
learned a lot about a lot of different things, including some things
related to the business of law, practice management, employment
law, computers, software, hardware, cars, home improvement, I did
focus on music for about 6 months straight (though I always
continued to apply for jobs and send out resumes during this 99
weeks...Washoe County had 15% unemployment during those 3
years and jobs were in short supply and starting my own law
practice seemed overly risky), and I was basically Melissa's maid
and helper with proofreading her schoolwork for a couple years (in
my mind at least, of course she may have a vastly different view of

things). She worked a significant amount of hours and was in
school full time and was irritable, extremely emotional, and
stretched pretty thin. I implemented the "I pay for dinner one time,
then you pay for dinner one time" rule for going out to dinner, and,
of course, that took a lot of the romance out of things. I think I
became very insecure about money and my career and getting fired
from WLS was very, very discouraging. But, I worked their for 18
months. Previous to that my longest tenure of employment at any
job whatsoever was literally 4 months at Hale Lane. I am talking
ANY job, my whole life. I realize my father has concerns about
someone in recovery taking a controlled substance like Adderall,
but I have exhibited symptoms consistent with a strong case of
ADHD my entire life, and feel to potential for substance abuse
inherent to untreated ADHD presents a great risk than does taking
Adderall, though, admittedly, it is something that one must watch
and realize that it can effect one's behavior and mood, sometimes in
good ways, sometimes in bad ways. But so can drinking or not
drinking water. So can taking or not taking insulin. Same with
coffee. So, in some ways I consider adding the Adderall to the
Wellbutrin a success and feel that I may have purposefully gotten
fired from WLS because the malaise there and institutional politics
were tough to deal with. Plus, it just occurred to me there that I
could work there forever, it was an incredibly easy job, but their
was not a pension, the pay was like $55K, they didn't give me the
$5K raise after a year they promised (it seems small, but watching
them heat half and empty building for months on end to 84 degrees
round the clock because the office manager couldn't figure out how
to fix the thermostat was just irritating), and that the law just held a
different destiny for me than to be a legal aid domestic violence

attorney for years and years, as honorable and admirable as that
may be. Interestingly, a couple of the people I had the most
problems with appear to have been fired from WLS after me.
Previously, the Executive Director basically would not fire anyone
unless they embezzled. It appears I changed his approach and got
him to implement firing people as a management tool. He fired that
office manager, RK,and he also fired ZL (I believe, though she
might have just left, though I cannot imagine that because what
other job would allow her to call in sick, with full pay, 30 Fridays a
year and be accountable to absolutely no one and call herself a
paralegal with no apparent legal training at all? Plus she, allegedly,
had borrowed money from various employees without paying them
back, so...).
Speaking of borrowing money, when we broke up, Melissa stayed
at Mom's for awhile (Mom now says Melissa "uses her tears to her
advantage" and that she "feels a bit used by Melissa"), and Mom
bought her a $500 mattress from Costco (we had two very nice
memory foam beds I build with spare foam from Mills End fabrics
and all bought with my $400 a week and thrift, and I just didn't
want to give Melissa one when I felt she had been so unappreciative
of things just like my building those beds and doing the research,
etc.). We both agreed though that Melissa being an insulin
dependent diabetic undoubtedly presents challenges to her in
regulating her mood and emotions and that Melissa has
demonstrated extraordinary courage and resolve in meeting those
challenges. Then, Mom just admitted to me that Carly loaned
Melissa several hundred dollars. Apparently Carly is pissed
because Melissa is in New York City right now and still hasn't paid
Carly or Mom back(she also went in September 2011, and we were
supposed to go in July 2011, bought the tickets and everything
$450, but her Aunt decided to change her travel to Ireland dates, so
I basically lost that $450 due to the change fees Delta and American
charge-Melissa bought the tickets and did not think to utilize
Southwest...). Melissa also made off with at least one and possibly
two months of my rent contribution that I gave her to give the
landlord, plus, she didn't pay the landlord her contribution for May
2011, June 2011, etc. However, as in all 4.5 year relationships,
things get blurry, etc., and she is a wonderful person.
SOMETHING PRETTY INTERESTING:
One thing I note from the prescription history is I filled a
Buproprion (note, I am using the terms Buproprion and
Wellbutrin interchangeably) script on 3/18/09, then did not fill
another one until 5/4/09...meaning a period of some 16 days
or so where I was either out of Buproprion or did not take it
or took less than my typical dose. I was suspended from
WLS on 4/20/09. My final termination date was 5/12/09.
That is pretty interesting. I seem to recall sometimes when
my script for Buproprion ran out and there could be some lag
time getting the doctor to fax a renewal to the pharmacy, and
I believe at one point during the past couple years I
complained to the pharmacy and the doctors office about an
extended delay in getting my prescription renewed and filled
and I specifically took them to task about the dangers of
patients suddenly going of there antidepressants and recall
being upset about what I perceived to be the doctor's office's
or pharmacies negligence in so renewing the prescriptions. I
do not believe I was blame shifting and avoiding my own

responsibilities in that regard, but it is possible I should have
done more in advance of running out of my Buproprion to
renew the prescription and or should have followed up more
on the failure to so renew after I made the renewal
request....I believe this was during that 5/4/11 to 5/21/11
period, but am not sure at this point, but I recall being upset
that somethign like 3 weeks went by and my prescription was
not ready...or I may have been late in making the request. I
seem to undervalue what Bupropion does for my mood and
behavior, I recall often thinking they were just "sugar pills"
and it was all in my mind, any benefit....But, I didn't always
believe that, sometimes finding the efficacy apparent.
Looks like I went off Buproprion between 5/21/20 and
6/17/10 as well. I went off Buproprion again between 8/12/10
and 10/6/10....I notice that my copays stopped around
7/12/10, which was went I stopped getting the reduced Cobra
premiums under the Obama bailout, and had to start paying
out of pocket (though it was essentially a wash, because the
Cobra was $180 a month, plus $20 in copays, whereas, out of
pocket was probably less overall, though it was $105 ever 3
months for the psychiatrist and the prices of Adderall and
Wellbutrin (I dropped Adderal XR probably because it cost
more) spiked somewhat during that time). Then again from
11/6/10 to 12/2/10, though its possible that I used that
10/6/10 prescription, which consisted of 120 of the 75mg
Buproprion generic versions to try to effect a discount by
taking less Buproprion per day, ie, stretch one month of a
script out 3 months or so by only taking 150 mg or 75 mg or
something, I do remember trying to save money like that. I

am very startled to see that from 5/4/11 to 5/21/11 I would
have been out of Wellbutrin/Buproprion. Melissa and I broke
up and she moved out on 5/17/11. I did have trouble with
the ignition cylinder turning the key to start the car when
trying to go to Melissa's graduation party on 5/15/11, and
was at least 45 minutes late, causing her embarassment and
pain. However, despite the fact that the key would not turn
the cylinder causing me some delay, I believe it did not cause
that much of a delay in finding some other way to get to the
graduation party, but rather, my ADHD and depression led
me to trying to do to many other things that day, misjudging
time and the ability to get a reasonable amount of things
done (I was probably trying to finish fixing Melissa's car or
something else that was no where near as important as
showing up to that party on time....but that is typical of
people with depression and ADHD, the prioritizing and
misjudging time, lateness, etc....). I do recall saying very
mean things to Melissa during that 3 week stretch in May
2011...however, both she and I were stressed out preparing
for her graduation and final exams, having a great deal of her
out of town family coming into town, my fighting with my Dad
starting on 4/28/11 and having a bad argument about
something rather small and minor, etc., and my
unemployment benefits stopping right about late April 2011
(99 weeks from May 21, 2009 start date would mean my
unemployment ran out in early April 2011, I believe).
I switched to the cheaper generic version of Adderall from the
perhaps more steady consistent Adderall XR in June 2010.
Melissa and I fought constantly from June 2010 until our

breakup in June 2011....There were news reports of the price
of Adderall XR skyrocketing out of the blue at about this time
and there was a fair amount of controversy about Shire
retaining the rights to make the generic and the generic
version being essentially, garbage, according to many
patients.
http://www.addforums.com/forums/showthread.php?
t=112229
It is pretty crappy when you think about it, these drug
companies increasing the copay from $29 on a mental health
medication once month to $180 the next...and artificially
forcing people to avoid the generic by retaining the rights to
the generic and purposefully making the generic lack efficacy.
http://www.drugs.com/answers/why-has-the-price-ofadderall-generic-30-mg-gone-455000.html
http://motherboard.vice.com/2012/2/16/anatomy-of-thegreat-adderall-drought
http://www.thefix.com/content/pay-attention-adderall-addbig-pharma7004
I then went off my Wellbutrin/Buproprion from 7/25/11 until
4/28/ 12..From filling the Buproprion at a cost of $20 in June
of 2011 until recently filling the prescription in late April 2012,
the cost has gone up 300%. That medication has been off
patent for some 20 years now, it should not be rising in price,
especially during a period where the economy has struggled

so mightily. Interestingly, the cost of those cough drop melts
with 30 mg of Dextromethorphan per melt rose form around
$6.50 a box in 2007 or so to $8.88 in September 2011 for the
exact same quantity/dosage. I simply could not afford it
though on at least two occasions I called up Northern Nevada
Adult Mental Health and inquired about the possibility of
getting the cost paid for by the state or subsidized. In
evaluating the time and relinquishment of my privacy rights
(there is a fair amount of shame and worry about one's
professional reputation and how those in recovery or AA will
view one's taking these medications associated with taking
ADHD and Major Depressive Disorder medications) that I felt
it would require to achieve the savings of around $125 a
month for these two prescriptions, I never decided it was
worth it to go to NAMS, but rather just stopped paying for the
Buproprion (again, I sometimes viewed it as a sugar pill,
whereas the Adderall I felt had an effect, both for controlling
ADHD and for the supplemental uses as a treatment resistant
antidepressant and the off label use for the control of OCD.
In that time period I was put in jail 8 times and, essentially
evicted 3 times and fought with and alienated myself from my
entire family, lived a very secluded, reclusive life, etc...
exhibited poor impulse control, a temper, and symptoms
consistent with untreated Major Depressive Disorder (MDD)
and perhaps some type of hoarding behavior or Obsessive
Compulsive Disorder, including tiling the River Rock home
office, collecting car seats, recarpeting the entire home office
with scraps in a patchwork, and tiling the crumbling front
steps, and putting green carpet on the dirt lawn.
I was arrested on:

8/20/11 for petit larceny (the lost mislaid iPhone thing where
the finder said he would "throw it in the river if someone
doesn't claim it right away"). 7 days in jail.
9/9/11 for petit larceny at Wal-Mart of a chocolate bar and
two boxes of the cough medication drops/melts with
Dextromethorphan 30 mg per melt. 1 day in jail.
11/12/11 for criminal trespass at my former home law office
(i was issued 3 traffic citations days later when I went to the
opposing attorney who signed the criminal trespass
complaints office to retrieve my wallet and driver's license and
was told to leave by the RPD. While driving away the RPD
pulled me over and charged me with a "California Roll"/failure
to come to a complete stop and a couple fix it tickets, that
were ultimately fixed). 3 days in jail
11/30/11 for summary contempt during the trial for the WalMart chocolate bar and cough medication drops Trial before
Judge Howard in RMC 11 CR 22176. 1 day in jail.
1/12/12 for jaywalking while filming personal property at my
former home law office being placed in a dump truck for
hauling to the dump. 1 day in jail
1/14/12 for "misuse of 911 where no actual or perceived
emergency exists), a gross misdemeanor incident to the
domestic violence I was victimized by on E. 9th St. by my
housemates. 3 days in jail
2/27/12 for summary contempt during the trial for the
11/15/11 traffic citations "California Roll"/failure to come to a
complete stop at stop sign deal....5 days in jail
4/19/12 for contempt, I believe, for failing to fully participate
(concern for privacy rights, shame, etc) in the ordered

competency evaluation that Judge Elliot ordered I undergo
with the Lake's Crossing doctors. I spent 7 days in jail.
I am feeling better and better since starting to take my
antidepressant, Wellbutrin again, and now realize I need to be
much more diligent in filling that prescription in a timely
manner and making preparations for situations where I might
not be able to afford it. I plan to write many apology letters,
including to judges, bar counsel, opposing counsel, etc. I
always fought and worked hard for my clients though for an
extremely competitive price.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
NOTE: this email is reproduced in truncated form here given it is a

resending of the same email from 5/14/12 to the SBN.
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resending this FW: Apology and Zach Coughlin prescription

medications information
Sent: Tue 7/31/12 1:39 PM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org
1 attachment
Zach Coughlin rx history since February 2008.pdf (1163.3 KB)
Dear Mr. King,
I am resending this too you just in case it went into your "junk mail" folder the first time I sent it (given
that it was addressed to numerous people, as sometimes results in an email being declared "junk mail"
by one's email server)....Its admittedly fairly rambling, but I believe it does demonstrate a willingness to
look within for a cause of the problems I have encountered in the last year.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: tcoughlinmd@hotmail.com; davidc@nvbar.org; patrickk@nvbar.org; glennm@nvbar.org;
marybarkbark@yahoo.com
Subject: Apology and Zach Coughlin prescription medications information
Date: Mon, 14 May 2012 12:37:17 -0700
D ear
Dad, Bar Counsel, Mom and Melissa,
I am sorry for all the hurtful things I have said and done in the last
year. I haven't been on my Wellbutrin/Buproprion antidepressant
RENO MUNICIPAL COURT

HON. JAY D. DILWORTH
Department I
"'''
1
,"
'
.",
HON. WILLIAM L. GARDNER
1
t
Department 2
"
CASSANDRA JACKSON
Court Administrator
JUSTIN ROPER
Chief Marshal- Department
of Alternative Sentencing
,
I
HON. DOROTHY NASH HOLMES

Department 3
HON. KENNETH R. HOWARD
Department 4
Affidayit
To: Nevada State Bar

Re: Zach Coughlin
I, Donna Ballard, Senior Court Specialist, of Reno Municipal Court, a court of law organized, incorporated
or existing under the laws of the Cityof Reno,
and with its principal business located at: 1 South Sierra Street. Reno. NY 89501.
Being duly sworn, do depose and say:
On 3/22/12 I heard Vanessa Garcia state that Coughlin was coming and he was in his pajamas. She
made a comment about them looking like Christmas pajamas. I looked up but was unable to see him. I
am unsure of the time at this point.
When Mr. Coughlin was called to Daniel Casillas' window #8, Daniel did his best to help Mr. Coughlin
for quite some time and then Daniel came to my desk and asked me to assist Mr. Coughlin. I began
speaking with Mr. Coughlin and noticed that he had on slightly shiny, polyester looking, white long sleeve
tee shirt that to me looked like the same fabric as an athleticjersey. I seem to recall a logo on the right
side. I could clearly see that he had a burgundy dress shirt and a lighter color tie under the white tee shirt.
During my conversation with Mr. Coughlin he was rude and repeated the same questions several times.
As he has asked in the past, "If Judge Howard told you to jump off a bridge would you?" The conversation
continued with Mr. Coughlin asking for records to which I answered that he could fIll out a records
request. Mr. Coughlin stated that he would depose me and I would be found negligent.
Mr. Coughlin kept insisting on copies of documents. I advised him to add them to the records request
he was mling out. He argues each time about being treated the same as anyone else that comes to the
court and asked why he can't email a request. After I had advised him several times that he could not
email or fax due to Judge Howard's order, I finally said that he was different because he abused it and
sent 176 pages.
This type of conversation went on until I could no longer help him and felt we had done everything we
could at this point. I walked back to my desk and heard him asking Daniel what the docket said. I could
see that he was writing down what Daniel told him and at this point I contacted Bill Williams in the
security office and told him we have had enough of Mr. Coughlin and he needs to leave. Marshal
Thornp",' arrived >rith another marsho! and
.1\
: !,.
Signature
State of Nevada
County of Washoe
4-\\-\
Date
SS
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
dtHlt .f>
day of-'--'.......
_,
UJI?..-.
1.012..
01865
FILED
APR 22 2014
12
FILID
RENO MUNICIPALcCOURT
DEPT. NO.3
Case No. 11 TR 26800 21

Dept. 3
APR -1 201~
i1<' :
T1ME:wr-_ _ _ _ __
BY
COROT~NASH HOLMES, JUDGE
4
5
IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF RENO
COUNTY OF WASHOE, STATE OF NEVADA
...............
8
9
CITY OF RENO,
10
11
Plaintiff,
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
vs.
12
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN,
13
Defendant.
______________________
~I
14
15
16
IT IS SO ORDERED.
18
Dated this 7th day of April, 2014.
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
RENO
P.o. !lor 1Il00
Reno,"",""
(7II2)3u-mo
interest of justice, that this case be, and hereby is, DISMISSED.
17
19
MUNICIPAL COURT
IT IS THE ORDER OF THfS COURT, for good cause appearing and in the
28
.&~~~
. Dorothy NaSlfOfmes
. .
Municipal Judge
..
'
- '
ceBTIEICAIE OF SERVIQfi
Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of the Reno Municipal Court,
Reno, Nevada, that I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to the above action, and that
on this date, served a true and correct copy of the attached document to the following as set
forth below:
...L Placing said document in a sealed envelope and placed for collecting and mailing by
Unites States mall in Reno, Nevada, postage prepaid, following ordinary business
practices.
Facsimile (FAX)
...L
Electronic Mail (E-mail) to City Attorney

