Torts - Session 14-19 Case Doctrines

Torts and Damages Session 15-19
Session 15 Art 2216-2220, Cases 269-290
in a particular case such an objective has been duly pursued is a

matter of proof.
Ventura v Bernabe (1971) V presented to B a letter supposedly

wrote by Commander Calinawan Jr, Presidential Fact Finding
Committee, asking for a loan of P350. The letter stated that
Calinawan is waiting in his home and to hand V the money. B issued
a check and was encashed. V found out that C did not make such
letter. B sued V for falsification of private document. V claims no
justifiable cause but merely for vengeance and to smear honor and
reputation.
It is of no moment that there is no such crime of malicious
prosecution in the Revised Penal Code. The present civil action
need not be based on the existence of such a crime Article
2219 (8) of the Civil Code for Malicious prosecution" It
serves as a basis for relief in court against a party who has
maliciously caused another to baselessly and unjustifiably
undergo a criminal prosecution for an offense he knows the
latter has not committed. Article 21 is related to such
providing, "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage"
and Article 2176 on torts or quasi-delict may also serve the
purpose.
Elements in Malicious prosecution: these 3 must concur
whether actions for criminal prosecution or civil suits. No distinction
between criminal and civil.
1. requires MALICE and
2. WANT of PROBABLE CAUASE
3. Defendant himself be the prosecutor of the instigator of the
prosecution, ended in acquittal
American Home Assurance Co v Chua (1999) Chua procured

a fire insurance for their companys stocks-in-trade for 200k. He
issued a check for renewal of policy to petitioners agent. The next
day, the whole business was gutted by fire amounting to a loss of
4M-5M. Chua asked for insurance claim with petitioner and other
insurers. Petitioner denied claim because of fraudulent income tax
return, failure to establish actual loss and failure to notify them to
cover the insured goods.
His loss of profit cannot be shouldered by petitioner whose
obligation is limited to the object of insurance, which was the stockin-trade, and not the expected loss in income or profit.
Under Article 2220 of the Civil Code, MORAL DAMAGES
may be awarded in breaches of contracts where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. No such fraud or
bad faith in case at bar. Moral damages are emphatically not
intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. Such
damages are awarded only to enable the injured party to
obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to
obviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of
the defendant's culpable action. Its award is aimed at the
restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual
status quo ante, and it must be proportional to the suffering
inflicted. When awarded, moral damages must not be palpably
and scandalously excessive as to indicate that it was the result of
passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court judge.
Moral of 200k deleted
In malicious prosecution, the following must be present to

be granted damages:
1.he has been denounced or charged falsely of an offense by
the defendant,
2. defendant knows that the charge was false
3. acted with malice;
4. he has suffered damages
The determination of the issue of malice must always be made
to rest on all the attendant circumstances, including the possibility
of the fiscal or judge being some-how misled by the accuser's
evidence. No doubt, the very purpose of preliminary investigations
is to avoid baseless and malicious prosecutions, still, whether or not
Fores v Miranda (1959) M was one of the passengers of the

jeep that hit the bridge wall because of its excessive speed the
driver lost control of such. M was injured and fractured part of body.
Paz Fores was the registered owner of the jeep, but she claims that
she sold it to Sacherman the day before the accident.
Moral damages are not recoverable in damage
actions predicted on a breach of the contract of
transportation, in view of Articles 2219 (1 and 2) and 2220.
GR: By contrasting the provisions of these two article it
immediately becomes apparent that:
(a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation)
proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e., wanton or deliberately
injurious conduct, is essential to justify an award of moral damages;
and
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(b) That a breach of contract cannot be considered included
in the descriptive term "analogous cases" used in Art. 2219;
not only because Art. 2220 specifically provides for the damages
that are caused by contractual breach, but because the definition
of quasi-delict in Art. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the
cases where there is a "preexisting contractual relation between
the parties."
EXCEPTION: mishap resulting in DEATH of PASSENGER,
Art 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of
Art. 2206, that entitles the deceased passenger to "demand moral
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased. Where the injured passenger does not die,
moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that
the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. Mere
carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute of
justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier
Lopez v Pan America (1966) Sen Lopez, wife, son-in-law and
daughter made reservations for 1st-class accommodations in TokyoSan Francisco flight. But due to mistake in travel agencys agents, it
was cancelled. It was included in the cancellation of Rufinos. PAMAMs supervisor withhold the information expecting cancellations of
bookings before flight time. While they were Toko, they weretold
that they could not be accommodated in first-class. Mr. Lopez had
an engagement in US, his wife has a medical check-up so they took
the tourist class but under protest. They sued PAN-AM for moral
damages.
Moral damages 100k for Sen Lopez, since Senate
President and former VP of Phils. His wife, 50K shared his
prestige and subjected to humiliation and discomfort for 13hours
considering she was sick. 25K for daughter shared his prestige
and experienced social humiliation.
The amount of damages is determined by considering the
official, political, social and financial standing of the
offended parties on one hand, and the business and financial
position of the offender on the other. Also the present rate of
exchange.
Moral damages for breach of contract of carriage is
not recoverable unless it results to (1) death or (2) bad
faith. PAN-AM is in bad faith. (1) failure to inform of cancellation
intentionally. It was done to promote self-interest and closing the
chances of having the Lopez family seek reservations from other
airlines.
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Zulueta v Pan America (1972) Zulueta spouse and daughter

were aboard PANAM from Honolulu to Manila. On its first lag, it
landed on Wake Island, the stopover was 30 mins. Mr Z went to the
CR at terminal but was full of soldiers, he was forced to look a CR
down the beach. Upon boarding, Mr Z could not be found. The takeoff was delayed and he blamed the EEs. Z claims that he was
stopped at the gate and asked that Z open his luggage but he
refused. He was disallowed to board and plane and was left in the
island. He stayed there for 2 nights.
In relation between carrier and passenger involves special
and peculiar obligations and duties, differing in kind and degree,
from those of almost every other legal or contractual relation. On
account of the peculiar situation of the parties the law implies a
promise and imposes upon the carrier the corresponding duty of
protection and courteous treatment. Therefore, the carrier is
under the absolute duty of protecting his passengers from
assault or injury by himself or his servants.
Where a conductor uses language to a passenger which is
calculated to insult, humiliate, or wound the feelings of a person of
ordinary feelings and sensibilities, the carrier is liable, because the
contract of carriage impliedly stipulated for decent, courteous, and
respectful treatment, at hands of the carriers EEs. Among the
factors court take into account is assessing moral damages
are the professional, social, political and financial standing
of the offended parties on one hand, and the business and
financial position of the offender on the other.
Moral damages of 1M excessive, only 500K. Contributory
negligence that aggravated the gravity of situation, mainly because
of his arrogant and overbearing attitude and behavior.
Ortigas v Lufthansa (1975) Ortigas bought a 1st class ticket to
Lufthansa because he was advised by the doctor to take only 1 st
class ticket because of his weak heart. But he was not given the
seat. L promised 4 times that he will be transferred. It was
aggravated by the fact that his seat was given to a Belgian and the
improper conduct of its agents in dealing with him during the
occasion of such discriminatory violation of its contract of carriage.
Moral damages 150k. Nobody, much less a common
carrier who is under constant special obligation to give utmost
consideration to the convenience of its customers, may be
permitted to relieve itself from any difficulty situation created by its
own lack of diligence in the conduct of its affairs in a manner
prejudicial to such customers. When it comes to contracts of
common carriage, inattention and lack of care on the part

of the carrier resulting in the failure of the passenger to be
accommodated in the class contracted for amounts to bad
faith or fraud which entitles the passenger to the award of
moral damages. Article 2220. But in the instant case, the breach
appears to be of graver nature, since the preference given to the
Belgian passenger over plaintiff was done willfully and in wanton
disregard of plaintiff's rights and his dignity as a human being and
as a Filipino, who may not be discriminated against with impunity.
An air carrier is liable only in the event of death or injury
suffered by a passenger, because, according to the Court, to so
hold would be tantamount to declaring the carrier "exempt from
any liability for damages in the event of its absolute refusal, in bad
faith, to comply with a contract of carriage, which is absurd."
Yutuk v Meralco (1961) Yutuk was a lawyer by profession. She
was recovering from broncho- pneumonia ailment. She just moved
in new house in Paranaque. Electirc meter was installed at outside
wall of the house. Meralcos inspector, Jaime inspected it, then
disconnected the meter alleging that Y uses a jumper and only
pays half of her electric bill. Because of the incident, Y suffered a
relapse.
Moral damages include mental anguish, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation. While these moral damages are incapable of
pecuniary estimation, they are made recoverable, in the
amount determined by the court, provided they are the
proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or
omission. As most of these damages affect the aggrieved
partys moral feeling and personal pride, these should be
wighed in the determination of the indemnity. Meralco not in
bad faith but did with reckless negligence. The meter was
disconnected without the presences of the homeowner which
shows trickery. The Meralco seal was not tampered nor opened but
Jaime was the one who broke the seal.
Northwest Airlines v CA (1990) 3 siblings were given their first
trip abroad as graudation gifts by their parents. While they were in
Tokyo with their grandma, they were to pick up their tickets to US
which were paid by their parents in Manila thru Northwests agent.
However, NOA refused to give their tickets claiming that their agent
made a wrong computation of the price wrong conversion rate
and 10% mileage surcharge was not included. They have a deficit
of $261.60 each. They were forced to pay $1,046.40, which
depleted their pocket money and was forced to check-in in a cheap
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hotel in Tokyo. Because they are worried that their money will not
be enough, their grandpa was forced to go to Japan.
Even if there is a breach of contract, as admitted in this
case, moral damages are nevertheless not justified where only
simple negligence can be imputed to the defendant. With respect
to moral damages, the rule is that the same are recoverable in a
damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only
where (1) the mishap results in the death of a passenger and (2) it
is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith, even if
death does not result.
Moral damgages 10k each plus 10k for 2 for their
humiliation at NOA office. There was clear malice here, manifested
in the contemptuous disregard of the passenger's protest and the
abrupt rejection of their request that the Manila office be contacted
for verification of the correct billing. Rudeness is never excusable. It
is especially condemnable if it is committed in one's own country
against a foreign guest, as in the case at bar.
PANAM v IAC (1990) Ongsiako boarded PANAM with one checkin luggage. It was not carried on board and found after a week in its
office in Manila. EE instead of helping him, arrogantly threatened to
bump him off if persist. PANAM offered to forward it to LA or San
Francisco but O refused, because he was about to leave.
Art 2220 moral damages based on breach of contract with
fraud or bad faith. Article 2220 of the Civil Code says that moral
damages may be awarded in "breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith." So, proof of
infringement of an agreement by a party, standing alone,
will not justify an award of moral damages. There must, in
addition, as the law points out, be competent evidence of fraud
of bad faith by that party. If the plaintiff, for instance, fails to
take the witness stand and testify as to his social humiliation,
wounded feelings, anxiety, etc., moral damages cannot be
recovered. The rule applies to common carriers. In this case,
the breach was substantial cause in bringing injury to plaintiff.
Heirs of Amparo de los Santos v CA (1990) A vessel sank
when it met a typhoon causing the death of A de los Santos and
other poor litigants. Heirs sought damages. Board of Marine Inquiry
found that crew were negligent in operating the vessel and
suspended its license. Compania Maritima claims the sinking was
due to force majeure. The case is pending for almost 23 years.
Moral damages 10k each heir for mental anguish suffered
due to death of their relatives. But does not apply to Reyes

(survived the tragedy). Relate to Northwest Airlines v CA regarding
the exceptions. No proof of bad faith in this case. Mere
carelessness of carrier does not constitute per se or justify
an inference of malice or bad faith on its part.
Guita v CA (1985) Haguisan was a security guard of MMIC. All
guards are required to take a psychiatric exam regularly because a
general manager was previously shot by one of their guards. G was
the administrative officer of MMIC. H was found to be unfit to work
and was subsequently dismissed. He asked for a certification of
employment, it states after he was found mentally unfit to work.
H sued G for damages, alleging that the statement was false and
derogatory which ruined his chances of employment elsewhere.
Moral damages may be awarded to compensate one for
diverse injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings and social humiliation. It is however not enough
that such injuries have arisen; it is essential that they have sprung
from a wrongful act or omission of the defendant which was the
proximate cause thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or
omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be
awarded.
Capco v Macasaet (1990) The parties are stockholders of
Monte Oro Mineral Resources. C indorsed his 2 certificate of stocks
(COS) value at 0.01/share to M for safekeeping only. When he
demanded its return, M failed to produce it because it was given to
an officer of said corporation. M instead placed it with his COS. M
then was able to return 1 COS of C. C accepted it noted all
cleared. The 2 COS was more than Cs previous shares. However,
C still sued for damages claiming he had a ready buyer at
0.014/share, but did not materialize because of Ms failure to return
his COS.
M was in good faith replaces Cs COS and tried to recover
it. No moral damages. Considering that in the absence of malice
and bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the
grant of moral and exemplary damages has no basis if not
predicated upon any of the cases enumerated in the Civil Code,
properly set aside damages.
Maglutac v NLRC (1990) M was an EE of Commart as a
Manager of Energy Equipment Service. He was dismissed because
of his familys establishment of MM Intl. Which is a direct
competition with the company. M sued for illegal dismissal alleging
that he was dismissed because his parents threatened to expose
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the massive diversion of funds to company presidents private

