Ridgeview Publishing Company

Phenomenal States
Author(s): Brian Loar
Source: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 4, Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind (1990), pp.
81-108
Published by: Ridgeview Publishing Company
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4
Perspectives,
Philosophical
ofMind,1990
ActionTheoryand Philosophy

PHENOMENALSTATES
BrianLoar
of SouthernCalifornia
University

ofa consciousstate
A phenomenal
letus say,is a feature
quality,
as thataspectofthestate,
thatisnotableintrospectively,
ostensively,
that way it feels,appears,etc. Phenomenalqualitiesvary in
I can notethata stateofminehaswhatall smellsshare,
generality:
orthatitis thesmellofnewmowngrass.Theycan be complexand
ofbeingina sailboaton a windyday,
ofwidescope,likea feeling
feelingofbeingawake.No direct
or an everydaycomprehensive
andEnglish
qualities
semantic
correlation
holdsbetween
phenomenal
features,
itisalltoeasytonoticenamelessphenomenal
expressions:
aboutwhichisdemonstrative-"that
themostdirect
wayofthinking
sortoffeeling."
1. Anti-physicalism
qualitiescannotbe physicalor
Nowsomesay thatphenomenal
as theobviousand
innature,
oftenwithdeepconviction,
functional
strainedand
naturalview,as iftheopposite-physicalism-were
at thisconviction,
entertainable
onlybyideologues.I am surprised
seems to me alwaysto reston some
forsuch anti-physicalism
assumption.
Perhapsthe
andfarfrom
evident
philosophical
technical
is this'.Itis
lineofthought
mostinfluential
current
anti-physicalist
orfunctional
ofanother
observed
thata physical
organism
description
ithas,whatitis
forknowingwhatexperiences
couldneversuffice
orphenomenal
thatexperiential
liketohavethem;anditisconcluded

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82 / BrianLoar
factsor
factsor qualitiescannotbe (merely)physical-functional
selfis implicitin less philosophically
The inference
properties.
a brainscientistmay despairof identifying
consciousthinking:
or rawfeelswithneuralstatesbecauseneuralfacts,
consciousness
are
nevertellhimwhichifanyexperiences
howeverexhaustive,
occurring.
valid,and the
formally
ofcourseis notexplicitly
The reasoning
Cartesian
Considerthefamiliar
implicit
premiseneedsuncovering.
ismoreorlesstheconverseofthe
whoseexplicit
premise
argument
thatonecanconceiveofhavingany
from
theobservation
foregoing:
or detailed
havinganyspecific
qualitywithout
givenphenomenal
that
drawn
the conclusionagain is
property
physical-functional
Thetwo
properties.
arenotphysical-functional
qualities
phenomenal
one
independence,
this:thecognitive
seemtopresuppose
arguments
and
in
in
phenomenal
couched
way or theother,ofconceptions
and
ofphenomenal
thedistinctness
terms
implies
physical-functional
factsor properties.
physical-functional
because
nosuchpremise
requires
anti-physicalism
Somemaythink
argument;it is simplyrevealedin
it requiresno philosophical
thatitisnot(entirely)
physical-functional
an experience
introspecting
is,withitsnature
quality
innature:
youobservewhatthephenomenal
laidoutbeforethemind,andnotethatitis nota physical-functional
But the onlyevidentfactshereare thatintrospection
property.
andalsoperhapsthat,
description,
delivers
up nophysical-functional
youcannottelljust
evenifsciencesuppliesa candidatedescription,
from
thesefacts
And
to
infer
itapplies.2
whether
fromintrospection
and
properties
ofphenomenal physical-functional
thedistinctness
premise.
requiressomeversionoftheabove implicit
to this
can be assimilated
thought
lineofanti-physicalist
Another
no
irreducible:
model.Phenomenal
qualitiesappearexplanatorily
cantellyouwhya twinge
anddescription
theory
amountofphysical
forwhat
theimplicit
premise;
feelslikethat.Nowthisagaininvolves
a priori:
onlysomething
Presumably
wouldcountas explanation?
thata statewithcertainphysicalyouwouldhavetojustunderstand
is a twinge.
functional
properties
One
havetwopremisses.
linesofthought
So theseanti-physicalist
the
about
our
conceptions;
and strictly
epistemic,
is conservative
the
from
conclusion
epistemic
a substantive
otherallowsderiving
The first
seemsto flowfromcommonsense:a conception
premise.
ofit
termscan implya conception
ofa statein physical-functional

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Phenomenal
States/ 83
in phenomenal
terms-ofwhatitis liketo havethatstate-onlya
posteriori.
Knowing
thatp, ifp is conceivedin physical-functional
terms,nevera priorisuffices
forknowing
thatq, ifq is conceived
in phenomenalterms(and vice versa fora detailedphysicalor
psychofunctional
p.) This has been denied3,but it seemsto me
itisthefundamental
correct;
intuition
andI acceptit.
anti-physicalist
Supposeyou tryto avoid the need fora further
premise,and
condensethe argument:
"knowingthe physicalfunctional
facts
forknowing
cannotsuffice
thephenomenal
therefore
thelatter
facts;
aren'tmerely
Butaccepting
physical-functional."
theanti-naturalist
intuition
does notcommitone to thiscondensedpremiseon the
strongtransparent
readingthe anti-physicalist
requires.Any
physicalist
mustdenyiton thatreading;he mustsaythatto know
thephysical-functional
factsistoknowfactsthatarethephenomenal
facts.Accepting
thebasicanti-physicalist
intuition
requires
accepting
thepremiseonlyon a conservative
or opaquereading:knowledge
conceivedin physical-functional
a priorifor
termscannotsuffice
in
conceived phenomenal
terms.Andforthatto imply
knowledge
thatphenomenal
overandabovephysicalqualitiesare something
functional
thefurther
properties,
premiseis needed.
Callitthesemantic
minor
twopredicates
that
premise:
orconcepts
a
are connected
introduce
distinct
ifitis
only posteriori
properties;
a posteriori
thatF occurswhenG occurs,thenthepredicates
or
F andG introduce
distinct
ofwhatever
concepts
properties
theyapply
to.
I use thenon-standard
'introduce'
to avoidascribing
a simplistic
Had I said 'designate',
thesemantic
positionto theanti-naturalist.
minorpremisewouldruleoutthosea posteriori
identities
property
thathaveservedas theparadigm
ofscientific
reduction,
e.g.ofheat
and a statistical-mechanical
It has been held that
property.4
are necessary)a posteriori
(althoughall identities
of
judgments
property
are possiblewhenat leastone termrefers
identity
via a
condition:'heat'connotesthe higher
contingent
reference-fixing
orderproperty
the
whichis distinct
being causeofheatsensations,
fromthestatistical
mechanical
andtherefore
from
property
distinct
heatitself;
'heat'connotes
theoneandthereby
theother.
designates
So in thesemanticminorpremise,let 'introduce'
mean"directly
or
connote
as
a
order
reference-fixer."
Thenthe
designate,
higher
semanticminorpremisedoes not excludea posteriori
property
butit does requirein thatcase a distinct
identities,
higherorder

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84 / BrianLoar
doingsemanticwork.
in thebackground,
property
appealed to thatparadigmof property
Supposea physicalist
in explainingthe a posterioristatusof "phenomenal
identities
G", whereG is a fully
property
F = physical-functional
property
shouldreply
The
anti-naturalist
ofsometheory.
spelledoutexpression
term
couldbetrueonlyifthephenomenal introduces
thatthisidentity
the propertybeing the
a referencefixingproperty-perhaps
thatfeelslikesuchand such,and thatthis
property
(underlying)
Given
cannotitselfbe physical-functional5.
higherorderproperty
ifthe
this;
I
concede
shall
premise
myacceptanceoftheepistemic
there
is
false
(or
semanticminorpremiseis truethenphysicalism
as phenomenal
qualities.)
are no suchproperties
phenomenal
It is easy to say underwhatabstractconditions
ofphysical-functional
independent
maybe cognitively
conceptions
introduce
are fully
the former
whilethe properties
conceptions
(a)
it
schematically:
This
captures
properties.
physical-functional
way
in
whatever
refer
ofbrainstates
conceptions
physical-functional
have
concepts
while(b)phenomenal
theories
refer,
termsinphysical
termssuchthat
fromthatof"theoretical"
a conceptual
roledistinct
orderreference
without
higher
withthatrolerefer
directly,
concepts
kinds
mayconverge
of
the
two
that
terms
(c)
withtheresult
fixing;
oftheir
the
independence
despite
theyintroduce
in theproperties
in
couched physicalknowledge
roles,thatis,eventhough
cognitive
termsneverputsone in a positionto applyspecific
functional
to whicha
phenomenalconceptsor vice versa. The property
a property
be
refers
may
just
directly
conceptsomehow
phenomenal
theory.
capturedby a termofa physical-functional
Beforewe turntothedetails,itmighthelpto havea lookat two
Kripke's
otheraccounts,one anti-and the otherpro-physicalist.
from
theantidiffers
ostensibly
in
and
Necessity"
"Naming
argument
that
could
intuition
far.
The
Cartesian
pain
so
argument
physicalist
to
be
he
explained
state
says,
has,
occurwithout
anygivenphysical
of the
The appearanceof thecontingency
away by physicalists.
Kripke
property,
identity
of,say,heatand a statistical-mechanical
speaking,
isexplainedthus:a person"couldbe,qualitatively
thinks,
situation"
as a personinthepresenceofheat
inthesameepistemic
beinginthepresenceofheat.Butthatcannothappenwith
without
likebeinginthepresence
situation
qualitatively
pain;an epistemic
withphysicalofpainis itself
pain.So toassertthatpainis identical
thatthisappearscontingent,
P whileconceding
functional
property

