23 IPSA World Congress

SOCIAL PROGRAMS OF BIG IMPACT AND MIDDLE-RANGE THEORIES:

DIFFUSION AND TRANSFER PROCESS IN LATIN AMERICA

Samira Kauchakje
Graduate Program in Urban Management
Pontifical Catholic University of Paran / PUCPR
Graduate Program in Political Science
Federal University of Paran / UFPR
Evelise Zampier da Silva
Graduate Program in Urban Management
Pontifical Catholic University of Paran / PUCPR
Huascar Pessalli
Graduate Programs in Public Policy
and Political Science
Federal University of Paran / UFPR

Montreal
Jully 19-24
2014

SOCIAL PROGRAMS OF BIG IMPACT AND MIDDLE-RANGE THEORIES: DIFFUSION

1
AND TRANSFER PROCESS IN LATIN AMERICA

Samira Kauchakje2
Evelise Zampier da Silva 3
Huascar Pessali 4
Abstract
Since the 1990s policies such as CCT Conditional Cash Transfers have been
converging, especially in Latin America. The fact has been explained in terms of
convergence inductors such as: common problems; geographical proximity; lessondrawing processes; ideological position of parties in governments and; diffusion by
international organizations - IOs. In this paper, we discuss some explanatory
variables in the process of diffusion and transfer of CCTs in Latin America from the
1990s, in particular, on the role of IOs. In the process of decision-making and policy
formulation, governments may be guided by international established goals and
follow the tendency to adopt policies seen as successful by the international
community. IOs such as the World Bank and the United Nations, for instance, have
disseminated the positive impacts of CCTs in poverty reduction. In some cases,
those IOs prescriptions may have a coercive character, but they also work as a
political drive to obtain support and build domestic consensus about such policies.
Having the Theory of Policy Transfer and the Theory of Policy Diffusion as our
analytical framework and supported by official documents from governments and the
IOs, we claim that the convergence of CCT policies in Latin America can be better
explained by a combination of inducting factors. Not only incentives from IOs have
played a role, but also the ideological proximity of parties in power and peculiarities
of CCT policies themselves. Our preliminary results support the role of such a myriad
of convergence inductors and we expect that further research developments may
indicate whether their individual influences are significantly different.
Keywords: international organizations; political ideology; income transfer; Latin
America; policy diffusion; policy transfer

This article presents part of the theoretical discussion and research data of Samira Kauchakje
(Project in progress, funded by CNPq in the form of research productivity) and also the Evelise
Zampier da Silvas research master, under the guidance of Samira Kauchakje. Contribute to the
development of research Paloma Govaski Ingrid Portugal (student of scientific initiation).
2
Political scientist. Professor at the Graduate Program in Urban Management at the Catholic
University of Paran / PUCPR and Graduate Program in Political Science from the Federal University
of Paran / UFPR.
3
Graduated in Law. Master student of the Program Graduate in Urban Management at the Catholic
University of Paran / PUCPR
4
Economist. Professor of the Graduate Program in Public Policy and Political Science at the Federal
University of Paran / UFPR

I. Introduction
The observation and discussion of the literature on policies to fight poverty 5
identify the adoption of a similar type of policy by both Latin American governments
on the right and left sides of the partisan-ideological spectrum6. The implementation
of CCTs 7 - Conditional Cash Transfer - as an element of central visibility of social
policy led to a decrease in variation of this type of policy between territorial spaces,
temporal and various political-institutional settings. We are facing the phenomenon
of convergence of a policy in which there are similarities of goals, processes and
institutional arrangements in societies, even when different economic, political and
cultural.
In general, policy convergence is understood as:
any increase in the similarity between one or more characteristics of a
certain policy (e.g. policy objectives, policy instruments, policy settings)
across a given set of political jurisdictions (supranational institutions, states,
regions, local authorities) over a given period of time. Policy convergence
thus describes the end result of a process of policy change over time
towards some common point, regardless of the causal processes. (Knill,
2005: 5)
Knill (2005) and Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) question: a) why different
countries develop similar policies; b) what explains the adoption of these policies by
countries in a given period; c) under which conditions domestic policies converge or
distance; d) why do countries converge on some policies and not in others?
This article starts from these inquiries and is based on initial findings and
reflections arising from ongoing research guided by the question of the explanatory
variables in the process of diffusion and transfer of CCTs in Latin America from the
1990s, in particular, on the role of IOs. The text is divided into two sections which
present and discuss, first, aspects of the research method and then some variables
and data on incidence and spread of CCTs in the region.
II. Justification and method
The basis of this article is the research on sites of government departments of
Latin American countries and international organizations such as the World Bank
and ECLAC - Economic Commission for Latin America. The documents accessed

