LAND TITLES CASE DIGESTS | ATTY.

CADIZ
REMEDIES

D2012

(1) FRANCISCO V. PUNO

(2) NEYPES V. CA

FACTS: On August 29, 1979, Lagar filed with CFI of Quezon a

complaint for reconveyance of a parcel of land and damages
alleging that her father caused the land in question titled in
his name alone in spite of the property being conjugal and
then sold it to the predecessor in interest of the Franciscos
from whom they bought the same.
Puno, Respondent judge rendered judgment finding the
evidence insufficient to sustain the cause of action alleged
and therefore dismissing the complaint.
Lagar filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration
alleging that the insufficiency of her evidence was due to
the fault of her counsel who presented the same without her
being fully prepared. She claimed that she had newly
discovered evidence that could prove her cause of action.
She wasnt prepared to take the witness stand when she
testified.
Puno denied the same for having been filed out of time
(more than 30 days had already elapsed 32 to be exact)
Lagar filed a petition for relief under Rule 38 claiming that
if she will be allowed to introduce evidence in her
possession, which by excusable neglect and/or mistake were
not introduced, the same will necessarily alter and/or
change the decision in her favor. Evidence in support of her
claim that it is a conjugal property consist of a deed of sale
in favor of the conjugal partnership. The petition wherein
his father changed his civil status was not known personally
to the Lagar, otherwise she could have made reservations in
that petition eventually protecting her right insofar as of
the property is concerned.
The Franciscos on the other hand claimed that the
petition for relied was filed out of time in the light of Sec 3
Rule 38 which provides that such a petition should e filed
within 60 days after the petitioner learns out of the
judgment, order or proceeding to be set aside, and not more
than 6 months after such judgment or order was entered or
such proceeding was taken.
CFI ruled in favor of Lagar, stating that the 60 day period
should be counted from the time where she personally
learned of the said notice and not from the when notice was
served to her counsel.

FACTS: Petitioners Neypes et.al filed for an action for

annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction
against Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands,
Land Bank and heirs of Bernardo del Mundo.
Petitioner filed a motion to declare the respondents in
default while the respondents filed a motion to dismiss
based on prescription. The motion to declare the
respondents in default were granted except for the heirs,
while the motion to dismiss was denied. The respondent
heirs filed a motion for reconsideration. On February 12,
1998, the trial court dismissed the petitioners complaint on
the ground that it has already prescribed which was
allegedly received only on March 3, 1998. On March 18,
1998, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied July 1, 1998 which was received on July 22,
1998. On July 27, 1998 petitioners filed a notice of appeal
which was denied holding that it was filed 8 days late.
Another motion for reconsideration was filed which was also
denied, hence this petition for certiorari and mandamus.
The petitioners claimed that the 15 day reglementary
period started to run only on July 22 since this was the day
they received the final order of the trial court denying their
motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
(1) W/N motion for trial and petition for relief are
exclusive of each other
(2) W/N notice to counsel of the decision is notice to
the party for purposes of Section 3 of Rule 38.
RULING: Yes to both.
1. Another remedy is available, as, in fact, private
respondent had filed motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration alleging practically the same main
ground of the petition for relied under discussion,
which was denied, what respondent should have
done was to take a higher court such denial.
2. The principle that notice to the party, when he is
represented by a counsel of record is not valid is
applicable here in the reverse for the very same
reason that it is the lawyer who is supposed to
know the next procedural steps or what ought to be
done in law henceforth for the protection of the
rights of the client, and not the latter

ISSUE: W/N the notice of appeal was filed within the 15 day
reglementary period
HELD: YES. To standardize the appeal periods and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court
deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC counted from
the receipt of order dismissing a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, hence this to should apply to MTC. The use
of the disjunctive word or signifies disassociation and
independence from one thing to another. The use therefore
of or should mean that the notice of appeal may be filed
15 days from the notice of judgment or 15 days from the
notice of the final order. The fresh period of 15 days
becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion
for reconsideration. The petitioner therefore filed it well
within the fresh appeal period of 15 days.

(3) CRUZ V. NAVARRO

FACTS: Respondent spouses filed an application for
registration of 5 parcels of land. Respondent judge declared
the spouses owners thereof and ordered the issuance of the
corresponding decree of registration.
Thereafter, the petitioners filed a "Petition for Review of
Decree of Registration" alleging that the spouses have
willfully and falsely made it appear that they are the
absolute owners and possessors of the parcels of land when,
in truth, the petitioners herein are the real owners and
possessors thereof. Respondent judge denied said petition,
as well as, the subsequent MR thus, this petition for
certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners, as grantees of public land, have
legal personality to file the petition for review
independently of the Director of Lands.
HELD: YES, having alleged compliance with all conditions
essential to grant of government land, petitioners have
amply alleged such real, legally protected interest over the

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LAND TITLES CASE DIGESTS | ATTY. CADIZ