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Phenomenal
States/ 85
you have to say thata personcan be in the same epistemic,
qualitative,
situation
as someonewhofeelspainwithout
beinginthe
presenceofP, thatis,pain;and thatis incoherent.6
Butthe appearanceof contingency
wouldbe explainedrather
withtheabovestructure.
A physicalist
differently
onan account
could
agreethatwhateverfeelslikepainis pain,and hence,giventhe
identity,
isP. Whatexplainsthe"appearance
ofcontingency"
isthat
a phenomenal
conception
ofpainanda conception
ofP inphysicalfunctionalterms can be cognitivelyindependent-canhave
independent
conceptualroles- even whileintroducing
thesame
property.
Thisleavesscopeforacknowledging,
despiteone'sown
thatotherscan coherently
thinkthatpain may be
physicalism,
unaccompanied
byP. ItseemsthatKripkemustdenythattherecan
be pairsoftermsthatare independent
butnotin the
conceptually
properties
theyintroduce,
andtherefore
iscommitted
tothesemantic
minorpremise.7

a different
Consider
physicalist
replytothesingle-premise
epistemic
in the form:"knowledgeof
thatis, to the argument
argument,
doesnotyieldknowledge
ofthephenomenal
physical-functional
facts
facts;therefore
phenomenalfactsare not physical-functional."
andDavidLewishaverepliedthatthepremise
LawrenceNemirow
Thefirst
occurrence
is trueonlyifyouequivocateon "knowledge".
can mean theoreticalknowledge,the second the abilityto
discriminate
ortoimagine
suchstates[Nemirow
introspectively
1980;
ofcertain
Lewis1983].Butthisallowsthattheoretical
knowledge
arethephenomenal
physical-functional
facts-which
facts-doesnot
yieldtheothersortofknowledge
ofthoseveryfacts,namelythe
them.Only
theminintrospection
ortoimagine
todiscriminate
ability
butthereare twoepistemic
factsare involved,
physical-functional
relationsto them.
kind
Nowthiscouldsuggest
something
false,thatonlytheformer
ofknowledge
is knowingthatsuchand such,is thepossessionof
howtoidentify
whilethelatter
involves
information,
merely
knowing
ortoimagine
certainstates.WhatI wishtosayisdifferent.
Knowing
how a statefeelsis knowingthatit feelsa certainway. Antiofdistinctive
areright
inholding
thatitisthepossession
physicalists
of
foritinvolvesa genuinely
information,
predicative
component
judgment-whatI am calling a phenomenalconcept-whose
withanyphysical-functional
association
conceptisstraightforwardly
a posteriori.

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86 / BrianLoar
A physicalist
wouldbe forcedintotheNemirow/Lewis
replyifhe
weretoindividuate
bitsofknowledge,
cognitive
information,
interms
ofpossibleworldtruth-conditions.
Forhe wouldhaveto grantthat,
ifknowinghowa statefeelsis knowing
thatsuchand such,then
So
itwouldbe securedbyknowing
all thephysical-functional
facts.8
a physicalist
whocountstheanti-physicalist
aboutknowledge
premise
as true(on an interpretation)
mustdeny eitherthatcognitive
information
isindividuated
interms
ofpossibleworldtruth-conditions
or that"knowing
thephenomenal
facts"(in thesensethatmakes
thepremisetrue)is knowing
thatsuchandsuch,havingdistinctive
and Lewistodenythelatter,
information
aboutit.9I takeNemirow
whileI denytheformer;
thereare ampleindependent
reasonsto
to denythelatter.
denyit and it seemsotherwise
unmotivated
Thisis nota quibbleabout'havinginformation'.
Consider
theterm
'malechick'.Onecanfully
understand
it,andthenacquirethefurther
theirviewof
abilityto recognizeinstances.
This,as I understand
knowing
what(say)painislike,isan exampleofwhatNemirow
and
Lewis have in mind.Nothingpreventsone fromsayingthatin
thatfurther
orknow-how
acquiring
ability
one'acquiresinformation',
thusverbally
meeting
theobjection.
Butas I see it,themostsensible
viewisthat(overandabovepurely
functional
mental
terms,
assuming
terms
thereare any)thereare cognitively
irreducible
phenomenal
in judgmentsand not merelyabilitiesto apply independently
masteredconceptions
ofthefunctional
Thismaybe seen
variety.
intwoways.1)Onecanhaveknowledge
notonlyoftheform
"pains
feellikesuchandsuch"butalso oftheform"ifpainsfeellikesuch
andsuchthenQ". Perhapsyoucouldgetawaywithsayingthatthe
former
expresses(nota genuinejudgment
but)themerepossession
of recognitional
know-how.There seems howeverto be no
fortheembedded
occurrence
of'feels
comparable
wayofaccounting
likesuchand such"in thelatter;itseemsto introduce
a predicate
witha distinctive
content.
ofphenomenal
2) Formanyconceptions
theresimply
mastered
isnocandidate
foran independently
qualities,
terminstances
ofwhichonethenproceeds
tolearnhowtorecognize:
ofa peculiarwaymyleftkneefeelswhenI run(a
myconception
thatoccurspredicatively
invariousjudgments)
is notmy
conception
understood
knowinghowto applyan independently
predicate.
that
one hasdistinctive
Byallappearances,
phenomenal
concepts
are connectedwithphysical-functional
conceptsonlya posteriori.
The 'knowing
how'viewis hardputto explainthis;and itwould

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Phenomenal
States/ 87
notbe cost-effective
to defendthatviewby insisting,
contrary
to
ofjudgment
powerful
intuition,
thattheonlycomponents
thatcould
countas genuinephenomenal
conceptsare equivalentto certain
physical-functional
conceptsa priori.
2. Recognitionalphenomenalconcepts
A first
to an accountwiththerequisite
approximation
structure
isthis:phenomenal
concepts
arerecognitional/imaginative
concepts.
Given a normalbackgroundof cognitivecapacities,certain
forhavingspecific
recognitional
ordiscriminative
dispositions
suffice
recognitional
concepts,
whichis justto say,suffice
forthecapacity
to makejudgments
on thoserecognitional
thatdependspecifically
havetheform:
theobject(event,
dispositions.
Simplesuchjudgments
a is one ofthatkind,wherethecognitive
situation)
backingforthe
predicate
isjusta recognitional
disposition,
i.e.a disposition
toclassify
thatoftenbutnotinevitably
is
objects(events,situations)
together,
Itis a basicfactabout
linkedwitha specific
imaginative
capacity.10
can suffice
for
ourcognitive
set-upthatrecognitional
dispositions
withspecificconceptualroles,and in thatway
mentalpredicates
createcognitive
content.
And,I wishto say,itis also a factabout
our cognitiveset-upthat such recognitional
conceptscan be
ofreferentially
cognitively
independent
equivalent
conceptswhose
rolesare determined
by some background
theory(say physicalso thatno information
aboutx couchedinthe
functional
concepts),
lattertermson itsownenablesone to makea judgment
exercising
a recognitional/imaginative
thatx feelsthus
concept,
e.g.a judgment
and so.
A pairofconcepts
ofthetwokindsmay,as I putitearlier,
converge
on a property,
as theircommonreference,
mayhavethatproperty
inthefollowing
way.A recognitional
conceptmayinvolvetheability
thathavea givenobjective
toclasstogether,
todiscriminate,
things
property.
Say thatifa recognitional
conceptis relatedthusto a
Thenthe
oftheconcept.
property,
theproperty
triggers
applications
valueorreference
thattriggers
theconceptisthesemantic
property
of the concept;the conceptdirectlyrefersto the property,
Nowsupposewe have
orderreference-fixer.
unmediated
bya higher
a giventheoretical
an independent
accountofwhatproperty
concept
thatproperty
frombeingtheproperty
refersto. Nothing
prevents

