NCHRP w100 PDF

NCHRP
Web-Only Document 100:
Examples of Best Practices for

Communicating the Economic
Benefits of Transportation
ICF Consulting
Fairfax, VA
Under Subcontract to
Hagler Bailly Services
(now PA Consulting)
Contractors Final Report for NCHRP Project 2-22(2)

Submitted February 2001
National Cooperative Highway Research Program
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was sponsored by the American Association of State
Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO), in cooperation with
the Federal Highway Administration, and was conducted in the
National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP), which is
administered by the Transportation Research Board (TRB) of the
National Academies.
COPYRIGHT PERMISSION
Authors herein are responsible for the authenticity of their materials
and for obtaining written permissions from publishers or persons who
own the copyright to any previously published or copyrighted material
used herein.
Cooperative Research Programs (CRP) grants permission to
reproduce material in this publication for classroom and not-for-profit
purposes. Permission is given with the understanding that none of the
material will be used to imply TRB, AASHTO, FAA, FHWA,
FMCSA, FTA, Transit Development Corporation, or AOC
endorsement of a particular product, method, or practice. It is expected
that those reproducing the material in this document for educational
and not-for-profit uses will give appropriate acknowledgment of the
source of any reprinted or reproduced material. For other uses of the
material, request permission from CRP.
DISCLAIMER
The opinion and conclusions expressed or implied in the report are
those of the research agency. They are not necessarily those of the
TRB, the National Research Council, AASHTO, or the U.S.
Government.
This report has not been edited by TRB.
NCHRP 2-22(2): Final Report
ICF Consulting, Inc.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: Research Methods
Chapter 3: Case Studies
12
Chapter 4: Findings
35
Chapter 5: Information on Other Campaigns
59
Appendix A: References
75
Appendix B: Findings from NCHRP 2-22
78
Best Practices Digest
AUTHOR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This research report was performed under NCHRP 2-22(2) by staff from ICF Consulting under
subcontract to Hagler Bailly Services (now PA Consulting). Mr. Sergio Ostria served as the
Principal Investigator. He was supported by Mr. Eric Beshers, Mr. Michael Grant, and Mr.
Thomas Walsh. Ms. Marcia Pincus (previously with Hagler Bailly Services) was involved in the
earlier stages of the work and was a major contributor to the Interim Report.
ABSTRACT
The objective of NCHRP 2-22 (Communicating the Economic Impacts of Transportation
Investments: Guidance for Transportation Planners and Policy Makers) was to use market
research to develop guidance for state DOTs, MPOs, and other transportation agencies to help
them communicate effectively transportations importance to the economy. But NCHRP 2-22 did
not employ detailed studies of actual efforts in the field to win over voters in the face of
opposition or to influence officials with arguments based on the economic benefits of
transportation. Accordingly, NCHRP 2-22(2), Examples of Best Practices for Communicating
the Economic Benefits of Transportation Projects, was commissioned to develop information on
strategies and techniques that have been employed in the field, the circumstances under which
they were used, and why they were, or were not, successful.
The end product of NCHRP 2-22(2) is a Best Practices Digest (published as a separate section,
but also replicated in this Final Report as Chapter 4). This Digest is based on information
developed in four detailed case studies of campaigns to win voter approval of significant
transportation projects and, in three cases, the tax increases necessary to pay for them. In all
cases there was opposition or potential opposition and success at the polls could not be taken for
granted. The intent is for the Digest to serve as a companion publication to the NCHRP Project
2-22 Report.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
BACKGROUND
The objective of NCHRP 2-22 (Communicating the Economic Impacts of Transportation
Investments: Guidance for Transportation Planners and Policy Makers) was to use market
research to develop guidance for state DOTs, MPOs, and other transportation agencies to help
them communicate effectively transportations importance to the economy. But NCHRP 2-22 did
not employ detailed studies of actual efforts in the field to win over voters in the face of
opposition or to influence officials with arguments based on the economic benefits of
transportation. Accordingly, NCHRP 2-22(2), Examples of Best Practices for Communicating
the Economic Benefits of Transportation Projects, was commissioned to develop information on
strategies and techniques that have been employed in the field, the circumstances under which
they were used, and why they were, or were not, successful.
METHOD
The end product of NCHRP 2-22(2) is a Best Practices Digest. This Digest is based on
information developed in four detailed case studies of campaigns to win voter approval of
significant transportation projects and, in three cases, the tax increases necessary to pay for them.
In all cases there was opposition or potential opposition and success at the polls could not be
taken for granted. The campaigns examined in the case studies were:
Charlotte/Mecklenburg County, North Carolina
Saint Louis County, Missouri
Santa Clara County, California
Seattle, Washington and Puget Sound area.
The case-study campaigns were selected in a two-phase screening of nine campaigns that were
identified around the country. The research team developed preliminary information on these
nine campaigns and then recommended six of them to the NCHRP Panel for further review, after
which the Panel chose the four campaigns listed above. The case studies were then carried out,
and the Best Practices Digest prepared, on the basis of the information so developed. The
conclusions reached in the Digest were also reinforced by the preliminary information gathered
on the other five campaigns.
FINDINGS
A successful campaign requires a strong message and an effective campaign.
To succeed, a message has to convey the following to voters:
The project is needed and will bring clear benefits
Any new taxes are equitable in relation to the distribution of benefits.
In short, the project must be a good idea, and recognized as such, but ensuring that recognition
by the electorate requires good analysis of voters attitudes and preferences.
THE MESSAGE
The role of economic impacts in the successful messages was either relatively muted or nonexistent. The typical case was that the business leadership was convinced of the economic
benefits but actual campaign messages were designed to emphasize direct transportation benefits
to voterseither reduced road congestion or alternatives to road transport. It should be noted,
though, that this case was often made in the context of accommodating future growthi.e., that
continuing growth and prosperity might be threatened if the transportation infrastructure were
not improved.
THE CAMPAIGN
The following features of a campaign are usually key to success:
A business community united in support of the project
Professional assistance for polling, advertising, campaign management, and related activities
Poll and/or focus group results for refining the message
A robust political campaign with abundant use of television, radio, or other media.
A united business community provides critical support in two ways. First, business leaders
have a strong influence on public opinion in their own communities. In particular, an argument
that transportation improvement is needed to facilitate future growth will have the greatest
credibility if it comes from the business community. Second, the business community can raise
the money required for a robust campaign.
Professional assistance, usually in the form of specialized consultants, is virtually essential for
an effective campaign. High-quality skills are required to conduct polls and focus groups,
analyze the results, craft the materials to be used for various media, and manage all the complex
activities of a political campaign.
Poll and/or focus-group results are essential for refinement of the message and also of the
project. If at all possible, some measure of public opinion should be taken before a project is put
before the public in its final form. It may well be that there are features that have a critical impact
on public opinion, positive or negative, that would not have been recognized as such by
professional transportation planners. And the data on public opinion is essential for development
of on-target messages for media advertising.
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A robust campaign entails a full range of media advertising, distribution of literature, front-yard
signs and posters, telephone banks and similar devices and methods to carry the message to the
public and, in the end, get out the vote.
It is useful to look back at the five key elements of successful communications that were
identified in NCHRP 2-22:
1. Identifying and understanding the audience
2. Crafting the message
3. Designating the messenger
4. Selecting communications techniques
5. Integrating and sustaining communications.
The first two of these are truly critical, and the second depends very much on the first. A strong
message is essential and it cannot be created without a clear understanding of the concerns and
preferences of voters. And that same understanding is essential to putting the right project before
the voters. The other elements are necessary, and must be done right, but will be useless without
a strong message based on good understanding of the voters.
We believe the following are the three absolutely essential requirements for a successful
campaign.
Good understanding of voters preferences and concerns
A strong message that meets voters wants
A united business community.
If these three elements are in hand, the other tasks become straightforward. Selecting and
refining communications and campaign techniques can be largely left to the professionals hired
with the money provided by the business leadership.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The underlying objective of NCHRP 2-22 (Communicating the Economic Impacts of
Transportation Investments: Guidance for Transportation Planners and Policy Makers) was to
use market research to develop a report or guide that state DOTs, MPOs, and other transportation
agencies could use to communicate more effectively and proactively transportations importance
to the economy. Although the resulting research described brief examples of communications
programs and strategies applied in the field, it did not use detailed case studies to demonstrate
the range of practices in:
identifying and understanding the target audience;
crafting messages;
designating messengers; and
selecting communication techniques.
Consequently, the objective of NCHRP 2-22 (2), Needs in Communicating the Economic
Impacts of Transportation Investments, is to investigate the effectiveness of specific
communication strategies that have been implemented by transportation agencies, and to
demonstrate how these strategies have been designed, implemented, and evaluated. A case study
approach is used to demonstrate the range of practices and to assess the strengths and
weaknesses of alternative strategies. Campaigns reviewed and analyzed in case studies were
selected to illustrate effective strategies used when transportation agencies have had to reach out
to other groups for support, develop a message concerning a transportation project, and use that
message to gain approval from voters.
The resulting product is a Best Practices Digest that transportation agencies can draw on in
developing and implementing a communications program. Information from the Digest is
included in the Findings Chapter of this report, while the full Digest has also been produced as a
stand alone product for broad dissemination to practitioners.
The general method for developing the Best Practices Digest was to identify, and collect
information on, a number of campaigns in which transportation agencies presented specific
projects to voters, successfully or unsuccessfully. After reviewing this initial information, six
campaigns were presented to the Panel as candidates for more detailed case studies, and the
Panel selected four of these campaigns for case studies.
The case studies were conducted primarily by interviews of key individuals who were familiar
with the campaigns and also by review of relevant documents. The findings of the case studies
were used as the foundation of the Best Practices Digest. The campaigns selected for the case
studies were carried out in the following areas:
Charlotte/Mecklenburg County, North Carolina

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Saint Louis County, Missouri
Seattle, Washington and Puget Sound area.
The work of the study has been carried out in the following tasks:
Task 1 Identification of candidates for case studies
Task 2 Selection of case-study candidates for presentation to Panel
Task 3 Preparation of an Interim Technical Report including a brief overview of NCHRP 222 and covering the work of Tasks 1 and 2
Task 4 Evaluation of case-study campaigns and assessment of effectiveness of various

strategies
Task 5 Preparation of Best Practices Digest
Task 6 Preparation of Final Report.
The findings of the case studies and other information developed in the course of this work are
presented in the Final Report in the following manner:
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 2 Research Methods (Tasks 1, 2, and 4)
Chapter 3 Case Studies
Chapter 4 Findings
Chapter 5 Information on Other (non-case-study) Campaigns
Appendix A: References
Appendix B: Finding of NCHRP 2-22 Regarding The Five Elements of A Successful
Communications Campaign
CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH METHODS

In this chapter, we review the research methods employed in Tasks 1, 2, and 4 and the manner in
which the work was carried out.
TASK 1 IDENTIFICATION OF CANDIDATES FOR CASE STUDIES

The purpose of Task 1 was to identify specific, organized campaigns to communicate the
benefits of transportation infrastructure projects or programs undertaken by state or local
transportation agencies: state Departments of Transportation (DOTs), Metropolitan Planning
Organizations (MPOs), or other bodies.
The research team identified an initial set of campaigns as potentially suitable for case studies
using the following resources:
NCHRP 2-22 Focus Group Participants. The research team contacted members of each of
the NCHRP 2-22 focus groups (Seattle, Tampa Bay, and Detroit) and asked them to suggest
potential case studies that might be applicable to this research, either from their city or from
their state.
AASHTO (Special Committee on Economic Expansion and Development). The research

team contacted AASHTO staff and asked them to identify possible candidate campaigns.
State DOTs and MPOs. Based on suggestions from AASHTO staff and the contacts of the
research team, individuals from various state DOTs and MPOs were contacted.
Once these contacts were made, individuals were able to refer us to the managers of the
campaigns (or other similarly involved individuals) that they thought might be helpful for this
research. The team then contacted these individuals to obtain more detail on the campaigns. The
following criteria were established to ensure that campaigns would be useful for this study:
The campaign had to concern a transportation infrastructure investment, involving either

new infrastructure or modifications of existing infrastructure;
The campaign had to address a specific public opinion problem; and
The campaign had to have been an organized effort to overcome this problem.
When a campaign met these initial criteria, research staff informally and briefly interviewed
individuals involved with the campaign and completed a short information form detailing the
following:
The organization and contact name, as well as the location and nature of the project;
The group to be convinced (voters, legislators, governor, etc.);

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The essential nature of the controversy;
The nature of the economic argument;
The campaign strategies used; and
The messengers.
The research team then collected information on the following campaigns:
City of Charlotte and Mecklenburg County, North Carolina (1998) (Charlotte-Mecklenburg

2025 transit/Land-Use Plan increase in county sales tax primarily for transit investment);
Washington State (1994-1997) (FAST Corridorfreight improvements)
Denver, Colorado (1997) Regional Transportation District (increase in regional sales tax for
transit investment);
City of Las Vegas and Clark County, Nevada (1990) (Las Vegas, various projects and taxincrease proposals);
Kansas City, Missouri (1999) (Conversion of airport to rail/truck freight center);
City of Miami and Dade County, Florida (1999) (sales tax increase to fund rail transit
extension and elimination of county road tolls);
Santa Clara County, California (1996) (increase in sales tax to fund variety of transportation
projects);
Seattle, Washington/Puget Sound area (1996) Regional Transportation Authority (increase

in sales tax/motor vehicle excise tax to fund transit development); and
St. Louis County, Missouri (1998) (Page Avenue Bridge extension).
TASK 2 SELECTION OF SIX CASE-STUDY CANDIDATES

The research team applied the four criteria listed below to narrow down the list of likely casestudy campaigns. The research team recommended six candidate campaigns to the Panel with
the expectation that the Panel would select four campaigns out of the six for detailed case study
analysis and documentation in the Best Practices Digest. Selection of the six campaigns was
based on the following criteria:
Robustness of Communication/Campaign ActivitiesPriority was given to formal, highly

organized campaigns that aggressively took a message on transportation investment to the
public;
Availability of DocumentationPriority was given to those campaigns with documented

materials to ensure availability of evidence to support anecdotal accounts of strategies and
effectiveness;
Modal DiversityAlthough this research effort was focused on highway-related investments,

the research team attempted to include campaigns that dealt with investments in modes other
than highways (such as transit, corridor enhancements, airport access highways, etc,.); and
Degree of Challenge Priority was given to campaigns that faced multiple barriers to
implementation (e.g., environmental concerns, resistance to tax increases, or other issues) to
ensure that case studies addressed situations where the campaign had to overcome genuine
opposition.
The nine case studies selected in Task 1 were each subjectively assessed according to these four
criteria. A simple scoring system was used: Low = 1; Medium = 2; High = 3. Below is a
summary table of the scores for each case study assessed in Task 2.
Summary of Evaluations
Place
Robustness of Availability of
Campaign
Documentation
Modal
Diversity
Degree of
Challenge
Total
Score
(Max=12)
Charlotte NC
10
Washington State
Denver CO
Las Vegas NV
Kansas City MO
Miami FL
Santa Clara CA
11
Seattle WA
10
St. Louis MO
The six case-study candidates chosen by the research team were recommended to the Panel in
the Interim Technical Report. These campaigns, from which the Panel would select four for case
studies were:
Charlotte, North Carolina
Denver, Colorado
Kansas City, Missouri
Seattle, Washington
St. Louis County, Missouri
The six campaigns selected as potential case studies stood out for a variety of reasons. First, all
had robust campaigns. In other words, each of the selected campaigns displayed a formal,
organized structure and execution. For example, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg communications
campaign involved a consultant team consisting of transit and land use experts, extensive
outreach efforts and workshops, and standard campaign activities, including television and radio
spots, newspaper coverage, leaflets and brochures, phone banks, etc., that focused on a specific
integrated land use/transit plan that had been developed to specifically work in support of the
bond issue.
The Kansas City campaign, directed by the citys Chamber of Commerce and with the majority
of the over $900,000 budget provided by Kansas City Southern Railroad, also used a variety of
media and a local consultant specializing in political campaigns. The campaign effort, rather
than attempting to change peoples views on the issue of converting an airport to surface freight
use, tried instead to reach voters most likely to support the lease of portions of the airport to the
Kansas City Southern Railway.
The majority of these six campaigns also had a variety of supporting documents available
(brochures, talking points, editorials, news articles, one-page fact sheets, etc.,) that served to
bolster and better document research team interviews. For example, the Santa Clara County and
St. Louis County campaigns both developed a wide variety of materials that research staff were
able to access. These included talking points, brochures, direct mailings, fact sheets, and copies
of editorials from different sides of the issue. The research teams choice of case studies also
attempted to reflect some degree of modal diversity. Efforts in Santa Clara County, Denver, and
Charlotte, for example, each had a strong transit component.
Several of these candidate campaigns faced a significant degree of challenge in that they faced
multiple barriers to implementation (environmental issues, political concerns). One good
example of this is the St. Louis, Missouri campaign for the proposed Page Avenue Bridge
Extension. Because the proposed extension required taking 25 acres of parkland (the state
offered additional land in mitigation) and other environmental issues, coalitions of environmental
and other groups mounted a strong opposition. The measure was successful, however, largely on
the publics general belief that the extension was necessary to mitigate congestion and help the
local economy.
The three campaigns not chosen as potential case studiesWashington State, Las Vegas, and
Miamiwere set aside for a variety of reasons. In Washington State, the campaign was
somewhat diffuse, being directed at a variety of state and federal officials, rather than being a
single, integrated effort aimed at the public. The Las Vegas campaign was interesting in many
respects, particularly the lengths to which the transportation agency went to tie particular tax
increases and new taxes to particular projects in an effort to ensure that the package of proposals
would be received as equitable. But the age of the campaign (1990) meant that memories of
participants and observers would no longer be fresh. In Miami, the campaign was put together in
considerable haste and was not really well organized.
TASK 4 EVALUATION OF CASE-STUDY CAMPAIGNS AND ASSESSMENT

OF EFFECTIVENESS OF VARIOUS STRATEGIES
The Panel reviewed the six candidates put forward for case studies and selected the following
four campaigns for case studies:
Charlotte/Mecklenburg County, North Carolina (1998)
St. Louis County, Missouri (1998)
Santa Clara County, California (1996)
Seattle/Puget Sound area, Washington (1996)
These were all cases where strong, highly organized campaigns were mounted and success was
achieved. They represent a good regional balance and they also represent a good balance in terms
of modes. The campaign in St. Louis County was strictly about a highway bridge and a resulting
significant extension of a highway. Santa Clara County was about a mixture of transit and
highway improvements and Charlotte involved significant transit investment albeit with some
highway projects as well. The Seattle proposal was entirely concerned with transit improvements
and was especially interesting because a similar proposal, but one much larger in dollar terms,
had been soundly defeated in the prior year.
Of the two cases not chosen in the final round, one, Denver, was a defeat for a major transit
project; the Panel felt there was somewhat less to learn from an unsuccessful effort. The
campaign in Kansas City was highly organized and successful, but it was thought that the
conversion of a general-aviation airport to surface freight use represented a relatively narrow
issue in terms of transportation and its impact on the region.
10
The research methods used for the case studies were straightforward. Additional interviews were
conducted to add both breadth and depth to the research teams information on the campaigns.
Documentation was obtained; this included both material descriptive of the campaigns or the
transportation issues and actual campaign materials, such as brochures, mailing pieces, videos,
and the like. Campaign materials on websites were also obtained.
All of this information was reviewed and analyzed by the research team and was used to develop
coherent, integrated, in-depth accounts of the case-study campaigns. In addition, members of the
research team applied their own intuition and expert judgment to evaluate the campaigns and
identify the critical elements of success. The expert analysis and evaluation in the case studies
provided the foundation for the Best Practices Digest.
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CHAPTER 3: CASE STUDIES

This chapter presents the individual reports on the four case studies:
Charlotte/Mecklenburg County, North Carolina (1998)
St. Louis County, Missouri (1998)
Santa Clara County, California (1996)
Seattle/Puget Sound area, Washington (1996)
The case studies are presented in similar, but not identical, formats. The history and character of
each campaign are different, and we found that some variation in format in the reports allowed
us to offer the clearest statement of what each campaign was about and what made it a success.
CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG COUNTY, NC (1998)

Contacts
Terry Lathrop, Charlotte Department of Transportation, 704-336-2261
Rick Davis, Corporate Communications, City of Charlotte, 704-336-4936
Transportation Issue
The issue in Mecklenburg County, involved two components:
1) Development of a long-range transit-land use plan for Mecklenburg County; and
2) A referendum on whether to increase the county sales tax by one-half percentage point in
order to support transportation investments in the plan.
Background
According to a 1997 study, Mecklenburg County, most of whose population is in the city of
Charlotte, ranked fourth among the largest 50 U.S. metropolitan areas in its level of traffic
congestion. Demographic projections forecast an almost 60 percent increase in population and
an almost 50 percent increase in jobs in the area over the next 20 years. The lack of adequate
rapid transit and other transportation infrastructure to link economic centers with employees was
expected to result in increasingly problematic levels of traffic congestion. As a result, city
planners set out to develop a plan for creating a regional rapid transit system. It was recognized,
however, that sufficient funding from the State DOT would not be available to support desired
major transit investments in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg County area.
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The State legislature in the Summer of 1997 authorized Mecklenburg County to hold a
referendum on a one-half percentage point increase in the county sales tax, with proceeds to be
used to support a bond issue to fund transportation projects. The window of opportunity to call
for a referendum, provided by the state legislature, spurred a concerted effort to develop a
regional transit plan. Although a typical long-term regional plan of this magnitude often stretches
over a long time period, the development of this plan was concentrated into an intensive sixmonth period so that a plan could be presented to the elected officials and the community to
decide whether to place a referendum on the ballot for the half-percent sales tax increase.
The planning effort culminated in the development of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg 2025
Integrated Transit/Land Use Plan, which was developed to address issues of land development
and growth in relation to transit along major transportation corridors. The County
Commissioners by a 9-3 vote agreed to put the proposal on the ballot in final form in early Fall
of 1998, and the public voted on it in November 1998.
Nature of Controversy
In developing the Transit/Land Use Plan, city and county officials wanted certain road projects,
plus regional transit and pedestrian improvements, but did not want to make the need for transit
the sole focus of their efforts. The focus was on developing a solution to cope with congestion,
growth, and land development. An important result was that the Plan called for the coordinated
planning of transit service and corridor land use to achieve maximum benefits in guiding and
serving existing and future land development with transit. This 2025 regional transit plan
includes land use changes that maximize the potential ridership for the transit system, and a
phased implementation program.
The Plan focuses on five transportation corridors within Charlotte-Mecklenburg: the Northeast,
Southeast (Independence), South, West (Airport) and North. Each corridor contained one or
more rail right-of-way, and interstate or other freeway-type arterial (see Figure 1 for a map of the
final transit vision for the combined corridors). The framework of the plan included rapid transit
(rail or bus) in each corridor, with a specific transit alignment and technology, and station
locations to best serve the land use in that corridor. Each station was categorized as one of six
possible development opportunities.
Overview of the Campaign
Research conducted by a public relations firm in March 1998, informed City planners that 86
percent of the citizens believed Charlotte-Mecklenburg would continue to enjoy a rapid rate of
growth and prosperity. It also found 81 percent believed a better mass transit system was
needed to cope with this growth, 45 percent felt traffic congestion was a problem, and 62
percent supported the Citys desire for developers to follow planned land development patterns
concentrated along the Countys major transportation corridors.
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These findings supported the Citys intention of implementing a rapid transit planning process
and revealed that selling the need for transit would not be necessary. The problem was evident
to the public; focus needed to be on developing the solution.
Other findings indicated that involving citizens in developing the transit plan was an integral and
essential component to the overall process: 42 percent of the respondents indicated a desire to
participate in the development of a transit system.
The March research results prompted the Citys Corporate Communications Department to
devise a campaign which not only would educate citizens on the various transit alternatives, the
transit/land use relationship, and the issues involved in regional transit planning, but which also
would involve citizens in the planning process itself. Previous transportation studies already had
identified the Countys five major transportation corridors. These corridors were deemed the
most viable locations for primary rapid transit lines.
The overall campaign set forth several objectives:
To create general awareness of the transit/land use issues and its associated opportunities and
challenges;
To obtain as much input and feedback from the public as possible in the development of the
plan;
To use citizen involvement as a justification for placing a referendum on the ballot for a percent sales tax increase to fund transit; and
To secure voter approval of the sales tax increase.
A consultant team consisting of transit and land-use experts was engaged to direct the technical
analysis portion of the transit/land-use plans development. With a public relations budget of
$150,000, a five-month campaign focused on citizen involvement was planned.
Advertising costs constituted less than a quarter of the overall budget as the campaign directed
its resources on the implementation of eighteen city- and county-sponsored public meetings. The
workshop process drew people into the decision-making effort, developed the list of specific
projects to be put on the ballot, and began the real communication to the public on the benefits of
the new projects. The campaign operated a speakers bureau which had individual city officials
make presentations to specific community groups and utilized newsletters, mailings, postings,
and radio programs to further disseminate information on the transit plan.
Identifying and Understanding the Audience
Public Involvement in Development of the Plan
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Involving citizens in the development of the Transit/Land Use Plan was an integral and essential
component to the overall planning process. The purpose of involving the public was to develop a
plan the community would support and that could justify a public vote on the issue.
An extensive public involvement and education process using the theme The Wheels of
Change: A Community in Motion was developed. The purpose of the communications
campaign was to:
Educate citizens on transit alternatives, the transit/land use relationship and the issues
involved in regional transit planning; and
Involve the citizens in the planning process itself.
The public involvement campaign included the following components to solicit feedback from
the public:
Three public meetings, two of which were televised live, providing opportunities for people
to call in questions and comments. These meetings were taped for multiple rebroadcasts.
Three sets of corridor group meetings (April, May and June) were held in each of the five
corridors, for a total of 15 corridor group meetings. These meetings constituted the "core" of
public involvement. The meetings gave citizens hands-on opportunities to participate with
the consultants in creating the plan - from locating alignments and stations to selecting
preferred transit technologies and identifying areas for potential development/redevelopment.
During each meeting, different aspects of the emerging plan were presented and discussed.
Participants used large maps of the corridors to provide comments on alignments, station
locations and other aspects of the plan. Attendance exceeded 200 people per month.
E-mail opportunities for citizens to send comments and questions and receive prompt
response from the appropriate source.
The public involvement program also focused considerable effort on educating the public about
the planning process and opportunities to participate in the process. Outreach activities included:
Advertisements in local newspapers and radio stations and on Charlotte Transit buses
promoting corridor group meetings and public meetings.
Bi-weekly fax/e-mail newsletters - one for elected officials, one for citizens.
A 12-page newspaper insert summarizing the plan.
Direct mail to more than 4,000 people who signed up to be on the mailing list.
Speakers bureau presentations to civic and neighborhood groups throughout the County.
Government Channel programming featuring call-in shows and educational videos.