5 We chose the term "political tackling" or "fight against poverty", considering that this terminology
covers policies for reduction, elimination, relief, etc ..
6 ECLAC - Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean - enrolls 20 Latin American
countries: Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of). Source: Profiles ODM them
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean - ECLAC United Nations. Retrieved from:
http://www.eclac.cl/cgibin/getprod.asp?xml=/MDG/noticias/paginas/2/43582/P43582.xml&xsl=/MDG/tpl/p18fst.xsl&base=/MDG/tpl/top-bottom.xsl
7 CCTs are characterized by direct provision of monetary values for low-income families, priority
attention to children and youth, and conditions associated with the use of educational and health
services.

are, mainly, official plan policies for cash transfer (CCTs), documents on CCTs in
Latin America published or developed by international organizations, and scientific
texts on governments and political parties in Latin America.
We have considered only Latin American to molds of CCT programs nationwide,
implemented since 19908. We have adopted the following definition of CCT:
Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) provide cash to participants
upon their fulfillment of a set of conditions or co-responsibilities.
Examples include programs that combine one or more
conditions such as ensuring a minimum level of school
attendance by children, undertaking regular visits to health
facilities, or attending skills training programs; conditional cash
transfers also include school stipend programs. (Gentilini;
Honorati; Yemtsov, 2014: 7)
The chosen region calls attention to the international highlight of countries like
Mexico, initially, and Brazil, nowadays, as centers of diffusion and successful
examples of CCTs 9. Moreover, according to Gentilini and others (2014), in 2014
Latin America and the Caribbean concentrated 36.5% of CCTs reported worldwide,
in other words, "conditional cash transfers are still a" trademark "of the Latin America
region. .. "(Gentilini; Honorati; Yemtsov (2014: 9) (figure 1).10

In the survey will be included in the analysis programs of parties, possession speeches of heads of
government and their messages at the annual opening session of the legislature, in selected
countries among representatives of governments with ideologically partisan positions to the right and
left in Latin American countries.
9
Documents of the UN, World Bank and IMF have been disclosed in this sense, eg UN (2011) and
Canuto (2013).
10
Data from our study differ from those presented by the mentioned authors and will be discussed in
the next section.

Fig 1: Number of Countries with Conditional Cash Transfers, by Region (2014)

Fonte: Gentilini; Honorati; Yemtsov (2014, p. 10)

The selected period coincides with the central years of implementation and with
the wave of diffusion of CCTs in Latin America
The analysis is driven by the hypothesis that considers the convergence of this
policy in the region as a result not only of an inducing factor, but for some suitable
conditions, such as the induction of International Organizations (IOs), the partypolitical ideology of governments, and certain characteristics of the policy itself of
CCTs type.
III. CCTs in Latin America: explanatory factors of diffusion and
convergence
Authors linked to theories about diffusion and transfer policies, such as Knill
(2005: 8) and Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) mention several explanatory factors or
inducers of policy convergence. They are: a) geographic proximity; b) institutional
similarities, of policies, cultural and economic among analyzed units; c) similar
responses, but independent from different units to pressures and similar problems;
d) harmonization of domestic policies on behalf of international and supranational
documents agreed in multilateral negotiations; e) mutual adjustments and
competition arising from economic integration; f) characteristics and content of public
policies themselves; g) mechanisms for the dissemination and transfer of policies
linked to processes of lesson-drawing, formation of an epistemic community and
policy network, reinforce or imposition of international organizations and emulation of
policy models and; h) standards and common ideology among political elites.
The studies of Gonnet (2012), Weyland (2006), and Stone (2004) on the
diffusion of CCTs and other social policies in Latin America have been devoted more
to analyze the role played by IOs. In fact, for the case of CCTs, there is evidence of

the importance, above all, the international financial institutions in the dissemination
and transfer of these policies. However, stimulation of IOs does not clarify the
temporal coincidence of the ascension wave of leftist governments with the wave of
diffusion of CCTs in the region. This also does not elucidate the specific ways in
which this policy can be implemented by governments with different political party
positions. Therefore, we examined some triggering factors or facilitators of policy
convergence, understood here as a dependent variable.
Geographical proximity seems to be a facilitator in spreading and
convergence of CCTs in Latin American regional bloc (map 1).