REMEDIES
parcels in question sufficient to clothe them with the
necessary personality to question, independently of the
Director of Lands, the validity of the grant of title over the
said properties to the private respondents.
Once a homestead applicant has complied with all the
conditions essential to a Government grant he is deemed to
have already acquired by operation of law not only a right to
a grant, but a grant of the Government. Thus, even without
a patent actually issued, he has unquestionably acquired a
vested right in the land and is to be regarded as the
equitable owner thereof.
A review of the decree of registration is warranted when
the following conditions concur (sec 38 of Act 496):
(a) the petitioner has a real or dominical interest or right
(he is the owner of the land ordered registered in the name
of the respondent) or the petitioner's lien or interest in the
land does not appear in the decree or title issued in the
name of the applicant;
(b) the petitioner has been deprived thereof or his lien or
interest thereon was omitted, through fraud;
(c) the property has not yet been transferred to an innocent
purchaser for value; and
(d) the petition is filed within 1 year from the issuance of
the decree.
The nature of fraud required to justify re-opening or
review of decree of registration must be:

ACTUALthere must have been an intentional

concealment or omission of a fact required by law
to be stated in the application or a willful
statement of a claim against the truth, either of
which is calculated to deceive or deprive another of
his legal rights.

EXTRINSICit is employed to deprive a party of his

day in court, thereby preventing him from asserting
his right to the property registered in the name of
the applicant.
Here, this fraud consists of the allegedly intentional
omission by the spouses to properly inform the court that
there were persons (the petitioners) in actual possession and
cultivation of the parcels in question. Thus, denying the
court and the Chief of the Land Reg Commission the exercise
of their authority to require the sending of specific
individual notices of the pendency of the questioned
application. The "Notice of Initial Hearing," did not contain a
specific mention of the names of the petitioners, but only
those of public official and private individuals who evidently
were not interested in the outcome of the questioned
application.

(4) REXLON REALTY V. CA

FACTS: Respondent Alex L. David is the registered owner of
two (2) parcels of land located in Molino, Bacoor, Cavite
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-72537
and T-72538. On August 17, 1989, petitioner Rexlon Realty
Group, Inc. (Rexlon, for brevity) entered into an agreement
with respondent David for the purchase of the said two (2)
parcels of land as evidenced by a document denominated as
"Absolute Deed of Sale".
On February 18, 1994, David filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Cavite City, Branch 16, a petition for the issuance
of owners duplicate copies of TCT Nos. T-72537 and T72538 to replace the owners duplicate copies which were
allegedly lost. On March 1, 1994, the RTC granted the said
petition in a decision.
Petitioner Rexlon then filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for annulment of the said Decision of the trial court

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on the ground that respondent David allegedly employed

fraud and deception in securing the replacement owners
duplicate copies of the subject TCTs; The petition was later
amended, with leave of court, to include as respondent
Paramount Development Corporation of the Philippines
(Paramount, for brevity) upon discovering that respondent
David had executed on September 20, 1994, a deed of sale
of the subject parcels of land in favor of Paramount. As a
result of that sale, new certificates of title designated as
TCT Nos. T-525664 and T-525665 were issued in the name of
respondent Paramount in lieu of TCT Nos. T-72537 and T72538 in the name of Alex L. David.
On November 19, 1996, public respondent Court of
Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition of
petitioner Rexlon.
ISSUE: Whether the Court can rule on the validity or nullity
of the titles issued in the name of respondent Paramount in
the light of the facts of this case?
HELD: YES
Firstly, it must be remembered that, in the amended
petition of Rexlon for annulment of judgment, respondent
Paramount was impleaded for the reason that the prayer
therein sought the nullification of the new titles issued in
the name of respondent Paramount. Inasmuch as a petition
for annulment of judgment is classified as an original action
that can be filed before the Court of Appeals,17 the said
court can admit, by way of an amendment to the petition,
new causes of action intimately related to the resolution of
the original petition. Hence, respondent Paramount became
a necessary party in the petitioners original cause of action
seeking a declaration of the existence and validity of the
owners duplicate copy of the subject certificate of title in
the possession of the latter, and an indispensable party in
the action for the declaration of nullity of the titles in the
name of respondent Paramount.
Secondly, respondent Paramount has duly consented to
put in issue the validity of its titles by invoking in this
appeal the reasons espoused by the appellate court and
respondent David for the dismissal of the petition to annul
the decision of the trial court.
Thirdly, in order for a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of the case, we must decide on the effect of void
duplicate copies of a certificate of title that served as a
basis for the sale of the property it represents and the
eventual issuance of titles in the name of respondent
Paramount. To require another proceeding only for the
purpose of annulling the said new titles when the same
could be decided in this very petition would promote
judicial bureaucracy.