accounts.
Moral damages 40k. Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to
award to the dismissed employee not only the reliefs
specifically provided by labor laws, but also moral and other
forms of damages governed by the Civil Code. Moral
damages would be recoverable, for example, where the
dismissal of the employee was not only effected without
authorized cause and /or due process for which relief is
granted by the Labor Code but was attended by bad faith or
fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was
done in a manner contrary to morals good customs or
public policy for which the obtainable relief is determined
by the Civil Code (not the Labor Code). The Labor Arbiter's
judgment shall be for the employer to reinstate the employee and
pay him his backwages or, exceptionally, for the employee simply
to receive separation pay. These are reliefs explicitly prescribed by
the Labor Code. But any award of moral damages by the Labor
Arbiter obviously cannot be based on the Labor Code but should be
grounded on the Civil Code.
American Express Intl v CA (1988) Alejandrino was granted a
credit card by the petitioner. He did not always pay the fee on time.
Account was cancelled one day then reinstated the next.
Alejandrino presumed that his card has been restored. The card
was cancelled so he was forced to surrender it at Bon Department
at Seattle since there was no pre-set spending to use the card.
Petitioner was only protected by stopping anyone who wrongfully
uses it. Alejandrino suffered humiliation, but petitioner apologized.
While petitioner was not in bad faith, negligence
caused the private respondent to suffer mental anguish,
serious anxiety, embarrassment and humiliation, for which
he is entitled to recover reasonable moral damages (Article
2217, Civil Code).
Strebel v Figueras (1954) S was a lessee of a lot which he
subleased to Standard Vacuum who constructed a gas station
operated by S and Eustaquio. F tried to built a drainage on the
property out of spite and expectation to acquire such. F allegedly
used political influence as Under Sec of Labor to cause City Fiscal
the right to construct drainage and to transfer temporarily the
husband of S step daughter from BOI to Bureau of Prison. S claims F
is guilty of malicious prosecution, they issued a press statement

that S and E violated 8-Hour Law since their EEs were required to
work beyond 8 hours a day.
Mental anguish is restricted as a rule, to such mental pain or
suffering as arises from an injury or wrong to the person himself, as
distinguished from that form of mental suffering which the
accompaniment of sympathy or sorrow for anothers suffering or
which arises from a contemplation of wrongs committed on the
person of another. Pursuant to such, a husband or wife cannot
recover for mental suffering caused by his sympathy for the
others suffering.
Art 2219. Moral damages may not be recovered in
cases of CRIME or TORT, unless either results or causes
physical injuries, which are lacking in this case.
Cachero v Manila Yellow Taxicab (1957) Cachero boarded a
taxi of def. That bumped against a Meralco post. C fell into the
ground and suffered slight physical injuries. He sought payment for
his medical expenses, transportation, actual monetary loss, moral
and exemplary damages.
Only Article 2219 (1 and 2) have any bearing on the case at
bar. The defendant herein has not committed in connection with
this case any "criminal offense resulting in physical injuries (Art
2219-1)". The case is but as a result of an admitted breach of
contract of carriage and against the defendant employer
alone. We, therefore, hold that the case at bar does not
come within the exception of paragraph 1, Article 2219 of
the Civil Code.
While under the law, ERs are made responsible for the
damages caused by their EEs acting within the scope of their
assigned task, plaintiff, in case at bar, does not maintain his
action against all the persons who might be liable for the
damages caused but on an alleged breach of contract of
carriage and against the defendant ER alone. However, the
defendant taxicab company has not committed any criminal
offense resulting in physical injuries against the plaintiff.
The one that committed the offense against plaintiff is the
driver of the defendants taxicab but he was not made
party defendant to the case. Therefore, plaintiff is not entitled
to compensation for moral damages as his case does not come
within the exception of Art 2219 (1).
Felisilda v Villanueva (1985) F spouses lot was levied and sold
to Dr. Galeon at public aution. No redemption was made so the sale
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was registered and new titles were given. F was ordered by MTC to
vacate the lot and pay Dr Galeon for the use of his land.
Award of moral and exemplary damages in an
EJECTMENT SUIT, manifestly erroneous. Trial judges have a
reprehensible propensity to adjudge moral and exemplary damages
without any justification. Mere vexation or mental anguish is
not sufficient to warrant moral damages. The case must
come within the terms of Art 2217-2220 of the Civil Code.
The ONLY damages recoverable in an ejectment suit are the
fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the real property. Other damages must be claimed in
an ordinary action.
Mercado v Lira (1961) M and others were owners and operators
of Laguna Transpo. Comp. One of its bus, while on the trip from
Batangas to Manila, its left front tire blew out and swerved
gradually on the left side of the road, into a ravine some 270
meters away. Several passengers died and others were injured.
Ramon Lira, Jr. died while Nita Lira was injured. The parents of
Ramon and Nita herself sued for damages.
Moral damages 4k for death of Ramon. Damages in
excess of P3k may be awarded for the death of a passenger, and in
addition, the heirs may demand moral damages commensurate
with the mental anguish suffered by them. Art 1764. Art 2206 shall
also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of
contract by a common carrier. Art 2206(3). Once the abovementioned heirs of the deceased claim compensation for moral
damages and are able to prove that they are entitled to such
award, it becomes the duty of the court to award moral
damages to the claimant in an amount commensurate with
the mental anguish suffered by them. Of course, the amount of
moral damages to be awarded, should be such as may be
reasonable and just under the circumstances in a given case.
See Fores v Miranda. A passenger who suffered physical
injuries because of the carriers negligence (culpa contractual)
cannot be considered in the descriptive expression analogous
cases used in Art. 2119 for which the new Civil Code authorizes
indemnification for moral damages in favour of the injured party.
Moral damages are only recoverable in this case when there is
evidence of fraud, malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier.
There is none in this case. The cause of the accident was merely
the bursting of tire.
Tamayo v Univ of Negros Occ (CA:1962)

A corporation, being an artificial person and having
existence only in legal contemplation, has no feelings, no
emotions, no senses; therefore, it cannot experience
physical suffering and mental anguish. Mental suffering can be
experienced only by one having a nervous system and it flows from
real ills, sorrows, and griefs of life.
PAL v CA (1981) Samson was a co-pilot in PAL while Capt
Bustamante was the commanding pilot on their Manila to Legaspi
flight. Because of Bs very slow reaction and poor judgment
overshot the airfield. The plane crash landed beyond the runway
and the head of Samson hit and break through the thick front
windshield of the plane which caused him severe concussion and
wounds. He request for medical treatment but PAL merely refer him
to the company doctor who is a only a general practitioner. He
experiences periodic dizzy spells, general debility and nervousness.
He was subsequently dismissed for physical disability. S sued PAL
for damages.
Moral damages 50k . The negligence of PAL is clearly a
quasi-delict, Art 2219(2) is applicable, justifying the recovery of
moral damages. Even form the standpoint of the petitioner PAL that
there is an EE-ER relationship between it and Samson as
respondent arising from the contract of employment, Samson is still
entitled to moral damages in view of the finding of bad faith and
malice by CA, applying Art 2220 relate to Art 19 (act with justice,
give everyone his due)
.
Buenaventura v CA (2005) The marriage of Noel
Buenaventura, petitioner and Lucia Singh, respondent was declared
null and void for the psychological incapacity under Art 36 FC of B.
He was ordered to pay 2.5M moral damages to Lucia,
Art 2217, Art 21 referred to Art 2219. The trial court referred
to Article 21 because Article 2219 of the Civil Code enumerates the
cases in which moral damages may be recovered and it mentions
Article 21 as one of the instances. It must be noted that Article 21
states that the individual must WILLFULLY cause loss or injury
to another. There is a need that the act is willful and hence done
in complete freedom. In granting moral damages, the lower
courts could not but have assumed that the acts on which the
moral damages were based were done willfully and freely,
otherwise the grant of moral damages would have no leg to stand
on.
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Psychological incapacity was defined as truly incognitive

of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage
The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts
of the petitioner after the marriage as proof of his psychological
incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless,
said courts considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds
for granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize
acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence
beyond the control of the party because of an innate
inability, while at the same time considering the same set
of acts as willful. The award of moral damages should be
predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the
marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done
deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of
his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No
such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case.
The definition of psychological incapacity removes the basis
for the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the
private respondent. If the private respondent was deceived, it was
not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the
award of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact.
Mercado v CA (1960) Mercado, petitioners child and
Quisumbing, respondents child are classmates. M has a pitogo
(piggy bank) which he lent it to Lim, then Lim lent it to Legaspi then
to Q. Legaspi and Q did not know that the pitogo is owned b y M.
When M was trying to get it to Q, Q refused. A fight ensued, and
when Q became weak, M cut the cheeks of Q with a razor.
While moral damages included physical suffering, which
must have been caused to the wounded boy Quisumbing (Art.
2217, Civil Code), the decision of the court below does not declare
that any of the cases specified in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in
which moral damages may be recovered, has attended or
occasioned the physical injury. The only possible circumstance
in the case at bar in which moral damages are recoverable
would be if a criminal offense or a quasi-delict has been
committed.
It does not appear that a criminal action for physical injuries
was ever presented. The offender, Augusto Mercado, was nine
years old and it does not appear that he had acted with

discernment when he inflicted the physical injuries on Manuel
Quisumbing, Jr.
It is apparent that the proximate cause of the injury caused
to Quisumbing was Quisumbing's own fault or negligence for
having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from
another boy. (Art. 2179, Civil Code.)
Session 16 Art 2015, 2208, 2229-2235, 4 Annotations on

Attorneys Fees, Cases 133, 200, 238, 251, 261, 265, 291310, and 322
Araneta v Areglado (1958) Araneta, Atenean teased Arreglado,
former Atenean because of transferring to La Salle. Arreglado fell
from the ground.
Moral damages in case of physical injuries are only
recoverable by the party who suffered them and not by his next of
kin, unless there is express statutory provision to the contrary.
The fathers failure to submit the son to a plastic operation
as soon as possible does not prove that such treatment is not
called for or that its cost, if actually necessary, should not enter in
the assessment of the damages to which the injured party is
entitled.
Herbosa v CA (2002) H sued for damages for breach of
contract. They hired PVE, division of Solid Corp, to record their
wedding ceremony. Through their utter disappoint, PVE failed to
record of problems in the equipment. A writ of execution was
issued, levied personal properties of Solid Corp. On the day of
auction sale, an injunction was issued but was delivered late. It was
sold & Solidbank sued for damages moral, exemplary and
attorneys fees.
The claim for actual, moral and exemplary damages
as well as attorneys fees must each be independently
identified and justified.
MORAL damages -75k - cannot be recovered in an action for
breach of contract because such an action is not among those
expressly mentioned in Art 2219 of NCC. However, it is recoverable
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if breach was wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith,

oppressive or abusive.
Exemplary damages 40k a warning to all entitled to
observe good faith and due diligence in fulfilling contractual
obligations
Attorneys fees of 10k Art 2208
Central Azucarera de Bais v CA (1990) Def are sugar cane
planters milling their sugarcane with petitioner without any written
milling contracts. They had a share of 60% in sugar produced. RA
809 was enacted compelling increased participation of majority
planters. Central gives 62% share for those who signed but 60%
share if without milling contract.
ATTORNEYs FEES is an award thereof as an item of
damages is the exception rather than the rule, and counsel's fees
are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. Article
2208 demands factual, legal and equitable justification, without
which the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being
improperly left to speculation and conjecture. In all events, the
court must explicitly state in the text of the decision, and
not only in the decretal portion thereof, the legal reason for
the award of attorney's fees. Deleted award of such
Mindanao Academy, Inc v Yap (1965) Nuqui and son sold land
with 2 schools (Mindanao Academy and Misamis Academy) to Yap.
Yap took possession and renamed it to Harvardian Colleges. But
found out that there are many co-owners in such school that has
not consented the sale. They sued for annulment of such.
Indeed the interests of the said stockholders, if any, were
already represented by the corporation itself, which was the proper
party plaintiff; and no cause of action accruing to them separately
from the corporation is alleged in the complaint, other than that for
moral damages due to "extreme mental anguish, serious anxiety
and wounded feelings."
Attorney's fees P2k should be upheld, although the same
should be for the account, not of the plaintiff stockholders of the
Mindanao Academy, Inc., but of the corporation itself, and
payable to their common counsel as prayed for in the
complaint.
Lazatin v Twano (1961) - Lazatin sued Twano for price of 225
autotrucks purchased from the US government. They are partners
in buying and selling such. Def claims that plaintiffs action was

clearly unfounded. SC: the case was dismissed on purely technical
ground prescription and res adjudicata.
Atty Fess 3k. Art 2208 (4). While it may appear also
that the move was a scheme to prevent the defendants-appellees
from reaping the benefits of the final judgment rendered in their
favor in said case CA- G.R. No. 5433-R, still one cannot nullify,
without cause, the good and honest motive, which should
be presumed, when a litigant goes to court for the
determination of his alleged right.
Considering the fact that defendants-appellant lees were
drawn into this litigation by plaintiff-appellant and were
compelled to hire an attorney to protect and defend them,
and taking into account the work done by said attorney, as
reflected in the record, throughout the proceedings.
Mambulao Lumber Co v PNB (1968) Mambulao Lumber
granted industrial loan of 100k by PNB. Only 27,500 and 15,500
was released. M failed to pay and the sheriff filed a notice of
foreclosure mortgaged land and the chattel mortgage. M requested
the suspension of foreclosure of the chattel mortgage, and was
granted. However, the sale of the land was done. The proceeds is
56,908. M deposited 738.59 which represents payment of the its
whole debt. PNB claims that there is still a balance.
Exemplary
10k. Attorneys fees 3k. But for the wrongful acts of herein appellee
bank and the deputy sheriff of Camarines Norte in proceeding with
the sale in utter disregard of the agreement to have the chattels
sold in Manila as provided for in the mortgage contract, to which
their attentions were timely called by herein appellant, and in
disposing of the chattels in gross for the miserable amount of
P4,200.
People v Bautista (1981) Abalayan went to B, faith healer
several times to seek help since she suspects that his husband is
cheating on her. One day, B asked A to lie down and unzip her
pants in the woods, claiming that he will do a ritual to ward off the
infidelity of his husband. B started caressing the breasts and
vagina, A protested. B instead gave her a potion but A after
drinking it felt weak. She was hypnotized and B abused her.
Moral damages 20k. As a victim of rape, complainant
undeniably felt mental anguish and distress. And having to
face public trial that would expose the lurid details of her
unhappy experience, that too had the effect of besmirching her
reputation to warrant the award of moral damages, an inseparable
8|thil lozada
liability to the punitive portion of the sentence imposed on all

