TH

E KO
REAN W AR

STAMATIS LOGOTHETIS
MAY 2004
On June 1950 North Korean sent an invasion force across the 38 th parallel
into South Korea. This was a defining moment in the Cold War as the US
thought this move was generated and supported by the Soviet Union. In
reality, Stalin approved the N. Korean initiative to invade in and unify with
S. Korea but he did that (1) after he was persuaded the US would not
intervene and (2) without any further support to the attack. As Kissinger
clearly states “the Korean War was not a Kremlin plot to draw America into
Asia so that it could then attack Europe” but just gave the okay.

Truman treated the invasion as a naked communist aggression, a Soviet

move done to se how far (Soviets) could press the US for advantages. To
this also contributed the Soviet Union boycott to the UN Security Council,
at that time. Truman thought this situation required a vigorous response and
so he acted, with the assistance of UN forces.

There was definitely a double misunderstanding, which indicates that both

communists and Americans based their moves on their own core judgments
and assumptions. If this did not happen and there was diplomatic
communication or a kind of agreement before each side made a move,
things might have been different in Korea. Apart from that, US made a
series of mistakes and violations of their own strategy in order to intervene
Korea. These were the following:
1. Truman ignored completely the US strategy followed so far (during
the Cold War) and fell into a trap, while the American strategy to
that time was both wise and effective.
2. Truman decided on his own, without prior approval of the Congress
for sending forces to Korea. If this did not happen, maybe the Congress
could have a more clear view of the situation than he did and US
participation might have been avoided.
 3. US seemed to be afraid by the expansionist communism that
escalated the postwar years and when another free state – in our case S.
Korea – was in danger, US fell again in a trap and
4. made a shift at a geographical area far away from its predetermined
defense perimeter – mainly constituting by European and Mediterranean
countries.
5. US did not really have a strategic interest in Korea and no direct
relation there. Additionally, their engagement, as it is described by
Kissinger, was “inconclusive” and there was really no clear objective or
goal for US, into such a limited war.

Wrong moves continued even after the beginning of the war. Criticizing US
policy and diplomacy, we observe that there was dad communication and
lack of coherence between Truman and MacArthur (even though both were
great in their jobs) wrong decisions were taken, quite a few times, at crucial
situations during the war. As Kissinger notes, at a point

“the best decision would have been to advance [the US forces] to the
narrow neck of the Korean peninsula, a hundred miles short of the
Chinese frontier. This would have been a defensible line which
would have included 90% of the population of the peninsula as well
as the capital of North Korea (…) and it would have achieved a
major political success [unifying Korea] without challenging China.”

Of course many decisions of both MacArthur and Truman saved US forces,

US policy and S. Koreans many times, but at some crucial situations US
was unprepared. One example was the conflict with China, which finally
did not accentuate, to everyone benefit.

Truman continuously changed objectives, which from the one hand was
acceptable as there were many turns during the war that needed different
treatment but from the other hand this indicated that there was no clear
objective or strategy behind the US moves, apart from the protection of S.
Korean from communism. Finally, we should not forget that US changed
again objectives when China got involved to the war.

The conclusions driven out from the Korean war and US participation to it
are:
1. the US response and intervention to the war frustrated and fulfilled
Stalin’s plans, as the intervention drove Mao firmly into the Soviet
camp,
2. US made many mistakes – in diplomatic and political terms – but
due to the prior experience and its great strength, its great
representatives – such as MacArthur – and the flexibility to change
decisions and act quickly, finally did not harm US very much
3. US involving UN to the war succeeded to strengthen NATO and
4. finally, helped South Korea, even this did not give to Americans any
special advantage.
TH
E KO
REAN W AR

STAMATIS LOGOTHETIS
MAY 2004
On June 1950 North Korean sent an invasion force across the 38 th parallel
into South Korea. This was a defining moment in the Cold War as the US
thought this move was generated and supported by the Soviet Union. In
reality, Stalin approved the N. Korean initiative to invade in and unify with
S. Korea but he did that (1) after he was persuaded the US would not
intervene and (2) without any further support to the attack. As Kissinger
clearly states “the Korean War was not a Kremlin plot to draw America into
Asia so that it could then attack Europe” but just gave the okay.

Truman treated the invasion as a naked communist aggression, a Soviet

move done to se how far (Soviets) could press the US for advantages. To
this also contributed the Soviet Union boycott to the UN Security Council,
at that time. Truman thought this situation required a vigorous response and
so he acted, with the assistance of UN forces.

There was definitely a double misunderstanding, which indicates that both

communists and Americans based their moves on their own core judgments
and assumptions. If this did not happen and there was diplomatic
communication or a kind of agreement before each side made a move,
things might have been different in Korea. Apart from that, US made a
series of mistakes and violations of their own strategy in order to intervene
Korea. These were the following:
6. Truman ignored completely the US strategy followed so far (during
the Cold War) and fell into a trap, while the American strategy to
that time was both wise and effective.
7. Truman decided on his own, without prior approval of the Congress
for sending forces to Korea. If this did not happen, maybe the Congress
could have a more clear view of the situation than he did and US
participation might have been avoided.
 8. US seemed to be afraid by the expansionist communism that
escalated the postwar years and when another free state – in our case S.
Korea – was in danger, US fell again in a trap and
9. made a shift at a geographical area far away from its predetermined
defense perimeter – mainly constituting by European and Mediterranean
countries.
10. US did not really have a strategic interest in Korea and no direct
relation there. Additionally, their engagement, as it is described by
Kissinger, was “inconclusive” and there was really no clear objective or
goal for US, into such a limited war.

Wrong moves continued even after the beginning of the war. Criticizing US
policy and diplomacy, we observe that there was dad communication and
lack of coherence between Truman and MacArthur (even though both were
great in their jobs) wrong decisions were taken, quite a few times, at crucial
situations during the war. As Kissinger notes, at a point

“the best decision would have been to advance [the US forces] to the
narrow neck of the Korean peninsula, a hundred miles short of the
Chinese frontier. This would have been a defensible line which
would have included 90% of the population of the peninsula as well
as the capital of North Korea (…) and it would have achieved a
major political success [unifying Korea] without challenging China.”

Of course many decisions of both MacArthur and Truman saved US forces,

US policy and S. Koreans many times, but at some crucial situations US
was unprepared. One example was the conflict with China, which finally
did not accentuate, to everyone benefit.

Truman continuously changed objectives, which from the one hand was
acceptable as there were many turns during the war that needed different
treatment but from the other hand this indicated that there was no clear
objective or strategy behind the US moves, apart from the protection of S.
Korean from communism. Finally, we should not forget that US changed
again objectives when China got involved to the war.

The conclusions driven out from the Korean war and US participation to it
are:
5. the US response and intervention to the war frustrated and fulfilled
Stalin’s plans, as the intervention drove Mao firmly into the Soviet
camp,
6. US made many mistakes – in diplomatic and political terms – but
due to the prior experience and its great strength, its great
representatives – such as MacArthur – and the flexibility to change
decisions and act quickly, finally did not harm US very much
7. US involving UN to the war succeeded to strengthen NATO and
8. finally, helped South Korea, even this did not give to Americans any
special advantage.