(5) RIVERA V. MORAN

FACTS: In a cadastral case, the CFI ordered several lots
registered in the names of Garcia and Llorente.
Subsequently, Llotente transferred his interest over the said
lots to Garcia, who mortgaged the land to Rivera.
Later on, the Attorney General presented a petition for
review under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act,
alleging that the adjudication of the land to Garcia and
Llorente had been obtained by fraud consisting in the
fraudulent alterations of the stenographic notes taken in the
cadastral case.
Llorente filed a petition in Court saying that the CFI was
without jurisdiction to reopen the case because of the
following reasons:

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LAND TITLES CASE DIGESTS | ATTY. CADIZ

REMEDIES
1)
2)

3)
4)

No sufficient notice was given of the hearing of the

petition for review filed on February 15, 1923, and
That the Director of Lands was precluded from
alleging fraud since in when his Motion for
Reconsideration was denied, he failed to appeal.
Therefore, the matter is res judicata.
That since there was no final decree was issued,
the petition for review was presented prematurely,
and
The parties are innocent mortgagors.

ISSUE: Is the petition for review valid?

HELD:
1)

2)

3)

4)

It was proven through preponderance of evidence

that notice of hearing was served upon Francisco,
the attorney for Garcia and Llorente. In addition
thereto, Garcia and Llorente appeared in Court
without questioning the jurisdiction of the court,
and hereby impliedly waived their objections to
such defects as there might have been in the
service of notice.
The petition for a review is separate and distinct
from a motion for a new trial. Therefore, the right
is a to the remedy is not affected by the denial of
such a motion irrespective of the grounds upon
which it may have been presented.
It is conceded that no decree of registration has
been entered and the law provides that a petition
for review of decree on the grounds of fraud must
be filed within one year after entry of the decree.
At first blush, it may seem that a petition for
review could not be filed in court. However, this
could not be the intention of the parties. The SC
held that a petition for review under Section 38
may be field at any time after the rendition of the
courts decision and before the expiration of one
year from the entry of the final decree of
registration.
The parties are not innocent purchasers for value.
They acquired interest over the land even before a
decree of registration was given

RULING: Petition for certiorari was denied.

(6) RUFLOE, ET AL V. BURGOS, ET AL

FACTS: During the marriage of Adoracion and Angel, they
acquired a 371- square meter parcel of land at Muntinlupa
subject of the present controversy. Respondent Delos Reyes
forged the signatures of Adoracion and Angel in a Deed of
Sale to make it appear that the subject property was sold to
her by the petitioner spouses. Because of this, she
succeeded in obtaining a certificate of title in her name.
The Rufloes then filed a complaint for damages against De
los Reyes contending that the Deed of Sale was falsified as
the signatures were forged because Angel Rufloe died in
1974, four (4) years before the alleged sale in favor of De los
Reyes. Along with this, they filed a notice of adverse claim.
During the pendency of the case, De los Reyes sold the
property to respondent Burgos siblings thus a new title was
issued in their names. The Burgos siblings sold the same
property to their aunt, Leonarda Burgos. Since the sale in
favor of the aunt was not registered, no title was issued in
her name. The said parcel of land remained in the name of
Burgos siblings who continued paying real estate taxes.

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The RTC ruled in favor of Rufloe saying that the Deed of

Sale was falsified because of the forged signatures. Rufloes
then filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Contract
and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles against the
respondents. Alleging that since Deed of Sale was falsified,
then no valid title was ever given to the Burgos siblings.
The RTC ruled in favor of Rufloes averring that the
respondents were not innocent purchasers for value and did
not have a better right to the property in question than the
true and legal owners, the Rufloes. In addition, the sale bet
Burgos siblings and their aunt was simulated to make it
appear that the aunt was a buyer in good faith. On the other
hand, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUES:
(1) W/N the sale of the parcel of land by Delos Reyes
to the respondents were valid and binding
(2) W/N the respondents are buyers in good faith and
for value despite the forged deed of sale of their
transferor Delos Reyes.
RULING: NO to both
Since the Deed of Sale executed by De los Reyes in favor
of the Burgos siblings and the subsequent sale to their aunt
was simulated based on forged signatures, no certificate of
title was ever issued in their name. Thus, it is a well-settled
principle that no one can give what one does not have. One
can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the
buyer can acquire no more right than what the seller can
transfer legally. The respondents could not be considered
buyers in good faith.
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the
property of another without notice that some other person
has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair
price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any
notice of another persons claim. The burden of proving the
status of a purchaser in good faith and for value lies upon
one who asserts that status.
The Rufloes, by filing an adverse claim, were more
protected of their interest over their property and served as
a notice and warning to third parties dealing with said
property that someone is claiming an interest on the same
and may have a better right than the registered owner.
Clearly, the respondent siblings and their aunt were not
innocent purchasers for value and in good faith.
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, every person dealing with
registered land, as in this case, may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefore and
will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to
determine the condition of the property.
However, this rule admits of an unchallenged exception:
when the party has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man
to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge
of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient
facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the
status of the title of the property in litigation. The
presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion
should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the
certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing
on the face of said certificate. One who falls within the
exception can neither be denominated an innocent
purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith and,
hence, does not merit the protection of the law.

