Reg 1-7 Highlighted Only

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs.HON. OMAR U. AMIN, Presiding Judge of
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 135, HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG,
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134, Pairing Judge,
SPECIAL COMPOSITE TEAM of: Senior State Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE,
State Prosecutor FERDINAND ABESAMIS and Asst. City Prosecutor EULOGIO
MANANQUIL; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas Law Offices for petitioner.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as having
committed rebellion complexed with murder 1 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, government prosecutors filed another information charging him for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1829 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The second
information reads:
That on or about the 1st day of December 1989, at Dasmarias Village, Makati, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
having reasonable ground to believe or suspect that Ex-Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan
has committed a crime, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously, willfully and knowingly
obstruct, impede, frustrate or delay the apprehension of said Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio
"Gringo" Honasan by harboring or concealing him in his house.
On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in abeyance the
issuance of a warrant of arrest pending personal determination by the court of probable
cause, and (b) to dismiss the case and expunge the information from the record.
On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge of
respondent Judge Omar Amin, denied Senator Enrile's Omnibus motion on the basis of
a finding that "there (was) probable cause to hold the accused Juan Ponce Enrile liable
for violation of PD No. 1829."
On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to
Quash/Dismiss the Information on the grounds that:
(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) The respondent court's finding of probable cause was devoid of factual and legal
basis; and
(c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder
against Senator Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan, on the basis of their
alleged meeting on December 1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of the Senator for
harboring or concealing the Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829.
On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying the motion for
reconsideration for alleged lack of merit and setting Senator Enrile's arraignment to May
30, 1990.
The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent court in
refusing to quash/ dismiss the information on the following grounds, to wit:
I. The facts charged do not constitute an offense;
II. The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a supposed
meeting on 1 December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a component element of, the
"complexed" rebellion presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-conspirator
of Col. Honasan on the basis of the same meeting on 1 December 1989;
III. The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only one prosecution for
all the component acts of rebellion;
IV. There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for alleged violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1829;
V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1829. The preliminary investigation, held only for rebellion, was marred by
patent irregularities resulting in denial of due process.
On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents
from conducting further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-777 until otherwise
directed by this Court.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner could be separately
charged for violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed
against him.
Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829
notwithstanding the rebellion case filed against the petitioner on the theory that the
former involves a special law while the latter is based on the Revised Penal Code or a
general law.
The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of People v. Hernandez
(99 Phil. 515 [1956]) the rulings of which were recently repeated in the petition for
habeas corpus of Juan Ponce Enrile v. Judge Salazar, (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164,
June 5, 1990). The Enrile case gave this Court the occasion to reiterate the long
standing proscription against splitting the component offenses of rebellion and
subjecting them to separate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in the Hernandez
case. This Court recently declared:
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court,
which that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means
to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that commutes rebellion.
(Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged with the
complex crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be
charged separately for two (2) different offenses where one is a constitutive or
component element or committed in furtherance of rebellion.
The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No. 1829 particularly
Section 1 (c) which states:
SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging
from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or
wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has
reasonable ground to believe or suspect has committed any offense under existing
penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction.
xxx xxx xxx
The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained and
accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in
his house. Knowing that Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly
did not do anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because of such
failure the petitioner prevented Col. Honasan's arrest and conviction in violation of
Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.
The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City were based on the
affidavits executed by three (3) employees of the Silahis International Hotel who stated
that the fugitive Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers attended
the mass and birthday party held at the residence of the petitioner in the evening of
December 1, 1989. The information (Annex "C", p. 3) particularly reads that on "or about
6:30 p.m., 1 December, 1989, Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan conferred with accused
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile accompanied by about 100 fully armed rebel soldiers
wearing white armed patches". The prosecution thereby concluded that:
In such a situation, Sen. Enrile's talking with rebel leader Col. Gregorio "Gringo"
Honasan in his house in the presence of about 100 uniformed soldiers who were fully
armed, can be inferred that they were co-conspirators in the failed December coup.
(Annex A, Rollo, p. 65; Emphasis supplied)
As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge constitute
or include the very incident which gave rise to the charge of the violation under
Presidential Decree No. 1829. Under the Department of Justice resolution (Annex A,
Rollo, p. 49) there is only one crime of rebellion complexed with murder and multiple
frustrated murder but there could be 101 separate and independent prosecutions for
harboring and concealing" Honasan and 100 other armed rebels under PD No. 1829.
The splitting of component elements is readily apparent.
The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col.
Gringo Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged act
of harboring or concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of
rebellion thus constitute a component thereof. it was motivated by the single intent or
resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. As held in People v. Hernandez, supra:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as
such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive
factor is the intent or motive. (p. 536)
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast movement of men
and a complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v. Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932).
Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion though crimes
in themselves are deemed absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. (People v.
Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v.
Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the
act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or ingredient
of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot therefore be made
the basis of a separate charge. The case of People v. Prieto 2 (80 Phil., 138 [1948]) is
instructive:
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some
kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a
mental operation. (Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or physical activity may be, and
often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so,
when the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes Identified with the latter
crime and can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with
treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just
as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the
Identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in
a prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force and trespass are
inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable
for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this
case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason.
The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a fugitive
is punishable under a special law while the rebellion case is based on the Revised
Penal Code; hence, prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution under the
other. This argument is specious in rebellion cases.
In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution's theory must fail. The rationale
remains the same. All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law,
which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof,
become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as
separate crimes in themselves. Thus:
This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part
and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished
either separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code. ... (People v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)
The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the
crime of rebellion. These common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder,
arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal Code. The attendant
circumstances in the instant case, however, constrain us to rule that the theory of
absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also to
offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.
The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator Ponce Enrile with
Colonel Honasan is too intimately tied up with his allegedly harboring and concealing
Honasan for practically the same act to form two separate crimes of rebellion and
violation of PD No. 1829.
Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on his
acts of conspiring with Honasan was committed in connection with or in furtherance of
rebellion and must now be deemed as absorbed by, merged in, and Identified with the
crime of rebellion punished in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.
Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor
the proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense,
are divested of their character as "common" offenses, and assume the political
complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and consequently,
cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same,
to justify the imposition of a graver penalty. (People v. Hernandez, supra, p. 541)
In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused, after having pleaded
guilty and convicted of the crime of rebellion, faced an independent prosecution for
illegal possession of firearms. The Court ruled:
An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with which the accused
is charged in the present case which is that of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition is already absorbed as a necessary element or ingredient in the crime of
rebellion with which the same accused is charged with other persons in a separate case
and wherein he pleaded guilty and was convicted. (at page 662)
xxx xxx xxx
[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the accused is charged in the
present case is already absorbed in the rebellion case and so to press it further now
would be to place him in double jeopardy. (at page 663)
Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v. Panga, (G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990)
where the Court had the occasion to pass upon a nearly similar issue. In this case, the
petitioner Misolas, an alleged member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), was charged
with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in furtherance of subversion under
Section 1 of PD 1866. In his motion to quash the information, the petitioner based his
arguments on the Hernandez and Geronimo rulings on the doctrine of absorption of
common in rebellion. The Court, however, clarified, to wit:
... in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified offense of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING
CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED
FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the
rulings of the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application in this
case.
The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal possession of firearms
under PD 1866 because no separate prosecution for subversion or rebellion had been
filed. 3 The prosecution must make up its mind whether to charge Senator Ponce Enrile
with rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case and charge him with murder and
multiple frustrated murder and also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot complex the
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. Neither can it prosecute him for
rebellion in Quezon City and violation of PD 1829 in Makati. It should be noted that
there is in fact a separate prosecution for rebellion already filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. In such a case, the independent prosecution under PD 1829 can
not prosper.
As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce
Enrile is not charged with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan
simply because the latter is a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is
completely different. But if the act is committed with political or social motives, that is in
furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion
instead of being punished separately.
In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried separately under PD 1829 in
addition to his being prosecuted in the rebellion case. With this ruling, there is no need
for the Court to pass upon the other issues raised by the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Information in Criminal Case No. 90-777
is QUASHED. The writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent Judges and their
successors in Criminal Case No. 90-777, Regional Trial Court of Makati, from holding
the arraignment of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and from conducting further proceedings
therein is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Grio-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Medialdea, J., took no part.
Fernan, C.J. and Paras, J., are on leave.
Footnotes
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 95320 September 4, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.BALTAZAR LACAO, SR.,
PATRIA LACAO and TRINIDAD LACAO MANSILLA, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Geomer C. Delfin for accused-appellants.
REGALADO, J:p
In an information filed on February 3, 1986 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 1416 in
the Regional Trial Court of Capiz, Branch XXI, Baltazar Lacao, Sr., alias "Bantan",
Patria Lacao, Trinidad Mansilla, Baltazar Lacao II, alias "Boticol," and Baltazar Lacao III,
alias "Toto," were charged with the complex crime of murder with direct assault upon an
agent of a person in authority allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of September, 1985, at around 10:00 o'clock in the
evening, in Brgy. Manibad, Municipality of Mambusao, Province of Capiz, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused armed with knives and wooden
stools, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, treachery and taking
advantage of nighttime and superior strength to better facilitate the commission of the
offense, assault, attack and hit one POLICE CORPORAL JOSE G. INOCENCIO, JR.,
an agent of person in authority while in the actual performance of his official duties,
thereby inflicting upon the latter several injuries on the different parts of his body which
caused his instantaneous death; that due to the death of said Police Corporal Jose G.
Inocencio, Jr. and the consequent loss of his earning capacity, his heirs have suffered
and are entitled to an indemnity in the sum of P30,000.00 plus moral and exemplary
damages.
That accused Baltazar Lacao, Sr., alias "Bantan", has been previously convicted by final
judgment of the crime of homicide.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
Upon arraignment, herein accused-appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. admitted killing the
victim but interposed self-defense, hence a plea of not guilty was entered in his behalf,
while Patria Lacao and Trinidad Mansilla pleaded not guilty. The other two accused,
Baltazar Lacao II and Baltazar Lacao III, were not apprehended and have remained at
large.
The facts found by the trial court, as established by unassailable evidence adduced at
the trial, are as follows: At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of September 28, 1985,
prosecution witness Mila Parto was at her house in Barangay Manibad attending to
persons who came to the wake of her aunt, Nemesia Lacao. Mila Parto is the sister-inlaw of the deceased police Cpl. Jose G. Inocencio, Jr. While she was so engaged, she
heard and witnessed a commotion at the first floor of the two-storey house and the
events that took place thereafter. The commotion arose from a card game where one
Mansueto Rivera was losing and accused Baltazar Lacao II, who was playing with him,
was furiously arguing with the former. Baltazar Lacao II then unsheathed his knife and
threatened Mansueto Rivera by pointing the knife at the latter's neck. Wilma Rivera, the
sister-in-law of Mansueto, intervened and Baltazar Lacao II released the latter. Baltazar
Lacao II then went inside the house wielding his knife and causing the other guests to
panic.
It was then that Cpl. Jose G. Inocencio, Jr. went down to inquire into the matter and to
pacify the people. When he saw Baltazar Lacao II with a knife, he held the latter's hand
holding that knife. Baltazar Lacao II then said: "Nyor, release me." As Cpl. Inocencio did
not release him, the latter's mother, Patria Lacao, then said: "Nyor, release my son."
When Cpl. Inocencio released Baltazar Lacao II, the latter suddenly stabbed Inocencio
on his right side. Baltazar Lacao, Sr. and his other son, Baltazar Lacao III, together with
his wife, Patria Lacao, and his sister, Trinidad Lacao Mansilla, rushed inside the house
and surrounded the victim.
The men then stabbed Cpl. Inocencio several times while the women hit him with stools.
As the attack continued, the victim was pushed toward the door of the kitchen and he
later slumped on the floor facing downward. Baltazar Lacao, Sr. then sat astride him
and continued stabbing the latter as he was thus lying prostrate. Thereafter, this
appellant asked: "Nyor, Nyor, are you still alive?" Appellant Patria Lacao interjected:
"What are you waiting for, it is already finished, we have to go." Baltazar Lacao III then
got the gun of Cpl. Inocencio and all the accused went away. 2
All the foregoing facts were clearly and categorically established by said prosecution
witness, unshaken and unaffected by the gruelling cross-examination to which she was
subjected. In the process she categorically identified the three appellants then present
in the courtroom, as well as the knives and the stools used against the victim in the
commission of the crime. Ample and credible corroboration was afforded by the
straightforward testimonies of two other eyewitnesses, Isabel Llorente 3 and the victim's
widow, Nelfa Inocencio, 4 who were admittedly present at the scene and the time of the
bloody incident.
After an examination of the body of the deceased by Dr. Abel P. Martinez, a medicolegal officer and rural health physician, the following autopsy report was submitted and
thereafter admitted in evidence:
PERTINENT POST-MORTEM FINDINGS ON THE BODY OF P/CPL. JOSE G.
INOCENCIO, JR. DONE AT MAMBUSAO, CAPIZ, ON SEPTEMBER 29, 1985 at 4:30
AM
1. Rigor mortis present.
2. Livor mortis present.
3. Lacerated wound about 1" dia located at the left frontopa reital region of the head,
superficial.
4. Stab wound, about 3/4" dia. located at the level of 31 CS MCL, left, going postersinferiorly reaching the anterior pericardium.
5. Stab wound, about 3/4" dia. located at the level of 31 CS 1" lateral to MCL right,
going posters-inferiorly reaching the right lung tissue.
6. Stab wound, about 2-1/2" horizontally located at the subcostal area, MCL right, going
posters-superiorly hitting the liver.