convicted rapists.
Prudenciado v Allied Transport System (1987) Dra Prudencio
was about to hold a class at Philippine Normal College. When she
was about to cross the intersection to Taft Ave, she stopped and
looked at both sides for any on-coming vehicle. She proceeded
when she saw that there no cars. Suddenly, a taxi of defendant
bumped her car. She sustained phyiscal injuries like brain
concussion.
Exemplary damages-5K. Article 2231: In quasi-delicts,
exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with
grave negligence. The rationale behind exemplary or corrective
damages is, as the name implies, to provide an example or
correction for the public good. However, a driver running at full
speed on a rainy day, on a slippery road in complete disregard of
the hazards to life and limb of other people cannot be said to be
acting in anything less than gross negligence. The frequent
incidence of accidents of this nature caused by taxi drivers indeed
demands corrective measures.
Attorneys fees 3k.
Corona v CA (1983) Popioco was driving jeep owned by Ong,
collided with pick-up driven by Pineda owned by Corona. Popioco
suffered injuries.
Attys fees 1k each to be paid to Ong and Popioco.
P50,000.00 moral damages quite excessive, considering
that on record the injuries suffered by private respondent Popioco
were as follows: Fracture, simple, complete, femur left, Fracture,
simple, complete, distal third, patella, left for which he underwent
"an intramedullary nailing of the left femur on March 15, 1969 and
removal of patellar fructure fragments and patellar tendon repair
on April 2, 1969. " There is no evidence showing that as a
consequence thereof, he now limps, became lame or that even one
of his legs became short.
People v Ruiz (1981) Ruiz found that Atty Jose Ong Oh,
deceased, refused to load his copra through Ruiz union. Looked for
the Ong Oh and shot him.
3 mitigating circumstances: passion and obfuscation,
drunkenness and voluntary surrender.
Moral damages from 50k to 20k. Amount awarded for
damages in a criminal case shall be reduced where there
are mitigating circumstances.

No exemplary damages shall be awarded if there are
no aggravating circumstances.
Attorneys fees from 10k to 5k. The private
prosecutors that helped in the prosecution of the case being
deemed to have rendered service for a fellow member of the bar
more in the spirit of professional fraternity.
Ribaya & Carbonell v Bautista (1980) Ribaya was engaged in
buying and selling jewelry. She was informed by her agent that
Bautista was interest in buying jewelries with big diamonds. B
bought jewelries amounting to P222k and 94K. B paid through
checks but all was dishonoured since Bs account was closed. R
cannot find B. B started to visit various pawnshops in Manila and
found that the jewelries were pawned. R found B but was given a
run around at maturity dates of checks.
Moral damages & Exemplary damages 25% of principal
sum
Moral damages Petitioner Niceta suffered "extremely" and
that for three months she could not sleep was a clear
demonstration of her physical suffering, mental anguish and
serious anxiety and similar injury, resulting from respondents'
malevolent acts that show her to be clearly entitled to moral
damages.
Exemplary - The wantonness and malevolence through
which respondents defrauded petitioners, deceitfully
incurring and then evading settlement of their just liability
certainly justifies the award of exemplary damages by way of
example and correction for the public good and also to serve as a
deterrent to the commission of similar misdeeds by others,
even if the transaction were viewed as a breach of civil
contract.
There was more than wanton refusal to pay a plainly valid
and just contractual debt, but a malicious defraudation and gross
abuse of petitioners' good faith, whereby petitioners were wantonly
"paid" with bouncing postdated checks and besides not being paid
what was due them, had to undergo trauma and travail to redeem
with their own and borrowed funds from the pawnshops some of
the jewelries in order to return them to their owners.
Domingding v Aranas v Ng (1958) From the record we also
understand that the offended party is an exporter of mangoes who,
evidently, does not seem to have much capital because she only
pays for the mangoes when the same is sold. Neither does the
9|thil lozada
offender seem or appear to be of much financial consequence

because he was only the overseer or manager of a mango store.
With all the above circumstances in mind, the Tribunal believes that
the sum of P50,000, assessed by the court a quo, is excessive.
P1,000 should be sufficient as moral damages, but the offender
should be required to pay punitive damages in the amount of
P2,000 because of his act in abusing the confidence of a customer
belonging to the weaker sex, which bespeaks of a perverse nature
dangerous to the community.
Attorney's fees 1k reasonable.
Peo v Medroso Jr (1975) Medroso driven by M while in a barrio,
hit Andes. Andes died. 2 mitigating: voluntary surrender, plea of
guilt. 1 aggravating: drove truck without a license.
Actual: 12k.
Moral damages 4k. May be recovered where physical injuries
ended in death. Determination of nature of human life discretionary
upon trial court. The assessment will not be disturbed on appeal
unless there is a manifest showing that the same is arbitrary or
excessive.
Exemplary damages 4k. Exemplary damages are corrective
in nature and are imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good (Art. 2229, Civil Code), and the situation before Us calls
for the imposition of this kind of damages to deter others from
taking into their hands a motor vehicle without being qualified to
operate it on the highways thereby converting the vehicle into an
instrument of death.
Tan Kapoe v Masa (1985) Masa, Tans tenant for 10 years,
asked the latter for the conversion of their share tenancy
relationship to one of leasehold, petitioners rejected. Masa filed in
CAR for such but Tan opposed and filed for ejectment. The
conversion was granted. Tan filed 6 cases against Masa. He was
arrested. Masa filed for moral and exemplary damages for
malicious prosecution.
Exemplary 200 each. The award of moral and exemplary
damages in an aggregate amount may not be the usual way of
awarding said damages. However, there can be no question
that the entitlement to moral damages having been
established, exemplary damages may be awarded. And
exemplary damages may be awarded even though not so expressly
pleaded in the complaint nor proved.

Attorneys fees 3k.
Attorney's fees are also
recoverable when exemplary damages are awarded, and in
criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff.
Munsayac v de Lara (1968) Plaintiff was a passenger in a jeep
owned and operated by defendant. Defendant drove at excessive
speed and did not take due care even though the road is under
repair and that his passengers requested him to go slowly.
The law does not contemplate a vicarious liability on his
part: the breach is his as party to the contract, and so if he is to
be held liable at all for exemplary damages by reason of the
wrongful act of his agent, it must be shown that he had
previously authorized or knowingly ratified it thereafter, in
effect making him a co-participant.
It is not enough to say that an example should be made, or
corrective measures employed, for the public good, especially in
accident cases where public carriers are involved. For the
causative negligence in such cases is personal to the
employees actually in charge of the vehicles, and it is they
who should be made to pay this kind of damages by way of
example or correction, unless by the demonstrated tolerance or
approval of the owners they themselves can be held at fault and
their fault is of the character described in Article 2232 of the Civil
Code. Otherwise there would be practically no difference between
their liability for exemplary damages and their liability for
compensatory damages, which needs no proof of their negligence
since the suit is predicated on breach of contract and due diligence
on their part does not constitute a defense.
Martinez v Gonzales (1962) Gonzales, owner and Fornal, driver
was sued by Martinez for damages because of physical injuries
sustained while riding the taxicab of Gonzales. Gs taxi bumped
with another taxi. Martinez lost consciousness because of such
accident and was required to be hospitalized. Ca deleted moral and
exemplary damages and reduced attorneys fees.
Moral damages are not recoverable in damages actions,
predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation, as in the
instant case, in view of the provisions of Articles 2219 and 2220 of
the New Civil Code.
The exceptions according to the Fores case:
(1) where the mishap results in the death of a passenger,
and
(2) where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or
bad faith, even if death does not result.
10 | t h i l l o z a d a
NO moral -Plaintiff-appellant designated the incident as

accident and predicated her cause of action on the failure of the
defendant to perform her obligation, as a carrier, to bring plaintiffappellant safely to her destination. This being the case, no moral
damages are awardable.
NO exemplary. Plaintiff-appellant not being entitled to moral
damages, she is not also entitled to exemplary damages. For one to
recover exemplary damages, he must first show that he is entitled
to moral, temperate liquidated or compensatory damages.
Attorneys fees. 200.
Octot v Ybanez (1982) Octot was a security guard in GSIS. The
government ordered all department heads to dismiss EEs that are
undesirable especially those who are facing charges. Octot was
convicted of libel in RTC. He was dismissed, Octot believing it was
illegal, still continued to work but his salary was withheld by
Ybanez. He was subsequently acquitted by CA. Imbong requested
for his reinstatement, which was approved. However, Octot delayed
in acting on such.
Exemplary damages are not generally recoverable in
a special civil action for mandamus unless the defendant
patently acted with vindictiveness or wantonness and not in
the exercise of honest judgment. The claim for exemplary
damages must presuppose the existence of the circumstances
enumerated in Articles 2231 and 2232 of the Civil Code.
Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Such damages
are required by public policy, for wanton acts must be
suppressed. They are an antidote so that the poison of
wickedness may not run through the body politic.
Conditions when exemplary damages may be awarded:
1. They may be imposed by way of example or correction only
in addition, among others, to compensatory damages, and
cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their
determination depending upon the amount of compensatory
damages that may be awarded to the claimant.
2. The claimant must first establish his right to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
3. The wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and
the award would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in
a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner

Matura v Laya (1979) Matura was a public school teacher, went
to school where Sarmago also works as a teacher. M accused her as
the paramour of her husband and started insulting her about the
immorality & physically assaulted in front of Sarmagos co-teachers
and students. Matura was convicted of oral defamation and slight
physical injuries.
Art 2230: criminal offenses exemplary damages as a part of
a civil liability may be imposed when the crime is committed with
one or more aggravating circumstance. In case at bar, no
aggravating circumstance.
Rotea v Halili (1960) Bacson was driving a bus owned by Halili,
which collided with a bus. Rotea, passenger of Halili was injured.
Sought 10k exemplary damages but trial court did not awarded the
same.
Exemplary damages are imposed primarily upon the
wrongdoer as a deterrent in the commission of similar acts
in the future. Such punitive damages cannot be applied to his
master or employer except only to the extent of his
participation or ratification of the act because they are
penal in character. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, exemplary
damages may only be imposed when the crime is committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances (Article 2230, new 3m 3
Civil Code), and here the crime being only qualified by negligence
is not accompanied by an aggravating circumstance and no
evidence of participation of wrongful act of EE.
Since they are awarded not by way of compensation, but as
a punishment to the offender and as a warning to others, they can
only be awarded against one who has participated in the offense
Geluz v CA (1961) Lazo, husband of Villanueva, sued Geluz for
the 3rd abortion done by his wife alleging that he did not consent on
such. But it was presumed that the 1 st abortion which happened
before they got married and the 2nd abortion (time that she was
employed in Comelec) were done to his wife with his knowledge.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of
personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one
injured, if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf
of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such
right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In
fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn
child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no
transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical
personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to

act).
Because the parents can not expect either help, support or services
from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral
damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the
spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and
anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their
parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217).
Exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them
(Art. 2230). No damages in case at bar, appellee's indifference to
the previous abortions of his wife, clearly indicates that he was
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and
affections.
Mirasol v de la Cruz (1978) Mirasol sued Mendoza for forcible
entry. But Mendoza claims there is a prior existence of a tenancy
contract and the case was purely for harassment.
Art. 2208: it is clearly intended to retain the award of
attorney's fees as the exception in our law, as the general rule
remains that attorney's fees are not recoverable in the absence of a
stipulation thereto, the reason being that it is not sound policy
to self a premium on the right to litigate. Art. 2208 (4) allows
attorney's fees in cases of clearly unfounded civil actions, but it
must be understood to mean those where the cause or causes of
action are so untenable as to amount to gross and evident bad
faith. Proof must be presented to the court as to the facts
and circumstances constituting the alleged bad faith.
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be
reasonable. ..." Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion in the
award of attorney's fees under Art. 2208 (11) of the New Civil Code
demands a factual, legal or equitable justification. Without such
justification, the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis
being improperly left to speculation and conjecture."
Pirovano v de la Rama S/S (1954) Estefania was one of the
daugthers of Esteban de la Rama, major stockholder of respondent.
He gave equal shares to his daughters. The husband of Estefania,
Pirovano became the president of the company. He was responsible
for the massive expansion of the company. When he died, the
board made a resolution donating to his minor heirs Ps life
insurance proceeds in terms of stocks. One daughter of Esteban
protested since it will make the voting rights twice as to her sisters.
The board nullified the donation and instead claims that the