(7) ADRIANO V. PANGILINAN

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LAND TITLES CASE DIGESTS | ATTY. CADIZ

REMEDIES

FACTS: The petitioner Adriano is the registered owner of a

parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
337942. Sometime on 1990, petitioner entrusted the original
owner's copy of the TCT to Salvador, a distant relative, for
the purpose of securing a mortgage loan.
Thereafter without the knowledge and consent of
petitioner, Salvador mortgaged the property to Respondent
Pangilinan. Subsequently when petitioner verified the status
of his title with the RD of Marikina, he was surprised to
discover that there was already annotation for REM in the
title, purportedly executed by one Adriano, in favor of the
Respondent, in consideration of P60,000.00, petitioner then
denied that he executed deed.
After repeated demand by the petitioner that respondent
return or reconvey to him his title to the said property and
when these demands were ignored or disregarded, he
instituted the present suit.
Respondent stated that he was a businessman engaged in
the buying and selling as well as in the mortgage of real
estate properties; that sometime in December, 1990
Salvador, together with Macanaya and a person who
introduced himself as Adriano, came to his house inquiring
on how they could secure a loan over a parcel of land; that
he asked them to submit the necessary documents, such as
the owner's duplicate of the transfer certificate of title to
the property, the real estate tax declaration, its vicinity
location plan, a photograph of the property to be
mortgaged, and the owner's residence certificate; that when
he conducted an ocular inspection of the property to be
mortgaged, he was there met by a person who had earlier
introduced himself as Adriano, and the latter gave him all
the original copies of the required documents to be
submitted; that after he (defendant) had verified from the
RD that the title to the property to be mortgaged was
indeed genuine, he and that person Adriano executed the
REM, and then had it notarized and registered with the RD.
After that, the alleged owner, Adriano, together with
Macanaya and another person signed the promissory note in
the amount of P60,000.00 representing the appraised value
of the mortgage property. This done, he defendant gave
them the aforesaid amount in cash.
Respondent claimed that petitioner voluntarily entrusted
his title Salvador for the purpose of securing a loan, thereby
creating a principal-agent relationship between the plaintiff
and Salvador for the aforesaid purpose. Thus, according to
respondent, the execution of the REM was within the scope
of the authority granted to Salvador; that in any event that
since the said TCT has remained with petitioner, the latter
has no cause of action for reconveyance against him." The
trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner, and the CA
reversed the said decision.
ISSUES: W/N consent is an issue in determining who must
bear the loss if a mortgage contract is sought to be declared
a nullity.

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the respondent to ascertain the identity of the imposter is

critical that it is due to this mistake that the property is now
encumbered by a REM. The court in granting that the
respondent is negligent finds that if there was any
negligence eon the party of Salvador, then such is
inconsequential. The court therefore ruled in favor of the
petitioner due to the negligence of the respondent.

(8) SANDOVAL V. CA
FACTS: This is another dispute over land ownership. The
subject property is a parcel of land on which a five-door
apartment building stands, located at No. 88 Halcon Street,
Quezon City, for which a TCT was issued in the name of
private respondent Lorenzo Tan, Jr.
In October 1984, Tan was asked to present his owners
copy of the TCT to the RD of QC in connection with an
adverse claim. He explained however that he was still
looking for his copy of the TCT. A month after, he
discovered that the adverse claim of one Godofredo Valmeo
had been annotated on his title. Apparently, a Lorenzo Tan,
Jr., obviously an impostor, had mortgaged the property to
Valmeo to secure a loan. Thereafter, the real Tan sued for
the cancellation of the annotation of mortgage and damages
against Almeda and Valmeo.
In 1985, Tan met with petitioner Juan Sandoval who
claimed to be the new owner of the site of the property. It
was discovered that as early as September 1984, someone
purporting to be Tan sod the property to Almeda in a Deed
of Sale of Registered Land with Pacto de Retro. Said person
also apparently executed a waiver in favor of Almeda, which
caused the cancellation of the TCT in Tans name and its
issuance in Almedas. Later on, Almeda sold the property to
petitioner for Php230, 000; a TCT was issued in Sandovals
name.
Tan alleged that petitioner had prior knowledge of the
legal flaws, which tainted Almedas title. Petitioner
countered that he was a purchaser in good faith and for
valuable consideration. He bought the land through real
estate brokers whom he contacted after seeing the property
advertised in an issue of the Manila Bulletin. Upon
guarantees of the brokers and his lawyers go-signal, he
proceeded to purchase the land, and paid in two
installments.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner Sandoval is a purchaser in good faith,
hence, shouldnt be held accountable for the fraud
committed against respondent Tan.
RULING: NO, he wasnt.
True, a forged deed can be the basis of a valid title, but
only if the certificate of title has already been transferred
from the true owners name indicated by the forger and
while it remained as such, the land was subsequently sold to
an innocent purchaser. Unquestionably, the vendee had the
right to rely upon the certificate of title.
It is well-settled doctrine that one who deals with
property registered under the Torrens system need not go
beyond the same, but only has to rely on the title; he is
charged with notice only of such burdens as are annotated
on the title. This admits of an exception though: a person
dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the
Torrens certificate and dispense with the need of inquiring
further except when the party has actual knowledge of facts
and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious
man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has
knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of