7. Stab wound 1" dia. located at the level of 51 CS AAL, right, going medio-superiorly
reaching the right lung.
8. Stab wound, about 2" dia. located at the level of the 10ICS AAL right, going mediasuperiorly reaching the right lung.
9. Incised wound, about 1/2" dia. superficially located at the superior portion of the
posterior elbow.
10. Stab wound, about 1/2" dia. located at the base of the neck, left going medioinferiorly reaching the body of the cervical vertebra.
11. Stab wound, about 1" dia. diag. located at the supra-scapular region, left going
antero-inferiorly reaching the left lung.
12. Two stab wounds superimposed to one another located at the scapular region, left,
superficial, reaching the scapula.
13. Stab wound about 1-1/2" dia. perpendicularly located at the midscapular region,
superficial, reaching the body of the scapula.
14. Stab wound, about 1" dia. located at the left paravertebral line 10T, left hitting the
rib.
15. Stab wound, about 1" dia. located at the left paravert, line 1L, superficial, hitting the
underlying muscles.
16. Stab wound, 1" dia. located 2" lateral to Wd 15 going anteromedially hitting the
underlying muscles.
CAUSE OF DEATH: CARDIAC TAMPONADE SEVERE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL
HEMORRHAGES SECONDARY TO THE HEREIN INFLICTED WOUNDS. 5
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment convicting the three appellants of the
crime charged, imposing on them the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering them
to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P30,000.00 for his death, P9,250.00 as
actual damages, plus P100,000.00 as moral damages, without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. 6
In their present recourse, appellants assign the following errors:
I
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
BALTAZAR LACAO, SR., PATRIA LACAO AND TRINIDAD LACAO MANSILLA GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER WITH DIRECT
ASSAULT UPON AN AGENT OF PERSON IN AUTHORITY PURSUANT TO THE
PROVISION OF ARTICLES 248 AND 148 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 48 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, As AMENDED, WHERE THE TRIAL COURT SENTENCES
EACH OF THEM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA AND TO
INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS OF THE VICTIM P/CPL JOSE INOCENCIO, JR. IN THE SUM
OF THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) FOR HIS DEATH; PLUS P9,250.00 AS
ACTUAL DAMAGES; PLUS P100,000.00 MORAL DAMAGES AND TO PAY THE COST
OF THE SUIT.
II
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT BALTAZAR LACAO, SR. ACTED IN COMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE WHEN
HE STABBED THE DECEASED JOSE INOCENCIO, JR.
III
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TREACHERY AS A
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE ATTENDED IN THE KILLING OF JOSE INOCENCIO
BY ALL ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
IV
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING APPELLANTS PATRIA LACAO AND
TRINIDAD MANSILLA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER WITH DIRECT ASSAULT NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THEY
HAVE NOT PERFORMED OVERT ACT SHOWING CONSPIRACY FOR MERE
KNOWLEDGE, ACQUIESCENCE OR APPROVAL OF THE ACT, WITHOUT
COOPERATION IS NOT ENOUGH TO CONSTITUTE ONE A PARTY TO A
CONSPIRACY, AND THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
APPELLANTS TRINIDAD MANSILLA AND PATRIA LACAO NOT HAVING CONSPIRED
WITH BALTAZAR LACAO, SR. IN KILLING THE VICTIM JOSE INOCENCIO, JR.
TREACHERY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AGAINST THEM.
V
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
BALTAZAR LACAO, SR. ON SELF-DEFENSE AND IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS PATRIA LACAO AND TRINIDAD MANSILLA FOR FAILURE
OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF SAID ACCUSED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT. 7
The main thrust of the defense is that appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. acted in selfdefense since Cpl. Jose Inocencio, Jr. attempted to shoot him but the gun did not fire.
Said appellant allegedly grabbed the gun and stabbed the deceased more than five (5)
times. 8
The other appellants, Trinidad Mansilla and Patria Lacao, interposed the defense of
alibi. Their version is that at 7:30 in the evening of September 28, 1985, they and one
Consolacion Lago went to the wake at Barangay Manibad. They prayed and, at about
9:30 A.M., they went home but Baltazar, Sr. was left behind. 9 Baltazar Lacao II was
alleged to be sleeping in their house and Baltazar Lacao III was said to be then in
Roxas City studying at the La Purisima College. 10
The Court finds the appeal to be devoid of merit.
Appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr., by pleading self-defense necessarily admits that he killed
the victim and he is thus duty bound to prove the essential requisites for this justifying
circumstance. 11 This circumstance he has to prove by clear and convincing evidence, 12
the onus probandi having shifted to him.
Now, this appellant admitted stabbing the victim more than five (5) times. As seen from
the medico-legal report, the victim actually suffered fifteen (15) stab wounds, that the
cause of death was hemorrhage and multiple stab wounds, 13 and that most of the
injuries inflicted were indeed fatal. It cannot now be denied that, even indulging said
appellant in his theory, he definitely exceeded the limits of what is necessary to
suppress an alleged unlawful aggression directed to him by the victim. In fact, from the
eyewitness accounts, he even continued stabbing the victim who was already slumped
prone and helpless.
Said appellant also sought to buttress his defense by claiming that Cpl. Inocencio, prior
to the stabbing, fired his gun at the former but the gun did not fire. This subterfuge is
refuted by the unequivocal statements of the prosecution witnesses that the victim
never removed his gun from his waistband, 14 and that the revolver only fell when
appellants pushed the deceased. 15 Significantly, this story of appellant Baltazar Lacao,
Sr. was never corroborated by any evidence of unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim. The first requisite of self-defense is indispensable. There can be no self-defense
unless it is proven that there has been unlawful aggression on the part of the person
injured or killed by the accused. If there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to
prevent or to repel. The second requisite of self-defense will have no basis. 16
We also take note of the finding of the court below that none of the six (6) bullets
recovered from the gun showed any sign or mark that the gun was ever fired. Had the
gun been fired, the base of at least one bullet would have been impressed in the center
by the corresponding indentation caused by the impact thereon by the firing pin of the
revolver when the trigger is pulled. The absence of such physical evidence further
sustains the holding of the trial court that even the first element of self-defense has not
been proved despite said appellant's protestations.
Appellants Patria Lacao and Trinidad Mansilla were positively identified by all the
prosecution witnesses as the ones who hit the victim with stools several times while the
other three (3) male accused were stabbing the victim with their knives. In their defense,
Patria and Trinidad sought refuge in the impuissant sanctuary of alibi. Trite as it is, we
have to impress on appellants once again the doctrine that alibi is the weakest defense
an accused can concoct. In order to prosper, it must be so convincing as to preclude
any doubt that the accused could not have been physically present at the place of the
crime or its vicinity at the time of the commission. In the face of positive identification of
the accused by eyewitnesses, an alibi crumbles like a sand fortress. 17
The trial court definitely held that appellants "Patria Lacao and Trinidad Mansilla were
positively identified by all the eyewitnesses for the prosecution who were without any
motive to falsely testify and implicate or point an unerring finger at the three accused
inside the courtroom as the perpetrators of the crime. Their disavowal of participation in
the gory killing of Cpl. Inocencio are self-serving and feeble attempts to disprove
complicity and to which the court gives scant consideration." 18 Indeed, the participatory
acts of said appellants having been testified to so clearly in detail by three (3)
eyewitnesses, to refute the same by the discreditable defense of alibi would be an
evidential travesty.
Identification of the culprits in this case was not difficult because the place where the
crime occurred was sufficiently lighted. Where considerations of visibility are favorable
and the witnesses do not appear to be biased against the accused, their assertions as
to the identity of the malefactor should be normally accepted. This is more so when the
witness is the victim or his near relative because these witnesses usually strive to
remember the faces of the assailants. Moreover, the trial court gave credence to the
prosecution's identification of the appellants as the culprits. Subject to exceptions which
do not obtain in this case, the trial court is in a better position to decide this question,
having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial. 19
The Court, however, is not favorably impressed with the prosecution's theory that the
assailants acted pursuant to a conspiracy just because they apparently acted in unison
in attacking the victim. True, conspiracy is always predominantly mental in composition
because it consists primary of the meeting of minds and, generally, complicity may be
inferred from circumstantial evidence, i.e., the community of purpose and the unity of
design in the contemporaneous or simultaneous performance of the act of assaulting
the deceased. 20 However, conspiracy must be proved with as much certainty as the
crime itself. 21 The same degree of proof required to establish the crime is required to
support a finding of conspiracy, 22 that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. 23
At the very least, conspiracy presupposes a prior agreement or contemporaneous
understanding on the part of the conspirators to commit a felony, in this case, to kill Cpl.
Inocencio. A dispassionate appraisal of the facts readily reveals, however, that the
attack on the victim originated spontaneously from and was initiated unexpectedly by
Baltazar Lacao II. Appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. and his other son, Baltazar Lacao III,
immediately joined in the fray by attacking the victim with their knives, whereupon the
two female appellants, also assisted their menfolk by hitting the victim with stools.
The rapidity in the succession of such consecutive acts of the assailants, with the last
four coming instinctively, as it were, to the aid of the original assailant, cannot but
produce the conclusion that their actuations were activated without prior or apparent
deliberation. It does not even appear that there was a call or a signal from one to the
other to join the attack on Cpl. Inocencio, much less is there even an intimation that they
had such a murderous intent or cabal at any time prior thereto. The spontaneity of their
respective reactions, albeit resulting in an attack where they all participated, rules out
the existence of a conspiracy.
As a consequence, therefore, the respective liabilities of appellants shall be determined
by the nature of their individual participations in the felonious act. 24 It is understood,
however, that whatever liabilities may attach to Baltazar Lacao II and Baltazar Lacao III
are not concluded by the dispositions herein nor shall they be bound by the discussions
in this opinion on their putative participations in the crime charged.
Anent the issue on whether or not treachery was properly appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance, we agree with the holding of the court below since this was sufficiently
proven by the evidence. It is elementary hornbook knowledge that there is treachery
when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. 25
In the present case, the deceased was stabbed without warning the moment he
unsuspectingly released the hand of Baltazar Lacao II. So sudden and unanticipated
was the attack that the victim was given no chance to defend himself. Then herein
appellants, although apparently acting without prior agreement, also instantly and all
together attacked him. Even if their aforesaid acts were independently performed on
their individual initiatives, such concerted action ensured the commission of the crime
without risk to them arising from any defense or retaliation that the victim might have
resorted to. Treachery was thus correctly appreciated against all appellants, the use of
superior strength being absorbed as an integral part of the treacherous mode of
commission.
Appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. admitted during the trial that he was once convicted of the
crime of homicide but he was granted an absolute pardon therefor. 26 The lower court
properly considered recidivism since a pardon for a preceding offense does not
obliterate the fact that the accused is a recidivist upon his conviction of a second
offense embraced in the same title of the Code. 27 This aggravating circumstance of
recidivism accordingly offsets the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender by
Baltazar Lacao, Sr.
With respect to appellants Patria Lacao and Trinidad Lacao Mansilla, they did cooperate
in the execution of the offense by simultaneous acts which, although not indispensable
to the commission of the offense, bore a relation to the acts done by the principal and
supplied material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way. 28
Since they were aware of the criminal intent of the principals and having participated in
such murderous criminal design sans a conspiracy, we hold them guilty of the milder
form of responsibility as accomplices. 29
The penalty for the complex crime at bar is that for the graver offense, the same to be
applied in its maximum period. No modifying circumstance can be considered for or
against herein appellants. With the proscription against the imposition of the death
sentence, the trial court correctly sentenced appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. to suffer
reclusion perpetua. Appellants Patria Lacao and Trinidad Lacao Mansilla are hereby
sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. The death indemnity is hereby increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with
the present policy on the matter, with appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. primarily liable for
P40,000.00 and appellants Patria Lacao and Trinidad Lacao Mansilla for P10,000.00,
subject to the provisions of Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, with the foregoing modifications, the judgment of the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
THIRD DIVISION
MARK CLEMENTE y MARTINEZ

@ EMMANUEL DINO,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 194367
Present:
BRION, J.,
- versus -
Acting Chairperson,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Promulgated:
Respondent.
June 15, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997

Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to reverse the March 29, 2010
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which denied petitioner's appeal and
affirmed the November 3, 2008 Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 7, convicting petitioner of illegal possession and use of false bank
notes under Article 1683 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended. Also
1
2
3
assailed is the CA Resolution dated October 14, 2010 4 denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
Petitioner was charged before the RTC with violation of Article 168 of the
RPC under an Information5 which reads:
That on or about August 5, 2007, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with
intent to use, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control twenty[-]four (24) pcs. [of] P500.00 bill with
Markings [] IIB-1 to IIB-24, respectively and specifically enumerated, to wit:
SERIAL NO.PCS. AMOUNT
SERIAL NO.
PCS. AMOUNT
PX626388
1
P500.00
CC077337
1
P500.00
CC077337
1
500.00
CC077337
1
500.00
CC077337
1
500.00
CC077337
1
500.00
BR666774
1
500.00
CC077337
1
500.00
CC077337
1
500.00
BR666774
1
500.00
BB020523
1
500.00
BR666774
1
500.00
PX626388
1
500.00
CC077337
1
500.00
BR666774
1
500.00
WW164152
1
500.00
PX626388
1
500.00 WW164152
1
500.00
BR666774
1
500.00
BR666774
1
500.00
UU710062
1
500.00
PX626388
1
500.00
CC077337
1
500.00
PX626388
1
500.00
Which are false and falsified.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter

ensued.
The version of the prosecution and the defense, as summarized by the CA,
are as follows:6
The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: Jail Officer 1 (JO1)
Michael Michelle Passilan, the Investigator of the Manila City Jail; JO1 Domingo
David, Jr.; and Loida Marcega Cruz, the Assistant Manager of the Cash Department
of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
4
5
6
[Their testimonies established the following:]

Appellant is a detainee at the Manila City Jail. On August 7, 2007, at around
3:30 pm, an informant in the person of inmate Francis dela Cruz approached JO1s
Domingo David, Jr. and Michael Passilan. The informant narrated that he received a
counterfeit P500.00 bill from appellant with orders to buy a bottle of soft drink from
the Manila City Jail Bakery. The bakery employee, however, recognized the bill as a
fake and refused to accept the same. Consequently, JO1s David and Passilan, along
with the informant, proceeded to appellant's cell for a surprise inspection. Pursuant to
their agreement, the informant entered the cubicle first and found appellant therein,
lying in bed. The informant returned to appellant the latter's P500.00 bill. The jail
guards then entered the cell and announced a surprise inspection. JO1 Passilan
frisked appellant and recovered a black wallet from his back pocket. Inside the wallet
were twenty-three (23) pieces of P500.00, all of which were suspected to be
counterfeit. They confiscated the same and marked them sequentially with IIB-2 to
II-B24. They likewise marked the P500.00 bill that was returned by informant to
appellant with IIB-1. Appellant was consequently arrested and brought out of his cell
into the office of the Intelligence and Investigation Branch (IIB) of the Manila City
jail for interrogation.
Meanwhile, the twenty-four (24) P500.00 bills confiscated from appellant
were turned over to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas for analysis. Pursuant to a
Certification dated August 7, 2007, Acting Assistant Manager Loida Marcega Cruz
of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas examined and found the following bills as
counterfeit, viz: one (1) P500.00 bill with Serial Number BB020523; six (6) P500.00
bills with Serial Number BR666774; nine (9) P500.00 bills with Serial Number
CC077337; five (5) P500.00 bills with Serial Number PX626388; one (1) P500.00
bill with Serial Number UU710062; and two (2) P500.00 bills with Serial Number
WW164152.
For the defense, appellant was the lone witness presented on the stand.
Appellant simply raised the defense of frame-up. He testified that in the
afternoon of August 5, 2007, he was inside his room located at Dorm 1 of the Manila
City Jail. At around 3:00 pm, JO1 Michael Passilan entered appellant's room while
JO1 Domingo David, Jr. posted himself outside. Without any warning, JO1 Passilan
frisked appellant and confiscated his wallet containing one (1) P1,000.00 bill. JO1s
David and Passilan left immediately thereafter. Appellant was left with no other
choice but to follow them in order to get back his wallet. Appellant followed the jail
officers to the Intelligence Office of the Manila City Jail where he saw JO1 Passilan
place the P500.00 bills inside the confiscated black wallet. Appellant was then told
that the P500.00 bills were counterfeit and that he was being charged with illegal
possession and use thereof. Appellant also added that JO1 Passilan bore a grudge
against him. This was because appellant refused to extend a loan [to] JO1 Passilan
because the latter cannot offer any collateral therefor. Since then, JO1 Passilan
treated him severely, threatening him and, at times, putting him in isolation.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged. The RTC gave credence to the prosecution's witnesses in finding
that the counterfeit money were discovered in petitioner's possession during a
surprise inspection, and that the possibility that the counterfeit money were planted
to incriminate petitioner was almost nil considering the number of pieces
involved.7 The RTC also did not find that the jail officers were motivated by
improper motive in arresting petitioner,8 and applied in their favor the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duties considering the absence of
contrary evidence. As to petitioners defense of frame-up, the RTC held that the
purported frame-up allegedly staged by JO1 Passilan would not affect the
prosecution's evidence since the testimony of JO1 David could stand by itself. The
RTC likewise found that it was strange that petitioner did not remonstrate despite
the fact that he was allegedly being framed.9
As to the elements of the crime, the RTC held that the fact that the P500.00
bills found in petitioners possession were forgeries was confirmed by the
certification issued by the Cash Department of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
which was testified into by Acting Assistant Manager Loida A. Cruz.10 The RTC
also ruled that petitioner knew the bills were counterfeit as shown by his conduct
7
8
9
10
during the surprise search and his possession of the bills. As to the element of
intention to use the false bank notes, the RTC ruled that the fact that petitioner
intended to use the bills was confirmed by the information received by the jail
officers from another inmate.11
Aggrieved, petitioner sought reconsideration of the judgment. Petitioner
argued that the evidence used against him was obtained in violation of his
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Petitioner also
argued that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
because of the non-presentation of the informant-inmate, Francis dela Cruz, who
could have corroborated the testimonies of the jail officers.
Unconvinced, the RTC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. The
RTC, however, only ruled that there was no violation of petitioners constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizures because the seizure was done
pursuant to a valid arrest for violation of Article 168 of the RPC. The trial court
pointed out that prior to the search, a crime was committed and the criminal
responsibility pointed to petitioner.12
On appeal before the CA, petitioner argued that the RTC erred in finding
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Article 168 of the RPC. Petitioner
contended that one of the elements of the crime which is intent to use the
counterfeit bills was not established because the informant Francis dela Cruz did
not take the witness stand.13
11
12
13
The CA, however, found the appeal unmeritorious and denied petitioners
appeal.14 The appellate court found that the fact the petitioner was caught in
possession of twenty-four (24) pieces of fake P500.00 bills already casts doubt on
his allegation that he was merely framed by the jail guards. The CA agreed with the
RTC that even without the testimony of JO1 Passilan, the testimony of JO1 David
was already sufficient to establish petitioners guilt since petitioner did not impute
any ill motive on the latter except to point out that JO1 David was JO1 Passilans
friend.15
Regarding the element of intent to use, the CA found that there are several
circumstances which, if taken together, lead to the logical conclusion that petitioner
intended to use the counterfeit bills in his possession. The CA pointed out that jail
officers were informed by inmate Francis dela Cruz that he received a fake
P500.00 bill from petitioner who told him to buy soft drinks from the Manila City
jail bakery. After Francis dela Cruz identified petitioner as the person who gave
him the fake money, the jail officers conducted a surprise inspection. Said
inspection yielded twenty-three (23) pieces of counterfeit P500.00 bills inside
petitioner's black wallet, which was taken from his back pocket. The CA further
held that the non-presentation of Francis dela Cruz would not affect the
prosecution's case because even without his testimony, petitioners intent to use the
counterfeit bills was established. The CA added that the matter of which witnesses
to present is a matter best left to the discretion of the prosecution.16
14
15
16
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the above ruling, but the CA denied