Inner-office mail following ordinary business practices
Personal Delivery to City Attorney
Mr. Zachary B. Coughlin
Booking # 1317551
Washoe County Detention Facility
911 Parr Blvd
:Reno NV 95512
Dan Wong
Chief Criminal Deputy City Attorney
PO Box 1900
Reno NV 89505
DATED: April", 2014.
Reno Municipal Court

P.O. Box 1800
Reno. NV 89505
(776) 3343822
1
2
FILED
RENO MUNICIPAL COURT

OEPT. NO.3
Case No. 11 CR 26405
APR -7 2014
~~E<tk:::
DOROTHY NASH HOLMES, JUDGE
Dept. 3
IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF RENO
..
COUNTY OF WASHOE, STATE OF NEVADA
'" '" '" '" '"
8
9
CITY OF RENO,
10
11
Plaintiff,
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
vs.
12
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN,
13
Defendant.
________________________
~I
14
15'
16
IT IS SO ORDERED.
18
Dated this 7th day of April, 2014.
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
RENO
1'.0.8011_
A.no,~UI06
~33f.D80
interest of justice, that this case be, and hereby is, DISMISSED.
17
19
MUNICIPAL COUFtT
IT IS THE ORDER OF THIS COURT, for good cause appearing and in the
28
=~~
Municipal Judge
CEBIIEJCAIE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of the Reno Municipal Court,
Reno, Nevada, that I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to the above action, and that
on this date, served a true and correct copy of the attached document to the following as set
forth below:
-L Placing said document in a ".Ied envelope and placed for collecting and mailing by
Unites States mail in Reno, Nevada, postage prepaid, following ordinary business
practices.
Facsimile (FAX)
-L
Electronic Mail (E-mail) to City Attorney

Inner-office mail following ordinary business practices
Personal Delivery to City Attorney
Mr. Zachary B. Coughlin
Booking # 1317561
Washoe County Detention Facility
911 Parr Blvd
Reno NV 96512
Dan Wong
Chief Criminal Deputy City Attorney
PO Box 1900
Reno NV 89505
DATED: April 7, 2014.
Reno Municipal Court

P.O. Box 1VOO
Reno, NV 89106
(776) 334-3822
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NORTBERN NEVADA ADULT MENrALEEALTH SERVICES

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.. 480 GALLETTI WAY . .
'SPARKS, NEVADA 89431
. 775-688-2025
CONFIDENrrALINFORMATION
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'fhi9. intbrm.ation has b~ disclosed ~ yon from records whose confidentiality is
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Progress Notes for COUGHLlN,ZACHARY B

PATIO: 282636 Facility Chart Number: 282636
Entered During the Period: 01/01/2011 - 06/17/2014
Agency: Northern Nevada Adult Mental Health Svcs

Date Written: 05/23/2013
Written by: NN - BILL JACKSON at 09:10 AM
Note Type: Psychologist
Episode: 8 - NNAMHS OP Counseling Adult
Duration: 60
Svc Code: 902 Date of Group Svc: 05/23/2013
Note: Regarding individual therapy on Thursday, May 23, 2013:
DATA:
Client did not appear and did not call to cancel today's 0800 appointment.
Client telephoned at 0830 to ask his appointment time, then asked for telephone therapy until 0850. I refused.
Client again requested telephone therapy, and asked my grounds for refusing, asked whether I would provide services in
jail, and why not, etc., and quoted my replies slowly back, as though noting them. We reviewed my notes cancelling his
previous appointment. We set an appointment for 6.24.13 11 am. Etc. We hung up at 0850.
ASSESSMENT: deferred.
PLAN: continued therapy.
Bill Jackson, PhD., Psychologist, 688-2074

Duration: 15
Note: Regarding individual therapy on Monday, May 06, 2013:
DATA:
I cancelled this appointment earlier.
Client telephoned at 0823 to confirm that it was cancelled. We set another appointment for 5.23.13 8am.

Episode: 6 - NNAMHS OP Counseling Wait List
Duration: 15
Note: I have not received a response from client (because he is presumably in jail). I telephoned client and left a voice mail
message to cancel his appointment of 5.6.13.

Written by: NN - EKATERINA STEPANOVA at 03:42 PM
Note Type: Psychiatrist
Episode: 7 - NNAMHS Med Clinic Adult
Duration: 30
Note: Pt reports feeling more depressed and irritable. Discussed with pt possibility of bipolar d/o. Pt denies any hlo manic sx. He
does become irritable, but is never energetic. His sleep can be disrupted and he is extremely fatigued the next day. He was
very irritable with the RN prior to this visit. Discussed with pt how he is making poor choices in terms of his life and career,
he is having difficulty understanding it.
MSE: labile affect, tearful when talking about his past, speech is RRR, no FOls or LOAs, mood is"depressed", affect is
congruent, labile
Plan: COnt current meds. Discussed possibility of starting Risperdal to address irritability as adjunct to antidepressant. Pt
refused at this time. E.STepanova, MD
COUGHLlN.ZACHARY B
3/11/2013
NNAMHS Med Clinic Adult
PATIENT NAME:
PATID:
282636
CHART NO.:
282636
ADMISSION DATE:
PROGRAM:
EPISODE NO.:
EVALUATION DATE:
3/11/2013
Status: Final
General Information
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Information was obtained from chart, patient.
Information is deemed to be reliable.

IDENTIFICATION: Pt is a 36 year old man, who lives alone, currently unemployed (worked as a
lawer), not in a relationship, has a hlo ADHD and depression, can not afford an outpt
psychiatrist.
INFORMATION RELIABILITY:
Depressed mood, inability to focus

REQUIRES HOSPITALIZATION: Yes
CHIEF COMPLAINT:
Patient History
Pt reports he has been off Wellbutrin and Adderall for several days. His
mood worsened, he is more often tearful, especially when thinking about his lost
relationship. He has poor attention and concentration. He can not watch long movies as he
gets distracted. He has a hard time sustaining a conversation, unless he is extremetly
interested in the subject. He pays little attention to details, disorganized, often late for
important appointments (court). He is impulsive, acts quick before thinking (took
somebody's cell phone on the street impulsively). Forgets to pay bills on time. From the
examples he gave about getting in trouble at work, it sounds like he voices his opinion
before thinking of a more appropriate way to phrase it.
He denied sx of anxiety, obsessions or compulsions, psychosis, eating dlo
Pt reports sexual problems. He believes it is due to narcotics he used 7 years ago. He
takes a long time to reach orgasm, which was not the case prior to him starting the
medications
PRESENTING ILLNESS:
Pt was seeing Dr. Rasul for "adhd and mdd", who provided him with
medications. He had some counseling back in law school for "emotional problems". He was
seen at NNAMHS on May 2012 for Mental Health Court, but became argumentative to the
point that he could not complete an evaluation.
Past meds: Paxil (made him sweat), Prozac (sexual SE), Effexor,
Vivanse, strattera (both no effect)
Neurontin for chronic pain
PSYCHIATRIC HISTORY:
MEDICAL HISTORY:
Chronic pain, took narcotics 7 years ago. No hlo hospitalizations.
COUGHLlN.ZACHARY B
3/11/2013
PATIENT NAME:
PATID:
282636
CHART NO.:
282636
ADMISSION DATE:
PROGRAM:
EPISODE NO.:
EVALUATION DATE:
3/11/2013
Status: Final
Pt currently lives alone in a trailor (for 75 dollars a month). He is single,

his ex-GF broke up with him 2 years ago. Since then pt got into trouble with the law. He got
arrested 15 times since 2011 (see legal Hx). Pt is his own lawer and wonders if he is
making the right decisions regarding his own case. He states he is often argumentative,
and stands his ground when he feels he is right. He gave an example of other lawers telling
him that if he complies with what the judge is telling him, he could have been working
already, but he believes that he should do "what's right". Pt has very few friends, although
states that he wants to have friends. He finds it difficult to do small talk with people, but will
talk about law or something of great interest to him. There was a time his family did not
support him after his GF broke up with him. Pt does not understand why people just don't
like him. He states that many judges in Reno do not like him because he "defends his
clients too hard".
SOCIAUFAMILY HISTORY:
Pt went to college and then law school. He did not

get his license rightaway although he passed all tests. He stated the reason was
"interpersonal issues". It took him 3.5 years to get his license. He has not had a steady
employment. His last job was as a domestic violence attorney, he got fired for arguing with
the judge. He believed that the judge wanted him to convince his client of something that
was not of benefit to her. He stood his grounds and got fired.
EDUCATIONAUVOCATIONAUOCCUPATIONAL HISTORY:
15 arrests since 2011. The first one was for petty larceny. He saw somebody
screaming they will through out the cell phone, he took it and then PO was called. He
stated he should have given it back rightaway, but got scared that they will have evidence
against him and did not. He was evicted from his apartment several times, has
tresspassing charges, also being late for court. He spend several days in jail because his
family would not bail him out.
LEGAL HISTORY:
Medications and Substances

COMMENTS ON PSYCHOTROPIC MEDS:
Wellbutrin 300 mg BID
Adderall 30 mg BID
COMMENTS ON NON-PSYCHOTROPIC MEDS:
None
COMMENTS ON ADDICTIVE SUBSTANCES:

ALLERGIES:
NKDA
ADVERSE REACTIONS:
denied
Addictive Behavior
THC, last 7 years ago. Denies EtOH abuse, but attends AA

meetings. He states he told the barr that he is an alcoholic because it would get him out of
trouble. He also attends Alanon meetings
SUBSTANCE ABUSE HISTORY:
ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORS:
Denied
PATIENT NAME: COUGHLlN.ZACHARY

ADMISSION DATE: 3/11/2013
PROGRAM:
PATIO:
282636
EPISODE NO.:
CHART NO.:
EVALUATION DATE:
282636
3/11/2013
Status: Final
Mental Status Exam
Well dressed (wearing a suit), cooperative, pleasant,

good eye contact. Labile affect, tearful a few times when talking about the breakup with GF
or past stressors that he did not elaborate on. Mood is depressed, affect is congruent,
appropriate
APPEARANCE, BEHAVIOR. AFFECT AND MOOD:
Pt is able to verbalize his thoughts in a coherent manner, however,

he frequently loses the train of thought and asks what he was talking about. No LOAs,
FOls, coherent. Denies AHNH/SI/HI
THOUGHT CONTENT/PROCESS:
A+Ox3
LEVEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS/ORIENTATION:
MEMORY FUNCTION:
Fair, forgets some of events of the past
Good. Pt is a lawer, has very good expressive language, which

suggests superior intellectual functioning
INTELLECTUAL FUNCTION:
JUDGEMENT/INSIGHT/IMPULSE CONTROL:
I/J is fair. Impulse control is poor
ASSETS IN DESCRIPTIVE (NOT INTERPRETIVE) FASHION:
Has family in the area, good intellect, realises
the need for treatment.

Diagnosis
Admission
314.00 ATTENTION-DEFICIT/HYPERACTIVITY DISORDER
PREDOMINANTLY INATTENTIVE TYPE
TYPE of DIAGNOSIS:
PRINCIPAL DIAGNOSIS:
AXIS I:
314.00 ATIENTION-DEFICIT/HYPERACTIVITY DISORDER

PREDOMINANTLY INATTENTIVE TYPE
Primary:
Secondary:
311 DEPRESSIVE DISORDER NOS
AXIS II:
301.9 PERSONALITY DISORDER NOS
Primary:
AXIS III:
338.29 OTHER CRONIC PAIN
Primary:
AXIS IV:
AXIS
Econ.
Educ.
Health
Housing
Legal
Occup.
Support
Social
Other
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
v:
Current GAF:
(48) 41 - 50 Serious Symptoms Or Impairm
Previous 12-month HIGH:
(41) 41 - 50 Serious Symptoms Or Impairm
Previous 12-month LOW:

Comments on Diagnosis:
Initial Treatment Plan
,"
~~)'
30f4
COUGHLlN.ZACHARY B
3/11/2013
PATIENT NAME:
PATID:
282636
CHART NO.:
282636
ADMISSION DATE:
PROGRAM:
EPISODE NO.:
EVALUATION DATE:
3/11/2013
Status: Final
Pt reports clear sx of inattention and impulsivity. It's unclear how much better those are
when he is on meds. In addition, he has multiple interpersonal conflicts. It could be due to
impulsivity secondary to ADHD (he blurts out things that are inappropriate or rude). It is
also possible that he has baseline irritability as part of a mood disorder, which makes him
appear arrogant and rude. Another possibility is a personality disorder (borderline vs
narcissistic, vs histrionic, possibly obsessive-compulsive). More info needed. Social
difficulties could be a result of a POD, mild form.
Start pt on Adderall 30 mg BID (gave 2 wks supply) and Wellbutrin SR 300 mg daily. Will
re-evaluate pt in 2 weeks when he is on meds. He already had an evaluation for individual
counseling, would follow up. Will attempt to get collateral info regarding his social
difficulties.
Electronically signed:
Completed by: STEPANOVA,EKATERINA
M.D.
Date: 3/11/2013
Time: 12:22 PM


Written by: NN - BILL JACKSON at 02:22 PM
Duration: 15
Note: Friday, 3.8.13, I telephoned client and left a voice mail message asking client to call.
Client telephoned and left a voice mail message asking me to call. He said that he was out of medication and asked me to
help him get medication before his Medication Clinic appointment set for 3.13.13.
Today I telephoned client and left a verbal message with a woman, asking client to call.
Written by: NN - EKATERINA STEPANOVA at 11:54 AM
Duration: 90
Note: Mr. Coughlin presented for an initial assessment. He has been seeing an outpt psychiatrist, but can no longer afford office
visits or medications. He has been off medications for several days. He is feeling more depressed, has poor energy, sleep,
feels overwhelmed with stressors. He has poor attention, concentration, can't focus on tasks, forgetful. During the session,
he is tearful when talking about stressors, can't focus on a topic, frequently asking what he was talking about. Making poor
choises.
Plan: Start Wellbutrin SR 300 mg QAM, Adderall30 mg BID. See initial eval for details. E.Stepanova, MD

Duration: 15
Note: I telephoned client and left a voice mail message asking client to call.

Written by: NN - JIM DISS at 11: 13 AM
Duration: 15
Note: d: pt attended OP Psych Orientation 2125, and has called, making a request to start treatment. a: Orientation. p: Case will
be assigned at the next weekly staff meeting.

Written by: NN - JIM DISS at 04:02 PM
Duration: 15
Note: d: pt attended OP Psych Orientation Monday, 2125113, and was instructed to call by 5pm this Friday if interested in starting
treatment. a: Orientation. p: will await call.


Duration: 30
Note: Mr. Coughlin reports having a difficult time going through the paperwork for his trial. There is a chance that he will go to jail
for 6 months after his next hearing. He showed his paperwork that he was reading in the waiting room. It's covered in
multiple notes he made on the side and across the writing (shows lack of organization?). Patient gave multiple examples of
making people angry with him. He believes he is making the right choices and standing for what he believes is right,
however, he does not see the pattern of alienating people while doing that. Today he appeared frustrated, his affect was
labile at times, tearing up when talking about stressful events. In addition, he continued to have trouble concentrating on a
conversation, asking multiple times what he was talking about.
Meds: Adderall 30 mg BID, Wellbutrin SR 150 mg BID
Dx:Mood d/o NOS, ADHD, innattentive type
Plan: Cont current meds. Consider adding another antidepressant or Strattera on next visit. Wrote a note for court stating
that I am questioning pt's fittness to aid in defence or stand a trial. Pt's is impulsive and has trouble focusing on interview
here, unclear how he is able to stand an 8 hr trial. Also, he has a self-destructive behaviors, mainly he makes people dislike
him while he believes that he is standing his grounds. He does not understand how he is hurting his own case by behaving
that way. He has always been polite during the sessions with me. RTC in 2 wks. E.Stepanova, MD

Duration: 15
Note: Client telephoned yeaterday evening and left a voice mail message confirming that he had received my voice mail message
setting an appointment for 5.6.13.
He said that he would be there if he were not incarcerated, he facing criminal trial between now and then.
I telephoned client and left a voice mail message asking client to call by 5.1.13 to confirm the appointment, or I would
consider it cancelled secondary to his being incarcerated.

Duration: 15
Note: Client telephoned and left a voice mail message asking me to call to set an appOintment.
I telephoned client and left a voice mail message with a tentative appOintment of 5.6.13 11 am, asking client to call to confirm
it.

Written by: NN - EKATERINASTEPANOVAat 01:43 PM
Duration: 30
Note: Pt reports feeling better. He has been able to defend himself in court, organize his court case. He has not had any
confrontations with authorities since last visit. No new legal problems. He has another court hearing coming up in a week,
where he might be sentenced to 6 months in jail, which he is extremely concerned about. Pt reported feeling lonely, trying to
date, but unsuccessfully. He is reconnecting with his family, spent some time with sisters and nephews. Today he appears
brighter, but mood is still labile. He teared up several times when mentioning his ex GF (he reported similar experience in
court). He denies SIII/P, denies HI/I/P. His TP is more organized, although at times he loses the train of thought and has to
repeat the question.l/J improved
Meds: Adderall 30 mg Bid
Wellbutrin SR 150 mg daily
Ox: Mood dlo NOS, ADHD, inattentive type
Plan: To address mood, increase Wellbutrin to 150 mg BID. ContAdderall at current dose. Pt attended psychological
orientation, encouraged him to attend groups and counseling. Pt would benefit from therapy addressing his social skills,
interpersonal difficulties. Supportive therapy provided today. E.Stepanova, MD
Progress Notes for CQUGHLlN,ZACHARY B


Duration: 15
Note: Client's mother, Mary Barker (telephone numbers: 747-4346, cell: 722-8772) telephoned and left a voice mail message that
client was in custody for six months, maybe longer, and that he had asked her to cancel his next appointment with me and
with Dr. Stepanova. She also expressed concern that client not receive Adderall while incarcerated.
I forwarded the voice mail message to the Medication Clinic director.
I called Ms. Barker and said that I could neither acknowledge nor deny client was my client. Ms. Barker again expressed her
concerns about her son. I suggested that he could probably sign the relevant Authorization for the Release of Information to
permit the jail to communicate with Northern Nevada Adult Mental Health Services.

