Laguna Tayabas Bus v. Tiongson(16 SCRA 940, April 30, 1966, Dizon, J.

FACTS: An LTB bus collided with a 7-UP delivery truck coming from the
opposite direction while trying to evade a road depression. As a
consequence, the bud fell on its right side on the shoulder of the road
resulting in the death of Ricardo Tiongson. Both drivers were prosecuted
criminally but a separate action was filed by the heirs of the deceased
against the petitioner LTB. CA affirmed the CFI decision ordering LTB to
pay P50,000 by way of actual, compensatory and moral damages. LTB
filed petition for certiorari.
HELD: The liability of a carrier is cintractual and arises upon its breach of
the obligation, and there is a breach if it fails to exercise extraordinary
diligence according to all circumstances of each case. A carrier is obliged to
carry its passengers with utmost diligence of a very cautious person,
having due regard for all circumstances sorrounding the case. A carrier is
presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of death of, or
injury to its passengers, it being its duty to prove that it exercised
extraordinary diligence.
LTB has not successfully discharged the burden of disproving its
presumptive negligencd because of its failure to transport its passenger to
his destination and has not sufficiently established its defense of fortuitous
event. On the contrary, the driver applied the brakes in his bus too late
( distance of 10 meters) to avoid the accident, and the driver was aware of
the depression, driving along the same route for a considerable period of
time.
This sufficiently showed that the company had not exercised due care and
diligence in connection with the hiring of the driver. The CA therefore found
that petitioner has failed to disprovd the presumption of negligence (Arts.
1733, 1755, 1756, NCC) and that its negligence had been established by
more than mere preponderance of evidence.
Petitioner's liability for moral damages cannot now be seriously questioned
in view of Arts. 1764 and 2206 of the NCC and the ruling in Necesito v.
Paras. Decision AFFIRMED.

Baliwag Transit, INC. v. CA (256 SCRA 746, May 15, 1996, Puno, J.)
FACTS: On July 32, 1980, Leticia Garcia, and her five-year old son, Allan
Garcia, boarded Baliwag Transit Bus No. 2036 bound for Cabanatuan City
driven by Jaime Santiago. They took the seat behind the driver. At about
7:30 in the evening, in Malimba, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, the bus passengers
saw a cargo truck parked at the shoulder of the national highway. Its left
rear portion jutted to the outer lane, as the shoulder of the road was too
narrow to accommodate the whole truck. A kerosene lamp appeared at the
edge of the road obviously to serve as a warning device. The truck driver,
Julio Recontique, and his helper, Arturo Escala, were then replacing a flat
tire. The truck is owned by respondent A & J Trading.
The bus rammed into the stalled cargo truck. It caused the instant death of
Santiago and Escala, and injury to several others. Leticia and Allan Garcia
were among the injured passengers. Spouses Antonio and Leticia Garcia
sued Baliwag Transit, Inc., A & J Trading and Julio Recontique for damages
in the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. Leticia sued as an injured passenger
of Baliwag and as mother of Allan. At the time of the complaint, Allan was a
minor, hence, the suit initiated by his parents in his favor.
HELD:
The records are bereft of any proof to show that Baliwag exercised
extraordinary diligence. On the contrary, the evidence demonstrate its
driver's recklessness. Leticia Garcia testified that the bus was running at a
very high speed despite the drizzle and the darkness of the highway. The
passengers pleaded for its driver to slow down, but their plea was ignored.
Leticia also revealed that the driver was smelling of liquor. She could smell
him as she was seated right behind the driver. Another passenger, Felix
Cruz testified that immediately before the collission, the bus driver was
conversing with a co-emoloyee. All these prove the bus driver's wanton
disregard for the physical safety of his passengers, which makes Baliwag
as a common carrier liable for damages under Article 1759 of the Civil
Code. Baliwag cannot evade its liability by insisting that the accident was

caused solely by the negligence of A & J Trading and Julio Recontique. It

harps on their alleged non-use of an early warning device.
The records do not bear out Baliwag's contention. Col. dela Cruz and
Romano testified that they did not see any early warning devicenat the
scene of the accident. They were refering to the triangular reflectorized
plates in red and yellow issued by the Land Transportation Office. However,
the evidence shows that Recontique and Escala placed a kerosene lamp or
torch atbthe edge of the road, near the rear portion of the truck to serve as
an early warning device. This substantially complied with Section 34(g) of
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, to wit:
"(g) Lights and reflector when parked or disabled. --- Appropriate parking
lights or flares visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at the
corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in
places that are not well-lighted or, is placed in such manner as to endanger
passing traffic. Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall be provided at all
times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning devices either pasted,
painted or attached at its front and back which shall likewise be visible at
night at least one hundred meters away. No vehicle not provided with any
of the requirements mentioned in this subsection shall be registered."
The aforequoted law clearly allows the use not only of an early warning
device of the triangular reflectorized plates variety but also parking lights or
flares visible one hundred meters away. Indeed, Col. dela Cruz himself
admitted that a kerosene lamp is an acceptable substitute for the
reflectorized plates. No negligence, therefore, may be imputed to A & J
Trading and its driver, Recontique. The CA decision awarding damages to
the Garcias is AFFIRMED.