petitioners motion for reconsideration in the assailed Resolution dated October 14,
2010.17 Hence, the present appeal.
Petitioner raises the following assignment of errors, to wit:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, CONVICTING PETITIONER OF THE CRIME
CHARGED, DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE
AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING THE
COUNTERFEIT BILLS SINCE THEY WERE DERIVED FROM
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE.18
The petition is meritorious.

Generally, the trial courts findings are accorded finality, unless there appears
in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court has
overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly considered,
would alter the result of the case. The exception applies when it is established that
the trial court has ignored, overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent facts
and circumstances which, if considered, will change the outcome of the case.19
Here, the Court finds that the RTC and the CA had overlooked certain
substantial facts of value to warrant a reversal of its factual assessments. While
17
18
19
petitioner's denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed by

strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credence, said defense must be given
credence in this case as the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proof.
Article 168 of the RPC, under which petitioner was charged, provides:
ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and
other instruments of credit. Unless the act be one of those coming under the
provisions of any of the preceding articles, any person who shall knowingly
use or have in his possession, with intent to use any of the false or falsified
instruments referred to in this section, shall suffer the penalty next lower in
degree than that prescribed in said articles. [Emphasis supplied.]
The elements of the crime charged for violation of said law are: (1) that any
treasury or bank note or certificate or other obligation and security payable to
bearer, or any instrument payable to order or other document of credit not payable
to bearer is forged or falsified by another person; (2) that the offender knows that
any of the said instruments is forged or falsified; and (3) that he either used or
possessed with intent to use any of such forged or falsified instruments.20 As held in
People v. Digoro, 21 possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without
anything more, is not a criminal offense. For it to constitute an offense under
Article 168 of the RPC, the possession must be with intent to use said false
treasury or bank notes.22
In this case, the prosecution failed to show that petitioner used the
counterfeit money or that he intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis dela
Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly gave the fake P500.00 bill to buy soft drinks,
was not presented in court. According to the jail officers, they were only informed
by Francis dela Cruz that petitioner asked the latter to buy soft drinks at the Manila
City jail bakery using a fake P500.00 bill. In short, the jail officers did not have
20
21
22
personal knowledge that petitioner asked Francis dela Cruz use the P500.00 bill.23
Their account, however, is hearsay and not based on the personal knowledge.24
This Court, of course, is not unaware of its rulings that the matter of
presentation of prosecution witnesses is not for the accused or, except in a limited
sense, for the trial court to dictate. Discretion belongs to the city or provincial
prosecutor as to how the prosecution should present its case.25 However, in this
case, the non-presentation of the informant as witness weakens the prosecution's
evidence since he was the only one who had knowledge of the act which
manifested petitioner's intent to use a counterfeit bill. The prosecution had every
opportunity to present Francis dela Cruz as its witness, if in fact such person
existed, but it did not present him. Hence, the trial court did not have before it
evidence of an essential element of the crime. The twenty-three (23) pieces of
counterfeit bills allegedly seized on petitioner is not sufficient to show intent,
which is a state of mind, for there must be an overt act to manifest such intent.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
Decision dated March 29, 2010 and Resolution dated October 14, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32365 are REVERSED and SET-ASIDE.
Petitioner Mark Clemente y Martinez alias Emmanuel Dino is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime of Illegal possession and use of false bank notes
defined and penalized under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
With costs de oficio.
23
24
25
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 174730-37
February 9, 2011
ROSALIO S. GALEOS, Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. Nos. 174845-52
PAULINO S. ONG, Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
The consolidated petitions at bar seek to reverse and set aside the Decision 1
promulgated on August 18, 2005 by the Sandiganbayan convicting petitioners Paulino
S. Ong (Ong) of eight counts and Rosalio S. Galeos (Galeos) of four counts of
falsification of public documents under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.
The facts are as follows:
Ong was appointed Officer-in-Charge (OIC)-Mayor of the Municipality of Naga, Cebu on
April 16, 1986. He was elected Mayor of the same municipality in 1988 and served as
such until 1998.2
On June 1, 1994, Ong extended permanent appointments to Galeos and Federico T.
Rivera (Rivera) for the positions of Construction and Maintenance Man and Plumber I,
respectively, in the Office of the Municipal Engineer. 3 Prior to their permanent
appointment, Galeos and Rivera were casual employees of the municipal government.
In their individual Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) for the year
1993, Galeos answered "No" to the question: "To the best of your knowledge, are you
related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or of affinity to anyone working in the
government?" while Rivera indicated "n/a" on the space for the list of the names of
relatives referred to in the said query.4 The boxes for "Yes" and "No" to the said query
were left in blank by Galeos in his 1994 and 1995 SALN. 5 Rivera in his 1995 SALN
answered "No" to the question on relatives in government. 6 In their 1996 SALN, both
Galeos and Rivera also did not fill up the boxes indicating their answers to the same
query.7 Ongs signature appears in all the foregoing documents as the person who
administered the oath when Galeos and Rivera executed the foregoing documents.
In a letter-certification dated June 1, 1994 addressed to Ms. Benita O. Santos, Regional
Director, Civil Service Commission (CSC), Regional Office 7, Cebu City, it was attested
that:
This is to certify that pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991, all restrictions/requirements relative to creation of
positions, hiring and issuance of appointments, Section 325 on the limitations for
personal services in the total/supplemental appropriation of a local government unit;
salary rates; abolition and creation of positions, etc.; Section 76, organizational structure
and staffing pattern; Section 79 on nepotism; Section 80, posting of vacancy and
personnel selection board; Section 81 on compensation, etc. have been duly complied
with in the issuance of this appointment.
This is to certify further that the faithful observance of these restrictions/requirements
was made in accordance with the requirements of the Civil Service Commission before
the appointment was submitted for review and action. 8 (Emphasis supplied.)
The above certification was signed by Ong and HR Officer-Designate Editha C. Garcia.
On October 1, 1998, the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naga, Cebu filed a
letter-complaint9 before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)-Visayas against Ong (then
incumbent Vice-Mayor of Naga), Galeos and Rivera for dishonesty, nepotism, violation
of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees and
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and for the crime of falsification of public
documents.
On August 11, 2000, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the recommendation of
OIC-Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas that criminal charges be filed against Ong,
Galeos and Rivera for falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, in connection with the Certification dated June 1, 1994
issued by Ong and the false statements in the 1993, 1995 and 1996 SALN of Rivera
and the 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996 SALN of Galeos. 10
On August 16, 2000, the following Informations 11 were filed against the petitioners:
Criminal Case No. 26181
That on or about the 14th day of February, 1994, in the Municipality of Naga, Province
of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named
[Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos] accused, public officers, being the former
Municipal Mayor and Construction and Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal
Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in
relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each
other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets
and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and
Identification of Relatives In the Government Service, as of December 31, 1993, filed by
accused Rosalio S. Galeos and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S.
Ong, wherein accused made it appear therein that they are not related within the fourth
degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of
facts, when in truth and in fact, accused very well k[n]ew that they are related with each
other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the
fourth degree of consanguinity, the mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos [being] the
sister of the mother of accused Paulino S. Ong.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)
That on or about the 15th day of February 1994, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named
[Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera] accused, public officers, being the former
Municipal Mayor and Plumber I of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of
Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving
and confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent,
with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public
document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of
Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In the
Government Service as of December 31, 1993, filed by accused Federico T. Rivera and
subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused Federico T.
Rivera made it appear therein that he has no relatives within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity working in the government, thereby making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as accused very well knew
that they are related with each other, since accused Federico T. Rivera is related to
accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of affinity, the mother of Federico T.
Riveras wife being the sister of the mother of Paulino S. Ong.
That on or about the 1st day of February, 1996, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of
degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby making false statements in a narration of
facts, when in truth and in fact, as accused very well k[n]ew that they are related with
each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong
within the fourth degree of consanguinity, the mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos
being the sister of the mother of accused Paulino S. Ong.
That on or about the 1st day of February 1996, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of
Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In The
Government Service, [a]s of December 31, 1995, filed by accused Federico T. Rivera
and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused
Federico T. Rivera made it appear therein that he has no relatives within the fourth
degree of consanguinity or affinity working in the government, thereby making untruthful
That on or about the 5th day of February 1997, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of
Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In The
Government Service, [a]s of December 31, 1996, filed by accused Federico T. Rivera
and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused
Federico T. Rivera made it appear therein that he has no relatives within the fourth
degree of consanguinity or affinity working in the government, thereby making untruthful
That on or about the 3rd day of March, 1995, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of
Identification of Relatives In the Government Services, as of December 31, 1994, filed
by accused Rosalio S. Galeos and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S.
each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong,
That on or about the 11th day of March, 1997, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of
relation to office, conniving and confederating, together and mutually helping with each
each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong
That on or about the 1st day of June, 1994, at the Municipality of Naga, Province of
accused, a public officer, being the former Mayor of the Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in
such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, with deliberate intent, with
intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public
document, consisting of a Certification in the form of a letter addressed to Mrs. Benita
O. Santos, then Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)-Region VII,
Cebu City dated June 1, 1994, a requirement in the approval of an appointment,
certifying therein that there was a faithful compliance of the requirement/restriction
provided under the Civil Service Laws and Rules in the appointment of Rosalio S.
Galeos, as Construction and Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer,
Naga, Cebu, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth
and in fact as accused very well knew that the appointment of Rosalio S. Galeos was
nepotic being made in violation of the Civil Service Rules and Laws on Nepotism, as
Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused within the fourth degree of consanguinity, since
the mother of Rosalio S. Galeos is the sister of the mother of accused, which
Certification caused the approval of the appointment of Rosalio S. Galeos, to the
detriment of public interest.
That on or about the 1st day of June, 1994, at the Municipality of Naga, Province of
accused, a public officer, being the former Mayor of the Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in
such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, with deliberate intent, with
intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public
document, consisting of a Certification in the form of a letter addressed to Mrs. Benita
O. Santos, then Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), Region VII,
Cebu City, dated June 1, 1994, a requirement in the approval of an appointment,

certifying therein that there was a faithful compliance of the requirement/restriction
provided under the Civil Service Laws and Rules in the appointment of Federico T.
Rivera, a Plumber I of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Naga, Cebu, thereby
making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact as accused
very well knew that the appointment of Federico T. Rivera was nepotic being made in
violation of the Civil Service Rules and Laws on Nepotism, as Federico T. Rivera is
related to accused within the fourth degree of affinity, since the mother of Federico T.
Riveras wife is the sister of the mother of accused, which certification caused the
approval of the appointment of Federico T. Rivera, to the detriment of public interest.
Under the Joint Stipulation of Facts submitted to the court a quo, the accused made the
following admissions: (1) Ong was the Municipal Mayor of Cebu at all times relevant to
these cases; (2) Ong is related to Galeos, within the fourth degree of consanguinity as
his mother is the sister of Galeos mother, and to Rivera within the fourth degree of
affinity as his mother is the sister of the mother of Riveras wife; and (3) Galeos and
Rivera were employed as Construction and Maintenance Man and Plumber I,
respectively, in the Municipal Government of Naga, Cebu at all times relevant to these
cases. Ong likewise admitted the genuineness and due execution of the documentary
exhibits presented by the prosecutor (copies of SALNs and Certification dated June 1,
1994) except for Exhibit "H" (Certification dated June 1, 1994 offered by the prosecution
as "allegedly supporting the appointment of Rosalio S. Galeos" 12).13
As lone witness for the prosecution, Esperidion R. Canoneo testified that he has been a
resident of Pangdan, Naga, Cebu since 1930 and claimed to be friends with Ong,
Galeos and Rivera. He knows the mother of Galeos, Pining Suarez or Pearanda
Suarez. But when the prosecutor mentioned "Bining Suarez," Canoneo stated that
Bining Suarez is the mother of Galeos and that Bining Suarez is the same person as
"Bernardita Suarez." Ong is related to Galeos because Ongs mother, Conchita Suarez,
and Galeos mother, Bernardita Suarez, are sisters. As to Rivera, his wife Kensiana, 14 is
the daughter of Mercedes Suarez who is also a sister of Conchita Suarez. He knew the
Suarez sisters because they were the neighbors of his grandmother whom he frequently
visited when he was still studying.15
Both Galeos and Rivera testified that they only provided the entries in their SALN but
did not personally fill up the forms as these were already filled up by "people in the
municipal hall" when they signed them.
Galeos, when shown his 1993 SALN, 16 confirmed his signature thereon. When he was
asked if he understood the question "To the best of your knowledge, are you related
within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity to anyone working in the
government?" he answered in the negative. He claimed that the "X" mark corresponding
to the answer "No" to said question, as well as the other entries in his SALN, were
already filled up when he signed it. When shown his SALN for the years 1994, 1995 and
1996, Galeos reiterated that they were already filled up and he was only made to sign
them by an employee of the municipal hall whom he only remembers by face. He also
admitted that he carefully read the documents and all the entries therein were explained
to him before he affixed his signature on the document. However, when asked whether
he understands the term "fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity" stated in the SALNs,
he answered in the negative.17
Rivera testified that he was not aware that his wife was a close relative of the Municipal
Mayor because when he asked her, the latter told him that Ong was a distant relative of
hers. Rivera added that it was not Ong who first appointed him as a casual employee
but Ongs predecessor, Mayor Vicente Mendiola.18
On the part of Ong, he testified that at the time he was serving as Municipal Mayor of
Naga, he did not know that he and Galeos are relatives, as in fact there are several
persons with the surname "Galeos" in the municipality. He signed Galeos 1993 SALN
when it was presented to him by Galeos at his office. There were many of them who
brought such documents and he would administer their oaths on what were written on
their SALN, among them were Galeos and Rivera. He came to know of the defect in the
employment of Galeos when the case was filed by his "political enemy" in the
Ombudsman just after he was elected Vice-Mayor in 1998. As to Rivera, Ong claimed
that he knows him as a casual employee of the previous administration. As successor of
the former mayor, he had to re-appoint these casual employees and he delegated this
matter to his subordinates. He maintained that his family was not very close to their
other relatives because when he was not yet Mayor, he was doing business in Cebu
and Manila. When queried by the court if he had known his relatives while he was
campaigning considering that in the provinces even relatives within the 6th and 7th
degree are still regarded as close relatives especially among politicians, Ong insisted
that his style of campaigning was based only on his performance of duties and that he
did not go from house to house. Ong admitted that he had been a resident of Naga,
Cebu since birth. He could no longer recall those SALN of most of the employees
whose oaths he had administered. He admitted that he was the one who appointed
Galeos and Rivera to their permanent positions and signed their official appointment
(Civil Service Form No. 33) but he was not aware at that time that he was related to
them. It was only after the filing of the case that he came to know the wife of Rivera. As
to the qualifications of these appointees, he no longer inquired about it and their
appointments were no longer submitted to the Selection Board. When the appointment
forms for Galeos and Rivera were brought to his office, the accompanying documents
were attached thereto. Ong, however, admitted that before the permanent appointment
is approved by the CSC, he issues a certification to the effect that all requirements of
law and the CSC have been complied with.19
On August 18, 2005, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Decision convicting
Ong, Galeos and Rivera, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered on the following:
In Criminal Case No. 26181, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S.
Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, are hereby
sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the
minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as
the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00).
Ong and Federico T. Rivera GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
(P5,000.00).
(P5,000.00).1auuphil
(P5,000.00).
(P5,000.00).
(P5,000.00).
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as
the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium
as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00).
Ong NOT GUILTY for Violation of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code for failure of
the Prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and
Ong GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Falsification of Public Document as defined
in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no
modifying circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision
Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to pay a FINE of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.20
In its Resolution21 dated August 28, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied the motions for
reconsideration of Ong and Galeos. However, in view of the death of Rivera on August
22, 2003 before the promulgation of the decision, the cases (Criminal Case Nos. 26182,
26184 and 26185) against him were dismissed.
In G.R. Nos. 174730-37, Galeos contends that the Sandiganbayan erred when:
1) . . . IT HELD THAT THE SUBJECT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE CONTAINED

UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS IN A NARRATION OF FACTS.
2) . . . IT DID NOT CONSIDER PETITIONERS VALID DEFENSE OF GOOD FAITH
AND LACK OF INTENT TO COMMIT THE CRIMES IMPUTED.
3) . . . IT GAVE FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE SOLE WITNESS
FOR THE PROSECUTION.22
In support of his assigned errors, Galeos argues that he did not make untruthful or false
statements in his SALN since a "statement" requires a positive averment and thus
silence or non-disclosure cannot be considered one. And even if they are considered
statements, Galeos contends that they were not made in a "narration of facts" and the
least they could be considered are "conclusions of law." He also argues that the
prosecution failed to adduce any evidence to support the finding that he was aware of
their relationship at the time of the execution of the SALN. With the presence of good
faith, Galeos avers that the fourth element of the crime the perversion of truth in the
narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person is
missing. He also faults the Sandiganbayan for its heavy reliance on the uncorroborated
testimony of the prosecutions sole witness despite the fact that there are aspects in his
testimony that do not inspire belief.
On the other hand, in G.R. Nos. 174845-52, Ong argues that the Sandiganbayan erred
when:
(a)
. . . IT HELD THAT THE SUBJECT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE CONTAINED
UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS IN A NARRATION OF FACTS.
(b)
IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 26181-26187, [IT HELD] THAT A PERSON MERELY
ADMINISTERING THE OATH IN A DOCUMENT IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
FALSIFICATION BY MAKING UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS IN A NARRATION OF
FACTS.
(c)
. . . IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 26189, IT INFER[R]ED, DESPITE THE COMPLETE
ABSENCE OF ANY RELEVANT AND MATERIAL EVIDENCE, THAT RESPONDENTS
EXHIBIT "I" (OR PETITIONERS EXHIBIT "8") REFERS TO OR SUPPORTS THE
APPOINTMENT OF FEDERICO T. RIVERA.23
Ong similarly argues that the subject SALN do not contain any untruthful statements
containing a narration of facts and that there was no wrongful intent of injuring a third
person at the time of the execution of the documents. He contends that he cannot be
held liable for falsification for merely administering the oath in a document since it is not
among the legal obligations of an officer administering the oath to certify the truthfulness
and/or veracity of the contents of the document. Neither can he be made liable for
falsification regarding the letter-certification he issued since there was no evidence
adduced that it was made to support Riveras appointment.
In the Joint Memorandum filed by the Ombudsman through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor of the Sandiganbayan, it was pointed out that Galeos categorically admitted
during his testimony that before affixing his signature on the subject SALN, he carefully
read its contents and the entries therein have been explained to him. Moreover, the
admission made by Ong during the pre-trial under the joint stipulation of facts indicated
no qualification at all that he became aware of his relationship with Galeos and Rivera
only after the execution of the subject documents. The defense of lack of knowledge of
a particular fact in issue, being a state of mind and therefore self-serving, it can be
legally assumed that the admission of that particular fact without qualification reckons
from the time the imputed act, to which the particular fact relates, was committed. As to
mistaken reliance on the testimony of prosecution witness, the analysis and findings in
the assailed decision do not show that such testimony was even taken into
consideration in arriving at the conviction of petitioners. 24
With respect to Ongs liability as conspirator in the execution of the SALN containing
untruthful statements, the Special Prosecutor argues that as a general rule, it is not the
duty of the administering officer to ascertain the truth of the statements found in a
document. The reason for this is that the administering officer has no way of knowing if
the facts stated therein are indeed truthful. However, when the facts laid out in the
document directly involves the administering officer, then he has an opportunity to know
of their truth or falsity. When an administering officer nevertheless administers the oath
despite the false contents of the document, which are known to him to be false, he is
liable, not because he violated his duty as an administering officer, but because he
participated in the falsification of a document. 25
After a thorough review, we find the petitions unmeritorious.
Petitioners were charged with falsification of public document under Article 171,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which states:
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister.
The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed
upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official
position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when
they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other

than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
x x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied.)
The elements of falsification in the above provision are as follows:
(a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of
facts;
(b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and
(c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.26
In addition to the afore-cited elements, it must also be proven that the public officer or
employee had taken advantage of his official position in making the falsification. In
falsification of public document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of
his official position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to
intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of the
document which he falsifies. 27 Likewise, in falsification of public or official documents, it
is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third
person because in the falsification of a public document, what is punished is the
violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly
proclaimed.28
Falsification of Public Documentby making untruthful statementsconcerning relatives in
thegovernment service
All the elements of falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements
have been established by the prosecution.
Petitioners argue that the statements "they are not related within the fourth civil degree
of consanguinity or affinity" and "that Section 79 of the Local Government Code has
been complied with in the issuance of the appointments" are not a narration of facts but
a conclusion of law, as both require the application of the rules on relationship under the
law of succession. Thus, they cite People v. Tugbang 29 where it was held that "a
statement expressing an erroneous conclusion of law cannot be considered a
falsification." Likewise, in People v. Yanza, 30 it was held that when defendant certified
that she was eligible for the position, she practically wrote a conclusion of law, which
turned out to be incorrect or erroneous; hence, she may not be declared guilty of
falsification because the law violated pertains to narration of facts.
We disagree.
A conclusion of law is a determination by a judge or ruling authority regarding the law

that applies in a particular case. It is opposed to a finding of fact, which interprets the
factual circumstances to which the law is to be applied. 31 A narration of facts is merely
an account or description of the particulars of an event or occurrence. 32 We have held
that a certification by accused officials in the Statement of Time Elapsed and Work
Accomplished qualifies as a narration of facts as contemplated under Article 171 (4) of
the Revised Penal Code, as it consisted not only of figures and numbers but also words
were used therein giving an account of the status of the flood control project. 33
In this case, the required disclosure or identification of relatives "within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity" in the SALN involves merely a description of such
relationship; it does not call for an application of law in a particular set of facts. On the
other hand, Articles 963 to 967 of the Civil Code simply explain the concept of proximity
of relationship and what constitute direct and collateral lines in relation to the rules on
succession. The question of whether or not persons are related to each other by
consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree is one of fact. Contrary to petitioners
assertion, statements concerning relationship may be proved as to its truth or falsity,
and thus do not amount to expression of opinion. When a government employee is
required to disclose his relatives in the government service, such information elicited
therefore qualifies as a narration of facts contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. Further, it bears to stress that the untruthful
statements on relationship have no relevance to the employees eligibility for the
position but pertains rather to prohibition or restriction imposed by law on the appointing
power.
Since petitioner Galeos answered "No" to the question in his 1993 SALN if he has
relatives in the government service within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he made
an untruthful statement therein as in fact he was related to Ong, who was then the
municipal mayor, within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he and Ong being first
cousins (their mothers are sisters). As to his 1994, 1995 and 1996 SALN, Galeos left in
blank the boxes for the answer to the similar query. In Dela Cruz v. Mudlong, 34 it was
held that one is guilty of falsification in the accomplishment of his information and
personal data sheet if he withholds material facts which would have affected the
approval of his appointment and/or promotion to a government position. By withholding
information on his relative/s in the government service as required in the SALN, Galeos
was guilty of falsification considering that the disclosure of such relationship with then
Municipal Mayor Ong would have resulted in the disapproval of his permanent
appointment pursuant to Article 168 (j) (Appointments), Rule XXII of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which
provides:
No person shall be appointed in the local government career service if he is related
within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to the appointing power or
recommending authority.
Section 7 (e), Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book V, Executive Order No. 292
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, provides that the CSC shall
disapprove the appointment of a person who "has been issued such appointment in
violation of existing Civil Service Law, rules and regulations." Among the prohibited
appointments enumerated in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, series of 1993 are
appointments in the LGUs of persons who are related to the appointing or
recommending authority within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity.35
The Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions (CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 40, series of 1998 dated December 14, 1998) contain a similar prohibition
under Rule XIII, Section 9:
SEC. 9. No appointment in the national, provincial, city or municipal governments or any
branch or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled
corporations with original charters shall be made in favor of a relative of the appointing
or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office or of the person
exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the word "relative" and the members of the family
referred to are those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.
In the local government career service, the prohibition extends to the relatives of the
appointing or recommending authority, within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity.
xxxx
The nepotism rule covers all kinds of appointments whether original, promotional,
transfer and reemployment regardless of status including casuals and contractuals
except consultants. (Emphasis supplied.)
The second element is likewise present. "Legal obligation" means that there is a law
requiring the disclosure of the truth of the facts narrated. 36 Permanent employees
employed by local government units are required to file the following: (a) sworn
statement of assets, liabilities and net worth (SALN); (b) lists of relatives within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity in government service; (c) financial and
business interests; and (d) personal data sheets as required by law. 37 A similar
requirement is imposed by Section 8 (B) of Republic Act No. 6713 otherwise known as
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, thus:
(B) Identification and disclosure of relatives 38. It shall be the duty of every public
official or employee to identify and disclose to the best of his knowledge and
information, his relatives in the Government in the form, manner and frequency
prescribed by the Civil Service Commission.
Section 11 of the same law penalizes the violation of the above provision, either with
imprisonment or fine, and, in the discretion of the court of competent jurisdiction,
disqualification to hold public office. Such violation if proven in a proper administrative

proceeding shall also be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public official or
employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.
The evidence on record clearly showed that Galeos negative answer reflected in his
SALN is absolutely false. During the trial, both Ong and Galeos admitted the fact that
they are first cousins but denied having knowledge of such relationship at the time the
subject documents were executed. The Sandiganbayan correctly rejected their defense
of being unaware that they are related within the fourth degree of consanguinity. Given
the Filipino cultural trait of valuing strong kinship and extended family ties, it was
unlikely for Galeos who had been working for several years in the municipal
government, not to have known of his close blood relation to Ong who was a prominent
public figure having ran and won in the local elections four times (three terms as Mayor
and as Vice-Mayor in the 1998 elections), after serving as OIC Mayor of the same
municipality in 1986 until 1988.
The same thing can be said of Ong, whose unbelievable claim that he had no
knowledge that a first cousin (Galeos) was working in the municipal government and
appointed by him to a permanent position during his incumbency, was correctly
disregarded by the Sandiganbayan. It was simply unthinkable that as a resident of
Naga, Cebu since birth and a politician at that, he was all the time unaware that he
himself appointed to permanent positions the son of his mothers sister (Galeos) and the
husband of his first cousin (Rivera). Indeed, the reality of local politics and Filipino
culture renders his defense of good faith (lack of knowledge of their relationship)
unavailing. Despite his knowledge of the falsity of the statement in the subject SALN,
Ong still administered the oath to Galeos and Rivera who made the false statement
under oath. The Sandiganbayan thus did not err in finding that Ong connived with
Galeos and Rivera in making it appear in their SALN that they have no relative within
the fourth degree of consanguinity/affinity in the government service.
Conspiracy need not be shown by direct proof of an agreement of the parties to commit
the crime,39 as it can be inferred from the acts of the accused which clearly manifest a
concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime. 40 In this case, Ong
administered the oaths to Galeos and Rivera in the subject SALN not just once, but
three times, a clear manifestation that he concurred with the making of the untruthful
statement therein concerning relatives in the government service.
Falsification by makinguntruthful statementsin the Certification re:compliance with the
prohibition on nepotism
As chief executive and the proper appointing authority, Ong is deemed to have issued
the certification recommending to the CSC approval of Galeos appointment although he
admitted only the authenticity and due execution of Exhibit "I". Since Ong was duty
bound to observe the prohibition on nepotistic appointments, his certification stating
compliance with Section 7941 of R.A. No. 7160 constitutes a solemn affirmation of the
fact that the appointee is not related to him within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity. Having executed the certification despite his knowledge that he
and Rivera were related to each other within the fourth degree of affinity, as in fact
Rivera was his cousin-in-law because the mother of Riveras wife is the sister of Ongs
mother, Ong was guilty of falsification of public document by making untruthful
statement in a narration of facts. He also took advantage of his official position as the
appointing authority who, under the Civil Service rules, is required to issue such
certification.
The importance of the certification submitted to the CSC by the proper appointing
authority in the local government unit, regarding compliance with the prohibition against
nepotism under R.A. No. 7160 cannot be overemphasized. Under Section 67, Book V,
Chapter 10 of the Administrative Code of 1987, a head of office or appointing official
who issues an appointment or employs any person in violation of Civil Service Law and
Rules or who commits fraud, deceit or intentional misrepresentation of material facts
concerning other civil service matters, or anyone who violates, refuses or neglects to
comply with any of such provisions or rules, may be held criminally liable. In Civil
Service Commission v. Dacoycoy,42 we held that mere issuance of appointment in favor
of a relative within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity is sufficient to constitute a
violation of the law. Although herein petitioners were prosecuted for the criminal offense
of falsification of public document, it becomes obvious that the requirement of disclosure
of relationship to the appointing power in the local government units simply aims to
ensure strict enforcement of the prohibition against nepotism.1avvphil
Relevant then is our pronouncement in Dacoycoy:
Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its
personnel. In Debulgado, we stressed that "[T]the basic purpose or objective of the
prohibition against nepotism also strongly indicates that the prohibition was intended to
be a comprehensive one." "The Court was unwilling to restrict and limit the scope of the
prohibition which is textually very broad and comprehensive." If not within the
exceptions, it is a form of corruption that must be nipped in the bud or abated whenever
or wherever it raises its ugly head. As we said in an earlier case "what we need now is
not only to punish the wrongdoers or reward the outstanding civil servants, but also to
plug the hidden gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to insist on strict compliance
with existing legal procedures in order to abate any occasion for graft or circumvention
of the law."43 (Emphasis supplied.)
The prosecution having established with moral certainty the guilt of petitioners for
falsification of public documents under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, we find no legal ground to reverse petitioners conviction.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Decision dated August 18, 2005 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 26181-26187 and 26189 is AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
NORMA DELOS REYES VDA.
DEL PRADO, EULOGIA R.
DEL PRADO, NORMITA R.
DEL PRADO and RODELIA
R. DEL PRADO,
Petitioners,
G.R. No. 186030

Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
-versus-
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
March 21, 2012
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which
seeks to assail and set aside the following issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA) in the
case docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 31225 and entitled Norma Delos Reyes Vda. Del
Prado, Eulogia R. Del Prado, Normita R. Del Prado and Rodelia R. Del Prado v. People
of the Philippines":
1)
the Decision[1] dated September 15, 2008 affirming with modification the
decision and order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38,
Lingayen, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. L-8015; and
2)
the Resolution[2] dated January 6, 2009 denying the motion for

reconsideration of the Decision of September 15, 2008.
The Factual Antecedents
This petition stems from an Information for falsification under Article 172, in relation to
Article 171(4), of the Revised Penal Code filed against herein petitioners Norma Delos
Reyes Vda. Del Prado (Norma), Normita Del Prado (Normita), Eulogia Del Prado
(Eulogia) and Rodelia[3] Del Prado (Rodelia) with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Lingayen, Pangasinan, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of July, 1991, in the [M]unicipality of
Lingayen, [P]rovince of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then
and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously falsified, execute[d] and
cause[d] the preparation of the DEED OF SUCCESSION, by stating
and making it appear in said document that they were the only heirs
of the late Rafael del Prado, when in truth and in fact, all the accused
well knew, that Ma. Corazon Del Prado-Lim is also an heir who is
entitled to inherit from the late Rafael Del Prado, and all the accused
deliberately used the DEED OF SUCCESSION to claim ownership
and possession of the land mentioned in the DEED OF
SUCCESSION to the exclusion of the complainant Ma. Corazon Del
Prado-Lim to her damage and prejudice.
Contrary to Art. 172 in relation to Art. 171, par. 4 of the Revised
Penal Code.[4]
Upon arraignment, the accused therein entered their plea of not guilty. After pre-trial
conference, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution claimed that Ma. Corazon Del Prado-Lim (Corazon), private
complainant in the criminal case, was the daughter of the late Rafael Del Prado (Rafael)
by his marriage to Daisy Cragin (Daisy). After Daisy died in 1956, the late Rafael
married Norma with whom he had five children, namely: Rafael, Jr., Antonio, Eulogia,
Normita and Rodelia.
The late Rafael died on July 12, 1978. On October 29, 1979, Corazon, as a daughter of
the late Rafael, and Norma, as the late Rafaels surviving spouse and representative of
their five minor children, executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the Estate of
Rafael Del Prado to cover the distribution of several properties owned by the late
Rafael, including the parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P22848, measuring 17,624 square meters, more or less, and situated at Libsong,
Lingayen, Pangasinan.
Per agreement of the heirs, Corazon was to get a 3,000-square meter portion of the
land covered by OCT No. P-22848. This right of Corazon was also affirmed in the Deed
of Exchange dated October 15, 1982 and Confirmation of Subdivision which she
executed with Norma.

Corazon, however, later discovered that her right over the subject parcel of land was
never registered by Norma, contrary to the latters undertaking. The petitioners instead
executed on July 19, 1991 a Deed of Succession wherein they, together with Rafael, Jr.
and Antonio, partitioned and adjudicated unto themselves the property covered by OCT
No. P-22848, to the exclusion of Corazon. The deed was notarized by Loreto L.
Fernando (Loreto), and provides in part:
WHEREAS, on the 12[th] day of July 1978, RAFAEL DEL PRADO[,]
SR., died intestate in the City of Dagupan, leaving certain parcel of
land, and more particularly described and bounded to wit:
ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. P-22848
A certain parcel of land (Lot No. 5518, Cad-373-D)
Lingayen Cadastre, situated in Poblacion,
Lingayen, Pangasinan, Island of Luzon. Bounded
on the NE., by Lots Nos. 5522, 5515; and 6287; on
the SE., by Lots Nos. 5516, 5517, 55 and Road; on
the SW., by Road, and Lots Nos. 5521, 5510, and
5520; and on the NW., by Road; x x x containing an
area of SEVENTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
TWENTY-FOUR (17,624) Square Meters, more or
less. Covered by Psd-307996 (LRC), consisting of
two lots. Lot No. 5510-A and Lot 5518-B.
WHEREAS, the parties hereto are the only heirs of the decedent,
the first name, is the surviving spouse and the rest are the children of
the decedent;
xxx
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the premises and
invoking the provisions of Rule 74, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, the
parties hereto do by these presents, agree to divide and partition the
entire estate above[-]described and accordingly adjudicate, as they
do hereby adjudicate the same among themselves, herein below
specified to wit:
x x x[5]
By virtue of the said Deed of Succession, OCT No. P-22848 was cancelled and several
new titles were issued under the names of Corazons co-heirs. When Corazon
discovered this, she filed a criminal complaint against now petitioners Norma, Eulogia,
Normita and Rodelia. Antonio and Rafael, Jr. had both died before the filing of said
complaint.
Among the witnesses presented during the trial was Loreto, who confirmed that upon
the request of Norma and Antonio, he prepared and notarized the deed of succession.
He claimed that the petitioners appeared and signed the document before him.
For their defense, the petitioners denied having signed the Deed of Succession, or
having appeared before notary public Loreto. They also claimed that Corazon was not a
daughter, but a niece, of the late Rafael. Norma claimed that she only later knew that a
deed of succession was prepared by her son Antonio, although she admitted having
executed a deed of real estate mortgage in favor of mortgagee Prudential Bank over
portions of the subject parcel of land already covered by the new titles.
The Ruling of the MTC
The MTC rejected for being unsubstantiated the petitioners denial of any participation in
the execution of the deed of succession, further noting that they benefited from the
property after its transfer in their names. Thus, on August 9, 2006, the court rendered its
decision[6] finding petitioners Norma, Eulogia, Normita and Rodelia guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, sentencing them to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor as minimum to two years and four
months and one day of prision correccional as maximum. They were also ordered to
pay a fine of P5,000.00 each, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment of
fine.
Considering the minority of Rodelia at the time of the commission of the crime,
she was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four months of arresto mayor, plus payment
of fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment.
All the petitioners were ordered to indemnify Corazon in the amount of P10,000.00 as
attorneys fees, and to pay the costs of suit.
Unsatisfied with the MTCs ruling, the petitioners filed a motion for new trial on the
grounds of alleged gross error of law, irregularities during the trial, and new and material
evidence. To prove that they did not intend to exclude Corazon from the estate of the
late Rafael, the petitioners cited their recognition of Corazons right to the estate in the
deed of extra-judicial partition, confirmation of subdivision, deed of exchange, joint
affidavit and petition for guardianship of minors Rafael, Jr., Eulogia, Antonio and
Normita, which they had earlier executed.[7] Again, the petitioners denied having signed
the deed of succession, and instead insisted that their signatures in the deed were
forged.
The motion was denied by the MTC via a resolution[8] dated December 21,
2006, prompting the filing of an appeal with the RTC.
The Ruling of the RTC

On August 10, 2007, the RTC rendered its decision[9] affirming the MTCs decision, with
modification in that the case against Rodelia was dismissed in view of her minority at
the time of the commission of the crime. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the
Municipal Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan dated August 9, 2006
is hereby AFFIRMED, but modified as to accused Rodelia R. Del
Prado as the case against her is hereby DISMISSED on account of
her minority at the time of the commission of the offense.
SO ORDERED.[10]
A motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit by the RTC via its
resolution[11] dated October 31, 2007. Hence, Norma, Eulogia and Normita filed a
petition for review with the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
On September 15, 2008, the CA rendered its decision[12] dismissing the petition and
affirming the RTCs ruling, with modification as to the imposable penalty under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The
appealed Decision dated August 10, 2007 and Order dated October
31, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Pangasinan, in Crim.
Case No. L-8015 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
appellants Norma delos Reyes Vda. Del Prado, Eulogia R. Del Prado
and Normita R. Del Prado are hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of one (1) year and one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[13]
The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the CA in
its resolution[14] dated January 6, 2009. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners appealed
from the decision and resolution of the CA to this Court, through a petition for review on
certiorari[15] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Present Petition
The petitioners present the following assignment of errors to support their

petition:
A.
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY ERRED

IN FINDING THAT COMPLAINANT MA. CORAZON DEL
PRADO-LIM WAS EXCLUDED AS AN HEIR OF THE LATE
RAFAEL DEL PRADO.
B.

IN NOT APPRECIATING THE FACT THAT IN SEVERAL
DOCUMENTS/INSTRUMENTS
EXECUTED
BY
THE
PETITIONERS WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF COMPLAINANT
MS. CORAZON DEL PRADO-LIM, SHE WAS SPECIFICALLY
NAMED
AS
AN
HEIR
WITH
CORRESPONDING
SHARES/INHERITANCE IN THE ESTATE OF THE LATE
RAFAEL DEL PRADO.
C.
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY

ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE GOOD FAITH OF
THE PETITIONERS WHICH NEGATES THE COMMISSION OF
THE OFFENSE OF FALSIFICATION ON THEIR PART.
D.

IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONERS WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL
AND LEGAL BASIS, THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF
THE PETITIONERS NOT HAVING BEEN OVERCOME BY THE
PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE.
E.
WITH DUE RESPECT [THE LOWER COURT ERRED] IN NOT

HOLDING THAT THE CASE IS PURELY CIVIL ONE[,] NOT
CRIMINAL.[16]
To support their assigned errors, the petitioners invoke the existence and
contents of the several documents which they had presented before the MTC, including
the deed of extrajudicial partition of the estate of Rafael Del Prado dated October 29,
1979, confirmation of subdivision, deed of exchange and petition in the guardianship
proceedings for the minor Del Prado children filed by Norma, in which documents they
claim to have indicated and confirmed that Corazon is also an heir of the late Rafael.
Given these documents, the petitioners insist that they cannot be charged with
falsification for having excluded Corazon as an heir of their decedent.
In sum, the issue for this Courts resolution is whether or not the CA erred in
affirming the petitioners conviction for falsification, notwithstanding the said petitioners
defense that they never intended to exclude private complainant Corazon from the
estate of the late Rafael.
This Courts Ruling

The petition is bound to fail.
Only questions of law may be
raised in petitions for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
First, the questions being raised by the petitioners refer to factual matters that
are not proper subjects of a petition for review under Rule 45. Settled is the rule that in a
petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised. It is not this
Courts function to analyze or weigh all over again evidence already considered in the
proceedings below, our jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may
have been committed by the lower court. The resolution of factual issues is the function
of the lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect. A
question of law which we may pass upon must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants.[17] This is clear under
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may
file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari.
The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only
questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner
may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in
the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.
(Emphasis supplied)
The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact is settled.
There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts. Such a question does not involve an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. On the other hand, there
is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged
facts or when the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence,
considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances, their relation to one another and to the whole, and the
probabilities of the situation.[18]
Contrary to these rules, the petitioners ask us to review the lower courts factual finding
on Carmens exclusion in the subject deed of succession, to reconsider its contents and
those of the other documentary evidence which they have submitted with the court a
quo, all of which involve questions of fact rather than questions of law. In their
assignment of errors, petitioners even fully question the factual basis for the courts
finding of their guilt. However, as we have explained in Medina v. Asistio, Jr.:[19]
Petitioners allegation that the Court of Appeals grossly
disregarded their Exhibits A, B, C, D and E, in effect, asks us to reexamine all the [evidence] already presented and evaluated as well
as the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals. Thus, in Sotto v.
Teves (86 SCRA 154 [1978]), [w]e held that the appreciation of
evidence is within the domain of the Court of Appeals because its
findings of fact are not reviewable by this Court (Manlapaz v. CA, 147
SCRA 236 [1987]; Knecht v. CA, 158 SCRA 80 [1988] and a long line
of cases).
It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh such
evidence all over again. Our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors
of law that may have been committed by the lower court. (Nicolas[,] et
al., v. CA, 154 SCRA 635 [1987]; Tiongco v. de la Merced, 58 SCRA
89 [1974]).
There are recognized exceptions to this rule on questions of law as subjects of petitions
for review, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
or conjectures, (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible, (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion, (4) when the judgment is based
on misapprehension of facts, (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting, (6) when in
making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee, (7) when the CAs
findings are contrary to those by the trial court, (8) when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based, (9) when the acts set forth
in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent, (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record, or (11) when the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.[20] After a consideration of the
petitioners arguments, this Court holds that the present appeal does not fall under any
of these exceptions.
There can be no good faith on
the part of the petitioners since
they knew of the untruthful
character
of
statements
contained in their deed of
succession.
Even granting that the present petition may be admitted, we find no cogent
reason to reverse the CA decision appealed from, considering that the elements of the
crime of falsification under Art. 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Art.
172 thereof, were duly proved during the proceedings below. Said elements are as
follows:
(a)
(b)
(c)
The offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a

narration of facts;
The offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
narrated by him; and
The facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false.[21]
These elements are based on the provisions of Art. 172, in relation to Art. 171,
par. 4, of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or
ecclesiastical minister. The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to
exceed P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer,
employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position,
shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
xxx
4. Making untruthful statements in narration of facts;
xxx
Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of
falsified documents. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000 pesos shall
be imposed upon:
1.
2.
Any private individual who shall commit any of the

falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in
any public or official document or letter of exchange or
any other kind of commercial document; and
Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with
the intent to cause such damage, shall in any private
document commit any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in the next preceding article.
xxx
The material document claimed to be falsified in this case is the Deed of

Succession dated July 19, 1991, the presentation of which before the Register of Deeds
and other government agencies allowed the cancellation of OCT No. P-22848, and the
issuance of several new titles in its stead. The first and third elements were committed
by the inclusion in the subject deed of the clause that states, (w)hereas, the parties
hereto are the only heirs of the decedent, the first name, is the surviving spouse and the
rest are the children of the decedent.[22] The untruthfulness of said statement is clear
from the several other documents upon which, ironically, the petitioners anchor their
defense, such as the deed of extrajudicial partition dated October 29, 1979, the parties
confirmation of subdivision, deed of exchange and Normas petition for guardianship of
her then minor children. Specifically mentioned in these documents is the fact that
Corazon is also a daughter, thus an heir, of the late Rafael.
The obligation of the petitioners to speak only the truth in their deed of
succession is clear, taking into account the very nature of the document falsified. The
deed, which was transformed into a public document upon acknowledgement before a
notary public, required only truthful statements from the petitioners. It was a legal
requirement to effect the cancellation of the original certificate of title and the issuance
of new titles by the Register of Deeds. The false statement made in the deed greatly
affected the indefeasibility normally accorded to titles over properties brought under the
coverage of land registration, to the injury of Corazon who was deprived of her right as
a landowner, and the clear prejudice of third persons who would rely on the land titles
issued on the basis of the deed.
We cannot subscribe to the petitioners claim of good faith because several
documents prove that they knew of the untruthful character of their statement in the
deed of succession. The petitioners alleged good faith is disputed by their prior
confirmation and recognition of Corazons right as an heir, because despite knowledge
of said fact, they included in the deed a statement to the contrary. The wrongful intent to
injure Corazon is clear from their execution of the deed, showing a desire to appropriate
only unto themselves the subject parcel of land. Corazon was unduly deprived of what
was due her not only under the provisions of the law on succession, but also under
contracts that she had previously executed with the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is
hereby DENIED. The Decision dated September 15, 2008 and Resolution dated
January 6, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31225 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
GINA A. DOMINGO,
G.R. No. 186101
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 12, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the Decision 26 dated November 24,