RULING: The court ruled in favor of the petitioner, setting

aside the decision of the CA, and reinstating the Ruling of
the RTC.
The court ruled that the mortgage is null and void, for
being entered into by a person who is not the absolute
owner of the thing.
The court also found that the petitioner is a not a
purchaser for value, that his negligence is the proximate
cause to the property being registered REM. According to
the court the respondent is a businessman and that while it
is true that when dealing with Torrens title one may rely on
the face of the title, the court held that the negligence of
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LAND TITLES CASE DIGESTS | ATTY. CADIZ

REMEDIES
sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to
inquire into the status of the title of the property in
litigation.
This case falls under the exception.
Firstly, since Sandovals lawyer apparently verified with
the RD, it was inevitable for him to come across the TWO
copies of the TCT. Sandoval was thus aware in fact of the
irregularity attending the original TCT and its derivative
certificates.
Secondly, Sandovals testimony that he actually met with
Almeda at the latters residence in Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila prior to the execution of the deed of sale is found to
be unconvincing and improbable on the ground of that the
deed contained the erroneous address of Almeda. It wasnt
likely that Sandoval could have been mistaken about the
residence of his vendor when the transaction was an
important one, involving as it does substantial
consideration.
Thirdly, the lack of consistency in his enumeration and
recollection of his alleged meetings with Almeda warrants
disbelief and inspires doubt.
Fourthly, the several but varying addresses of Almeda
should have alerted Sandoval of the questionability of
Almedas title. Thus, he is deemed to have actual notice of
the defects in Almedas title, which is contrary to his claim
of good faith.
Lastly, the certification on the deed that the property was
not tenanted was untrue. As parties interested in the
transaction, they should not have permitted such falsehood
to taint the instrument.
Sandoval, however, must be paid back by Almeda the sum of
Php230, 000.

(9) DURAN V. IAC

FACTS: Petitioner, Circe Duran originally owned two parcels
of land covered by TCT 1647 registered in the Registry of
Deeds in Caloocan City. Allegedly, she left the Philippines on
1954 and returned only on 1966. Allegedly while she was still
out of the country, on 13 May 1963, a Deed of Absolute Sale
of the two lots was executed in favor of Fe Duran,
petitioners mother. By virtue of the sale, TCT 1647 was
cancelled and was replaced by TCT 2418 and 2419.
Subsequently on 3 December 1965, Fe executed a Real
Estate Mortgage of the two lots in favor of private
respondent Erlinda B. Marcelo Tiangco.
Upon learning of the REM, petitioner wrote the Registry of
Deeds to inform the latter that her mother has no authority
to mortgaged the land. Petitioner received no reply, which
prompted her to return to the Philippines in 1966.
Meanwhile, the lots were foreclosed due to Fes
(petitioners mother) failure to redeem the properties and a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of private respondent
Tiangco.
Petitioner assailed the validity of the foreclosure
proceedings and the sale arguing that her signature was
forged in the Deed of Absolute Sale executed in favor of her
mother since it was impossible for her to sign the documents
while she was out of the country during that time.
ISSUE: W/N private respondent Tianco is a purchaser in good
faith and for value?
HELD: YES. Good faith consists in the possessor's belief that
the person from whom he received the thing was the owner
of the same and could convey his title. Good faith, while it
is always to be presumed in the absence of proof to the

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contrary, requires a well-founded belief that the person

from whom title was received was himself the owner of the
land, with the right to convey it. There is good faith where
there is an honest intention to abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage from another. In the case at bar,
private respondents, in good faith relied on the certificate
of title in the name of Fe S. Duran and as aptly stated by
respondent appellate court "[e]ven on the supposition that
the sale was void, the general rule that the direct result of a
previous illegal contract cannot be valid (on the theory that
the spring cannot rise higher than its source) cannot apply
here for the court is confronted with the functionings of the
Torrens System of Registration. The doctrine to follow is
simple enough: a fraudulent or forged document of sale
may become the ROOT of a valid title if the certificate of
title has already been transferred from the name of the
true owner to the name of the forger or the name
indicated by the forger."