Note: No Show
Duration: 5


Duration: 5
Note: Regarding individual therapy on Friday, October 18, 2013:
DATA:
Client telephoned earlier and left a voice mail message to cancel today's appointment.
Client telephoned again and we set an appointment for 11.15.13 9am.

Note: No Show
Duration: 5


Duration: 5
Note: Regarding individual therapy on Friday, September 27,2013:
DATA:
Client telephoned at the time of his appointment to say that his car would not start. We reset his appointment to 10.18.13
9am.
Bill Jackson, PhD., Psychologist,688-2074

Episode: 8 - NNAMHS. OP Counseling Adult
Duration: 10
Note: I telephoned chent and left a voice mail message asking client to call to reset his appointment and suggesting that we meet
9.27.13 at 9am.
Client telephoned and we agreed on that appointment.
Progress Notes for COUGHLIN,ZACHARY B


Duration: 5
Note: Regarding individual therapy on Monday, September 09,2013:
DATA:
Client telephoned earlier and left a voice mail message to cancel today's appointment secondary to illness.
I telephoned client and left a voice mail message asking client to call and setting a tentative new appointment for 9.26.13
10am.

Duration: 60
Svc Code: 9083: Date of Group Svc: 08/12/2013
Note: Regarding individual therapy on Monday, August 12, 2013:
DATA:
Observed behavior: Talkative; unkempt; wearing an inside-out shirt again.
We began discussion of client's treatment plan, clarifying that the situation is not the problem, and beginning an exploration
of the notion of a "personality disorder".
ASSESSMENT: no significant change.
PLAN: Complete treatment plan. Placement in Monday mindfulness group. Provide introduction to group therapy guidelines.
Next individual therapy session: 9.9.13 10am.
Bill Jackson, PhD, Psychologist. Telephone: 688-2074


Duration: 5
Note: Regarding individual therapy on Thursday, July 11, 2013:
DATA:
Client did not appear and did not call to cancel today's appointment.
I will request that client be sent a letter requesting contact.

Duration: 30
Note: Pt reports spending 2 weeks in jail for past charges. He has several charges pending. He has been continuing to work on
his own case, not having time for anything else. He is still not working, parents pay for his housing. Pt is more inclined to
follow judges orders and not try to fight with the courts. He reports that he is more interested in the process of getting his
law license back than actually having his license. Discussed different options for employment given that he does not have a
good reputation as a lawer after multiple charges against him. He reports feeling fairly well. He has good sleep and appetite.
Mse; Pleasant, cooperative, good grooming and hygiene. Speech is RRR, coherent, linear. Mood is "good', affect is full,
congruent, appropriate. Denies SIIIIP, no psychotic sx. No Hl/i/p. IIJ is fair.
Meds: Adderall30 mg BID
Wellbutrin SR 150 mg BID
Plan: Cont current meds. Cont individual therapy (pt states he is going monthly). Recommended to increase frequency of
visits, if possible. Recommended to start a routine of exercising. Also, pt needs to find a job and start earning money,
discussed several legal possibilities. RTC in 1 month. E.Stepanova, MD

Duration: 60
Note: Regarding individual therapy on Monday, June 24, 2013:
DATA:
Observed behavior: talkative, restrained. Client presented a lot of information about his chaotic, conflict-filled life.
We began Outpatient Psychological Evaluation, MR204.
Client reports:
"My life's just kind of been a disaster zone," for two years. "Just not getting along with people&."
"I've been fired a lot in my life." "I've had so much antagonism in my life&. [I think] it's a by-product of' depression and
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, etc., perhaps a form of release from other distress. "But I've been a troubled person
for a while now," and was seeing Dr. Osckay for five years, secondary to conflicts with professors, etc. His initial licensure
was delayed.
Client denied suicidal ideation.
Client denied homicidal ideation, or thoughts of hurting others.
Client denied ever hallucinating.
I introduced client to mindfulness meditation.
Homework: mindfulness meditation.
ASSESSMENT: Diagnosis deferred.
PLAN: continued assessment. Complete treatment plan, MR204 etc. Placement in group. Provide introduction to group
therapy guidelines. Next individual therapy session: 7.11.13 11am.


Duration: 60

Progress Notes for CQUGHLlN,ZACHARY B


Note:
Regarding individual therapy on Friday, July 26, 2013:

DATA:
Observed behavior: wearing golf shirt inside out. Disheveled.
We continued Outpatient Psychological Evaluation, MR204.
Client reports: he had two court dates since we last met. He turned down a plea bargain for one. One arrest is on YouTube.
He spent some time with his family, "and that's been good."
"My schedule is all messed up. I just woke up&. in this screwed up rush to get things done."
This electronic progress note is submitted by William S. Jackson, PhD (telephone 688-2074) in place of the paper form,
Nevada Mental Health Institute Outpatient Psychological Evaluation, MR 204. This information was gathered on Monday,
June 24, and Friday, July 26, 2013.
1. IDENTIFYING INFORMATION
Client described himself as a 36-year-old, single, childless, Caucasian, heterosexual man.
2. REFERRAL SOURCE
Self.
3. PRESENTING PROBLEM
"My life's just kind of been a disaster zone," for two years. "Just not getting along with people&."
"I've been fired a lot in my life." "I've had so much antagonism in my life&. [I think] it's a by-product of' depression and
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, etc., perhaps a form of release from other distress. "But I've been a troubled person
for a while now," and was seeing Dr. Osckay for five years, secondary to conflicts with professors, etc. His initial licensure
as an attorney was delayed.
May, 2009: fired from legal position. Client went on unemployment benefits; he said that he was "&Lashing out at family,"
engaged in heated arguments with girlfriend, almost daily.
May, 2011 unemployment benefits ran out.
May 2011: break-up after four years living together.
June, July, and August, 2011: rent not paid for home and law office, combined in same building. Contention over
landscapers damaging his personal property. .
August 2011: "I went off my medications abruptly in August." Client said that he went off medications (used for over a
decade: Adderall and Wellbutrin).
August 20,2011: was arrested for petty larceny secondary to cell phone possession.
September 9, 2011: "I was convicted of shoplifting," some cough drops with DXM.
November 1, 2011: client was evicted from home and law office, combined in same building. Eviction was started in August
2011.
November 13,2011: June, 2012: attorney license (since 2005) was suspended.
September, 2011:
April 2012: Back on Adderall.
April, 2013: Back on both medications.
May 7-24,2012: briefly in Mental Health Court. Ejected for being on Adderall.
Relationship of 4 years ended 6 weeks before that, and he couldn't afford his medications. And stole again a few weeks
later. Jailed on petty larceny charge. Was arrested for trespass at his former law office. Since August 2011 client has been
incarcerated 18 times, evicted 10 times, etc.
Client was arrested the day we last talked for not obeying a bailiff. Client has developed antagonism with Reno Justice
Court, conflicts with WCSO re lock-out orders.
"I'm out of money. I'm pretty exhausted." Client has a large negative internet presence.
"I had a protection order hearing this morning."
Medications now? Wellbutrin 300 mg daily, and Adderall, 30 mg bid; this dose has been the same for about three years.
4. HISTORY OF IMPAIRMENT (include medical and substance abuse history)


History of presenting problem:
Medical history: "I think it's pretty good."
Surgery: denied.
Fractures: fingers: bike fall.
Seizures: "I think as a baby I did."
Loss of consciousness: denied.
Substance abuse:
Last use of substances:
Caffeine: yesterday; less than two cups of coffee daily.
Tobacco: over 7 years ago; first use in 20s. smoked less than daily for five years.
Alcohol: over 7 years ago; first use in late teens; denied daily use. Stopped "just to simplify things."
Marijuana: "If I have ever smoked marijuana, it would be over 7 years ago;"
Methamphetamine: denied.
Cocaine: denied.
Opiates: denied.
Hallucinogens: denied. "Never, and/or, over 7 years ago;"
Inhalants:denied.
Steroids: denied.
Prescription Abuse: "I don't think so." He said that he ran out early.
OTC abuse: "They said I shoplifted cough medicine."
Gambling: denied.
5. OTHER IMPORTANT BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Friday, July 26,2013: "I've seen this movie before."
Client said that he has been burgled by the Washoe County Sheriff three times.
6. MENTAL STATUS (include attitude, general behavior, affect, stream of mental activity, perception, estimate of
abstraction, orientation, memory, and judgment)
Attitude: "I like what I'm doing sometimes, which is scary." Client described his attitude as trying to make the best of things,
but in the process sometimes making things worse. He said that he is vulnerable to depression if he does not stay busy.
Sleep: disrupted.
Appetite: "it's good."
Client appeared fully oriented.
Memory: "it's pretty good."
Judgment: distorted. "I'm probably still too impulsive." For example filing something without proof-reading it, but "I'm anxious
to get some of this out there before they attest me again&."
Affect: somber to bemused.
Client denied suicidal ideation.
Client denied homicidal ideation, or thoughts of hurting others.
Client denied ever hallucinating.
7. STRENGTHS (descriptive, not interpretive, strengths such as knowledge, interests, skills, aptitudes, experience,
educational status, which may be useful in developing a meaningful treatment plan)
"I think I can tell when people are saying something by not saying something." "I can get a sense of whether somebody is
engaged in what they do." "I'm not sure I have any strengths. People say I can write, but then my writing just gets me in
trouble," as does client's persistence.
8. HOPE FACTORS (what motivates the person to go on living?)
"Love for my family, probably." "Just an innate appreciation for life&. My nieces and nephew." "& Wanting to have my own
family."
9. QUALITY OF LIFE FACTORS (what is missing in the person's life right now that would make the person's life more

PATID: 282636 Facility Chart Number: 282636

enjoyable?)
"Probably love." "Probably more of a place in society."
10. INSIGHT INTO EMOTIONAL DYNAMICS (does person have some understanding of his/her problem?)
"Probably by sensing what people are predisposed to feeling about me or towards me&. And then not going out of my way
to disprove that&. [allowing me to] feel superior to them&. [which] engenders animosity between the two of us."
11. BARRIERS TO TREATMENT
"I'm just too scattered&. Doing a marathon hundred yard dash."
12. DIAGNOSIS
Axis I: 296.90 Mood disorder not otherwise specified.
Axis II: 301.9 Personality Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified.
Axis III: Per medical history
Axis IV: Problems with primary support group
Problems related to the social environment
Occupational problems
Housing problems
Economic problems
Problems with access to health services
Problems related to interaction with the legal system
Axis V: Current GAF: 55; 0; O.
DISPOSITION AND PLAN FOR INTERVENTION
Individual and group therapy.
Homework: mindfulness meditation.
ASSESSMENT: above
PLAN: Complete treatment plan. Placement in group. Provide introduction to group therapy guidelines. Next individual
therapy session: 8.12.13 10am

Duration: 15
Note: Client telephoned 7.13.13 and left a voice mail message apologizing for his missed appointment and confirming 7.26.13
10am.

Duration: 15
Note: Client telephoned and left a voice mail message that he could not find his appointment information, and asking me to call.
I telephoned client and left a voice mail message that he had missed the appointment yesterday, and tentatively setting
another for 7.26.13 10am, and asking client to call to confirm that.


Written by: NN - EKATERINA STEPANOVA at 10:29 AM
Duration: 30

Progress Notes for COUGHLIN,ZACHARY 8


Note:
DPBH MEDICATION CLINIC PRESCRIBER SERVICES

Progress Note/Plan of Care
DATA/DESCRIPTION: 5/8/14/ minutes 30 min Billing Code: 99213
Vitals Reviewed: yes
Current psychotropic/nonpsychotropic/over-the-counter medications:
Adderall30 mg BID
Adherence to treatment: Yes, per client report
Response to current medications: good
Side Effects:
denies
HISTORY:
Family Member/Other Supporter Involved in Session:no
CC: inability to function
HPI: Pt continues to have significant difficulty functioning. He was in jail for 6 months for past charges, where he did not get
is Adderall. He had a difficult time functioning and was not able to concentrate and work on his case. He stated that he is
now taking responsibility for his behavior and alienating people. He is trying to work on rescuing some of the relationships
that he ruined by his behavior. However, he continues to be involved with several lawsuits and does not understand why
people from these companies would not hire him back.
On 5/13/2014 spoke with Paul Elcano, who is pts prior employer. He reported that Zach has not been stable in a long time.
He would speak nice to Paul one day and would be verbally aggressive the next day. He was verbally aggressive to Paul
last week and Paul would not talk to Zach in person. No information about Zach was related to Paul since he did not sign
release of information form.
Pertinent medical history: denies
ASSESSMENT/EVALUATION
Affect: Appropriate
Appearance: Casually dressed,
Approach: Cooperative
Behavior: Engaged
Eye Contact: Appropriate
Insight: Fair
Judgment: fair
Language: Appropriate
Memory: WNL
Mood: good
Orientation: X3
Motor Activity:wnl
EPSlTardive Dyskinesia: none
Speech: WNL
Thought Content: No noted thought disorder
Delusions: denies
Hallucinations: denies
Suicidal Ideations: denies
Homicidal Ideations: denies
Aggressive Ideations: denies
Obsessions: denies
Diagnosis: ADHD
PLAN OF CARE:
Medications: Cont current medications
Risk/Benefits/Side Effects/Alternatives to proposed treatment discussed with client and Medication Consent Form signed.
Provided 30 day supply of current medications with 2 refills.
Potential impact of drug and alcohol use on psychiatric symptoms discussed with client.
Interactions of street drugs and alcohol with prescribed treatment discussed with client.
Safety plan discussed with client and emergency contact numbers provided.
Labs: Ordered
Progress Notes for COUGHLlN,ZACHARY 8


Done
Results discussed with client Yes
Discussed need to present to clinic/urgent care/ER prior to follow-up appointment if symptoms worsen or side effects
appear.
Referral to/Continue with AAlNAldrug and ETOH rehab/co-occurring disorders program (resources information provided).
Diet and exercise discussed with client.
Sleep hygiene discussed with client.
Avoiding caffeine intake and smoking discussed with client.
Adequate hydration and sunscreen discussed with client.
Follow-up with PCP and/or dental services (resources information provided).
Ekaterina Stepanova, MD, PhD

Written by: NN - BILL JACKSON, PHD at 05:07 PM
Duration: 5
Note: Client telephoned and we set an appointment for 5.15.14 11 am.
Bill Jackson, PhD, Psychologist (tel.: 688-2074)

Duration: 5
Note: I telephoned client and heard only a recorded female voice speaking the message: "Good-Bye."
I telephoned client again and heard only a recorded female voice speaking the message: "Have a nice day!" followed by a
tone, after which I (think I) left a voicemail message asking client to call.

Duration: 5
Note: I telephoned client and left a voice mail message asking client to call.

Duration: 0
Note: April 21, 2014: Client telephoned and left a voice mail message asking me to call. He said that he had been released after 5
months incarceration and was interested in continuing therapy.
I telephoned client and left a voice mail message asking client to call.