2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31158
entitled People of the Philippines v. Gina A. Domingo, which
affirmed the Decision27 dated May 21, 2007 in Criminal Case Nos.
Q-98-75971-87 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 80 in
Quezon
26
27
City.
The
RTC
convicted
petitioner
Gina
Domingo
(petitioner) of 17 counts of Estafa through Falsification of

Commercial Document.
The Facts
Private complainant, Remedios D. Perez (Remedios), is a

businesswoman and a valued depositor of the Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI), Aurora Boulevard branch. Petitioner, on
the other hand, is a dentist who had a clinic in Remedios
compound.
Being the wife of the best friend of Remedios son, petitioner
had a close relationship with Remedios and her family.
On June 15, 1995, Remedios accompanied petitioner to BPI
because the latter wanted to open an account therein. Remedios
then introduced petitioner to the banks staff and officers. Soon
thereafter, petitioner frequented Remedios office and volunteered
to deposit her checks in her bank account at BPI.
Sometime in October 1996, Remedios wanted to buy a car
thinking that she already had a substantial amount in her
account. Thus, she went to BPI to withdraw two hundred thousand
pesos (PhP 200,000). To her surprise, however, she found out that
her money had already been withdrawn. The withdrawals were
effected
through 18 encashment slips bearing her forged
signatures reaching the amount of eight hundred thirty-eight
thousand pesos (PhP 838,000). She denied having affixed her

signatures on the encashment slips used.
Testimonies showed that on several occasions beginning
September 18, 1995 until October 18, 1996, petitioner presented
a number of encashment slips of various amounts to BPI, and by
virtue of which she was able to withdraw huge amounts of money
from the checking account of the complainant. She deposited the
bigger portion of these amounts to her own account and pocketed
some of them, while also paying the rest to Skycable. The
transactions were processed by four tellers of BPI, namely: Regina
Ramos, Mary Antonette Pozon, Sheila Ferranco, and Kim Rillo who
verified the signatures of the complainant on the questioned
encashment slips.
As synthesized by the trial court, the transactions are as
follows:
Date of
encashment
slip
1.
Sept.
1995
8,
Amount
withdraw
n via
encashme
nt slip
Amount
deposite
d to
accuseds
account
Amount
paid to
Skycable
(PS) or
Pocketed
(Po) by the
accused
Name of
Teller who
processed
the
transaction
P10,000.00
P8,000.00
P2,000.00
(Po)
Regina
Ramos
2. Sept.
1995
18,
3.
Feb.
1996
12,
4.
Feb.
1996
15,
5. March
1996
21,
6. April 8, 1996
7. April
1996
10,
8. April
1996
29,
9.
May
1996
13,
10. May
1996
24,
11.
June
1996
12. June
1996
7,
26,
30,000.00
20,000.00
10,000.00
(Po)
30,000.00
28,550.00
1,450.00
(PS)
Shiela
Ferranco
20,000.00
20,000.00
none
Mary
Antonette
Pozon
40,000.00
30,000.00
10,000.00
(Po)
Shiela
Ferranco
40,000.00
35,000.00
5,000.00
(Po)
Regina
Ramos
30,000.00
30,000.00
none
Shiela
Ferranco
40,000.00
34,500.00
5,500.00
(Po)
Regina
Ramos
40,000.00
38,550.00
1,450.00
(PS)
Shiela
Ferranco
50,000.00
50,000.00
none
Mary
Antonette
Pozon
40,000.00
40,000.00
none
Shiela
Ferranco
45,000.00
45,000.00
none
Shiela
Ferranco
13.
July
1996
14. July
1996
5,
25,000.00
none
Mary
Antonette
Pozon
17,
15. Aug.
1996
5,
16. Sept.
1996
17,
17.
Oct.
1996
4,
18. Oct.
1996
25,000.00
18,
40,000.00
40,000.00
none
Mary
Antonette
Pozon
50,000.00
48,550.00
1,450.00
(PS)
Shiela
Ferranco
35,000.00
35,000.00
none
Shiela
Ferranco
40,000.00
40,000.00
none
Kim P. Rillo
40,000.00
40,000.00
none
Kim P. Rillo
After having been apprised of the illegal transactions of

petitioner on complainants account, the latter complained to the
bank for allowing the withdrawal of the money with the use of
falsified encashment slips and demanded that the amount
illegally withdrawn be returned. She was required by BPI to submit
checks bearing her genuine signature for examination by the
Philippine
National
Police
(PNP)
Crime
Laboratory.
After
examination, Josefina dela Cruz of the PNP Crime Laboratory

came up with a finding that complainants signatures on the
questioned encashment slips had been forged. Only then did the
bank agree to pay her the amount of PhP 645,000 representing a
portion of the amount illegally withdrawn with the use of the
forged encashment slips.
In her defense, petitioner testified that she is a dentist,
practicing her profession in her house at No. 21, Alvarez Street,
Cubao, Quezon City. She further stated that she knew Remedios
as the owner of the house that she and her husband were renting
at No. 3 New Jersey Street, New Manila, Quezon City. She declared
that she never used Perez as an alias or nickname and that the
signatures appearing on the questioned encashment slips were
not hers.
Petitioner, however, admitted that she was once a depositor

of BPI Aurora Boulevard branch, having opened an account in said
bank sometime in June 1995. She had been maintaining said
account until she was arrested in 1998. She used to frequent the
bank three times a week or as the need arose for her bank
transactions, for which reason, she and the bank tellers had
become familiar with each other. She knows that, like her,
Remedios was also a depositor of BPI Aurora Boulevard branch,
but there was no occasion that they met each other in the bank.
Remedios and BPI filed a complaint before the prosecutors

office.
The Information in Criminal Case No. Q-98-75971 reads as

follows:
That on or about the 18th day of October 1996, in Quezon

City, Philippines, the above-named accused, a private individual,
by means of false pretenses and/or fraudulent acts executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud and
by means of falsification of commercial document did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Remedios D.
Perez and/or the Bank of the Philippine Islands represented in the
following manner, to wit: said accused falsified or caused to be
falsified an encashment slip of Bank of the Philippine Islands
dated October 18, 1996 for P40,000.00, Philippine Currency, by
then and there filling up said encashment slip and signing the
name of one Remedios D. Perez, a depositor of said bank under
Account No. 3155-0572-61, thereby making it appear, as it did
appear that said encashment slip is genuine in all respect, when
in truth and in fact said accused well knew that Remedios D.
Perez never signed the said encashment slip; that once said
encashment slip was forged and falsified in the manner set forth,
accused pretending to be the said Remedios D. Perez used it to
withdraw the aforesaid sum of P40,000.00 from the latters
account, and once, in possession of the said amount of money
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to her own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the
offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.28
28
The allegations in the Information in Criminal Case Nos. Q-9875972-87 are all substantially the same as those in Criminal Case
No. Q-98-75971, except for the dates of the commission of the
crime or dates of the BPI encashment slips and the amounts
involved, to wit:
Criminal Case No.
Date of the commission of Amount Involved

the crime/encashment slip
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Q-98-75972
Q-98-75973
Q-98-75974
Q-98-75975
Q-98-75976
Q-98-75977
Q-98-75978
Q-98-75979
October 4, 1996
September 4, 1996
August 5, 1996
July 17, 1996
July 5, 1996
June 26, 1996
June 7, 1996
May 24, 1996
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
Q-98-75980
Q-98-75981
Q-98-75982
Q-98-75983
Q-98-75984
Q-98-75985
Q-98-75986
May 13, 1996

April 29, 1996
April 10, 1996
April 8, 1996
March 21, 1996
February 15, 1996
February 12, 1996
16. Q-98-75987
P40,000.00
35,000.00
50,000.00
40,000.00
25,000.00
45,000.00
40,000.00
50,000.00
40,000.00
40,000.00
30,000.00
40,000.00
40,000.00
20,000.00
30,000.00
September 18, 1995 30,000.0029
Upon motion by the prosecution, the 17 cases were

consolidated and tried jointly by the trial court. When arraigned,
petitioner pleaded not guilty to each of the crimes charged in the
17 Informations. Trial on the merits ensued with the prosecution
presenting seven witnesses, namely: Remedios; Arturo Amores,
29
General Manager of BPI, Aurora Blvd. Branch; Regina Ramos, Mary

Antonette Pozon, Sheila Ferranco, and Kim P. Rillo, all bank tellers
of BPI, Aurora Blvd. Branch; and Josefina Dela Cruz, a Document
Examiner III of the PNP Crime Laboratory. On the part of the
defense, it presented petitioner herself and Carmelita Tanajora,
petitioners house helper.
Ruling of the Trial Court
On May 21, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, joint judgment is hereby
rendered finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crimes charged in Criminal [Case] Nos. Q-98-75971; Q-9875972; Q-98-75973; Q-98-75974; Q-98-75975; Q-98-75976; Q98-75977; Q-98-75978; Q-98-75979; Q-98-75980; Q-98-75981;
Q-98-75982; Q-98-75983; Q-98-75984; Q-98-75985; Q-98-75986
and Q-98-75987. Accordingly, and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment, as follows:
1.
In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75971 Two (2) Years, Eleven

(11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision]
correccional to Seven (7) Years and Twenty One (21)
Days of prision mayor;
2.

3.

4.

correccional to Eight (8) Years and Twenty One (21)
5.

6.

correccional to Six (6) Years and Twenty One (21) Days
of prision mayor;
7.

8.

9.

10. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75980 Two (2) Years, Eleven

of prision mayor;

of prision mayor;
of prision mayor;
17. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-7598[7] Two (2) Years,
Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision]
of prision mayor;
Further, the accused is hereby ordered to pay BPI and/or
Remedios Perez the total sum of Six Hundred Thirty Five
Thousand Pesos (P635,000.00), as civil indemnity, plus six
percent (6%) interest per annum from the time of the filing of
these cases, until fully paid.
The bond posted by the accused for her provisional liberty
is hereby canceled.
SO ORDERED.30
Ruling of the Appellate Court

On appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated November 24, 2008,
disposed of the case as follows:
30
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby

DISMISSED and the challenged Joint Decision of the Court a quo
is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.31
The CA held that petitioner was the one who authored the crimes
of which she was convicted reasoning that she was the only
person who stood to be benefited by the falsification of the
document in question; thus, the presumption that she is the
material author of the falsification is present.
Moreover, petitioners theory that the crimes committed were
perpetrated by the bank tellers or is an inside job cannot be
sustained because of the lack of any evidence showing that the
tellers harbored any ill motive against her. The CA emphasized
that the defense of denial, unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving and merits no
weight in law; it cannot be given greater evidentiary value than
the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative
matter.
On March 4, 2009, petitioner filed a timely appeal before this
Court.
The Issues
31
Petitioner interposes in the present appeal the following

assignment of errors:
I
ERROR IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE, DOCUMENTARY
AND TESTIMONIAL, WERE COMMITTED BY THE LOWER COURT IN
THE PROMULGATION AND ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT DECISION;
II
ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW, SUBSTANTIVE AND
PROCEDURAL, WERE COMMITTED IN THE PROMULGATION OF THE
SUBJECT DECISION.
Our Ruling
The appeal has no merit.

Substantially, the issues raised boil down to the question of
whether or not the evidence adduced by the prosecution is
sufficient to establish the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable
doubt.
Elements of Falsification of Commercial Documents are
Present
Petitioner contends that the decision of the lower court is not

supported by the evidence on record and that this evidence
cannot
sustain
in
law
the
requirements
of
proof
beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime for which she was charged.
Specifically, petitioner claims that, as a matter of policy, the
bank
personnel
verified
the
signature
cards
of
private
complainant Remedios before any encashment can be drawn

against the account of Remedios. Thus, petitioner contends that
the signatures in the encashment slips are genuine as found by
the staff and manager of BPI and that the cases filed against her
are the products of inside jobs. Further, she argues that the
results of the examinations conducted by Josefina dela Cruz of the
PNP Crime Laboratory lack evidentiary value, since the report only
stated that the signatures on the Encashment/Withdrawal Slips
were different from the genuine signatures of Remedios based on
the checks, which contained the genuine signatures of Remedios,
but did not state that the signatures belong to petitioner.
The contentions are flawed.
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) punishes any

private individual who commits any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Art. 171 of the Code in any public or official
document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial

document. The acts of falsification enumerated in Art. 171 are:
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary
or ecclesiastic minister. The penalty of prision mayor and a fine
not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public
officer, employee or notary who, taking advantage of his official
position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the
following acts:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature,

or rubric;
Causing it to appear that persons have
participated in any act or proceeding when they
did not in fact participate;
Attributing to persons who have participated in an act
or proceeding statements other than those in fact made
by them;
Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
Altering true dates;
Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine
document which changes its meaning;
Issuing in an authenticated form a document
purporting to be a copy of an original document when
no such original exists, or including in such copy a
statement contrary to, or different from, that of the
genuine original; or
Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the
issuance thereof in a protocol, registry or official book.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Essentially, the elements of the crime of Falsification of