(10) PINEDA V. CA | GONZALES

FACTS: In 1982, Spouses Benitez mortgaged their house and
lot (TCT 8361) to Pineda and Sayoc as security for P243,000
loan with 1 year maturity period. In 1983, with the consent
of Pineda, Benitezes sold the house to Mojica, where the
latter filed a petition for the issuance of 2nd owners
duplicate TCT 8361. Mojica claimed that she purchased a
parcel of land and that the owners duplicate TCT 8361 was
lost. 2nd owners duplicate TCT 8361 was issued in favor of
Mojica. A month after, she was able to purchase the lot on
which the house stood and upon registration with the RD,
TCT 8361 (2nd) was cancelled and TCT 13138 was issued in
favor of Mojica.
In Feb 1985, Mojica obtained a P290,000 loan from
Gonzales, secured with a PN and a mortgage of the house
and lot. Gonzales registered this deed of mortgage with the
RD, who annotated the mortgage on TCT 13138 as Entry No.
33209.
In May 1985, Pineda and Sayoc filed a complaint before
the RTC against Benitez and Mojica, praying for the
cancellation of 2nd owners duplicate TCT 8361. During the
pendency of the case, Notice of Lis Pendens was annotated
on the original TCT 8361 with the RD. In 1987, the court
granted the petition.
Mojica eventually defaulted on her obligation to Gonzales,
which led to the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged
house and lot. Gonzales purchased the house and lot at the
public auction; Mojica failed to redeem the property.
Because of Gonzales purchase, the RD cancelled TCT 13138
(Mojica) and issued TCT 16084 (Gonzales), which contained
Entry No. 35520 (Notice of Lis Pendens).
Dissatisfied, Benitez and Mojica appealed to CA, which
affirmed RTCs decision. On motion of Pineda and Sayoc,
RTC issued a WRIT OF EXECUTION to enforce the judgment.
The Sheriffs Return declared that the RD could NOT
implement the writ of execution because it had already
cancelled TCT 8361 and issued TCT 16084 (Gonzales). Pineda
and Sayoc, then, filed a motion with the RTC for the
issuance of an order requiring Gonzales to surrender the
owners duplicate TCT 16084 to the RD.
There were 3 orders, which the RTC rendered:
FIRST ORDER: declared Gonzales in default for having failed
to appear at hearing and oppose the motion to surrender his
TCT.
SECOND ORDER: declared TCT 16084 (Gonzales) void and
reinstated TCT 8361 (Benitez).

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REMEDIES
THIRD ORDER: denied Gonzales motion to lift 1st order and
to reconsider 2nd order.
Gonzales then filed with the CA, petition for Writ of
Prohibitory Injunction. CA declared 1st, 2nd and 3rd orders of
the RTC null and void, and Writ of PI permanent.
ISSUES:
(1) W/N a notice of lis pendens binds a subsequent
purchaser of the property (Gonzales) to the
outcome of the pending case
(2) W/N TCT 13138 and TCT 16084, being derived from
the void 2nd owners duplicate TCT 8361, are also
void
(3) W/N a separate action should be filed to cancel
TCT 16084, in accordance with Sec. 108, PD 1529
(4) W/N Gonzales was an innocent purchaser for value
RULING: Petition DENIED, CAs decision AFFIRMED.
(1) The effect of the Notice of Lis Pendens was to
subject Gonzales to the outcome of the case. But
such could not defeat Gonzales right under the
foreclosure sale because:
a. Gonzales registered the mortgage before
annotation of lis pendens in good faith,
making her mortgage valid despite
invalidity of TCT 13138.
b. Gonzales mortgage was valid, with the
auction sale retroacting to the date of the
registration of her mortgage.
(2) 2nd owners duplicate TCT 8361: VOID
a. It was in Pinedas possession and not lost,
as Mojica contended.
b. Mojica also obtained this through
misrepresentation by saying that she has
purchased a parcel of land when she
only bought the house.
c. What is void is the TCT, not Mojicas title
over it. TCT and Title are 2 different
things; TITLEownership of a property
while TCTevidence of ownership
TCT 13138 (Mojica): VOID
a. It was derived from the 2nd owners
duplicate TCT 8361, which is void.
TCT 16084 (Gonzales): VALID
a. It was obtained from the public auction.
b. Mortgage annotated on a void title is VALID
if mortgagee registered such in good faith.
c. Gonzales was in good faith because he had
no actual notice of prior unregistered
mortgage in favor of Pineda and Sayoc.
Notice of Lis Pendens was annotated after
Gonzales purchased property from the
public auction.
(3) YES. Under Sec. 108, PD 1529, Pineda and Sayoc
should have filed the petition to surrender TCT
16084 in the original case where decree of
registration of such TCT was entered and not in
case where they prayed for cancellation of 2nd
owners duplicate TCT 8361.
(4) YES, for having no actual notice of prior
unregistered mortgage in favor of Pineda and
Sayoc. Moreover, Gonzales was vigilant in
exercising her right to foreclose the property, while
Pineda and Sayoc were negligent in not registering
their mortgage. Rule is that whoever registers their
mortgage first would have better rights.