proceeds will be considered as their debt and will pay 5% interest
per annum. Estefania filed for the recovery of proceeds.
Attys fee reduced from 20% to 10% of the amount as
damages. Art 2208(2).
United General Industries v Paler (1982) Paler bought a tv in
instalment basis, and executed as promissory note and chattel
mortgage. Paler violated the contract of mortgage, plaintiff sued for
estafa.
Attys fees increased by 250 to 1k. Art 19 relate to Art 2208
(5). Paler wilfully refused to pay debt which he clearly ought to
have paid. He even imposed a burden on this Court by filing an
unnecessary and frivolous appeal.
Rizal Surety & Ins v CA (1967) Imperial, consignee of 6 bales
of cotton remnants, procured insurance. The cotton is shipped by
US Lines. Upon arrival, Manila Port Service (MPS), arrastre operator
gained custody of such. However, Imperial found that 4 were short
landed or short delivered. Rizal forced to pay P1,422.42. Rizal
subrogated the rights of Imperial. It asked reimbursement from US
Lines and MPS as alternative defendants. US Lines claims for
attorneys fees claiming the suit was unfounded.
Art 2208(2) not applicable. Attorneys fees:
1. The litigation expenses recoverable therein are those
incurred in suing third persons, upon the premise that such
expenses were unnecessary. The expenses mentioned in the
second situation in said par. 2 are therefore non-litigation;
otherwise, there would have been no justification for the
distinction.
2. The article in question starts out with the general rule; "In
the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered . . ."
Now a party sued in court is compelled under pain of default
to become a party defendant either necessarily or
unnecessarily. If necessarily, he cannot recover the
attorney's fees and litigation expenses incurred even
if he should win, since it is not the fact of winning
alone that entitles recovery of such items but rather
the attendance of special circumstances the
enumerated exceptions in Article 2208 in addition.
Otherwise, everytime a defendant wins, automatically
plaintiff must pay attorney's fees, thereby putting a
premium on the right to litigate, which should not be so. For
those expenses then, the law deems the award of costs as
sufficient reimbursement. On the other hand, if a party is

unnecessarily made a defendant it will not be par. 2 of the
article but par. 4 of the article that will apply, because the
term "unnecessarily" connotes the idea that the cause of
action against such party was clearly unfounded in the first
place.
Attys fees of 300 to US Lines was reversed. Clearly
unfounded - cause of action must be so untenable as to amount to
gross and evident bad faith. There might have been such bad faith
on petitioner's part if, it knew before filing the complaint against
U.S. Lines that MPS would admit liability.
Traders Royal v CA (1997) TRB EEs Union secured the services
of Atty Cruz, and agreed a monthly retainer of 3k. The union claims
for holiday, mid-year and year-end bonuses against TRB. But only
the holiday was granted to the union amounting to P175,794.32.
TRB paid the amount to its employees. Atty Cruz sought 10% of
award as attorneys lien, which was granted by NLRC. Union
protested alleging that attorneys fees should have been
incorporated in main case not after final judgment of SC. The
decision can no longer be altered.
There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorneys fees,
the so-called ordinary and extraordinary. In its ORDINARY
CONCEPT, an attorneys fee is the reasonable compensation
paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has
rendered to the latter. The basis of this compensation is the
fact of his employment by and his agreement with the
client.
In its EXTRAORDINARY CONCEPT, an attorneys fee is an
indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by
the losing party in a litigation. The basis of this is any of the
cases provided by law where such award can be made, such as
those authorized in
Article 2208, Civil Code, and is payable not
to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed
that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional
compensation or as part thereof.
When the labor arbiter ordered the payment of
attorneys fees, he did not in any way modify the judgment
of the Supreme Court.
Even though or, better stated, especially after its earlier
decision had been reviewed and partially affirmed. It is well settled
that a claim for attorneys fees may be asserted either in
the very action in which the services of a lawyer had been
rendered or in a separate action.

With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering
attorneys fees as an incident of the main action may be
availed of only when something is due to the client.
Attorneys fees cannot be determined until after the main
litigation has been decided and the subject of the recovery is at
the disposition of the court. The issue over attorneys fees only
arises when something has been recovered from which the fee is to
be paid.
While a claim for attorneys fees may be filed before the
judgment is rendered, the determination as to the propriety of
the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be held in
abeyance until the main case from which the lawyers claim
for attorneys fees may arise has become final. Otherwise,
the determination to be made by the courts will be
premature. Of course, a petition for attorneys fees may be
filed before the judgment in favor of the client is satisfied
or the proceeds thereof delivered to the client.
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co v Chavez (1966) Firestone
sued Ines Chavez for the price of automobile tires sold and
delivered amounting to P6,241.75 plus interest and attorneys fees.
C issued a check but was dishonoured. invoice stipulates that in
case of suit, C agrees to pay 25% as attorneys fees and liquidated
damages.
Attorneys fees warranted. Art 2208. One such case is
where the defendant is guilty of "gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy plaintiff's plainly valid, just and
demandable claims. Article 19 related to Art 1170. Bad faith is
evident on the part of Chaves because of issuing a check with no
funds.
Abrogar v IAC (1988) - Respondents was ordered to pay Abrogar
P2,553 in a civil case. Because of its failure to pay, its 2 land worth
75k was levied and was sold at public auction but without consent
of Soccoro Desear, one of the respondent. It was sold for only
P2,553. RTC ruled that sale was null and void for lack of notice and
awarded attorneys fees of 2k.
No Attorneys fees. There is neither an allegation nor
evidence to support the award of P2,000.00 by way of attorney's
fees in favor of private respondents. The exercise of judicial
discretion in the award of attorney's fees under Article
2208 (ii) of the New Civil Code demands a factual, legal,
and equitable justification. Without such justification, the
award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being

improperly left to speculation and conjecture.
Attorney's fees are recoverable not as a matter of right. It is
the import of Article 2208 that the award of attorney's fees is an
exception and that the decision must contain an express finding of
fact to bring the case within the exception and justify the grant of
attorney's fees. "Just and equitable" under paragraph 11, Article
2208, New Civil Code is not a matter of feelings, but
demonstration. The reason for the award of attorney's fees must
be stated in the text of the court's decision, otherwise, if it is
stated only in the dispositive portion of the decision, the
same must be disallowed on appeal.
Antonio v Santos Antonio applied for the registration of the 2
land previously owned by his father. It was granted and declared
owner but he found out that the lot is already registered to the
respondents. A sued for recovery of land alleging that the title of
respondents
is
void
being
procured
thru
fraudulent
misrepresentations and machinations. Respondent claims in
peaceful possession of the property and Antonio never possessed
it.
An award of moral damages is not warranted since the
record is bereft of any proof that Antonio acted maliciously or in
bad faith in filing the action. Neither should attorneys fees be
awarded. The accepted rule is that the reason for the award of
attorneys fees must be stated in the text of the trial
courts decision; otherwise, if it is stated only in the
dispositive portion of the decision, the same must be
disallowed.
Bantoto v Bobis (1966) Vallejo owner of jeep, driven by Bobis
struck 3 year old girl, daughter of Bantoto. The young girl died
because of serious injuries. Bobis pleaded guilty to homicide thru
reckless imprudence. Bantoto filed a motion to declared also the
owner solidary responsible for damages civil indemnity, moral and
exemplary damages.
Exemplary damages improper. No such damages were
imposed on the driver, and the master, as person
subsidiarily liable, cannot incur greater civil liability than
his convicted employee, any more than a guarantor can be
held responsible more than the principal debtor. (Art 2064)

Attorneys fees of 3k disallowed only 1k. Driver cannot pay
because if he could, or if he had money or leviable property worth
that much, he must be operating his own jeep. Art 2208(9).
Session 17 Art 559, 1505, 2177 CC; Art 100-113 RPC;
Cases 311-327, 426 scra 167, 427 scra 456
Martinez v Barredo (1948) A taxi, driven by Digman, owned by
Barredo collided with the Chevrolet car of Martinez. They sued each
other for damages to property thru reckless imprudent. However,
Digman plead guilty. He was ordered to pay Martines for P605.97 as
indemnity. He was unable to pay so M sued B for subsidiary liability
under Art 102-103 RPC. Whether a judgment of conviction
sentencing the defendant to pay an indemnity is conclusive in an
action against his employer for enforcement of the latter's
subsidiary liability under articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal
Code?
The judgment of conviction, in the absence of any
collusion between the defendant and the offended party,
should bind the person subsidiary liable. A finding of guilt in a
criminal case in which proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary,
should be nullified in a subsequent civil action requiring only
preponderance of evidence to support a judgment, unless those
who support the contrary rule should also hold that an absolution in
a civil case will operate to automatically set aside the verdict
against the defendant in a criminal case.
The employer can not be said to have been deprive of his
day in court, because the situation before us is not one wherein the
employer is sued for a primary liability under article 1903 of the
Civil Code. The employer becomes ipso facto subsidiary
liable upon his driver's conviction and upon proof of the
latter's insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out
not only the employee's primary civil liability but also his
employer's subsidiary liability for such criminal negligence.
MD Transit v CA (1968) Epstein, plaintiff, was hit by a bus of
MD transit driven by Sembrano. E suffered fractures bones. S was
found guilty of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence
but no pronouncement of his civil liability since E reserved right to
file a separate civil action for damages. E sued S and MD Transit for
damages. Whether the liability sought to be enforced therein arises
from a crime, as contended by the plaintiff, or from a quasi-delict,
as urged by appellant?
Delict Art 102-103 RPC
Quasi-delict
EE primarily liable while ER secondarily liable.

The secondary nature of the latter's obligation
necessarily connotes that his properties may
not be levied upon, in pursuance of a writ of
execution of the judgment declaring the
existence of both liabilities, as long and so long
as the ER can point out properties of the EE
which may be levied upon in satisfaction of said
judgment. Thus, the EE's solvency is merely
a matter of defense which may be availed
of by the ER.
In the criminal action, he had reserved the right
to seek indemnity in a separate civil action
The law authorizing the commencement of a
civil action based upon a liability arising from a
crime, even before the institution of the
criminal action, necessarily implies that the
rendition of a judgment of conviction in the
latter need not be alleged in the civil complaint.
Not a defense diligence of ER. Judgment of
conviction in the criminal case against an EE is,
not only admissible in evidence in the civil case
against the ER, but, also, conclusive upon his
subsidiary liability arising from the EE's criminal
liability.
Prayer
in
the
pleading
ER
solidarily liable
with EE.
Reservation
unnecessary
if
based on quasi
delict
Defense:
due
diligence
of
selection
and
supervision of ER.
That "actual" damages and "consequential damages" are

dealt with in the Civil Code of the Philippines under the same
Chapter; thereof that the two (2) terms are thus used therein as
equivalent to one another. Art 2220 CC - "indemnification for
damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered"
otherwise known as "damnum emergens," and alluded to in said
decision as "actual damages" "but also that of the profits which the
obligee failed to obtain" or "lucrum cessans" or "compensatory
damages," pursuant to the same decision the distinction therein
made appears to be inconsequential, insofar as the law and this
case is concerned.
Cerezo v Tuazon (2004) The tricycle was in its proper lane
(Tuazon). While Country Bus Lines bus collided with a tricycle. Many
died. Cerezo spouse was sued for damages as owner of Country

Bus Lines with the driver. T was paralayzed. Is the EE an
indispensable party in recover of damages against ER against a
quasi-delict committed by EE?
The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising
from a delict under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, or may
give rise to an action for a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code. An aggrieved party may choose between the two
remedies. An action based on a quasi-delict may proceed
independently from the criminal action. The choice of remedy,
whether to sue for a delict or a quasi-delict, affects the procedural
and jurisdictional issues of the action.
QUASI-DELICT: ER liability: primary and direct. Where there
is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors, as in this case, each
debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Either of the parties is
indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party
because complete relief is available from either. When an
employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer
has himself committed an act of negligence in not
preventing or avoiding the damage. Not necessary to reserve
the filing of separate civil action since liability is primary and direct
for her own civil negligence.
DELICT. The aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action
where the EEs delict and corresponding primary liability are
established. If the present action proceeds from a delict, then trial
courts jurisdiction over EE is necessary.
Arambulo v Manila Electric (1930) A motorman with his
student was operating a streetcar with a speed of 35-40 kph. They
saw an old woman but the student did not slacken speed and
struck the old woman. Motorman seized the hand gear and applied
the brakes but it was too late. The old woman died after 8 days.
The car even after applying the brakes travelled for about 20m.
They were held guilty of homicide by simple negligence.
Art 1092 CC relate to Art 20 RPC.
1. exemption from civil liability in Art 1903 CC for all who have
acted with the diligence of a good father of a family, is not
applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided in Art 20
RPC; and
2. amount of the subsidiary civil liability can in no case exceed
that of the principal civil liability.
Pajarito v Senerix (1978) Felipe Aizon owns a bus driven by
Joselito Aizon. The bus turned turtle and passengers (one is
Pajarito) died. Ps mother sued for double homicide thru reckless
imprudence. Joselito was convicted and ordered to indemnify the