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Inserts in City/County services bills.
Road signage (similar to zoning notices) highlighting dates and times of corridor group
meetings.
Information available at the City/County web site.
An information hotline (City/County Customer Service and Information Center).
Media relations activities, including assisting reporters with information and story ideas and
participating in television programs and radio talk shows focusing on the transit planning
process. These activities resulted in extensive and detailed media coverage throughout the
entire process.
Given the amount of work and coordination required, considerable staff and consultant resources
were dedicated to developing and implementing this public involvement/ education campaign.
Staff from Charlottes Corporate Communications, Mecklenburg Countys Public Service and
Information Department, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Planning Commission and Charlotte
Department of Transportation worked together with a local consultant with expertise in
constituencies and land use and a local consultant who served as a liaison with minority
communities.
Additionally, specially trained facilitators were hired to assist in conducting corridor group
meetings.
Organization of a Transit Planning Advisory Committee (T-PAC)
In addition to the multitude of public involvement activities, a specific effort was made to
include citizens in a more formalized way through a Transit Planning Advisory Committee (TPAC). The Charlotte City Council, Mecklenburg County Board of Commissioners, Mecklenburg
County School Board and the towns of Matthews, Mint Hill, Pineville, Cornelius, Huntersville
and Davidson appointed a total of 21 citizens to serve on the T-PAC. The charge to this
committee included:
Evaluating the opportunities for public involvement.
Determining whether the plan developed provides sufficient basis for citizens to vote on a
half-cent sales tax funding source.
Making a collective go/no go decision on whether to recommend holding a Fall 1998

referendum.
In addition to attending the corridor and public meetings, T-PAC met 11 times between March
and August 1998 to hear reports from the consultants, discuss technical aspects of the developing
plan and review input received from citizens.
16
The Importance of Public Input in the Transit/Land Use Planning Process
Public input helped the transportation agencies to understand public preferences and to develop a
plan that would be acceptable to the public. It was apparent from the more than 250 people
attending the kick-off meeting in March 1998 that there was substantial community interest in
transit/land use planning. People representing a good cross-section of the community and from
communities adjacent to Mecklenburg County actively participated in discussions and planning
exercises. Their level of participation, commitment to tackling the issues and surprisingly
sophisticated knowledge of transit issues made planning for active involvement throughout the
six-month effort doubly important.
Citizen involvement in the corridor and public meetings as well as input provided through the
variety of other public involvement methods helped the consultant team to understand better the
transit/land use needs and wishes of the community. In fact, many of the specific details of the
2025 plan responded directly to comments and suggestions from members of the community,
and citizen input during the corridor group meetings provided the basis for several changes to the
consultants original vision for transit and land use development.
Citizens filled out comment sheets following each meeting, which provided useful information
and evaluations. Data gathered at the early meetings prompted immediate changes, including
moving meeting locations, extending meeting times and expanding the question and answer
sessions.
Targeting Voter Audiences
As the referendum neared, various target voter audiences were identified for the campaign. At
the broadest level, citizens were identified as those that lived in direct proximity to the proposed
transit corridors and those who lived between the corridors.
Crafting the Message
The series of 18 public meetings provided a forum in which the public could provide input on the
project, evaluate and critique the progress of the meetings and campaign, ask questions, and
voice concerns. This format revealed the shifting concerns of the citizenry and provided the
campaign with the information needed to refine the focus of the message accordingly.
Public officials and business leaders were convinced that transportation improvements were
necessary to allow for and encourage the continued growth and development of the Charlotte
area. Transportation improvements were sold to voters largely on the point that investing in
transportation infrastructure along five major transportation corridors in the region that were
deemed the most viable locations for transit lines would economically benefit the city center, the
City of Charlotte as a whole, and Mecklenburg County. The selling point for the transit system
was that it would provide an alternative to congested highway travel and support efforts at
development along the countys major corridors. It was projected that the transit system would
account for 5 percent-6 percent of daily commuter transport so the need for transit, and its
17
ability to reduce congestion and improve air quality were not major selling points of the
campaign.
Because the proposed creation of five transit corridors created geographic areas that directly and
indirectly benefit from the corridors, the Plan also recognized the need to invest in transportation
projects that would benefit population groups outside the transit corridors. As a result, the Plans
recommendations were set in the context of improving the entire existing public transportation
system and improving the regional highway system. Improvements outside of the transit
corridors included lateral connections between the corridors and to key development hubs
outside the corridors. It was also recognized in the Plan that the rapid transit alignment and
service proposed for each corridor could be extended into adjacent jurisdictions in the future.
Designating the Messenger
In 1997 the Mayor of Charlotte appointed ten community business leaders to the Committee of
Ten to review and promote transportation improvements in Charlotte. The business leaders
were vocal proponents of the project proposal and their respective businesses provided funding
for the public campaign.
The principal spokesman for the bond issue referendum was the Mayor of Charlotte. He was
active throughout the outreach program serving as the official host or co-host to the public
meetings and acting as a general organizer for the campaign. The Charlotte Department of
Transportation provided the technical information and expertise for the outreach program.
Selecting Communication Techniques
In the initial process of developing the Plan, a consultant team consisting of transit and land-use
experts was engaged to direct the technical analysis portion of the analysis. A five-month
campaign of extensive and intensive citizen involvement was undertaken, as described above.
The public relations budget was set at $150,000.
Campaign funds were provided by local businesses. A business group called The Committee of
Ten hired a consultant to conduct the campaign. The campaign techniques used were
straightforward, and styled in the form of a political campaign: TV and radio spots, newspaper
coverage, leaflets dropped off at homes, signs in front yards, people manning phone banks to get
the vote out, etc,.
In both cases, efforts were made to communicate with the audience directly, through the media,
and through community-based organizations and stakeholders. Primary among these
stakeholders were:
Elected officials and government agencies (County Commission, City Council, Town
Councils, Carolinas Council of Governments, etc.);
Business associations (Chambers of Commerce, Charlotte Center City partners, Business

Corridor Associations, etc);
18
Neighborhood associations adjacent to the corridors and county-wide;
Citizens grassroots organizations;
Environmental groups;
Educational institutions;
Existing transit riders; and
Land developers.
Key Factors in Success

The referendum was approved with 58 percent of the citizens voting yes. Those involved with
and managing the campaign believe the workshops and related outreach activities were the
essential foundation for the success of the campaign. Holding 18 public meetings over only five
months ensured that people remained interested and allowed involved citizens to see how their
input was utilized. Key factors in success were:
More citizens participated in the process of developing the plan than had ever before
participated in a community-wide planning effort in Charlotte-Mecklenburg.
Citizen input provided the basis for several changes to the consultants original visions for
transit and land use development.
Although the overall campaign was very successful, it provides lessons on techniques that were
and were not effective. For example, there was a general consensus that the speakers bureau did
not work well. The staff hours needed to effectively target key neighborhood groups and civic
organizations with speakers were not available, and it was difficult to keep speaking points up to
date with the progress of the public meetings.
19
Figure 1: Charlotte-Mecklenburg 2025 Adopted Transit Corridors
20
Figure 2: Charlotte-Mecklenburg 2025 Transit-Land Use Vision
21
SANTA CLARA COUNTY, CA (1996)

Contact
Carl Guardino, Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group, 408-501-7864
In November 1996, the voters of Santa Clara County were asked to vote on two ballot measures,
called Measures A and B. Measure A was an advisory measure that outlined a specific package
of transportation improvements for the county. It did not call for an increase in taxes, but asked
the voters whether or not any new voter-approved sales taxes should fund the following package
of transportation improvements:
Maintaining Streets and Filling Potholes: Improving local streets and filling potholes in all
fifteen cities and on county roads and expressways.
Traffic Signal Synchronization: Improving the signal timing on all eight county
expressways.
Connection to BART: Connecting Santa Clara County to BART by adding a CalTrain-type

rail line between downtown San Jose, through east San Jose and Milpitas, and up to the
BART system in Alameda County.
Light Rail Lines: Building the Tasman East Light Rail line and Capitol Light Rail Line.
Transit Service for Seniors and the Disabled: Providing improved transit service for
seniors and the disabled by purchasing low floor vehicles for all future light rail lines.
Improving CalTrain Service: Adding trains and improving facilities.
Widening Highways: Widening Interstate 880 and Highway 101, 17, and 85.
Interchange Improvements: Improving key interchanges at 237/880 in Milpitas, 85/101 in

Mountain View, 85/87 in the Almaden Valley of San Jose, 85/101 in South San Jose, and
along Highway 17.
Safety Improvements: Placing a safety barrier in the Highway 85 median and building
additional truck climbing lanes and pull-outs on Highway 152.
Bicycle Facilities: Improving bicycle facilities throughout the county to improve safety and
eliminate gaps in the county-wide bicycle network.
In total, the improvements were estimated at approximately 55 percent transit, 45 percent

highways and other, by dollar value. The measure called for all projects to be completed in 9
years, with administrative expenses limited to 0.5 percent of total funds.
22
Measure B was a referendum asking voters to authorize the Board of Supervisors to enact a onehalf percent sales tax for general county purposes, with a nine-year time frame, 1997 to 2006.
Although not stated in the referendum itself, the purpose of the tax was to fund the projects
identified in Measure A. In addition, Measure B contained a provision that an independent
Citizens Watchdog Committee be established to review all expenditures of the tax revenue and
conduct annual audits of the sales tax expenditures. The committee was to be composed of 17
private citizens (not elected officials) representing diverse geographic, gender, age and other
perspectives.
Background
Santa Clara County is located in the San Francisco Bay Area and encompasses part of the area
commonly referred to as Silicon Valley. It contains the cities of San Jose, Palo Alto, Santa
Clara, and Cupertino. Silicon Valley is a major employment hub, drawing employees from
across the Bay Area as well as the Central Valley and Central Coast. It is also home to some of
the most congested corridors in California. According to Caltrans, one of Silicon Valleys
commuter corridors Interstate 680 over the Sunol Grade recently topped the Bay Bridge as
the regions worst daily commute. Five other corridors that feed into the Silicon Valley have
made the 10 worst Bay Area Commute Corridors list.
In 1984, the voters of Santa Clara County passed a transportation initiative, also called Measure
A, which raised taxes to support highway investments on Highways 101, 85 and 237. The tax
ended in 1995, and the new Measures A & B were proposed to support a new set of
transportation investments. The project package was developed by the Citizens Coalition for
Traffic Relief, with input from local officials and transportation staff. Guiding principles used in
developing the list included need, project readiness, geographic diversity, and an approximate
split between road-oriented projects and transit-oriented projects.
The controversy surrounded those who did and those who did not support the sales tax increase.
Supporters of measures A & B included major business groups, such as the Santa Clara Valley
Manufacturing Group, the San Jose Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce, the Santa Clara
County Firefighters Association, the South Bay Labor Council and businesses including HewlettPackard, IBM, Lockheed-Martin. They wanted improved transportation, because they saw
economic and safety benefits in making their employees commutes less stressful and less timeconsuming, making the roads safer, expanding transit alternatives, and reducing traffic
congestion. A number of health, environmental, and transit-supportive groups, including the
American Lung Association, the Congress of California Seniors, the Greenbelt Alliance, also
supported the proposal.
Opponents of the measures generally included taxpayer groups opposed to increasing the sales
tax, including the Santa Clara County Taxpayers' Association. They argued that the measures did
not guarantee that additional money would go to transportation projects, and the measures
contained little guarantee that the politicians would not use the funds to supplement other areas
23
of the budget. They also argued that there was no guarantee that cost-effective projects would
result for the money.
Moreover, they argued that the propositions were an attempt to circumvent state law regarding
special taxes. Under Proposition 12, a special tax requires a two-thirds majority vote for passage.
They argued that Measures A & B together were a special tax designed to look like a general tax
in an attempt to allow a majority vote.
Supporters of the initiatives hired a pollster to conduct surveys of the voting public. Three
surveys were conducted to determine what interest groups existed in the county, what issues
defined them, and what types of transportation projects and subsequent levels of taxation they
would support. Interest groups were established along geographic, gender, age and other lines,
and their interests and concerns were established. This information, in turn, helped the campaign
to craft its message for each of these voter groups.
The pitch to the public was largely on quality of life issues, highlighting congestion relief. The
campaign materials promoted Measures A and B as a means of improving transportation safety
and access. Messages about the projects that comprised by Measure A were always couched in
language that focused on increased safety, service or access. To accentuate the importance of
passing both Measures A and B the campaign adopted the slogan:
Measures A + B = Traffic Relief
The message was also tailored to match the interests of different voter constituencies. A focus
group was used to test ballot language. The information gathered by the three surveys of the
voting public was used to create mailings, and a second focus group was convened to fine-tune
the messages and images conveyed in the mailings. The results of the second focus group were
not satisfactory to the campaign, and two additional surveys of the voting public were conducted
to further define the focus of the mailings. Using a budget of $1.6 million, the campaign was able
to address each groups interest by creating six mail pieces, each piece having as many as 35
variations. The mailings were created with geographic, gender, age and other demographicspecific messages and images and were distributed accordingly.
There was no single messenger in the sense of a high-profile individual taking the case to the
public. Leadership in the effort to pass measures A and B was provided by a countywide
coalition of business leaders, environmental and health organizations, senior and disabled
groups, and citizens, led by the Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group (SVMG).
The SVMG was founded in 1978 by David Packard and other Valley CEOs and today
represents 125 Silicon Valley employers, who collectively provide over 250,000 local jobs
24
nearly one-third of the Valleys private sector workforce. SVMG had already led two successful
transportation investment campaigns in Santa Clara County, so it was a natural leader of the
campaign.
The campaign for the ballot initiatives relied heavily on targeted mailings to the voting public.
As described above, six different mail pieces, each having as many as 35 variations, were sent to
voters in Santa Clara County.
There was also a limited use of television and radio to convey messages that were applicable to
the region as a whole.
The strength of the coalition created by SVMG and the active community groups provided the
resources necessary to conduct a thorough campaign. The surveys and focus groups established
who the campaign needed to reach and what needed to be conveyed to them.
Continuing Efforts
In November 1996, the voters in Santa Clara County approved Measures A and B. In 1997,
however, implementation of the measures was delayed by a court challenge contesting the
validity of Measure B as a general tax. The California Superior court declared the lawsuit
frivolous and threw it out. The case was brought to court again on appeal, and the 6th District
Court of Appeals ruled unanimously in favor of Measures A and B. Opponents of Measures A
and B then took their case to the California Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court in
August 1998 threw out the appeal filed against Measures A and B, finally clearing the way for
the program to get underway.
SEATTLE, WA PUGET SOUND AREA (1996)

Contacts
Ned Conroy, MPO, 206-587-5670
Barbara Dougherty, Central Puget Sound Regional Transportation Authority, 206-398-5054
Michael Vaska, local lawyer who organized campaign, 206-447-8895
The voters within the Washington Regional Transportation Authority (RTA) district were asked
in November 1996 to approve a measure to increase the sales tax and motor vehicle excise tax to
fund a set of transit improvements. The taxes would include a local sales tax increase of fourtenths of one percent (four cents on a $10 purchase) and a motor vehicle excise tax (license plate
25
tabs) increase of three-tenths of one percent (about $30 a year on a vehicle valued at $10,000)
and would provide the local portion of revenues to develop and operate the Regional Transit
Authority's proposed $3.9 billion Ten-year Plan, called Sound Move.
The plan entailed a mix of transportation improvements throughout the region, including:
23 miles of new, high-capacity light-rail transit connecting the University of Washington,

Capitol Hill, First Hill, downtown Seattle, the Rainier Valley and Sea-Tac International
Airport;
A 1.6-mile light-rail line in Tacoma connecting the downtown theater and University districts
with local and regional bus and commuter rail services at the new Tacoma Dome intermodal
station;
Direct access ramps to freeway bus and carpool lanes, creating 100 miles of HOV
Expressway;
20 new regional rapid-express bus routes with service beginning within three years better to
connect cities and suburbs throughout the region and linking with other local and regional
transit services;
81 miles of commuter rail service using existing railroad tracks between Everett, Seattle,
Tacoma and Lakewood, starting with rush-hour service; and
"Community connections" such as stations, park-and-ride lots, and pedestrian and bicycle
improvements to provide local access to the regional transit network.
Background
The Regional Transportation Authority (RTA) district covers the most congested urban areas of
King, Pierce and Snohomish counties in the Puget Sound area and includes the cities of Seattle,
Bellevue, Tacoma, and Everett, as well as many smaller towns and suburbs. The district
boundary lines generally follow the urban growth boundaries created by each county in
accordance with the states Growth Management Act. The RTA district includes about half of
the states population and has experienced rapid growth over the past two decades.
In March 1995, the region's voters narrowly rejected a much larger $6.7 billion transit proposal
to be built over 16 years. In response, the RTA set out to develop a new transit plan that would
be smaller, cost less, and built within a shorter time frame; they sought to bring this plan to the
voters by Fall 1996. On May 31, 1996, the RTA board passed Resolution 73 adopting Sound
Move - the Ten-Year Regional Transit System Plan after weeks of discussion and fine-tuning of
a draft plan released in March. In August, the RTA Board passed Resolution 75 calling for a
November 5 election to implement Sound Move by increasing local taxes to fund the local share
of the proposal. The total cost to build and operate the ten-year proposal would be $3.9 billion
26
and, in addition to local-government funds, would be paid for with bonded debt, federal funding
and farebox revenues.
Proponents of the transit plan argued for the need for transit given the rapid growth experienced,
and projected for, the Puget Sound area. The business community was convinced that
transportation investment and improvements were needed to encourage continued growth and to
provide their employees with a pleasant living environment.
Opponents of the plan included many of the same groups that had opposed the initial, larger
transit plan. The group, Citizens Opposed to Sitting in Traffic (COST), was supported by road
building, trucking, and construction, retail, and real estate interests. COST campaigned on the
grounds that the RTA plan was not cost effective and would not reduce traffic congestion.
After the failure of the 1995 ballot initiative, the RTA set out to develop a plan that would more
closely match the preferences of the voting public. Early in the process of developing the new
transit plan, the RTA adopted a set of principles which called for a plan that would:
focus on the region's most congested transportation corridors;
be designed to recognize local as well as regional needs with services tailored to serve the
unique needs within each of the five RTA District subareas;
contain a balanced mix of transportation modes (i.e. commuter rail, light rail, regional bus,
HOV facilities, general traffic improvements);
spend local tax revenues and related debt for projects and services which benefit RTA
District subareas at a level generally in proportion to the revenues each subarea generates;
fund the system with new, local tax rates no higher than those used in the last ballot proposal
using conservative federal/state revenue projections; and
be completed within 10 years.
Understanding the reasons that voters did not approve the 1995 ballot initiative enabled the new
plan to be developed to match more closely voter preferences. According to a statement from
RTA Board Chair Bruce Laing in November 1995, These actions are a clear response to what
weve heard from the public since the last vote on regional transitBy adopting a set of
principles now we are telling the public early in the process the guidelines weve set on the size
and scope of the new proposal that we plan to submit to the region's voters...
The decision to hold a new vote in the Fall of 1996 provided the RTA with the flexibility to work
more closely with local governments and community organizations to decide whether the plan
27
should include a broader range of transportation improvements. The Fall 1996 date was also
selected to give the board time to conduct more exhaustive outreach to communities through the
recently-created Regional Outreach Committee of civic leaders.
Following the failed ballot proposal in spring 1995, the Regional Transit Authority took several
steps to involve key business and civic leaders in the formulation of a new proposal. RTAs
intention was to be as open as possible and to listen to opponents, as well as supporters, of the
first proposal. One of the steps RTA took was to form a Regional Outreach Committee to
review whatever new proposal would come forth and bring feedback from various points of
view. The committee comprised 15 members, including supporters and opponents of the first
RTA proposal. Among the members, there was balanced representation from the five subareas of
the RTA district as well as from labor, environmental, business and civic interests. The group
was chaired by Richard Ford, known in the region for various other public policy leadership
roles and as a former Executive Director of the Port of Seattle.
The group met frequently over the several months during which the RTA was developing a new
proposal. Staff and board members from the RTA sat in on the meetings to hear first hand the
discussion and the reactions of individual members to various concepts for a new proposal. It
was never expected that the group would reach consensus on any particular proposal. In the end,
a majority of the group did support the proposal that went to the voters and was approved.
In order to help support public discussion about the new ballot proposal, the RTA developed a
decision-making package, including background on the RTA, guidelines for developing a new
proposal, issues that needed to be resolved and some hypothetical examples of what the plan
could include. The package was designed to be used to help RTA board membersand the
Regional Outreach Committeework with the public to create a new transit proposal. As part of
the work program to develop the new proposal, the RTA met with local jurisdictions and interest
groups within the region's five subareas (Snohomish County, Seattle/North King County, East
King County, South King County and Pierce County). The RTA also held a regional workshop
of the board, subarea interest groups and local governments before developing its draft plan in
March and held public hearings in April.
In the course of developing the regional plan and campaigning for it, the pro-RTA campaign,
working with the Greater Seattle Chamber of Commerce, conducted a poll showing strong
support for rail transit among likely general election voters inside the RTA district and disbelief
that more roads would solve congestion. The polling was also used to test support for various
transit plan scenarios and subsequent levels of taxation. The pro-RTA campaign team also
conducted focus groups with likely voters, and that research was used to develop media
advertising messages and campaign strategy.
Because the taxes would primarily be used for new transit improvements, including bus service,
commuter rail, and light-rail, project proponents recognized that they could not argue for the tax
increase on the basis of relieving traffic congestion. Studies showed that the transit investments
28
would not have a significant impact on traffic congestion. As a result, the main message to voters
during the campaign was that transit improvements would provide an alternative to congested
highways, and provide a faster means of commuting to work. Proponents of the sales-tax
increase did not argue that congestion would be reduced. In this regard, there was, however, a
certain ambivalence in their message; some of the campaign advertising did say that the new
transit systems would take tens of thousands of cars a day off the regions freeways. Many in the
audience would likely have interpreted this to mean a reduction in congestion.
As a government agency, the Regional Transportation Authority could not directly campaign for
the transit proposal. However, it conducted numerous technical analyses and objective
information on the transit proposals, which in turn, helped the public to understand the costs and
benefits of the proposal. The state-appointed Puget Sound Region High Capacity Transit Expert
Review Panel (ERP), which was created by the Legislature as a safeguard to review and critique
the technical and financial work of the Regional Transit Authority staff, found that the RTA
technical work was reasonable and credible. As a result, the RTA was able to provide credible
information to the public, which in turn could be used by proponents in campaigning for the
ballot initiative.
Understanding the arguments of the opposition was also important in that it enabled the protransit campaign to tailor its message to counter the opposition. Being familiar with the
arguments made by COST, the pro-transit campaign aired commercials that raised the
oppositions questions and positively answered them, effectively inoculating the voting public
against the oppositions message.
There was no single individual who took on the role of a high-profile public messenger. The
Greater Seattle Chamber of Commerce and other pro-RTA groups took the lead in organizing the
public campaign. Phil Condit, the Boeing Companys CEO convened a business fund-raising
outreach program, that included Microsoft and other major local employers, which led to efforts
to win business and local government endorsements for the plan and neutralize opposition. As
much as anyone, Michael Vaska, a Seattle lawyer, was the individual driving and orchestrating
the campaign.
As a government organization, the Regional Transportation Authority could not be involved in a
campaign that promoted the designation of public funds. The RTA, however, did provide
objective information on the transit proposal that was used to inform the public throughout the
campaign. The RTA developed estimates of the economic and financial costs and benefits of the
transit proposal, as well as estimates of transit ridership and cost-effectiveness.
The campaign for the RTA proposal involved a very visible grass-roots element, including a
kickoff rally, volunteer phone calling, and outdoor sign waving. Pro-RTA campaign advertising
was used to raise and then answer a number of questions about the proposed project. This
29
strategy was described as inoculating voters against the oppositions messages. RTA advocates
used television, and to a lesser extent radio, to tell voters that the new transit proposal would take
tens of thousands of cars a day off the regions freeways..
Television was chosen as the primary mode of communication with the public because with the
variety of decisions to be made on the November 1996 ballot, particularly the presidential
election, the pro-RTA campaign felt the benefits of the transit project needed to stand out clearly
in peoples minds. The commercials used general images such as children planting a young tree,
or people commuting on transit systems and slogans such as Its about time, or Is it time for a
sound move? to promote investment in the RTA proposal as an investment in the future of the
region.
Key Factors in Success or Failure
The proposition was a success with 57 percent voter approval, compared to 47 percent in 1995.
One key factor was the significant reduction of the size of the proposed investment. Another
was the fact that the second vote attracted a much larger percentage of the population since it
was held in November 1996, with the election of the President, among other offices, on the
ballot. The first vote was a special election with only the transit program on the ballot.
In addition, large employers, as well as business and civic organizations, came out in support of
the plan. The regions large employers, including Boeing and the Microsoft Corporation, had
increased employment considerably and were concerned with employee transport. RTA received
position statements from 66 organizations, including cities, business organizations, labor unions,
civic and environmental groups, communicating their official positions on the regional transit
proposal on the November ballot. Of those received, 62 organizations indicated their support of
the proposal and four groups communicated their opposition. In fact, a number of organizations
that opposed or remained neutral on the 1995 ballot issue registered their support for the new
proposal, including the City of Everett, the City of Renton, and the Everett Chamber of
Commerce.
The campaign in 1995 was conducted during the winter using targeted direct mail and radio. The
1996 campaign was more visible, being conducted during the summer and fall with a grass-roots
element and an extensive television advertising schedule.
Continuing Efforts
The communications process did not end after the vote. Rather, the RTA recognized the
importance of continuing to involve the public in the implementation of the transit program as a
means to maintain support for the program. At the first meeting after the election, the RTA
Board passed Resolution No. 76, expressing its thanks to the region's voters for approving
Proposition No. 1 and to citizens, organizations, committees, and local jurisdictions which
supported and advocated the plan. The resolution also acknowledged the RTA's responsibilities
to the citizens within RTA District boundaries to diligently and efficiently use public funds now
entrusted by the November 5, 1996 vote. In addition, Resolution No. 76 called on citizens and
30
organizations previously opposed to the plan to join with the RTA so that the opinions and
advice of the entire Puget Sound community could be part of, and supportive to, the Sound Move
implementation process.
Over the following months, the RTAs action agenda included: appointing a Citizens Oversight
Committee and adopting a new citizen participation program; setting a state Legislative agenda;
securing federal funding; and adopting a six-year capital program.
ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MO (1998)

Contact
Freeman McCullah, Regional Commerce and Growth Association (RCGA): (314) 444-1155
The campaign concerned the extension of Page Avenue over the Missouri River with the
construction of a bridge connecting St. Louis County to St. Charles County. The issue was that
the construction of the bridge required the use of 36 acres of Creve Coeur Park. The State of
Missouri offered to add more than 1,000 acres to the park and construct a nature center, bike
trail, and soccer and polo fields in mitigation and replacement.
Background
The St. Louis County Council had to approve the land transfers to enable construction of the
bridge. Although the bridge had already received all environmental clearances, a number of
environmental and other groups, including church groups and municipalities, opposed the bridge.
Together, these groups were able to block action and force a referendum in St. Louis County.
The ballot asked voters to support the Page Avenue Extension agreement to grant easements
through Creve Coeur Park, accept more than 1,000 acres of land for mitigation (as the extension
would take parkland), and authorize leases so that some businesses could remain on the
mitigation land. The voters were not voting directly on the $350 million highway project.
The Controversy
The Regional Commerce and Growth Association (RCGA) strongly supported the bridge
extension, believing that without the extension, traffic congestion would slow economic
development and raise the costs of doing business within the region, forcing businesses to stop or
slow expansions, and possibly leave the region. The need for the Page Avenue extension had
been studied as part of the regions plan since the late 1960s, and the corridor had been preserved
since the early 1970s. Public meetings were held in the late 1980s and early 1990s, at which time
no St. Louis County municipality had come out against the project.
A coalition of environmental and other groups including the Coalition for the Environment, the
St. Louis County Municipal League, and Churches United for Community Action opposed the
31
bridge project. They saw the extension as a threat to the Creve Coeur Park, an encourager of
urban sprawl, and a damaging drain on other areas of the county.
The intended audience for this campaign was the voters of St. Louis County. When it was ruled
that there would be a referendum, the RCGA conducted a poll to determine whether there were
support for the bridge, and if so, who would support it and why. The RCGA found that the
general voter was concerned with reducing traffic congestion and with economic growth.
The City of St. Charles in St. Charles County is a prosperous suburban area. Employment levels
are high and many St. Charles County residents work in St. Louis County and in the City of St.
Louis. Many St. Louis County residents work in St. Charles County. The RCGA made a pitch to
voters that the bridge was an economic benefit for the whole region because a reduction in
congestion would provide improved access to jobs in St. Charles County, and improve the
commute for county residents.
The RCGA argued for the bridge for many reasons:
The movement of freight through the region was seen as critical for the region to take
advantage of its central geographic location, the region needed to move people and goods
more efficiently through the area. The Page Avenue bridge will draw away some of the
commuter traffic now using the route I-70 crossing of the Missouri River. I-70 is the major
freight corridor in the state of Missouri and a major east-west trucking route for the nation.
Points along I-70 handle the highest volume of vehicles each day on any road in the state,
and supporters of the extension argued that delays on I-70 would be extended to six hours or
more daily (with additional traffic delays on Routes 40 and 64 also increasing), with travel to
and from the airport becoming a major problem even as the airport is going through an
expansion. These types of delays would quickly become unacceptable for all types of
travelers, and increase air pollution significantly.
Population growth continues and a strong infrastructure system is needed to manage this
population increase. Without maintaining mobility in the region, jobs are at risk. For
example, businesses that depend on efficient freight movement in the area may choose not to
expand their operations, and the ability of existing workers to travel to their jobs will also be
negatively impacted.
Highway funds will be lost. The moneys earmarked for this project were not expected to be
allocated to other projects in the St. Louis region, but rather to other projects within the state
of Missouri that are ready to move forward
The Page Avenue extension will not lead to sprawl. The area where Page avenue will
terminate is already more than 70 percent developed, so the real issue is enabling residents to
32
continue to commute to jobs within St. Louis county instead of accelerating the movement of
individuals to jobs out to other counties.
The additional acreage and other improvements as part of the project will enhance the park
and increase the number of individuals using the area. In addition, some of the
improvements will be preventative, such as a siltation basin, which will reduce dredging
expenses in the future. The size of the park will be almost doubled from 1,137 acres to 2,181
acres. A new bike path will be developed, the lake will be dredged, and a siltation basin will
be added to eliminate the need for future dredging. A Nature Center will be developed in a
pre-existing building, connected to a bike path and parking lot. Other park amenities will
also be further developed, including sports fields and parking spaces for park users. Wetland
will be restored and development in the flood plain will be reduced.
The extension is critical to long term economic development. The extension was expected to
create, according to the Missouri Department of Economic Development, over 7,100 jobs
over five years.