Duration: 10
Note: Discharge Note:
According to client's mother, client has been incarcerated and will not return for services for at least six months; he is now
discharged from outpatient Psychological Services.
William S. Jackson, PhD, Psychologist, 688-2074


Axis III: Per medical history
Axis IV: Problems with primary support group
Problems related to the social environment
Occupational problems
Housing problems
Economic problems
Problems related to interaction with the legal system
Axis V: Current GAF: 48 54
Written by: NN - TERRI PITTENGER, PHD at 11:56 AM
Duration: 60
Note: D. Individual session at NNAMHS. Confidentiality risks and benefits of services were reviewed. Explored previous therapy
and what aspects client would like to continue in current tx. Client talked about propensity to
dominatelmanipulateladversarial position and developed historical hx of same and explored consequences to behavior.
A. Depressive dlo, ADHD by hx. Stage of life issues.
Concepts of Transactional Analysis, CBT and ACT were reviewed.
P. Individual session in 1 week. Monitor mood; increase future orientation and behavioral activation to move toward goals.
Tpittenger psyd

Duration: 5
Note: I telephoned client and left a voice mail message that he had been transferred to the care of Dr. Pittenger.
Bill Jackson, PhD, Psychologist (tel.: 688-2074)

Duration: 15
Note: D. Additional call to client at alternate number. left additional message to call regarding initiating services @ 775 338
5334. tpittenger psyd

Duration: 30
Note: D. Reviewed file; attempted call to client and left detailed message advising of client transfer and requesting call to set up
initial apt. A. psychotherapy P. transfer client tpittenger, psyd

Written by: NN - BILL JACKSON, PHD at 10:47 AM
Duration: 60
Note: I consulted 5.7.14 with colleagues about this client in a general way in light of the fact that I know his mother and stepfather.
I consulted 5.15.14 more particularly with Doctors Diss and Corpuel.
Regarding individual therapy on Thursday, May 15, 2014:
DATA: client was talkative; even-mannered; reflective; and, given enough rein, prone to meandering into legal territory and
self-defense.
We reviewed: client's status as a client; a third-party relationship that raised the prospect of a dual relationship likely to
influence therapy (I know client's mother and stepfather.); and, the prospect of transfer to another therapist. We agreed that
I will seek to transfer client at the next departmental staffing.
Client said that he experiences himself now as more resilient, less drawn to interpersonal conflict. He aims to seek
reinstatement after his two-year suspension. He asked me for a letter of support in that regard, "Or just something saying
I'm getting treatment."
We completed a Suicide Risk Assessment.
ASSESSMENT: client appears more hopeful than when I saw him last in August, 2013.
PLAN: transfer to a colleague for continued assessment and treatment. Next individual therapy session: not set.
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Electronically Filed
Jun 06 2014 08:54 a.m.
Tracie K. Lindeman
Clerk of Supreme Court
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
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IN RE:
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ.
10 NEVADA BAR NO: 9473
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Case 62337
OPPOSITION TO SBNS RESPONSE TO ORDER OF MAY 16, 2014.
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COMES NOW, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN by and through his attorney, ZACHARY
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BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ. and hereby requests permission to file this Opposition to the SBNs
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6/3/14 Response and apprise this court of his Petition for Reinstatement Pursuant to SCR 111(10) in
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65587.
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FACTS:
Perhaps most important of all to note is the fact that the SBN failed to even get into evidence
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in the matter now on appeal in 62337 that there was any conviction for either petit larceny or criminal
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trespass. FHE 12 and 13 simply were not admitted and Kings splatter paint shot gun carpet bombing
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style of Complaint drafting and hearing presentation had its drawbacks.
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As such, a clearly motivated Panel was forced to purport that Coughlin had not filed a verified
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answer or response, and therefore, the SBNs Complaint could be deemed evidence. Indeed, the
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Panels 12/14/12 Findings of Fact; Conclusions of Law points to nothing beyond the Complaint
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itself for proof of any petit larceny conviction, and nothing beyond a controverted assertion by
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Docket 62337 Document 2014-18375
hostile/biased witness Richard G. Hill, Esq. that there existed any criminal trespass conviction. So
whether or not some petit larceny conviction was affirmed on appeal, and whether Judge W. Gardner
has rescinded the recent Order by Judge Holmes vacating any criminal trespass conviction really is of
no import here as Asst. Bar Counsel King simply failed to meet his burden to prove any such
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convictions exist.
There are plenty of things Coughlin wishes he had argued and wishes he had gotten into
evidence at the formal disciplinary hearing of 11/14/12. And King got 5.5 hours to put on his case
compared to the Panel only giving Coughlin 2.5 hours to put on his and denying him the right to call
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Judge Holmes, Richard G. Hill, Esq., etc. in Coughlins case in chief, and denying Coughlin any
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time, much less the purportedly order fifteen minutes per side to conduct a cross-examination of
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himself despite the SBN being given 45 minutes, at least, to conduct a direct examination of
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Coughlin.
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So, the SBNs OBC must be held to what it proved, and what it did not prove. As such,
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extended discussions of whether some petit larceny conviction was affirmed or not really is
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unnecessary, as is the case with any criminal trespass conviction.

It is important to note that Coughlins protected Fourteenth Amendment property right, his
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license to practice law, has now been suspended for over two years due solely to an automatic
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temporary suspension pursuant to SCR 111(6). To be clear, the disciplinary board never filed an
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SCR 102 petition to obtain a temporary suspension of Coughlins law license, and, necessarily,
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Coughlin never received any pre-deprivation hearing connected thereto. Further, neither the SBNs
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8/23/12 SCR 105 Complaint nor anything filed thereafter nor any argument made as the 11/14/12
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formal disciplinary hearing ever moved to continue Coughlins temporary suspension (from 60838)
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during the pendency of the disciplinary matter at issue in 62337.
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Well, unless one counts Kings writing at page 6:1-3 of his Complaint: 3. That pursuant
to Supreme Court Rule 102, such disciplinary action be taken by the Northern Nevada Disciplinary
Board against Respondent as may be deemed appropriate under the circumstances. Of course, SCR
102 does not allow for a disciplinary board, much less this Panel1, to enter temporary orders of
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suspension. Thats because a law license is importantand not just to the attorneyit (and the
attorneys possessing them) are important to the public. Making law licenses too easily suspended
weakens the legal system dramatically. There is simply too much competition and static out there to
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allow otherwise. If a bunch of attorneys (mostly prosecutors and others with economic interests (like
NNDB Members Hill, Kandaras, and Hahn2/WLSs Elcano, the well paid Reno City Attorneys
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Office deputies, etc) can just go merrily about suspending anyone who has a position contrary to their
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own then you get what we have herethe Reno City Attorneys Office running to the SBN to co-sign
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its unsupportable citations to NRAP 9 and State v. Hill, Barkley, and Mitchell (which RCA Roberts
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neglected to even trot out when she viewed Coughlin as opposing counselinterestingly) with
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respect to its contention that NRS 189.030(1) somehow can be ignored or re-imagined to allow for
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shifting the burden to file the transcript (the trade off for not having to provide a trial de novo in the
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district court) to the defendant (even obviously indigent ones). It cannot:
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http://www.scribd.com/doc/225900173/2JDC-Judge-Polaha-on-NRS-189-030-1-RMC-MustFile-Transcript-Prior-to-Payment-by-Defendant-s
http://www.scribd.com/doc/225900176/RCA-Hazlett-Stevens-RPC-3-1-Violation-Re-NRS189-030-1-Transcript-Requirement-Citing-Mitchell-and-NRAP-9
Coughlin did not steal any candy bar and some cough drops from Walmart (though it would
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certainly be easier and more convenient for Coughlin to now lie and assert that he did steal such),
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and, regardless, the conviction for such was not affirmed on appeal (though the SBN and Reno City
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Attorneys Office keep trying to legislate away NRS 189.030(1) (which can not be done given
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Nevadas Constitution expressly imbued the Legislature with the exclusive authority to enact
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procedural rules for appeals from justice and municipal courts of record to the district courts in
Art 6. Sec. 8.
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AMJUR Courts: However, where the conflict is irresolvable, a procedural rule

generally prevails over a statute on procedure,[FN2] absent a constitutional provision
subordinating the court's rulemaking authority to the legislature in regard to practice and
procedure.[ FN3] State rules of civil procedure supersede all previous court
decisions.[FN7]
[FN2] In re Opinion of Clerk, 606 So. 2D 138 (Ala. 1992); Hickson v. State, 316 Ark.
783, 875 S.W.2D 492 (1994); Haven Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Kirian, 579 So. 2D 730
(Fla. 1991) (Declaring conflicting statute unconstitutional); Shaw v. Shaw, 603 So. 2D 287
(Miss. 1992); Williams v. Cummings, 191 W. Va. 370, 445 S.E.2D 757 (1994). [FN3] Stokes
v. Denmark Emergency Medical Services, 315 S.C. 263, 433 S.E.2D 850 (1993). [FN7]
Thomas v. Cornell, 316 Ark. 366, 872 S.W.2D 370 (1994); Shaw v. Shaw, 603 So. 2D 287
(Miss. 1992).
McElroy v. State, 172 S.W. 1144 (Tex.Crim.App.,1915) Supreme Court rule 116 102
Tex. Liii, 142 S.W. Xxv, adopted under Vernon's Ann.St.Const. Art. 5, 25, Held invalid,
because inconsistent with Code Cr.Proc.1911, Arts. 930, 931, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P. Arts. 842,
843, Providing for the preparation of transcripts in criminal cases and their filing with the
clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Watkins v. Kelley, 80 So.2D 247 (Ala.,1955) Where both Supreme Court rule and
statute purported to regulate time for filing transcripts and securing trial court's ruling on
exceptions to the transcript, but were conflicting in their terms and mutually exclusory in
their effects, the act of the Legislature prevailed. Supreme Court Rules, rule 48, Code 1940,
Tit. 7Appendix; Code 1940, Tit. 7, 827(1) Et seq., 827(1A), 827(4).
Tuttle v. Commonwealth, 77 S.W.2D 351 Ky.,1934 Statute permitting Court of
Appeals to adopt rules "consistent with law" does not empower court to set aside Code
provision respecting time for filing transcript by adoption of inconsistent rule. Const.
110; Ky.St. 949; Cr.Code Prac. 336.
Further, even if NRAP did apply here (it does not), due to the provision N.R.S. Const. Art. 6,
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8, there is a constitutional provision prohibiting even NRAP from overriding NRS 189.030(1)s
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requirment that the justice file the transcript with the district court:
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terms of office and jurisdiction of Justices of the Peace; appeals; Courts of Record...The
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Legislature shall also prescribe by law the manner, and determine the cases in which appeals
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8. Number, qualifications,
may be taken from Justices and other courts.
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AMJUR Courts 51. Limitations on authority The state constitution may grant the
legislature limited authority to make procedural rules where necessary.[FN1] The state's
supreme court cannot contradict the state constitution by court rule.[FN9] The court also
may not promulgate rules in order to diminish constitutional rights,[FN10] A trial court is
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without authority to adopt local rules or procedures that conflict with statutes or with
rules of court adopted by the Judicial Council, or that are inconsistent with the
Constitution or case law. Elkins v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. 4Th 1337, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3D 483,
163 P.3D 160 (2007).
[FN1] R. E. W. Const. Co. V. District Court of Third Judicial Dist., 88 Idaho 426, 400
P.2D 390 (1965). [FN9] Sackett v. Santilli, 146 Wash. 2D 498, 47 P.3D 948 (2002); State v.
Saintcalle, 309 P.3D 326, 349, Wash. [FN10] City of Auburn v. Brooke, 119 Wash. 2D 623,
836 P.2D 212 (1992).
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Coughlin filed Motions to Dismiss the SBNs Complaint at issue in 62337 based on lack of
service of the Complaint, then, under protest, filed a Verified Response and or Answer to the
Complaint plainly denying, under oath, each and every allegation in Kings 26 (sicsuch skips
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from count/paragraph 19 to 26) count Complaint.
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Validity and construction of procedures to temporarily suspend attorney from practice, or

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place attorney on inactive status, pending investigation of, and action upon, disciplinary charges. 80
A.L.R.4th 136.3
Further, RMC Judge Howard failed to find that Coughlin possessed any intent to commit
larceny, but, rather, merely found that Coughlin failed to "purchase" "a candy bar and some cough
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drops". As such, even where there still a conviction, such would not be a "serious crime" given the
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requisite specific intent was not proven. Further, SCR 111(6) and Sloan seem to contemplate that the
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crime need be committed in one's stead as an attorney.
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http://www.scribd.com/doc/228372827/3-10-14-to-4-22-14-Couglin-s-Handwritten-Filingsin-Jail-in-Disbarment-Appeal-in-62337
http://www.scribd.com/doc/228375119/8-13-13-SCR-102-4-d-and-SCR-111-7-Petition-toDissolve-Temporary-Suspension-61462-in-Re-Coughlin-77-Pages
http://www.scribd.com/doc/228375239/5-7-14-65587-Coughlin-Petition-for-ReinstatementSCR-111-10-Stamped
http://www.scribd.com/doc/228374844/5-22-14-Supplemental-Petition-for-Reinstatement65587-14-16680
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Coughlin timely moved for an extension of time to file his Opening Brief in this matter.
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Coughlin filed his Brief on 3/14/14. The SBNs Answering Brief was due 4/14/14. The SBN has
failed to file a brief, and failed to move for an extension of time to do so, much less timely move for
such an extension. Asst. Bar Counsel Machado, whom heretofore has had no connection to this
matter, filed the SBNs Response on 6/3/14, and at many points therein admits he lacks much in the
way of knowledge about this case. However, that did not stop Machado from making many
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inflammatory allegations, largely premised upon unsworn hearsay, whilst providing absolutely no
citation to legal authority for the key contentions he made therein.
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For instance, the SBNs 6/3/14 Response reads: Coughlin's claim that his conviction (as to
60838 petty larceny conviction) was not affirmed on appeal is false and Coughlin knew or should
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have known of its falsity when he filed his notice on April 22, 2014.
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Actually, Coughlins Notice of Appeal clearly appealed both the 11/30/11 Judgment of
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Conviction and Court Order as well as the 11/30/11 Order Punishing Summary Contempt.4 Such
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contempt order notes it is against Coughlin the defendant, not Coughlin the attorney representing a
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client. As such, Pengillys mandate that any challenge to such a contempt order by a sanctioned
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attorney ought come by way of petition for mandamus is inapplicable. Regardless, the district court
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has the jurisdiction and discretion to treat a notice of appeal of such a summary contempt order as a
petition for writ of mandamus.
Machado does not even seem to be aware of the fact that Judge Elliott merely affirmed the
rulingwhich even RCA Sooudi admitted to Coughlin he was unsure whether such was in
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reference to the Order Punishing Summary Contempt or the Judgment of Conviction and Court
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Order. RCA Sooudi also had to admit to Coughlin that he was stumped as to why the district court
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judge would remand for all further proceedings (plural) if, consistent with Sooudis contention,
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such was done merely to impose the fine (sentence). RCA Sooudi also admitted to Coughlin that he
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had no answer for the fact that NRAP 1 clearly spells out that NRAP only applies to appeals to the
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Nevada Supreme Courtwhich makes rather puzzlingly the district court judges later 8/27/12 Order
claiming he was divested of jurisdiction to even address Coughlins NRAP 40 Petition for Rehearing.
(The SBNs 6/3/14 Response indicates: Further, Coughlin moved for a new trial, but the
court denied the motion. The Reno Municipal Court case docket for this matter and the Order
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Denying Appellant's Motion for a New Trial are attached hereto as Exhibit 4.)
Coughlin filed a timely functional equivalent of an NRAP 40 Petition for Rehearing5 (arguing
that the RMC had failed in its duties to transmit that required of it under NRS 189), which the district
court judge then refused to adjudicate, indicating in his 8/27/12 Order6 denying such that: On March
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15, 2012, this Court entered an Order denying the Appeal and affirming the decision of the Municipal
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Court. This Court no longer has jurisdiction over this case and the Appellant's Motion for New
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Trial is moot.. However, NRAP 40 provides that Coughlin is to have 18 days to file such after any
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order disposing of his appeal, and that remittitur shall not occur until the passing of such period of
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time. Judge Elliott, after all, invoked NRAP 28, 30, and 32 in affirming the ruling of the RMC.7
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A loose but apt analogy may be found in our criminal practice. A Rule 59(e) motion is the
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functional equivalent of a motion for a new trial or, on appeal, of a petition for rehearing." Bruce
v. 2. Bruce, 587 So. 2d 898, 903 (Miss. 1991)).
A case from Utah, Falkner v. Lindberg, 288 P. 3d 1097 (Utah 2012)8 is instructive here,
especially where Utahs Rules of Appellate Procedure parallel NRAP 1 in specifying the
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applicability of such to certain courts of which neither the court there nor the court here (ie,
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NRAP does not apply to appeals from the justice courts (or, as here, from a municipal court that is
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allegedly a court of record) to the district court), are included amongst and as to whether the
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relationship between remittitur and jurisdiction, concluding that remand to the justice court does not
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necessarily divest the district court of jurisdiction. However, one key distinction between such and
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the issues arising here is that this Utah case did not involve a question of whether a district
court, borrowing the jurisdictional principles from a set of rules of appellate procedure that do
not apply to it (but, rather, to high courts in such state) may apply one such rule where such
expressly contradicts a statute requiring the filing of the transcript by a justice or municipal
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court of record with the district court, as NRS 189.030(1) plainly does in Nevada:
110k1193 k. Jurisdiction and proceedings of appellate court after remand.
Even after a remittitur returns jurisdiction to the lower court, the appellate court may retain
limited jurisdiction over certain matters, particularly where constitutional rights are implicated.
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Falkner v. Lindberg, 288 P.3d 1097 Utah App., 2012.