mother for 12k. A writ of execution was unsatisfied, so a subsidiary
motion for execution was filed against Felipe. F opposed the claims
alleging that he is not the ER of Joselito and if he is insolvent, he
must suffer subsidiary imprisonment.
Art 100 RPC. The institution of the criminal action carries
with it the institution of the civil action arising therefrom, except
when there is a separate civil action or reservation of the latter on
the part of the complainant. Civil action may be tried and
prosecuted, with all the ancillary processes provided by law."
Art 103 in relation to Art 102 of RPC for an ER to be
subsidiarily liable for EEs civil liability in criminal action:
1) ER is engaged in any kind of industry;
2) EE committed the offense in the discharge of his
duties; and
3) he is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil
liability.
The subsidiary civil liability of the employer, however,
arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal
case.
The enforcement of the employer's subsidiary civil liability
may be conveniently litigated within the same proceeding because
the execution of the judgment is a logical and integral part of the
case itself. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to
the rival claims of the contending parties. It was created not to
hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice." In proceedings to apply justice, it is the duty of the courts
"to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination" of their rival claims.
Baza Marketing Corp v Bolinao Security (1982) Baza
Marketing leased a part of the building of Chamber of Commerce.
CC signed a contract of security with the respondent. Fajarillo was
designated as guard in the premises of CC. One day, F conspired
with Secreto, 16-year-old outsider to steal office equipments from
Basa worth P5,440. F was convicted with robbery. The writ of
execution was unsatisfied, so a subsidiary writ was filed. Whether
Bolinao w/c furnished guards for CC Building, wherein Basa is one
of the tenants, is subsidiarily liable for the civil liability imposed on
one of its security guards, as proven that he is insolvent.
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may only arise
if the employee commits the crime of which he was found
guilty in line or in pursuance of the discharge of his
assigned duties. An employer will be held responsible for any

misdeed that his employee could have done while performing his
assigned tasks. The statutory limitation that the crime of the
employee must have been committed "in the discharge of
his duties" is clearly intended to exclude crimes not related
to the performance of the duties assigned to him by his
employer. It is not correct to say that the employer's subsidiary
liability will be imposed even when the act is not done in pursuance
of the duties of the employee, the act of stealing not being included
in an employee's assigned tasks: nor would an employer ever
include among the duties of his employee the commission of a
crime.
Clemente v Foreign Mission Sisters (CA)
Connel Bros v Aduna (1952) Aduna was a driver of Ex-Meralco
EEs Transportation Company. He bumped the car of Connel Bros
Company and fell into the canal, where Boomer and Nichol were
passengers and sustained injuries. A separate civil action for
damages was filed against Aduna. Aduna was convicted with
damage to property & serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence. Ex-Meralco presented evidence of their exercise of
due diligence of good family in selecting and supervising its EEs.
Art 1902-1903 CC. Liability of Ex-Meralco only subsidiary.
Every civil obligation arising from a crime or misdemeanor is to be
governed by the provisions of the penal code, then, inasmuch as all
acts or omissions causing damage to another as a result of one's
fault or negligence are punishable by law.
The remedy provided by the penal code for the recovery of
damages by the party damaged is more burdensome and difficult,
particularly in the amount or extent of proof to establish his
rights to damages, because to establish the guilt of the offender
guilty of negligence, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
required, whereas in a purely civil action to recover the same
damages under Arts. 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code, only
preponderance of the evidence is required. So, the court in that
case held that the offended party seeking damages has the
right to choose between a criminal action and a civil suit.
Jamelo v Serfino (1972) Regoles was driving a truck of Serfino
with his co-EE Jamelo collided with a parked track. Jamelo died.
Jamelo sued for damages. The writ of execution was unsatisfied. A
motion of subsidiary liability to the owner was filed. S was adjuded
liable for 8k. S claims that there being no judgment in a criminal
case filed against the driver Regoles, S is not subsidiarily liable.
A subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon

his driver's criminal negligence which is a proper issue to be tried
and decided only in a criminal action." There can be no automatic
subsidiary liability of defendant-ER under Article 103 RPC
where his employee has not been previously criminally
convicted. Criminal conviction of EE is a condition sine qua
non under RPC. The plaintiff in case at bar filed an independent
civil action for damages solely against the erring driver Antonio
Regoles based on his criminal negligence resulting in the death of
plaintiff's son and secured the P8,000.00 damage judgment against
him alone, which she could not collect, however, due to his
insolvency. Such civil judgment is enforceable solely and
exclusively against the only defendant, ER Regoles.
Phil Rabbit Bus Lines v People (2004) Roman was convicted
of reckless imprudence.
Art 102, 103 RPC. Civil actions in Art 32-34 and Art 2176 CC.
shall remain "separate, distinct and independent" of any criminal
prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct
consequences of such revision and omission:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil
Code need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since
they are not deemed included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate
civil action arising from the crime charged does not
extinguish the right to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover
more than once for the same act or omission.
What is deemed instituted in every criminal
prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or
delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those
liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasicontracts. ERs are not parties to the criminal cases instituted
against their employees. Although in substance and in effect, they
have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of
their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to
the extent of supplying the latters lawyers, as in the present case,
the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can
only defend the accused.
Conviction of EE binds ER subsidiarily. The subsidiary liability
of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil
liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the
latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then

the formers subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately
enforceable.
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a
criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final
judgment rendered by a competent court. The resolution of these
issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But the
determination must be based on the evidence that the offended
party and the employer may fully and freely present. In a hearing
set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as
part of the proceedings for the execution of the judgment.
Joaquin v Ancieto (1964) Pilar Joaquin, on the sidewalk, was hit
by Aniceto while driving the taxi of Rodelas. A was found guilty of
serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. J reserved the
right to file a separate civil action for damages. J sued for damages
against the driver and owner pending criminal case. May an EEs
primary civil liability for crime and his ERs subsidiary liability
therefor be proved in a separate civil action even while the criminal
case against EE is still pending?
See Pajarito v Senerix for the 3 requisites for an ER to be
held subsidiarily liable. Without the conviction of the employee, the
employer cannot be subsidiarily liable. Any action brought against
him before such is premature. Art 33 RPC only applies to an action
against EE on his primary civil liability. Conviction is a condition sine
qua non for the ERs subsidiary liability. In cases of negligence, the
injured party or his heirs has the choice, between an action to
enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-delict under Articles
2176-2194 of the Civil Code.
De los Santos v Tan Khey (CA)
Steinmetz v Valdez p 249
US v Baggay (1911) Many people was gathered in Baggays
house for a song service buni, Tingguian custom. Baggay, without
provocation suddenly attacked a woman, Bil-liingan with a bolo and
wounded her head and also inflicted wounds to 5 other women
including her mother. He was declared exempt from criminal
liability because of insanity but was obligated to indemnify heirs of
murdered woman, 1k.
Civil liability accompanies criminal liability, because every
person liable criminally for a crime or misdemeanor is also liable for
reparation of damage and for indemnification of the harm done, but
there may be civil liability because of acts ordinarily punishable,

although the law has declared their perpetrators exempt from
criminal liability. Such is the case of a lunatic or insane person
who, in spite of his irresponsibility on account of the deplorable
condition of his deranged mind, is still reasonably and justly liable
with his property for the consequences of his acts, even though
they be performed unwittingly, for the reason that his fellows
ought not to suffer for the disastrous results of his harmful
acts more than is necessary, in spite of his unfortunate
condition.
Even when they hold the accused exempt from criminal
liability, must fix the civil liability of the persons charged with
watching over and caring for him (guardians) or the liability of the
demented person himself with his property for reparation of the
damage and indemnification for the harm done, unless the
offended party or the heirs of the person murdered expressly
renounce such reparation or indemnification.
Teleria v Garcia (CA) p 250
Generoso v Univesal Textile Mills (1980) Marcelo Generoso,
working in the weaving department in Universal Textile, was
stabbed to death by co-EE, Lebantino while L was performing his
duties. L was convicted for homicide and sentenced to pay 6k. L
was unable to pay. Heirs of G received from the company P5,269.36
as workmens compensation (WC). Is the ER who already paid WC
to heirs of an EE, who was killed by his co-EE, is still liable to pay to
the same heirs the subsidiary civil liability under Art 103 of RPC.
Sections 5 and 6 of the Workmen's Compensation Law and
articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code are statutes in pari
materia. They should be construed together.
In view of the textile corporation's payment of workmen's
compensation, its obligation to pay, in a subsidiary capacity (or in
default of the killer), the civil indemnity adjudged against him in
the criminal case, was extinguished. The instant case is an
exception to the rule in article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Their
remedies were alternative and could not be claimed simultaneously.
Having opted for workmen's compensation, they are bound by that
election of remedy and are estopped to claim other remedies. The
injured employee who sustains a compensable personal injury has
the option:
1. to claim workmen's compensation or
2. to sue for damages the person responsible for the personal
injury.

Having paid workmen's compensation, the employer is
subrogated ipso jure to the right of the heirs to claim civil liability
from the author of the homicide. Instead of being liable for the
indemnity, the employer, as subrogee, is entitled to recover it from
the convicted killer of the employee. Any excess in the recovery
would be paid by the ER to the injured EE or any other person
entitled thereto, after deduction of the expenses of the ER and the
costs of the proceedings.
Miranda v Malate Garage (1956) A collision occurred between
Miranda, owner of Studebaker car and Ramos, driver of Malate
Garage. R plead guilty and was sentenced to pay P2,318.40. Malate
was ordered to pay the indemnity. M admitted to be Rs ER but
denied other allegations. In allowing the case to be submitted for
decision. In allowing the case to be submitted for decision w/o
giving said defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the plaintiff
regarding his claim for damages because such claim was never
admitted as in fact denied when its answer it stated that it did not
have sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the
truth thereof.
The decision in criminal case is binding and
conclusive upon the defendant not only with regard to its
civil liability but also with regard to its amount because the
liability of an ER cannot be separated but follows that of his
EE. That is why the law says that his liability is subsidiary. To allow
to dispute the civil liability fixed in the criminal case would be to
amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent
court.
While strictly speaking, an ER is not a party to the criminal
case instituted against his EE, it is his concern, as well as of his EE,
to see to it that his interest be protected in the criminal case by
taking virtual participation in the defense of his EE. If because of his
indifference or inaction the EE is convicted and damages are
awarded against him, he cannot later be heard to complain, if
brought to court for the enforcement of his subsidiary liability, that
he was not given his day in court.
Bantoto v Bobis (1966) Vallejo owner of jeep, driven by Bobis
struck 3 year old girl, daughter of Bantoto. The young girl died
because of serious injuries. Bobis pleaded guilty to homicide thru
reckless imprudence. Bantoto filed a motion to declared also the
owner solidary responsible for damages civil indemnity, moral and
exemplary damages. Bobis was insolvent.
Exemplary damages improper. No such damages were

imposed on the driver, and the master, as person
subsidiarily liable, cannot incur greater civil liability than
his convicted employee, any more than a guarantor can be
held responsible more than the principal debtor. (Art 2064)
In Art 103, insolvency of servant not mentioned. Such
insolvency is required only when the liability of the master is being
made effective by execution levy, but not for the rendition of
judgment against the master. The subsidiary character of the
employer's responsibility merely imports that the latter's property
is not be seized without first exhausting that of the servant. And by
analogy to a regular guarantor (who is the prototype of persons
subsidiarily responsible), the master may not demand prior
exhaustion of the servant's (principal obligor's) properties if he can
not "point out to the creditor available property of the debtor within
Philippine territory, sufficient to cover the amount of the debt" (Cf.
Civil Code, Article 1060). This rule is logical, for as between the
offended party (as creditor) and the culprit's master or employer, it
is the latter who is in a better position to determine the resources
and solvency of the servant or employee.
Ramirez v Yatco (1963) The Oldsmobile car by Bulkley, Dunton
Paper Co disappeared and was seized from Ramirez which he
allegedly bought from Barach Motor. Reyes was sued for qualified
theft. ISSUE:
Art 105 RPC. Said article provides that the restitution of the
thing itself shall be made by the court whenever possible, even
though it b e found in the possession of a third person who has
acquired it by lawful means, saving only to the latter the action he
may have against the proper person who may be held liable to him.
The only exception is when the thing has been acquired by a third
person in a manner which bars its recovery. In case at bar, there is
no claim that petitioner falls within the exception.
Session 18 Art 29-35, 2177; RR of Crim Pro, Rule 111, Sec
1-5, Cases 328-348
Barredo v Garcia and Almario (1942) Garcia, 16 year old died
while riding a carretela when it collided with a taxi driven by
Fontanilla. F convicted in criminal case, parents of victim filed a
right to reserved a separate civil action. Parents sued owner of taxi,
Barredo as ER for damages. F is negligent for the mishap because
he was driving on the wrong side of the road at high speed. B

claims that his liability is only subsidiary under RPC, he cannot be
liable because F was not included as defendant.
A quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from delict or
crime. Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit article
1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of
employers may be safely anchored.
The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil
liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual
under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal
Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code
are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are
only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the
criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of
indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the
former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly
covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts
in which "any king of fault or negligence intervenes."
However, it should be noted that not all violations of the
penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in
contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws,
infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt.
The title upon which the action for reparation is based
cannot be confused with the civil responsibilities born of a crime,
because there exists in the latter, whatever each nature, a culpa
surrounded with aggravating aspects which give rise to penal
measures that are more or less severe. The injury caused by a
felony or misdemeanor upon civil rights requires restitutions,
reparations, or indemnifications which, like the penalty itself, affect
public order; for this reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the
office of the prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by this
means the losses and damages are repaired, the injured party no
longer desires to seek another relief; but this coincidence of effects
does not eliminate the peculiar nature of civil actions to ask for
indemnity.
The action can be brought directly against the person
responsible (for another), without including the author of
the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the
sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act
committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the
sense that it cannot be instituted till after the judgment
against the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary
to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of the
employer) is in itself a principal action. 2 jurisdictions had
taken cognizance of the same act in its different aspects.
Art 365 RPC punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay
in damages.
To hold that there is only one way to make defendant's
liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the
latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the
plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining
relief. RATIONALE: to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the
procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of
delay.
Art 2180: to protect society. It is the masters or
employers who principally reap the profits resulting from
the services of these servants and employees. It is but right
that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the
personnel and patrimonial safety of others. Before third persons
the employer and employee become as one personality by
the merging of the person of the employee in that of him
who employs and utilizes him.
Chan v Yatco (1958) Phil Rabbits bus collided with parked
truck. 2 helpers & driver of truck was injured. In the bus, 8 died, 20
passenger injured. The cargo of truck was also damaged (sacks of
clean rice and tiqui-tiqui) Petitioner, owner of truck filed a suit for
damages in truck, cargo and consequential losses, salaries of EEs
during incapacity. The civil case was suspended pending judgment
of criminal case previously filed.
The civil action for damages could be based on quasi-delict,
which is different and independent from civil liability arising out of
criminal negligence under RPC. It is an independent judicial
institution separate from civil liability arising from crime.