Since the St. Louis region is segmented into numerous municipalities, there are few
organizations or public officials that speak as a regional voice on transportation issues. There
was no single, high-profile individual who served as the principal public salesman for the
campaign.
The RCGA is one of the few regionally oriented groups and the only one that deals with
transportation issues. The RCGA serves the 12 county metropolitan area including St. Louis
City, and St. Louis, St. Charles, Jefferson, Franklin, Lincoln and Warren counties in Missouri
and Madison, St. Clair, Monroe, Clinton and Jersey counties in Illinois. Due to its position, the
RCGA headed the initiative to plan and promote the Page Avenue Bridge.
Civic Progress, a group comprising 26 area CEOs provided funding for the campaign and also
provided major messengers in the campaign. RCGA ran a speakers bureau and the CEOs were
sent out as spokespeople.
A professional campaign director was hired by the RCGA and ran a standard campaign
operation. RCGA took the lead publicly as well as in financing the campaign. The general
strategy focused on avoiding a long, protracted public effort and instead pursuing a short,
relatively late campaign that operated in the month leading up to the vote. The late
campaign was utilized to avoid giving the opposition the opportunity to develop negative
messages against the campaign. The campaign had a budget of $750,000 and utilized television,
mail, telephones, radio and billboards. Polls showed that voters were more concerned about
congestion than about the park and campaign material emphasized congestion relief and quality
of life issues. The campaign focused secondarily on job creation and economic development,
33
and targeted this message primarily to the voters in northern St. Louis County where the
economic benefits of the bridge would most likely be received.
Targeted political initiatives were designed to: 1) minimize the oppositions ability to attract
additional political support; and 2) challenge the oppositions support among mayors and other
political officials. This was achieved by focusing on the potential economic benefits of the
bridge. The bridge was promoted as a solution to increasing congestion which would eventually
be a detriment to the county as it lost corporations to other cities and local businesses had
reduced revenue due to transportation problems. It was estimated that the construction of the
bridge would create 11,000 construction jobs over ten years, and would have an overall
economic impact of $830 million and 13,000 permanent jobs. The bridge was also to be paid for
by state and federal dollars that would be lost to other parts of the state if they were not used.
The bridge won, 2-1, in the St. Louis County referendum. The factors seem to be a united
business community and the fact the voters believed the bridge would help with congestion and
the local economy.
34
CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS
INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE
This Chapter provides information that can assist state and local transportation agencies,
communications professionals, and policy makers in developing communications strategies to
gain public support for transportation investment projects and programs. The Chapter uses realworld examples to provide lessons on successful communications techniques and to describe best
practices in developing and implementing communication strategies.
This Chapter forms the basis of the companion product under NCHRP 2-22(2) entitled Best
Practices Digest which has been designed as a supporting companion to the Communications
Guide developed under NCHRP Project 2-22. The Communications Guide identifies five
elements of a successful communications campaign based on market research regarding public
perceptions on the economic impacts of transportation. The market research, however, does not
lend itself to an all-inclusive list of dos and donts for planners. As a result, the
Communications Guide notes that its recommendations are suggestive, not prescriptive
The real world examples in this Chapter are designed to provide supporting information on how
communications initiatives have successfully been undertaken. The Chapter uses four example
campaigns developed under NCHRP Project 2-22(2) to describe each element of a
communications campaign and to highlight practices and lessons learned from these experiences.
This Chapter is not meant to be prescriptive or to serve as a how-to manual. Rather, it
emphasizes lessons learned from actual experience
Figure 3: Key Elements of a
and highlights how different approaches have been
Successful Communications
taken to run successful communications campaigns in
Strategy
different circumstances. These best practices are
presented to help practitioners in designing and
Element 1
implementing their own communications strategies.
Elements of Successful Communications Strategy

While there is no simple blueprint for success in
communicating the economic impacts of
transportation investments, NCHRP 2-22 identified a
set of five broad elements for a successful
communications campaign. Figure 3 illustrates these
elements.
Chapter Organization
Element 2

Element 3

Element 4

Element 5
Integrating and Sustaining Communications
This Chapter is organized around the five

communications process elements illustrated above. The Chapter discusses the five
35
communication-process elements in the context of four successful efforts to communicate the

benefits of transportation investments.
The Chapter compares actual practices in the four examples with the conclusions of market
research conducted under NCHRP 2-22. As noted earlier, the market research did not lend itself
to prescriptive recommendations regarding the dos and donts of a communications
campaign. While these examples are not prescriptive either, they provide lessons on approaches
that were effective in winning support for new transportation investments. They also demonstrate
that different approaches can be executed successfully in different circumstances. As a result,
planners should find the best practices from these examples helpful in designing and
implementing their own communication campaigns.
REAL WORLD EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGNS

Selecting the Examples
In selecting examples to be used in this Chapter, four example campaigns were chosen by the
project panel for NCHRP Project 2-22(2) from among nine candidate campaigns identified in the
course of the project. The nine example campaigns were each subjectively assessed according to
four criteria:
1. Robustness of Communication/Campaign Activitiesthe extent to which the campaigns
were organized to address specific transportation investments;
2. Availability of Documentationthe extent to which documented materials and empirical
information were available rather than just anecdotal accounts;
3. Degree of Challengethe extent to which the campaigns faced multiple barriers to
implementation, such as environmental issues; and
4. Modal Diversityan attempt was made to include campaigns that were broader than only
highway-related investments.
Each example campaign was ranked according to these criteria, and with these subjective
rankings in mind, the research team further narrowed the group down using three additional
criteria:
1. The decision process used to decide to undertake a communications campaign;
2. The extent to which there were specific processes used for identifying and targeting
audiences, crafting messages, and designating messengers; and
3. The effectiveness of communications techniques and media employed.
On the basis of the initial rankings and these criteria, the list of examples was narrowed down to
four campaigns for in-depth analysis.
36
Four Campaign Examples

The four examples of successful communications campaigns used in this Chapter include efforts
to communicate the benefits of transportation projects/programs in Charlotte-Mecklenburg
County, North Carolina; St. Louis County, Missouri; Santa Clara County, California; and the
Seattle-Puget Sound Region, Washington. These four locations are distributed geographically
across the U.S., as show in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Locations of Example Campaigns
Seattle-Puget Sound,
Washington (1996)
Santa Clara County,
California (1996)
Charlotte-Mecklenburg County,
North Carolina (1998)
St. Louis County,

Missouri (1998)
These four communication campaigns have two overarching common elements:

1. Each campaign involved a public vote with a choice whether or not to support a
transportation program or project; and
2. Each was successful in securing public approval for the transportation project.
The four campaigns, however, were distinct from each other in many ways. Each campaign was
undertaken in a different part of the U.S., with unique circumstances surrounding the issues,
including the record of transportation investment in the region and the history of the debate on
the proposal being considered. Each campaign also involved a different set of political players
and stakeholder groups.
Each campaign is described briefly below.
Puget Sound area, Washington
The voters within the Washington Regional Transportation Authority (RTA) district were asked
in November 1996 to approve a measure to increase taxes to fund a set of transportation
improvements, consisting primarily of new bus, commuter-rail, and light-rail service. The taxes
were to include a local sales tax increase of four-tenths of one percent (an increase of four cents
37
on a $10 purchase) and a motor vehicle excise tax (license plate tabs) increase of three-tenths of
one percent (an increase of about $30 a year on a vehicle valued at $10,000), and were to provide
the local portion of revenues to develop and operate the RTA's proposed $3.9 billion Ten-year
Plan, called Sound Move. A much larger transit program had been voted down in 1995.
Following the 1995 defeat, the RTA launched an effort to develop a new transit proposal and
provide the public with information on the benefits of the new proposal. As a public agency,
however, the RTA could not be directly involved in a political campaign on raising or using
public funds. Business groups, including the Greater Seattle Chamber of Commerce, undertook
the political campaign needed to secure voters support for the measure. The proposition was
successful with 57 percent voter approval, compared to 47 percent for the 1995 measure.
Two ballot measures were placed before the voters of Santa Clara County in November 1996:
Measure A, an advisory measure on a specific package of transportation projects for the county,
to be funded with proceeds of any new voter-approved sales taxes; and Measure B, a binding
measure on whether the Board of Supervisors should enact a one-half percent sales tax with a
nine-year time frame, with the implicit understanding that the County would use the revenue to
carry out the projects in Measure A.
A communications campaign was undertaken by the Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group to
garner support for Measures A and B, using a variety of mailings and television and radio spots.
The two measures were approved by the voters.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg County, North Carolina
Mecklenburg County, NC, which includes the city of Charlotte, held a referendum in November
1998 on a one-half percentage point increase in the county sales tax, with proceeds to be used to
support a bond issue to fund transportation improvements in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg 2025
Integrated Transit/Land Use Plan. A broad communications process involving a series of
eighteen meetings over five months was undertaken to involve the public in the development of
the transportation-land use plan and to secure voter approval of the sales tax increase. The
outreach process began in the Fall of 1997, after the state legislature authorized the referendum.
The outreach process resulted in the development of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg 2025 Integrated
Transit/Land Use Plan, which called for the creation of five transit corridors with improved bus
service, pedestrian infrastructure and roadways linking communities to the transit corridors.
The County Commissioners agreed to put the proposal on the ballot in early Fall of 1998. At that
point, an intense period of campaigning for approval of the bond issue was undertaken using
television and radio spots, newspaper coverage, leaflets, and other traditional campaign
techniques. The referendum was approved with 58 percent of the citizens voting for the tax
increase.
38

In 1998, residents of St. Louis County voted in a referendum to approve a set of agreements that
would allow building of the Page Avenue Bridge connecting St. Louis County to St. Charles
County across the Missouri River, thereby improving the links between the two counties and
giving the City of St. Louis a new link through St. Louis County to St. Charles County, an
important suburban area. The ballot asked voters to approve an agreement to grant easements
through Creve Coeur Park, accept more than 1,000 acres of land for mitigation (since the Page
Avenue extension would take parkland), and authorize leases so that some businesses could
remain on the mitigation land.
Environmental and some religious and municipal groups opposed the bridge, while local
business groups, including the Regional Commerce and Growth Association (RCGA), supported
the bridge as necessary for economic growth. The RCGA took the lead in developing a campaign
to support the referendum, including use of television, mail, radio, and billboards. The measure
passed 2-1 in the election.
Lessons Learned
The five key elements of a successful communications strategy (Figure 1, above) were involved
in each campaign but, of course, in different ways. As a result, the examples demonstrate that
there is no one size fits all approach to success. Rather, techniques and methods must be
adapted to the unique circumstances of each region and the transportation issues being debated.
These five key elements (identified in NCHRP 2-22) are discussed below, highlighting lessons
learned from the approaches used in the four example campaigns.
ELEMENT 1: IDENTIFYING AND UNDERSTANDING THE AUDIENCE

The first element in developing a successful communications campaign is to identify the target
audience and assess the audiences understanding of relevant issues.
Identify the Audience
To communicate a message effectively, one first needs to understand the audience to be reached
and how members of that audience perceive the issues at hand. Identifying key groups of voters
and understanding their concerns enables the backers of a project to adjust both their proposal
and their message to the public so they will resonate with relevant stakeholders.
The scope of expected project benefits and costs, and their impact on various groups within the
voting public, is an important consideration in winning voter support. In particular, citizen
perceptions that they may be paying for a project that benefits other people can adversely affect
voter support.
In the Puget Sound area, for example, voter perceptions about the equity of the costs and
benefits of the transit proposals were crucial to the votes that took place in 1995 and 1996. Both
39
of these ballot initiatives were put before the voters of the Regional Transportation Authority
(RTA) district. The RTA district covers the most congested urban areas of King, Pierce, and
Snohomish counties (including the cities of Seattle, Bellevue, Tacoma, and Everett and many
smaller towns and suburbs). The RTA district boundary lines generally follow the urban-growth
boundaries created in accord with Washingtons Growth Management Act.
In the unsuccessful March 1995 vote, opponents in Everett focused on the plans lack of lightrail service to that city as evidence the plan was unfair. The plan included light rail connecting
Seattle, Bellevue, and Tacoma, with one terminus of the line just two miles south of the Everett
city limits. Opponents in Everett argued that they would be paying for services elsewhere in the
RTA district that they would never use. This view was shared by leaders of the city of Renton in
King County who believed the plan did not provide Renton a level of benefit commensurate with
the taxes to be paid there. In both these areas, opponents were successful in getting business and
political leaders to oppose the transit plan.
In the post-defeat efforts to craft a new plan, a set of guiding principles was adopted which called
for the new transit proposal to be regional, but also to recognize needs identified locally in each
of the RTA districts five subareas. Under this framework, there would be a close match between
the revenues generated in each subarea and the transit services provided there. In fact, financial
policies were put in place to construct firewalls between subarea revenues so that cost overruns
in one subarea could not impact projects in another subarea. A consequence of this was a greater
sense of equity, a feeling that tax payments and benefits were in balance for most people.
Similarly, in Charlotte, the Transit/Land Use Plan focused on five transportation corridors in
Mecklenburg County: Northeast, Southeast (Independence), South, West (Airport), and North.
The framework of the plan included rapid transit in each corridor and also recognized the need
for transit in areas between the corridors.
In contrast to these two cases, the vote regarding the Page Avenue Bridge in St. Louis County
involved only the voters of St. Louis County, even though the bridge was to link St. Louis
County with St. Charles County over the Missouri River and would also have an effect on people
in the City of St. Louis. In this case, the project could provide substantial economic benefits to
people outside the jurisdiction where the decision lay. In fact, the bridge was seen as a way to
allow St. Charles County, a prosperous suburban area, to grow further. But the vote was limited
to St. Louis County so the message needed to be tailored to voters in St. Louis County and
benefits to them. Since the proposal did not involve taxes, the issue of fiscal equity did not arise.
Santa Clara County, California, is a large county, which includes much of the area commonly
termed Silicon Valley and encompasses the cities of San Jose, Palo Alto, and Santa Clara,
among others. The proposed transit and highway projects were to benefit businesses and
residents of Santa Clara County, as well as improve linkages with other counties. The proposal
included transit projects to link Silicon Valley to the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) System in
Alameda County and to increase CalTrain Service which connects to San Francisco. The
transportation program also included widening a number of Interstate highways that help to
connect the county to surrounding areas. The proposed program would primarily benefit
40
residents and businesses in Santa Clara County but would also have some effect on the broader
region. Understanding who the voters were and the relevance of these transportation investments
to them was an important component in the development of the communications campaign.
Use Information on Public Opinion in Developing the Proposal
One overarching lesson that emerges from the campaign examples is the importance of
understanding public preferences prior to final development of an investment proposal, rather
than after presenting it to the public. There are, basically, two methods of getting this
information:
Involve the public directly in the planning process
Use polls, focus groups, and other devices to learn about public opinion.
With the first method, the public is brought directly into project development through workshops
and similar techniques and participates in decisions on the components of the project. With the
second method, transportation professionals develop the project, but information on public
opinion is brought into the process and adjustments in project components are made as
appropriate.
The first method was used extensively, and effectively, in Charlotte. In the other three cases, the
second method predominated. In the Puget Sound region, however, an advisory committee was
also used. It did not directly participate in project planning, but it met frequently to discuss the
issues; professional staff attended the meetings, and the discussions gave them valuable
information for project development. None of these approaches can be taken as a guarantor of
success. Substantial public involvement through planning workshops, for example, was used for
development of a Denver rail-transit project that was defeated at the polls in 1997.
Direct Public InvolvementThe Charlotte Example
The potential gain from direct public involvement in planning is that a substantial portion of
voters is convinced of the desirability of the project by the time the planning process is complete.
The method certainly appears to have worked in this fashion in Charlotte-Mecklenburg County.
It is useful, therefore, to include some details of the Charlotte experience in this Chapter.
An extensive public involvement and education process using the theme, The Wheels of
Change: A Community in Motion, was developed. The purpose of the effort was twofold: to
educate citizens on transit alternatives, the transit/land use relationship, and the issues involved
in regional transit planning; and to involve citizens in the planning process itself.
The public involvement campaign included the following components:
Three public meetings, two of which were televised live, providing opportunities for people
to call in questions and comments. These meetings were taped for multiple rebroadcasts.
41
Three sets of corridor group meetings (April, May and June) were held in each of the five
corridors, for a total of 15 corridor group meetings. These meetings constituted the "core" of
public involvement. The meetings gave citizens hands-on opportunities to participate with
the consultants in creating the planfrom locating alignments and stations to selecting
preferred transit technologies and identifying areas for potential development/redevelopment.
During each meeting, different aspects of the emerging plan were presented and discussed.
Participants used large maps of the corridors to provide comments on alignments, station
locations and other aspects of the plan. Attendance exceeded 200 people per month.
e-Mail opportunities for citizens to send comments and questions and receive prompt
The public involvement program also focused considerable effort on educating the public about
the planning process and opportunities to participate in the process. Outreach activities included:
Speakers bureau presentations to civic and neighborhood groups throughout the County.
Road signage (similar to zoning notices) highlighting dates and times of corridor group
meetings.
Media relations activities, including assisting reporters with information and story ideas and
participating in television programs and radio talk shows focusing on the transit planning
process. These activities resulted in extensive and detailed media coverage throughout the
entire process.
Due to the amount of work and coordination required, considerable staff and consultant
resources were dedicated to developing and implementing the public-involvement effort. Staff
from the City of Charlottes Corporate Communications office, Mecklenburg Countys Public
Service and Information Department, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Planning Commission and
42
Charlotte Department of Transportation worked together with a local consultant with expertise in
constituencies and land use and another local consultant who served as a liaison with minority
communities. Additionally, specially trained facilitators were hired to assist in conducting
corridor group meetings. As all of these activities were in the nature of public education and
solicitation of public contribution to the planning process, local governments were not inhibited
by restraints on political-campaign activities.
A specific effort also was made to include citizens in a more formalized way through a Transit
Planning Advisory Committee (T-PAC). The Charlotte City Council, Mecklenburg County
Board of Commissioners, Mecklenburg County School Board, and the towns of Matthews, Mint
Hill, Pineville, Cornelius, Huntersville, and Davidson appointed 21 citizens to serve on the TPAC. The charge to this committee included:
Determining whether the developed plan provided sufficient basis for citizens to vote on a
half-cent sales-tax increase as a funding source.
Making a collective go/no-go decision on whether to recommend holding a Fall 1998

referendum.
T-PAC met 11 times between March and August 1998 to hear reports from the consultants,
discuss technical aspects of the developing plan, and review input from citizens.
Citizen involvement in the corridor and public meetings, as well as input provided through the
variety of other public involvement methods, helped the consultant team to understand better the
transit/land use needs and wishes of the community. Many of the specifics of the 2025 plan that
emerged were provided in direct response to comments and suggestions from citizens.
Contributions from the corridor meetings, for example, provided the basis for several changes to
the consultants original vision for transit and land use development.
The high level of public involvement helped justify taking the sales-tax increase to a referendum
and served as a foundation for the ensuing campaign to win voter support for the tax increase. In
this way, the public became invested in the transportation plan and were willing to support it on
the ballot.
An Advisory CouncilPuget Sound
The defeat of an ambitious transit project in a 1995 referendum posed a particular challenge for
the Regional Transit Authority and other backers of the project as they sought to win voter
approval of a scaled-down version in 1996. The RTA needed to know why they had lost the first
time out.
Following the failure in the spring of 1995, the RTA took several steps to involve key business
and civic leaders in the formulation of the next proposal. RTAs intention was to be as open as
possible and to listen to opponents as well as supporters of the first proposal. RTA formed a
43
Regional Outreach Committee to review a new proposal and provide feedback from a wide
spectrum of opinion. The committee comprised 15 members including opponents as well as
supporters of the first proposal. Among the 15, there was geographic balance among the five
subareas of the RTA district and there was representation from labor, environmental, business,
and civic groups. The committee was chaired by Richard Ford, known in the region for various
other public-policy leadership roles and a former Executive Director of the Port of Seattle.
The group met frequently over several months while the RTA was developing a new proposal.
Staff and board members from the RTA sat in on the meetings to hear the discussion first hand
and to learn the reactions of individual members to various concepts under consideration.
As one result of the committees work, the RTA adopted a set of principles and guidelines for the
new transit proposal that emphasized the voters desires for a broader range of transportation
investments with lower total cost. It was never expected that the outreach committee would reach
consensus on a new proposal, but, in the end, a majority of the group did support the proposal
that was successfully taken to the voters.
Polls, Surveys, and Focus Groups
The Communications Guide developed under NCHRP 2-22 suggested that it might be useful to
segment an audience into different groups in order to tailor different messages to each group.
Audience segments, in this view, could be specified according to stakeholder roles, socioeconomic characteristics, or perceptions regarding the relationship of transportation to economic
growth. In the actuality of the campaigns studied, however, such an effort to segment voters was
made only in Santa Clara County. Some segmentation of voters, however, according to
geographic location and relative impact of improvements was a feature of every campaign.
The campaigns did, indeed, use focus groups and surveys to gain an understanding of voters
preferences and attitudes. But the usual purpose was to gain an assessment of overall views of
the electorate in order to craft messages to the broad voting audience. Focus groups and surveys
were also used to help develop proposals before taking them to the voters and sometimes to
refine ballot language.
In the Puget Sound area, for example, the Greater Seattle Chamber of Commerce, along with
other pro-transit groups, conducted a poll of likely general election voters in the RTA district.
The poll examined the level of support for rail transit and was used to test support for various
transit plan scenarios and associated levels of taxation. The poll showed strong support for rail
transit among likely voters and a disbelief that more roads would solve congestion. The pro-RTA
campaign also conducted focus groups with likely voters in order to develop media advertising
messages.
In St. Louis County, market research was used to gauge voter sentiment. The Regional
Commerce and Growth Association (RCGA), which strongly supported the Page Avenue bridge,
conducted a poll to determine if there were support for the bridge, and if so, who would support
it and why. The RCGA found that the general voter was concerned with reducing traffic
44
congestion and, to a lesser degree, economic growth. This poll did segment the audience in the
sense it was found that voters who lived near St. Charles County were aware of economic
impacts in terms of improved access to jobs in St. Charles County.
In Santa Clara County, there was an effort to segment the audience into distinct groups in order
to identify voter groups and understand the views of different constituencies. Supporters of the
ballot initiatives hired a pollster to conduct surveys of the voting public prior to final
development of the ballot language. Three surveys were conducted to determine what interest
groups existed in the county, what issues defined them, and what types of transportation projects
and subsequent levels of taxation they would support. Interest groups were established along
geographic, gender, age, and other lines, and their interests and concerns identified. Polls and
focus groups were used to test ballot language and gauge support for different types of
transportation investments.
In Charlotte, in addition to the extensive outreach effort, there was also a poll on voters
attitudes towards economic growth and mass transit.
ELEMENT 2: CRAFTING THE MESSAGE

The second communications element identified in NCHRP 2-22 is crafting effective messages to
the audience. Success depends in large part on understanding the concerns of the audience as
discussed in the preceding section. But the information developed on voter opinions must be
used skillfully to develop media messages that reach, and move, voters. In the example
campaigns, certain types of messages resonated more strongly with citizens than did others. The
experience of these campaigns also showed the importance of responding to the opposition's
messages.
Messages that Resonate
Research conducted for NCHRP 2-22 found that economic benefits did not, generally, make the
most powerful messages in securing support for transportation investments. For the most part,
economic benefit messages were no more powerful than messages about improved safety,
environmental quality, or reduced travel time. The research also found that the importance of
specific messages varies for different groups of people. Traffic congestion is an important issue
in garnering support for transportation investments in urban and suburban areas, while retaining
area businesses is more important to rural residents than to urban or suburban residents.
NCHRP 2-22 field tests conducted in three regional sitesDetroit, Tampa, and Seattle
demonstrate that the most important messages can differ in different parts of the country. For
example, the survey found that messages about creating jobs were as likely to produce support
for transportation projects in Detroit as messages about reducing accidents, improving air
quality, and improving traffic congestion. In Tampa and Seattle, creating new jobs ranked
considerably lower than the other three messages. In Seattle, reducing traffic congestion was the
most important message for voters.
45
Congestion Relief/Alternatives to Congestion

In all four cases, the campaigns focused heavily on the issue of traffic congestion. Congestion
was the dominant issue in Santa Clara County, the Puget Sound area, and Charlotte. In St. Louis
County, economic issues were raised somewhat more frequently.
In Santa Clara County, the Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group used a multi-faceted message
emphasizing how the transportation investments would add to quality of life. Business leaders
and other supporters of the measures wanted transportation improvements to reduce traffic
congestion, make employees commutes less stressful and time-consuming, improve safety, and
provide additional transportation alternatives. Their pitch was largely on these issues,
highlighting congestion relief. The effect of congestion relief on the local economy got some
attention, the point being that the area could not continue to flourish if workers found commuting
conditions intolerable.
In the Puget Sound area and in Charlotte, traffic congestion was also a central issue. In each
place, however, the transportation program on the ballot was a transit program, and studies
showed that the transit investments would not have a significant impact on traffic congestion. As
a result, proponents of the transit plans could not argue for the tax increase on the basis of
relieving traffic congestion. The message to voters in these campaigns was that transit
improvements would provide an alternative to congested highways and a faster or pleasanter
means of commuting to work. In this regard, there was, however, a certain ambivalence in the
Puget Sound message; some of the campaign advertising did say that the new transit systems
would take tens of thousands of cars a day off the regions freeways. Many in the audience
would likely have interpreted this to mean a reduction in congestion.
Research conducted by a public relations firm in Charlotte revealed that 86 percent of the
citizens believed Charlotte would continue to enjoy a rapid rate of growth and prosperity. It also
found 81 percent believed a better mass transit system was needed to cope with this growth, 45
percent felt traffic congestion was a problem, and 62 percent supported the Citys desire for
developers to follow planned land development patterns concentrated along the Countys major
transportation corridors. These findings supported the Citys intention of investing in rapid
transit and showed that convincing the public of a need for transit would not be necessary. That
need was already evident to the public; what the campaign had to do was show the public that the
right rapid-transit system was going to be developed.
Economic and Transportation Benefits
In St. Louis County, the Regional Commerce and Growth Association (RCGA) worked up a
number of economic arguments but, in the end, made limited use of some of them. A principal
argument, that was used in the campaign, was that the bridge would be an economic benefit for
the region because it would reduce congestion, provide improved access to jobs in St. Charles
County, and improve the commute for St. Louis County residents. Infrastructure improvements
were needed because of rapid population growth, and that jobs would be at risk if mobility were
46
not preserved. This theme is similar to ones developed in the other campaignsthat economic
growth would be threatened if relief from highway congestion were not, in some way, provided.
It was also argued that the bridge would have a favorable effect on the movement of freight
throughout the region, because a new river crossing would take some commuter traffic off I-70,
the major freight corridor in the state of Missouri and a major east-west trucking route for the
nation.
Another argument was that if the bridge were not built, highway funds for the St. Louis region
would be lost. Funds earmarked for the bridge would not be allocated to other projects around St.
Louis, but to other projects in Missouri that were ready to move forward.
The RCGA also made a case that the additional acreage and other improvements to Creve Coeur
Park as part of the project would enhance the park and increase the number of individuals using
the area. The size of the park was to be almost doubled from 1,137 acres to 2,181 acres. A new
bike path was to be developed, the lake was to be dredged, and a siltation basin added to
eliminate the need for future dredging. A nature center was to be developed in a pre-existing
building, connected to a bike path and parking lot. Other park amenities were also to be further
developed, including sports fields and parking spaces. Wetlands were to be restored and
development in the flood plain reduced.
When it came to the actual campaign, the focus was on delivering a somewhat simpler message
to the voters. The chosen strategy was to avoid a long, protracted public effort and pursue a
short, relatively late campaign utilizing television, mail, telephones, radio and billboards.
Polls showed that voters were more concerned about congestion than about the park and
campaign material emphasized congestion relief and quality of life issues. The campaign
focused secondarily on job creation and economic issues, and targeted this message primarily to
the northern part of the county, the part nearest to St. Charles County across the river.
Local Benefits
The transportation projects considered here all had region-wide benefits, but audiences tended to
be most receptive to messages showing how programs would bring benefits directly to their own
communities and to themselves.
In Charlotte, the 2025 Integrated Transit/Land Use Plan was developed with five priority transit
corridors, based on previous studies that had identified these corridors as the most viable
locations for primary rapid transit lines. The designation of five transit corridors immediately
created geographic areas that could be perceived as getting more benefit from the project than
other parts of Mecklenburg County. For this reason, the Plan also provided for investment in
transportation projects that would benefit other parts of the county as well. Otherwise, people
living outside the designated transit corridors were likely to feel that they would not benefit from
the Plan.
The Plans recommendations were set in the context of improving the entire existing public
transportation system and improving the regional highway system. Improvements outside of the
47
transit corridors included lateral connections between the corridors and to key development hubs
outside the corridors. It was also recognized in the Plan that the rapid transit alignment and
service proposed for each corridor could be extended into adjacent jurisdictions in the future.
In the Puget Sound area, the RTA District was divided into five sub-areas: Snohomish County,
North King County, South King County, East King County, and Pierce County. Part of the
proposal was to distribute projects equitably so that spending would benefit the five sub-areas
based on the share of revenues each sub-area generates. As a result, residents could be assured
that their tax dollars would not go largely to fund projects in other parts of the District.
Responding to Opposition
A good understanding of the opposition is a necessary requirement for crafting an effective
message. Understanding arguments against a transportation proposal enables supporters of the
proposal to develop effective counter-arguments and restrict the oppositions ability to attract
voters. Understanding the opposition can also be used to adapt the transportation investment
proposals so that opposition is reduced, if not altogether eliminated.
In St. Louis County, the controversy over the Page Avenue Bridge project involved a
combination of business groups supporting the bridge and environmental groups, along with
some church groups and municipal governments, opposing the bridge. Although the bridge
project had already received all environmental clearances, a coalition of environmental and other
groups the Coalition for the Environment, the St. Louis County Municipal League, and
Churches United for Community Action were able to block action and force a referendum in
St. Louis County. The opposition to the project saw the extension as a threat to Creve Coeur Park
and an encouragement of urban sprawl.
Understanding the oppositions argument, the Regional Commerce and Growth Association
(RCGA) undertook to weaken the oppositions support and its ability to attract support. Targeted
political initiatives were designed to challenge the oppositions support among mayors and other
elected officials and to minimize the oppositions ability to attract additional political support.
RCGA argued that the Page Avenue extension would not lead to sprawl because the area where
Page Avenue will terminate is already more than 70 percent developed. The campaign
emphasized that the bridge would improve access to St. Louis County, enabling St. Charles
County residents to continue to commute to jobs in St. Louis County, rather than accelerating the
dispersal of individuals to dwellings nearer jobs in other counties. It also noted that
improvements as part of the project would enhance the park and increase the number of
individuals using the area, rather than threatening the park.
In the Puget Sound area, the transit program was opposed by Citizens Opposed to Sitting in
Traffic (COST), a coalition of road building, trucking, and suburban retail, real estate and home
construction groups that had successfully opposed the 1995 transit investment initiative in the
Puget Sound area. COST had opposed the 1995 initiative on the grounds that the transit plan was
not cost effective and would not reduce traffic congestion.
48
Supporters of the 1996 initiative tailored their message to counter the arguments used by the
opposition in 1995. The advertising campaign focused on raising and then answering a number
of questions about the proposed initiative. The pro-transit campaign aired commercials that
raised the oppositions points and strongly refuted them, effectively inoculating the voting
public against the oppositions message.
ELEMENT 3: DESIGNATING THE MESSENGER

