G.R. No.

193459 February 15, 2011

GUTIERREZ
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE
FACTS:

On 22 July 2010, Baraquel, et al. filed an impeachment complaint against Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez (petitioner)
based on betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution.
On 3 August 2010, a Second Complaint was filed by Reyes, et al. against the same respondent also based on betrayal of public
trust and culpable violation of the Constitution.
On 11 August 2010, the two complaints were referred by the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice at the same time.
On September 2010, the Committee on Justice found the First and Second Complaints sufficient in form
On 13 September 2010, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court seeking to enjoin the
Committee on Justice from proceeding with the impeachment proceedings. The petition prayed for a temporary restraining order.
Petitioner: She invokes the Courts expanded certiorari jurisdiction to "determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Respondent: The petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the course of the proceedings before public respondent. Public respondent argues that when petitioner filed
the present petition on September 13, 2010, it had not gone beyond the determination of the sufficiency of form and substance
of the two complaints. Hence, certiorari is unavailing.
The following day, during the en banc morning session of 14 September 2010, the majority of the Court voted to issue a status
quo anteorder suspending the impeachment proceedings against petitioner.
Section 3(5), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year."

ISSUE #1: WON Supreme Court has the power to determine whether public respondent committed a violation of the Constitution in the
exercise of its discretion relating to impeachment proceeding?
HELD: YES, under the doctrine of expanded judicial review. The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the
sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr, judicially
discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. There exists
no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of
checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another."
Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution. Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the
Legislature in this instance, but simply upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will.
ISSUE #2: WON petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication?
HELD: NO. In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions on the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two complaints and
on the need to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment
Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation. The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public
respondent two impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to
have acted prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be
initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of one year.
ISSUE #3: WON the Impeachment Rules provide for comprehensible standards in determining the sufficiency of form and substance.
HELD: YES. Contrary to petitioner contention, the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and
providing that there must be a "verified complaint or resolution," and that the substance requirement is met if there is "a recital of facts

constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee. In fact, it is only in the Impeachment Rules
where a determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is made necessary. This requirement is not
explicitly found in the Constitution which merely requires a "hearing." (Section 3[2], Article XI). In the discharge of its constitutional duty,
the House deemed that a finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an impeachment complaint is vital "to effectively carry out" the
impeachment process, hence, such additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules.
ISSUE #4: WON petitioner is denied of due process, because of the delay in the publication of the Impeachment Rules.
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court discussed the difference between publication and promulgation. To recall, days after the 15th Congress
opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3, 2010, public respondent provisionally adopted the Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress
and thereafter published on September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules, admittedly substantially identical with that of the 14thCongress,
in two newspapers of general circulation. Citing Taada v. Tuvera, petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process since the
Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the
complaints. She likewise tacks her contention on Section3 (8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that Congress shall
promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. Public respondent counters that
"promulgation" in this case refers to "the publication of rules in any medium of information, not necessarily in the Official Gazette or
newspaper of general circulation.
While "promulgation" would seem synonymous to publication," there is a statutory difference in their usage. PROMULGATION means
the delivery of the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication. Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is
generally understoodthat is, to make known. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its
Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate decision means to deliver
the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication. It is not for the Supreme Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to
promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court is in no position to dictate a
mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution. Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not
nullify the proceedings taken prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing
provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the
mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution would already run or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15day period of publication prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House would already violate the Constitution for
its inaction on the impeachment complaints pending the completion of the publication requirement.
ISSUE #5: WON an impeachment complaint need to allege only one impeachable offense.
HELD: NO. To petitioner, the two impeachment complaints are insufficient in form and substance since each charges her with both
culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust. However, the Constitution allows the indictment for multiple
impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the Articles of
Impeachment." It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one impeachable offense.