Such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Padua v Robles (1975) Taxi driven by Punzalan, owned by
Robles hit a 10-year old son of petitioners. The child was dragged
by 40m. Paduas sued for damages and fiscal also charged Punzalan
with homicide thru reckless imprudence. Civil Case, Punzalan was
ordered to pay, in crim case, he was also convicted but civil liability
already assessed in civil case. Paduas was unable to collect from
Punzalan so Padua filed a motion to enforce subsidiary liability
against Robles, ER. Does the crim case include civil liability?
Civil liability coexists with criminal responsibility. In
negligence cases the offended party (or his heirs) has the option
between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa
criminal under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action
for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under article
2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability
based on culpa criminal section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
deems simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless
expressly waived or reserved for a separate application by the
offended party. Article 2177 of the Civil Code, however, precludes
recovery of damages twice for the same negligent act or omission.
Allowance of the application of subsidiary liability involves
no violation of the proscription against double recovery of damages
for the same negligent act or omission. Article 2177 of the Civil
Code forbids actual double recovery of damages for the same
negligent act or omission.
Ace Haulers Corp v CA (2000) Truck, driver De la Cruz, owner
Ace Hauler; Jeep driver Parma, owner Rivera. A motorcycle, Abiva
driving was dragged by jeep towards the truck. The truck ran over
the motorcycle and Abiva died. A criminal case was filed against De
la Cruz and Parma while pending civil case. Ace and De la Cruz filed
a motion to dismiss while criminal case is pending invoking that
filing of independent civil action arising from quasi-delict is no
longer allowed and civil aspect is already included with criminal
case.
A separate civil action for damages lies against the offender
in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and
found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality
only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in
the two cases vary. In case at bar, it has not been shown that
Abivas wife has recovered on the award in the criminal case,
consequently, she can unquestionably recover from petitioner in

the civil case.
Safeguard Sec Inc v Tangco (2006) Tangco went to a Ecology
Bank to renew her time deposit. She was also a licensed to carry
firearms. She deposited it to the security guard, Pajarillo. P
suddenly shot T in her abdomen with his service shotgun. T
instantly died. Her husband filed a criminal case of homicide and
reserved right to file a separate civil action in the said criminal
case. He was convicted. A civil case was filed for damages against
Pajarillo and its ER Safeguard for failing to observe due diligence.
Safeguard claims due diligence in selection and supervision and the
act of P was only on self-defense. RTC ordered to pay damages
since P did not report the incident to head office or police the T was
roaming around the area prior to the shooting. RTC: ER solidarily
liable. CA: subsidiary only.
Sec 1, Rule 111 of CrimPro
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two
separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e.,
1. civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code;
2. independent civil liabilities, such as those
a. not arising from an act or omission complained of as
a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising
from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code,
intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa
aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code;
or
b. where the injured party is granted a right to file an
action independent and distinct from the criminal
action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of
these liabilities may be enforced against the offender
subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil
Code that the offended party cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission or under
both causes.
It is important to determine the nature of respondents'
cause of action. The nature of a cause of action is determined by
the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of
action. The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is
to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action,

made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its
allegations and prayer for relief.
"x x x Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence,"
covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words,
the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3,
Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same
act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed
by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of
Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts
which may be punishable by law." (Emphasis supplied)
The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in the
civil case is a quasi-delict not an act or omission punishable by law.
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the
choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from
crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for
quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party
chooses the latter, he may hold the employer solidarily liable for
the negligent act of his employee, subject to the employer's
defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family.
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an
action for damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that
appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file an
independent civil action did not preclude them from
choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict.[20] (Emphasis
supplied)
Parker v Panlilio and PAL (1952) Parker was a passenger in a
PAL plane which exploded in mid-air. P sued for damages of P100k
against PAL for not bringing him safely to Manila. The case was
suspended upon pendency of crim case.
The civil case is based on alleged culpa contractual incurred

by respondent Philippine Air Lines, Inc. because of its failure to
carry safely the late Richard Parker to his place of destination,
whereas the criminal case involves the civil liability of the accused,
who bear no relation whatsoever with said entity, and are complete
strangers to it. Rule 107 contemplates a case where the offended
party desires to press his right to demand indemnity from the
accused in the criminal case or in a separate action. But this
situation does not here obtain.
The failure to reserve the right to institute a separate
civil action in the criminal case would not necessarily
constitute a bar to the institution of the civil action against
respondent, for the cause of action in one is different from
that in the other. These are two independent actions based on
distinct causes of action. Bit in this case, the civil case is directly
interowner with the criminal case in the sense that the main
issue involved in both cases is the determination of the failure
of deceased passenger to reach safely to his destination or the
determination of the cause of his death, RTC correct in suspending
civil case.
Lanuza v Ping (1980) Freight truck owned by Ping, driven by
Mendoza rammed in a residential house and store of Lanuzo. It was
completey razed to ground. L sued for damages against Ping and
Mendoza due to reckless negligence of driver. Defendants filed a
motion to dismiss since a criminal case for damage to property thru
reckless imprudence pending between same parties for same
cause.
The institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of
interrupting the civil action based on quasi-delict. And the separate
civil action for quasi-delict may proceed independently and
regardless of the result of the criminal case, except that a plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or commission of
the defendant.
The civil action referred to in Sections 3(a) and (b) of Rule
111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the
institution of the criminal action, is that arising from delict, and not
the civil action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
But although the employer is solidarity liable with the
employee for damages, the employer may demand reimbursement
from his employee (driver) for whatever amount the employer will
have to pay the offended party to satisfy the latter's claim.

Virata v Ochoa (1978) Virata collided with jeep owned by
Ochoa, driven by Borilla. A criminal case was filed against B. The
heirs of V reserved a right to institute separate civil action. They
filed a civil case for damages based on quasi-delict against O and
B. RTC acquitted B in crim case on the ground of mere accident.
The civil case was also dismissed because of the acquittal.
In negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose
between an action under the Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. What is
prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to
recover twice for the same negligent act.
The extinction of civil liability referred to in Sec 3(e),
Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Art
100 of RPC, whereas the civil liability for the same act
considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that
the criminal act charged has not happended or has not
been committed by the accused.
Marcia v CA (1983) Victory Liner bus was driven by Paje when is
collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia (with 2 passengers
Edgar Marcia and Yap). A crim action of homicide and serious
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed. While Yap and
Marcia filed for damages against Victory and Paje because of
negligence and reckless imprudence. CA acquitted because it was
only a PURE ACCIDENT, NOT even guilty of CIVIL NEGLIGENCE. Civil
case was also dismissed.
Sec 2 Rule 111. However, an acquittal based on the finding
that the facts upon which civil liability did not exist, bars the filing
of an independent civil action if it is based on the crime.
Reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the
three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code. The injuries
suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the result of
criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no
independent civil action for damages may be instituted in
connection therewith.
The essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of
an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. CAs declaration that the mishap was pure
accident are relevant and material evidence.
Manio v Gaddi (1972) Balanza, 16 years old, in charge of a rig
which he drove recklessly, sideswept Guevarra. G died. He pleaded
guilty with homicide thru reckless imprudence. He was ordered P6k

as damages. Manio, widow sued B and ER for damages. CFI
dismissed since P6k as damages is crim case barred civil action
sought by Manio.
Right to file a separate civil suit in culpa acquiliana in spite
of lack of express reservation. The failure to make, in the criminal
case, the reservation reuired in Rule 111, Sec 1, will not bar a
separate civil action for quasi-delict provided that the
injured party has not intervened actually or actively in the
prosecution of said criminal action. Res judicata is not
applicable where there is no identity of parties and civil liability for
tort is different from liability for negligence under RPC.
Andamo v IAC (1990) Andamo owns an adjacent land to the
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc. A filed against the
corporations officer and directors a criminal case under Art 324
RPC and civil case for damages. Issue: Whether a corporation,
which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors
and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and
damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages
under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts
such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the
criminal case. RTC dismissed civil case pending criminal case.
All the elements of a quasi-delict under Art 2176-2177 are
present, to wit:
a. damages suffered by the plaintiff,
b. fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person
for whose acts he must respond; and
c. the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by
the plaintiff. (assertion of such between act of building
waterpaths and damage sustained)
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence",
covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal
in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed,
(if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality
only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in
the two cases vary.

Quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution
under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or
crime. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is
entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of
an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which
the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the extinction of
the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil
liability.
Yakult Phils v CA (1990) Camaso, 5-year old boy was
sideswiped by a motorcycle of Yakult while driven by Salvao. A
criminal case against driver was filed while father of victim filed a
civil case against Yakult and driver. In the civil case, defendants are
solidarily liable. Yakult claimst that the civil case has no jurisdiction
since under Sec 1, Rule 111 of Crim Pro that a separate civil action
may not be filed unless a reservation is expressly made.
Although the incident in question and the actions arising
therefrom were instituted before the promulgation of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure, its provisions which are procedural
may apply retrospectively to the present case.
In this case, the offended party has not waived the civil
action, nor reserved the right to institute it separately. Neither has
the offended party instituted the civil action prior to the criminal
action. However, the civil action in this case was filed in court
before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution in the
criminal action of which the judge presiding on the criminal case
was duly informed, so that in the disposition of the criminal action
no damages was awarded.
The aforecited revised rule requiring such previous
reservation also covers quasi-delict as defined under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission of the
accused.
Although the separate civil action filed in this case was
without previous reservation in the criminal case, nevertheless
since it was instituted before the prosecution presented evidence in
the criminal action, and the judge handling the criminal case was
informed thereof, then the actual filing of the civil action is even far
better than a compliance with the requirement of an express
reservation that should be made by the offended party before the
prosecution presents its evidence.
The purpose of this rule requiring reservation is to prevent
the offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act
or omission.
Mendoza v Arrieta (1979) 3 way accident. Jeep tried to

overtake truck but was stopped at intersection but while still in a
stop position, truck bumped it at the back. Jeep was then swerved
to the Benz and Salazar in the jeep was thrown. Benz owned and
driven by Mendoza sued Salazar, owner and driver of jeep. Salazar
in turn sued driver Montoya of gravel truck. Montoya was convicted
of damage to property thru reckless imprudence + fire and actual
damages. While between Mendoza and Salazar, S was acquitted.
The owner of a car which was bumped by a jeep after the
latter was bumped from behind by a truck may still file an civil
action for damages against the truck driver and the jeepney driver,
in the case filed by the car owner was acquitted in the criminal
case for negligence filed by the car owner against the jeepney
owner. There is no identity of cause of action between the
civil case in question and the criminal case against the
truck driver for damage to jeep.
Failure to make a reservation in the criminal action
for negligence of the right to file an independent civil
action does not amend the substantive provision of Art 31
CC on quasi-delict.
Art 2176-2177 CC creates a civil liability distinct from
the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under
RPC. No reservation need be made in criminal case.
Escutea v Fandialan (1974) July 2, 1952, Fandialan inflicted
physical injuries against Escueta. F was convicted of slight physical
injuries, E reserved right to file a separate civil action. The civil
case filed based on Art 100 of RPC was dismissed for lack of
interest. The civil case was refilled after 16 years, July 5, 1968. F
claims action is not barred by prescription since only 4 years can a
quasi-delict be filed under Art 1146(1).
Plaintiff's (offended party) civil action for recovery of civil
liability and damages from defendant (accused) would have been
implicitly instituted with the criminal action, but plaintiff expressly
reserved his right to institute the civil action separately. Under
Article 33 of the Civil Code, even without such reservation, he could
prosecute his civil action for damages from the physical injuries
separately and independently of the criminal action and would
require only a preponderance of evidence to support his action.
Such separate and independent civil action under the cited codal
article proceeds to trial and final judgment irrespective of the result
of the criminal action.

