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82-84, Rollo).
On the basis of the aforestated undisputed facts, the Municipal Court of Sta. Maria,
Davao del Sur in its February 20, 1978 Decision found that herein petitioner
(defendant Ignacio Wong) had prior, actual and continuous physical possession of
the disputed property and dismissed both the complaint and the counter-claim.
On appeal, the then Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, in its September 29,
1978 Decision drew a completely different conclusion from the same set of facts
and ruled in favor of herein private respondent (plaintiff Manuel Mercado). The
decretal portion of the said decision, reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the plaintiff to have taken possession of the
property earlier in point of time and defendant is an intruder and must, as he
is hereby ordered to return, the possession of the land in question for the
plaintiff, paying a monthly rental of P400.00 from August, 1976, till the
property is returned with costs against the defendant. Judgment is reversed.
Petitioner filed the instant petition with the Court of Appeals. But the Court of
Appeals, in its March 1, 1979 Resolution **** found that the only issue is a pure
question of law the correctness of the conclusion drawn from the undisputed
facts and certified the case to this Court.
In its April 4, 1979 Resolution, the Second Division of this Court docketed the case
in this Court and considered it submitted for decision.
Petitioner alleged two (2) errors committed by respondent judge, to wit:
A) THE CONCLUSION DRAWN BY RESPONDENT JUDGE THAT PETITIONER IS AN
INTRUDER IS WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS FOR PURPOSES OF A FORCIBLE
ENTRY.
B) THE CONCLUSION DRAWN BY RESPONDENT JUDGE THAT PETITIONER MUST PAY
A MONTHLY RENTAL OF P400.00 FROM AUGUST, 1976 TILL THE PROPERTY IS
RETURNED HAS NO LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASIS.
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner, in claiming that the private respondent has not established prior
possession, argues that private respondent's periodic visit to the lot to gather
coconuts may have been consented to and allowed or tolerated by the owner
thereof for the purposes of paying an obligation that may be due to the person
gathering said nuts and that a person who enters a property to gather coconut
fruits and convert the same to copras may only be a hired laborer who enters the
premises every harvest season to comply with the contract of labor with the true
owner of the property.
The argument is untenable.
It should be stressed that "possession is acquired by the material occupation of a
thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our
will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities for acquiring such right." (Art. 531,
Civil Code; Rizal Cement Co., Inc. vs. Villareal, 135 SCRA 15 [1985]); and that the
execution of a sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of
the thing, unless there is stipulation to the contrary . . . . If, however,
notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the
enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use of it herself, because
such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by another, then delivery has not been
effected. (Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1989 Ed., p. 400).
Applying the above pronouncements on the instant case, it is clear that possession
passed from vendor William Giger to private respondent Manuel Mercado by virtue
of the first sale a retro (Exhibit A), and accordingly, the later sale a retro (Exhibit 5)
in favor of petitioner failed to pass the possession of the property because there is
an impediment the possession exercised by private respondent. Possession as a
fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in
the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of
possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessions,
the one longer in possession, if the dates of possession are the same, the one who
presents a title; and if these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in
judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through
proper proceedings (Art. 538, Civil Code).
As to petitioner's query that "Is the entry of petitioner to the property