The third element of a communications campaign is to designate a messenger or messengers to
deliver the chosen messages. The Communications Guide developed under NCHRP 2-22
highlights the importance of selecting an appropriate messenger, but acknowledges that in some
cases the chosen communications technique may not require selecting a specific messenger. For
example, an educational campaign consisting only of billboards and shopping mall displays may
not require a high-profile individual as messenger.
In practice, most of the communications campaigns involved a set of messengers. The
messengers, however, often were not specifically selected by the transportation agencies. Rather,
the messengers evolved from those who were most interested in promoting the transportation
investments and had the clout and/or resources to participate in the campaign in a significant
way. Generally, the messengers identified themselves in the initial stages of developing the
campaign typically before audience preferences had been analyzed and before the message
itself had been fully developed. In fact, the messengers typically not only functioned as
spokespersons for the campaigns, but were integrally involved in developing campaign strategies
and messages.
Credibility of the Messenger
Overall, the examples show no clear convergence on any particular type of messenger as most
effective for promoting transportation investments. Instead, they demonstrate that the
effectiveness of messengers must depend on the circumstances surrounding the individual
campaign, including the personalities of individuals, public perceptions, and time and resources.
Most importantly, the messenger must be credible with the target audience, which often requires
empathy with audience concerns. For example, a project whose outcomes affect one
neighborhood in particular may call for an area resident to bring credibility to the message. A
longer-term and broader transportation investment initiative may, however, be most persuasively
presented by an official of a local or state transportation agency. Correspondingly, some
individuals or groups may make poor messengers if they are viewed suspiciously by the public.
In some cases, specific efforts were made to keep a low profile for certain groups involved in the
campaign.
Role of the Business Community
Research conducted for NCHRP 2-22 suggests that economic impact messages may be most
effectively communicated by members of the business community, rather than elected officials
49
or transportation planners themselves. Local business leaders are the messengers from whom the
majority of respondents to a national survey say they prefer to hear economic benefit messages.
Over 63 percent of respondents rated local business leaders a seven or above on a ten-point scale
of the likelihood that a message delivered from a group would increase their support for a
proposed transportation project. The second highest rated type of messenger is local
transportation officials, followed by political leaders and state officials.
In practice, the four examples showed very different levels of involvement and profile by the
business community. These experiences demonstrates that the business community can be an
effective lead messenger in some cases, but that in other cases a lower profile for this group has
also met with success. In all cases, however, some involvement by the business community was
important in helping to communicate the economic message.
In St. Louis County, for example, business leaders served as the primary messengers in the
campaign to support the Page Avenue Extension agreement. In this case, officials of the
Regional Commerce and Growth Association (RCGA)an organization that coordinates regionwide economic development activities with members of local economic development agencies
and area business leaders were the major messengers. RCGA ran a speakers bureau and the
CEOs of major area businesses were sent out as spokespeople for the bridge project. Their
message focused on economic growth and how the bridge would be an economic benefit to the
region because it would reduce congestion, provide increased access to jobs, and improve freight
movement.
Because part of the message focused on the economic importance of the bridge project, business
leaders may have been a good choice for messenger. Moreover, the RCGA developed targeted
initiatives to minimize the oppositions support among mayors and other political officials.
Rather than have their message compete against the messages coming from political leaders, the
business community attempted to minimize the impression of conflict between the business
community and politicians. The RCGA presented a strong united message coming from business
leaders.
Similarly, business leaders took a lead role in supporting transportation improvements in Santa
Clara County, California. There the Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group (SVMG) led a
coalition of business leaders, environmental and health organizations, and senior and disabled
groups in supporting Measures A and B. The SVMG, founded in 1978 by David Packard and
other Silicon Valley CEOs, represents 125 Silicon Valley employers who collectively provide
over 250,000 local jobsnearly one-third of the Valleys private sector workforce. As a result,
the SVMG has a large degree of credibility in the community. Since its inception SVMG has
lead three successful campaigns to have taxes dedicated to transportation initiatives in Santa
Clara County. The respected position of the employer groups, combined with support from a
diverse coalition of other groups, provided an effective means to communicate the potential
benefits of the transportation projects.
In contrast to these examples, business leaders played a supporting role in spreading the
economic benefit message in Charlotte and the Puget Sound area. In both of these places,
50
businesses provided financial support and backing to others in the campaign and promoted the
project proposals. However, business groups did not take the lead role or most highly visible role
in terms of individual personalities promoting the message.
In Charlotte, the Mayor of Charlotte appointed ten community business leaders to the
Commission of Ten to review and promote transportation improvements. The business leaders
were vocal proponents of the project proposal and their respective businesses provided funding
for the public campaign. They also hired a consultant to conduct the political campaign to secure
voter approval of the sales tax increase. The business groups, however, played, in public, a
supporting role to the Mayor, who was the most visible advocate for the campaign.
In the Puget Sound area, the support of large businesses, such as Boeing, is believed to have
been important in the success of the ballot initiative. The Greater Seattle Chamber of Commerce,
along with other pro-RTA groups, organized the public campaign. Phil Condit, the Boeing
Companys CEO, convened a business fund-raising outreach program that included Microsoft
and other major local employers. The business efforts led to business and local government
endorsements for the plan, which helped to neutralize opposition. The Seattle Chamber of
Commerce, headed by Michael Vaska, a local lawyer, and other pro-RTA groups organized and
funded the campaign.
Importance of Coalitions / Cooperation with Stakeholders
Research conducted under NCHRP 2-22 suggests that cooperation with affected or interested
groups can add to the effectiveness of a message. That is, when a transportation planning agency
or business group cooperates with other stakeholder organizations, the public is more likely to
view with favor messages about the positive impacts of transportation.
This may have been one reason that the business-led coalition in Santa Clara County was so
successful. Not only was the messenger respected, but the Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group
also worked to include other interests within a broader coalition. SVMG included major
employers such as Hewlett-Packard, IBM, and Lockheed-Martin. But the business leadership
also brought public health and community oriented groups into the coalition , such as the
American Lung Association, the Congress for California Seniors, the Greenbelt Alliance, the San
Jose Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce, the Santa Clara County Firefighters Association, and
the South Bay Labor Council. Since the coalition was very broad and did not just represent
business groups, the SVMG could argue effectively to promote the transportation investments
without the appearance of being self-serving.
In order to reach the broad voter constituency, it is often helpful for a campaign to target
individuals or organizations that serve as liaisons or connections to the public. For example, in
order to communicate a message to the public, it is often useful to target neighborhood
associations, community and grassroots organizations, business associations, and elected
officials.
51
The Charlotte campaign, for example, targeted elected officials, neighborhood groups, and other
community-based groups to help spread support for the ballot initiative. Among these groups
were: elected officials and government agencies; business associations; neighborhood
associations; citizen grassroots organizations and environmental groups; and educational
institutions.
Role of Elected Officials and Transportation Agencies
According to findings of a national state preference survey conducted under NCHRP 2-22, local
transportation officials tend to be viewed as more credible than most potential messengers,
including local elected officials. Twenty-eight (28) percent of respondents said they were very
likely to increase their support for a transportation project upon hearing an economic message
from local transportation officials, compared to 23 percent hearing the message from state or
local politicians and 21 percent from prominent civic leaders, as shown in Figure 5.
In practice, both elected officials and appointed officials of transportation agencies have
effectively served as messengers. The effectiveness most likely has to do with the popularity and
perceived credibility of the individual in question.
In the Puget Sound area, the Regional Transportation Authority (RTA), developed the transit
project and provided objective technical information to the campaign. As a public agency, the
RTA could not campaign for the allocation of tax funds. The RTA, however, was involved in the
campaign through the provision of objective information about the transit plan. As a result, the
public agency provided a sense of legitimacy and credibility to the arguments of those pushing
for the transit plan.
Figure 5: Percent of Respondents Very Likely to Increase their Support for a
Transportation Project Upon Hearing an Economic Message from
[PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHO RATED 9 OR 10 (ON A 10 POINT SCALE)]
32%
35%
28%
30%
21%
25%
23%
20%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Lo cal B usiness
Leaders
Lo cal
P ro minent Civic
Transpo rtatio n
Leaders
Officials
Lo cal/State
P o liticians,
Leaders
State Officials
52
In Charlotte, the principal spokesman for the bond-issue referendum was the Mayor of
Charlotte. A popular figure representing most of the population of Mecklenburg County, the
Mayor was very active throughout the entire campaign. As we have seen, the entire process of
developing the transit/land use plan and bringing the county sales tax increase to referendum
included extensive public involvement.
In contrast, public officials had a relatively low profile in St. Louis County. St. Louis County is
fragmented into small municipalities, making it difficult for one political leader to serve as a
regional spokesperson. The Regional Commerce and Growth Association (RCGA) that operated
the campaign was one of the few regional voices that had an interest in transportation issues.
ELEMENT 4: SELECTING COMMUNICATIONS TECHNIQUES

The Communications Guide developed under NCHRP 2-22 notes that no single set of
communications techniques can be identified as the most appropriate or effective across all
circumstances with which transportation agencies are faced. Two general conclusions, however,
emerged from the market research: 1) Some traditional approaches, such as town meetings, have
limited value and should be employed selectively; and 2) Emerging technology, such as Web
pages, can be very effective.
In three of the four examples, fairly standard political campaigns were conducted, with extensive
use of television, radio, and other media. In Santa Clara County, a series of mailings was
employed with only limited use of other communications media. A Web page was used in
Charlotte but not elsewhere.
Review of the example campaigns that what matters most is not so much selection of the
communication technique but, rather, getting a prior understanding of the concerns and
preferences of the electorate and developing a program in accord with voters wishes. It is much
easier to argue for a tax increase or other measure to support a program when the public is
already familiar with and invested in the transportation program. As we have already noted,
the campaign in Charlotte went much farther than the others in the use of direct public
involvement in the development of the program to be presented to the public.
Public Meetings and Workshops
The Charlotte referendum on a county sales-tax increase to support a bond issue for
transportation projects provides a good example of how a strong public involvement campaign
helped to generate support for the initiative. Before the public campaign to increase the sales tax
was undertaken, a public participation process was developed to involve the public in the
development of the 2025 Integrated Transit/Land Use Plan. Mecklenburg County and the City of
Charlotte held 18 public meetings over five months, providing citizens with many opportunities
to be involved in the planning process.
The public meetings informed citizens of the details of the proposed program, encouraged
citizens to provide input on the plan, and to evaluate and critique the progress of the consultants.
53
The five month time frame allowed citizens to see the process through from start to finish and to
see how their input was integrated into the plan design. A speakers bureau also operated
simultaneously. The speakers bureau had individual city officials make presentations to
community groups. The purpose of all these efforts was to create general awareness of
transit/land use issues and its associated opportunities and challenges; to obtain as much input as
feedback from the public in the development of the plan; and to use citizen involvement as a
justification for placing the referendum on the ballot and securing voter approval.
The public involvement campaign was seen as important to the success of the referendum, and
generated many of its own successes. More citizens participated in the process of developing the
plan than had ever before participated in a community-wide planning effort in Charlotte and
Mecklenburg County. Citizen input also provided the basis for several changes to the
consultants original visions for transit and land use development.
The Charlotte example, however, also demonstrates that not all public involvement activities are
effective or cost-effective. Although the public meetings were viewed as successful, the
speakers bureau did not work as well. According to staff from the City of Charlotte, the staff
hours needed to target effectively key neighborhood groups and civic organizations with
speakers were not available. It was also difficult to keep talking points up to date with the
evolution of ideas in the public meetings.
Advertising and Political Campaigns
A standard political campaign is the usual method for generating support for a ballot initiative
and was used in all four of the examples, albeit with some variation in Santa Clara County.
Political advertising and campaigning methods include use of a variety of different media and
direct contacts, such as use of television and radio advertising, direct mailings, leaflets dropped
off at homes, signs in front lawns, campaign events to achieve newspaper coverage, and phone
banks to get out the vote.
In Charlotte, for example, campaign techniques included television and radio advertisements,
newspaper coverage, leaflets dropped off at homes, signs in front yards, and people calling from
phone banks to get out the vote.
In the Puget Sound area, the campaign operated a million-dollar television effort coupled with
radio ads, a kickoff rally, volunteer phone calling, and outdoor sign waving at sporting events
and along high traffic arterials.
The Santa Clara County campaign used a $1.6 million budget to send six rounds of mailings,
each mailing having up to 35 variations in content depending on the geographic location, gender,
or age of its audience. The mailing was supplemented by some television and radio
advertisements directed at the general public.
In St. Louis County, the RCGA used a $ 750,000 budget to hire a campaign consultant, a
radio/television specialist, and a telephone/mail specialist. The campaign consisted of a series of
television ads, radio spots, fliers mailed to homes, phone banks, and yard signs. The strategy
54
focused on avoiding a long, protracted public effort and instead pursued a short, relatively late
campaign that operated in the month leading up to the vote. A late campaign was utilized to
avoid allowing opposition to develop a counter attack or to engage in negative dialogue with the
campaign spokespeople.
ELEMENT 5: INTEGRATING AND SUSTAINING COMMUNICATIONS

The final element of a communications campaign is to ensure that communications are integrated
and sustained throughout the entire campaign. As a result, this element is not so much a step in
the process, but rather a concept governing the communications process from initial proposal
development through voter approval and beyond.
Successful communication campaigns generally cannot be implemented immediately before an
election, but rather, must begin early and be sustained through the entire process of developing
and implementing a transportation program or plan. The case examples clearly show how
communicating with the public can be an important component of developing a transportation
plan and gaining overall public support for that plan.
Moreover, communications activities should not stop once the voters approve the program.
Communications efforts must be phased in and sustained throughout the life cycle of any
undertaking. An extensive transit system, like the ones in Charlotte and the Puget Sound area,
requires many years to become fully operational. Careful technical analysis must proceed
construction of each transit component and public commitment to carry out the plan in full must
be sustained for many years.
In the Puget Sound area, the RTA recognized the importance of continuing communication
efforts as a means to maintain support for the program. At their first meeting after the election,
the RTA Board passed Resolution No. 76, expressing its thanks to the regions voters for
approving the ballot measures and to citizens, organizations, committees, and local jurisdictions
who supported and advocated the plan. In addition, Resolution No. 76 called on citizens and
organizations previously opposed to the plan to join with the RTA so that the opinions and
advice of the entire Puget Sound community could be part of, and supportive of, the Sound Move
Over the following months, the RTA appointed a 15-member Citizens Oversight Committee
with geographic and expert representation and adopted a new citizen participation program. The
role of the panel is to monitor the RTA's progress in delivering the plan the voters approved and
to offer comments from their perspective. The panel meets monthly and conducts a formal
evaluation of the RTA's performance twice yearly. The results are taken seriously and help guide
improvements for greater effectiveness.
In Charlotte, public involvement activities have also been sustained throughout the process of
beginning to implement the transit-land use plan.
55
CONCLUSIONS
Each of the four campaigns examined has its unique set of characteristics, but there are some
clear common elements present in the campaigns. And we can draw some useful inferences
about the requirements for success. Perhaps we belabor the obvious, but success requires:
A strong message
An effective campaign
A Strong Message
A message has to convey the following to voters:
A strong message is, in large part, a matter of the substance of a proposal but also depends on
good information on voters attitudes and concerns. In short, the project must be a good idea, and
recognized as such, but ensuring that recognition by the electorate requires good analysis of
voters attitudes and preferences.
The role of economic impacts in the successful messages was either relatively muted or nonexistent. The typical case was that the business leadership was convinced of the economic
benefits but actual campaign messages were designed to emphasize direct transportation benefits
to voterseither reduced road congestion or alternatives to road transport. It should be noted,
though, that this case was often made in the context of accommodating future growthi.e., that
continuing growth and prosperity might be threatened if the transportation infrastructure were
not improved.
An Effective Campaign
Professional assistance for polling, advertising, campaign management, and related activities
A united business community provides critical support in two ways. First, business leaders
have a strong influence on public opinion in their own communities. If the voters see the leading
businessmen speaking with one voice, the public credibility of a proposal is greatly enhanced. In
56
particular, an argument that transportation improvement is needed to facilitate future growth will
have the greatest credibility if it comes from the business community.
Second, the business community can raise the money required for a robust campaign. This is
critical, because government agencies are generally prohibited from using public money for
political campaigns. And, as the examples show, successful campaigns had substantial budgets,
ranging from a few hundred thousand to more than a million dollars.
Professional assistance, usually in the form of specialized consultants, is virtually essential for
an effective campaign. Local-government staff will usually be under significant legal constraint
regarding participation in a political campaign and, in any event, would be unlikely to possess
the required skills in sufficient depth. High-quality skills are required to conduct polls and focus
groups, analyze the results, craft the materials to be used for various media, and manage all the
complex activities of a political campaign.
Poll and/or focus-group results are essential for refinement of the message and also of the
project. If at all possible, some measure of public opinion should be taken before a project is put
before the public in its final form. It may well be that there are features that have a critical impact
on public opinion, positive or negative, that would not have been recognized as such by
professional transportation planners. And the data on public opinion is essential for development
of on-target messages for media advertising.
A robust campaign entails a full range of media advertising, distribution of literature, front-yard
signs and posters, telephone banks and similar devices and methods to carry the message to the
public and, in the end, get out the vote. A project may be soundly conceived and designed and
still fail if the message is not carried to the voters in a vigorous and effective manner.
Other Points
The choice of a messenger does not seem, generally, to be a critical point. In some successful
campaigns a single strong spokesman emerged; in other successful campaigns this was not the
case.
In one campaign (Charlotte-Mecklenburg), very extensive use was made of outreach
techniquesworkshops, various other types of meetingsto involve the public in the actual
development of the project. This was certainly successful in the Charlotte case, but outreach on
this scale was definitely not a feature of the other example campaigns. In the other cases, project
planning was done by professionals with public input through polls, focus groups, or advisory
committees.
Summing Up
57

What we have seen is that the first two of these are truly critical, and the second depends very
much on the first. A strong message is essential and it cannot be created without a clear
understanding of the concerns and preferences of voters. And that same understanding is
essential to putting the right project before the voters. The other elementsdesignating the
messenger, selecting the techniques, and integrating and sustaining communicationsmust, of
course, be done right. But without a strong message based on good understanding of the voters,
these latter elements cannot save the day.
Perhaps it goes without saying that a sound project is essential at the start, though the project
may have to be adjusted according to what is found about voters feelings. Given a strong
project, however, we can name the following three critical requirements for a successful
campaign.
1. Good understanding of voters preferences and concerns
2. A strong message that meets voters wants
3. A united business community.
refining communications and campaign techniques can be largely left to the professionals hired
with the money provided by the business leadership.
58
CHAPTER 5: INFORMATION ON OTHER CAMPAIGNS

In this chapter, we present information on the five campaigns that were not selected for further
analysis under Task 4. Some useful information was collected on these campaigns in Task 1.
While data were not developed in the same depth as for the case studies, this information is
interesting, and it supports the conclusions reached from the case studies.
The unsuccessful campaigns have important lessons for transportation agencies that have to
make a case to the voters for a project. The campaigns in both Denver and Miami lost, in part,
because of divisions in community leadership. In Denver, there was strenuous opposition from
some members of the board of the Regional Transportation District, the body that would have
made the transit investment. This division at the top probably had a negative impact on the
effectiveness of the outreach effort.
In Miami, where a transit investment was also defeated, there was dissent in the Dade County
Commission, the business community was split with some businessmen leading attacks on the
proposal; indeed, the Chairman of the MPOs Transportation Advisory Committee was one of
the leaders of the opposition.
Among the successes, the Las Vegas case was interesting, because of the degree to which
different taxes were carefully linked with different projects to ensure equity in terms of tax
payments and benefits received. Supporters of the Kansas City initiative made an interesting
tactical decision in that they designed their campaign to turn out the favorable voters and not to
change the minds of those opposed. Like the Kansas City campaign, the Washington State
initiative was focused on freight but, alone of all the campaigns considered, was directed at
elected officials, not voters.
59
DENVER, CO (1997) DEFEATED

State/County/City
Colorado, Regional Transportation DistrictDenver is principal city
Contacts: Name, Organization, Phone, etc.
Scott Woodward, Denver Regional Council of Governments (MPO), 303-455-1000
Lauren Martens, Transit Alliance, 303-573-1496
Kelley Wark, Colorado Public Interest Research Group, 303-573-7474, x301
Nature of Project (highway, bridge, rail line, etc.)
The nature of the campaign involved primarily transit (light rail in three corridors into Denver).
Audience (voters, legislators, a commission, governor, etc.)
The audience for this campaign was voters in the Regional Transportation District (RTD)
The campaign was designed to support a proposal to increase the regional sales tax by fourtenths of one percent to support a major ($2.7 billion) transit investment.
Nature of Economic Argument (the Message).
The business community (and particularly those in downtown Denver) believed that
transportation investment was essential for the continued growth of the entire region and of
businesses in the center. The message to the voters was that the transit corridors would allow
continued growth without excessive congestion.
Particular Strategy or Combination of Strategies Used
An umbrella committee, Transit 97, was established to conduct the campaign. The committee
included local elected officials, the Regional Transportation District (RTD), and various business
and environmental groups. Business groups included the Denver Metro Chamber of Commerce
and the Downtown Denver Partnership. Business supporters also contributed funds to cover
campaign expenses. RTD held a large number of public workshops before the campaign began in
May of 1997. The campaign itself was a standard political effort.
60
The RTD board was divided with some members strongly opposed to the project. This fact
probably blunted the effectiveness of RTDs workshops and undermined public confidence in the
plan.
Who Were the Messengers?
A variety of elected officials acted as messengers. At the beginning, the Mayor of Lakewood
took the public lead in the campaign. She was chosen, in part, to emphasize suburban support
for what some perceived as downtown-oriented project. Towards the end of the campaign, the
Mayor of Denver took on a more prominent role.
The proposal was defeated at the polls. Local observers believe the divided RTD board and the
high price tag on the project were major factors in the defeat. There is also some belief that the
workshops and so forth prior to the campaign had not done enough to build a public consensus
for the project.
61
KANSAS CITY, MO (1999)SUCCESS

State/County/City
Kansas City, Missouri
Pam Whiting, Greater Kansas City Chamber of Commerce, (816) 374-5481
Doug Luciani, Greater Kansas City Chamber of Commerce, (816) 374-5452
Pat Gray, Pat Gray and Associates, (816) 756-0153
Pat ONeill, (816) 561-7555
Kansas City Southern, which owned railroad tracks along side of Richards-Gebaur Memorial
Airport (a former Airforce base now converted to civilian use), applied to lease a section of the
airport from the City for an intermodal freight center where it could unload international freight
from Mexico (in particular, new cars and trucks) onto tractor trailers for distribution around the
country. The City voted to approve a fifty-year lease of a portion of Richards-Gebaur to Kansas
City Southern to establish an intermodal freight center. The City was losing $1.3 to $1.6 million
in taxpayer dollars to operate and maintain Richards-Gebaur. The Mayor and a number of City
Council members agreed that by leasing out the facility as a freight distribution center the City
could convert the site from a source of losses to a source of net revenues.
Freight transport has traditionally played a significant role in the Kansas City economy, which is
the second largest rail center in the US after Chicago. In the early 1990s, the Greater Kansas
City Chamber of Commerce received the message from its large transportation and freight
members that Kansas Citys position in the international freight market was slipping. The
Chamber of Commerce and its members founded the Heartland Freight Coalition, which funded
two studies investigating the role of freight in the Kansas City area. The first of the studies
analyzed the flow of freight in the region; the second study assessed the feasibility of an inland
freight processing center in Kansas City. The feasibility study determined that the now underutilized Richards-Gebaur Memorial Airport provided a viable site for an inland freight
processing center.
Audience (voters, legislators, commission, governor, etc.)
The campaign was targeted at the voting public of Kansas City, Missouri.
62
A citizen initiative to prevent conversion of the airport to a freight center was brought as a ballot
measure in Kansas City. The ballot measure, brought to vote on August 3, 1999, required voters
to approve or deny a fifty-year land lease of portions of Richards-Gebaur Memorial Airport by
Kansas City and the Port Authority to Kansas City Southern for development of an intermodal
freight facility. Two distinct groups supported the opposition to the lease
Aviation stakeholdersthe Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) at the national
level and local pilots and aircraft owners at the local level and
Neighborhood stakeholdersresidents of the neighborhood surrounding the airport.
Aviation stakeholders saw the move as a negative national precedent and objected to the closure
of this airport, which housed a sizeable 8500-foot landing strip. Neighborhood residents
expressed concern that the freight center would increase truck traffic and light pollution from 24hour operation. Because Kansas City Southern intended to use the site for freight shipments to
and from Mexico, local residents also expressed concern that the center might result in increases
in drug trafficking and entry of illegal aliens. One local transportation activist ran a campaign
for mayor in February and March of 1999, which focused largely on the issue of the airport
conversion.
For the opposition, this was an emotional issue. Emotions and passions have a lot of currency,
a lot of value, explains Pam Whiting. The communications campaign had to overcome the
atmosphere of high emotions and fear to educate and refocus public attention on the potential
economic benefits to the Kansas City area.
Nature of the Economic Argument (the Message)
Taxpayers were funding the airports annual losses of $1.3 to $1.6 million. Conversion to a
freight center would turn the site into a source of net revenue for the City and would maintain
Kansas Citys historical role as a major US freight center.
The communications campaign sought to inform the voting public through a direct mail
campaign, newspaper advertisements, and television spots. The Chamber of Commerce ran the
communications campaign with the majority of the $982,000 budget provided by Kansas City
Southern Railroad. The Civil Council and the Chamber of Commerce also contributed to the
campaign fund. The Chamber of Commerce hired an area consultant specializing in political
campaigns. The campaign did not focus on changing peoples view of the issue. Rather, it
attempted to reach voters most likely to support the freight center, raise their awareness, and
encourage them to vote. The message of the ad campaign was kept very simple and avoided
controversy. Tag lines included: It doesnt cost. It pays.; and Vote yes for the new
Richards-Gebaur.
63
Television spots of 30 seconds each served to familiarize voters with a brief, sound bite style
message. The Mayor and the president of the Chamber of Commerce spoke in favor of the
freight center at organized press conferences. A direct mail campaign targeted citizens who were
most likely to vote and most likely to be in favor of the lease of Richards-Gebaur to Kansas City
Southern. Messengers used a standard slide presentation to communicate the purpose and
benefits of the freight center at board and committee meetings.
Although not the main focus of the campaign, the campaign also involved presentations to
concerned and interested neighborhood associations. As part of communications with the
neighborhoods surrounding the airport, the campaign prepared a video that messengers regularly
presented when invited to speak at neighborhood meetings.
Who were the Messengers?
The Greater Kansas City Chamber of Commerce organized the formal communications
campaign. Many key figures participated in communicating the message. Chief among these
were:
Mayor Kay Barnes
Pete Levi, President, Greater Kansas City Chamber of Commerce
Warren Erdman, Vice President, Kansas City Southern
Deep pocketsWith a budget of approximately $982,000, the campaign was well funded
and significantly outspent the opposition.
A simple message
Education to dissuade misinformation and fear
64
WASHINGTON STATE (1994-1997) SUCCESS (OBTAINED INITIAL

FUNDING)
State/County/City
Washington State
Peter Beaulieu, Puget Sound Regional Council, (206) 464-7537
Paul Chilcote, Port of Tacoma, (253) 383-5841
Dan Pike or Rob Fellows, Washington State Department of Transportation, (206) 464-5878
The project involves FAST Corridor infrastructure improvements in the Seattle-Tacoma area.
Phase I of the FAST Corridor project will construct fifteen railroad grade separations and a few
port access improvements to the Everett-Seattle-Tacoma Corridor. The initial effort in the state
was to apply for and obtain funds from the federal government (through TEA-21), state-level
sources (through the state DOT), local sources (city or county governments), and the private
sector (such as the railroads and other carriers involved in freight transportation).
In 1994, the Puget Sound Regional Council (PSRC) convened a group of public and private
sector freight stakeholders and asked them what do [we] need to know about freight mobility.
This group eventually became the Regional Freight Mobility Roundtable, which includes
shippers, carriers, deep water ports, public agencies, and non-profits with an interest in freight
transport in and through Washington State. Over time, the Roundtable has become a permanent,
institutionalized venue for coordination and communication among the various regional freight
mobility stakeholders.
The Freight Action Strategy for the Everett-Seattle-Tacoma Corridor project (a.k.a., FAST
Corridor) grew at a grassroots level out of the coincident and sometimes conflicting needs of
local communities, ports, railroads, and state and regional transportation authorities. FAST
Corridor was aided in its early stages by the communications mechanism provided by the
Roundtable. Many future FAST Corridor partners were already discussing regional needs
through the Roundtable. As a result, FAST Corridor became one of the agendas recommended
by the Roundtable.
The Phase I FAST Corridor project comprises an expensive package of improvements spanning
several jurisdictions as well as both public and private systems. The projects involved would
65
benefit both private business and public residents/taxpayers/commuters/etc. Project organizers

anticipated a number of potential hurdles:
Low priority for freight mobilityLocal officials and voters are often not aware of the
public benefits of freight mobility; without full information on public benefits, local officials
and voters might view the project as a public subsidy of business;
Lack of a region-wide viewOfficials and voters might recognize the congestion and
quality of life arguments for localized transportation improvements, but fail to view these
local needs as a part of a coordinated package of improvements that would affect the
economic vitality of the entire region.
Few precedents for consulting the private sectorAgencies lacked precedent for
effectively consulting with and obtaining financial contributions from relevant private sector
businesses while maintaining their separate and independent status;
Thus, project champions sought ways to effectively communicate the economic and quality of
life benefits, consult with the private sector, effect public-private partnerships for funding, and
achieve cooperation among many public agencies at the local, state, and federal level.
Nature of Economic Argument (the Message)
The basic nature of the economic argument was that a more efficient and cost-effective system
(and supporting infrastructure) to move freight through the state would benefit the states
economy. Project champions stressed that Washingtons economy is the most trade-dependent
of any state in the country and provided a variety of trade-related statistics to support this
argument, such as: nearly 25 percent of Washington State jobs relate to international trade;
direct export sales from Washington State were estimated at $24.8 billion in 1995 placing it as
the sixth largest exporter among all US states; and Washington farmers and manufacturers
benefit from lower-cost ocean shipping that would result from carriers ability to better fill
backhaul trips
Project champions also stressed the following economic messages:
Traffic congestion around the ports increases congestion and delays for residents and
truckers,
Growth in freight and commuter rail traffic strains rail capacity,
Washington must upgrade its intermodal facilities or risk losing freight business to other
West Coast ports that are improving their ports and intermodal facilities,
Multiple stakeholders stand to benefit economically from the corridor improvements

Washington residents/taxpayers/job seekers, carriers, and shippers.