Prescriptive period of 4 years under Art 1146(1) applies not
Art 1144(3) which provides 10 years for actions based upon a
judgment. No civil liability was adjudged in the criminal case since
plaintiff expressly reserved the right of filing a separate civil action.
Hence, he had no standing in the criminal action as an offended
party and the verdict of conviction excluded any civil liability. As in
other-civil actions where judgment has obtained, the action to
enforce the judgment would prescribe only after ten years, with the
judgment being enforceable by mere motion within the first five
years.
Tactaquin v Palileo (Sept 1967) Tactaqun filed to recover
damages for the death of her daughter when she was hit by Palileo
while it was driving recklessly. P filed a motion to dismiss being
barred by final judgment in criminal case convicting him of
homicide and serious physical injuries for the same accident. He
was also sentence to pay in crim case that pay offended party 4k.
"the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same
act or omission of the defendant" (Emphasis supplied). In the case
at bar, it is crystal clear that any civil liability contracted by
appellee whether based on quasi-delict or otherwise arose from
exactly the same act or omission, namely, his reckless manner of
driving which resulted in serious physical injuries to appellant, and
in the death of her daughter. For this same act or omission
appellant cannot recover twice.
The reservation was made after appelee had already
pleaded guilty. Such must be deemed legally ineffective.
Jocson v Glorioso (1968) 2 actions was filed for death of 3-year
old boy who was run over by a jeep. (1) civil case against owner
and driver for culpa acquilina, (2) criminal action for homicide thru
reckless imprudence. Civil case was dismissed, cannot hold driver
guilty of negligence, but crim case, driver was convicted and
ordered to pay 6k as indemnity. The writ of execution was
unsatisfied. An action to enforce against owner was filed. Owner
claims barred by prior judgment in civil case. Whether the previous
dismissal of an action based on culpa aquiliana precludes the
application of the plain and explicit command of Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code?
The enforcement does not concern the identity of reliefs
prayed for. The negligent act committed by defendant's employee
is not a quasi crime, for such negligence is punished by law.
To deprive them now of this remedy, after the conviction of
defendant's employee, would be to deprive them altogether of the
indemnity to which they are entitled by law and by a court decision,

which injustice it is our duty to prevent." On the same principle
then, the previous dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana
could not be a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability
required by Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
What clearly emerges then is the controlling force of the
principle that once there is a conviction for a felony, final in
character, the employer, according to the plain and explicit
command of Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, is subsidiarily
liable, if it be shown that the commission thereof was in the
discharge of the duties of such employee.
PNB v Catipon (1956) Catipon was charged by estafa for having
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the merchandise
covered by trust receipt which prejudiced PNB. C was acquitted.
PNB sued to recover value of goods. C ordered to pay. Does the
acquittal in crim case bar the institution of present civil action,
because bank did not reserve in crim case the right to separately
enforce the civil liability against him?
The acquittal is predicated on the conclusion that the guilt
of the defendant has not been satisfactorily established. The
acquittal being equivalent to reasonable doubt, does not preclude a
suit to enforce the civil liability for the same act or omission, under
Art 29 CC; it does not finally determine nor expressly declare that
the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist.
The declaration in the decision of acquittal to the effect that
if any responsibility was incurred by the accused that is civil in
nature and not criminal amounts to a reservation of the civil action
in favour of offended party.
The appellant executed the trust receipt, he is liable ex
contractu for its breach.
Albornoz v Albornoz (1956) Racela filed 2 claims against
estate of Soriano. R claims that S was supposed to sell properties to
R evidenced by 2 deeds of sale. However, S sold the same to
Ballesteros and registered the deed of sale. R filed crim case for
estafa. S was acquitted. Civil case filed but was dismissed stating
that the claim on both case is founded on same deed of sale and
acquittal in crim case produced the effect of exemption of her
estate from any civil liability.
RTC found that S did not sell any land to R and the deeds of
sale were executed in order to enable R to convince the residents
of the barrio that decedent could freely dispose of his properties.
They were therefor simulated sales.

The judgment of acquittal amount to a judicial declaration
that the basis of claimants action, or sales of said parcels of land to
the claimant did not exists. His action is barred under Sec 2(d),
Rule 107. (d) Extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds

from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil might arise did not exist. It is unnecessary to
consider the claim of the claimant-appellant that he had
submitted sufficient evidence to sustain defendant's liability.
Tan v Standard Oil Co (1952) Standard delivered to Rural
Transit gallons of gasoline contained in a gasoline tank-truck trailer.
While the gasoline was being discharged to underground tank, it
caught fire, the driver, Sto Domingo, helper Rico, took the truck in
the middle of the road, and abandoned it. The cause of its moving
in the opposite side of street caused buildings on that to be burned
ad destroyed. Tans house was also destroyed. Sto Domingo and
Rico was charged with arson thru reckless imprudence, but
acquitted because the fire was due to an unfortunate accident. Tan
then sued Standard and rural including SD and R a civil case for
damages.
Rule 107, section 1(d) means that the acquittal of the
accused from the criminal charge will not necessarily extinguish the
civil liability unless the court declares in the judgment that the fact
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Where the
court states that the evidence throws no light on the causes of fire
and that it was an unfortunate accident for which the accused
cannot be held responsible, this declaration fits well into the
exception of the rule which exempts the accused from civil liability.
The principle of res judicata cannot apply to them for the
simple reason that they were not included as co-accused in the
criminal case. Not having been included in the criminal case they
cannot enjoy the benefit resulting from the acquittal of the
accused. This benefit can only be claimed by the accused if a
subsequent action is later taken against them under the Revised
Penal Code. And this action can only be maintained if proper
reservation is made and there is no express declaration that the
basis of the civil action has not existed.
The act of driver is to avoid greater evil or harm. It cannot
be denied that this company is one of those for whose benefit a
greater harm has been prevented, and as such it comes within the
purview of said penal provision. The acquittal of the accused
cannot, therefore, be deemed a bar to a civil action against this
company because its civil liability is completely divorced from the

criminal liability of the accused. The rule regarding reservation of
the right to file a separate civil action does not apply to it.
Salta v de Veyra (1982) Salta, manager of PNB Malolos,
recommended the granting of loans in violation of the bank rules
fraud and negligence w/c resulted in losses by bank. PNB filed 2
civil cases and also a crim case for violation of anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Crim case was dismissed. 1 civil case also
dismissed because of such but 1 was not.
The motion to dismiss must be denied for the reason that
acquittal in criminal case will not be an obstacle for the civil case to
prosper unless in the criminal case the Courts makes a finding that
even civilly the accused would not be held liable there is no such
finding. In civil cases evidence only requires a preponderance,
unlike beyond reasonable doubt which is the requisite in criminal
case.
Purpose of law in allowing a civil case related to criminal
case to be filed separately and to proceed independently even
during pendency of the latter case. This must be so because the
offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a nature, unlike other
offenses not mentioned, that they may be made the subject of a
separate civil action because of the distinct separability of their
respective juridical cause or basis of action.
The wisdom of the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil
Code is to be found in the fact that when the civil action is reserved
to be filed separately, the criminal case is prosecuted by the
prosecuting officer alone without intervention from a private
counsel representing the interest of the offended party.
Manliclic and Phil Rabbit v Calaunan (2007) Jeep owned by
Calaunan, driven by Mendoza collided with PRBLI bus driven by
Manliclic. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the
rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the shoulder
on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further
extensive damage. Calaunan sustained injuries. Criminal case was
filed against Manlilic. Calanuan filed for damages against PRBLI and
Manliclic. PRBLI claims due diligence. CA acquitted Manliclic. Can
Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent
notwithstanding the declaration of the CA that there was an
absence of negligence on his part?
From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it
appears that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable
doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author of the act

complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held
liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted section applies only to a
civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil
action arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of
civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now
Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas
the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or
has not been committed by the accused.
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or
crime. In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on
reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from the
crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not
the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil
liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance,
there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based
thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if
any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained
of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it
be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the
author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from
fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant
in the civil case based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
Abellana v Marave (1974) Felix Abellana (FA) was convicted by
TC of physical injrueis thru reckless imprudence. Because FA while
driving atruck hit a pedicab with its 3 passengers sustaining
injuries. He was ordered to pay victims, 6k. He appealed in CA.
Then respondents filed a separate civil action against FA and
Clemente Abellana as ER of FA. They filed a motion to dismiss since

respondents did not reserved their right to file a separate case. And
the civil case was only filed when crim case was already on appeal.
The offended party in a criminal case has the remedy of
pursuing an independnent civil action, although he has not made
any reservation therefor in the city court where the action was
begun, if the case us appealed to the CFI where the trial de novo is
required by the Rules. The rule in this jurisdiction is that upon
appeal by the defendant from a judgment of conviction by the
municipal court, the appealed decision is vacated and the appealed
case shall be tried in all respects anew in the CFI as if it has been
originally instituted in that court. So it is in civil cases under Sec 4
of Rule 40.
The right to initiate a civil action apart from the
criminal case is substantive. The grant of power to this
Court, does not extend to any diminution, increase or
modification of substantive right.
Santos v Pizarro (2005) Viron Transit driven by Sibayan
collided woth Lite Ace Van. In the van, 3 died including 2-month old
baby and 5 were injured. S was convicted with Reckless
Imprudence resulting to multiple homicide and multiple physical
injuries but reserved to file a separate civil action. Filed for
damages against S, Viron Transit and its President, Rondaris. Viron
filed a motion to dismiss alleging that action based on quasi-delict
prescribed after 4 years from accrual of cause of action. It also
alleges that cannot be held subsidiary liable since S was not
ordered to pay damages in criminal case.
Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Such civil liability
may consist of restitution, reparation of the damage caused and
indemnification of consequential damages. When a criminal action
is instituted, the civil liability arising from the offense is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, subject to three notable
exceptions:
1. when the injured party expressly waives the right to recover
damages from the accused;
2. when the offended party reserves his right to have the civil
damages determined in a separate action in order to take
full control and direction of the prosecution of his cause; and
3. when the injured party actually exercises the right to
maintain a private suit against the offender by instituting a
civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case.
Sec 1, Rule 111. See Safeguard Security case.

At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this
case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed.
Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened
for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex
delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi
delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil
liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been
expressly reserved.
Dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar
to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the employer. Once
there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer
becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime was in
the discharge of the duties of the employees. This is so because
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code operates with controlling
force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being
deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment
convicting the employee.
This does not offend the policy that the reservation or
institution of a separate civil action waives the other civil actions.
The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits
between the same litigants arising out of the same act or omission
of the offender. However, since the stale action for damages based
on quasi delict should be considered waived, there is no more
occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits against private
respondents as the only recourse available to them is to pursue
damages ex delicto. This interpretation is also consistent with the
bar against double recovery for obvious reasons. Such procedural
misstep, however, should be exempted from the strict application
of the rules in order to promote their fundamental objective of
securing substantial justice.
Session 19 Art 19-35, 2187, Reading on Product Liability,
Cases 53, 69 (380 scra 467), 349-368
Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v Reyes (2005) party gatecrasher
in the birthday party of the President of Nikko Hotel in its
penthouse. WON Lim, general manager, acted abusively in asking
Reyes, to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant
and thereby become liable under Art 19 and 21 CC.
A person who did not abuse her right in asking a person in
leave a party to which he was not invited cannot bemade to pay for
damages under Art 19 and 21 CC.
Art 19 Principle of Abuse of Rights. when a right is

exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible. The rationale of this article is to set certain standards
which must be observed:
1. not only in the exercise of ones rights
2. but also in the performance of ones duties.
a. act with justice,
b. give everyone his due and
c. observe honesty and good faith.
Its elements are:
1) There is a legal right or duty;
2) exercised in bad faith;
3) sole intent: prejudicing or injuring another.
4) must be INTENTIONAL
When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper
under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code.
Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of
law which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within
her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave.
Art 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the
following elements:
1) an act which is legal;
2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public
order, or public policy; and
3) it is done with intent to injure
4) must be INTENTIONAL
A complaint based on Art 19 and 21 CC must necessarily fail
if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.
Bad judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount
to bad faith. The cause of action was predicated upon mere
rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not
only protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity.
Ramos v CA (2002) A surgeons irresponsible conduct of
arriving very late for a scheduled operation is violative, not only his
duty as a physician but also of Art 19 CC which requires a person,
in the performance of his duties, to act with justice and give
everyone his due.
Velayo v Shell Co (1956) Shell was one of the principal
creditors of CALI. Taking advantage of its knowledge that voluntary

insolvency proceedings will be instituted by CALI if the creditors
would not agree on the manner of its distributing its assets among
the creditors. So, it transferred its credit to a sister corporation in
US. Its sister corporation immediately filed an action in California
and the court attached the plane in California. Velayo became the
assignee of CALI and filed an action against CALI of the transferring
of credit.
A creditors transfer of credit to another without knowledge
of other creditors of insolvent enable the transferor to collect
almost if not the entire amount of credit, but it cannot be
countenance such attitude, and much less from a foreign
corporation to the detriment of the Government and local business.
A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute
a violation of a statute law, should be compensated by
damages.
PNB v CA (1978) Tapnio was granted a crop loan of 2k from PNB.
He secured it with a mortgage on standing crop including her sugar
quota allocation. T was not able to harvest enough to cover her
sugar quota allocation, so she leased to Tuazon at P2.50 per picul
subject to the approval of PNB as a requirement in their mortgage
contract. PNBs Board of Directors required to raise it to P3. T
however said that he was no longer interested. Tapnio lost P2,800
because of PNBs unreasonable price requirement. She failed to pay
the loan and PNB sued her.
PNBs approval may be required, but the latter certainly
cannot escape its responsibility of observing, for the protection of
the interest of private respondents, that degree of care, precaution
and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand in approving
or disapproving the lease of said sugar quota. Art 19. Certainly, it
knew that the agricultural year was about to expire, that by its
disapproval of the lease private respondents would be unable to
utilize the sugar quota in question. Petitioner is consequently liable
for the damages caused on private respondents. Art 21. The aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the
concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate
legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which
is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in
the statutes.
A corporation is civilly liable in the same manner as
natural persons for torts. A principal or master is liable for every
tort which he expressly directs or authorizes, and this is just as true
of a corporation as of a natural person. A corporation is liable,
therefore, whenever a tortious act is committed by an
officer or agent under express direction or authority from

the stockholders or members acting as a body, or,
generally, from the directors as the governing body."
Manila Gas Corp v CA (1980) Ongsip applied for installation of
gas service connection for his residence. Additional gas was
installed for his 46-door apartment in the same compound.
However, there was no significant increase in his meter reading.
Petitioner then filed a complaint for qualified theft and
disconnected its gas service without prior notice.
Petitioner's act in disconnecting respondent Ongsip's gas
service without prior notice constitutes breach of contract
amounting to an independent tort. The prematurity of the action
is indicative of an intent to cause additional mental and
moral suffering to private respondent. A clear violation of
Article 21 CC. Article 2219 (10) of the Code. Article 2220: Moral
damages. Moral: 15k. Exemplary 5 + attorneys fees. The same
rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Non-payment of gas bill for 3 months cannot be used to
justify disconnection without prior notice. Apparently, such
misconduct or omission of petitioner formed part of a malevolent
scheme to harass and humiliate respondent, exposing him to
further ignominy and greater mental torture.
Grand Union Supermarket v Espino (1979) Espino with his
family were shopping in a supermarket in Makati and he forgot to
pay a merchandise that he placed in his pocket shirt with its good
part showing. It was worth 3.85. His wife paid P77 for the
merchandise bought. The guard called his attention and took the
product and publicly announced that he was a shoplifter. He was
mechanical engr. and P&G executive and occupied positions in the
government and business community.
The false accusation charged against the private respondent
after detaining and interrogating him by the uniformed guards and
the mode and manner in which he was subjected, shouting at him,
imposing upon him a fine, threatening to call the police and in the
presence and hearing of many people at the Supermarket which
brought and caused him humiliation and embarrassment,
sufficiently rendered the petitioners liable for damages under
Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Art
26. Moral 5k, attorneys fees 3k.