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88 / BrianLoar
andso thetwoconcepts
concept,
a givenrecognitional
thattriggers
independence,
cognitive
their
despite
intheirreference
canconverge
The semantic
fact.-"
thelatterbeinga sortofbrutepsychological
minorpremiseis thenfalsified.
"thestatea feelslikethat"and "thestatea
Thusthejudgments
P" canhavethesametruth
condition
property
hasphysical-functional
onlya posteriori.
canbe known
orfalsity
eventhough
their
jointtruth
For what
I mean, same condition-of-truth-in-a-possible-world.
the
determines
is in partwhatever
truthconditions
determines
conditionsof predicates;and if a
possibleworld satisfaction
then
refersto a physicalproperty,
predicatedirectly
phenomenal
condition.12
itssatisfaction
thatproperty
constitutes
concepts,and about
Moreneedsto be said aboutrecognitional
triggering.
disposition.
1) I havesaid thatsucha conceptis a recognitional
ability?The reasonis thatthisconnotes
Whynota recognitional
Butthe
is reidentified.
itimpliesthata realproperty
achievement:
a personmight
judge
I meancan be ungrounded:
factors
cognitive
"once again somethingof that sort ... and yet again ..." quite

orevent)
situation,
norealkind(ofobject,
eventhough
unconfusedly,
thoughts
ofsucha person's
reidentified.
Still,itisa feature
isthereby

thathe is disposedto judge"same ... same again ..."as ifreidentifying

a real kind;and thatis what I mean by a mere recognitional

disposition.Of course if the dispositionis ungrounded,the
conceptlacksreference.
recognitional
isa disposition
orability
disposition
2) Insomecases,a recognitional
onewhoseinitial
termorconcept,
orability
toapplyanindependent
Forexample,
a specific
ability.
recognitional
doesnotinvolve
mastery
'porcelain'froma technical
a personmightcome to understand
and aurallyto
and onlylaterlearnvisually,tactually
description
I mean.
Thatis notthephenomenon
instances.
identify
I have
desertandspota succulent
SupposeI go intotheCalifornia
neverseen before;lackinga nameI maystillcome to recognize
instanceshere and there.WhatI have acquiredis the kindof
or abilityI mean; it does not involve
disposition
recognitional
instancesofan old term.
recognizing
neednotinvolvedemonstrative
disposition
3) Sucha recognitional
need nothave theform"is ofthesame
to a paradigm,
reference
observed
formerly
one."Onemayforget
typeas that(remembered)
one ofthose".An imagemaybe
andstilljudge"another
instances,

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Phenomenal
States/ 89
to be ofa particular
instance.
involved,
butit need notpurport
need involveno analysisinto
4) The recognitional
disposition
'gestalt'.
component
features;
itcan be irreducibly
conceptin the
5) It may intrinsically
involvean independent
fromthe 'porcelain'example:in
following
way, quite different
recognitional
type,one may
identifying
something
as ofa specific
presupposethatit is of a typemoregeneralthanthe putative
a plant,a dog.Each
recognitional
typeitself,
e.g. a physicalthing,
disposition
mayhave theform,
implementation
ofa recognitional
as itwere,'physical
stateofmineof
thingofthattype',or 'internal
thattype',and so on.
explication
ofwhat
Triggering.
We do notrequirea philosophical
itis fora property
a givenrecognitional
to be theone thattriggers
inwhichthe
experiment,
concept.Thinkofsomepsychophysiology
triestodetermine
whichinternal
property
hersubject
experimenter
discriminates
when saying"again" ... "yetagain." There seems no

intheideathatthereisa bestpossible
specialphilosophical
problem
itmaybe
question,
howeverdifficult
answerto theexperimenter's
to comeup with.13
does
Itmaybe objected
thatappealing
to'recognitional
dispositions'
nothelptoexplicatenon-circularly
concept',
'havinga recognitional
for'recognitional'
theexerciseofconcepts.
Perhapsso.
itself
implies
innona cognitive
feature
Thepointhere,though,
isnottoexplicate
evident
to an intuitively
cognitiveterms,but to call attention
phenomenon,one that any cognitivepsychologyought to
acknowledge.
does not requirethat
The anti-physicalist
epistemicargument
inEnglish.
terms
tospecific
correspond
specific
phenomenal
qualities
intuition
appealsto intuitive
aspectsof
Rather,theanti-physicalist
inthepresence
tothink
mentalstates,
whichitisnatural
of,whether
interms
suchas 'likethis',
orinimagination,
ofan actualoccurrence
So theanti-physicalist
should
or'whatit'sliketobe inthatsituation.'
agree thatphenomenalconceptsare recognitional/imaginative
in a naturalway our havingintuitive
concepts;it accommodates
of mentalqualitiesto whichno termsin our public
conceptions
Butof courseI am arguingthatthat
languageneed correspond.
thesemanticminorpremise.
undercuts
Phenomenal
conceptsappearto
conceptsandphysical-functional
ofstates.Thatcouldseem
introduce
distinct
modesofpresentations
toimply
thattheypresent
distinct
aspectsofstates.But,we maysay,

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90 / BrianLoar
thata phenomenal
qualitydoes notpresentitselfin introspection
as a physicalproperty
meansonlythatphenomenal/recognitional
conceptsdo notcognitively
implyphysical/functional
theoretical
Theintuition
thattherearedistinct
concepts.
modesofpresentation
isallright;
itisexplainedbya distinctness
inconcepts,
anddoesnot
requirea distinctness
in features,
aspects,properties.
A phenomenal
conceptperhapstypically
involvesnotmerelya
recognitional
disposition
butalsoan image;andso,as a psychological
statein itsownright,
a phenomenal
concept,givenitsconnection
withimaging,is farmoresimilar(in some intuitive
sense) to a
phenomenal
statethaneitheristothepsychological
stateofhaving
a givenphysical-theoretical
concept.Whenwe thenbringconcepts
ofthetwokindstogether
inourphilosophical
ruminations,
theyare
themselves
as psychological
statesso different
thattheillusionis
createdthattheirreferences
Itis as thoughantimustbe different.
physicalist
intuitions
rest on a resemblancetheoryof mental
as though
we concludefrom
thelackofresemblance
representation,
in our physical-functional
and phenomenal
a lack of
conceptions
samenessin theproperties
theyreferto.
3. Projectivephenomenalconcepts
referto
ofphenomenal
Ascriptions
qualitiesto othersostensibly
properties
thatothers
mayhaveindependently
ofourascribing
them;
one'sconceptions
ofthephenomenal
statesofothersarerealist.But
atthesametimetheyareprojections
from
one'sowncase:theyhave
theform"x has a stateofthissort",wherethedemonstrative
gets
itsreference
froman actualor possiblestateofone's own,and if
one conceivesofa phenomenal
that
stateone hasnotexperienced,
is by analogywith,or by construction
out of, thoseone has
experienced.Phenomenalqualitiesare sometimesspokenof as
of whichone can fashionno adequate
"subjective",
properties
conceptionwithouthavingexperiencedat least closelyrelated
mustdenythis,foritimpliesthat
properties.
Evidently
physicalism
phenomenal
qualitiesare physical-functional
properties
capturable
inphysical-functional
withphysicalism
that
terms.
Butitisconsistent
in thesenseof
other-directed
phenomenal
conceptsare subjective
projections
fromone'sowncase.
Thequestioniswhether
can
other-directed
phenomenal
concepts