66
Unified FrontAlthough the PSRC originally organized the Roundtable and considered its
recommendations, it was clear from the start that any effective FAST Corridor project must be
the joint effort of several public agencies. Additionally, it was clear that the agencies must create
some institutionalized form of communication among themselves to ensure coordination of
efforts and recognition of the relevance of individual, local projects to the viability of the whole
system. Thus, the relevant agencies formed the FAST Corridor partnership to coordinate their
roles in the project. The FAST Corridor project, therefore, has been a joint planning activity of
the following FAST Corridor partners:
Washington State DOT
City of Pacific
Puget Sound Regional Council
City of Puyallup
Port of Tacoma
City of Renton
Port of Seattle
City of Seattle
Port of Everett
City of Sumner
City of Algona
City of Tacoma
City of Auburn
City Tukwila
City of Everett
King County
City of Kent
Pierce County
Job Impact Study FAST Corridor partners hired a consultant to conduct an origin-destination
study to estimate job impacts of the planned FAST Corridor improvements. This study was
included in the FAST Corridor TEA-21 application.
VideoAs FAST Corridor partners, the Port of Tacoma produced a video to convey the key
economic benefits of the project and familiarize viewers with freight mobility and the potential
for FAST Corridor.
Glossy BrochureThe PSRC identified a need for a flexible information piece that could
succinctly and attractively present FAST Corridor to multiple audiences in various venues,
including legislators, the US Congress and staff working on TEA-21, city council members, and
citizens. This piece could be used by various FAST Corridor participants to communicate a
consistent message to geographically and institutionally disparate stakeholders. The appropriate
brochure would:
succinctly present the importance of freight mobility to Washingtons economy,
67
provide a straight-forward explanation of the economic and quality of life benefits of the
project,
describe the project partnership, planned improvements, evaluation techniques, and costs,
and
create a picture and project label that would reinforce the project identity and help
readers visualize and discuss the project.
To fund design and production of the brochures, the PSRC set aside money in the MPO work
program through its budget process. The PSRC hired two consultants, who could research and
present necessary freight data, develop text for the brochure, and serve as a catalyst for
Roundtable interaction. WashDOT and PSRC jointly published the FAST Corridor brochure.
They originally produced 5,000 brochures and later updated and refined the brochure for a
second printing of 7,000. The Washington State DOT has been primarily responsible for the
distribution of these communications brochures; however, they are available for the use of
FAST Corridor partners in their individual venues.
FAST Corridor partners presented the FAST Corridor message in various venues. (See partners
list above.) Partners conducted outreach for project and funding support within Washington
DOT and to the state legislature, U.S. DOT, and the U.S. Congress.
Consistent and repeated terminologyA short, recognizable name and a number of catch
phrases allowed several different messengers to communicate a unified, consistent message.
The FAST Corridor project name effectively tied together the set of planned improvements
into one easily recognized and recalled vision. Other catch phrases boiled down the essential
message into a clear, simple vision. For example, Senator Schuster termed FAST Corridor
the Port of Chicago and, thereby, immediately conveyed the importance of the Corridor to
inland trade and the national economy.
Different level of detail for different venues
Economic Impact StudyThe origin-destination study was not considered succinct and
marketable enough for use in the general communications campaign. However, it did
demonstrate that the partnership had researched the economic impacts of the proposed
project to those who would carefully scrutinize funding proposals. The study was
included as an attachment to FAST Corridors TEA-21 application.
Simple MessageThe bulk of the communications campaign sought simple and

straightforward communication of the importance of the corridor in the regional, state,
68
and national economy. A brochure and video produced for the communications
campaign focused on the heart of the economic message as stated above.
Corridor Approach
ExternalPartners presented the project to funding sources as one corridor-wide project

rather than as a series of individual improvements. In this way, partners obtained greater
attention from state, federal, and private sector funding sources than they would have for
individual improvements;
InternalPartners understood the importance of the system and, therefore, placed

priority on the corridor outcome rather than their local/favored improvements. A less
inclusive planning process might have involved greater contention among different
localities. However, communications through the partnership allowed a grassroots,
cooperative attitude. The partnership approach avoided much potential local opposition
by including local organizations. Potential opposition was reduced because, in one
partners words, we are them. Individual localities cooperated and sometimes
sacrificed local improvements for the success of improvements in neighboring
jurisdictions that were more critical to success of the whole Corridor.
Enlist the support of legislatorsFAST Corridor partners found that the support of state
or federal legislators often helped them overcome a lack of interest within state or federal
agencies. Likewise, the backing of state-level legislators helped enlist support of
representatives and senators in the US Congress.
Public-Private PartnershipFunding from railroads added a needed source of financing

and reduced concerns that the railroads might try to get a free ride off tax payer dollars.
The railroads are not formal partners in FAST Corridor; however, as stakeholders and
contributors, they play a consulting role as ex officio partners in FAST Corridor.
No new governing authorityAlthough the Fast Corridor partnership provided a means

of coordinating the project, it did not establish a new governing authority for the corridor.
One partner notes this as a key success factor in gaining funding and project support from
partners, because it left control at the local level.
69
LAS VEGAS, NV (1990) -- SUCCESS

State/county/city
Clark County, Nevadaprincipal city is Las Vegas
Kurt Weinreich, Regional Transportation Commission (MPO) 702-676-1500
Pat Shalmy, Chamber of Commerce, 702-735-2450 (County Manager in 1990)
Bruce Woodbury, 702-293-3674, member of County Commission (Chairman in 1990)
The campaign concerned itself with a wide variety of transportation investments, including
highways, bus service, and airport-access improvements.
The audience for this campaign was the voters of Clark County
The issues in this particular campaign were both the projects themselves and the distribution of
the tax burden for financing the projects. The proposal that went on the ballot included: an
increase in the fuel tax; a tax on new development; an increase in tax on motor vehicles; an
increase in sales tax; an increase in jet-fuel tax; and a hotel room tax for the principal hotel and
gambling area. These taxes were linked to specific projects, e.g., the jet-fuel tax was to be for
access and ground-side improvements at airport.
The business community, especially the owners of the area hotels and casinos, real-estate
developers, and contractors, were convinced that substantial improvement in transportation was
necessary to permit further economic growth without excessive congestion. The message to the
voters was therefore based on general economic development issues (such as employment) and
more transportation-related issues concerning the continued growth of the metro area (such as air
quality and congestion relief).
The groundwork for the campaign was laid in the meetings and negotiations in which the
package of improvements and taxes was developed. This process was attended with a good deal
70
of publicity, allowing much of the electorate to become aware of and educated about the issues
and the emerging proposal well before the actual campaign started.
A committee called Citizens for Better Transportation was formed that brought together
elected officials and business and environmental groups. It held public meetings at which
proposals were discussed. Business groups provided financial support for the conduct of the
campaign.
The principal spokesman for the campaign effort was Bruce Woodbury, Chairman of the County
Commissioners. Woodbury is a prominent lawyer in Las Vegas as well as an elected official.
Other elected officials, together with some members of the business community, also took a high
public profile in the campaign.
Key factors in Success or Failure
The proposals were approved with 64 percent of the vote in Clark County. A major factor in the
success of this campaign was that the package of improvements and taxes was worked out in a
way that drew in support from the major interest groups in the community. By the time the final
package was presented to the public there was a broad consensus of opinion leaders and interest
groups behind it. Elected officials, businessmen, and environmental groups were together in the
coalition. Also, it was clear to the public that continued growth in the Las Vegas area required
significant transportation improvements.
71
MIAMI, FL (1999) -- DEFEATED

State/county/city
Dade County, Florida
Norman Wartman, Chair, Citizens Transportation Advisory Committee (to MPO), 305-469-3660
Dorothy Cissel, Co-chair, Transit not Tolls, 305-385-1602
Richard N. Friedman, community activist, 305-666-2747
This project primarily concerned a planned major extension of Metro Rail and the abolishment of
tolls on the four toll roads of the Miami-Dade Expressway Authority (MDX).
The primary audience was the voters of Dade County
Seizing on an announcement in Spring, 1999 that MDX intended to increase tolls, Miami Mayor
Alex Penelas presented his tax-for-tolls proposal that would have raised the area sales tax from
6.5 percent to 7.5 percent and immediately removed MDX tolls. The Mayor cited a KPMG
report arguing for the sales tax increase as the best way to fund transport in the area. The sales
tax increase was sought to obtain the local match needed to get federal funds for new rail
projects and some road improvements.
Miami vies with Chicago and the San Francisco Bay Area for third place below Los Angeles and
Washington, D.C. as measured by the Texas Transportation Institutes Road Congestion Index.
The belief is widely held that Miami area roads have been neglected over the past 20 years, while
federal and state funds have been spent on underused rail projects. Most measures indicate that
Miami could do with 25 percent more lane-miles of highways built to modern standards,
especially at interchanges.
MDX was formed in 1995 after 1990 and 1991 attempts to get local residents to accept higher
gas taxes via ballot to fund highway improvements. MDX issued $80 million in bonds in
December 1996 to fund acquisition of four old urban-area toll roads (built in the 1960s) from
the Turnpike District of the State DOT. Apparently, these toll roads had been under-funded by
the state DOT, with toll rates not raised with inflation, resulting in tolls having become gesture
tolls and the toll roads becoming one of the few remaining areas in the U.S. to have 25 cent tolls
at mainline toll plazas. In addition, due to a relatively low number of existing toll plazas in the
72
system, some proportion of trips on the network are not tolled at all. Toll revenues managed to
cover operating costs, but at low maintenance levels and with no surplus to support rebuilding or
expansion. Service levels were correspondingly poor.
The central message of the campaign was that transit expansion would enable continued growth
without excess congestion. This proposition was not accepted by a consensus in the business
community.
The campaign was a straightforward political campaign. Penelas supporters formed an umbrella
body, Transit Not Tolls, to garner support for his proposal. This group had some business
community support. The Mayor also invested major resources in the Transit Not Tolls
committee an estimated $2 million in cash and estimated $3 million in in-kind contributions.
In the meantime, the Florida State Congress had also passed a law that allowed the Miami-Dade
government to override the legal powers of the MDX board and to remove tolls if the local
government came up with the extra tax revenues.
Not surprisingly, MDX board members were critical of the Mayors proposal, holding that the
proposal would be disruptive to the turnpikes expansion plans. MDX went ahead with its toll
increase (effectively doubling tolls), then thought to be tremendously unpopular with the citizens
of Dade County. Apparently, however, the MDX board cut a deal with the Mayor under which it
would have been guaranteed a portion of the tax increase to continue its program of highway
expansion without tolls.
There was also apparently very limited preparation before the campaign. Dade County officials
had learned in the Spring of 1999 that the state would not help with matching funds. Therefore,
Dade County felt compelled to go to the voters immediately, lest FTA fund projects elsewhere
and not reserve funds for Dade County. The Dade County Commission, however, was not united
in support of the proposal.
Who Were the Messengers?
The principal, nearly sole, spokesman for this campaign was Alex Penelas, the Mayor of Dade
County. It became his personal campaign.
Former State Senator and North Miami Mayoral candidate and another Miami politician formed
The People Against the New Tax organization to garner support for the toll program. Its name
was later changed to Sales Taxes Oppressing People (STOP), and it focused its efforts on several
major themes:
Do not support everyone paying more in taxes to eliminate tolls for some;
73
Do not support efforts that will not relieve traffic congestion (thousands of expected transit
passengers versus millions of drivers)
Do not support a sales tax increase that was not necessary for an already approved and
funded 20-year Dade County transportation plan; and
Do not support a slush fund for Metro government.
The anti-tax groups also stressed the futility of huge transit spending in a community that was
largely car-oriented, and warned that the main beneficiaries of the sales tax increase would be the
building contractors hired to build the transit lines.
Key Factors In Success or Failure
The proposal lost badly: 68 percent No. Three dissident members of the County Commission
fought hard against it. The business community was not united behind the plan and some local
businessmen mounted their own campaigns to attack the proposal. Further, the Chairman of the
MPOs Citizens Transportation Advisory Committee was one of the leaders of the opposition.
The fact that Metro Rail ridership has remained far below original projections has made it easier
for opponents to attack the project on its merits. Proponents of the transit expansion had simply
not convinced the voters of Dade County, or the business community, that their proposal was the
right response to transportation problems in the area. Voters, in essence, indicated their opinion
that people wont get on trains if you dont fix the roads. They go someplace else where there
are decent roads.
74
APPENDIX A: REFERENCES
GENERAL REFERENCE
NCHRP2-22: Needs in Communicating the Economic Impacts of Transportation Investments,
Final Report, by Hagler Bailly, Inc. and MORPACE International, Inc., Transportation
Research Board, March 1999
CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA

Interviews with Mr. Terry Lathrop, Charlotte Department of Transportation, by Mr. Eric
Beshers, Fall 1999. Further interviews with Mr. Lathrop by Mr. Thomas Walsh, Summer 2000.
Interview with Ms. Julie Hill, Communications Officer, City of Charlotte, by Mr. Beshers, Fall
1999.
e-Mail from Mr. Rick Davis, Assistant Director, Corporate Communications, City of Charlotte to
Mr. Walsh, July 3, 2000.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg 2025 Transit/land Use plan Public Involvement Campaign, City of
Charlotte, Charlotte, North Carolina, Undated.
A substantial file of press releases, campaign materials, news clippings, and similar materials
covering the campaign up to the point of decision to take the issue to a referendum, provided by
Mr. Davis in July 2000.
DENVER, COLORADO
Interview with Mr. Scott Woodward, Denver Regional Council of Governments (MPO), by Mr.
Beshers, Fall 1999.
Interview with Mr. Lauren Martens, Transit Alliance, by Mr. Beshers, Fall 1999.
Interview with Ms. Kelley Wark, Colorado Public Interest Research Group, by Mr. Beshers, Fall
1999.
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI

Interview with Ms. Pam Whiting, Greater Kansas City Chamber of Commerce, by Ms. Roxanne
Bruder, Winter 1999.
Interview with Mr. Doug Luciani, Greater Kansas City Chamber of Commerce, by Ms. Bruder,
Winter 1999.
Interview with Mr. Pat Gray, Pat Gray and Associates, by Ms. Bruder, Winter 1999.
75
SANTA CLARA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA

Interviews with Ms. Linda Mandolini, Director, Transportation and Land Use, Silicon Valley
Manufacturing Group, by Mr. Beshers, Fall 1999.
Interview with Mr. Carl Guardino, Director, Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group, by Mr. Walsh,
Summer 2000.
A+B = Traffic Relief: Yes on Measures A and B, Citizens Coalition for Traffic Relief,
Brochure, Undated.
Draft Base Case Implementation Plan, Executive Summary, County of Santa Clara, May 1999.
Press releases, Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group, found at http://www.svmg.org
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON
Interviews with Mr. Ned Conroy, Seattle MPO, by Mr. Beshers, Fall 1999. Further interview
with Mr. Conroy by Mr. Walsh, Summer 2000.
Interview with Mr. Michael Vaska, local lawyer who organized campaign, by Mr. Beshers, Fall
1999.
Interview with Ms. Barbara Dougherty, staff member, Sound Transit, by Mr. Walsh, Summer
2000.
From No to Yes, Regional high-capacity transit for the Central Puget Sound Region, An
election evaluation, 1995-96, The Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority, undated.
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI

Interviews with Mr. Freeman McCullah, St. Louis Regional Commerce and Growth Association
(RCGA, essentially the Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce), by Mr. Beshers, Fall 1999 and
Summer 2000. Further interviews with Mr. McCullah by Mr. Walsh, Summer 2000.
Competition Ahead, St. Louis Regional Commerce and Growth Association, Brochure,
Undated.
All Dressed Up and Nowhere to Go: Traffic and Transportation Challenges of the New
Millenium, St. Louis Regional Commerce and Growth Association, Brochure, Undated.
Traffic CongestionIts a Two-Way Street, Missouri River Bridges Committee, Brochure,
Undated.
Region Needs Page Extension, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Editorial Section, March 4, 1998, p.
B7.
76
Page Avenue Extension Points, Missouri Department of Transportation, March 6, 1998.

A video on the Page Avenue Bridge campaign, Regional Commerce and Growth Association,
undated.
A substantial file of assorted campaign materials and press clippings provided by Mr. McCullah.
WASHINGTON STATE
Interview with Mr. Peter Beaulieu, Puget Sound Regional Council, by Ms. Bruder, Winter 1999.
Interview with Mr. Paul Chilcote, Port of Tacoma, by Ms. Bruder, Winter 1999.
Interview with Messrs. Dan Pike and Rob Fellows, Washington State Department of
Transportation, by Ms. Bruder, Winter 1999
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA

Interview with Mr. Pat Shalmy, Chamber of Commerce (County Manager in 1990), by Mr.
Beshers, Fall 1999 .
Interview with Mr. Bruce Woodbury, member, County Commission (Chairman in 1990), by Mr.
Beshers, Fall 1999.
MIAMI, FLORIDA
Interview with Mr. Norman Wartman, Chair, Citizens Transportation Advisory Committee (to
MPO), by Mr. Beshers, Fall 1999.
Interview with Ms. Dorothy Cissel, Co-chair, Transit not Tolls, by Mr. Beshers, Fall 1999.
Miami Voters Reject Tax to End Toll, Toll Roads Newsletter, July/August 1999, No. 41.
77
APPENDIX B: FINDING OF NCHRP 2-22 REGARDING THE FIVE

ELEMENTS OF A SUCCESSFUL COMMUNICATIONS CAMPAIGN
ELEMENT 1: IDENTIFY AND UNDERSTAND THE TARGET AUDIENCE
The first element in successfully communicating economic impact messages is composed of two
steps: the identification of the target audience and an assessment of that audiences
understanding of relevant issues. The determination of the target audience is a prerequisite to an
effective communications program, while information on the degree to which that audience
understands and values the links between transportation and the economy will equip
transportation planners and communications professionals to make the best choices among
alternate messages and communications strategies. Together, these elements are vital to crafting
economic impact messages that will resonate with target audiences.
Identify Target Audience
Identification of the audience must be based on program, plan, or project goals. If, for example,
an agencys goal is increased state funding for a local or regional priority, the target audience
will consist largely of state officials, particularly those legislators who control appropriations. If,
on the other hand, the aim is to ensure approval of a long-range Transportation Improvement
Plan (TIP), with its attendant public involvement requirements, the target audience will include
the general public, as well as interested community and environmental groups. The most
appropriate communications strategies for each of these endeavors will vary, and it is important
for planners and communications professionals alike to recognize such distinctions at the outset
of a communications effort.
Link Program/Project Goals to Appropriate Stakeholders
Transportation agencies cannot effectively communicate economic impact messages without
identifying the target audience. The critical path is to link program or project goals to appropriate
stakeholders. Only by taking this first step can planners and communications professionals
effectively focus resources on the right audience.
Explore Audience Understanding of Economic Linkages
Another initial step necessary before embarking on an effort to convey economic benefit
messages is the exploration of the target audiences level of understanding of the linkages
between transportation investments and economic performance. Without such knowledge,
transportation planners and those charged with communications will be ill-equipped to convey
persuasively messages focused on the economic impacts of transportation investments.
Use Market Research to Gauge Audience Awareness. State and local officials need to
employ market research tools to assess level of awareness among target audience(s).
Appropriate market research tools will vary, so planners and communications
78
professionals should choose research instruments based on target audience

characteristics.
Use Market Research to Identify Audience Segments. Developing an understanding of

target audience knowledge and preferences enables the more effective creation and
delivery of messages. If the audience seems to be the general public, it is often helpful to
conduct market research aimed at identifying audience opinion sub-groups, or opinion
segments 1 , to make the most effective use of resources. Such research also enables the
tailoring of distinct messages to separate segments to enhance the effectiveness of the
overall communications effort.
ELEMENT 2: CRAFT THE MOST APPROPRIATE MESSAGE

The second element in the communications process should flow directly from the first. Because
differences in audience understanding and concern are critical to the shaping of a message, and
targeting specific audience subgroups to then understand their knowledge and preferences allows
for the creation of more effective messages, using this information to craft the most appropriate
message is important.
Explore Target Audience Preferences
Messages about the positive impacts of transportation investments address just one of many
issues identified and prioritized by the general public. Audiences, of course, will have their
preferences among issues. To develop the most effective message, officials must take these
preferences into account. To this end, agency officials should explore target audience message
preferences along two major paths: first, among a broad range of potential messages, including
non-economic priorities (such as the environment); and, second, among various economic
messages.
Build on Messages that Resonate Most with Target Audience. Among messages
focused generally on the positive impacts of transportation investments, purely economic
messages are generally no more powerful than messages about improved safety,
environmental quality, or reduced personal travel costs or time.
Determine the Influence of Various Economic Benefit Messages. As with more general
messages on the links between transportation investment and the economy, agencies also
need to explore the impact of alternative economic messages.
ELEMENT 3: DESIGNATE THE MOST APPROPRIATE MESSENGER

The next crucial step is to identify and designate the most appropriate messenger. However,
this messenger need not be a specific person. Under some circumstances, transportation
1
For example, three economic opinion clusters found in the NCHRP 2-22 study were the economically
conscious, the economically indifferent, and the economically affected.
79
agencies may decide not to employ a specific individual messenger and may instead choose to
conduct an educational campaign consisting of billboards, for example. However, in many
cases, there will be a need for the involvement of specific individuals in the dissemination of
certain economic benefit messages. In such circumstances, it is crucial for officials to designate
a messenger suitable for the message being delivered and ensure that he or she (or the group he
or she represents) possesses credibility with the target audience.
Program or project goals should play an important role in the determination of the messenger, as
should the priorities and general opinions of the target audience. Research conducted in NCHRP
2-22 suggests that the general public does not, however, view all messengers as equally credible.
ELEMENT 4: SELECT THE MOST APPROPRIATE COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE(S)

No single set of communication techniques has been proven to be most appropriate or effective
across the many situations and circumstances facing transportation agencies. However, market
research (or previous experience) can provide insights into likely audience responses to alternate
communication strategies and techniques. Some traditional approaches, for example, may have
limited value; in other cases, use of emerging technologies may be of more value. Either way, it
is important to accurately gauge the likely response of the audience to a technique prior to
investing resources, and also important to recognize that any approach has its advantages and
disadvantages.
Some communications techniques include:
Public meetings
Shopping mall displays
Talk radio
Door-to-door canvassing
Conferences
Focus group-type meetings
Round-table discussions
Cable television
One-on-one meetings
Traditional marketing and

advertisements
Transportation planning agencies should consider a combination of techniques and a variety of

factors when selecting a communications technique or techniques. Moreover, whatever
technique or techniques is/are decided upon should be cumulative and coordinated over the life
of a project or program.
ELEMENT 5: INTEGRATE AND SUSTAIN COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGIES OVER

TIME
One of the most important elements of an effective communications strategy is to sustain
communications from start to finish maintain ongoing communications throughout the life
cycle of each plan, program, and project, and keep communications a factor throughout planning,
80
design and execution. Transportation plans or programs often require a communications

strategy over a five to twenty-year life cycle. Transportation projects may have a shorter life
cycle. However, to be most effective, a communications strategy must be phased in and
sustained throughout, just not in one phase. However, the role of communications techniques
and strategies is likely to change over time and in response to the reaction of the audience.
81
EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICES FOR COMMUNICATING THE

ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF TRANSPORTATION PROJECTS
NCHRP 2-22(2):
BEST PRACTICES DIGEST
Prepared By:
ICF Consulting
9300 Lee Highway
Fairfax, Virginia 22031
Under subcontract to:

Hagler Bailly Services
February 28, 2001
NCHRP 2-22(2): BEST PRACTICES DIGEST
ICF CONSULTING, INC.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
Purpose
Elements of a Successful Communications Strategy
Digest Organization
1
1
1
2
Real World Examples of Successful Campaigns

Selecting the Examples
Four Campaign Examples
Lessons Learned
2
2
3
5
Element 1: Identifying and Understanding the Audience

Identify the Audience
Use Information on Public Opinion in Developing the Proposal
6
6
7
Element 2: Crafting the Message

Messages that Resonate
Responding to Opposition
12
12
15
Element 3: Designating the Messenger

Credibility of the Messenger
Role of the Business Community
Importance of Coalitions/Cooperation with Stakeholders
Role of Elected Officials and Transportation Agencies
16
16
17
18
19
Element 4: Selecting Communications Techniques

Public Meetings and Workshops
Advertising and Political Campaigns
20
21
22
Element 5: Integrating and Sustaining Communications
22
Conclusions
A Strong Message
An Effective Campaign
Other Points
Summing Up
23
23
24
25
25
Appendix: Descriptions of Selected Examples
27
ii
AUTHOR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This research report was performed under NCHRP Project 2-22(2) by staff from ICF
Consulting under subcontract to Hagler Bailly Services (now PA Consulting). Mr. Sergio
Ostria served as the Principal Investigator. He was supported by Mr. Eric Beshers, Mr.
Michael Grant, and Mr. Thomas Walsh.
iii
EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICES FOR COMMUNICATING THE

ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF TRANSPORTATION PROJECTS
INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE
This Best Practices Digest is designed to assist state and local transportation agencies,
communications professionals, and policy makers in developing communications
strategies to gain public support for transportation investment projects and programs. The
Digest uses real-world examples to provide lessons on successful communications
techniques and to describe best practices in developing and implementing communication
strategies.
This Digest is designed as a supporting companion to the Communications Guide
developed under NCHRP Project 2-22. The Communications Guide identifies five
elements of a successful communications campaign based on market research regarding
public perceptions on the economic impacts of transportation. The market research,
however, does not lend itself to an all-inclusive list of dos and donts for planners. As
a result, the Communications Guide notes that its recommendations are suggestive, not
prescriptive
The real world examples in this Best Practices Digest are designed to provide supporting
information on how communications initiatives have successfully been undertaken. The
Digest uses four example campaigns developed under NCHRP Project 2-22(2) to
describe each element of a communications campaign and to highlight practices and
lessons learned from these experiences. This Digest is not meant to be prescriptive or to
serve as a how-to manual. Rather, it emphasizes
Figure 1: Key Elements of a
lessons learned from actual experience and highlights
Successful Communications
how different approaches have been taken to run
Strategy
successful communications campaigns in different
circumstances. These best practices are presented to Element 1
help practitioners in designing and implementing their
own communications strategies.
Element 2
ELEMENTS OF SUCCESSFUL COMMUNICATIONS

STRATEGY

Element 3
While there is no simple blueprint for success in

communicating the economic impacts of
transportation investments, NCHRP 2-22 identified a
set of five broad elements for a successful
communications campaign. Figure 1 illustrates these
elements.
The best practices analysis presented in this Digest

Element 4

Element 5
Integrating and Sustaining Communications
shows that the first two elements of a communications strategy are truly critical for
success. Designing messages that resonate with stakeholders (be it the general public or
policy-makers) requires a comprehensive understanding of the concerns and preferences
of voters, for example. Obtaining resources for the development of this understanding is
often a pre-requisite; one that can be met by integrating the business community into the
process early on. In many cases, having business leaders serve as key messengers can
improve the likelihood of success. At the end of the day, however, the merit of the project
at hand is paramount, and the flexibility of project planners and supporters in adjusting
the projects characteristics to reflect the concerns of stakeholders is very important.
Given a strong project, a comprehensive understanding of stakeholders preferences and
concerns, a strong message, and a united business community, designing and
implementing the other elements of a successful communications strategy becomes
straightforward.
DIGEST ORGANIZATION
This Best Practices Digest is organized around the five communications process elements
illustrated above. The Digest discusses the five communication-process elements in the
context of four successful efforts to communicate the benefits of transportation
investments.
The Digest compares actual practices in the four examples with the conclusions of market
research conducted under NCHRP 2-22. As noted earlier, the market research did not
lend itself to prescriptive recommendations regarding the dos and donts of a
communications campaign. While these examples are not prescriptive either, they
provide lessons on approaches that were effective in winning support for new
transportation investments. They also demonstrate that different approaches can be
executed successfully in different circumstances. As a result, planners should find the
best practices from these examples helpful in designing and implementing their own
communication campaigns.
REAL WORLD EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGNS 1