Petrophil Corp v CA (2001) Petrophil contracted with Dr. Cruz
for Cruz to haul and transport any packages and bulk products of
Petrophil. P can terminate the contract anytime and if there is
breach or inadequate performance. P terminated the contract. A
complaint was filed by Dr. Cruz alleging that it was unjustified and P
only acted such as a retaliation for sympathizing with its striking
Petrophil EEs. It was intended to silence her. All tank truck drivers
of Dr. Cruz filed a complaint for damages against Petrophil officers.
Article 20 of the Civil Code: every person who, contrary to
law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the damage done. Petitioner might not
have deliberately intended to injure the respondent-drivers. But as
a consequence of its willful act directed against Dr. Cruz,
respondent-drivers lost their jobs and, consequently suffered loss of
income. Under Article 20, there is no requirement that the act
must be directed at a specific person, but it suffices that a
person suffers damage as a consequence of a wrongful act
of another in order that indemnity could be demanded from
the wrongdoer.
Cebu Country Club Inc v Elizagaque (2008) Cebu Country
Club Inc (CCCI) is a domestic corp operates as a non-profit and nonstock private membership club. SMC was a special proprietary
member of CCCI. E filed an application for proprietary membership.
It was indorsed by 2 members. CCCI president offered to sell a
share for 3.5M (5M as regular price). But E purchased share of Dr.
Butalid for 3M. CCCI issued Proprietary Ownership Certificate to E.
Es application was denied. CCCI did not reply thrice for his motion
for reconsideration. E filed a complaint for damages against CCCI.
CCCI claims that to approve proprietary seat all members of the
Board must agree. However, in this case, 1 disagreed. SC: such rule
was not printed on the application form.
CCCI, Board of directors has a right to approve or disapprove
an application for proprietary membership, but such right should
not be exercised arbitrarily. Art 19 correlated with Art 21: The law,
therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in
their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19
must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible.
The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must

nonetheless be in accordance with the proper norm. When the
right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. CCCIs disapproval is
characterized by bad faith.
Damnun absque injuria does not apply when there is
an abuse of a persons right.
Pe v Pe (1962) Plaintiffs are parents, brothers and sisters of
Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman, 24 years of age. Defendant, a
married man and frequently visited Lolita to teach her to pray the
rosary. They fell in love and had sexual relations. Lolitas parents
prohibited him to go to their house. But they still had contact and
Lolita disappeared. Defendant was sued. He was a collateral
relative and considered a member of a family.
Defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she
disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion
can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not
only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in
winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit
relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is
indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married
man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as
contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
Tanjanco v CA (1966) Tanjanco courted Araceli Santos, both of
adult age. T professed his undying glove and affection for S which S
reciprocated. Ts promised to marry S, so S consented and acceded
to Ts pleas for carnal knowledge. They regularly had sex for a year.
They conceived a child and to avoid embarrassment, S resigned her
job as secretary in IBM Phils but T was unable to support herself
and her baby. T refused to marry S. Is T liable for moral damages
under Art 21.
Voluntariness and mutual passion is incompatible with idea
of deceit. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is
more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise

of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit,
enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on
the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded.
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient
promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the

promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from
carnal lust and the intercourse from mutual desire, there is
no seduction.
Domingo v Maliwat
Quisaba v Sta Ines-Melale Veneer & Plywood Inc (1974) Q
served respondent for 18 years. Hyde, VP of resp, was instructed to
buy logs for company plant, Q refused alleging it was inconsistent
with his work as internal auditor. Hyde warned Q that failure to do
the instruction will be a ground for dismissal. Q sued damages for
constructive dismissal.
The "right" of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba
should not be confused with the manner in which the right
was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the
dismissal was done anti-socially or oppressively, as the
complaint alleges, then the respondents violated article 1701 of the
Civil Code which prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or
labor against the other, and article 21, which makes a person
liable for damages if he wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy, the sanction for which, by way of moral
damages, is provided in article 2219, no. 10.
Hermosisima v CA (1960) Soledad Cagigas was a teacher while
Hermosisima was 10 years younger. They were lovers and
introduced themselves as engaged even though no promise of
marriage was tackled between them. SC was pregnant, H promised
to marry her. Their son was born but after 7 days, H married
Romanita Perez.
The action for breach of promises to marry has no standing
in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced . . . upon the faith of such promise.
Not morally liable for seduction. Complainant "surrendered
herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him,
she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even
before they had the benefit of clergy."
Wassmer v Velez (1964) Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer
decided to get married and set their wedding on Sept 4, 1954. On
Sept 2, Velez left a note for Wassmer stating that they should
postpone their marriage because her mother opposed to it. But the
next day, he sent a telegram but their marriage will push through.
Velez was not heard of again. W sued for damages.
Art 21. Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to

marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through
all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out
of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good
customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages
in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Castro v Meralco ()
Toledo v Saulog Transit Corp
Equitable Banking Corp v Rural Insurance Surety Co
Heirs of Pedro v Tayag, jr v Alcantara (1980) Tayag Sr was
riding a bicycle when he was bumped and hit by Phil Rabbit Bus
driven by Villa. Tayags heirs sued PLRB for his death. PLRB moved
to suspend the civil action while criminal action on the driver is still
pending. The crim case was dismissed based on reasonable
grounds. Civil action was instituted but PLRC opposed claiming
heirs has no cause of action since driver was acquitted in criminal
action.
Art 31. This refers to civil action based, not on the act or
omission charged as a felony in a criminal case, but one based on
an obligation arising from other sources, like quasi-delict.
All the essential averments for a quasi-delictual action are
present, namely:
1. act or omission constituting fault or negligence on the part
of respondent
2. damage caused by said act or omission
3. direct causal relation between damage and the act or
omission
4. no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.
Lim & taha v Ponce de Leon & Maddela (1975) Taha sold a
boat to Alberto. After a year, A sued T for forcibly taking his boat.
The fiscal (Ponce) filed a case for robbery with force and
intimidation against Taha. The bost was impounded. Upon its
seizure it was exposed to elements that made it worthless and
beyond repair. Are respondents civilly liable for damages to
petitioners suffered by them from the seizure?

No law grants fiscal power to issue search warrants, much
less to order without warrant the seizure of a personal property
even if it was the corpus delicti of the crime.
A person whose constitutional rights have been violated or
impaired is entitled to actual (3k) and moral (1k- illegality of
seizure) damages from the public officers or EE responsible therefor
+ exemplary damages. Attorneys fees (750 for violation of consti
rights).
The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil
or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there should be
malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the
main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of
individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their
powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the
performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is
to put an end to official abuse by the plea of good faith.
Carandang v Santiago and Valenton (1955) V was found
guilty for frustrated homicide against C. While crim case was
pending, C filed for damages. The civil case was suspended upon
motion of V. C claims that Art 33 stated that in cases of defamation,
fraud and physical injuries, separate civil action is allowed.
The term physical injuries in Art 33 is not in the PI
in RPC. It should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the
crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the
latter are general terms.
If the intent has been to establish a civil action for the bodily
harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action for
assault and battery, as the Code Commission states, the civil action
should lie whether the offense committed is that of physical
injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or even
death.
As notice is required where the cause of action is founded
on injury to the person, it has no application when the damages
sought are for the death of the person. The court ruled that a claim
to recover for death resulting from personal injury is as certainly
"founded on injury to the person."
Reyes v Sempio Dy (1986) Cristina Malicsi was charged with
intriguing against honor by Reyes. M pleaded guilty and was fined
with P50. Because of the plea of guilt, R was not able to present
evidence to prove damages, nor did she make reservation to file a
separate civil action for damages. R filed a new civil case for
damages.
mere appearance of a private prosecutor in the criminal

case against the herein private respondents did not necessarily
constitute such intervention on the part of the aggrieved party as
could only import an intention on her part to press her claim for
damages in said criminal case and a waiver of her right to file a
separate civil action for damages. Because the accused had
pleaded guilty upon arraignment and was immediately sentenced,
there was no chance for the aggrieved party to present evidence in
support of her claim for damages and to enter a reservation in the
record to file a separate civil action.
Under Article 33 of the Civil Code there is no requirement
that as a condition to the filing of a separate civil action for
damages a reservation to file said civil action be first made in the
criminal case and such reservation is not necessary, the provision
of Rule 111, Section 2 notwithstanding.
Bernaldes v Bohol Land Transportation (1963) Plaintiffs son
was a passenger of a bus of defendant that fell off a precipe. He
filed for damages for the death of his son. Defendant moved to
dismiss on the ground that its driver was acquitted in the criminal
case on reasonable doubt and that B intervened in prosecution in
criminal case.
Article 31 CC. This provision evidently refers to a civil action
based, not on the act or omission charged as a felony in a criminal
case, but to one based on an obligation arising from other sources,
such as law or contract. Upon the other hand it is clear that a civil
action based on contractual liability of a common carrier is
distinct from the criminal action instituted against the
carrier or its employee based on the latter's criminal
negligence. The first is governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code, and not by those of the Revised Penal Code, and it being
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, the same
may be instituted and prosecuted independently of, and regardless
of the result of the latter.
Appellant's action concerned the civil liability (culpa
contractual) of appellee as a common carrier, regardless of the
liabilities of its driver who was charged in the criminal case. The
failure, on the part of the appellants, to reserve their right
to recover civil indemnity against the carrier can not in any
way be deemed as a waiver, on their part, to institute a
separate action against the latter based on its contractual
liability, or on culpa aquiliana, under Articles 1902-1910 of
the Civil Code. As a matter of fact, such reservation is already
implied in the law which declares such action to be

independent and separate from the criminal action.
Moreover, it has been held that the duty of the offended party to
make such reservation applies only to defendant in the criminal
action, not to persons secondarily liable.

Torts - Session 14-19 Case Doctrines

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Torts and Damages Session 15-19

Session 15 Art 2216-2220, Cases 269-290

in a particular case such an objective has been duly pursued is a

Ventura v Bernabe (1971) V presented to B a letter supposedly

American Home Assurance Co v Chua (1999) Chua procured

In malicious prosecution, the following must be present to

Fores v Miranda (1959) M was one of the passengers of the

Torts and Damages Session 15-19

Zulueta v Pan America (1972) Zulueta spouse and daughter

Torts and Damages Session 15-19

Torts and Damages Session 15-19

the massive diversion of funds to company presidents private

Torts and Damages Session 15-19

Torts and Damages Session 15-19

Psychological incapacity was defined as truly incognitive

Torts and Damages Session 15-19

Session 16 Art 2015, 2208, 2229-2235, 4 Annotations on

if breach was wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith,

Torts and Damages Session 15-19

liability to the punitive portion of the sentence imposed on all

Torts and Damages Session 15-19

offender seem or appear to be of much financial consequence

Torts and Damages Session 15-19

NO moral -Plaintiff-appellant designated the incident as

Torts and Damages Session 15-19

personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to

Torts and Damages Session 15-19

sufficient reimbursement. On the other hand, if a party is

Torts and Damages Session 15-19

award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being

Torts and Damages Session 15-19

EE primarily liable while ER secondarily liable.

That "actual" damages and "consequential damages" are

Torts and Damages Session 15-19

imprudence. Joselito was convicted and ordered to indemnify the

Torts and Damages Session 15-19

A subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon

Torts and Damages Session 15-19

there may be civil liability because of acts ordinarily punishable,

Torts and Damages Session 15-19

Exemplary damages improper. No such damages were

Torts and Damages Session 15-19

Torts and Damages Session 15-19

consequently, she can unquestionably recover from petitioner in

Torts and Damages Session 15-19

The civil case is based on alleged culpa contractual incurred

Torts and Damages Session 15-19

guilty with homicide thru reckless imprudence. He was ordered P6k

Torts and Damages Session 15-19

Mendoza v Arrieta (1979) 3 way accident. Jeep tried to

Torts and Damages Session 15-19

indemnity to which they are entitled by law and by a court decision,

Torts and Damages Session 15-19

with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds

company because its civil liability is completely divorced from the

Torts and Damages Session 15-19

Clemente Abellana as ER of FA. They filed a motion to dismiss since

Torts and Damages Session 15-19

Art 19 Principle of Abuse of Rights. when a right is

Torts and Damages Session 15-19

officer or agent under express direction or authority from

Torts and Damages Session 15-19

The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must