Commercial Document under Art. 172 are: (1) that the offender is
a private individual; (2) that the offender committed any of the
acts of falsification; and (3) that the act of falsification is
committed in a commercial document.
As borne by the records, all the elements of the crime are

present in the instant case. Petitioner is a private individual who
presented to the tellers of BPI 17 forged encashment slips on
different
dates
and
of
various
amounts.
The
questioned
encashment slips were falsified by petitioner by filling out the

same and signing the name of the private complainant, thereby
making it appear that Remedios signed the encashment slips and
that they are genuine in all respects, when in fact petitioner knew
very well that Remedios never signed the subject encashment
slips.
In her testimony, Remedios categorically denied having filled
out and signed any of the subject encashment slips on the dates
indicated on them. Her testimony is further strengthened by the
testimonies of the bank manager and the bank tellers, who
facilitated the banking transactions carried out by petitioner with
their branch. Their testimonies were coherent and consistent in
narrating that it was indeed petitioner who presented the
encashment slips, received the proceeds of the transactions,
and/or caused the transfer of the money to her own bank account.
Moreover, the testimony of Josefina dela Cruz (dela Cruz)
bolsters the findings of the trial court that the alleged signatures
of Remedios in the encashment slips are forged, to wit:
Q:
Using the method you employed in the examination of

questioned and standard signatures of Remedios Perez, will
you please elaborate the study you made?
A:
After conducting the examination, I reduced

examination to writing and my findings are as follows:
my
Scientific comparative examination and analysis of the

questioned documents and the submitted standard
signature reveals significant divergences in handwriting
movement, stroke structure and other individual
handwriting characteristics.
Q:
You mentioned divergences in handwriting movement, will

you please point to this Honorable Court this significant
divergences of differences in the strokes of handwriting?
A:
First of all the manner of execution. The manner of

execution is slow while in the execution of the standard, it
is moderate. The line quality in the questioned signature,
there is presence of tremors in the strokes while in the
standard signatures, all the strokes are smooth. In the
capital R in the questioned signature, there is presence of
re-trace strokes while in the standard signature, there is no
re-trace strokes. In the downward portion of the letter R in
the questioned signature, the direction is downward while
in the standard it is horizontal. Now the angular strokes
following the capital R is traced in the middle part of the
letter R, the downward portion while in the standard, it is
found in the last stroke of capital R. In the middle name
letter D, the shape is more rounded on the questioned
signature but in the standard it is more elongated. In the
loop of the family name, it is more rounded in questioned
signature[;] while in the standard, it is more elongated.
With that, I was able to conclude that the questioned
signatures Remedios D. Perez marked Q-1 to Q-36 standard
signatures of Remedios Perez marked S-1 to S-27 inclusive
were not written by one and the same person.32
Typically, such inconspicuous divergences noted by dela Cruz

on the questioned signatures could not be easily detected by
untrained eyes or by one who had no formal training in
handwriting examination; thus, resort to the opinion of an expert
32
is imperative. This explains why the bank tellers who processed

the illegal transactions entered into by the petitioner on the
account of Remedios failed to notice the forgery or falsification.
As a result, they allowed the encashment by petitioner. The
training or skill, if any, of the tellers in detecting forgeries is
usually minimal or inadequate and their opinion is generally
unreliable. It was, therefore, prudent on the part of the bank to
seek the opinion of an expert to determine the genuineness of the
signatures in the encashment slips.
As found by the trial court, the totality of the testimonies of
Remedios, dela Cruz, the handwriting expert, and the bank tellers
bears the earmarks of truth that the questioned encashment slips
had been falsified by petitioner and that they were presented to
the bank in order to defraud the bank or holder of the account.
Additionally, the Court has held that in gauging the relative
weight to be given to the opinion of handwriting experts, the
following standards are adhered to:
We have held that the value of the opinion of a handwriting
expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether a
writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford
in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and
discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of
writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an
unpracticed observer. The test of genuineness ought to be the
resemblance, not the formation of letters in some other
specimens but to the general character of writing, which is
impressed on it as the involuntary and unconscious result of
constitution, habit or other permanent course, and is, therefore

itself permanent.33
Moreover, it cannot be said that since none of the

prosecution witnesses saw the falsification actually done by
petitioner, she cannot be held liable. The bank tellers who
processed the illegal transactions of petitioner involving the
account of Remedios were consistent in their testimonies that it
was petitioner herself who presented the encashment slips and
received the proceeds of the slips. In such a situation, the
applicable rule is that if a person has in his possession a falsified
document and he made use of it, taking advantage of it and
profiting from it, the presumption is that he is the material author
of the falsification.34 In the instant case, petitioner has failed to
overthrow the presumption.
Furthermore,
questioned
contrary
encashment
to
slips
petitioners
are
assertions,
commercial
the
documents.
Commercial documents are, in general, documents or instruments

which are used by merchants or businessmen to promote or
facilitate trade.35 An encashment slip necessarily facilitates bank
transactions for it allows the person whose name and signature
33
34
35
appears thereon to encash a check and withdraw the amount

indicated therein.
Even more, petitioner would have this Court believe that the
crime of falsification of a commercial document did not exist
because Remedios and BPI did not suffer any damage. Such
argument is specious. It has been ruled that damage or intent to
cause damage is not an element in falsification of a commercial
document, because what the law seeks to repress is the prejudice
to the public confidence in such documents. 36
Therefore, the acts of petitioner clearly satisfy all the

essential elements of the crime of Falsification of Commercial
Document.
Crime of Falsification was a Necessary Means to Commit
Estafa
It has been held that whenever a person carries out on a
public,
official,
or
commercial
document
any
of
the
acts
enumerated in Art. 171 of the RPC as a necessary means to
36
perpetrate another crime, such as estafa or malversation, a

complex crime is formed by the two crimes.37
Under Art. 48 of the RPC, a complex crime refers to: (1) the
commission of at least two grave or less grave felonies that must
both (or all) be the result of a single act; or (2) one offense must
be a necessary means for committing the other (or others).
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document
may be a means of committing estafa, because before the
falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the
crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or
intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of
falsification of public, official, or commercial document. In other
words, the crime of falsification has already existed. Actually
utilizing that falsified public, official, or commercial document to
defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the
commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document.
Therefore, the falsification of the public, official, or commercial
document is only a necessary means to commit estafa. 38
37
38
In general, the elements of estafa are: (1) that the accused

defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence or (b) by means of
deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. Deceit
is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words
or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment
of that which should have been disclosed; and which deceives or
is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it, to his
legal injury.
In the case before us, all the elements of estafa are present.
Once petitioner acquired the possession of the amounts she
encashed by means of deceit, she misappropriated, misapplied,
and converted the same to her own personal use and benefit, to
the damage and prejudice of the private complainant and BPI.
Without a doubt, the falsification of the encashment slips
was necessary means to commit estafa. At that time, the offense
of falsification is already considered consummated even before
the falsified document is used to defraud another.
Therefore, the trial court aptly convicted petitioner for the
complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial
Document.
Defense of Denial Is Untenable
It is a hornbook doctrine that the defense of denial,

unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative
and self-serving, and merits no weight in law and cannot be given
greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses
who testified on affirmative matters.39
In the instant case, petitioners defense of denial crumbles in

the face of the positive identification made by the prosecution
witnesses during trial. As enunciated by this Court, [p]ositive
identification where categorical and consistent and not attended
by any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses on
the matter prevails over alibi and denial. 40 The defense has
miserably failed to show any evidence of ill motive on the part of
the prosecution witnesses as to falsely testify against her.
Thus, between the categorical statements of the prosecution
witnesses, on the one hand, and bare denials of the accused, on
the other hand, the former must, perforce, prevail. 41
39
40
41
We accord the trial courts findings the probative weight it

deserves in the absence of any compelling reason to discredit its
findings. It is a fundamental judicial dictum that the findings of
fact of the trial court are not disturbed on appeal, except when it
overlooked,
misunderstood,
circumstances
of
weight
or
and
misapplied
substance
some
that
facts
would
or
have
materially affected the outcome of the case. We find that the trial
court did not err in convicting petitioner of the crime of Estafa
through Falsification of Commercial Document.
WHEREFORE,
the
appeal
is
DENIED
for
failure
to
sufficiently show reversible error in the assailed decision. The
Decision dated November 24, 2008 of the CA in CA-G.R. CR No.

31158 is AFFIRMED.
No costs.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 164443
June 18, 2010
ERIBERTO S. MASANGKAY, Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Every criminal conviction must draw its strength from the prosecutions evidence. The
evidence must be such that the constitutional presumption of innocence is overthrown
and guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecutorial burden is not met
when the circumstances can yield to different inferences. Such equivocation betrays a
lack of moral certainty to support a judgment of conviction.
This Petition for Review1 assails the March 16, 2004 Decision2 and the July 9, 2004
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25775. The dispositive
portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that Eriberto Masangkay is instead meted the penalty of
imprisonment for a term of Six (6) months and One (1) day of prision correccional
minimum.
SO ORDERED.4
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Eriberto Masangkay (Eriberto), his common-law wife Magdalena Ricaros
(Magdalena), Cesar Masangkay (Cesar) and his wife Elizabeth Masangkay (Elizabeth),
and Eric Dullano were the incorporators and directors of Megatel Factors, Inc. (MFI)
which was incorporated in June 1990.5
On December 29, 1993 Eriberto filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) a Petition for the Involuntary Dissolution 6 of MFI for violation of Section 6 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 902-A. The named respondents were MFI, Cesar and
Elizabeth.7 The said petition was made under oath before a notary public, and alleged
among others:
3. At or around September 1, 1993, respondent Elizabeth A. Masangkay prepared or
caused to be prepared a Secretarys Certificate which states:
That at a special meeting of the Board of Directors of the said corporation held at its
principal office on December 5, 1992, the following resolution by unanimous votes of the
directors present at said meeting and constituting a quorum was approved and adopted:
RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved that Lot No. 2069-A-2 situated at Bo. Canlalay,
Bian, Laguna containing an area of 3,014 square meters covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-210746 be exchanged with 3,700 shares of stock of the
corporation worth or valued at P370,000.00 by way of a "Deed of Exchange with
Cancellation of Usufruct".
xxxx
4. Said secretarys certificate is absolutely fictitious and simulated because the alleged
meeting of the Board of Directors held on December 5, 1992 did not actually
materialize.
xxxx
5. Using the said falsified and spurious document, x x x respondents executed another
fictitious document known as the "Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct".
The contract purporting to be a transfer of 3,700 shares of stock of MFI in return for a
piece of a land (Lot No. 2064-A-2) located at Canlalay, Bian, Laguna and owned by
minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay is void.
Article 1409 of the New Civil Code states:
"Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning.
xxxx
(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;
(3) Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the transaction;
xxxx
These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of
illegality be waived."
The aforementioned contract is indeed simulated and fictitious because they defrauded
minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay and deprived him of his own property without
any consideration at all.
Records of the MFI revealed that minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay [or] his
alleged guardian Magdalena S. Ricaros never became a stockholder at any point in
time of MFI.
x x x x8
The case remains pending to date.9
Claiming that Eriberto lied under oath when he said that there was no meeting of the
Board held on December 5, 1992 and that the Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of
Usufruct is a fictitious instrument, the respondent in the SEC case, Cesar, filed a
complaint for perjury10 against Eriberto before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Rizal.
Eriberto raised the defense of primary jurisdiction. He argued that what is involved is
primarily an intra-corporate controversy; hence, jurisdiction lies with the SEC pursuant
to Section 6 of PD 902-A, as amended by PD No. 1758. He also insisted that there was
a prejudicial question because the truth of the allegations contained in his petition for
involuntary dissolution has yet to be determined by the SEC. These defenses were
sustained by the assistant provincial prosecutor and the complaint for perjury was
dismissed for lack of merit.11
It was however reinstated upon petition for review 12 before the Department of Justice. 13
Chief State Prosecutor Zenon L. De Guia held that the petition for involuntary
dissolution is an administrative case only and thus cannot possibly constitute a
prejudicial question to the criminal case. He also rejected the claim that the SEC has
exclusive authority over the case. The Chief State Prosecutor explained that the
prosecution and enforcement department of the SEC has jurisdiction only over criminal
and civil cases involving a violation of a law, rule, or regulation that is administered and
enforced by the SEC. Perjury, penalized under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), is not within the SECs authority.14 Thus, he ordered the conduct of a preliminary
investigation, which eventually resulted in the filing of the following information:
That sometime in the month of December 1992, 15 in the City of Mandaluyong,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of perjury
in his Petition for Involuntary Dissolution of Megatel Factors, Inc. based on violation of
Section 6 of Presidential Decree 902-A against Megatel Factors, Inc., Cesar

Masangkay, Jr. and Elizabeth Masangkay which he made under oath before a notary
authorized to receive and administer oath and filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, wherein he made willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood on a
material matter when he declared the following, to wit: a) the secretary certificate dated
September 1, 1993, proposed by Elizabeth Masangkay is fictitious and simulated
because the alleged December 5, 1992, meeting never took place; and, b) the Deed of
Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct is a fictitious document, whereby the
respondents defrauded the minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay, by exchanging the
childs 3,014 square meters lot with 3, 700 shares of stock of the corporation, when in
fact no consideration for the transfer was made as Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay or his
guardian Magdalena Ricaros has never been a stockholder of the Corporation at any
point in time, when in truth and in fact the accused well knew that the same statements
he made in his petition and which he reaffirmed and made use as part of his evidence in
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are false. 16
The information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 56495 and raffled to the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 59.
Eriberto filed a motion to quash, 17 insisting that it is the SEC which has primary
jurisdiction over the case. He also argued that the truth of the allegations contained in
the information is still pending resolution in SEC Case No. 12-93-4650, thereby
constituting a prejudicial question to the perjury case.
The MeTC denied the motion to quash for lack of merit. 18 It held that the fact that the
parties to the criminal case are mostly stockholders of the same corporation does not
automatically make the case an intra-corporate dispute that is within the SEC
jurisdiction. It likewise held that the fact that the parties are stockholders is merely
incidental and that the subject of the case is a criminal act and hence within the general
jurisdiction of the MeTC. As regards the issue of prejudicial question, the MeTC ruled
that the petition before the SEC has nothing to do with the criminal case. The truth of
the statements for which he is being indicted is a matter of defense which the defendant
may raise in the criminal case.
Eriberto filed a petition for certiorari before Branch 158 of the Pasig City Regional Trial
Court (RTC) to assail the denial of his motion to quash. The denial was affirmed. 19 He
then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which was denied for being a wrong
mode of appeal.20
Failing to suspend the criminal proceedings, Eriberto entered a plea of not guilty during
arraignment.21 He then waived the conduct of a pre-trial conference. 22
During trial, the prosecution presented the private complainant Cesar as its sole
witness.23 He testified that on December 5, 1992, a meeting of the Board of Directors
was held at 9:00 oclock in the morning at the office of MFI in Canlalay, Bian, Laguna.
He presented the minutes of the alleged meeting and reiterated the details contained
therein indicating that the Board unanimously approved Magdalenas proposal to