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States/ 91
Phenomenal
conceptsI have
withthe recognitional/imaginative
be identified
in
featureis theirgrounding
The latters'important
characterized.
in thehavingofthem.Andso
properties
capacitiestodiscriminate
concepts
recognitional
ariseshowself-directed
a questionnaturally
can be appliedto casesofwhichitmakesno sensetosaythatone
be turned
applythoseconcepts.The questionmight
coulddirectly
concepts
ofphenomenal
ingredient
asideifthereweresomefurther
capacities
so tospeak,as recognitional
specific,
thatisas conceptually
Andperhapsthatissimply
other-directed.
andis unproblematically
statesofothers.Buthow
thecapacityto imaginethephenomenal
ofyourmind?Itseems
toa property
doesan imageinmymindrefer
in
in generalthatimagesreferbytheirgrounding
notimplausible
backto thefact
capacities;butthenwe are brought
recognitional
capacitiesare notofthekindthat
recognitional
thatphenomenal
can be directedat others.
NowI mention
thesepointsbecausesomeversionofthemseems
likelyto arise.Butin factit is notnecessarythata recognitional
to serve as that which is
capacityitselfbe other-directable
concept.Self-directed
conceptually
specificin an other-directed
tothe
inopposition
mayretaintheirintegrity,
concepts
phenomenal
mental
inrecentyearstosupposethatalllegitimate
tendency
strong
Butnothing
conceptsmustbe equallyself-and other-predicable.
conceptsin
recognitional
self-directed
preventsincorporating
xis ina statethathasthissortofquality-where
concepts:
projective
recognitional
fora self-directed
"thissortofquality"is schematic
a
thatis actuallyor potentially
conceptthatpicksouta property
recognitional
self-directed
ofone'sown,via thepeculiarly
property
capacitythatbacksit up.
statesbyprojecting
Theintuitive
ideathatwe ascribephenomenal
byandlarge,
philosophers,
themhasbeenmuchcriticized
byanalytic
viewson concept
as itseemstome,becauseofpublic-verificationist
Thereis no problem
as follows.
Butone maysee things
formation.
oftheform"x has thissortofthing",
in generalaboutpredicates
in a
is grounded
to a property
reference
wherethedemonstrative
ofx. Andwhat
thatisacquiredindependently
capacity
recognitional
recognitional
is wrongin the idea of essentiallyself-directed
inthehavingofthem?
todetectproperties
Taking
abilities
capacities,
conceptsappearprimafacie
phenomenal
thesetogether,
projective
unproblematic.(The Appendix discusses an argumentof
mentalascriptions.)
againstprojective
Wittgenstein's

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92 / BrianLoar
statesofothersinvolve
Thatourconceptions
ofthephenomenal
projective
ofselfconcepts
ofthissortexplains,
giventhesemantics
directed
can
recognitional/imaginative
concepts,howphysicalism
be compatible
Itshowshowitcan
withtheanti-physicalist
intuition.
be truethat"shefeelslikethat"and"shehassuchandsuchphysicalat besta posteriori,
functional
property"
mayalwaysbe correlated
even iftheyhave thesamepossibleworldtruth
condition.-4
An anti-physicalist
shouldregarditas evidently
truethatotherdirectedphenomenalconceptsare projective.Indeedit is antiphysicalists
whotypically
stressthatphenomenal
ascriptions
project
a conception
thatone acquiresfromone'sowncase. Whatcounts
in the foregoing
substantively
againstthe anti-physicalist
is the
treatment
ofself-directed
Ifthe
recognitional/imaginative
concepts.
ideaofprojective
concepts
isunobjectionable,
thissemantic
treatment
offirst-person
phenomenal
concepts
showsthattheunexceptionable
anti-physicalist
premise-thatphysical-functional
conceptionsof
othersarealwaysrelateda posteriori
tophenomenal
conceptionsdoes notentailanti-physicalism.
The upshotthenis this.Other-directed
phenomenal
conceptsfail
tobe "physical-functional
concepts"
becausetheycontain
self-directed
phenomenal
concepts.Whatis leftoutconceptually
bya physicalfunctional
description
ofanotherpersonis thatsheis ina statethat
isidentical
witha certain
actualorpossible
phenomenal
stateofone's
own.Itis inthissensethatother-directed
phenomenal
conceptsare
At thesame time,therealistimportof other-directed
subjective.
phenomenal
ascriptions
is accountedfor.Myconceiving
another's
phenomenal
statesis not(as such)imagining
whatitwouldbe like
forme to be in thatperson'ssituation.
RatherI ascribea property
thatis realizableindependently
ofmyconception.
Youcanascribeanobjective
property-one
completely
expressible
in the objectivetermsof naturalscience-undera subjective
"x haswhatI wouldhavewereI to feelthis."Thomas
conception:
Nagelwritesthatmentalfactsare "accessibleonlyfromone point
Thisdoesreflect
ofview"15.
aboutphenomenal
something
concepts;
sense"from
onepointofview",subjective.
theyareinsomeintuitive
In whatsense?Thiscouldseemto meanthathavingsuchconcepts
ofthekindtheystandfor;but
presupposes
havinghad properties
itappearsthatwe can imaginebeingendowed(bya godor superwithappropriate
scientist)
recognitional
and hencewith
capacities,
without
suchconcepts,
havinghadappropriate
experiences.
Perhaps

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States/ 93
Phenomenal
a pointofview,
orfrom
aresubjective,
concepts
thisisit:phenomenal
certainstatesinthe
becausetheyinvolvecapacitiestodiscriminate
capacitiesthatare
havingofthem,and also,perhaps,imaginative
Ifthatisit,thenNageltakes
capacities.
insuchrecognitional
anchored
anddrawsa wrongconclusion
aboutconcepts
observation
a correct
Forconceptscan inthatsensebe from
aboutfactsand properties.
thatare
properties
introduce
one pointofviewand nevertheless
in objectivescience.
exhaustively
capturable
notstillleavesomething
ofreality
objective
description
Doesa fully
This is a play on "leave
out, viz. the subjectiveconceptions?
leaves out
somethingout". A completeobjectivedescription
the
characterize
notbecauseitcannotfully
conceptions,
subjective
or fullyaccountforthe concepts
propertiestheydiscriminate
states,butsimplybecauseitdoes not
as psychological
themselves
employthem.
4. Knowledgeof otherminds
Does the projectionanalysisand the theoryof self-directed
Itwould
conceptsdissolvetheOtherMindsproblem?
phenomenal
anotherpersonis inthe
reasonforthinking
seemso. Anyempirical
withfeeling
suchand
statethatinmeisidentical
physical-functional
suchwouldbe an equallygoodreasontoregardtheotheras feeling
another's
between
resemblance
ofphysical
suchandsuch.Statements
stateswouldclose thequestion.
statesand myphenomenal
question.Whenthe
Butitwillbe objectedthatthereis a further
thatotherpersons
first
struck
one,thethought
othermindsproblem
Given
seemedinsufficient.
toonedoubtless
arephysically
verysimilar
a complete account of another person's physical-functional
but
wondered:
I stillwithout
inconsistency
resemblance
to myself,
does she also resembleme in thisway-does she feelthis?
butmisguided.
1) WiththeantiThe reactionis understandable,
ofone'sownstates
awareness
I supposethatitisonlyfrom
physicalist
place.
qualitiesarisesinthefirst
thata questionaboutphenomenal
thata fullphysical
description
thereis no reasontothink
Otherwise
aboutthis
information
omitssomething-namely,
ofanother
creature
of
sortofthing.Evenwithbats,whatone lacksare determinations
statea phenomenal
theconception
ofwhich-being
a determinable
derivesfromone'sowncase. Butwhatreasonis therein thefirst-

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94 / BrianLoar
physical?
personcasetodoubtthatwhatoneisawareofissomething
We have seen onlythe epistemicargument:
physical-functional
conceptions
descriptions
arecorrelated
a posteriori
withphenomenal
ofone'sstates.Butthatargument
is onlyas strongas thesemantic
it,given
minorpremise.
Andthatpremisehas littleto recommend
the distinction
betweenthe cognitiverole of a conceptand its
reference-potential.
Furthermore,
we otherwise
haveeveryinductive
is
reasonto supposethatwhatwe are awareof in introspection
physical,forwe have everyinductive
reasonto supposewe are
organisms
explainablein physicalterms.
2) As earliernoted,the anti-physicalist
oughtto accept that
ascriptionsof phenomenalstatesto othersinvolveprojective
phenomenal
concepts,forthatis justtheidea thatunderstanding
conceptsderivesfromone'sowncase. Butin thelightof 1) there
thencan be no problemofotherminds.
Howcouldtherebe?Thequestionis whether
another
personhas
this(a phenomenal
from
seeingred
qualityofanydeterminateness,
tofeeling-something-or-other.)
Butifonehasno reasontodoubtthat
witha physical
andnoreasontodoubtthat
thisis identical
property,
oneinthatrespect,
onecannot
resembles
anotherpersonphysically
thenconsistently
doubtthatthepersonhas this.
It goes without
property
sayingthat,foranyphysical-functional
P, itis conceptually
coherent
tosupposethatanotherpersonhasit,
as one conceivesitin physical-functional
and to doubtthat
terms,
he has some particularphenomenalquality,as conceivedin
phenomenal
terms;thathasbeencentralto thispaper.Butitdoes
anotherperson
notmeanthatone cancoherently
wonderwhether
inphysical-functional
stateP hasa phenomenal
statewiththisquality,
ifone hasacknowledged
thatone'sconceptof"thisquality"refers
inoneself
theconceptdiscriminates
towhatever
(whatelse?)
property
P.
theproperty
and thatin oneselfit discriminates
ofa further
ofa problem,
question?
Whythenis theretheillusion
It is as ifone wishesto do to othersas one does to oneself-apply
phenomenalconceptsdirectly,that is, exercise the relevant
Butina senseonecannotconceiveofothers'
recognitional
capacities.
statesprecisely
as oneconceivesofone'sown;one cannotapplyto
There
themthoseself-directed
concepts.
recognitional/imaginative
for what I have called
are of course commonpredications,
"projective"
conceptsare as applicableto oneselfas to others.But
This
theself-directed
coresofsuchconcepts
arenotother-applicable.