D2012

(11) HEIRS OF JOSE OLVIGA V. CA

FACTS: Angelita Glor and her children filed for reconveyance
of a parcel of land with the RTC of Caluag, Quezon against
the heirs of Jose Olviga. The RTC ruled in favor of the Glors
which led to the Olvigas to appeal with the CA arguing that
the action for reconveyance has already prescribed and that
they were purchasers in good faith. The CA affirmed the RTC
decision. A summary of events follows because it is much
easier that way:
1950 - Lot in question was still forestland when Eutiquio
Pureza and his father cultivated it by introducing fruit
bearing trees such as coconuts, jackfruits, mangoes,
avocado and bananas.
1956 The Bureau of Lands surveyed the land in the name of
Pureza but Godofredo Olviga, a son of Jose Olviga, protested
and claims that theyre entitled to of the lot.
1960 Pureza filed for homestead application over the lot.
1961 Pureza transferred his rights to Cornelio Glor, the
husband of Angelita. Neither the homestead application nor
the transfer was acted upon by the Director of Lands for
unknown reasons.
1967 Jose Olviga obtained a registered title for said lot in a
cadastral proceeding, in fraud of the rights of Pureza and his
transferee, Cornelio Glor and family. The lot was split and
transferred to the Olilas.
1988 Glors learned of the Olvigas title
April 10, 1989 The Glors filed an action for reconveyance
ISSUE: W/N the action for reconveyance has already
prescribed?
Held: NO. The SC has ruled in a number of cases that action
for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of
reference being the date of registration of the deed of the
date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the
property. However such rule applies only when the
plaintiff is not in possession of the property. If a person
claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of
the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in
effect seeks to quiet title to property doesnt prescribe.
In the case at bar, the Glors were in actual possession
since 1950 hence their undisturbed possession gave them the
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to
determine the nature of the claim of the Olvigas who, upon
their discovery in 1988 of the adverse title, disturbed their
possession.
Added factual note: What mustve happened was that the
Glors were not notified of the registration proceedings with
Angelita testifying that theres been neither notice nor
posting. Jose Olvigas falsely ommitted the fact that other
persons were in possession of the land he sought to be
registered.

(11) HEIRS OF JOSE OLVIGA V. CA

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LAND TITLES CASE DIGESTS | ATTY. CADIZ

REMEDIES
FACTS: The land in question was still considered a forestland
when Eutiquic Pureza and his father entered and cultivated
the land on 1950. On 1956 the land was released for
disposition and the Bureau of Lands surveyed the same and
was named in favor of Pureza. The lot was labeled as lot 13.
Godofredo Olviga, the father of Jose Olviga protested only
to the share of lot 13 claiming ownership over it, which
was included in the public records of the Bureau of Lands.
On 1960, Pureza applied for a homestead patent over lot
13 and while it was pending, he transferred all of his rights
to Cornelio Glor on 1961. Neither the patent application nor
the transfer of rights were acted upon by the Director of
Lands for some undisclosed reasons.
On 1967, in fraud of the Pureza and Glor, Jose Olviga
obtained a registered title for said lot in a cadastral
proceeding. It appeared that Glor was not aware of the
proceedings because due notice of the proceedings were not
given although Glor was in actual possession of the land.
Olviga, omitted to mention in the proceedings that other
persons were in actual possession of lot 13.
On 1988, Glor found out that the land was registered
already in the name of Olviga and subsequently filed an
action for reconveyance the following year.
ISSUE: W/N the action for reconveyance has already
prescribed?
HELD: NO, although the Court has ruled a number of times
before that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of lands
based on implied or constructive trust prescribed in ten
years, the point of reference being the date of registration
of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of
title over the property, it provides for an exception. This
rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of
the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner
thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to
seek reconveyance which in effect seeks to quiet title to the
property, does not prescribe.

(12) CABRERA V. CA
FACTS: The subject of the controversy is a parcel of land in
Cainta, Rizal. It was originally owned by the Spouses
Gonzaga, presumably with conjugal funds. Their
grandchildren, the private respondents claim the property
by right of succession. On the other hand, Cabrera, the
petitioner, claim the property by virtue of an alleged sale of
the uncle of the grandchildren in their favor.
The records show that the tax declaration on the land had
since 1921 been in the name of the spouses Gonzaga until
1944, when it was made in the name of Eliseo Gonzaga, the
petitioners uncle. In 1953, the tax declaration was again
changed in the name of Cabrera.
The grandchildren filed a complaint for recovery of the
property in the CFI of Rizal. Both parties adverted in their
respective pleadings to Cabreras application for registration
o the land under the Torrens system which was then pending
in another court.
At the trial, the counsel of the grandchildren asked for the
amendment of the complaint so as to make it read that they
discovered the change in the name of the tax declaration in
1969 instead of 1960 as erroneously writen. This was granted
without objection from the defense.
TC sustained the plaintiffs (grandchildren) after finding
that their evidence remained unrebutted and held that
Cabrera ailed to prove the alleged sale to them by Eliseo
(the uncle)

D2012

CA affirmed the decision but with modification that, as

recognized by plaintiffs, the 1/5 share pertaining to Eliseo
Gonzaga should be retained by Cabrera.
Cabrera came to the SC on certiorari. They claim that CA
erred in considering and allowing the complaint as an action
for reconveyance.
ISSUE: W/N action for reconveyance may be filed even
before the issuance of the decree of registration.
RULING: Action for reconveyance may be filed even before
the issuance of the decree of registration.
In Agreda v Agreda, SC held that an action for
reconveyance may be filed even before the issuance of the
decree of registration. There is no reason, indeed, why one
has to wait until the land is actually registered before he
can sue for reconveyance. The grandchildren filed their
complaint because they were unwilling to recognize the
registration proceedings for lack of compliance with the
notification requirements. They did not have to await its
termination. As it happened, providentially, the registration
was granted during the trial of the plaintiffs complaint for
recovery of the property. Hence, their pending action could
conveniently and properly be deemed an action for
reconveyance filed within the 1- year reglementary period.
There were valid grounds too. The private respondents
were able to establish that the transfer of the land had been
made under fraudulent circumstances. No evidence was
adduced that their uncle who allegedly purchased the land
from their grandfather had informed them of this fact
although he was living with them at that time.