exchange her sons (Gilberto Masangkay [Gilberto]) property with MFI shares of stock. 24
The prosecution established that one of the signatures appearing in the minutes
belongs to Eriberto.25 This allegedly belies Eribertos statement that the December 5,
1992 meeting "did not actually materialize," and shows that he knew his statement to be
false because he had attended the meeting and signed the minutes thereof. The
prosecution also pointed out that in the proceedings before the guardianship court to
obtain approval for the exchange of properties, Eriberto had testified in support of the
exchange.26 The guardianship court subsequently approved the proposed transaction. 27
The resulting Deed of Exchange contained Eribertos signature as first party.28
As for Eribertos statement that the Deed of Exchange was simulated, the prosecution
disputed this by again using the minutes of the December 5, 1992 meeting, which states
that the property of Gilberto will be exchanged for 3,700 MFI shares.
For his defense, Eriberto asserted that the December 5, 1992 meeting did not actually
take place. While he admitted signing, reading and understanding the minutes of the
alleged meeting, he explained that the minutes were only brought by Cesar and
Elizabeth to his house for signing, but there was no actual meeting. 29
To support the claim that no meeting took place in 1992, the defense presented
Elizabeth, the MFI corporate secretary, who could not remember with certainty if she
had sent out any notice for the December 5, 1992 meeting and could not produce any
copy thereof.
The defense also presented a notice of meeting dated October 19, 1993, which called
for the MFI boards initial meeting "since its business operations started," to be held on
November 9, 1993. Emphasizing the words "initial meeting," Eriberto argued that this
proves that prior to November 9, 1993, no meeting (including the December 5, 1992
meeting) had ever taken place.
As for the charge that he perjured himself when he stated that the Deed of Exchange
was fictitious and simulated for lack of consideration, Eriberto explained that MFI never
issued stock certificates in favor of his son Gilberto. Corporate secretary Elizabeth
corroborated this statement and admitted that stock certificates were never issued to
Gilberto or any of the stockholders.30
While he admitted supporting the proposed exchange and seeking its approval by the
guardianship court, Eriberto maintained that he did so because he was convinced by
private complainant Cesar that the exchange would benefit his son Gilberto. He
however reiterated that, to date, Gilberto is not a stockholder of MFI, thus has not
received any consideration for the exchange.
On rebuttal, the prosecution refuted Eribertos claim that the board had its first actual
meeting only on November 9, 1993. It explained that the November 9, 1993 meeting
was the initial meeting "since business operations began", because MFI obtained permit
to conduct business only in 1993. But the November 9, 1993 meeting was not the first
meeting ever held by the board of directors. The prosecution presented the secretarys
certificates of board meetings held on April 6, 1992 31 and September 5, 199232 -- both
before November 9, 1993 and both signed by Eriberto. 33 At this time, business
operations have not yet begun because the companys hotel building was still under
construction. The said secretarys certificates in fact show that MFI was still sourcing
additional funds for the construction of its hotel. 34
Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court
On October 18, 2000, the MeTC rendered a judgment 35 holding that the prosecution
was able to prove that the December 5, 1992 meeting actually took place and that
petitioner attended the same as evidenced by his signature in the minutes thereof. As
for Eribertos statement that the Deed of Exchange was "fictitious," the MeTC held that
his participation in the approval and execution of the document, as well as his avowals
before the guardianship court regarding the proposed exchange all militate against his
previous statement. Petitioner was thus found guilty as charged and sentenced to
imprisonment of two months of arresto mayor minimum and medium, as minimum, to
one year and one day of arresto mayor maximum and prison correccional minimum, as
maximum.36
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Eriberto appealed37 his conviction to the RTC of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213, which
eventually affirmed the appealed judgment.38 The fallo of the Decision states that:
WHEREFORE, the decision of October 18, 2000 by Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 59,
Mandaluyong City, convicting the accused-appellant Eriberto S. Masangkay of the crime
of perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.39
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the appealed ruling of the trial courts, holding that the prosecution was
able to prove that the falsehoods in the petition for involuntary dissolution were
deliberately made. It explained that Eribertos signatures on the two allegedly fictitious
documents show that he participated in the execution of the Deed of Exchange and was
present in the December 5, 1992 meeting. Having participated in these two matters,
Eriberto knew that these were not simulated and fictitious, as he claimed in his verified
petition for involuntary dissolution of MFI. Thus, he deliberately lied in his petition. 40
The CA rejected petitioners argument that the two statements were not material. It ruled
that they were material because petitioner even cited them as principal basis for his
petition for involuntary dissolution.41
The appellate court found no merit in the issue of prejudicial question. It held that the
result of the petition for involuntary dissolution will not be determinative of the criminal
case, which can be resolved independently.42
The CA however, corrected the imposed penalty on the ground that the trial court was
imprecise in its application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The CA meted the
penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months and one day of prision correccional
minimum.43
Petitioner moved for reconsideration44 which was denied.45
Hence, this petition.46
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for review:
I
Whether there was deliberate assertion of falsehood
II
Whether the TRUTHFUL allegation in the petition for involuntary dissolution that there
was no meeting is material to the petition
III
Whether perjury could prosper while the main case remains pending 47
Since this is a case involving a conviction in a criminal case, the issues boil down to
whether the prosecution was able to prove the accuseds guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Our Ruling
We rule that the prosecution failed to prove the crime of perjury beyond reasonable
doubt.
Article 183 of the RPC provides:
False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. The penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall
be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not
being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles shall testify under oath, or
make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to
administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.

Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit
any of the falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section,
shall suffer the respective penalties provided therein.
For perjury to exist, (1) there must be a sworn statement that is required by law; (2) it
must be made under oath before a competent officer; (3) the statement contains a
deliberate assertion of falsehood; and (4) the false declaration is with regard to a
material matter.48
The presence of the first two elements is not disputed by the petitioner and they are
indeed present in the instant case. The sworn statements which contained the alleged
falsehoods in this case were submitted in support of the petition for involuntary
dissolution, as required by Sections 105 and 121 of the Corporation Code.1avvphi1
The petition was also verified by the petitioner before a notary public 49an officer duly
authorized by law to administer oaths. This verification was done in compliance with
Section 121 of the Corporation Code. 50
It is the elements of deliberate falsehood and materiality of the false statements to the
petition for involuntary dissolution which are contested.
On the element of materiality, a material matter is the main fact which is the subject of
the inquiry or any fact or circumstance which tends to prove that fact, or any fact or
circumstance which tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony relative to the
subject of inquiry, or which legitimately affects the credit of any witness who testifies. 51
Petitioner filed a petition for involuntary dissolution of MFI based on Section 105 of the
Corporate Code, which states:
Section 105. Withdrawal of stockholder or dissolution of corporation. In addition and
without prejudice to the other rights and remedies available to a stockholder under this
Title, any stockholder of a close corporation may, for any reason, compel the said
corporation to purchase his shares at their fair value, which shall not be less than their
par or issued value, when the corporation has sufficient assets in his books to cover its
debts and liabilities exclusive of capital stock: Provided, That any stockholder of a close
corporation may, by written petition to the Securities and Exchange Commission,
compel the dissolution of such corporation whenever any of the acts of the directors,
officers or those in control of the corporation is illegal, or fraudulent, or dishonest, or
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to the corporation or any stockholder, or whenever
corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted.
He stated in his petition for involuntary dissolution that:
xxxx
4. Said secretarys certificate is absolutely fictitious and simulated, because the alleged
meeting of the Board of Directors held on December 5, 1992 did not actually
materialize.
xxxx
5. Using the said falsified and spurious document, x x x respondents executed another
fictitious document known as the Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct.
xxxx
xxxx
8. The foregoing acts and deeds of the respondents, done in evident bad faith and in
conspiracy with one another, are seriously fraudulent and illegal because they constitute
estafa through falsification of documents, punishable under Articles 315 and 171 of the
Revised Penal Code.
9. Likewise, said acts and deeds are feloniously prejudicial to the stockholders of MFI,
including petitioner, as corporate assets are being misapplied and wasted.
10. MFI should therefore be ordered dissolved after appropriate proceedings before this
Honorable Commission, in accordance with Sections 105 and 121 of the New
Corporation Code x x x.52
The statements for which the petitioner is tried for perjury are the very grounds he relied
upon in his petition for corporate dissolution. They refer to acts of the MFI directors
which are allegedly fraudulent, illegal and prejudicial, and which would allegedly justify
corporate dissolution under Section 105 of the Corporation Code. Evidently, these
statements are material to his petition for involuntary dissolution. The element of
materiality is therefore present.
The prosecution, however, failed to prove the element of deliberate falsehood.
The prosecution has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt the falsehood of
petitioners statement that the December 5, 1992 meeting "did not actually materialize."
In other words, the prosecution has to establish that the said meeting in fact took place,
i.e., that the directors were actually and physically present in one place at the same time
and conferred with each other.
To discharge this burden, the prosecution relied mainly on the minutes of the alleged
December 5, 1992 meeting, signed by the accused, which are inconsistent with his
statement that the December 5, 1992 meeting did not actually materialize. According to
the minutes, a meeting actually took place. On the other hand, according to the
petitioners statement in the petition for dissolution, the meeting did not actually
materialize or take place. The two statements are obviously contradictory or
inconsistent with each other. But the mere contradiction or inconsistency between the
two statements merely means that one of them is false. It cannot tell us which of the two
statements is actually false. The minutes could be true and the sworn statement false.
But it is equally possible that the minutes are false and the sworn statement is true, as
explained by the petitioner who testified that the minutes were simply brought to his
house for signature, but no meeting actually transpired. Given the alternative
possibilities, it is the prosecutions burden to affirmatively prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the first statement (the minutes) is the true one, while the other statement (in
the petition for dissolution) is the false one.
We have held before that a conviction for perjury cannot be obtained by the prosecution
by merely showing the inconsistent or contradictory statements of the accused, even if
both statements are sworn. The prosecution must additionally prove which of the two
statements is false and must show the statement to be false by evidence other than the
contradictory statement.53 The rationale for requiring evidence other than a contradictory
statement is explained thus:
x x x Proof that accused has given contradictory testimony under oath at a different time
will not be sufficient to establish the falsity of his testimony charged as perjury, for this
would leave simply one oath of the defendant as against another, and it would not
appear that the testimony charged was false rather than the testimony contradictory
thereof. The two statements will simply neutralize each other; there must be some
corroboration of the contradictory testimony. Such corroboration, however, may be
furnished by evidence aliunde tending to show perjury independently of the declarations
of testimony of the accused.54
In this case, however, the prosecution was unable to prove, by convincing evidence
other than the minutes, that the December 5, 1992 meeting actually took place. It
merely presented, aside from the minutes, the testimony of private complainant Cesar,
who is a respondent in the corporate dissolution case filed by the petitioner and is
therefore not a neutral or disinterested witness. 55 The prosecution did not present the
testimony of the other directors or participants in the alleged meeting who could have
testified that the meeting actually occurred. Neither did the prosecution offer any
explanation why such testimony was not presented. It likewise failed to present any
evidence that might circumstantially prove that on December 5, 1992, the directors were
physically gathered at a single place, and there conferred with each other and came up
with certain resolutions. Notably, the prosecution failed to present the notice for the
alleged meeting. The corporate secretary, Elizabeth, who was presented by the
petitioner, could not even remember whether she had sent out a prior notice to the
directors for the alleged December 5, 1992 meeting. The lack of certainty as to the
sending of a notice raises serious doubt as to whether a meeting actually took place, for
how could the directors have been gathered for a meeting if they had not been clearly
notified that such a meeting would be taking place?

The insufficiency of the prosecutions evidence is particularly glaring considering that
the petitioner had already explained the presence of his signature in the minutes of the
meeting. He testified that while the meeting did not actually take place, the minutes
were brought to his house for his signature. He affixed his signature thereto because he
believed that the proposed exchange of the assets, which was the subject of the
minutes, would be beneficial to his child, Gilberto. Acting on this belief, he also
supported the approval of the exchange by the guardianship court.
Under these circumstances, we cannot say with moral certainty that the prosecution
was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the December 5, 1992 meeting
actually took place and that the petitioners statement denying the same was a
deliberate falsehood.
The second statement in the petition for involuntary dissolution claimed to be perjurious
reads:
5. Using the said falsified and spurious document, respondents executed another
fictitious document known as the Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct.
The contract purporting to be a transfer of 3,700 shares of stock of MFI in return for a
piece of land (Lot No. 2064-A-2) located at Canlalay, Bian, Laguna and owned by
minor child Gilberto Masangkay is void.
Article 1409 of the New Civil Code states:
Article 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:
xxxx
(2) those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;
(3) those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the transaction;
xxxx
These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of
illegality be waived.
Records of the MFI revealed that minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay [or] his
alleged guardian Magdalena S. Ricaros never became a stockholder at any point in
time of MFI.
In short, the petitioner is being charged with deliberate falsehood for his statement that
the deed of exchange is fictitious. To support the accusation, the prosecution proved
that petitioner assented to the said Deed of Exchange by virtue of his signatures in the
minutes of the alleged December 5, 1992 meeting and on the instrument itself, and his
participation in procuring the guardianship courts approval of the transaction. These
allegedly show that the exchange was not fictitious and that Eriberto knew it.
We cannot agree with this line of reasoning. Petitioners imputation of fictitiousness to
the Deed of Exchange should not be taken out of context. He explained in paragraph 5
of his petition for involuntary dissolution that the Deed of Exchange is simulated and
fictitious pursuant to Article 1409 of the Civil Code, because it deprived Gilberto
Masangkay of his property without any consideration at all. To justify his allegation that
Gilberto did not receive anything for the exchange, he stated in the same paragraph that
Gilberto never became a stockholder of MFI (MFI stocks were supposed to be the
consideration for Gilbertos land). This fact was subsequently proven by the petitioner
through the corporate secretary Elizabeth, who admitted that MFI never issued stocks in
favor of the stockholders. This testimony was never explained or rebutted by the
prosecution. Thus, petitioners statement that the exchange was "simulated and
fictitious x x x because they x x x deprived [Gilberto] of his own property without any
consideration at all" cannot be considered a deliberate falsehood. It is simply his
characterization of the transaction, based on the fact that Gilberto did not receive
consideration for the exchange of his land.
As importantly, petitioners statements in paragraph 5 of the petition for involuntary
dissolution about the nature of the Deed of Exchange are conclusions of law, and not
factual statements which are susceptible of truth or falsity. They are his opinion
regarding the legal character of the Deed of Exchange. He opined that the Deed of
Exchange was fictitious or simulated under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, because MFI
supposedly did not perform its reciprocal obligation to issue stocks to Gilberto in
exchange for his land. His opinion or legal conclusion may have been wrong (as failure
of consideration does not make a contract simulated or fictitious), 56 but it is an opinion or
legal conclusion nevertheless. An opinion or a judgment cannot be taken as an
intentional false statement of facts.57
We recognize that perjury strikes at the very administration of the laws; that it is the
policy of the law that judicial proceedings and judgments shall be fair and free from
fraud; that litigants and parties be encouraged to tell the truth, and that they be
punished if they do not. 58 However, it is also at the heart of every criminal proceeding
that every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Given the foregoing findings, there is no more need to discuss the issue involving the
propriety of proceeding with the perjury case while the civil case for corporate
dissolution is pending.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed March 16, 2004 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. GR No. 25775 and its July 9, 2004 Resolution, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Eriberto S. Masangkay is ACQUITTED of the
charge of perjury on the ground of REASONABLE DOUBT.
SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

posters-superiorly hitting the liver.

MARK CLEMENTE y MARTINEZ

G.R. No. 194367

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997

Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter

[Their testimonies established the following:]

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the above ruling, but the CA denied

The petition is meritorious.

petitioner's denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed by

ROSALIO S. GALEOS, Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Cebu City, dated June 1, 1994, a requirement in the approval of an appointment,

1) . . . IT HELD THAT THE SUBJECT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE CONTAINED

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other

A conclusion of law is a determination by a judge or ruling authority regarding the law

disqualification to hold public office. Such violation if proven in a proper administrative

G.R. No. 186030

March 21, 2012

the Resolution[2] dated January 6, 2009 denying the motion for

executed with Norma.

The Ruling of the RTC

The petitioners present the following assignment of errors to support their

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY ERRED

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY ERRED

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY ERRED

WITH DUE RESPECT [THE LOWER COURT ERRED] IN NOT

This Courts Ruling

The offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a

Any private individual who shall commit any of the

The material document claimed to be falsified in this case is the Deed of

G.R. No. 186101

October 12, 2009

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision 26 dated November 24,

(petitioner) of 17 counts of Estafa through Falsification of

Private complainant, Remedios D. Perez (Remedios), is a

through 18 encashment slips bearing her forged

signatures reaching the amount of eight hundred thirty-eight

thousand pesos (PhP 838,000). She denied having affixed her

After having been apprised of the illegal transactions of

examination, Josefina dela Cruz of the PNP Crime Laboratory

Petitioner, however, admitted that she was once a depositor

Remedios and BPI filed a complaint before the prosecutors

The Information in Criminal Case No. Q-98-75971 reads as

That on or about the 18th day of October 1996, in Quezon

Date of the commission of Amount Involved

May 13, 1996

September 18, 1995 30,000.0029

Upon motion by the prosecution, the 17 cases were

General Manager of BPI, Aurora Blvd. Branch; Regina Ramos, Mary

In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75971 Two (2) Years, Eleven

In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75972 Two (2) Years, Eleven

In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75973 Two (2) Years, Eleven

In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75974 Two (2) Years, Eleven

In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75975 Two (2) Years, Eleven

In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75976 Two (2) Years, Eleven

In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75977 Two (2) Years, Eleven

In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75978 Two (2) Years, Eleven

In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75979 Two (2) Years, Eleven

10. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75980 Two (2) Years, Eleven

correccional to Seven (7) Years and Twenty One (21)