SELECTING THE EXAMPLES
In selecting examples to be used in this Digest, four example campaigns were chosen by
the project panel for NCHRP Project 2-22(2) from among nine candidate campaigns
identified in the course of the project. The nine example campaigns were each
subjectively assessed according to four criteria:
1. Robustness of Communication/Campaign Activitiesthe extent to which the
campaigns were organized to address specific transportation investments;
See the Appendix to this Digest for detailed descriptions of the four chosen examples.
2. Availability of Documentationthe extent to which documented materials and

empirical information were available rather than just anecdotal accounts;
3. Degree of Challengethe extent to which the campaigns faced multiple barriers to
implementation, such as environmental issues; and
4. Modal Diversityan attempt was made to include campaigns that were broader than
only highway-related investments.
Each example campaign was ranked according to these criteria, and with these subjective
rankings in mind, the research team further narrowed the group down using three
additional criteria:
1. The decision process used to decide to undertake a communications campaign;
2. The extent to which there were specific processes used for identifying and targeting
audiences, crafting messages, and designating messengers; and
3. The effectiveness of communications techniques and media employed.
On the basis of the initial rankings and these criteria, the list of examples was narrowed
down to four campaigns for in-depth analysis.
FOUR CAMPAIGN EXAMPLES
The four examples of successful communications campaigns used in this Digest include
efforts to communicate the benefits of transportation projects/programs in CharlotteMecklenburg County, North Carolina; St. Louis County, Missouri; Santa Clara County,
California; and the Seattle-Puget Sound Region, Washington. These four locations are
distributed geographically across the U.S., as show in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Locations of Example Campaigns
Seattle-Puget Sound,
Washington (1996)
Charlotte-Mecklenburg County,
North Carolina (1998)
Santa Clara County,

California (1996)
St. Louis County,

Missouri (1998)
These four communication campaigns have two overarching common elements:

1. Each campaign involved a public vote with a choice whether or not to support a
transportation program or project; and
2. Each was successful in securing public approval for the transportation project.
The four campaigns, however, were distinct from each other in many ways. Each
campaign was undertaken in a different part of the U.S., with unique circumstances
surrounding the issues, including the record of transportation investment in the region
and the history of the debate on the proposal being considered. Each campaign also
involved a different set of political players and stakeholder groups.
Each campaign is described briefly below.
Puget Sound area, Washington
The voters within the Washington Regional Transportation Authority (RTA) district were
asked in November 1996 to approve a measure to increase taxes to fund a set of
transportation improvements, consisting primarily of new bus, commuter-rail, and lightrail service. The taxes were to include a local sales tax increase of four-tenths of one
percent (an increase of four cents on a $10 purchase) and a motor vehicle excise tax
(license plate tabs) increase of three-tenths of one percent (an increase of about $30 a
year on a vehicle valued at $10,000), and were to provide the local portion of revenues to
develop and operate the RTA's proposed $3.9 billion Ten-year Plan, called Sound
Move. A much larger transit program had been voted down in 1995.
Following the 1995 defeat, the RTA launched an effort to develop a new transit proposal
and provide the public with information on the benefits of the new proposal. As a public
agency, however, the RTA could not be directly involved in a political campaign on
raising or using public funds. Business groups, including the Greater Seattle Chamber of
Commerce, undertook the political campaign needed to secure voters support for the
measure. The proposition was successful with 57 percent voter approval, compared to 47
percent for the 1995 measure.
Two ballot measures were placed before the voters of Santa Clara County in November
1996: Measure A, an advisory measure on a specific package of transportation projects
for the county, to be funded with proceeds of any new voter-approved sales taxes; and
Measure B, a binding measure on whether the Board of Supervisors should enact a onehalf percent sales tax with a nine-year time frame, with the implicit understanding that
the County would use the revenue to carry out the projects in Measure A.
A communications campaign was undertaken by the Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group
to garner support for Measures A and B, using a variety of mailings and television and
radio spots. The two measures were approved by the voters.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg County, North Carolina

Mecklenburg County, NC, which includes the city of Charlotte, held a referendum in
November 1998 on a one-half percentage point increase in the county sales tax, with
proceeds to be used to support a bond issue to fund transportation improvements in the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg 2025 Integrated Transit/Land Use Plan. A broad communications
process involving a series of eighteen meetings over five months was undertaken to
involve the public in the development of the transportation-land use plan and to secure
voter approval of the sales tax increase. The outreach process began in the Fall of 1997,
after the state legislature authorized the referendum. The outreach process resulted in the
development of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg 2025 Integrated Transit/Land Use Plan,
which called for the creation of five transit corridors with improved bus service,
pedestrian infrastructure and roadways linking communities to the transit corridors.
The County Commissioners agreed to put the proposal on the ballot in early Fall of 1998.
At that point, an intense period of campaigning for approval of the bond issue was
undertaken using television and radio spots, newspaper coverage, leaflets, and other
traditional campaign techniques. The referendum was approved with 58 percent of the
citizens voting for the tax increase.
In 1998, residents of St. Louis County voted in a referendum to approve a set of
agreements that would allow building of the Page Avenue Bridge connecting St. Louis
County to St. Charles County across the Missouri River, thereby improving the links
between the two counties and giving the City of St. Louis a new link through St. Louis
County to St. Charles County, an important suburban area. The ballot asked voters to
approve an agreement to grant easements through Creve Coeur Park, accept more than
1,000 acres of land for mitigation (since the Page Avenue extension would take
parkland), and authorize leases so that some businesses could remain on the mitigation
land.
Environmental and some religious and municipal groups opposed the bridge, while local
business groups, including the Regional Commerce and Growth Association (RCGA),
supported the bridge as necessary for economic growth. The RCGA took the lead in
developing a campaign to support the referendum, including use of television, mail,
radio, and billboards. The measure passed 2-1 in the election.
LESSONS LEARNED
The five key elements of a successful communications strategy (Figure 1, above) were
involved in each campaign but, of course, in different ways. As a result, the examples
demonstrate that there is no one size fits all approach to success. Rather, techniques
and methods must be adapted to the unique circumstances of each region and the
transportation issues being debated.
These five key elements (identified in NCHRP 2-22) are discussed below, highlighting
lessons learned from the approaches used in the four example campaigns.
ELEMENT 1: IDENTIFYING AND UNDERSTANDING THE AUDIENCE

The first element in developing a successful communications campaign is to identify the
target audience and assess the audiences understanding of relevant issues.
IDENTIFY THE AUDIENCE
To communicate a message effectively, one first needs to understand the audience to be
reached and how members of that audience perceive the issues at hand. Identifying key
groups of voters and understanding their concerns enables the backers of a project to
adjust both their proposal and their message to the public so they will resonate with
relevant stakeholders.
The scope of expected project benefits and costs, and their impact on various groups
within the voting public, is an important consideration in winning voter support. In
particular, citizen perceptions that they may be paying for a project that benefits other
people can adversely affect voter support.
In the Puget Sound area, for example, voter perceptions about the equity of the costs and
benefits of the transit proposals were crucial to the votes that took place in 1995 and
1996. Both of these ballot initiatives were put before the voters of the Regional
Transportation Authority (RTA) district. The RTA district covers the most congested
urban areas of King, Pierce, and Snohomish counties (including the cities of Seattle,
Bellevue, Tacoma, and Everett and many smaller towns and suburbs). The RTA district
boundary lines generally follow the urban-growth boundaries created in accord with
Washingtons Growth Management Act.
In the unsuccessful March 1995 vote, opponents in Everett focused on the plans lack of
light-rail service to that city as evidence the plan was unfair. The plan included light rail
connecting Seattle, Bellevue, and Tacoma, with one terminus of the line just two miles
south of the Everett city limits. Opponents in Everett argued that they would be paying
for services elsewhere in the RTA district that they would never use. This view was
shared by leaders of the city of Renton in King County who believed the plan did not
provide Renton a level of benefit commensurate with the taxes to be paid there. In both
these areas, opponents were successful in getting business and political leaders to oppose
the transit plan.
In the post-defeat efforts to craft a new plan, a set of guiding principles was adopted
which called for the new transit proposal to be regional, but also to recognize needs
identified locally in each of the RTA districts five subareas. Under this framework, there
would be a close match between the revenues generated in each subarea and the transit
services provided there. In fact, financial policies were put in place to construct
firewalls between subarea revenues so that cost overruns in one subarea could not
impact projects in another subarea. A consequence of this was a greater sense of equity, a
feeling that tax payments and benefits were in balance for most people.
Similarly, in Charlotte, the Transit/Land Use Plan focused on five transportation
corridors in Mecklenburg County: Northeast, Southeast (Independence), South, West
(Airport), and North. The framework of the plan included rapid transit in each corridor
and also recognized the need for transit in areas between the corridors.
In contrast to these two cases, the vote regarding the Page Avenue Bridge in St. Louis
County involved only the voters of St. Louis County, even though the bridge was to link
St. Louis County with St. Charles County over the Missouri River and would also have
an effect on people in the City of St. Louis. In this case, the project could provide
substantial economic benefits to people outside the jurisdiction where the decision lay. In
fact, the bridge was seen as a way to allow St. Charles County, a prosperous suburban
area, to grow further. But the vote was limited to St. Louis County so the message needed
to be tailored to voters in St. Louis County and benefits to them. Since the proposal did
not involve taxes, the issue of fiscal equity did not arise.
Santa Clara County, California, is a large county, which includes much of the area
commonly termed Silicon Valley and encompasses the cities of San Jose, Palo Alto,
and Santa Clara, among others. The proposed transit and highway projects were to
benefit businesses and residents of Santa Clara County, as well as improve linkages with
other counties. The proposal included transit projects to link Silicon Valley to the Bay
Area Rapid Transit (BART) System in Alameda County and to increase CalTrain Service
which connects to San Francisco. The transportation program also included widening a
number of Interstate highways that help to connect the county to surrounding areas. The
proposed program would primarily benefit residents and businesses in Santa Clara
County but would also have some effect on the broader region. Understanding who the
voters were and the relevance of these transportation investments to them was an
important component in the development of the communications campaign.
USE INFORMATION ON PUBLIC OPINION IN DEVELOPING THE PROPOSAL
One overarching lesson that emerges from the campaign examples is the importance of
understanding public preferences prior to final development of an investment proposal,
rather than after presenting it to the public. There are, basically, two methods of getting
this information:
Involve the public directly in the planning process

Use polls, focus groups, and other devices to learn about public opinion.
With the first method, the public is brought directly into project development through
workshops and similar techniques and participates in decisions on the components of the
project. With the second method, transportation professionals develop the project, but
information on public opinion is brought into the process and adjustments in project
components are made as appropriate.
The first method was used extensively, and effectively, in Charlotte. In the other three
cases, the second method predominated. In the Puget Sound region, however, an advisory
committee was also used. It did not directly participate in project planning, but it met
frequently to discuss the issues; professional staff attended the meetings, and the
discussions gave them valuable information for project development. None of these
approaches can be taken as a guarantor of success. Substantial public involvement
through planning workshops, for example, was used for development of a Denver railtransit project that was defeated at the polls in 1997.
Direct Public InvolvementThe Charlotte Example
The potential gain from direct public involvement in planning is that a substantial portion
of voters is convinced of the desirability of the project by the time the planning process is
complete. The method certainly appears to have worked in this fashion in CharlotteMecklenburg County. It is useful, therefore, to include some details of the Charlotte
experience in this Digest.
An extensive public involvement and education process using the theme, The Wheels of
Change: A Community in Motion, was developed. The purpose of the effort was
twofold: to educate citizens on transit alternatives, the transit/land use relationship, and
the issues involved in regional transit planning; and to involve citizens in the planning
process itself.
The public involvement campaign included the following components:
Three public meetings, two of which were televised live, providing opportunities for
people to call in questions and comments. These meetings were taped for multiple
rebroadcasts.
Three sets of corridor group meetings (April, May and June) were held in each of
the five corridors, for a total of 15 corridor group meetings. These meetings
constituted the "core" of public involvement. The meetings gave citizens hands-on
opportunities to participate with the consultants in creating the planfrom locating
alignments and stations to selecting preferred transit technologies and identifying
areas for potential development/redevelopment. During each meeting, different
aspects of the emerging plan were presented and discussed. Participants used large
maps of the corridors to provide comments on alignments, station locations and other
aspects of the plan. Attendance exceeded 200 people per month.
e-Mail opportunities for citizens to send comments and questions and receive
prompt response from the appropriate source.
The public involvement program also focused considerable effort on educating the public
about the planning process and opportunities to participate in the process. Outreach
activities included:
Speakers bureau presentations to civic and neighborhood groups throughout the

County.
Road signage (similar to zoning notices) highlighting dates and times of corridor
group meetings.
Media relations activities, including assisting reporters with information and story
ideas and participating in television programs and radio talk shows focusing on the
transit planning process. These activities resulted in extensive and detailed media
coverage throughout the entire process.
Due to the amount of work and coordination required, considerable staff and consultant
resources were dedicated to developing and implementing the public-involvement effort.
Staff from the City of Charlottes Corporate Communications office, Mecklenburg
Countys Public Service and Information Department, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Planning
Commission and Charlotte Department of Transportation worked together with a local
consultant with expertise in constituencies and land use and another local consultant who
served as a liaison with minority communities. Additionally, specially trained facilitators
were hired to assist in conducting corridor group meetings. As all of these activities were
in the nature of public education and solicitation of public contribution to the planning
process, local governments were not inhibited by restraints on political-campaign
activities.
A specific effort also was made to include citizens in a more formalized way through a
Transit Planning Advisory Committee (T-PAC). The Charlotte City Council,
Mecklenburg County Board of Commissioners, Mecklenburg County School Board, and
the towns of Matthews, Mint Hill, Pineville, Cornelius, Huntersville, and Davidson
appointed 21 citizens to serve on the T-PAC. The charge to this committee included:
Determining whether the developed plan provided sufficient basis for citizens to vote
on a half-cent sales-tax increase as a funding source.
Making a collective go/no-go decision on whether to recommend holding a Fall 1998

referendum.
T-PAC met 11 times between March and August 1998 to hear reports from the
consultants, discuss technical aspects of the developing plan, and review input from
citizens.
Citizen involvement in the corridor and public meetings, as well as input provided
through the variety of other public involvement methods, helped the consultant team to
understand better the transit/land use needs and wishes of the community. Many of the
specifics of the 2025 plan that emerged were provided in direct response to comments
and suggestions from citizens. Contributions from the corridor meetings, for example,
provided the basis for several changes to the consultants original vision for transit and
land use development.
The high level of public involvement helped justify taking the sales-tax increase to a
referendum and served as a foundation for the ensuing campaign to win voter support for
the tax increase. In this way, the public became invested in the transportation plan and
were willing to support it on the ballot.
An Advisory CouncilPuget Sound
The defeat of an ambitious transit project in a 1995 referendum posed a particular
challenge for the Regional Transit Authority and other backers of the project as they
sought to win voter approval of a scaled-down version in 1996. The RTA needed to know
why they had lost the first time out.
Following the failure in the spring of 1995, the RTA took several steps to involve key
business and civic leaders in the formulation of the next proposal. RTAs intention was to
be as open as possible and to listen to opponents as well as supporters of the first
proposal. RTA formed a Regional Outreach Committee to review a new proposal and
provide feedback from a wide spectrum of opinion. The committee comprised 15
members including opponents as well as supporters of the first proposal. Among the 15,
there was geographic balance among the five subareas of the RTA district and there was
representation from labor, environmental, business, and civic groups. The committee was
chaired by Richard Ford, known in the region for various other public-policy leadership
roles and a former Executive Director of the Port of Seattle.
The group met frequently over several months while the RTA was developing a new
proposal. Staff and board members from the RTA sat in on the meetings to hear the
discussion first hand and to learn the reactions of individual members to various concepts
under consideration.
10
As one result of the committees work, the RTA adopted a set of principles and
guidelines for the new transit proposal that emphasized the voters desires for a broader
range of transportation investments with lower total cost. It was never expected that the
outreach committee would reach consensus on a new proposal, but, in the end, a majority
of the group did support the proposal that was successfully taken to the voters.
Polls, Surveys, and Focus Groups
The Communications Guide developed under NCHRP 2-22 suggested that it might be
useful to segment an audience into different groups in order to tailor different messages
to each group. Audience segments, in this view, could be specified according to
stakeholder roles, socio-economic characteristics, or perceptions regarding the
relationship of transportation to economic growth. In the actuality of the campaigns
studied, however, such an effort to segment voters was made only in Santa Clara County.
Some segmentation of voters, however, according to geographic location and relative
impact of improvements was a feature of every campaign.
The campaigns did, indeed, use focus groups and surveys to gain an understanding of
voters preferences and attitudes. But the usual purpose was to gain an assessment of
overall views of the electorate in order to craft messages to the broad voting audience.
Focus groups and surveys were also used to help develop proposals before taking them to
the voters and sometimes to refine ballot language.
In the Puget Sound area, for example, the Greater Seattle Chamber of Commerce, along
with other pro-transit groups, conducted a poll of likely general election voters in the
RTA district. The poll examined the level of support for rail transit and was used to test
support for various transit plan scenarios and associated levels of taxation. The poll
showed strong support for rail transit among likely voters and a disbelief that more roads
would solve congestion. The pro-RTA campaign also conducted focus groups with likely
voters in order to develop media advertising messages.
In St. Louis County, market research was used to gauge voter sentiment. The Regional
Commerce and Growth Association (RCGA), which strongly supported the Page Avenue
bridge, conducted a poll to determine if there were support for the bridge, and if so, who
would support it and why. The RCGA found that the general voter was concerned with
reducing traffic congestion and, to a lesser degree, economic growth. This poll did
segment the audience in the sense it was found that voters who lived near St. Charles
County were aware of economic impacts in terms of improved access to jobs in St.
Charles County.
In Santa Clara County, there was an effort to segment the audience into distinct groups
in order to identify voter groups and understand the views of different constituencies.
Supporters of the ballot initiatives hired a pollster to conduct surveys of the voting public
prior to final development of the ballot language. Three surveys were conducted to
determine what interest groups existed in the county, what issues defined them, and what
types of transportation projects and subsequent levels of taxation they would support.
Interest groups were established along geographic, gender, age, and other lines, and their
11
interests and concerns identified. Polls and focus groups were used to test ballot language
and gauge support for different types of transportation investments.
In Charlotte, in addition to the extensive outreach effort, there was also a poll on voters
attitudes towards economic growth and mass transit.
ELEMENT 2: CRAFTING THE MESSAGE

The second communications element identified in NCHRP 2-22 is crafting effective
messages to the audience. Success depends in large part on understanding the concerns of
the audience as discussed in the preceding section. But the information developed on
voter opinions must be used skillfully to develop media messages that reach, and move,
voters. In the example campaigns, certain types of messages resonated more strongly
with citizens than did others. The experience of these campaigns also showed the
importance of responding to the opposition's messages.
MESSAGES THAT RESONATE
Research conducted for NCHRP 2-22 found that economic benefits did not, generally,
make the most powerful messages in securing support for transportation investments. For
the most part, economic benefit messages were no more powerful than messages about
improved safety, environmental quality, or reduced travel time. The research also found
that the importance of specific messages varies for different groups of people. Traffic
congestion is an important issue in garnering support for transportation investments in
urban and suburban areas, while retaining area businesses is more important to rural
residents than to urban or suburban residents.
NCHRP 2-22 field tests conducted in three regional sitesDetroit, Tampa, and Seattle
demonstrate that the most important messages can differ in different parts of the country.
For example, the survey found that messages about creating jobs were as likely to
produce support for transportation projects in Detroit as messages about reducing
accidents, improving air quality, and improving traffic congestion. In Tampa and Seattle,
creating new jobs ranked considerably lower than the other three messages. In Seattle,
reducing traffic congestion was the most important message for voters.
Congestion Relief/Alternatives to Congestion
In all four cases, the campaigns focused heavily on the issue of traffic congestion.
Congestion was the dominant issue in Santa Clara County, the Puget Sound area, and
Charlotte. In St. Louis County, economic issues were raised somewhat more frequently.
In Santa Clara County, the Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group used a multi-faceted
message emphasizing how the transportation investments would add to quality of life.
Business leaders and other supporters of the measures wanted transportation
improvements to reduce traffic congestion, make employees commutes less stressful and
time-consuming, improve safety, and provide additional transportation alternatives. Their
pitch was largely on these issues, highlighting congestion relief. The effect of congestion
12
relief on the local economy got some attention, the point being that the area could not
continue to flourish if workers found commuting conditions intolerable.
In the Puget Sound area and in Charlotte, traffic congestion was also a central issue. In
each place, however, the transportation program on the ballot was a transit program, and
studies showed that the transit investments would not have a significant impact on traffic
congestion. As a result, proponents of the transit plans could not argue for the tax
increase on the basis of relieving traffic congestion. The message to voters in these
campaigns was that transit improvements would provide an alternative to congested
highways and a faster or pleasanter means of commuting to work. In this regard, there
was, however, a certain ambivalence in the Puget Sound message; some of the campaign
advertising did say that the new transit systems would take tens of thousands of cars a
day off the regions freeways. Many in the audience would likely have interpreted this to
mean a reduction in congestion.
Research conducted by a public relations firm in Charlotte revealed that 86 percent of the
citizens believed Charlotte would continue to enjoy a rapid rate of growth and prosperity.
It also found 81 percent believed a better mass transit system was needed to cope with
this growth, 45 percent felt traffic congestion was a problem, and 62 percent supported
the Citys desire for developers to follow planned land development patterns
concentrated along the Countys major transportation corridors. These findings
supported the Citys intention of investing in rapid transit and showed that convincing the
public of a need for transit would not be necessary. That need was already evident to the
public; what the campaign had to do was show the public that the right rapid-transit
system was going to be developed.
Economic and Transportation Benefits
In St. Louis County, the Regional Commerce and Growth Association (RCGA) worked
up a number of economic arguments but, in the end, made limited use of some of them. A
principal argument, that was used in the campaign, was that the bridge would be an
economic benefit for the region because it would reduce congestion, provide improved
access to jobs in St. Charles County, and improve the commute for St. Louis County
residents. Infrastructure improvements were needed because of rapid population growth,
and that jobs would be at risk if mobility were not preserved. This theme is similar to
ones developed in the other campaignsthat economic growth would be threatened if
relief from highway congestion were not, in some way, provided.
It was also argued that the bridge would have a favorable effect on the movement of
freight throughout the region, because a new river crossing would take some commuter
traffic off I-70, the major freight corridor in the state of Missouri and a major east-west
trucking route for the nation.
Another argument was that if the bridge were not built, highway funds for the St. Louis
region would be lost. Funds earmarked for the bridge would not be allocated to other
projects around St. Louis, but to other projects in Missouri that were ready to move
forward.
13
The RCGA also made a case that the additional acreage and other improvements to Creve
Coeur Park as part of the project would enhance the park and increase the number of
individuals using the area. The size of the park was to be almost doubled from 1,137
acres to 2,181 acres. A new bike path was to be developed, the lake was to be dredged,
and a siltation basin added to eliminate the need for future dredging. A nature center was
to be developed in a pre-existing building, connected to a bike path and parking lot.
Other park amenities were also to be further developed, including sports fields and
parking spaces. Wetlands were to be restored and development in the flood plain
reduced.
When it came to the actual campaign, the focus was on delivering a somewhat simpler
message to the voters. The chosen strategy was to avoid a long, protracted public effort
and pursue a short, relatively late campaign utilizing television, mail, telephones, radio
and billboards. Polls showed that voters were more concerned about congestion than
about the park and campaign material emphasized congestion relief and quality of life
issues. The campaign focused secondarily on job creation and economic issues, and
targeted this message primarily to the northern part of the county, the part nearest to St.
Charles County across the river.
Local Benefits
The transportation projects considered here all had region-wide benefits, but audiences
tended to be most receptive to messages showing how programs would bring benefits
directly to their own communities and to themselves.
In Charlotte, the 2025 Integrated Transit/Land Use Plan was developed with five priority
transit corridors, based on previous studies that had identified these corridors as the most
viable locations for primary rapid transit lines. The designation of five transit corridors
immediately created geographic areas that could be perceived as getting more benefit
from the project than other parts of Mecklenburg County. For this reason, the Plan also
provided for investment in transportation projects that would benefit other parts of the
county as well. Otherwise, people living outside the designated transit corridors were
likely to feel that they would not benefit from the Plan.
The Plans recommendations were set in the context of improving the entire existing
public transportation system and improving the regional highway system. Improvements
outside of the transit corridors included lateral connections between the corridors and to
key development hubs outside the corridors. It was also recognized in the Plan that the
rapid transit alignment and service proposed for each corridor could be extended into
adjacent jurisdictions in the future.
In the Puget Sound area, the RTA District was divided into five sub-areas: Snohomish
County, North King County, South King County, East King County, and Pierce County.
Part of the proposal was to distribute projects equitably so that spending would benefit
the five sub-areas based on the share of revenues each sub-area generates. As a result,
residents could be assured that their tax dollars would not go largely to fund projects in
other parts of the District.
14
RESPONDING TO OPPOSITION
A good understanding of the opposition is a necessary requirement for crafting an
effective message. Understanding arguments against a transportation proposal enables
supporters of the proposal to develop effective counter-arguments and restrict the
oppositions ability to attract voters. Understanding the opposition can also be used to
adapt the transportation investment proposals so that opposition is reduced, if not
altogether eliminated.
In St. Louis County, the controversy over the Page Avenue Bridge project involved a
combination of business groups supporting the bridge and environmental groups, along
with some church groups and municipal governments, opposing the bridge. Although the
bridge project had already received all environmental clearances, a coalition of
environmental and other groups the Coalition for the Environment, the St. Louis
County Municipal League, and Churches United for Community Action were able to
block action and force a referendum in St. Louis County. The opposition to the project
saw the extension as a threat to Creve Coeur Park and an encouragement of urban sprawl.
Understanding the oppositions argument, the Regional Commerce and Growth
Association (RCGA) undertook to weaken the oppositions support and its ability to
attract support. Targeted political initiatives were designed to challenge the oppositions
support among mayors and other elected officials and to minimize the oppositions
ability to attract additional political support.
RCGA argued that the Page Avenue extension would not lead to sprawl because the area
where Page Avenue will terminate is already more than 70 percent developed. The
campaign emphasized that the bridge would improve access to St. Louis County,
enabling St. Charles County residents to continue to commute to jobs in St. Louis
County, rather than accelerating the dispersal of individuals to dwellings nearer jobs in
other counties. It also noted that improvements as part of the project would enhance the
park and increase the number of individuals using the area, rather than threatening the
park.
In the Puget Sound area, the transit program was opposed by Citizens Opposed to
Sitting in Traffic (COST), a coalition of road building, trucking, and suburban retail, real
estate and home construction groups that had successfully opposed the 1995 transit
investment initiative in the Puget Sound area. COST had opposed the 1995 initiative on
the grounds that the transit plan was not cost effective and would not reduce traffic
congestion.
Supporters of the 1996 initiative tailored their message to counter the arguments used by
the opposition in 1995. The advertising campaign focused on raising and then answering
a number of questions about the proposed initiative. The pro-transit campaign aired
commercials that raised the oppositions points and strongly refuted them, effectively
inoculating the voting public against the oppositions message.
15
ELEMENT 3: DESIGNATING THE MESSENGER

The third element of a communications campaign is to designate a messenger or
messengers to deliver the chosen messages. The Communications Guide developed under
NCHRP 2-22 highlights the importance of selecting an appropriate messenger, but
acknowledges that in some cases the chosen communications technique may not require
selecting a specific messenger. For example, an educational campaign consisting only of
billboards and shopping mall displays may not require a high-profile individual as
messenger.
In practice, most of the communications campaigns involved a set of messengers. The
messengers, however, often were not specifically selected by the transportation agencies.
Rather, the messengers evolved from those who were most interested in promoting the
transportation investments and had the clout and/or resources to participate in the
campaign in a significant way. Generally, the messengers identified themselves in the
initial stages of developing the campaign typically before audience preferences had
been analyzed and before the message itself had been fully developed. In fact, the
messengers typically not only functioned as spokespersons for the campaigns, but were
integrally involved in developing campaign strategies and messages.
CREDIBILITY OF THE MESSENGER
Overall, the examples show no clear convergence on any particular type of messenger as
most effective for promoting transportation investments. Instead, they demonstrate that
the effectiveness of messengers must depend on the circumstances surrounding the
individual campaign, including the personalities of individuals, public perceptions, and
time and resources.
Most importantly, the messenger must be credible with the target audience, which often
requires empathy with audience concerns. For example, a project whose outcomes affect
one neighborhood in particular may call for an area resident to bring credibility to the
message. A longer-term and broader transportation investment initiative may, however,
be most persuasively presented by an official of a local or state transportation agency.
Correspondingly, some individuals or groups may make poor messengers if they are
viewed suspiciously by the public. In some cases, specific efforts were made to keep a
low profile for certain groups involved in the campaign.
ROLE OF THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY

Research conducted for NCHRP 2-22 suggests that economic impact messages may be
most effectively communicated by members of the business community, rather than
elected officials or transportation planners themselves. Local business leaders are the
messengers from whom the majority of respondents to a national survey say they prefer
16
to hear economic benefit messages. Over 63 percent of respondents rated local business
leaders a seven or above on a ten-point scale of the likelihood that a message delivered
from a group would increase their support for a proposed transportation project. The
second highest rated type of messenger is local transportation officials, followed by
political leaders and state officials.
In practice, the four examples showed very different levels of involvement and profile by
the business community. These experiences demonstrates that the business community
can be an effective lead messenger in some cases, but that in other cases a lower profile
for this group has also met with success. In all cases, however, some involvement by the
business community was important in helping to communicate the economic message.
In St. Louis County, for example, business leaders served as the primary messengers in
the campaign to support the Page Avenue Extension agreement. In this case, officials of
the Regional Commerce and Growth Association (RCGA)an organization that
coordinates region-wide economic development activities with members of local
economic development agenciesand area business leaders were the major messengers.
RCGA ran a speakers bureau and the CEOs of major area businesses were sent out as
spokespeople for the bridge project. Their message focused on economic growth and how
the bridge would be an economic benefit to the region because it would reduce
congestion, provide increased access to jobs, and improve freight movement.
Because part of the message focused on the economic importance of the bridge project,
business leaders may have been a good choice for messenger. Moreover, the RCGA
developed targeted initiatives to minimize the oppositions support among mayors and
other political officials. Rather than have their message compete against the messages
coming from political leaders, the business community attempted to minimize the
impression of conflict between the business community and politicians. The RCGA
presented a strong united message coming from business leaders.
Similarly, business leaders took a lead role in supporting transportation improvements in
Santa Clara County, California. There the Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group
(SVMG) led a coalition of business leaders, environmental and health organizations, and
senior and disabled groups in supporting Measures A and B. The SVMG, founded in
1978 by David Packard and other Silicon Valley CEOs, represents 125 Silicon Valley
employers who collectively provide over 250,000 local jobsnearly one-third of the
Valleys private sector workforce. As a result, the SVMG has a large degree of credibility
in the community. Since its inception SVMG has lead three successful campaigns to have
taxes dedicated to transportation initiatives in Santa Clara County. The respected position
of the employer groups, combined with support from a diverse coalition of other groups,
provided an effective means to communicate the potential benefits of the transportation
projects.
In contrast to these examples, business leaders played a supporting role in spreading the
economic benefit message in Charlotte and the Puget Sound area. In both of these places,
businesses provided financial support and backing to others in the campaign and
17
promoted the project proposals. However, business groups did not take the lead role or
most highly visible role in terms of individual personalities promoting the message.
In Charlotte, the Mayor of Charlotte appointed ten community business leaders to the
Commission of Ten to review and promote transportation improvements. The business
leaders were vocal proponents of the project proposal and their respective businesses
provided funding for the public campaign. They also hired a consultant to conduct the
political campaign to secure voter approval of the sales tax increase. The business
groups, however, played, in public, a supporting role to the Mayor, who was the most
visible advocate for the campaign.
In the Puget Sound area, the support of large businesses, such as Boeing, is believed to
have been important in the success of the ballot initiative. The Greater Seattle Chamber
of Commerce, along with other pro-RTA groups, organized the public campaign. Phil
Condit, the Boeing Companys CEO, convened a business fund-raising outreach program
that included Microsoft and other major local employers. The business efforts led to
business and local government endorsements for the plan, which helped to neutralize
opposition. The Seattle Chamber of Commerce, headed by Michael Vaska, a local
lawyer, and other pro-RTA groups organized and funded the campaign.
IMPORTANCE OF COALITIONS / COOPERATION WITH STAKEHOLDERS
Research conducted under NCHRP 2-22 suggests that cooperation with affected or
interested groups can add to the effectiveness of a message. That is, when a
transportation planning agency or business group cooperates with other stakeholder
organizations, the public is more likely to view with favor messages about the positive
impacts of transportation.
This may have been one reason that the business-led coalition in Santa Clara County
was so successful. Not only was the messenger respected, but the Silicon Valley
Manufacturing Group also worked to include other interests within a broader coalition.
SVMG included major employers such as Hewlett-Packard, IBM, and Lockheed-Martin.
But the business leadership also brought public health and community oriented groups
into the coalition , such as the American Lung Association, the Congress for California
Seniors, the Greenbelt Alliance, the San Jose Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce, the
Santa Clara County Firefighters Association, and the South Bay Labor Council. Since the
coalition was very broad and did not just represent business groups, the SVMG could
argue effectively to promote the transportation investments without the appearance of
being self-serving.
In order to reach the broad voter constituency, it is often helpful for a campaign to target
individuals or organizations that serve as liaisons or connections to the public. For
example, in order to communicate a message to the public, it is often useful to target
neighborhood associations, community and grassroots organizations, business
associations, and elected officials.
18
The Charlotte campaign, for example, targeted elected officials, neighborhood groups,
and other community-based groups to help spread support for the ballot initiative. Among
these groups were: elected officials and government agencies; business associations;
neighborhood associations; citizen grassroots organizations and environmental groups;
and educational institutions.
ROLE OF ELECTED OFFICIALS AND TRANSPORTATION AGENCIES
According to findings of a national state preference survey conducted under NCHRP 222, local transportation officials tend to be viewed as more credible than most potential
messengers, including local elected officials. Twenty-eight (28) percent of respondents
said they were very likely to increase their support for a transportation project upon
hearing an economic message from local transportation officials, compared to 23 percent
hearing the message from state or local politicians and 21 percent from prominent civic
leaders, as shown in Figure 3.
In practice, both elected officials and appointed officials of transportation agencies have
effectively served as messengers. The effectiveness most likely has to do with the
popularity and perceived credibility of the individual in question.
In the Puget Sound area, the Regional Transportation Authority (RTA), developed the
transit project and provided objective technical information to the campaign. As a public
agency, the RTA could not campaign for the allocation of tax funds. The RTA, however,
was involved in the campaign through the provision of objective information about the
transit plan. As a result, the public agency provided a sense of legitimacy and credibility
to the arguments of those pushing for the transit plan.
19
Figure 3: Percent of Respondents Very Likely to Increase their Support for a

Transportation Project Upon Hearing an Economic Message from
[Percentage of Respondents who rated 9 or 10 (On a 10 point scale)]
32%
35%
28%
30%
21%
25%
23%
20%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Lo cal B usiness
Leaders
Lo cal
P ro minent Civic
Transpo rtatio n
Leaders
Officials
Lo cal/State
P o liticians,
Leaders
State Officials
In Charlotte, the principal spokesman for the bond-issue referendum was the Mayor of
Charlotte. A popular figure representing most of the population of Mecklenburg County,
the Mayor was very active throughout the entire campaign. As we have seen, the entire
process of developing the transit/land use plan and bringing the county sales tax increase
to referendum included extensive public involvement.
In contrast, public officials had a relatively low profile in St. Louis County. St. Louis
County is fragmented into small municipalities, making it difficult for one political leader
to serve as a regional spokesperson. The Regional Commerce and Growth Association
(RCGA) that operated the campaign was one of the few regional voices that had an
interest in transportation issues.
ELEMENT 4: SELECTING COMMUNICATIONS TECHNIQUES

The Communications Guide developed under NCHRP 2-22 notes that no single set of
communications techniques can be identified as the most appropriate or effective across
all circumstances with which transportation agencies are faced. Two general conclusions,
however, emerged from the market research: 1) Some traditional approaches, such as
town meetings, have limited value and should be employed selectively; and 2) Emerging
technology, such as Web pages, can be very effective.
In three of the four examples, fairly standard political campaigns were conducted, with
extensive use of television, radio, and other media. In Santa Clara County, a series of
mailings was employed with only limited use of other communications media. A Web
page was used in Charlotte but not elsewhere.
20
Review of the example campaigns that what matters most is not so much selection of the
communication technique but, rather, getting a prior understanding of the concerns and
preferences of the electorate and developing a program in accord with voters wishes. It
is much easier to argue for a tax increase or other measure to support a program when the
public is already familiar with and invested in the transportation program. As we have
already noted, the campaign in Charlotte went much farther than the others in the use of
direct public involvement in the development of the program to be presented to the
public.
PUBLIC MEETINGS AND WORKSHOPS
The Charlotte referendum on a county sales-tax increase to support a bond issue for
transportation projects provides a good example of how a strong public involvement
campaign helped to generate support for the initiative. Before the public campaign to
increase the sales tax was undertaken, a public participation process was developed to
involve the public in the development of the 2025 Integrated Transit/Land Use Plan.
Mecklenburg County and the City of Charlotte held 18 public meetings over five months,
providing citizens with many opportunities to be involved in the planning process.
The public meetings informed citizens of the details of the proposed program,
encouraged citizens to provide input on the plan, and to evaluate and critique the progress
of the consultants. The five month time frame allowed citizens to see the process through
from start to finish and to see how their input was integrated into the plan design. A
speakers bureau also operated simultaneously. The speakers bureau had individual city
officials make presentations to community groups. The purpose of all these efforts was
to create general awareness of transit/land use issues and its associated opportunities and
challenges; to obtain as much input as feedback from the public in the development of the
plan; and to use citizen involvement as a justification for placing the referendum on the
ballot and securing voter approval.
The public involvement campaign was seen as important to the success of the
referendum, and generated many of its own successes. More citizens participated in the
process of developing the plan than had ever before participated in a community-wide
planning effort in Charlotte and Mecklenburg County. Citizen input also provided the
basis for several changes to the consultants original visions for transit and land use
development.
The Charlotte example, however, also demonstrates that not all public involvement
activities are effective or cost-effective. Although the public meetings were viewed as
successful, the speakers bureau did not work as well. According to staff from the City of
Charlotte, the staff hours needed to target effectively key neighborhood groups and civic
organizations with speakers were not available. It was also difficult to keep talking points
up to date with the evolution of ideas in the public meetings.
21
ADVERTISING AND POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS

A standard political campaign is the usual method for generating support for a ballot
initiative and was used in all four of the examples, albeit with some variation in Santa
Clara County. Political advertising and campaigning methods include use of a variety of
different media and direct contacts, such as use of television and radio advertising, direct
mailings, leaflets dropped off at homes, signs in front lawns, campaign events to achieve
newspaper coverage, and phone banks to get out the vote.
In Charlotte, for example, campaign techniques included television and radio
advertisements, newspaper coverage, leaflets dropped off at homes, signs in front yards,
and people calling from phone banks to get out the vote.
In the Puget Sound area, the campaign operated a million-dollar television effort
coupled with radio ads, a kickoff rally, volunteer phone calling, and outdoor sign waving
at sporting events and along high traffic arterials.
The Santa Clara County campaign used a $1.6 million budget to send six rounds of
mailings, each mailing having up to 35 variations in content depending on the geographic
location, gender, or age of its audience. The mailing was supplemented by some
television and radio advertisements directed at the general public.
In St. Louis County, the RCGA used a $ 750,000 budget to hire a campaign consultant, a
radio/television specialist, and a telephone/mail specialist. The campaign consisted of a
series of television ads, radio spots, fliers mailed to homes, phone banks, and yard signs.
The strategy focused on avoiding a long, protracted public effort and instead pursued a
short, relatively late campaign that operated in the month leading up to the vote. A
late campaign was utilized to avoid allowing opposition to develop a counter attack or
to engage in negative dialogue with the campaign spokespeople.
ELEMENT 5: INTEGRATING AND SUSTAINING COMMUNICATIONS

The final element of a communications campaign is to ensure that communications are
integrated and sustained throughout the entire campaign. As a result, this element is not
so much a step in the process, but rather a concept governing the communications
process from initial proposal development through voter approval and beyond.
Successful communication campaigns generally cannot be implemented immediately
before an election, but rather, must begin early and be sustained through the entire
process of developing and implementing a transportation program or plan. The case
examples clearly show how communicating with the public can be an important
component of developing a transportation plan and gaining overall public support for that
plan.
Moreover, communications activities should not stop once the voters approve the
program. Communications efforts must be phased in and sustained throughout the life
cycle of any undertaking. An extensive transit system, like the ones in Charlotte and the
22
Puget Sound area, requires many years to become fully operational. Careful technical
analysis must proceed construction of each transit component and public commitment to
carry out the plan in full must be sustained for many years.
In the Puget Sound area, the RTA recognized the importance of continuing
communication efforts as a means to maintain support for the program. At their first
meeting after the election, the RTA Board passed Resolution No. 76, expressing its
thanks to the regions voters for approving the ballot measures and to citizens,
organizations, committees, and local jurisdictions who supported and advocated the plan.
In addition, Resolution No. 76 called on citizens and organizations previously opposed to
the plan to join with the RTA so that the opinions and advice of the entire Puget Sound
community could be part of, and supportive of, the Sound Move implementation process.
Over the following months, the RTA appointed a 15-member Citizens Oversight
Committee with geographic and expert representation and adopted a new citizen
participation program. The role of the panel is to monitor the RTA's progress in
delivering the plan the voters approved and to offer comments from their perspective.
The panel meets monthly and conducts a formal evaluation of the RTA's performance
twice yearly. The results are taken seriously and help guide improvements for greater
effectiveness.
In Charlotte, public involvement activities have also been sustained throughout the
process of beginning to implement the transit-land use plan.
CONCLUSIONS
Each of the four campaigns examined has its unique set of characteristics, but there are
some clear common elements present in the campaigns. And we can draw some useful
inferences about the requirements for success. Perhaps we belabor the obvious, but
success requires:
A strong message
An effective campaign
A STRONG MESSAGE
A message has to convey the following to voters:
A strong message is, in large part, a matter of the substance of a proposal but also
depends on good information on voters attitudes and concerns. In short, the project must
be a good idea, and recognized as such, but ensuring that recognition by the electorate
requires good analysis of voters attitudes and preferences.
23
The role of economic impacts in the successful messages was either relatively muted or
non-existent. The typical case was that the business leadership was convinced of the
economic benefits but actual campaign messages were designed to emphasize direct
transportation benefits to voterseither reduced road congestion or alternatives to road
transport. It should be noted, though, that this case was often made in the context of
accommodating future growthi.e., that continuing growth and prosperity might be
threatened if the transportation infrastructure were not improved.
AN EFFECTIVE CAMPAIGN
Professional assistance for polling, advertising, campaign management, and related

activities
A united business community provides critical support in two ways. First, business
leaders have a strong influence on public opinion in their own communities. If the voters
see the leading businessmen speaking with one voice, the public credibility of a proposal
is greatly enhanced. In particular, an argument that transportation improvement is needed
to facilitate future growth will have the greatest credibility if it comes from the business
community.
Second, the business community can raise the money required for a robust campaign.
This is critical, because government agencies are generally prohibited from using public
money for political campaigns. And, as the examples show, successful campaigns had
substantial budgets, ranging from a few hundred thousand to more than a million dollars.
Professional assistance, usually in the form of specialized consultants, is virtually
essential for an effective campaign. Local-government staff will usually be under
significant legal constraint regarding participation in a political campaign and, in any
event, would be unlikely to possess the required skills in sufficient depth. High-quality
skills are required to conduct polls and focus groups, analyze the results, craft the
materials to be used for various media, and manage all the complex activities of a
political campaign.
Poll and/or focus-group results are essential for refinement of the message and also of
the project. If at all possible, some measure of public opinion should be taken before a
project is put before the public in its final form. It may well be that there are features that
have a critical impact on public opinion, positive or negative, that would not have been
recognized as such by professional transportation planners. And the data on public
opinion is essential for development of on-target messages for media advertising.
24
A robust campaign entails a full range of media advertising, distribution of literature,

front-yard signs and posters, telephone banks and similar devices and methods to carry
the message to the public and, in the end, get out the vote. A project may be soundly
conceived and designed and still fail if the message is not carried to the voters in a
vigorous and effective manner.
OTHER POINTS
The choice of a messenger does not seem, generally, to be a critical point. In some
successful campaigns a single strong spokesman emerged; in other successful campaigns
this was not the case.
In one campaign (Charlotte-Mecklenburg), very extensive use was made of outreach
techniquesworkshops, various other types of meetingsto involve the public in the
actual development of the project. This was certainly successful in the Charlotte case, but
outreach on this scale was definitely not a feature of the other example campaigns. In the
other cases, project planning was done by professionals with public input through polls,
focus groups, or advisory committees.
SUMMING UP
What we have seen is that the first two of these are truly critical, and the second depends
very much on the first. A strong message is essential and it cannot be created without a
clear understanding of the concerns and preferences of voters. And that same
understanding is essential to putting the right project before the voters. The other
elementsdesignating the messenger, selecting the techniques, and integrating and
sustaining communicationsmust, of course, be done right. But without a strong
message based on good understanding of the voters, these latter elements cannot save the
day.
Perhaps it goes without saying that a sound project is essential at the start, though the
project may have to be adjusted according to what is found about voters feelings. Given
a strong project, however, we can name the following three critical requirements for a
successful campaign.
25
1. Good understanding of voters preferences and concerns

2. A strong message that meets voters wants
3. A united business community.
refining communications and campaign techniques can be largely left to the professionals
hired with the money provided by the business leadership.
26
APPENDIX: DESCRIPTIONS OF SELECTED EXAMPLES

CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG COUNTY, NC (1998)
TRANSPORTATION ISSUE
The issue in Mecklenburg County, involved two components:
1) Development of a long-range transit-land use plan for Mecklenburg County; and
2) A referendum on whether to increase the county sales tax by one-half percentage
point in order to support transportation investments in the plan.
BACKGROUND
According to a 1997 study, Mecklenburg County, most of whose population is in the city
of Charlotte, ranked fourth among the largest 50 U.S. metropolitan areas in its level of
traffic congestion. Demographic projections forecast an almost 60 percent increase in
population and an almost 50 percent increase in jobs in the area over the next 20 years.
The lack of adequate rapid transit and other transportation infrastructure to link economic
centers with employees was expected to result in increasingly problematic levels of
traffic congestion. As a result, city planners set out to develop a plan for creating a
regional rapid transit system. It was recognized, however, that sufficient funding from the
State DOT would not be available to support desired major transit investments in the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg County area.
The State legislature in the Summer of 1997 authorized Mecklenburg County to hold a
referendum on a one-half percentage point increase in the county sales tax, with proceeds
to be used to support a bond issue to fund transportation projects. The window of
opportunity to call for a referendum, provided by the state legislature, spurred a
concerted effort to develop a regional transit plan. Although a typical long-term regional
plan of this magnitude often stretches over a long time period, the development of this
plan was concentrated into an intensive six-month period so that a plan could be
presented to the elected officials and the community to decide whether to place a
referendum on the ballot for the half-percent sales tax increase.
The planning effort culminated in the development of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg 2025
Integrated Transit/Land Use Plan, which was developed to address issues of land
development and growth in relation to transit along major transportation corridors. The
County Commissioners by a 9-3 vote agreed to put the proposal on the ballot in final
form in early Fall of 1998, and the public voted on it in November 1998.
NATURE OF CONTROVERSY
In developing the Transit/Land Use Plan, city and county officials wanted certain road
projects, plus regional transit and pedestrian improvements, but did not want to make the
need for transit the sole focus of their efforts. The focus was on developing a solution to
27
cope with congestion, growth, and land development. An important result was that the
Plan called for the coordinated planning of transit service and corridor land use to
achieve maximum benefits in guiding and serving existing and future land development
with transit. This 2025 regional transit plan includes land use changes that maximize the
potential ridership for the transit system, and a phased implementation program.
The Plan focuses on five transportation corridors within Charlotte-Mecklenburg: the
Northeast, Southeast (Independence), South, West (Airport) and North. Each corridor
contained one or more rail right-of-way, and interstate or other freeway-type arterial (see
Figure 1 for a map of the final transit vision for the combined corridors). The framework
of the plan included rapid transit (rail or bus) in each corridor, with a specific transit
alignment and technology, and station locations to best serve the land use in that corridor.
Each station was categorized as one of six possible development opportunities.
OVERVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN
Research conducted by a public relations firm in March 1998, informed City planners
that 86 percent of the citizens believed Charlotte-Mecklenburg would continue to enjoy a
rapid rate of growth and prosperity. It also found 81 percent believed a better mass
transit system was needed to cope with this growth, 45 percent felt traffic congestion
was a problem, and 62 percent supported the Citys desire for developers to follow
planned land development patterns concentrated along the Countys major transportation
corridors.
These findings supported the Citys intention of implementing a rapid transit planning
process and revealed that selling the need for transit would not be necessary. The
problem was evident to the public; focus needed to be on developing the solution.
Other findings indicated that involving citizens in developing the transit plan was an
integral and essential component to the overall process: 42 percent of the respondents
indicated a desire to participate in the development of a transit system.
The March research results prompted the Citys Corporate Communications Department
to devise a campaign which not only would educate citizens on the various transit
alternatives, the transit/land use relationship, and the issues involved in regional transit
planning, but which also would involve citizens in the planning process itself. Previous
transportation studies already had identified the Countys five major transportation
corridors. These corridors were deemed the most viable locations for primary rapid
transit lines.
The overall campaign set forth several objectives:
To create general awareness of the transit/land use issues and its associated
opportunities and challenges;
To obtain as much input and feedback from the public as possible in the development
of the plan;
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To use citizen involvement as a justification for placing a referendum on the ballot

for a -percent sales tax increase to fund transit; and
To secure voter approval of the sales tax increase.
A consultant team consisting of transit and land-use experts was engaged to direct the
technical analysis portion of the transit/land-use plans development. With a public
relations budget of $150,000, a five-month campaign focused on citizen involvement was
planned.
Advertising costs constituted less than a quarter of the overall budget as the campaign
directed its resources on the implementation of eighteen city- and county-sponsored
public meetings. The workshop process drew people into the decision-making effort,
developed the list of specific projects to be put on the ballot, and began the real
communication to the public on the benefits of the new projects. The campaign operated
a speakers bureau which had individual city officials make presentations to specific
community groups and utilized newsletters, mailings, postings, and radio programs to
further disseminate information on the transit plan.
IDENTIFYING AND UNDERSTANDING THE AUDIENCE
Public Involvement in Development of the Plan
Involving citizens in the development of the Transit/Land Use Plan was an integral and
essential component to the overall planning process. The purpose of involving the public
was to develop a plan the community would support and that could justify a public vote
on the issue.
An extensive public involvement and education process using the theme The Wheels of
Change: A Community in Motion was developed. The purpose of the communications
campaign was to:
Educate citizens on transit alternatives, the transit/land use relationship and the issues
involved in regional transit planning; and
Involve the citizens in the planning process itself.
The public involvement campaign included the following components to solicit feedback
from the public:
Three public meetings, two of which were televised live, providing opportunities for
people to call in questions and comments. These meetings were taped for multiple
rebroadcasts.
Three sets of corridor group meetings (April, May and June) were held in each of the
five corridors, for a total of 15 corridor group meetings. These meetings constituted
the "core" of public involvement. The meetings gave citizens hands-on opportunities
29
to participate with the consultants in creating the plan - from locating alignments and
stations to selecting preferred transit technologies and identifying areas for potential
development/redevelopment. During each meeting, different aspects of the emerging
plan were presented and discussed. Participants used large maps of the corridors to
provide comments on alignments, station locations and other aspects of the plan.
Attendance exceeded 200 people per month.
E-mail opportunities for citizens to send comments and questions and receive prompt
The public involvement program also focused considerable effort on educating the public
about the planning process and opportunities to participate in the process. Outreach
activities included:
Speakers bureau presentations to civic and neighborhood groups throughout the

County.
Road signage (similar to zoning notices) highlighting dates and times of corridor
group meetings.
Media relations activities, including assisting reporters with information and story
ideas and participating in television programs and radio talk shows focusing on the
transit planning process. These activities resulted in extensive and detailed media
coverage throughout the entire process.
Given the amount of work and coordination required, considerable staff and consultant
resources were dedicated to developing and implementing this public involvement/
education campaign. Staff from Charlottes Corporate Communications, Mecklenburg
Countys Public Service and Information Department, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Planning
Commission and Charlotte Department of Transportation worked together with a local
30
consultant with expertise in constituencies and land use and a local consultant who
served as a liaison with minority communities.
Additionally, specially trained facilitators were hired to assist in conducting corridor
group meetings.
Organization of a Transit Planning Advisory Committee (T-PAC)
In addition to the multitude of public involvement activities, a specific effort was made to
include citizens in a more formalized way through a Transit Planning Advisory
Committee (T-PAC). The Charlotte City Council, Mecklenburg County Board of
Commissioners, Mecklenburg County School Board and the towns of Matthews, Mint
Hill, Pineville, Cornelius, Huntersville and Davidson appointed a total of 21 citizens to
serve on the T-PAC. The charge to this committee included:
Determining whether the plan developed provides sufficient basis for citizens to vote
on a half-cent sales tax funding source.
Making a collective go/no go decision on whether to recommend holding a Fall 1998

referendum.
In addition to attending the corridor and public meetings, T-PAC met 11 times between
March and August 1998 to hear reports from the consultants, discuss technical aspects of
the developing plan and review input received from citizens.
The Importance of Public Input in the Transit/Land Use Planning Process
Public input helped the transportation agencies to understand public preferences and to
develop a plan that would be acceptable to the public. It was apparent from the more than
250 people attending the kick-off meeting in March 1998 that there was substantial
community interest in transit/land use planning. People representing a good cross-section
of the community and from communities adjacent to Mecklenburg County actively
participated in discussions and planning exercises. Their level of participation,
commitment to tackling the issues and surprisingly sophisticated knowledge of transit
issues made planning for active involvement throughout the six-month effort doubly
important.
Citizen involvement in the corridor and public meetings as well as input provided
through the variety of other public involvement methods helped the consultant team to
understand better the transit/land use needs and wishes of the community. In fact, many
of the specific details of the 2025 plan responded directly to comments and suggestions
from members of the community, and citizen input during the corridor group meetings
provided the basis for several changes to the consultants original vision for transit and
land use development.
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Citizens filled out comment sheets following each meeting, which provided useful
information and evaluations. Data gathered at the early meetings prompted immediate
changes, including moving meeting locations, extending meeting times and expanding
the question and answer sessions.
Targeting Voter Audiences
As the referendum neared, various target voter audiences were identified for the
campaign. At the broadest level, citizens were identified as those that lived in direct
proximity to the proposed transit corridors and those who lived between the corridors.
CRAFTING THE MESSAGE
The series of 18 public meetings provided a forum in which the public could provide
input on the project, evaluate and critique the progress of the meetings and campaign, ask
questions, and voice concerns. This format revealed the shifting concerns of the citizenry
and provided the campaign with the information needed to refine the focus of the
message accordingly.
Public officials and business leaders were convinced that transportation improvements
were necessary to allow for and encourage the continued growth and development of the
Charlotte area. Transportation improvements were sold to voters largely on the point
that investing in transportation infrastructure along five major transportation corridors in
the region that were deemed the most viable locations for transit lines would
economically benefit the city center, the City of Charlotte as a whole, and Mecklenburg
County. The selling point for the transit system was that it would provide an alternative
to congested highway travel and support efforts at development along the countys major
corridors. It was projected that the transit system would account for 5 percent-6 percent
of daily commuter transport so the need for transit, and its ability to reduce congestion
and improve air quality were not major selling points of the campaign.
Because the proposed creation of five transit corridors created geographic areas that
directly and indirectly benefit from the corridors, the Plan also recognized the need to
invest in transportation projects that would benefit population groups outside the transit
corridors. As a result, the Plans recommendations were set in the context of improving
the entire existing public transportation system and improving the regional highway
system. Improvements outside of the transit corridors included lateral connections
between the corridors and to key development hubs outside the corridors. It was also
recognized in the Plan that the rapid transit alignment and service proposed for each
corridor could be extended into adjacent jurisdictions in the future.
DESIGNATING THE MESSENGER
In 1997 the Mayor of Charlotte appointed ten community business leaders to the
Committee of Ten to review and promote transportation improvements in Charlotte.
The business leaders were vocal proponents of the project proposal and their respective
businesses provided funding for the public campaign.
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The principal spokesman for the bond issue referendum was the Mayor of Charlotte. He
was active throughout the outreach program serving as the official host or co-host to the
public meetings and acting as a general organizer for the campaign. The Charlotte
Department of Transportation provided the technical information and expertise for the
outreach program.
SELECTING COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUES
In the initial process of developing the Plan, a consultant team consisting of transit and
land-use experts was engaged to direct the technical analysis portion of the analysis. A
five-month campaign of extensive and intensive citizen involvement was undertaken, as
described above. The public relations budget was set at $150,000.
Campaign funds were provided by local businesses. A business group called The
Committee of Ten hired a consultant to conduct the campaign. The campaign
techniques used were straightforward, and styled in the form of a political campaign: TV
and radio spots, newspaper coverage, leaflets dropped off at homes, signs in front yards,
people manning phone banks to get the vote out, etc,.
In both cases, efforts were made to communicate with the audience directly, through the
media, and through community-based organizations and stakeholders. Primary among
these stakeholders were:
Elected officials and government agencies (County Commission, City Council, Town
Councils, Carolinas Council of Governments, etc.);
Business associations (Chambers of Commerce, Charlotte Center City partners,

Business Corridor Associations, etc);
Neighborhood associations adjacent to the corridors and county-wide;
Citizens grassroots organizations;
Environmental groups;
Educational institutions;
Existing transit riders; and
Land developers.
KEY FACTORS IN SUCCESS