Map 1. Location of programs of CCTs type between 1997 and 2008.

Source: Fiszbein (2009)

In the Latin American region there is diversity in economic development, the

position in the context of international relations and cultural specificity make it difficult
to suppose that the shared general cultural traces and institutional would have
strength to facilitate convergence.
In the region also there is a certain unit less due to the deliberate policy
integration and more to the similar history of the formation of societies and some
political institutions. for the case of this policy, a common element in the Latin
American context that can be highlighted is the historical trajectory of social policies
and legislation. According to Knill (2005: 7)
converging policy developments are more likely for countries that are characterized
by high institutional similarity. [...] Moreover, cultural similarity plays an important role
in facilitating cross-national policy transfer. [...] similarity in socioeconomic structures
and development has been identified as a factor that facilitates the transfer of policies
across countries.

However, this common institutional and cultural legacy within the social policy
system would not favor the dissemination of a policy with the characteristic and
content of CCTs.
CCTs have aspects of redistributive policy (Lowi, 1964) and compensatory
and focused characteristic with extensive, ongoing and personalized coverage of
impoverished sectors. Policies with these characteristics carry a potential for conflict
and, therefore, tend to encounter great difficulties to spread and to converge (Knill
2005: 7).
The content of the policy also would not be a facilitator in a region that
traditionally rejects the idea of monetary gain dissociated from work or property and
associated with the notion of law guaranteed by the state (particularly for the working
class or lower/without income). In general, the rejection is not only in the social
democratic welfare model with redistributive perspective of universality but also in
the states of well-being stricter regarding the public provisions and the target groups.
The history and the social legislation, past and current, in most of these
countries show that between models of welfare state treated by Esping-Anderson
(1991), the largest rejection is by public social protection systems of universal
coverage. However, even more protective limited systems - focusing on specific
groups and reduced monetary values compared with the patterns of services and
resources of citizenship achieved in a society - suffer resistance by a portion of the
population who believes that the beneficiaries need intermittent charity or they are
profiteers "abutting the State" as studies of Kings (2000) and Rego (2013), among
others.
The Report of the United Nations Program for Development - UNDP (2004:
123) points out that "for the vast majority of Latin Americans, employment is the way
to fight poverty and to leave it." The question, therefore, is concerned for the values,
traditional beliefs and political culture in this region. In Brazil, for instance, social
rights were included in the list of fundamental rights for the first time in the Federal
Constitution of 1988.
In a contrasting way, in countries where redistributive and universal policies
are part of the institutional, cultural and political trajectory movements emerge as the
Basic Income Earth Network and the Global Basic Income Foundation. They
advocate the establishment of cash transfer programs independent from income of
beneficiaries and involving transfer of resources - disassociated from work - the

expansion of individual freedom and a redistributive conception of social justice