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Phenomenal
States/ 95
can presentitselfas an epistemological
barrier,
as something
that
makesitlogicallyimpossible
to knowcertainfacts.Butthatis not
therealnatureofthephenomenon.
Doubtlessmorecan be saidin
explanation
of thenaturalness
of theconflation
of theinnocuous
conceptualfactwitha noxiousepistemological
disability.
It is not
easytoshakethegripofthatconflation
northerefore
easytodispel
theillusion
ofanti-physicalism
andtheproblem
ofotherminds.The
thefortification
cognitive
remedy,
againsttheillusion,
is theideaof
projective
conceptscoupledwiththeobservation
thatthereis no
reasonto doubtthatit is physical-functional
properties
thatselfdirectedrecognitional/imaginative
conceptsdiscriminate.
5. Phenomenalstructure,and exotic others
Somefunctionalists
might
think
thisaccountignores
a majorfeature
ofourconceptions
ofthemental,
theirsystematic
namely,
structure.
We haveconceptions
ofdifferent
and ofintrasensorymodalities,
modality
comparisons
alongvariousspectra,ofpitch,timbre,
hue,
brightness,
shape,size,texture,
etc.Thesecouldbe
acidity,
acridity,
seen as subsidiary
functional
withina theoryofthe
organizations
mental.Anti-naturalists
ofthepoint,wanting
maysharesomething
to speakofphenomenological
structures.
Myaccountmightseem
to implythatphenomenalconceptsare atomistic,
unstructured,
foraretheserecognitional
notinprinciple
unsystematic;
dispositions
independent
ofeach other?
We havephenomenal
recognitional
conceptsofvariousdegrees
ofgenerality.
Someare ofhighly
determinate
and others
qualities,
are ofphenomenal
determinables:
darkred,red,warmcrimson,
colored,colored,visual.'6The lastis therecognitional
conception
ofa wholesensorymodality.
Andthereis themostgeneralofall,
therecognitional
the highest
conceptphenomenal(state,quality),
ranking
phenomenal
determinable.
(Thisis a recognitional
concept.
One discriminates
statesfromnon-phenomenal
phenomenal
states,
a twingefromhavinga bruise,hearing
a chirpfrom
feeling
jerking
a knee,andthathighly
generaldiscriminative
capacityis thebasis
oftheconceptphenomenal
quality.)
Thereare also relational
of
concepts:qualityx is a determinate
x is morelikequality
quality
y; quality
y thanlikequalityz; quality
x isofa different
modality
from
Thesearealsorecognitional
qualityy.

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96 / BrianLoar
grounds,
together,
on phenomenal
concepts:
dispositions
toclassify
them
qualities.Combining
certainpairsand triplesofphenomenal
structures,
e.g.
ofabstract
phenomenal
yieldscomplexconceptions
ofsuch
ofa structured
One'sgeneralconception
sensorymodality.
one's abilityto exercisein concerta group
a structure
is in effect
ofsuchgeneralphenomenal
concepts.
thatour conceptions
of suchphenomenal
Now it is important
Nopurely
areyetphenomenal
conceptions.
structures,
whileabstract,
ofa complexstructure,
howeverisomorphic
functional
conception
toa phenomenal-structure
conception
itmaybe,willbe cognitively
conceptionsignorethatthe
equivalentto it; purelyfunctional
ofphenomenal
similarity
relations,
structures
are of phenomenal
and so on.
determinateness,
of thesemanticminorpremise,thatis no
Butgiventhe falsity
conceptions
thatthoseabstract
phenomenal
impediment
to holding
as their
orphysical-functional
structures
can havepurelyfunctional
maywell be whattheseabstract
references.
For suchstructures
infactdiscriminate.
Indeedwe
capacities
phenomenal
recognitional
aretobe fully
conceptions
maygo ontosaythat,ifourphenomenal
thenthe brainmusthave a certain
vindicatedby brain-science,
of (as it were)semantic
functional
anypossibletotality
structure;
functional
conceptions
musthavecertain
valuesforourphenomenal
of some
This perhapsexplainsthe strongintuition
structures.
arefunctional
commonsense
functionalists
thatphenomenal
concepts
view.
without
ourhavingto acceptthatcounterintuitive
concepts,
thata bat
thethought
"Canyourprojection
accommodate
analysis
phenomenal
statesthatarenotlike
hashighly
specific,
determinate,
I can experienceor imagine?It seemsto me thatyour
anything
program will require you to bring in the bat's own
capacities,
suchas theyare."'7
recognitional/imaginative
onethinks
Whenonethinks
abouta bat'ssonarphenomenal
states,
aboutthemas phenomenal,
thatis,as havingincommonwithmy
incommon,
I discriminate
themallas having
phenomenal
states.what
of
One also thinks
and thatmaybe something
physical-functional.
kindormodality,
different
from
themas ofa distinctive
phenomenal
at which
one'sownstates,ofroughly
thatorderofdeterminateness
one'svisualstatesare markedofffromone's auditory
states.One
hassucha generalconceptfrom
one'sowncase,andonecanproject
it.Thatconceptmayin factdenotea generalphysical-functional
ofthebat's
ofsetsofphenomenal
states.Andone thinks
property,

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States/ 97
Phenomenal
degrees
ofdifferent
variation
sonarstatesas exhibitingphenomenal
structure,
ofgeneralphenomenal
ofspecificity.
Theseconceptions
and so
relations,
resemblance
relations,
determinable-determinate
on, we have,as I have said,fromourowncase.
condition
requiresthata necessary
intheforegoing
Nownothing
qualitiesis havingthecapacityto
of havingcertainphenomenal
discriminatethem. (See however the discussionbelow of
We ascribeto bats not phenomenalconceptsbut
transparency.)
phenomenalstates; and we do that by projectingour own
above. Otherconceptsin themannercharacterized
phenomenal
are ofothers'states,and notas
conceptions
directedphenomenal
suchoftheirconceptions.
and
betweensubjective
In hisrecentbook18Nageldistinguishes
ofthemental.In thelattercase,he says,we
objectiveconceptions
ofour
conceptions
from
subjective
byabstracting
achieveobjectivity
thatare
fashioning
objectivementalconceptions
ownpsychology,
Thisenablesus thento conceive
neitherphysicalnorfunctional.
projective,
ofmentallivesofwhichwe havenosubjective,
abstractly
in
is quitedifferent
whatever.Nowthissuggestion
understanding
spiritfrommine.Itappearsto me thatall mentalconceptsthatare
concepts(wherethe latterincludeconceptsof
not functional
however
concepts,
are subjective-projective
psychology)
theoretical
generaland abstracttheymaybe. The reasonis simple:as faras
mental
I can determine,
I have no "objective"non-functional
mental
IfI trytoconceivean alienmindinnon-functional
concepts.
and thoseother
terms,I relyon conceptslike"sensorymodality"
above.
mentioned
structure
ofphenomenological
conceptions
general
butitappearstome
conceptions;
Theyare,ofcourse,quiteabstract
andtherefore
concepts,
thattheyareallintheir
waystillrecognitional
as the specific
in the relevantsense as subjective-projective
concept,say,of havingan itchin theleftankle.
phenomenal
6. The concept "phenomenalconcept"
concepts,
conceptsare recognitional
The thesisthatphenomenal
certainstatesinthehaving
theability
toclassify
together
involving
thelatter
ofthem,does notimplythateveryconceptthatsatisfies
condition
is a phenomenalconcept.Considerblindsight,theodd
abilityof some personswho are partiallyblind(phenomenally