CERVANTES VS CA
FACTS:
PAL issued to Cervantes a round trip ticket for Manila-Honolulu-Los Angeles-Honolulu-Manila.
This ticket expressly provide an expiry date of 1 year from issuance or until March 27,
1990.The ticket was issued in compliance w/ a Compromise Agreement entered between PAL
& Cervantes in 2 previous suits between them.On March 3, 1990, $ days before the expiry
date, Cervantes used it. Upon his arrival to LA, on the same day, he immediately booked his
LA-Manila return ticket w/ PAL office which was confirmed for April 2, 1990 flight.Cervantes
learned that the same PAL plane would make a stop-over in San Francisco and because he
would be in San Francisco on April 2, 1990, he made arrangements w/ PAL for him to board
the flight in San Francisco instead of boarding it in LA.When Cervantes checked in at PAL
counter in San Francisco he was not allowed to board. PAL personnel made annotation on his
ticket
TICKET NOT ACCEPTED DUE TO EXPIRATION OF VALIDITY.Aggrieved,
Cervantes filed a complaint for damages for Breach of Contract of Carriage. The RTC
dismissed the complaint w/c was upheld by the CA.
ISSUE: WON the act of the PAL agents in confirming the ticket of Cervantes extended the
period of validity.
RULING: The SC ruled in the negative.
The plane ticket itself provides that it is not valid after March 27, 1990. It is also stipulated in
paragraph 8 of the Conditions of Contract that This ticket is good for carriage for one year
from date of issue, except as otherwise provided in this ticket, in carrier's tariffs, conditions
of carriage, or related regulations. The fare for carriage hereunder is subject to change prior
to commencement of carriage. Carrier may refuse transportation if the applicable fare has
not been paid.
In the case of Lufthansa vs. Court of Appeals , the SC held that the "ticket constitute the
contract between the parties. It is axiomatic that when the terms are clear and leave no
doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, contracts are to be interpreted according
to their literal meaning."In his effort to evade this inevitable conclusion, petitioner theorized
that the confirmation by the PAL's agents in Los Angeles and San Francisco changed the
compromise agreement between the parties. As aptly by the appellate court:. . . on March
23, 1990, he was aware of the risk that his ticket could expire, as it did, before he returned
to the Philippines.'The 2 personnel from PAL did not have an authority to extend the validity
of the ticket. Cervantes knew this from the start when he called up the Legal Department of
appellee in the Philippines before he left for the United States of America. He had first hand
knowledge that the ticket in question would expire on March 27, 1990 and that to secure an
extension, he would have to file a written request for extension at the PAL's office in the
Philippines. ). Despite this knowledge, he persisted to use the ticket in question."Since the
PAL agents are not privy to the said Agreement and Cervantes knew that a written request
to the legal counsel of PAL was necessary, he cannot use what the PAL agents did to his
advantage. The said agents, according to the Court of Appeals, acted without authority when
they confirmed the flights of the petitioner.Under Article 1989 of the New Civil Code, the acts
an agent beyond the scope of his authority do not bind the principal,unless the latter ratifies
the same expressly or impliedly. Furthermore, when the third person (herein petitioner)
knows that the agent was acting beyond his power or authority, the principal cannot be held

liable for the acts of the agent. If the said third person is aware of such limits of authority, he
is to blame, and is not entitled to recover damages from the agent, unless the latter
undertook to secure the principal's ratification.

[G.R. No. 119756. March 18, 1999]

FORTUNE EXPRESS, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
On November 18, 1989, a bus of petitioner figured in an accident with a jeepney in
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, resulting in the death of several passengers of the jeepney,
including two Maranaos. Military investigation found that the owner of the jeepney was a
Maranao and that certain Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by
burning some of its buses. Such information was disclosed to Diosdado Bravo, the operations
manager of petitioner, at its main office in Cagayan de Oro City. Bravo assured him that the
necessary precautions to insure the safety of lives and property would be taken.
On November 22, 1989, three armed Maranaos seized a bus of petitioner which resulted to
the killing of one of the passengers of the bus Atty. Caorong. The private respondents filed
suit for breach of contract of carriage in the RTC but the trial court dismissed the complaint
holding the defendant common carrier not negligent. On appeal, however, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner breached the contract of carriage by failure to exercise the
required degree of diligence.
2
Whether or not the act of the Maranao outlaws were so grave, irresistible, violent and
forceful, as to be regarded as caso fortuito.
RULING:
1. Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries
suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts of other passengers, if the employees
of the common carrier could have prevented the act the exercise of the diligence of a good
father of a family. In the present case, it is clear that because of the negligence of
petitioners employees, the seizure of the bus by Maranao outlaws was made possible.
Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary that the Maranaos were planning to take
revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses and the assurance of petitioners
operation manager, Diosdado Bravo, that the necessary precautions would be taken,
petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its passengers.
Had petitioner and its employees been vigilant they would not have failed to see that the
malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Under the circumstances, simple
precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers and
inspecting their baggages, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors,
before allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the passengers
constitutional rights.