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Coughlin has to proceed with all the ambiguity dealt him, combined with dealing with the, uh,
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spin giving to the plain wording of the Nevada Constitution and statutes like NRS 189.030(1) by
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some. As such, even where the district court judges 3/15/12 Order Affirming the Ruling of the RMC
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is not clear which ruling it was affirming (The Judgment of Conviction? The Order Punishing
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Summary Contempt?
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http://www.scribd.com/doc/225900173/2JDC-Judge-Polaha-on-NRS-189-030-1-RMCMust-File-Transcript-Prior-to-Payment-by-Defendant-s
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Further, compare Judge Elliotts Order Affirming the Ruling of the Reno Municipal Court
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in Coughlins case in CR11-2064 (where Elliotts Order is not clear as to whether it is affirming the
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Order for Summary Punishment of Contempt or the Judgment of Conviction and Court Order or
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some other ruling), to Judge Elliotts standard phraseology in the following, where the term
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conviction is specified and where there is no remand for all further proceedings as there is in
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his 3/15/12 Order in Coughlins case, where the RMC failed to file the transcript as required by NRS
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189.030(1), which requires a remand pursuant to NRS 189.035
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http://www.scribd.com/doc/225900174/2JDC-Judge-Elliott-Order-Affirming-Appellants-Conviction-Compare-to-CR11-2064-Order-Affirming-Ruling-of-the-RMC
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It is real clear from the plain text of NRS 189.030(1) that the justice (or municipal court judge
where a court of record is involved) must file the transcript within 10 days of the filing of the notice
of appeal, regardless of whether the defendant (much less the indigent criminal defendant) has paid
for such up front:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/225901665/Legislative-history-NRS-189-030-1-189-050-SB2671979-2064-22176-60838-ocr
http://www.scribd.com/doc/225900171/NRS-189-030-1-2JDC-Judge-Flanagan-ApplyingCivil-Rules-of-Procedure-to-Excuse-RMC-s-Failure-to-File-Transcript
Its pretty, uh, interesting to consider that Judge Elliott failed to recuse himself9 (much less
even divulge his being the President of WLSs co-defendant CAAWs Executive Board10) where
presiding over Coughlins wrongful termination suit in CV11-01955 (see 60317), when considering
the view of Elliotts 3/15/12 Order Affirming the Ruling of the RMC the Reno City Attorney and
SBN wish one to take (ie, that such was not obeying NRS 189.030(1), and NRS 189.035, 189.050)
http://www.scribd.com/doc/225900172/2JDC-Judge-Elliott-Order-Granting-Motion-toDismiss-Without-Prejudice-NRS-189-030-1
http://www.scribd.com/doc/225900176/RCA-Hazlett-Stevens-RPC-3-1-Violation-Re-NRS189-030-1-Transcript-Requirement-Citing-Mitchell-and-NRAP-9
The OBCs Machado also writes: The court order relied upon by Coughlin is titled "Order
Affirming Ruling of the Reno Municipal Court." See Exhibit 1. The district court, on page 3 of this
order, specifically affirms the Reno Municipal Court's finding that Coughlin was guilty of Petit
Larceny in violation of Reno Municipal Code 8.10.040. The district court then remanded the matter
for all further proceedings.
Actually, that is not true. Far from it. Nothing specific to the finding of one being guilty
of Petit Larceny compared to the ruling found in the municipal court judges Order Punishing
Summary Contempt. Here is what page 3 (emphasis added) of such order actually reads in its
entirety (nothing specific to a Judgment of Conviction and Court Order compared to an Order
Punishing Summary Contempt about it):
his burden in providing an adequate appellate record, and this Court must affirm
the ruling of the Reno Municipal Court. fn1 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that the ruling of the Reno Municipal Court is AFFIRMED. IT IS FURTHER
ORDERED that this matter is remanded back to the Reno Municipal Court for all further
proceedings. Dated this 15th day of March, 2012 /s/ Steven P. Elliott District Judge
(Fn 1: 1 It is worth noting that, pursuant to NRS 4.410(2), "[T]he fees for transcripts
and copies [of municipal court proceedings] must be paid by the party ordering them. In a
civil case the preparation of the transcript need not commence until the fees have been
deposited with the deputy clerk of the court." Accordingly, NRS 189.030, Which requires
the municipal court to transmit various papers to the district court upon appeal, does not
require action until such fees have been paid. Here, it appears that Appellant never paid
the requisite fees to secure the transcription of the proceedings. For this reason, the
appellate record is incomplete. )
Interestingly, the OBCs Machado then slips up and adopts the dismissed terminology
himself: In summary, Coughlin's criminal conviction for theft which formed the basis for the SCR
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111 Petition in Supreme Court Case No. 60838 has not been dismissed. Coughlin is attempting to
mislead this Court by claiming otherwise whilst elsewhere claiming ineffectual the 4/8/14 Order
of Dismissal by Judge Holmes in the criminal contempt case (11 TR 26800 from which Machado
attaches the 3/12/12 Order as an exhibit to his 6/3/14 Response) forming the heart of the SBNs SCR
105 Complaint (or, at least, certainly, the heart of the Panels Recommendation, which finds at
most one actual RPC violation (RPC 3.3(a)(1) at R1362:18-23, and, perhaps, a quasi RPC 8.4(c)
violation at R1367:11-12 stemming from the exact same alleged conduct). The entire case was
dismissed on March 29, 2013, as reflected in the Order of Dismissal dated April 7, 2014. See
Exhibit 7.
Machado continues: As noted above, Reno Municipal Court Case No. 11 TR 26800 21,
which concerned traffic violations, was dismissed. The matter was also considered by the hearing
panel. However, the panel's findings reflected a concern over Coughlin's behavior11 at the trial for
the matter, not the underlying charges themselves. See Exhibit 10 at 3-5. These concerns included
Coughlin being found in contempt of court and being incarcerated for five (5) days. See id. at 3-4 TT 78; see also Exhibit 11, Order, filed March 12, 2012. The hearing panel also noted that Coughlin filed
nonsensical pleadings in the matter and Coughlin's conduct was described as "inappropriate,
bizarre, dishonest, irrational and disruptive . . . ." See Exhibit 10 at 4-5 TT 10-11.
The dismissal of the charges in Reno Municipal Court Case No. 11 TR 26800 21 did not
vacate the Municipal Court's finding of contempt nor did it excuse Coughlin's behavior during the
proceeding. Accordingly, the disciplinary proceeding is not impacted by the dismissal in Reno
Municipal Court Case No. 11 26800 21.
The OBCs prosecutor appears to want nothing to do with explaining how the dismissal12 of
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the case/conviction at issue in its fellow prosecutor Becketts case is any different than the dismissal
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of the case/convictions at issue in the two 4/8/14 Orders of Dismissal entered by Judge Holmes
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attached to Coughlins 4/22/13 Notice (which resulted in this Courts 5/16/14 Order requiring the
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6/3/14 Response the OBC recently filed. It certainly seems like these prosecutors have one set of
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rules for themselves (such as RCA Sooudi et al being permitted to constantly violate RPC 3.1 what
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with their constantly seeking to have appeals of criminal convictions dismissed based upon their
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meritless arguments that NRAP 9 and Hill, Barkley, and Mitchell v. State somehow excuse the failure
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of the City of Renos judges on the Reno Municipal Court bench to obey NRS 189.030(1) with
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respect to the requirement that the justice shall file the transcripts within 10 days of the filing of a
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notice of appeal.
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SCR 123(3) allows for comparing this matter to In Re Beckett case 57763:
http://caseinfo.nvsupremecourt.us/public/caseView.do?csIID=25910 . Mr. Beckett's case/conviction
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was dismissed on 1/21/11. On 2/14/11 Beckett filed Petition for Reinstatement Pursuant to SCR
111(10). Mr. Beckett's law license was reinstated six weeks later by an Order Granting Petition for
Reinstatement on April 4th, 2011.
In Re Beckett case 57763 reveals that the Nevada Supreme Court (SCR 123(3) allows for
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citing to such) views the dismissal of a conviction as a basis for dissolving a temporary suspension
under SCR 111(10), as the 4/4/11 Order in such case held:
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"SCR 111(10) gives us discretion to reinstate an attorney whose underlying conviction has
been reversed. The petition is accompanied by a certified copy of a February 2, 2011, order
from the Pahrump Township Justice Court dismissing Case No. 10CR01587 with prejudice. In
light of the fact that the charge underlying our order of temporary suspension has been
dismissed with prejudice, and our previous determination that Beckett's California
misdemeanor conviction did not warrant imposition of a temporary suspension, we conclude
that there is no longer a basis for Beckett being temporarily suspended pending the outcome
of his disciplinary proceedings. We therefore grant the petition. Attorney Robert S. Beckett,
Bar No. 3383, is hereby reinstated to the practice of law pending the outcome of his
disciplinary proceedings."
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(The RMC Judges rather consistently ignore notices of appeal toowhich goes against, at least, that
1979 Atty Gen. Adv. Op: www.ag.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/agnvgov/Content/.../1979_AGO.pdf 13
Further, it simply is not true, much less an ethical display, for the SBN to adopt the position
RCA Sooudi tried to sell to Coughlin (ie, that the case in which Holmes issued a criminal contempt
conviction against Coughlin was dismissed on 3/29/13). A close look at that one sentence Order of
Dismissal of 4/8/14 reveals absolutely no mention of such case having been dismissed on
March 29, 2013. Additionally, a simple look at the docket from such case reveals nothing about
a dismissal on 3/29/13, but, rather, merely notates that the active bond that was the $100.00
Coughlins mother testified to14 the RMC having taken but then having failed to release Coughlin a
day early, as having been exonerated.
Further, not that it has any real relevance here, but the SBN ought be made to have WLSs
Elcano and the Reno City Attorneys Offices Sooudi sign affidavits rather than attach emails that the
SBN purport to be from them. Further, an email from Elcano claiming Coughlin to not then be an
WLS employee is not the same thing as a claim that WLS had not rehired Coughlin at the time
Coughlin made such claim (which was made under oath, in a signed, sworn Declaration, as opposed
to the innuendo/hearsay parade the SBN engages in here).
Respectfully submitted DATED this 6/6/14
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/s/ Zachary Barker Coughlin

Zachary Barker Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No 9473
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
Attorney for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE/DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN PURSUANT TO

SCR 111(10)
STATE OF NEVADA)
ss.
COUNTY OF WASHOE)
Comes Now, Declarant, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, being first duly sworn, deposes
and says under penalty of perjury and certifies the following is true and correct:
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1. I am subject attorney in the above-referenced matter, have personal knowledge of the facts
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contained herein and am competent to attest thereto, and I hereby declare that all assertions I have
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made herein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge. Everything I have linked to herein
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directs to a true and complete copy of the document it purports to be.
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Respectfully submitted DATED this 6/6/14
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/s/ Zachary Barker Coughlin

Zachary Barker Coughlin, Esq.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on June 5, 2014 a true and correct copy of the foregoing document
was submitted for electronic filing to be electronically served upon the State Bar of Nevada's Patrick
O. King and or David Clark:
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/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin,
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and you get those whom are contracted to provide access to legal tools to those whom are
incarcerated willfully violating the 1993 NVD Consent Decree (CV-N-91-65-ECR) requiring as
muchand you get the Sheriff/WCDA/RCA/RJC/RMC ignoring the fact that the Legislature
requires the passing of 24 hours per NRS 40.253 from the tenants receipt of a summary eviction
removal order prior to the Sheriff conducting a lockout, and you get judges like the RMCs Howard
willfully violating ADKT 411 in denying indigent defendants counsel, ruling on such applications
whilst being the presiding judge, refusing to obey the requirement of NRS 189.030(1) that the
justice file the transcript with the district court within 10 days of a notice of appeal being filedand
you get judges like the RMCs Howard and W. Gardner violating NRS 178.415s mandatory stay
during the pendency of orders for competency evaluations like that by Judge Holmes of 3/12/12
(which the SBN laughably interprets to somehow support its contention that the trespass conviction
would somehow still be in existence had there not been a 4/8/14 Order vacating such. It is entirely
unclear how Judge W. Gardner could know such was a clerical error? Certainly, the municipal and
justice court judges step in for one another from time to time on each others cases (see RJC Judge
Cliftons having RCR2012-065630 transferred to him from Judge Lynch on 2/27/12, or RMC 12 CR
00696 being transferred from Judge Dilworth to Judge Holmes by Judge W. Gardner on 2/27/12).
Why not have the judge whom entered such Order enter something saying as much? Perhaps, Judge
Holmes was annoyed that Judge W. Gardner passed her a vacated 4/13/09 Order (vacated by 6/19/09
Final Decree of Divorce) sanction against Coughlin by his sister without telling Judge Holmes that
such had been vacated. Judge Holmes probably would have appreciated that knowledge before
having it sent to the SBN with her 3/14/12 letter (see FHE8).
http://www.scribd.com/doc/228404516/6-19-09-0204-62337-Ocrd-01955-01168-FOFCOLDODFinal-Order-or-Decree-of-Divorce-in-Joshi-01168-Overrides-FHE3-4-13-09-Ord
Consistent with the 4/13/09 Order After Trial directing him to prepare a proposed Final Decree
consistent with such order in FHE3, opposing counsel in that Joshi divorce matter (the one whom
failed to attempt the 21 day filing ready safe harbor motion required by NRCP 11 (by way of NRS
7.085) prior to moving for sanctions in his closing argument at trial (Springgate) even submitted a
Proposed Final Decree of Divorce that included the attorney fee sanction:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/228404700/5-21-09-0204-01168-Springgate-s-Req-for-Submission-andProposed-Order-That-Was-Entered-Vitiating-the-Order-of-4-10-09
However, again, the Final Decree of Divorce vacated such sanction, and, instead, awarded the very
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alimony Coughlin was allegedly vexatious in pursuing in the first place.