(13) PINO V. CA
FACTS: A parcel of land in Echague, Isabela was bought by
spouses Juan and Rafaela Gaffud in 1924. On 1936 Juan
died. The land was registered on 1938 and an OCT was
issued in favor of Rafaela and his 2 sons Raymundo and
Cicero as co-owners. The lot was sold to Rafaela through a
Deed of Transfer which cancelled the OCT and in lieu
thereof a TCT was issued in the name of Rafaela. On 1967,
Rafaela sold a portion of the lot to Pascua which caused the
subdivision of the lot to Lot-A and Lot-B which was issued its
corresponding TCTs. On 1970, Rafaela sold the Lot-B to
Felicisima Pino evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute
Sale. It was registered and the corresponding TCT was
issued. On 1980 Cicero died and his wife Demetria and sons
Romualdo and Adolfo filed a complaint for nullity of sale and
reconveyance against petitioner, the portion sold to Pascua
however was not questioned. During the pendency of the
case Rafaela died. In 1988 the trial court held that she was
not a purchaser in good faith and that the action to annul
the deed of sale has not yet prescribed (4 years). This was
affirmed by CA.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner is a purchaser in good faith
HELD: YES. A vendee for value has a right to rely on what
appears on the face of the certificate of title and to
dispense with the need of inquiring further except when the
party concerned had actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man
to make such further inquiry. In the case at bar the TCT was
in the name of Rafaela Donato alone.
The non-production of the extra-judicial statement does
not prove that there was fraud committed. The respondents

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REMEDIES
should have presented it. No allegations much less any
evidence was given by the respondents.
The petitioner is therefore a purchaser in good faith. An
action for reconveyance based on constructive trust cannot
reach an innocent purchaser for value. The remedy of such
defrauded party is to file an action for damages within 10
years from the issuance of the Torrens Title. The action has
already prescribed since the date from the OCT and even on
the TCT was over 10 years.

(14) DE GUZMAN JR. V. NATIONAL TREASURER

FACTS: Spouses Milambiling bought a parcel of land and
before they left for abroad to work, they entrusted the Deed
of Sale and the Certificate of Title (still in the name of Sta.
Lucia Realty) to Belgica, a long-time friend, who
volunteered to register the sale and transfer the title in
their names
When Belgica arrived in Saudi Arabia to deliver the title,
she forgot to bring the title with her. This infuriated the
husband who then asked relatives to investigate. They
discovered that the title had indeed been transferred in
their names but was subsequently cancelled and transferred
in the names of the de Guzman spouses. What happened was
an impostor-couple, having obtained possession of the
owners duplicate copy of the certificate of title, sold the
property to the petitioners.
Thus, the Milambilings filed an action for declaration of
nullity of sale and title with damages. RTC, CA and SC ruled
in favor of them thus, spouses De Guzman filed action for
damages against the Assurance Fund.

D2012

The purpose for which the Assurance Fund was established

does not support the petitioners claim.
The Assurance Fund was intended to relieve innocent
persons from the harshness of the doctrine that a certificate
is conclusive evidence of an indefeasible title to land.
Petitioners did not suffer any prejudice because of the
operation of this doctrine. On the contrary, petitioners
sought to avail of the benefits of the Torrens System by
registering the property in their name. Unfortunately for
petitioners, the original owners were able to judicially
recover the property from them. However, the fact that the
petitioners eventually lost the property to the original
owners does not entitle them to compensation under the
Assurance Fund. The Court cannot sanction compensation
that is not within the law's contemplation.
The Government is not an insurer of the unwary citizens
property against the trickery of scoundrels. Petitioners
recourse is not against the Assurance Fund but against the
rogues who duped them.

ISSUE: W/N the Assurance Fund is liable for the losses

allegedly sustained by petitioners.
HELD: NO, According to Sec 95 of the Property Registration
Decree, the persons who may recover from the Assurance
Fund are as follows:
1) Any person who sustains loss or damage under the
following conditions:
a) there was no negligence on his part; and
b) the loss or damage sustained was through any omission,
mistake or malfeasance of the court personnel, or the
Registrar of Deeds, his deputy, or other employees of the
Registry in the performance of their respective duties under
the provisions of the Land Registration Act, now, the
Property Registration Decree; or
2) Any person who has been deprived of any land or interest
therein under the following conditions:
a) there was no negligence on his part;
b) he was deprived as a consequence of the bringing of his
land or interest therein under the provisions of the PRD; or
by the registration by any other person as owner of such
land; or by mistake, omission or misdescription in any
certificate of owners duplicate, or in any entry or
memorandum in the register or other official book or by any
cancellation; and
c) he is barred or in any way precluded from bringing an
action for the recovery of such land or interest therein, or
claim upon the same.
Petitioners have not alleged that the loss or damage they
sustained falls in either of the 2. Moreover, they were
negligent in not ascertaining whether the impostors were
really the owners of the property.
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