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98 / BrianLoar
speaking):
whenan objectis placedbeforetheireyesthattheydo
maycorrectly
judgethat,
notphenomenally
"see",theynevertheless
say,itissquare.Theydo notknowhowtheydo it;novisualsensation
conceive
tellsthemtheobjectis square.Nowwe mayanalogously
ofan ability
toidentify
a characteristic
recurring
innerstateswithout
feeling:one mightfindoneselfsaying"thereit is again",butnot
becauseofa specificexperience.
an innerstatein thehavingof
So notjustanyabilityto identify
itsuffices
concept.Noris thereanyother
forhavinga phenomenal
concept";theconceptof
philosophical
explication
of"phenomenal
a phenomenal
conceptand
conceptis itselfa sortofphenomenal
notopento neutralexplication.
For howelse can one telloneself
theability
whata phenomenal
conceptisthanbysaying:itinvolves
tore-identify
andperhapsto imaginea feeling
ofa certaintype,for
example,feelinglikethis.
7. Transparency
It couldseem thefollowing
is possibleon myaccount:another
suchand such,
personis inthestatethatin meamountsto feeling
relevant.
Itmayappeartohave
butsincerely
deniesfeeling
anything
been leftopen thatothershave phenomenalstatesthatare not
oftransparency
hasbeen
introspectable
at will,forno requirement
of myconcept
mentioned.
Thentheproperty
thatis thereferent
in me,occur
feeling
likethatcould,evenifitoccurstransparently
in you. But (theobjectioncontinues)denying
non-transparently
and
istantamount
toallowing
unconscious
experiences;
transparency
itwouldnotbe unreasonable
to say thatthetopicofphenomenal
statesis thetopicofcertainconsciousstates.
Therereallyisnoissuehere.Supposethatanyphenomenal
quality
I correctly
and thatno property
mustbe essentially
transparent,
as phenomenal
canbe realizedinanother
non-transparently.
identify
Ifcognitive
tosuchproperties,
so be it;there
is essential
integration
itselfis nota physicalis no reasonto thinkthatsuchintegration
functional
as it were implicated
by each phenomenal
property,
property.
Now it is not obviousthat phenomenalpropertiesmustbe
ina cognitive
andbats?(Earlier
sense.Whataboutinfants
transparent
in thepresentaccountrequiresbats
itwas observedthatnothing

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Phenomenal
States/ 99
to have phenomenalconcepts.)There has always been a
philosophical
puzzle about how subtracting
reflexivecognitive
awarenessfromphenomenal
or consciousstatesleavessomething
thatisstillphenomenal
orconscious.Butthatpuzzleisindependent
of thecurrent
theory.All thatis impliedhereis that,ifI have a
ofa phenomenal
conception
qualitythatis sharedby me and an
infant,
myconceptionof it involvesa recognitional/imaginative
concept,and thereis no reasonwhythatphenomenal
qualityitself
shouldnotbe a physical-functional
Whatever
property.
indefinable,
elusiveaspectofphenomenal
qualitiesmight
constitute
theirbeing
conscious
without
reflexive
requiring
therewould
conceptualizability,
be no reasonto doubtit is a physical-functional
property.
8. Functionalism
Therearetwofunctionalist
theses:thatallconcepts
ofmental
states
arefunctional
concepts,
andthatallmentalproperties
arefunctional
The firstI rejectedby acceptingthe anti-physicalist
properties.
I agreewiththeanti-physicalist
intuition;
thatphenomenal
concepts
cannotbe captured
inpurelyfunctional
terms.Nothing
howeverin
philosophy
prevents
phenomenal
frombeingfunctional
properties
There are two possibilities:
properties.
theyare commonsensefunctional
ortheyare psychofunctional.
I takethelatter
properties,
tobe theinteresting
one.'9Mightthephenomenal
qualityofseeing
red be identicalwith a propertycaptured by a detailed
Thiswouldbe so iftherepeatablethat
psychofunctional
theory?
one'sphenomenal
triggers
concept"looksred"haspsychofunctional,
rather
thansaybiochemical,
identity
conditions.
Thishasbeendenied
byanti-functionalist
on twogrounds,
thepossibilities
of
physicalists
inverted
qualiaandofabsentqualia,butI donotfindthesearguments
persuasive.
The invertedqualia argument
is commonly
advancedagainst
identifying
phenomenalqualitieswithcommonsense
functional
but also againstthe psychofunctional
properties,
identification.20
The positionI espouse is agnostic:forall philosophers
know,
phenomenal
arepsychofunctional
Theopposing
qualities
properties.
is thatit is possiblethatthepsychofunctional
rolethat
argument
seeingredhasinmeis hadinyouby,as I wouldthinkofit,seeing
green.Ifthisis,as theysay,metaphysically
thenofcourse
possible,

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100/ BrianLoar
properties.
phenomenal
qualitiesare notpsychofunctional
is the
forthe possibility
Now it seemsthatthe onlyargument
ofinverted
qualia.Butthisis justanother
coherentconceivability
itis conceivable
epistemic
argument:
versionoftheantiphysicalist
theseeing
statecan occurwithout
thatanygivenpsycho-functional
of green, and with the seeing of red, say; thereforethe
roleandthephenomenal
qualityinvolvedistinct
psychofunctional
I am puzzledas to howa physicalist
can acceptthis
properties.
and notalso accepttheanalogous
argument
againstfunctionalism
reason
thereis as much,or as little,
one againstphysicalism
itself;
hereas in the earliercase. Phenomenal
to acceptthe argument
arecognitively
ofpsychofunctional
concepts,
independent
concepts
granted;it does notfollowthatconceptsofthetwosortscannot
introduce
thesame property.
absentqualia argument
Ned Blockhas advancedthefollowing
so as to realize
[1978].SupposetheChinesenationwereorganized
ofa personseeinggreen.Evidently
thepsychofunctional
organization
theChinesenationwouldnotcollectively
be seeinggreenorhaving
could
Inthiswayanypsychofunctional
property
anyothersensation.
be realizedwithout
a givenphenomenal
and hencecannot
quality,
be identical
withone.Nowthisargument
couldappeardialectically
moretelling
thantheinverted
foritapparently
rests
qualiaargument,
thatthe
on morethana conceptual
Itseemsa plaintruth
possibility.
sensation.
be havinga collective
Chinesepeoplewouldnotthereby
Surelyit is barmyto be agnosticaboutthat.
intomyown
Have I a specialinsight
Butwhatis theargument?
physicalstateswherebyI can say:therepeatablethatI reidentify
wheneverI attendto myseeinggreenis nota psychofunctional
ButI mustifI can be surethattheChinesenationcannot
property?
havewhatI have whenI see green.Iftheargument
is
collectively
not"theydo notcollectively
have,byvirtue
oftheirpsychofunctional
whatI have whenthisoccurs",thenwhatis it?But
organization,
ifthatis theargument,
I mustknow,independently
ofthethought
thatin me the property
of seeinggreenis not a
experiment,
knowinotherwordsthatwhatI reidentify
psychofunctional
property,
is not sucha property.
But I knowno suchthing.How could I
possibly?
concepts
againstapplying
phenomenal
Intuition
countsstrongly
intuition
to things
thatare notsingleorganisms.
Butphilosophical
has also countedstrongly
againstapplying
suchconceptseven to

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Phenomenal
States/ 101
otherhumanphysicalsystems.
Andthatintuition,
I have argued,
countsforlittle.Itseemsto derivefromtheinability
to applyselfdirected
tothings
otherthanoneself,
phenomenal
concepts
andthis
inability
signifies
nothing.
It is notthatwe are epistemologically
barredfromknowingwhetherthe Chinesenationwould then
be seeinggreen.Ourignorance
collectively
isofourownstates,and
it preventsconcludinganythingsubstantivefromthought
ofthistype.Itispossiblethatphenomenal
experiments
qualitiesare
psychofunctional;
andyetagainforallphilosophers
knowitispossible
that, say, biochemical properties are essential to their
individuation.21

9. Incorrigibility
Physicalism,
itmaybe said,cannotacknowledge
theincorrigibility
ofphenomenal
oftheform"iffeelslikethat".Forsurely
judgments
thereisno guarantee
thata capacity
forrecognizing
a givenphysical
property
does notat timesmisfire;
and perhapseven moreto the
point,therecan be no guaranteethatto a givenrecognitional
therecorresponds
a repeatable
disposition
physical
property.
Perhaps
an anti-physicalist
willgrantthatcertainkindsof mistakeabout
butone thinghe presumably
phenomenal
qualitiesare possible22;
willinsiston is this:we cannotbe wronginthinking
thatthereare
phenomenalqualities.
Nowsupposeitturnedoutthatno systemofphysical-functional
properties
corresponded
tothesystem
ofourphenomenal
concepts.
Woulda physicalist
notthenhaveto saythereare no phenomenal
leaves thisopen nota
qualities?And is thefactthatphysicalism
seriousproblem?
But thatverypossibility
oughtto makeus dubiousaboutthe
of the judgmentthatthereare real phenomenal
incorrigibility
repeatables.What reason have we to thinkour phenomenal
discriminate
real properties?
one mightsay,
judgments
Memory,
cannotbe thatmistaken:
we canhardly
innerstates
denythatpresent
resemble
paststatesinwayswe wouldrecognize
again.Despitethis
conviction
however,ifno systemofphysical-functional
properties
an
to one's putativephenomenaldiscriminations,
corresponded
alternative
tononphysical
wouldbe this:memory
qualities
radically
deceivesus intothinking
internal
features
andnonwe discriminate