More likely, Judge Holmes was moved by Coughlins taking responsibility in his filings (a
few weeks prior to Judge Holmes entering the two 4/8/14 Orders vacating the criminal trespass
conviction the Panel was apparently referencing at page 20 of its Recommendation) and all
orders stemming from the traffic citation case that begat a criminal contempt conviction (and,
despite Asst. Bar Counsel Machados contentions (however uninformed and recklessly made), the
Panel refused to admit any evidence with respect to Coughlins conduct at such 2/27/12 trial (which
begat the two orders the SBNs references in its Response), as the Panel applied SCR 111(5) to in
essence, a conviction while insisting that Coughlin would not be permitted to relitigate such
issues)) in both the traffic case from which the two orders the SBNs 6/3/14 Response references and
in the criminal trespass case (which was never put into evidence at the formal disciplinary hearing,
thus Asst. Bar Counsel Machados apparently caveat).
The price for the SBNs scattershot approach at such formal disciplinary hearing and the Panels
reluctance to afford Coughlin much due process at all (funny, Panel Chair Echeverria gets over four
hours of closing argument for Whittemore, yet Coughlin was given less than 2.5 hours total to put on
his entire case) is that the SBN simply did not get much of what it needed to prove proven. FHE 12
and 13 were not even admitted. The SBNs 6/3/14 Response was forced to
SCR Rule 102. Types of discipline. Misconduct is grounds for: 4. Temporary suspension by the
supreme court. (4)(a) On the petition of a disciplinary board, signed by its chair or vice chair,
supported by an affidavit alleging facts personally known to the affiant, which shows that an
attorney appears to be posing a substantial threat of serious harm to the public, the supreme court
may order, with notice as the court may prescribe, the attorneys immediate temporary suspension or
may impose other conditions upon the attorneys practice.
Of course, the SBN was too embarrassed by apparent grievant (and NNDB Member) Richard G. Hill,
Esq.s five page unsigned, unsworn emailed grievance to the SBN to even put such into evidence as
the hearing (sabotaging the whole RPC 8.1 splatter paint accusation the SBN attempted to coble
together) http://www.scribd.com/doc/228396280/1-14-12-62337-is-This-NNDB-MemberRichard-G-Hill-Esq-s-Grievance-Unsigned-Unsworn-the-SBN-Was-Too-Embarassed-by-to-Put-inEvidence ? Who knows?
As such, Coughlin had no responsibility to argue against the continuation of such at the formal
disciplinary hearing, nor with any respect to 62337. Nonetheless, the Panels Recommendation
(which is not titled a Recommendation and, as such, fails to vest this Court with jurisdiction under
SCR 105(3) even more than the fact that the SBNs Clerk of Court Laura Peters has admitted that she
refused to and failed to file in Coughlins tolling motions, which were timely submitted to the
SBN).
Regardless of the fact that SCR 102 requires the disciplinary board to file a petition and obtain
an order for such from the supreme court, the Panel was undeterred by such due process
annoyances, and in its Findings of Fact; Conclusions of Law (which, again, is not titled a
Recommendation) at page 22 recommends (2) That his temporary suspension be continued
pending final resolution of this matter.
Rather, the SBN has, so far, been able to piggy back its more holes than an afghan SCR 105
Complaint at issue in 62337 onto that temporary suspension, by Asst. Bar Counsel King unilaterally
ruling that the SCR 111(8) hearing mandated by such rule and this Courts 6/7/12 Order referring
this matter to the appropriate disciplinary board for the institution of a formal hearing before a
hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent of the discipline to be
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imposed was to be consolidated and or combined with the formal disciplinary proceedings
to follow from the 8/23/12 SCR 105 Complaint King filed, but never served Coughlin with. King
went so far as to order SBN Clerk of Court to vacate the already scheduled, noticed, and on
calendar 9/25/12 formal hearing to be held in response to this Courts 6/7/12 SCR 111(8) mandate in
60838.
The combining of such formal hearing (and, necessarily, the adjudication to follow therefrom)
required by SCR 111(8) in connection with the temporary suspension of Coughlins law license and
that at issue in the SCR 105 Complaint has now clearly resulted in an unconstitutional deprivation of
Coughlins protected Fourteenth Amendment property right (license to practice law) with no predeprivation hearing.
Simply put, this alleged conviction of petty larceny of a candy bar and cough drops has been given
more than enough run by now, resulting in over two years worth of temporary suspension
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10/08/2013
Notice/Incoming
Filed Notice of Unimaginable Impropriety of WCDA.
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13-30110
Generally, an attorney is entitled to reasonable notice of a disciplinary proceeding against him
or her, and an opportunity to defend. The general rule is that before an attorney may be
disciplined, as by suspension, whether under a statute or in the exercise of a court's inherent powers,
he or she is entitled to notice and opportunity to defend. Ordinarily, the right to defend is exercised
in a trial or hearing. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S. Ct. 1222, 20 L. Ed. 2D 117 (1968); In re Jones,
506 F.2D 527 (8th Cir. 1974). Ind.Matter of Murray, 266 Ind. 221, 362 N.E.2D 128 (1977). Va.
Maddy v. First Dist. Committee of Virginia State Bar, 205 Va. 652, 139 S.E.2D 56 (1964). Kan.
Knutson Mortg. Corp. V. Coleman, 24 Kan. App. 2D 650, 951 P.2D 548 (1997).
Criminal activityTemporary suspension not appropriate
Finding that the particular criminal activities for which attorneys had been found guilty were not
necessarily serious crimes, the courts in the following cases held that temporary suspension from the
practice of law pending the completion of disciplinary proceedings was not warranted.
The court in Re Hutchinson (1984, Dist Col App) 474 A2d 842, held that the conviction of a
misdemeanor for violating a statute and regulation prohibiting the communication of non-public
information relating to a tender offer where it was reasonably foreseeable that the communication
would result in a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act or crime, was not per se a serious crime as
that term is used in bar rules governing temporary suspension of attorneys, and thus immediate
suspension pending disposition of disciplinary proceedings was not mandated. The court observed
that under the rule, the term "serious crime" included any felony and any lesser crime a necessary
element of which, as determined by the statutory or common-law definition of such crime, involved
improper conduct as an attorney, interference with the administration of justice, false swearing,
misrepresentation, fraud, willful failure to file income tax returns, deceit, bribery, extortion,
misappropriation, theft, or an attempt to commit, conspiracy to commit, or solicitation of another to
commit, a serious crime.
The court stated that the offense for which the attorney in the instant case had been convicted
had five elements. These elements were, said the court, that the accused be in possession of
information relating to a tender offer; that he or she know, or have reason to know, that the
information was nonpublic; that he or she know, or have reason to know, that the information had
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been acquired, directly or indirectly, from the offeror or issuer or any agent of either; that he or she
communicate the information to another; and that it be reasonably foreseeable that the
communication would likely result in a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act or practice in
violation of the regulation. Noting that no intent of any kind was required in order to be convicted
inasmuch as a negligent communication was sufficient, the court concluded that since the
components of the definition of a serious crime relevant to this case all involved intentional acts,
such as fraud and deceit, and intent was not a necessary element of the crime for which the
attorney was convicted, his offense could not be deemed a serious crime.[8]
An attorney was not convicted of a "serious crime" such that he could be temporarily
suspended from the practice of law pending final disposition of disciplinary charges where he
pleaded nolo contendere to conspiracy to commit the crime of being an accessory to a forged
conveyance, the court held in Sloan v State Bar, (Nev. 1986) 102 Nev. 436, 726 P2d 330. Noting that
the phrase "serious crime" was defined as any felony, or any crime less than a felony, a necessary
element of which involved improper conduct as an attorney, interfering with the administration of
justice, misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, or an attempt to commit, conspiracy to commit, or
solicitation of another to commit, a serious crime, the court, responding to the contention that the
attorney's conviction was based on fraudulent conduct and therefore was a serious crime,
concluded that the evidence clearly indicated that the attorney did not have knowledge of the
fact that the act that he was involved in (preparing documents for the transfer of equipment
that was later found to have been stolen) was fraudulent until at least 2 months after his
involvement.
Failure to provide presuspension notice and opportunity to be heardRights of
attorney violatedgenerally
The court in the following case held that a statute, which provided that whenever an
investigating committee recommended the filing of a complaint against an attorney, the attorney
stood suspended from the time the complaint was filed, was invalid insofar as the suspension was
not based upon any judgment or finding of the court, and was without trial or notice to the
accused.
In McMurchie v Superior Court (1923) 26 Ariz 52, 221 P 549, the court held that a statute,
which provided that whenever an investigating committee recommended the filing of a complaint
against an attorney, the attorney stood suspended from the time the complaint was filed, was invalid
insofar as the suspension was not based upon any judgment or finding of the court, and was without
trial or notice to the accused. Noting that an attorney in this situation was suspended by legislative
decree, the court stated that this was contrary to one of the cardinal principles of the administration
of justice, that no man could be condemned or divested of his rights until he had the opportunity of
being heard. The license of an attorney to practice his profession is acquired by order and judgment
of a court, after examination into his moral and intellectual qualifications, the court declared, adding
that an attorney could only be divested of that right by a like judgment of court, entered after due
notice and inquiry and opportunity to be heard, and based upon some conduct on his part which made
him unworthy to engage further in the practice of law.
Failure to provide presuspension notice and opportunity to be heardAs applied
Despite construing a statute which provided that at any time after charges were filed against an
attorney a court had the power, pending trial of the charges, to suspend the attorney, to include the
right to notice and a presuspension hearing, the court in the following case nevertheless held that it
was invalid as applied to an attorney who was suspended without such notice and hearing. See, also,
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Failure to guarantee prompt final disposition of chargesRights of attorney violated
Gershenfeld v Justices of Supreme Court (1986, ED Pa) 641 F Supp 1419, Finding what
could only be characterized as unreasonable delays, the court said that it was inconceivable that all of
the complaints assembled would have to be heard at once; that there was absolutely no reason why it
should take 2 months to schedule a hearing; that the hearing committee members were not available
to allow an expedited hearing which could be accomplished in consecutive days, while
understandable, did not relieve the defendants from their due process obligations; and that the state
Supreme Court, because of its busy schedule, could not convene on disciplinary matters more
frequently than every 3 months was both unfortunate and unacceptable.
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Coughlins Notice of Appeal, Motion to Vacate and or Set Aside, JCRCP 59, JCRCP 60,
Motion for Reconsideration; Motion for Recusal; Motion For Publication Of Transcript at Public
Expense, Petition for In Forma Pauperis Status at pages 109-114 clearly indicates he is appealing
both the 11/30/11 Judgment of Conviction and Court Order and the 11/30/11 Order for Summary
Punishment of Contempt. http://www.scribd.com/doc/225490010/12-13-11-Final-0204-60838-RMC11-CR-22176-Notice-of-Appeal-Motion-to-Vacate-Motion-for-Reconsid-and-Motion-for-RecusalStamped-With-Exhbit-and-Pic-o See, also, page 571: The notice of appeal does and should apply
to the Summary Contempt Order as well, http://www.scribd.com/doc/225316199/12-23-11-to-9-813-0204-62337-all-filings-except-RMCROA-from-22176-in-2064-60838-ocr
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http://www.scribd.com/doc/225574773/3-26-12-NRAP-40-Functional-Equivalent-CR11-20642790430 At pages 916 to 993 of combined record.
6
That Judge Elliott 8/27/12 Order reads:
ORDER DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL Presently
before the Court, is a Motion for New Trial, or Pled in the Alternative, Motion to Alter or
Amend filed by Appellant ZACH COUGHLIN ("Appellant'') on March 26, 2012.
Subsequently, on March 27, 2012, Respondent CITY OF RENO ("Respondent'') filed a
Motion to Strike Appellant's Motion for New Trial.
Following, on July 25, 2012, Appellant filed a Motion to Set Aside or Vacate
Conviction and or Order Affirming it. Thereafter, on July 26, 2012, Appellant filed a
Supplemental Motion to Set Aside or Vacate Conviction and or Order Affirming it. On that
same date, Appellant filed a Request for Submission, thereby submitting the matter for the
Court's consideration.
On March 15, 2012, this Court entered an Order denying the Appeal and affirming
the decision of the Municipal Court. This Court no longer has jurisdiction over this case
and the Appellant's Motion for New Trial is moot.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant's Motion for a New
Trial is DENIED. DATED this 27th day of August, 2012. /S/ Steven P. Elliott District Judge"
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However, where NRAP clearly was applied here by the appellate judge, Coughlins' 3/26/12
filing operates as the functional NRAP 40 Petition for Rehearing, which the district court has refused
to adjudicate, claiming it no longer had jurisdiction upon entering its 3/15/12 Order Affirming the
Ruling of the RMC and remanding the matter.
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Recently, in In Re Hunter, 02-1975 (La.8/19/02), 823 So.2d 325, this court removed a judge
for reasons stemming from administrative incompetence evidenced by poorly organized case files,
missing portions of records, poorly drafted or non-existent minute entries, unsigned motions for
appeal, cases that had fallen off the docket, and failure to produce transcripts for appellate review
which resulted in the reversal of serious criminal convictions.
Misconduct, including judge's repeated failures to produce transcripts timely, accurately, or
frequently not at all, resulting in eleven appellate reversals of serious felony criminal convictions and
sentences for violation of the defendants' constitutional right to judicial review, and her continuous
lack of cooperation with the court of appeal in securing transcripts for appellate review, amounted to
willful and persistent failure to perform her duty to administer her court in professional and
competent manner, and conduct gravely prejudicial to administration of justice that brought the
judicial office into disrepute. LSA-Const. Art. 5, 25(C); Code of Jud.Conduct, Canon 3, subd. B(1),
8 LSA-R.S. In re Hunter, 2002-1975 (La. 8/19/02), 823 So. 2d 325
Judge Howard willfully refuses to comply with NRS 189.030(1)'s requirement that he file the
transcript with the district court upon a criminal defendant appealing his conviction.
NRS 189.030 Transmission of transcript, other papers, sound recording and copy of docket
to district court.
1. The justice shall, within 10 days after the notice of appeal is filed, transmit to the clerk
of the district court the transcript of the case, all other papers relating to the case and a certified
copy of the docket.
8
Falkner v. Lindberg, 288 P. 3d 1097 (Utah 2012): "Having analyzed supreme court
cases dealing with the relationship between remittitur and jurisdiction, we conclude that
remand to the justice court does not necessarily divest the district court of jurisdiction. We
further determine that the district court must retain jurisdiction for a reasonable time
sufficient to resolve appropriate postjudgment1 motions. Because the district court in this
case declined on an improper basis to exercise jurisdiction, we find it appropriate to grant
Falkner's petition for extraordinary relief and remand the case to the district court with
additional instructions for resolving Falkner's motion to reinstate.
I. We Look to the Rules of Appellate Procedure for Guidance in Analyzing the District
Court's Jurisdiction Over Appeals from Justice Court.
6 "[T]he appeals process from a justice court decision is unique" in that "[a] defendant
who has pleaded guilty or been convicted in justice court is entitled to a trial de novo in a
district court, provided that he or she files a notice of appeal within thirty days of the sentence
or guilty plea." Bernat v. Allphin, 2005 UT 1, 8, 106 P.3d 707. The hybrid nature of this
proceeding makes it difficult at times to determine what procedures might apply in situations
where no procedure is explicitly provided for in the context of appeals from justice court.
Falkner asserts that we should employ only the rules of civil and criminal procedure to
resolve the jurisdictional issue, while Judge Lindberg suggests that we rely on the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure. While the form of a trial de novo differs from that of a traditional
appeal, it is still considered an appellate proceeding,2 see id. 25, 30-32, and we therefore
find it appropriate to employ the rules of appellate procedure "as a model in the context of
justice court appeals," see Gordon, 2009 UT App 25, 22 n. 7. (NOTE, Gordon, provides:
While not applicable to appeals from justice court convictions, rule 23A's criteria justifying
reinstatement could serve as a model in the context of justice court appeals. Gordon did not
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address any of these possibilities in her motion to the district court or in the present
petition.)
II. An Appellate Court Does Not Necessarily Lose Juris-diction When a Case Is
Remanded to a Lower Court.
7 In support of her assertion that the district court lost jurisdiction upon remand, Judge
Lindberg points us to our decision in State v. Clark, 913 P.2d 360 (Utah Ct.App.1996), in
which we rejected a defendant's attempt to appeal his case after the appeal had once been dismissed for failure to prosecute, explaining that once the case was remitted, "this court lost
jurisdiction over the matter and the dismissal became an adjudication on the merits." Id. at
362-63. Judge Lindberg asserts that Clark stands for the proposition that a remand to a lower
court necessarily divests the appellate court of jurisdiction and prevents it from further
considering any issues relat-ing to the case.
8 However, additional case law from our supreme court suggests that there are at least
two circumstances where an appellate court may retain jurisdiction after a case has been
remitted to the district court. First, if a remittitur is premature, it cannot effectively return
jurisdiction to the lower court. See Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Foothills Water
Co., 942 P.2d 305, 306-07 (Utah 1996) (per curiam) (determining that a remittitur issued
before a pending petition for certiorari was resolved did not serve to divest the Utah Court of
Appeals of jurisdic-tion). Second, even after a remittitur returns jurisdiction to the lower
court, the appellate court may retain limited jurisdiction over certain matters, particularly
where consti-tutional rights are implicated. See State v. Lara, 2005 UT 70, 21, 124 P.3d 243
(holding that the Utah Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to consider the voluntariness of a
defendant's withdrawal of his appeal despite having re-mitted the case to the trial court).
A. Premature Remittitur
9 First, a remittitur cannot serve to return jurisdiction to a lower court for
implementation of the appellate court's mandate while the case is still pending on appeal. See
Hi-Country, 942 P.2d at 306. Our rules of appellate proce-dure outline a schedule for
remittitur that implements this principle. Specifically, the rules instruct the court of ap-peals
to remit a case "immediately after the expiration of the time for filing a petition for writ of
certiorari" and to stay the remittitur if such a petition is filed. See Utah R.App. P. 36(a)(2).
The rules similarly instruct the su-preme court to issue remittitur "15 days after the entry of
the judgment" or, "[i]f a petition for rehearing is timely filed, ? five days after the entry of the
order disposing of the petition." Id. R. 36(a)(1). See generally id. R. 35(a) ("A petition for
rehearing may be filed with the clerk within 14 days after the entry of the decision of the
court, unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order."). If a case is remitted before the time
for such petitions has passed or before the petitions can be considered, jurisdic-tion will
nevertheless remain with the appellate court and not return to the lower court. See HiCountry, 942 P.2d at 306-07 (holding that the trial court did not have juris-diction to
implement the mandate of the court of appeals while a petition for certiorari was pending in
the supreme court, despite the fact that the court of appeals had remit-ted the case to the trial
court).
B. Limited Retained Jurisdiction
10 Furthermore, there are circumstances where an appel-late court may retain limited
jurisdiction, despite the low-er court having regained jurisdiction as a result of a re-mand....11
However, because "remittitur is a procedure created pursuant to the rule making authority
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vested in [the su-preme court]," see id. 13; see also Utah R.App. P. 36, its jurisdictional
effect is judicially, rather than constitution-ally, imposed, see Lara, 2005 UT 70, 12-13
(internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, "the significance of remittitur as a limitation
on ? jurisdiction" should not be overinflated. Id. 9. "[T]he appellate court retains [at least]
the jurisdiction necessary to compel compliance with the terms of the remittitur." Id. 16.
Additionally, the jurisdictional implications of remittitur "cannot be in-terpreted in a manner
that would stymie a legitimate quest to assert important constitutional guarantees," id. 19,
which "override ? whatever jurisdictional significance might reside within ? jurisprudence
relating to remit-titurs," id. 21-22 (holding that because the constitu-tional right to an appeal
overrides any jurisdictional effect of the rules of appellate procedure, the court of appeals had
the authority to exercise jurisdiction over an appel-lant's claim that he had not knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to an appeal by withdrawing it, even af-ter the case had been
remitted).
12 Thus, had Falkner identified a constitutional right or other appropriate claim, the
district court could have exer-cised jurisdiction over the motion to reinstate, even if it had
properly returned jurisdiction to the justice court. Cf. id. 21. No such claim was raised.
However, because the district court remanded the case immediately, without allowing any
time for filing of postjudgment motions, re-mittitur was premature and could not have
immediately divested the district court of jurisdiction. Thus, the ulti-mate question of whether
the district court had jurisdic-tion over Falkner's motion to reinstate turns on whether the
motion was filed prior to the time that jurisdiction could properly have been surrendered by
the district court.
III. The District Court Must Retain Jurisdiction over Appeals from Justice Court for a
Reasonable Time Sufficient to Permit Consideration of Postjudgment Matters.
13 Unlike the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
do not provide clear guidelines regarding the district court's retention of juris-diction
following a remand for abandonment. Although section 78A-7-118(8) of the Utah Code
provides that "[t]he district court shall retain jurisdiction over the case on trial de novo," see
Utah Code Ann. 78A-7-118(8) (Supp.2012), the provision in the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure which permits remand to the justice court in the case of abandonment, see Utah
R.Crim. P. 38(h), sug-gests that jurisdiction must eventually return to the justice court after an
appeal has been abandoned. Nevertheless, a remand under such circumstances must allow at
least some time for parties to file appropriate postjudgment mo-tions before the district court
loses jurisdiction.
14 Judge Lindberg argues that we should look to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
as a guide in deter-mining the appropriate deadline for returning jurisdiction to the justice
court after an appeal is remanded for aban-donment. Under rule 36 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, the court of appeals is expected to issue a re-mittitur "immediately after
the expiration of the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari," Utah R.App. P. 36(a)(2),
and a "petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court
within 30 days after the entry of the final decision by the Court of Ap-peals," id. R. 48(a).
Thus, jurisdiction may be appropriate-ly returned to the district court following appeal thirtyone days after the court of appeals makes its final deci-sion. Judge Lindberg asserts that,
likewise, the district court's "jurisdiction is lost no later than 31 days after the dismissal
decision is made."
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15 We agree that the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure may "serve as a model in
the context of justice court appeals." Cf. Gordon v. Maughan, 2009 UT App 25, 22 n. 7,
204 P.3d 189 (suggesting that rule 23A of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure might serve
as a guide for determining whether reinstatement of an appeal from jus-tice court might be
appropriate). However, the time for remittitur outlined in rule 36 is not an arbitrary number of
days but is based on the time allowed for filing petitions for certiorari and rehearing. Indeed,
the supreme court is directed to remit a case a mere fifteen days after a final decision,
consistent with the fourteen-day period allotted for filing a petition for rehearing. See Utah
R.App. P. 36(a)(1); see also id. R. 35(a). Thus, the guidance provid-ed by rule 36 is not a
strict deadline for returning jurisdic-tion to a lower court but, rather, a method for
determining the appropriate deadline in light of the circumstances. That method requires that
the court retain jurisdiction for a period sufficient to allow appropriate postjudgment mo-tions
to be filed and considered.
... IV. The District Court Exceeded Its Discretion When It Denied the Motion to Reinstate
Without Conducting an Analysis Under Rule 23A of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
19 We also reject the district court's alternative ground for denying the motion to
reinstate, namely, that Falkner offered no excuse for his failure to appear. Because we
determine that Falkner did offer an explanation for his failure to appear, we determine that the
district court ex-ceeded its discretion by denying the motion to reinstate without considering
whether Falkner's failure was excus-able under rule 23A of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
20 In Gordon v. Maughan, 2009 UT App 25, 204 P.3d 189, this court upheld a district
court's denial of a motion to reinstate an appeal from justice court remanded for
abandonment, in part based on the fact that the defendant "provided no reasons justifying her
failure to appear." Id. 22. In so doing, we explained that the criteria outlined by rule 23A of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure for determining whether reinstatement of an appeal is
appropriate "could serve as a model in the context of justice court appeals." See id. 22 n. 7.
Rule 23A provides that "[a]n appeal dismissed for failure to take a step other than the timely
filing of a notice of appeal may be reinstated by the court upon motion of the appellant for (a)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect or (b) fraud, misrepresentation, or
misconduct of an adverse party." Utah R.App. P. 23A." Falkner v. Lindberg, 288 P. 3d 1097
(2012).
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http://www.scribd.com/doc/228407213/Judge-Steven-Elliott-Bio-0204-0376-Caaw-cv11-0195560317-cr12-1262-cr11-2064-cr12-0376-ie
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Filed Request for Extension of Time to File Opposition to Motion for