The referendum was approved with 58 percent of the citizens voting yes. Those
involved with and managing the campaign believe the workshops and related outreach
activities were the essential foundation for the success of the campaign. Holding 18
public meetings over only five months ensured that people remained interested and
33
allowed involved citizens to see how their input was utilized. Key factors in success
were:
More citizens participated in the process of developing the plan than had ever before
participated in a community-wide planning effort in Charlotte-Mecklenburg.
Citizen input provided the basis for several changes to the consultants original
visions for transit and land use development.
Although the overall campaign was very successful, it provides lessons on techniques
that were and were not effective. For example, there was a general consensus that the
speakers bureau did not work well. The staff hours needed to effectively target key
neighborhood groups and civic organizations with speakers were not available, and it was
difficult to keep speaking points up to date with the progress of the public meetings.
34
Figure 1: Charlotte-Mecklenburg 2025 Adopted Transit Corridors Vision
35
Figure 2: Charlotte-Mecklenburg 2025 Transit-Land Use Vision
36
SANTA CLARA COUNTY, CA (1996)

In November 1996, the voters of Santa Clara County were asked to vote on two ballot
measures, called Measures A and B. Measure A was an advisory measure that outlined a
specific package of transportation improvements for the county. It did not call for an
increase in taxes, but asked the voters whether or not any new voter-approved sales taxes
should fund the following package of transportation improvements:
Maintaining Streets and Filling Potholes: Improving local streets and filling potholes
in all fifteen cities and on county roads and expressways.
Traffic Signal Synchronization: Improving the signal timing on all eight county
expressways.
Connection to BART: Connecting Santa Clara County to BART by adding a

CalTrain-type rail line between downtown San Jose, through east San Jose and
Milpitas, and up to the BART system in Alameda County.
Light Rail Lines: Building the Tasman East Light Rail line and Capitol Light Rail
Line.
Transit Service for Seniors and the Disabled: Providing improved transit service for
seniors and the disabled by purchasing low floor vehicles for all future light rail lines.
Improving CalTrain Service: Adding trains and improving facilities.
Widening Highways: Widening Interstate 880 and Highway 101, 17, and 85.
Interchange Improvements: Improving key interchanges at 237/880 in Milpitas,

85/101 in Mountain View, 85/87 in the Almaden Valley of San Jose, 85/101 in
South San Jose, and along Highway 17.
Safety Improvements: Placing a safety barrier in the Highway 85 median and

building additional truck climbing lanes and pull-outs on Highway 152.
Bicycle Facilities: Improving bicycle facilities throughout the county to improve

safety and eliminate gaps in the county-wide bicycle network.
In total, the improvements were estimated at approximately 55 percent transit, 45 percent

highways and other, by dollar value. The measure called for all projects to be completed
in 9 years, with administrative expenses limited to 0.5 percent of total funds.
Measure B was a referendum asking voters to authorize the Board of Supervisors to enact
a one-half percent sales tax for general county purposes, with a nine-year time frame,
1997 to 2006. Although not stated in the referendum itself, the purpose of the tax was to
37
fund the projects identified in Measure A. In addition, Measure B contained a provision

that an independent Citizens Watchdog Committee be established to review all
expenditures of the tax revenue and conduct annual audits of the sales tax expenditures.
The committee was to be composed of 17 private citizens (not elected officials)
representing diverse geographic, gender, age and other perspectives.
BACKGROUND
Santa Clara County is located in the San Francisco Bay Area and encompasses part of the
area commonly referred to as Silicon Valley. It contains the cities of San Jose, Palo
Alto, Santa Clara, and Cupertino. Silicon Valley is a major employment hub, drawing
employees from across the Bay Area as well as the Central Valley and Central Coast. It is
also home to some of the most congested corridors in California. According to
CALTRANS, one of Silicon Valleys commuter corridors Interstate 680 over the
Sunol Grade recently topped the Bay Bridge as the regions worst daily commute.
Five other corridors that feed into the Silicon Valley have made the 10 worst Bay Area
Commute Corridors list.
In 1984, the voters of Santa Clara County passed a transportation initiative, also called
Measure A, which raised taxes to support highway investments on Highways 101, 85
and 237. The tax ended in 1995, and the new Measures A & B were proposed to support
a new set of transportation investments. The project package was developed by the
Citizens Coalition for Traffic Relief, with input from local officials and transportation
staff. Guiding principles used in developing the list included need, project readiness,
geographic diversity, and an approximate split between road-oriented projects and
transit-oriented projects.
The controversy surrounded those who did and those who did not support the sales tax
increase. Supporters of measures A & B included major business groups, such as the
Santa Clara Valley Manufacturing Group, the San Jose Metropolitan Chamber of
Commerce, the Santa Clara County Firefighters Association, the South Bay Labor
Council and businesses including Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Lockheed-Martin. They wanted
improved transportation, because they saw economic and safety benefits in making their
employees commutes less stressful and less time-consuming, making the roads safer,
expanding transit alternatives, and reducing traffic congestion. A number of health,
environmental, and transit-supportive groups, including the American Lung Association,
the Congress of California Seniors, the Greenbelt Alliance, also supported the proposal.
Opponents of the measures generally included taxpayer groups opposed to increasing the
sales tax, including the Santa Clara County Taxpayers' Association. They argued that the
measures did not guarantee that additional money would go to transportation projects,
and the measures contained little guarantee that the politicians would not use the funds to
supplement other areas of the budget. They also argued that there was no guarantee that
cost-effective projects would result for the money.
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Moreover, they argued that the propositions were an attempt to circumvent state law
regarding special taxes. Under Proposition 12, a special tax requires a two-thirds majority
vote for passage. They argued that Measures A & B together were a special tax designed
to look like a general tax in an attempt to allow a majority vote.
Supporters of the initiatives hired a pollster to conduct surveys of the voting public.
Three surveys were conducted to determine what interest groups existed in the county,
what issues defined them, and what types of transportation projects and subsequent levels
of taxation they would support. Interest groups were established along geographic,
gender, age and other lines, and their interests and concerns were established. This
information, in turn, helped the campaign to craft its message for each of these voter
groups.
The pitch to the public was largely on quality of life issues, highlighting congestion
relief. The campaign materials promoted Measures A and B as a means of improving
transportation safety and access. Messages about the projects that comprised by Measure
A were always couched in language that focused on increased safety, service or access.
To accentuate the importance of passing both Measures A and B the campaign adopted
the slogan:
Measures A + B = Traffic Relief
The message was also tailored to match the interests of different voter constituencies. A
focus group was used to test ballot language. The information gathered by the three
surveys of the voting public was used to create mailings, and a second focus group was
convened to fine-tune the messages and images conveyed in the mailings. The results of
the second focus group were not satisfactory to the campaign, and two additional surveys
of the voting public were conducted to further define the focus of the mailings. Using a
budget of $1.6 million, the campaign was able to address each groups interest by
creating six mail pieces, each piece having as many as 35 variations. The mailings were
created with geographic, gender, age and other demographic-specific messages and
images and were distributed accordingly.
There was no single messenger in the sense of a high-profile individual taking the case to
the public. Leadership in the effort to pass measures A and B was provided by a
countywide coalition of business leaders, environmental and health organizations, senior
and disabled groups, and citizens, led by the Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group
(SVMG).
The SVMG was founded in 1978 by David Packard and other Valley CEOs and today
represents 125 Silicon Valley employers, who collectively provide over 250,000 local
39
jobs nearly one-third of the Valleys private sector workforce. SVMG had already led
two successful transportation investment campaigns in Santa Clara County, so it was a
natural leader of the campaign.
The campaign for the ballot initiatives relied heavily on targeted mailings to the voting
public. As described above, six different mail pieces, each having as many as 35
variations, were sent to voters in Santa Clara County.
There was also a limited use of television and radio to convey messages that were
applicable to the region as a whole.
The strength of the coalition created by SVMG and the active community groups
provided the resources necessary to conduct a thorough campaign. The surveys and focus
groups established who the campaign needed to reach and what needed to be conveyed to
them.
CONTINUING EFFORTS
In November 1996, the voters in Santa Clara County approved Measures A and B. In
1997, however, implementation of the measures was delayed by a court challenge
contesting the validity of Measure B as a general tax. The California Superior court
declared the lawsuit frivolous and threw it out. The case was brought to court again on
appeal, and the 6th District Court of Appeals ruled unanimously in favor of Measures A
and B. Opponents of Measures A and B then took their case to the California Supreme
Court. The California Supreme Court in August 1998 threw out the appeal filed against
Measures A and B, finally clearing the way for the program to get underway.
SEATTLE, WA PUGET SOUND AREA (1996)

The voters within the Washington Regional Transportation Authority (RTA) district were
asked in November 1996 to approve a measure to increase the sales tax and motor vehicle
excise tax to fund a set of transit improvements. The taxes would include a local sales tax
increase of four-tenths of one percent (four cents on a $10 purchase) and a motor vehicle
excise tax (license plate tabs) increase of three-tenths of one percent (about $30 a year on
a vehicle valued at $10,000) and would provide the local portion of revenues to develop
and operate the Regional Transit Authority's proposed $3.9 billion Ten-year Plan, called
Sound Move.
The plan entailed a mix of transportation improvements throughout the region, including:
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23 miles of new, high-capacity light-rail transit connecting the University of

Washington, Capitol Hill, First Hill, downtown Seattle, the Rainier Valley and SeaTac International Airport;
A 1.6-mile light-rail line in Tacoma connecting the downtown theater and University
districts with local and regional bus and commuter rail services at the new Tacoma
Dome intermodal station;
Direct access ramps to freeway bus and carpool lanes, creating 100 miles of HOV
Expressway;
20 new regional rapid-express bus routes with service beginning within three years
better to connect cities and suburbs throughout the region and linking with other local
and regional transit services;
81 miles of commuter rail service using existing railroad tracks between Everett,
Seattle, Tacoma and Lakewood, starting with rush-hour service; and
"Community connections" such as stations, park-and-ride lots, and pedestrian and

bicycle improvements to provide local access to the regional transit network.
BACKGROUND
The Regional Transportation Authority (RTA) district covers the most congested urban
areas of King, Pierce and Snohomish counties in the Puget Sound area and includes the
cities of Seattle, Bellevue, Tacoma, and Everett, as well as many smaller towns and
suburbs. The district boundary lines generally follow the urban growth boundaries
created by each county in accordance with the states Growth Management Act. The
RTA district includes about half of the states population and has experienced rapid
growth over the past two decades.
In March 1995, the region's voters narrowly rejected a much larger $6.7 billion transit
proposal to be built over 16 years. In response, the RTA set out to develop a new transit
plan that would be smaller, cost less, and built within a shorter time frame; they sought to
bring this plan to the voters by Fall 1996. On May 31, 1996, the RTA board passed
Resolution 73 adopting Sound Move - the Ten-Year Regional Transit System Plan
after weeks of discussion and fine-tuning of a draft plan released in March. In August,
the RTA Board passed Resolution 75 calling for a November 5 election to implement
Sound Move by increasing local taxes to fund the local share of the proposal. The total
cost to build and operate the ten-year proposal would be $3.9 billion and, in addition to
local-government funds, would be paid for with bonded debt, federal funding and farebox
revenues.
Proponents of the transit plan argued for the need for transit given the rapid growth
experienced, and projected for, the Puget Sound area. The business community was
41
convinced that transportation investment and improvements were needed to encourage

continued growth and to provide their employees with a pleasant living environment.
Opponents of the plan included many of the same groups that had opposed the initial,
larger transit plan. The group, Citizens Opposed to Sitting in Traffic (COST), was
supported by road building, trucking, and construction, retail, and real estate interests.
COST campaigned on the grounds that the RTA plan was not cost effective and would
not reduce traffic congestion.
After the failure of the 1995 ballot initiative, the RTA set out to develop a plan that
would more closely match the preferences of the voting public. Early in the process of
developing the new transit plan, the RTA adopted a set of principles which called for a
plan that would:
focus on the region's most congested transportation corridors;
be designed to recognize local as well as regional needs with services tailored to

serve the unique needs within each of the five RTA District subareas;
contain a balanced mix of transportation modes (i.e. commuter rail, light rail, regional
bus, HOV facilities, general traffic improvements);
spend local tax revenues and related debt for projects and services which benefit RTA
District subareas at a level generally in proportion to the revenues each subarea
generates;
fund the system with new, local tax rates no higher than those used in the last ballot
proposal using conservative federal/state revenue projections; and
be completed within 10 years.
Understanding the reasons that voters did not approve the 1995 ballot initiative enabled
the new plan to be developed to match more closely voter preferences. According to a
statement from RTA Board Chair Bruce Laing in November 1995, These actions are a
clear response to what weve heard from the public since the last vote on regional
transitBy adopting a set of principles now we are telling the public early in the process
the guidelines weve set on the size and scope of the new proposal that we plan to submit
to the region's voters...
The decision to hold a new vote in the Fall of 1996 provided the RTA with the flexibility
to work more closely with local governments and community organizations to decide
whether the plan should include a broader range of transportation improvements. The
Fall 1996 date was also selected to give the board time to conduct more exhaustive
outreach to communities through the recently-created Regional Outreach Committee of
civic leaders.
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Following the failed ballot proposal in spring 1995, the Regional Transit Authority took
several steps to involve key business and civic leaders in the formulation of a new
proposal. RTAs intention was to be as open as possible and to listen to opponents, as
well as supporters, of the first proposal. One of the steps RTA took was to form a
Regional Outreach Committee to review whatever new proposal would come forth and
bring feedback from various points of view. The committee comprised 15 members,
including supporters and opponents of the first RTA proposal. Among the members,
there was balanced representation from the five subareas of the RTA district as well as
from labor, environmental, business and civic interests. The group was chaired by
Richard Ford, known in the region for various other public policy leadership roles and as
a former Executive Director of the Port of Seattle.
The group met frequently over the several months during which the RTA was developing
a new proposal. Staff and board members from the RTA sat in on the meetings to hear
first hand the discussion and the reactions of individual members to various concepts for
a new proposal. It was never expected that the group would reach consensus on any
particular proposal. In the end, a majority of the group did support the proposal that went
to the voters and was approved.
In order to help support public discussion about the new ballot proposal, the RTA
developed a decision-making package, including background on the RTA, guidelines
for developing a new proposal, issues that needed to be resolved and some hypothetical
examples of what the plan could include. The package was designed to be used to help
RTA board membersand the Regional Outreach Committeework with the public to
create a new transit proposal. As part of the work program to develop the new proposal,
the RTA met with local jurisdictions and interest groups within the region's five subareas
(Snohomish County, Seattle/North King County, East King County, South King County
and Pierce County). The RTA also held a regional workshop of the board, subarea
interest groups and local governments before developing its draft plan in March and held
public hearings in April.
In the course of developing the regional plan and campaigning for it, the pro-RTA
campaign, working with the Greater Seattle Chamber of Commerce, conducted a poll
showing strong support for rail transit among likely general election voters inside the
RTA district and disbelief that more roads would solve congestion. The polling was also
used to test support for various transit plan scenarios and subsequent levels of taxation.
The pro-RTA campaign team also conducted focus groups with likely voters, and that
research was used to develop media advertising messages and campaign strategy.
Because the taxes would primarily be used for new transit improvements, including bus
service, commuter rail, and light-rail, project proponents recognized that they could not
argue for the tax increase on the basis of relieving traffic congestion. Studies showed that
the transit investments would not have a significant impact on traffic congestion. As a
result, the main message to voters during the campaign was that transit improvements
would provide an alternative to congested highways, and provide a faster means of
43
commuting to work. Proponents of the sales-tax increase did not argue that congestion
would be reduced. In this regard, there was, however, a certain ambivalence in their
message; some of the campaign advertising did say that the new transit systems would
take tens of thousands of cars a day off the regions freeways. Many in the audience
would likely have interpreted this to mean a reduction in congestion.
As a government agency, the Regional Transportation Authority could not directly
campaign for the transit proposal. However, it conducted numerous technical analyses
and objective information on the transit proposals, which in turn, helped the public to
understand the costs and benefits of the proposal. The state-appointed Puget Sound
Region High Capacity Transit Expert Review Panel (ERP), which was created by the
Legislature as a safeguard to review and critique the technical and financial work of the
Regional Transit Authority staff, found that the RTA technical work was reasonable and
credible. As a result, the RTA was able to provide credible information to the public,
which in turn could be used by proponents in campaigning for the ballot initiative.
Understanding the arguments of the opposition was also important in that it enabled the
pro-transit campaign to tailor its message to counter the opposition. Being familiar with
the arguments made by COST, the pro-transit campaign aired commercials that raised the
oppositions questions and positively answered them, effectively inoculating the voting
public against the oppositions message.
There was no single individual who took on the role of a high-profile public messenger.
The Greater Seattle Chamber of Commerce and other pro-RTA groups took the lead in
organizing the public campaign. Phil Condit, the Boeing Companys CEO convened a
business fund-raising outreach program, that included Microsoft and other major local
employers, which led to efforts to win business and local government endorsements for
the plan and neutralize opposition. As much as anyone, Michael Vaska, a Seattle lawyer,
was the individual driving and orchestrating the campaign.
As a government organization, the Regional Transportation Authority could not be
involved in a campaign that promoted the designation of public funds. The RTA,
however, did provide objective information on the transit proposal that was used to
inform the public throughout the campaign. The RTA developed estimates of the
economic and financial costs and benefits of the transit proposal, as well as estimates of
transit ridership and cost-effectiveness.
The campaign for the RTA proposal involved a very visible grass-roots element,
including a kickoff rally, volunteer phone calling, and outdoor sign waving. Pro-RTA
campaign advertising was used to raise and then answer a number of questions about the
proposed project. This strategy was described as inoculating voters against the
oppositions messages. RTA advocates used television, and to a lesser extent radio, to tell
44
voters that the new transit proposal would take tens of thousands of cars a day off the
regions freeways..
Television was chosen as the primary mode of communication with the public because
with the variety of decisions to be made on the November 1996 ballot, particularly the
presidential election, the pro-RTA campaign felt the benefits of the transit project needed
to stand out clearly in peoples minds. The commercials used general images such as
children planting a young tree, or people commuting on transit systems and slogans such
as Its about time, or Is it time for a sound move? to promote investment in the RTA
proposal as an investment in the future of the region.
KEY FACTORS IN SUCCESS OR FAILURE
The proposition was a success with 57 percent voter approval, compared to 47 percent in
1995. One key factor was the significant reduction of the size of the proposed investment.
Another was the fact that the second vote attracted a much larger percentage of the
population since it was held in November 1996, with the election of the President, among
other offices, on the ballot. The first vote was a special election with only the transit
program on the ballot.
In addition, large employers, as well as business and civic organizations, came out in
support of the plan. The regions large employers, including Boeing and the Microsoft
Corporation, had increased employment considerably and were concerned with employee
transport. RTA received position statements from 66 organizations, including cities,
business organizations, labor unions, civic and environmental groups, communicating
their official positions on the regional transit proposal on the November ballot. Of those
received, 62 organizations indicated their support of the proposal and four groups
communicated their opposition. In fact, a number of organizations that opposed or
remained neutral on the 1995 ballot issue registered their support for the new proposal,
including the City of Everett, the City of Renton, and the Everett Chamber of Commerce.
The campaign in 1995 was conducted during the winter using targeted direct mail and
radio. The 1996 campaign was more visible, being conducted during the summer and fall
with a grass-roots element and an extensive television advertising schedule.
CONTINUING EFFORTS
The communications process did not end after the vote. Rather, the RTA recognized the
importance of continuing to involve the public in the implementation of the transit
program as a means to maintain support for the program. At the first meeting after the
election, the RTA Board passed Resolution No. 76, expressing its thanks to the region's
voters for approving Proposition No. 1 and to citizens, organizations, committees, and
local jurisdictions which supported and advocated the plan. The resolution also
acknowledged the RTA's responsibilities to the citizens within RTA District boundaries
to diligently and efficiently use public funds now entrusted by the November 5, 1996
vote. In addition, Resolution No. 76 called on citizens and organizations previously
opposed to the plan to join with the RTA so that the opinions and advice of the entire
45
Puget Sound community could be part of, and supportive to, the Sound Move
Over the following months, the RTAs action agenda included: appointing a Citizens
Oversight Committee and adopting a new citizen participation program; setting a state
Legislative agenda; securing federal funding; and adopting a six-year capital program.
ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MO (1998)

The campaign concerned the extension of Page Avenue over the Missouri River with the
construction of a bridge connecting St. Louis County to St. Charles County. The issue
was that the construction of the bridge required the use of 36 acres of Creve Coeur Park.
The State of Missouri offered to add more than 1,000 acres to the park and construct a
nature center, bike trail, and soccer and polo fields in mitigation and replacement.
BACKGROUND
The St. Louis County Council had to approve the land transfers to enable construction of
the bridge. Although the bridge had already received all environmental clearances, a
number of environmental and other groups, including church groups and municipalities,
opposed the bridge. Together, these groups were able to block action and force a
referendum in St. Louis County.
The ballot asked voters to support the Page Avenue Extension agreement to grant
easements through Creve Coeur Park, accept more than 1,000 acres of land for mitigation
(as the extension would take parkland), and authorize leases so that some businesses
could remain on the mitigation land. The voters were not voting directly on the $350
million highway project.
THE CONTROVERSY
The Regional Commerce and Growth Association (RCGA) strongly supported the bridge
extension, believing that without the extension, traffic congestion would slow economic
development and raise the costs of doing business within the region, forcing businesses to
stop or slow expansions, and possibly leave the region. The need for the Page Avenue
extension had been studied as part of the regions plan since the late 1960s, and the
corridor had been preserved since the early 1970s. Public meetings were held in the late
1980s and early 1990s, at which time no St. Louis County municipality had come out
against the project.
A coalition of environmental and other groups including the Coalition for the
Environment, the St. Louis County Municipal League, and Churches United for
Community Action opposed the bridge project. They saw the extension as a threat to the
Creve Coeur Park, an encourager of urban sprawl, and a damaging drain on other areas of
the county.
46

The intended audience for this campaign was the voters of St. Louis County.
When it was ruled that there would be a referendum, the RCGA conducted a poll to
determine whether there were support for the bridge, and if so, who would support it and
why. The RCGA found that the general voter was concerned with reducing traffic
congestion and with economic growth.
The City of St. Charles in St. Charles County is a prosperous suburban area.
Employment levels are high and many St. Charles County residents work in St. Louis
County and in the City of St. Louis. Many St. Louis County residents work in St. Charles
County. The RCGA made a pitch to voters that the bridge was an economic benefit for
the whole region because a reduction in congestion would provide improved access to
jobs in St. Charles County, and improve the commute for county residents.
The RCGA argued for the bridge for many reasons:
The movement of freight through the region was seen as critical for the region to
take advantage of its central geographic location, the region needed to move people
and goods more efficiently through the area. The Page Avenue bridge will draw
away some of the commuter traffic now using the route I-70 crossing of the Missouri
River. I-70 is the major freight corridor in the state of Missouri and a major east-west
trucking route for the nation. Points along I-70 handle the highest volume of vehicles
each day on any road in the state, and supporters of the extension argued that delays
on I-70 would be extended to six hours or more daily (with additional traffic delays
on Routes 40 and 64 also increasing), with travel to and from the airport becoming a
major problem even as the airport is going through an expansion. These types of
delays would quickly become unacceptable for all types of travelers, and increase air
pollution significantly.
Population growth continues and a strong infrastructure system is needed to manage

this population increase. Without maintaining mobility in the region, jobs are at risk.
For example, businesses that depend on efficient freight movement in the area may
choose not to expand their operations, and the ability of existing workers to travel to
their jobs will also be negatively impacted.
Highway funds will be lost. The moneys earmarked for this project were not
expected to be allocated to other projects in the St. Louis region, but rather to other
projects within the state of Missouri that are ready to move forward
The Page Avenue extension will not lead to sprawl. The area where Page avenue will
terminate is already more than 70 percent developed, so the real issue is enabling
residents to continue to commute to jobs within St. Louis county instead of
accelerating the movement of individuals to jobs out to other counties.
47
The additional acreage and other improvements as part of the project will enhance the
park and increase the number of individuals using the area. In addition, some of the
improvements will be preventative, such as a siltation basin, which will reduce
dredging expenses in the future. The size of the park will be almost doubled from
1,137 acres to 2,181 acres. A new bike path will be developed, the lake will be
dredged, and a siltation basin will be added to eliminate the need for future dredging.
A Nature Center will be developed in a pre-existing building, connected to a bike
path and parking lot. Other park amenities will also be further developed, including
sports fields and parking spaces for park users. Wetland will be restored and
development in the flood plain will be reduced.
The extension is critical to long term economic development. The extension was
expected to create, according to the Missouri Department of Economic Development,
over 7,100 jobs over five years.

Since the St. Louis region is segmented into numerous municipalities, there are few
organizations or public officials that speak as a regional voice on transportation issues.
There was no single, high-profile individual who served as the principal public salesman
for the campaign.
The RCGA is one of the few regionally oriented groups and the only one that deals with
transportation issues. The RCGA serves the 12 county metropolitan area including St.
Louis City, and St. Louis, St. Charles, Jefferson, Franklin, Lincoln and Warren counties
in Missouri and Madison, St. Clair, Monroe, Clinton and Jersey counties in Illinois. Due
to its position, the RCGA headed the initiative to plan and promote the Page Avenue
Bridge.
Civic Progress, a group comprising 26 area CEOs provided funding for the campaign and
also provided major messengers in the campaign. RCGA ran a speakers bureau and the
CEOs were sent out as spokespeople.
A professional campaign director was hired by the RCGA and ran a standard campaign
operation. RCGA took the lead publicly as well as in financing the campaign. The
general strategy focused on avoiding a long, protracted public effort and instead pursuing
a short, relatively late campaign that operated in the month leading up to the vote. The
late campaign was utilized to avoid giving the opposition the opportunity to develop
negative messages against the campaign. The campaign had a budget of $750,000 and
utilized television, mail, telephones, radio and billboards. Polls showed that voters were
more concerned about congestion than about the park and campaign material emphasized
congestion relief and quality of life issues. The campaign focused secondarily on job
creation and economic development, and targeted this message primarily to the voters in
northern St. Louis County where the economic benefits of the bridge would most likely
be received.
48
Targeted political initiatives were designed to: 1) minimize the oppositions ability to
attract additional political support; and 2) challenge the oppositions support among
mayors and other political officials. This was achieved by focusing on the potential
economic benefits of the bridge. The bridge was promoted as a solution to increasing
congestion which would eventually be a detriment to the county as it lost corporations to
other cities and local businesses had reduced revenue due to transportation problems. It
was estimated that the construction of the bridge would create 11,000 construction jobs
over ten years, and would have an overall economic impact of $830 million and 13,000
permanent jobs. The bridge was also to be paid for by state and federal dollars that
would be lost to other parts of the state if they were not used.
The bridge won, 2-1, in the St. Louis County referendum. The factors seem to be a united
business community and the fact the voters believed the bridge would help with
congestion and the local economy.
49

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NCHRP

Web-Only Document 100:

Examples of Best Practices for

Contractors Final Report for NCHRP Project 2-22(2)

NCHRP 2-22(2): Final Report

ICF Consulting, Inc.

Chapter 2: Research Methods

Chapter 3: Case Studies

Chapter 5: Information on Other Campaigns

Appendix B: Findings from NCHRP 2-22

Best Practices Digest

NCHRP 2-22(2): Final Report

ICF Consulting, Inc.

NCHRP 2-22(2): Final Report

ICF Consulting, Inc.

NCHRP 2-22(2): Final Report

ICF Consulting, Inc.

Charlotte/Mecklenburg County, North Carolina

Saint Louis County, Missouri

Santa Clara County, California

Seattle, Washington and Puget Sound area.

NCHRP 2-22(2): Final Report

The project is needed and will bring clear benefits

Any new taxes are equitable in relation to the distribution of benefits.

ICF Consulting, Inc.

A business community united in support of the project

Poll and/or focus group results for refining the message

NCHRP 2-22(2): Final Report

ICF Consulting, Inc.

Good understanding of voters preferences and concerns

A strong message that meets voters wants

A united business community.

NCHRP 2-22(2): Final Report

ICF Consulting, Inc.

identifying and understanding the target audience;

designating messengers; and

selecting communication techniques.

Charlotte/Mecklenburg County, North Carolina

NCHRP 2-22(2): Final Report

Saint Louis County, Missouri

Santa Clara County, California

Seattle, Washington and Puget Sound area.

ICF Consulting, Inc.

Task 1 Identification of candidates for case studies

Task 2 Selection of case-study candidates for presentation to Panel

Task 4 Evaluation of case-study campaigns and assessment of effectiveness of various

Task 5 Preparation of Best Practices Digest

Task 6 Preparation of Final Report.

Chapter 2 Research Methods (Tasks 1, 2, and 4)

Chapter 3 Case Studies

Chapter 5 Information on Other (non-case-study) Campaigns

NCHRP 2-22(2): Final Report

ICF Consulting, Inc.

CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH METHODS

TASK 1 IDENTIFICATION OF CANDIDATES FOR CASE STUDIES

AASHTO (Special Committee on Economic Expansion and Development). The research

The campaign had to concern a transportation infrastructure investment, involving either

The campaign had to address a specific public opinion problem; and

The group to be convinced (voters, legislators, governor, etc.);

NCHRP 2-22(2): Final Report

The essential nature of the controversy;

The nature of the economic argument;