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102/ BrianLoar
randomly
classify
ourownstates.Strongevidencethatno suitable
physical-functional
properties
existmightamaze and staggerone.
Butstrange
things
do happen.Itwouldthenhaveemergedthatwe
are subjectto a powerfulillusion,a cognitiveratherthan a
phenomenalillusion-we would be judgingfalselythat we
discriminate
realphenomenal
properties.
Itdoesseemlikely
thatwe genuinely
internal
discriminate
physicalButwiththatsaid,positing
nonfunctional
statesinintrospection.23
physical
properties
toforestall
thepossibility
ofradicalerror,
however
theoretically
adventurous
(evenreckless),
wouldin something
like
a moralsensestillbe ratherfaint-hearted.
The wholepointabout
the phenomenalis how it appears.And thatmeansthereis no
introspective
guarantee
ofanything
beyondmereappearance,
even
ofdiscriminations
ofgenuinerepeatables.
The dualistbalksat the
implications
and inventsa realmofproperties
to ensurethatthe
appearances
arefacts,
butthisdoesnotrespect
thetruly
phenomenal
natureofwhatis revealedby introspection
at itsleasttheoretical.
10. Sensationtermsand phenomenalqualities
Consider
thisobjection.
"Doesitnotfollowfrom
youraccountthat,
if no physical-functional
propertiesare discriminated
by our
phenomenal
conceptions,
thenthereare no suchstatesas pains,or
orevenconsciousness?"
Itdoesnotfollow.
Whatfollows
sensations,
isthatsensations,
andconsciousness
itself,
would(inthatimprobable
Brainstatescouldstillhave
case)notinvolvephenomenal
qualities.
causalrolesthatmakethemsensations,
without
havingproperties
thataregenuinely
markedoffordiscriminated
byjudgnentsofthe
form"feelslikethis,likethat".Keep in mindthat"phenomenal
is notintroduced
from
quality"
byabstraction
"pain"or"sensation",
butrather
as thegenerictermforqualitiesourconception
ofwhich
derivesfromintrospection,
of Englishmentalstate
independently
terms.
creatures
to which
Supposethaton anotherplanetwe encounter
we finditthoroughly
appropriate
to ascribepains,on thebasisnot
states(as we
onlyoftheirbehaviorbutalso oftheirhavinginternal
infer)
produced
whichtheytryinstinctively
bydamageandburning,
to getoutof,and so on. It is compatible
withthisthattheyshare
withyou or me no psychofunctional
or physicalstatethatwe

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Phenomenal
States/ 103
specifically
discriminate
whenwe are in pain. It does not seem
toinsist
obviously
misguided
nevertheless
thattheywouldbe feeling
pain.Nowitshouldbe clearwhattheconceivability
ofthatwould
show:nospecific
phenomenal
conceptispartofourconcept"pain".
Ifintuition
insists
thatanypainmusthavea certaincharacteristic
phenomenal
thentheEnglish
quality,
term"pain",
as oneunderstands
it,does inpartexpress(counter
tothesupposition
justentertained)
a phenomenal
Itisfarfrom
concept.
cleartomewhich,
ifany,English
termsformentalstatesconnotephenomenal
qualities.ButI do not
thinkthismatters
inanyfundamental
way;intuition
mayina given
case favorasserting
ordenying
thata giventermexpressesa given
phenomenal
concept,and eitherway itwouldbe clearwhatthen
tosay.I do notthink
theseconsiderations
createanyfurther
problem
aboutourconceptions
ofphenomenal
inphilosophy
qualities.
Nothing
shouldmakeonedoubteitherthatsuchqualities
arerealorthatthey
are physical.
Appendix
Kripke,in a postscript
to his book aboutWittgenstein
[1982],
an argument
reconstructs
of Wittgenstein's
to thiseffect:if my
primary
conceptofsensation
isderivedfrom
myowncase,I cannot
form
a conception
ofanother
coherently
a sensation,
person's
having
i.e.ofthatperson's
whatI have.(Conventional
having
epistemological
aboutothermindswouldthenbe unformulatable,
scepticism
forit
presupposes
whatthisargument
denies.)In Kripke'sversion,the
argumentgoes like this.Assumethatif I have conceptionsof
of subjectsof experience,
and ofwhatit is fora
sensation-types,
I havethemfrom
subjecttohavean experience,
myowncase.There
are twopossiblemodelsformyconception
of anotherpersonas
ofa giventype.On thefirst,
I conceiveanother
havinga sensation
anotherself,as havingthesensation
subjectofexperience,
(putting
asidethequestionhowI conceivetherelation
betweenanotherself
and anotherbody.)On the second,I conceivethe sensationas
toanother
I have
belonging
directly
body.Now,forHumeanreasons,
from
ofa separateselftowhicha given
myowncase no conception
sensationbelongs,and therefore
no conceptionof a sensation's
I cannotconceiveofanother
tosucha self.Consequently
belonging
person'shavinga sensation
bygeneralizing
first-person
conceptions

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104/ BrianLoar
ofa) a selfthatb) standsinsucha relation
to c) a sensation
ofthis
type.IfI am thento havea conception
ofanotherperson'shaving
a certainsensation
I acquirefrommyowncase) that
(a conception
canonlymeanthatI havea conception
ofsomeappropriate
relation
betweenanotherbodyand a sensation
ofthattype.Buthowam I
to conceivethatrelation?
Whatmeaningcan I give,forexample,
to thedifference
betweena givenpain'shavingthatrelationto a
givenbody,to a partofthatbody,or to a distinct
body?Consider
theusualcausal relations
betweena painand a body-i.e. being
causedbydamageto thebody,or alleviablebyrepairing
it.There
is no incoherence
insucha relation's
holding
betweenanother
body
and a pain of mine,and so it cannotsuffice
fora givenpain's
"belonging
to" thatbody.Or considersubjectively
locatinga pain
inone'sbody-"myleftthighhurts".
Thereis noincoherence
inmy
conceivingmyfeelinga pain "in" anotherbodyin thatsense.24
Wittgenstein
concludes
ofa sensation,
that,ifmyconception
e.g.pain,
comesfrom
myowncase,I cannotdistinguish
(i)imagining
myfeeling
pain"in"thatbody,from(ii)conceiving
ofthatpainas belonging
to thatbodyin some sense sufficient
forconceivingof another
I havefrommy
person'sfeeling
pain.Butifwhatever
conceptions
owncase giveme no genuineconception
ofanotherbody'sfeeling
pain,andno genuineconception
ofanotherself'sfeeling
pain,they
ofanotherperson'sfeelingpain.
giveme no genuineconception
Itshouldbe clearwhatreplyshouldbe madetothis.A sensationconceptionacquiredfrommy own case does not excludethe
thattheproperty
ofwhichitis a conception
is a physical
possibility
Itis a conception,
whatever
property.
ifyoulike,of"thisproperty
itis".Mereintrospection
ofcoursedoesnottellmethatthisproperty
is a physical
property;
butnordoesittellmethatitis nota physical
andifI thendiscoverthatit(theproperty
I discriminate)
property,
I can easilyconceivea suitablerelationbetweenthat
is physical,
sensation(type)-thatproperty-and
anotherbody:thesensation
ofthesetmustbe a property
ofthatbody.Anditis no requirement
thatrelationsolelyfrommyown case.
up thatI understand
Wittgenstein's
questionis how to accountfor the intuitive
connection
betweena phenomenal
stateandthebodyoftheperson
ofnonwho has thesensation.
Ifwe haveno genuineconception
andto
selveswhoseconnection
tobodiesis unproblematic
physical
which phenomenalstates belong,then perhapsWittgenstein's
doesshowthatwe havenofurther
argument
satisfactory
conception