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14-17671
Also, Judge Elliott dismissed Coughlins suit on the grounds that Coughlin failed to effect
service of process within the 120 days required by NRCP 4, despite the Motion to Dismiss filed by
WLS et al tolling the running of such time period. Brown v. Florida Keys Aqueduct Auth., 614 F.
Supp. 87, 92 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
See Geiger v. Allen, 850 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Of course, the 120-day period was
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tolled between the time that the action was dismissed and the date that the court reinstated the action,
since no action was pending during that interval."). Thing is, the 120 days for service was tolled by
any number of filings, including WLSs Motion to Quash from 9/2011, as such, Elliotts 12/8/11 and
various 1/13/12 orders are void for lack of jurisdiction: 62B Am. Jur. 2D Process 111 The 120-day
period may be tolled upon the filing of either a motion to quash service or a motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of process or service, and such period will not continue to run until such time as the
court has taken action on the motion.Brown v. Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority, 614 F. Supp. 87
(S.D. Ohio 1985) The defense that process has not been timely served may be waived if the defense
is not raised in the party's first responsive pleading or in an amendment to a first responsive pleading
allowed as a matter of course. Kersh v. Derozier, 851 F.2D 1509, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 3D 1505 (5th Cir.
1988).
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(NOTE: actually, no, the Panel did not consider such conduct, but, rather, applied an offensive
collateral bar to Coughlin challenging the apparent or quasi RPC 3.3(a)(1) and RPC 8.4(c) violations
drawn from such since vacated 2/28/12 summary contempt order (allegedly a criminal contempt
conviction sufficient to invoke SCR 111(5) despite no SCR 111 Petition ever being filed)and
despite Coughlins notices of appeal of such going stricken and or ignored) and such since vacated
3/12/12 Order from the traffic citation trial entered by Judge Holmes in 11 TR 26800.
Indeed, upon Coughlin attempting to put the transcript of such 2/27/12 trial before Judge
Holmes (and the allegedly troubling filings submitted via facsimile) into evidence at the 11/14/12
formal disciplinary hearing, the Panel denied the admission of such, citing an offensive collateral bar
(despite the fact the SBN never made such an argument itselfsee Transcript of 11/14/12 formal
disciplinary hearing at:
Pages 221:15 to 222:9) MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm focusing on what you're proffering now.
MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. MR. ECHEVERRIA: This is a transcript of the trial for your traffic
citation? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. MR. ECHEVERRIA: The one that Judge Holmes issued an
order finding you in contempt? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Did you appeal it?
MR. COUGHLIN: I tried to. She wouldn't let me. MR. ECHEVERRIA: And it's a final order? MR.
COUGHLIN: I did the research on that, but she is saying -- I don't know what she is saying. But she
is not letting me appeal it. MR. ECHEVERRIA: We know what she said in her order. So I'm not
going to entertain an inquiry into the conduct of the trial on your traffic citation itself. That issue
has been litigated....
Pages 62:14 to 63:1) R. ECHEVERRIA: -- this panel has been asked to look at. The issue as to
whether or not you were properly in that residence building, the issue as to whether you were
trespassing has all been litigated. That's not the function of this panel. This panel is to determine, by
supreme court order, what, if any, punishment you should be subject to. I'd like you to focus on that
issue. Please proceed. MR. COUGHLIN: Whether the punishment under Claiborne is binding
authority upon you entails more than a cursory, receiving a certified conviction in the mail from a
clerk of court, and not undertaking any diligent inquiry in that regard.
Page 225:2 to 225:9: MR. COUGHLIN: this idea that a conviction is completely dispositive, he
cited no authority for that. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, the supreme court issued an order
in your case that says with respect to, in essence, a conviction, that the sole issue to be determined
here is the nature and extent of the punishment
Pages 225:20 to 226:16): MR. ECHEVERRIA: The supreme court, as I read its order, tells
this panel that the only issue to be determined with respect to a conviction is the nature and extent of
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the punishment, if any. So if you have testimony on that issue (emphasis added) with respect to any
conviction, or order holding you in contempt, please present it. MR. COUGHLIN: Not under
Claiborne. Claiborne says a conviction is not the end of the inquiry. That in fact, the panel and the
Bar have a duty to look beyond the conviction. MR. ECHEVERRIA: We have a specific order in
your case with respect to what the issues to be determined in this proceeding are with respect to a
conviction. So do you wish to offer evidence as to the nature and extent of punishment, if any, that
should be rendered by this panel? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes. And I -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Please
proceed. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. So I'll play that audio with your permission. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: I'm sustaining the objection
Page 235:1 to 235:8) MR. ECHEVERRIA: -- proper to play. So I'm sustaining the objection
to playing whatever it was you're going to play, and proceed. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. I'd like to
play an official copy of the transcript from that Reno Muni Court traffic citation case. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: You've already proffered that. I've sustained the objection.
Pages 63:25 to 64:20) MR. COUGHLIN: The important thing is the law in Nevada says
within 24 hours of the sheriff receiving that eviction order they've got to do the lockout. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: That's all been litigated, hasn't it? Didn't you raise these issues below? MR.
COUGHLIN: In which context? MR. ECHEVERRIA: In the trespass conviction. MR.
COUGHLIN: Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Okay. Let's focus on the issues here, which, as I
understand it, are to focus on what, if any, punishment you should be subject to with respect to -- MR.
COUGHLIN: What's all this living in the basement stuff have to do with that? Jesus. This is Richard
Hill in a nutshell. Prejudicial nonsense. Hearsay. Character assassination. And then you try to rebut it,
and this is not the issue, it's not relevant. Nothing he says is relevant. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I didn't
say that. It is relevant. Your conviction is relevant. You're trying to relitigate --..."
Pages 180:13 to 181:9) MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. King, you cited in one of your pleadings a
request that all issues pending before you be heard at one hearing. There was a letter you sent to the
state Bar that you quote in one of your pleadings. THE WITNESS: I requested that? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Yes, sir. THE WITNESS: You haven't read my pleadings. My whole point was
bifurcating, how ridiculous it is to glom all these together. I'm so glad you just said that on the record.
BY MR. KING: Q Could you please take a look at this document that's been marked as Exhibit No.
9, And tell me if you recognize that? A You actually just said that. My whole point was -- Q Mr.
Coughlin, there is a question pending -- A -- separate hearing. The sole purpose of the 60838
suspension, on a candy bar. That was my whole point. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, those
issues have been resolved.
Page 71:10 to 71:18) MR. ECHEVERRIA: I believe the issue that this panel has to determine
is what the degree, if any, of punishment should be for the conduct that you have alleged to have been
involved with, in terms of candor to the court, candor to counsel, candor to witnesses, competency to
practice law. MR. COUGHLIN: Including -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: I believe those are the issues that
this panel should focus on
Pages 73:18 to 75:5) MR. ECHEVERRIA: I believe you're here today to measure all of your
conduct as a practicing lawyer. So I'd like to move on. If you have further questions of Mr. Hill,
please ask them. I've now afforded you in excess of 20 minutes. I'll give you another five. MR.
COUGHLIN: So we're not here today based on what's been noticed? MR. ECHEVERRIA: We're
not here today to relitigate orders that have been filed that you have appealed, and that you have lost.
MR. COUGHLIN: I'm not asking -- I'm asking what is it limited to? Because it sounds like from
what you just said it's not limited. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't intend to impose any limits on you in
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terms of what you attempt to proffer as evidence. I will rule on what you proffer as evidence. MR.
COUGHLIN: I'm saying what he's limited to, your Honor. MR. ECHEVERRIA: The issue here, sir,
as I understand the supreme court's order with respect to your conviction of theft, and the issues here
with respect to the other grievances that have been filed against you are to the extent as to what, if
any, should be the punishment that you should sustain as a result of your conduct. MR. COUGHLIN:
Yet this is entered into evidence. MR. ECHEVERRIA: This is what? MR. COUGHLIN: This order
has been entered into evidence. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Exhibit 2 has. MR. COUGHLIN: But it's not
pled in any complaint. Judge Flanagan's not a grievant. I wasn't noticed that that was the purpose of
this hearing to some extent today. MR. ECHEVERRIA: You were noticed that the issue of your
conviction of trespass was an issue, that your handling of that case was an issue, and it's relevant as to
that
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(Pages 230:13 to 231:5) Q Did my dad say the State Bar of Nevada's Coe Swobe kept
hounding him, calling him up, trying to lean on me so Washoe Legal Services and Paul Elcano could
get out -- A I'm sorry, I could not hear that. Q Did my dad ever tell you that the State Bar of
Nevada's Coe Swobe called him up trying to get him to make me settle easier with Washoe Legal
Services whose director is friends with the chairman here, close childhood friends, they both went to
Stanford together, 1966? MR. KING: Objection, hearsay. THE WITNESS: Your father told me -MR. ECHEVERRIA: Sustained. THE WITNESS: -- yes, they wanted you to settle. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me, Ms. Barker. There was an objection made to the question. I'm
sustaining the objection. It's also argumentative.
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Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802 (C.A.4.S.C.,2010) Under the statute providing the district courts of
the United States with original jurisdiction of all offenses against the laws of the United States, the
district court had jurisdiction to entertain the government's motion to vacate the defendant's
conviction for using a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense, which motion was
made under the rule of criminal procedure authorizing the government to dismiss an indictment,
information, or complaint, even though the motion was made after the defendant was convicted.
U.S. v. Smith, 467 F.3d 785 C.A.D.C.,2006 Federal district court had jurisdiction, under its
general grant of jurisdiction over all offenses against the laws of the United States, to entertain the
government's motion to vacate federal prisoner's conviction for use of a firearm during a drug
trafficking crime, even though motion was brought after conviction was affirmed on direct appeal
and following denial of post-conviction relief. See, also, State v. Avelar, 979 P.2d 648 Idaho,1999.
In some states, the court may grant nolle prosequi on its own initiative and without consent of the
prosecutor. People v. Morrow, 214 Mich. App. 158, 542 N.W.2d 324 (1995). Judge Nash Holmes
recently did this as to the criminal contempt "conviction" ("lying"/misrepresenting RPC
3.3(a)(1)/8.4(c) violations) that the State Bar largely basis its attempt to irrevocably disbar Coughlin
upon.
Generally, a nolle prosequi entered with the court's consent after conviction is without
prejudice to a new indictment. Regardless, Coughlin is not an never will sue anyone in connection
with this arrest/matter, he hereby swears under penalty of perjury.
Thus, after an accused has been convicted, the prosecution may, with the court's consent, enter
a nolle prosequi without prejudice to a new indictment or information. Ala.Anthony v. City of
Birmingham, 240 Ala. 167, 198 So. 449 (1940). N.H.State v. Cook, 96 N.H. 212, 72 A.2d 778
(1950). W.Va.State v. Burke, 130 W. Va. 64, 42 S.E.2d 544 (1947).
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Dismissal of state criminal charge in furtherance of, or in interest of, justice, 71 A.L.R.5th 1:
19 Participation in treatment program. Coughlin is and has been since March 2013
receiving treatment froma psychologist and psychiatrist at Northern Nevada Adult Mental Health and
completed and 8 week course while incarceration from November 2013 to April 18, 2014 in Washoe
jail. Similar is In Re Beckett (where an attorney (Pahrump DA) convicted of NRS 199.280 was
deemed to have committed a serious crime) (former Pahrump DA failed to turn over receipts to the
Treasuser....such conviction was ultimately dismissed, resulting in Beckett's temporary suspension
under SCR 111(10) being two months long compared to the two year long suspension Coughlin is
currently still subject to incident to a conviction that was not affirmed on appeal), but not before a
temporary suspension was put in place):
22[a] Mental illness or capacityDismissal warranted: In the following cases, the
courts ruled that mental illness or lack of mental capacity warranted dismissing charges in the interest
of justice. In People v. Balukas, 95 A.D.2d 813, 463 N.Y.S.2d 534 (2d Dep't 1983)
34[a] Prior administrative or noncriminal adjudication of conduct
chargedDismissal granted:
The State Bar of Nevada included this iPhone petty larceny case in its SCR 105 complaint
against Coughlin now on appeal in 62337. There was not a conviction in this matter at the time of
such formal disciplinary hearing. Such circumstances would subjecdt Coughlin to double jeopardy
of sorts (as this case was factored into the Panel's Recommendation already) where Bar Counsel to
now file an SCR 111(6) Petition should this conviction remain (resulting in another temporary
suspension of Coughlin's law license, which has already been suspended two years for a conviction
that was not affirmed due to the RMC failing to comply with NRS 189.030(1) in refusing to file the
transcript with the district court.
It has been held that a prior administrative acquittal justified dismissing the present, identical
criminal charge in the interest of justice. In People v. Trucchio, 159 Misc. 2d 523, 605 N.Y.S.2d 649
(Sup. Ct. 1993).
E. Merits of the State's Case 41[a] Strength of prima facie caseDismissal warranted.
Here the State offered (and Coughlin accepted) a plea deal that allowed for a stipulated conviction for
disturbing the peace instead of petty larceny. For whatever reason, such plea deal was rejected by
Judge Sferrazza. Such a generous plea offer illustrates that this was not really a petty larceny case in
the traditional sense, with the prima facie case here being rather week, and only Coughlin behaving
like an idiot throughout likely being the driving force behind convicting him for not only petty
larceny, but also receiving stolen property, which is in violation of Shepp and Staab v. State, 526 P.2d
338 (1974)in Nevada as "a thief cannot receive the fruit of his own larceny from himself".
Inconsisent verdicts.
In the following case, the court held that where the prosecution announced it did not have
enough evidence to justify a trial, the trial court could properly dismiss the case in the interest of
justice. In People v. Bonds, 70 Cal. App. 4th 732, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 10 (1st Dist. 1999).
42[a] Absence of culpable mental stateDismissal granted
Criminal charges have been dismissed in the interest of justice because evidence of the
existence of the requisite mental state was highly doubtful. In People v. Torres, 166 Misc. 2d 798, 634
N.Y.S.2d 354 (Sup. Ct. 1995).
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43[a] Affirmative defenses to chargeDismissal granted Coughlin really has quite a