2
Art. 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous even as an occurrence which could not
be foreseen or which though foreseen, is inevitable. In Yobido v. Court of Appeals, we held
that to be considered as force majeure, it is necessary that: (1) the cause of the breach of
the obligation must be independent of the human will; (2) the event must be either
unforeseeable or unavoidable; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for
the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free of
participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor.
The absence of any of the requisites mentioned above would prevent the obligor from being
excused from liability. Thus, in Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the common
carrier was liable for its failure to take the necessary precautions against an approaching
typhoon, of which it was warned, resulting in the loss of the lives of several passengers. The
event was foreseeable, and, thus, the second requisite mentioned above was not
fulfilled. This ruling applies by analogy to the present case. Despite the report of PC agent
Generalao that the Maranaos were going to attack its buses, petitioner took no steps to
safeguard the lives and properties of its passengers. The seizure of the bus of the petitioner
was foreseeable and, therefore, was not a fortuitous event which would exempt petitioner
from liability.

Bacarro vs. Castano

(GR L-34597, 5 November 1982)
FACTS:
Respondent Castano boarded a jeep driven by Petitioner Montefalcon who thereafter drove it
at around 40 kilometers per hour. While approaching Sumasap Bridge at the said speed, a
cargo truck coming from behind, blowing its horn to signal its intention to overtake the jeep.
The jeep, without changing its speed, gave way by swerving to the right, such that both
vehicles ran side by side for a distance of around 20 meters. Thereafter as the jeep was left
behind, its driver was unable to return it to its former lane and instead it obliquely or
diagonally ran down an inclined terrain towards the right until it fell into a ditch pinning
down
and
crushing
Castanos
right
leg
in
theprocess.
Castano filed a case for damages against Rosita Bacarro, William Sevilla, and Felario
Montefalcon. Defendants alleged that the jeepney was sideswiped by the overtaking cargo
truck. After trial, the CFI of Misamis Oriental ordered Bacarro, et.al. to jointly and severally
pay
Castano.
It
was
affirmed
by
the
CA
upon
appeal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there was a contributory negligence on the part of the jeepney driver.
2
Whether or not extraordinary diligence is required of the jeepney driver.
3
Whether or not the sideswiping is a fortutious event.

HELD:
1.) Yes. The fact is, petitioner-driver Montefalcon did not slacken his speed but
instead continued to run the jeep at about forty (40) kilometers per hour even at
the time the overtaking cargo truck was running side by side for about twenty (20)
meters and at which time he even shouted to the driver of the truck.
Thus, had Montefalcon slackened the speed of the jeep at the time the truck was
overtaking it, instead of running side by side with the cargo truck, there would have
been no contact and accident. He should have foreseen that at the speed he was
running, the vehicles were getting nearer the bridge and as the road was getting
narrower the truck would be to close to the jeep and would eventually sideswiped it.
Otherwise stated, he should have slackened his jeep when he swerved it to the right
to give way to the truck because the two vehicles could not cross the bridge at the

same. time.
2.) Yes. x x x [T]he fact is, there was a contract of carriage between the private
respondent and the herein petitioners in which case the Court of Appeals correctly applied
Articles 1733, 1755 and 1766 of the Civil Code which require the exercise of extraordinary
diligence on the part of petitioner Montefalcon.
Indeed, the hazards of modern transportation demand extraordinary diligence. A common
carrier is vested with public interest. Under the new Civil Code, instead of being required to
exercise mere ordinary diligence a common carrier is exhorted to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide "using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons." (Article 1755). Once a passenger in the course of travel is injured, or does
not reach his destination safely, the carrier and driver are presumed to be at fault.
3.) The third assigned error of the petitioners would find fault upon respondent court in not
freeing petitioners from any liability, since the accident was due to a fortuitous event. But,
We repeat that the alleged fortuitous event in this case - the sideswiping of the jeepney by
the cargo truck, was something which could have been avoided considering the narrowness
of the Sumasap Bridge which was not wide enough to admit two vehicles. As found by the
Court of Appeals, Montefalcon contributed to the occurrence of the mishap.