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Phenomenal
States/ 105
ofa nonphysical
phenomenal
state'sspecialconnection
to another
body.ButthatmakesWittgenstein's
argument
rather
different
than
it seemed:theproblemwouldlie notin theidea ofconceptsone
acquiresfromone's owncase butin dualismitself.25
Notes
1. Cf. Thomas Nagel [1974, 1986]; FrankJackson[1982].
2. Cf. Warner[1986].
statesto be functional
3. E.g. by anyonewho holdsconceptsofexperiential
concepts.
claim is hardlytakenforgrantednowadays,butitshould
4. This identity
not be ruledout by any philosophicalprinciple.
5. Then thepropertyconnotedby the termwould be physical-functional;
butthatimplies,by the lightsof the theoryof meaningthatbacks the
semanticminorpremise,thatthesense ofthetermwouldbe a physical
property.Butthentherewouldbe an a prioriconnectionbetweenthat
phenomenaltermand some physicalterm,viz. one thatmore directly
expresses thatsense, which is inconsistentwiththe premise.
replyto Kripkethantheone
6. RichardBoyd [1980]givesa quitedifferent
I give, one thatrequiressayingthatwe can coherentlyimaginethat
pain is notidenticalwithP because we can imaginea worldin which
pain is not identicalwithsome stateotherthan P whichappears as P
in factappears.I findthisunpersuasive,foressentiallythereasonsgiven
by Levin [1983],pp 94-5.
7. I believe he is oftenunderstoodas being thus committed.
8. For a physicalisthas to say that"thisstatefeelslikethat"has thesame
possibleworldtruthconditionsas somethingoftheform"thisstatehas
propertyP."
physical-functional
9. Itis in respectofthiskindofpoint,and thepointsofthenextparagraphs,
thatmy positiondiffersfromthatof JanetLevin in [1986].
10. At timesonlythe recognitionalabilityis operative,associatedwithan
extrinsiccharacterization:I may thinkabout feelingnausea as "that
obnoxiousstatewhich...",not being able to imagineit althoughquite
able to recognizeitwhen itoccurs.Still,abilitiesto recognizea feeling
and to imagineit seem closelylinked,perhapsbecause althoughthe
abilitydoes notimplytheimaginativecapacitysomething
recognitional
like the converse is true.
11. I hope that,fromthe characterizationof recognitionalconcepts that
occursa fewparagraphshence,it willbe plausiblethatsuch concepts
account
ofanydetailedtheoretical
are normallycognitively
independent
of the propertiesthattriggerthem.This certainlyseems quite evident
regardingrecognitionalconceptionsof physicalobjects,e.g. stars: a
personmay be extremelygood at tellingstarsfromotherobjects-e.g.
bugs,airplanes,comets,planets-withouthavingany real idea
lightning
of what theyare.

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106 / Brian Loar

12. Itshouldbe clearthatonthisaccount"feelslikethis"rigidly
designates
whatever
property
itpicksout.Butthenitrigidly
designates
thesame
property
thatsometheoretical
conceptrigidly
designates.
Thiscould
seemproblematic.
Forifa predicate
a property
rigidly
designates
without
theintervention
ofa contingent
mustthatpredicate
reference-fixer,
not
Andiftwopredicates
capturetheessenceofthedesignated
property?
capturetheessenceofthesameproperty
mustonenotbe abletoknow
thata priori?
For thesequestionsbothto be answeredaffirmatively,
thenotion
it mustbe a
"capturetheessenceof"mustbe equivocal.In thefirst
referential
notion:"directly
i.e. via no contingent
rigidly
designate",
reference
fixer.Intheseconditmustmean:be cognitively
equivalent
tosometheoretical
whichrevealstheinternal
predicate
ofthe
structure
property.
does notimplythesecond.
And,I say,thefirst
13. Coulditnotturnoutinthefollowing
waythatthereis nobestanswer:
thereis equallygood reasonto say thatx discriminates
a certain
stateandtosaythatx discriminates
a lowerorderstatethat
functional
realizesthatfunctional
state.(Thiswasputto mebyStephenSchiffer.)
Let'sbe clearthatthisis notinevitable:
an arsenicdetector
mayonly
ofa-poison-that-works-thus-and-so,
andvice
peraccidensbe a detector
Andsupposetheproblem
versa.Butsupposeithappens.
is notmerely
a matter
oftherebeingnoobviouswayofproceeding
experimentally.
intruth:
Thenthesewillbe indeterminate
"thatphenomenal
qualityis
identical
withsuchandsuchphysical
and"thatphenomenal
property",
withso andso functional
AndI can see
qualityis identical
property".
no reasonwhythispossibility
shouldbe an objectionto thepresent
account.
14. Thattheymayhavethesametruth
canbe shownas follows.
condition
a self-directed
(i).Ex hypothesi,
ofone'sownstates"x feels
conception
likethat"rigidly
a property
designates
ofstatesthatisalso designated
by a physical-functional
predicateof statesFx (ifthatself-directed
ofstatesGx
conception
designates
anyproperty.)
(ii).Ifthepredicates
andFx rigidly
thesameproperty,
thenso do thepredicates
designate
ofpersonsy is in a G stateandy is in an F state.(iii)But,if...y...and
-y- rigidly
thesameproperty,
then...she...and-she- have
designate
thesamepossible-world
condition.
truth
15. Nagel1974,p. 442.
16. Empiricists
facedtheproblemofwhata merelydeterminable
image
might
be like.Thisis anotherreasonwhythenotionofrecognitional
ofcertain
morefundamental
capacities-i.e.
classificatory
propensities-is
than that of imaginative
capacities;there is no problemabout
recognitional
dispositions
beingofvaryingdegreesofgenerality.
17. ThomasNagel,in a notecommenting
on an earlierdraft.
18. Cf.Nagelop cit.
19. Asforcommonsense
functional
itisempirically
properties,
that
unlikely
withthem.Hereisonewayofseeing
areidentical
phenomenal
qualities
this.Weknowthatsensations
canbe produced
bynon-standard
means,
e.g.bypokingaroundinthebrain;butthisofcourseis no partofthe

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PhenomenalStates / 107

20.
21.

22.
23.

24.
25.

commonsense
functional
roleoftheproperty
ofseeingred.Nowsuppose
thisproperty
is producedinmebya brainprobe.Whatconstitutes
its
beinga sensation
ofred?Ifitis itscommonsense
role,then
functional
thatproperty
wouldbe thesensation
ofredbyvirtue
of(something
like)
itsnormally
havingsuchandsuchcausesandeffects
(itdoesn'thave
themhere).Butthismakessenseonlyiftheproperty
inquestion
isitself
a distinct
"lower-order"
property
aboutwhichitiscontingently
truethat
normally
ithassuchandsuchcausesandeffects
although
itlacksthem
here.Thatlower-order
property
wouldthenbe a farbettercandidate
(thanthecommonsense
functional
property)
forbeingtheproperty
one's
discriminates.
phenomenal
conception
Forthisreason,
suchbrainprobes
turnout to be strongand perhapseven conclusiveevidencethat
phenomenal
qualities,
theoneswe discriminate
inapplying
phenomenal
concepts,
are notidentical
withcommonsense
functional
properties.
Thereare otherwaysofreachingthesameconclusion.
Cf.Block1978.
Supposeoneconceives
of"understanding
a language"
as something
that
essentially(but only very partially)involveshavingappropriate
phenomenalstatesand dispositions
to have such states(where
is notconstrued
thesame
"appropriate"
toonarrowly.)
Thenessentially
is to be madeinreplyto Searle'sclaimthathis
pointas theforegoing
"Chineseroom"case showsthatunderstanding
a languagecannotbe
a psychofunctional
property
[1980].
Cf.Warner[forthcoming].
WhenI see a ripelemonindaylight
andattendtomyvisualexperience
I formthememory
beliefthatwhatI introspect
is whatI introspected
inclined
as I am)thelasttimeI saw a ripelemon
(phenomenologically
indaylight.
Itseemsa reasonable
thatprobably
inference
empirical
ripe
lemonsin suchcircumstances
cause in me stateswhichmymemory
recordsas the same. Butthisinference
accurately
is, I take it,not
muchabout
reasonable
on introspective
grounds
alone;itpresupposes
howtheworldworks.
Imagine
feeling
pain"in"thetipofthepencilinyourhand.Nowimagine
to feelpain"in"itafteryoudropit.
continuing
Forpointing
Thispaperhasgonethrough
manydrafts.
outa substantial
whose
errorinan ancestor
ofthepaperI amindebted
toGeorgeMyro,
correction
trackas I nowsee it.I havelearnedmuch
putmeontheright
fromconversations
on phenomenal
qualitieswithJanetLevinand
RichardWarner.StephenSchiffer
madeseveralvaluablesuggestions
certain
aboutthestructure
ofthepaperandgotmetoclarify
arguments.
I amalsograteful
forcomments
ancestor
toKentBach,
onthementioned
Hartry
Field,AndreasKemmerling,
DugaldOwen,ThomasRicketts,
HansSluga,StephenStichand BruceVermazen.

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108 / Brian Loar

References
in W. Savage, ed.,
Block,Ned [1978]."TroubleswithFunctionalism",
ofScience,Vol IX.
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Studiesin thePhilosophy
inN.Block(ed.)
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Boyd,Richard
[1980]."Materialism
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