claim of right defense to the petty larceny charge where even hostile witnesses admit that Coughlin
only claimed the phone from the Finder upon Finder offering it up, it going unclaimed, whereupon
Finder threatened to throw the phone in the river if it still went unclaimed. Once Finder offered
phone up and it went unclaimed, it became Finder's, and Finder freely gave such to Coughlin, thus,
Coughlin could not have stolen anything from Goble, nor could Finder be said to have delivered
stolen property to Coughlin.
Criminal charges have been dismissed in the interest of justice because evidence of the
existence of the requisite mental state was highly doubtful. In People v. Torres, 166 Misc. 2d 798, 634
N.Y.S.2d 354 (Sup. Ct. 1995),
25[a] De minimis harmDismissal warranted
In the following cases, the courts approved the dismissal of charges in the interest of justice
on the ground that the offense caused little or no harm. The court in People v. Sales, 169 A.D.2d 411,
563 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1st Dep't 1991), while disagreeing with the trial court's characterization of the
defendant's conduct as a mere "prank," nonetheless held that the trial judge did not abuse her
discretion in dismissing an indictment for a violent felony theft offense, in the interest of justice
under N.Y. Crim. Proc. 210.40, explaining that although the defendant had made an intimidating
gesture while, with the assistance of three friends, taking food from an undercover officer disguised
as a delivery person, a dismissal was warranted in light of the fact that the defendant had never before
been arrested, the property stolen was a relatively small amount of food, and no weapon was
displayed during the incident. Further, the court remarked that no one had been injured, and in light
of the defendant's good prospects for future schooling and employment, the defendant could be held
responsible for his actions in ways other than a conviction for a violent felony.
heft In the following cases, the courts applied the de minimis infraction defense to charges of
theft against the defendant. The court in State v. Smith, 195 N.J. Super. 468, 480 A.2d 236 (Law Div.
1984), held that shoplifting three pieces of bubble gum was a de minimis infraction in light of the
circumstances surrounding the offense. The defendant was charged with shoplifting under N.J. Stat.
Ann. 2C:2011 by concealing three pieces of bubble gum in his pocket at a grocery store. At the
time of the offense, he was a fulltime college student pursuing a degree in electrical
engineering. He argued that his actions were too trivial to warrant the condemnation of
conviction. While the court acknowledged that sympathetic considerations were not part of a
determination under the de minimis statute, it found that an objective consideration of the
surrounding circumstances was authorized. The court noted that the defendant had no prior record,
that a conviction would seriously damage his ability to find a job in the engineering field, that
he had worked his way through college, and that he had already suffered substantial detriment
in his personal life from the notoriety of his arrest. The court rejected the state's argument that
dismissal would grant a license to other students to shoplift with impunity. It found, instead, that the
consequences which had already attended the arrest of the defendant were more punitive than those
which would follow conviction and that the prospect of the public humiliation suffered by the
defendant would serve as a forceful deterrent to the youths in his academic community. The court
also stated that it was difficult to envision a prosecution more acceptable for the invocation of the
discretion granted the assignment judge than one for the theft of three pieces of bubble gum.
Therefore, the court held that dismissal of the charge against the defendant was warranted.
Similarly, here, this bizarre scenario (confirmed by hostile witnesses) of the Finder
threatening to throw a phone that was ridiculously left on the ground in downtown Reno unattended,
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only to also involve an attorney with schooling on the law of lost, mislaid, abandoned property and
contributory negligence/Fourth Amendment law.
The court in State v. Nevens, 197 N.J. Super. 531, 485 A.2d 345 (Law Div. 1984), applied
New Jersey's de minimis statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:211, to overturn the defendant's conviction for
stealing fruit from a restaurant buffet.The defendant was convicted of stealing two bananas, an
orange, an apple, and a pear from a hotel restaurant. ... judge could dismiss a prosecution if the
defendant's conduct was within a customary license or tolerance, neither expressly negated by the
person whose interest was infringed nor inconsistent with the purpose of the law defining the offense;
did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the
offense or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction; or presented
such other extenuations that it could not reasonably be regarded as envisaged by the legislature in
forbidding the offense.
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Coughlins filings in the two matters in which the two Orders of Dismissal attached to his
4/22/14 filing in 62337, filed just a few weeks before such were entered, touched on all of these basis,
in addition to some others. For whatever reason (most likely because she has character), Judge
Holmes entered those Orders. It is not for the SBN or the Reno City Attorney to now engage in ex
parte communications with Judge W. Gardner to obtain the 5/26/14 Order Rescinding such, which is
void anyways. The RCA may go pursue a Writ of Mandamus against Judge Holmes, perhapsbut
what is done is done. Certainly, those two Orders of Dismissal played a role in a great deal of things
that followed, including what transpired in the suit between Coughlin and Washoe Legal Services and
the very Elcano whose ex parte email to Judges Hardy and Stiglich the SBN brazenly attaches to its
6/3/14 Response.
It would be highly inappropriate for one, Elcano to tell Coughlins father (a Duke trained
physician, All-SECAcademic team fullback with halfback speed who started for Tulane out of
Dayton, Ohio (1965-1968) both on the telephone and then again during a visit to Dr. Coughlins
office that Elcano and Washoe Legal Services was, at the very least, going to give Coughlin some
work/assignments to start with, then gradually restore Coughlin to his salaried position as a domestic
violence attorney at WLS, and how lawyers are very forgiving people and do all it could (a la In Re
Briggs) to help Coughlin restore his law license and have the various criminal convictions that remain
vacated and or addressed in some other way, provided Couglhin dropped all his lawsuits and appeals
(really, Coughlin just up and withdrew six criminal appeals for no apparent reason? Appeals where
Coughlin was incarcerated despite plainly being denied counsel? Coughlin was incarcerated from
11/6/13 to 4/18/14 and in every one of the matters underlying such he was denied counsel in plain
violation of ADKT 411 (he was on food stamps, making less than $10,000 per year, law license
temporarily suspended, and had been ruled indigent by the judges involved, so) only for
Elcano/WLS to back out of such the minute it/he got what he wanted. Whatever. Two, it would be
similarly inappropriate for the 4/8/14 Orders of Dismissal entered to all the sudden be rescinded
once such had the desired effect of getting Coughlin to dismiss Coughlins appeal in
http://caseinfo.nvsupremecourt.us/public/caseView.do?csIID=33044 in which Coughlin appealed
Hill/Merliss being permitted to substitute in for Coughlin via Judge Stiglichs 1/7/14 Order
(apparently Hill/Merliss, whom committed fraud (apparently WLS had to give them thousands of
dollars though, and Hill/Merliss ought be stuck with any shortfall realized with respect to the $42,000
prevailing party attorney fee award the SBN tried to characterize as a sanction at the disciplinary
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hearing (see FHE2) as Hill/Merliss certainly would keep any windfall realized, and further, Coughlin
may have won such lawsuit and been reinstated to his job as a legal aid attorney, which is not a thing
or chose in action) in lying in the matters at issue in 61383 that the commercial lease entered into
with Coughlin had expired when, plainly, by its terms (not less than 12 months is not the same as
12 monthsand the lease does not provide the landlord a no cause termination right anyways),
only to compound such by then both lying to the police in alleging they warned Coughlin to leave the
property (beyond having a summary removal order posted (not that the 24 hours required to pass per
NRS 40.253 was obeyed by theyand an eviction order is not a criminal trespass warning,
regardless)see 61383 and 61901, and Hills lying testimony at issue in 62337 with respect to
whether or not anyone, including the Reno police, issued Coughlin a criminal trespass warning).
Further problematic is the fact that WLS was under contract to provide Coughlin with access to legal
tools while he was then incarcerated at the time of and leading up to such hearing, and plainly failed
to in any way whatsoever.
Really, Judge Holmes may have been doing Judge W. Gardner et al a favor dismissing such
criminal trespass conviction considering the rampant violations of NRS 178.415 committed by W.
Gardner (co-signed readily by RCA Hazlett-Stevens in an appalling display) in holding the 6/18/12
trial and other associated hearings in violation of the stay pending the order for competency
evaluation that Gardner was provided notice of in writing.
13
OPINION NO. 79-4 Criminal Appeals From Municipal CourtNRS 189.010 and 189.020
However, regardless of the nontimeliness of filing an appeal, NRS 189.030 Provides that, The
justice must, within 10 days after the notice of appeal is filed, transmit to the clerk of the district court
all papers relating to the case and a certified copy of his docket. This action is not tied to the
timeliness of filing an appeal. It is a mandatory action which is to take place after the appeal is filed
regardless of when it is filed. The remedy for disposing of a nontimely appeal is found in NRS
189.060. Subparagraph 1 of that statute provides that an appeal may be dismissed for failure to take it
in time. But subparagraph 2 of NRS 189.060 Provides: If the appeal is dismissed, a copy of the order
of dismissal must be remitted to the justice, who may proceed to enforce the judgment. (Italics
added.) The clear implication is that only the district court may dismiss the appeal for want of
timeliness since it is the district court which could only remit the order of dismissal to the magistrate.
Thus it would be the opinion of this office that it would be the duty of the magistrate to forward the
appeal to the district court, even though the appeal was filed in a nontimely manner, and that the city
attorney would then be free to move for the dismissal of the appeal before the district court for lack of
timeliness. The district court could then reach its decision pursuant to NRS 189.060.
14
Pages 227:25 to 228:18) MARY BARKER having been first duly sworn, testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Mom, did you have to buy an audio of the trial
with that Judge Nash Holmes? A Did I have to buy an audio? Q Yeah. Did you buy a copy of the
proceeding? A Yes. Q Did you give it to me? A Oh, God. I think so. I did several things. I paid
$100 for something -- no, that was something else. Q Right. You paid a hundred dollars for bail, and
she wouldn't let me out, but she kept the money anyway? A Yes. And the man that I gave the money
to told me that you would be released within several hours, and you weren't. Q They did the old
switcheroo, right?"
Pages 229:18 to 230:12) BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Mom, you paid $100 bail, and the muni
court kept the money but didn't let me out? A Yes. Q What did that Tom guy, the counter clerk, say
about that? A When I went back on Monday, he said, no, he should have been released. And I said,
well, he wasn't, and I would like to get my money back. And he made a phone call. And he said, I'm
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sorry, but that's not possible. Q Did he say that she had done something wrong? A No. No, he didn't
say anything to me like that. He just said it was not what he expected. When I went down there and
paid the hundred dollars, he said you would be out within three hours. And that didn't happen. And I
believe that was on a Thursday. The courts were closed Friday, so I went back on Monday to find out
why you weren't released, and to see if I could get my hundred dollars back."
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7/14/2014
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Document(s) filed by...

Received Returned Mail. Documents returned per
order filed 6/16/14 addressed to Zachary
Coughlin...
Supreme Court Case

Title
COUGHLIN VS. LOPEZ
Docket Number
64855
File Date
Jun 20 2014
Documents:
Received Returned Mail. Documents returned per order filed 6/16/14 addressed to Zachary Coughlin. Per USPS,
"return to sender, not here". Remailed to correct address on file.
Filed Order Denying Motion to File Confidential
Settlement Agreement and Release Under Seal.
We ...
COUGHLIN VS. LOPEZ
64855
Jun 16 2014
Documents:
Filed Order Denying Motion to File Confidential Settlement Agreement and Release Under Seal. We direct the clerk
of this court to return, unfiled, the confidential settlement agreement and release that was received on May 19, 2014.
fn1[In light of this order, appellant's request for an extension of time to file an opposition to respondents' May 16,
motion is denied as moot.]
Motion was submitted for filing by Zachary Barker IN RE: REINSTATEMENT
Coughlin
OF ZACHARY COUGHLIN
65587
Jun 06 2014
IN RE: DISCIPLINE OF
ZACHARY COUGHLIN
62337
Jun 06 2014
ZACHARY COUGHLIN
62337
Jun 04 2014
Documents:
Filed Request to File This Second Supplemental.
Response to Motion was submitted for filing by
Zachary Barker Coughlin
Documents:
Filed Opposition to SBN's 6 3 14 Response.
Received Returned Mail. Order filed 5/16/14
addressed to Zachary Coughlin. Order mailed to
incor...
Documents:
Received Returned Mail. Order filed 5/16/14 addressed to Zachary Coughlin. Order mailed to incorrect address.
Remailed to corrected address on file.
Response to Order was submitted for filing by
Glenn Machado
ZACHARY COUGHLIN
62337
Jun 04 2014
64855
Jun 02 2014
Documents:
Filed Response to Supreme Court's Order of May 16, 2014.
Response to Motion was submitted for filing by
Zachary Barker Coughlin
COUGHLIN VS. LOPEZ
Documents:
Filed Request for Extension of Time to File Opposition to Motion for Permission to File Confidential Settlement
Agreement and Release Under Seal.
Petition was submitted for filing by Zachary
Barker Coughlin
IN RE: REINSTATEMENT
OF ZACHARY COUGHLIN
65587
May 22 2014
Documents:
https://efile.nvsupremecourt.us/notify
1/2
7/14/2014
eFlex
Filed Supplemental to SCR 111(10) Petition for Reinstatement.

Filed Order to File Response. State Bar: Response
due: 10 days. Fn1[The clerk shall send a copy ...
ZACHARY COUGHLIN
62337
May 16 2014
Documents:
Filed Order to File Response. State Bar: Response due: 10 days. Fn1[The clerk shall send a copy of the notice filed
on April 22, 2014, to the State Bar's counsel.]
Motion was submitted for filing by Joseph Garin
COUGHLIN VS. LOPEZ
64855
May 16 2014
Documents:
Filed Motion for Permission to File Confidential Settlement Agreement and Release Under Seal.
Petition was submitted for filing by Zachary
Barker Coughlin
IN RE: REINSTATEMENT
OF ZACHARY COUGHLIN
65587
May 07 2014
COUGHLIN (ZACHARY)
VS. CLIFTON
63342
Apr 28 2014
COUGHLIN VS. LOPEZ
64855
Apr 25 2014
Documents:
Filed Petition for Reinstatement Pursuant to SCR 111(10).
Issued Notice in Lieu/Rehearing was Issued by
Court
Documents:
Issued Notice in Lieu/Rehearing
Filed Order Dismissing Appeal. Proper person
appellant has filed a notice of withdrawal of
appea...
Documents:
Filed Order Dismissing Appeal. Proper person appellant has filed a notice of withdrawal of appeal, which we construe
as a motion to voluntarily dismiss this appeal. The motion is granted, and "we hereby dismiss this appeal" with the
parties to bear their own costs and fees. Case Closed/No Remittitur Issued.
Filed Notice of Dismissal of Cases from Which
Alleged Criminal Trespass 'Conviction' and
'Crimin...
ZACHARY COUGHLIN
62337
Apr 22 2014
Documents:
Filed Notice of Dismissal of Cases from Which Alleged Criminal Trespass 'Conviction' and 'Criminal Contempt'
Conviction Stem.
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1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN RE: THE MATTER OF

NOTICE OF NON-SERVICE OF COURTS ORDER OF 4/23/14 AND RESPONSE TO

Clerks Office on May 2, 2014. Coughlins incarceration ended on 4/18/14. Coughlin

attached 5/7/14 correspondence to Clerks Office attached in addition to Coughlins filing

remail such returned to sender 4/23/14 Order to Coughlin.

allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 22 of the SCR 117 Petition.

Gist of the SCR 117 Petition is:

-numerous complaints received,

-Screening Panel believes Coughlin is either mentally ill or addicted to something,

accusation that Coughlin is incapable of practicing due to mental infirmity or illness

at any point in his career at such time.

Coughlins admission to practice (off by some eights months).

-an alleged contempt citation purporting Coughlin to have disregarded the

testimony and questioning the judges authority

arrest. No conviction alleged.

difficulty finding employment during a period in Washoe County witnessing 15%

for drug or alcohol addiction.

Pengillys proviso applies to a pro se attorney defendant found in contempt).i

illness or infirmity, or addiction to, or dependence upon, intoxicants or

SCR 105 Complaints and or SCR 102 Petitions being filed).

conducts summary lockouts, its obviously quite troubling.

to continue on with some of these losing battles.

Howard contained a seeming scriveners error in according such an 11/14/11 filing

incarceration of any length at all in an attempt to avoid prejudice to his clientswhich

justice file per NRS 189.030(3).

in violation of Schaefer). Whichever, it is all ridiculous and grasping. Coughlin was

representing clients. To suggest that Coughlin thereafter either attempted to mislead

411s dictates, finding them optional) is unsupportable.

of Fact; Conclusions of Law and the Recommendation buried therein.

whateverSusich wrote: 18. On December 14, 2011, Respondent filed an Affidavit of

Poverty in support of his Motion to Proceed Informa Pauperis. In his Affidavit,

recently decided is a Fourth Amendment violationnice precedent: attorneys in Nevada

drops, followed quickly by a wrongful no cause summary eviction of a commercial tenant

Courts Clerks Office. http://www.scribd.com/doc/233302390/10-23-13-Submission-of-

conviction (see p 225 of transcript in 62337, or some conviction allegedly affirmed

as Exhibit 1) ) or as to such not operating to make irrelevant a respondents intent incident

adversely on moral character or fitness), or 8.4(c), etc., etc.).

thereto in parentheses interspersed therealong):

The State Bar of Nevada (State Bar), by and through 1. Thomas

4/16/12), and made various findings and recommendations, (NOTE:

inherent to having WCDA Hahn sit on such NNDB Screening Panel is

nearly as troubling as having CAAW Executive Board President 2JDC

Judge Stephen P. Elliott preside over Coughlins lawsuit against CAAW

and Washoe Legal Services at issue in the appeal in 60317)

including the following: Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule

arrangement with the SBN and NNDB.).

3. The NNDB Chair has reviewed various materials to evaluate the

(NOTE: well.Coughlin got an email from Christiansen, Esq.s (Sanft) Office

support or even anecdotal evidence to support this innuendo.

5. The NNDB Chair has received and reviewed the multiple

Elcano compounding that questionable approach by showing up to testify at Coughlins

Also, as to the alleged criminal trespass conviction, RJC Judge Sferrazza

which plainly establish a causal correlation between Coughlins divorce from

would be a number of arrests on 8/20/11(the iPhone case

Hill/Merliss initiated the wrongful no cause summary eviction of commercial

larceny arrest of 9/9/11 at issue in 60838 and 62337).

thereto resulting in Coughlins wrongful arrest?)

temporary suspension of Coughlins law license sufficient to justify this embarrassing

deprivation of Coughlins protected Fourteenth Amendment property right, his license to

8. Bar Counsel has reported to the NNDB Chair that the

this much of a sore thumb ever again.)