(PAREIJS, 2005).
Before the legal-institutional and cultural basis in the recent past and even
today, the capacity of Latin American governments to implement CCTs due to, in a
counter-intuitive way, just to its content. In the period when this program spreads two
international consensus were built - not always encouraged by the same agents or in
an articulated way, but, it seems, leveraging each other. On the one hand, there was
a consensus on the fight against poverty (reduction or elimination) via active
government policies and, secondly, about the "need" to limit the scope of public
social protection. The content of this program meets these two consensus embodied
to the right and to the left of the ideological spectrum. To the right, they are
contemplated in the formulation of selective government policies and in regarding the
targets of social provision with weakening of universal coverage. Although to the left
they are met by the composition of state policies aiming to provide social citizenship
via guaranteed income in countries that, until then, had happened prioritly through
labor legislation and, more or less sufficiency and quality through access to social
services (education, health and housing, basically).
This convergence process may cause less strangeness if we assume that the
diffusion and transfer of a government policy from one location to another does not
always result in the absorption of the policy in its entirety of the components.These
components are filtered and shaped in the internal political process in each context.
Roughly, these components are divided into two categories: i) hard - that is, content,
tools and institutional arrangements of the policy and; ii) soft - goals, ideologies,
ideas, norms, concepts and principles of politicy (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Stone
2001). Thus, there may be transfer and convergence of design and institutions in
various places, without the ideological principles be the same. It seems to be the
case of spreading of CCTs and their implementation by governments on both to the
left and to the right of partisan-ideological spectrum, as illustrated by the cases of
Chile and Brazil. Pinochets Chile established the Single Family Allowance in 1981
and in 2005 the government to the left of Ricardo Lagos deployed Solidarity Chile. In
Brazil, the National Policy School Grant (2001) was implemented by the center-right
government of Cardoso and Lula government, to the left, initiated the Family Grant in
2003. In these two cases, policies of CCT types of to the left governments have
gained greater scope in terms of policy design aimed to tackle poverty, as well as in
terms of coverage and effectiveness in relation to the proposed objectives, as
reported by international organizations whose documents are mentioned throughout
the text. This appears to be a trend linked to their own ideologies and party
programs, however, not a necessity, as demonstrated in Mexico by the Progresa
program and its version of greater amplitude called Opportunities, which were
implemented by governments to the right. In this sense, Lavinas (2014: 11) notes
that "it was in Brazil [with the Family grant] and Mexico [with Opportunities] that
income-support schemes were first extended on a large scale ..."
In this work, the starting point of policy implementation of CCTs type in each
country is the date disclosed as such in documents cited as the source. There are
differences in them, often, because of the understanding that what would be CCTs.
Because of this, we did a few options using as criteria our understanding of this

policy and the recurrence of the information in the documents11. For instance, it was
considered as starting point for Brazil the School Grant (Bolsa Escola); for Chile, the
Solidary Chile program (Chile Solidario) (Table 2) 12.
Table 2 Examples of CCT policy type in Latin America since the 1990s
Programs (starting and ending years)
School Grant /Bolsa Escola (2001-2003)

Country
Brazil

Food Grant /Bolsa alimentao (2001-2003)

Family Grant /Bolsa Famlia (2003)
Progresa - Opportunities (1997)

Mexico

Juancito Pinto Grant (2006)

Bolivia

Juana Azurduy de Padilla Mother-and-Child Grant (2009 -)

Solidary Chile /Chile Solidario (2002 -)
Tekopora (2005 -)

Chile
Paraguay

Abrazo (2005 -)
Families in Action /Familias en Accion (2001 -)

Colombia

Conditional Subsidies for School Attendance (2005 -)

Juntos Network /Juntos (2007)
Join for Social Prosperity / Ingreso para la Prosperidad Social (2011)
Families for Social Inclusion; Unemployed Heads of Household /Programa
Jefes e Jefas de Hogar Desocupados (2002-2005)
Family plan /Plan Familias por la Inclusion Social (2005-2010)

Argentina

Universal Child Allowance for Social Protection /Asignacin Universal por

Hijo para Proteccion Social (2009 - )
Together /Juntos (2005 -)
Solidarity Grant /Bono Solidario (1998-2002)

Peru
Ecuador

Human Development Grant (Bono de Desarrolo Humano) (2003 )

Social protection network /Red de Protecin Social (2000-2006);

Nicaragua

Crisis Response System (2005-2006)

Family Allowance Programme /Asignacin Famlias (1990 -)

Honduras

Bonus 10.000 / Bono 10.000 (2010 -)

Overcome/ Supermonos (2000-2006)

Costa Rica

Advance/ Avancemos (2006 -)

My Family Makes Progress /Mi Familia Progresa (2008 -)

Guatemala

My Secure Bond /Mi Bono Seguro (2012 -)

11 Because of these criteria and knowledge on all the programs in this phase of the study, we
excluded the Bolivariana Grant/ Bolsa Bolivariana in Venezuela, from 2001, for being related to food
subsidy without conditionalities.
12
Tables and figures about CCTs in relation to the ideological-partisan position of rulers are
temporary; data will be revised and supplemented.
.

Solidary network / Comunidades Solidarias (2005 -)

El Salvador

Opportunity network /Red de Oportunidades (2006 -)

Panama

Attendance card/ Tarjeta de Asistencia Escolar

Dominican Republic

Solidarity Program / Solidaridad (2005 - )

National Social Emergency Response Plan

Uruguay

/Plan de Atencion Nacional a la Emergencia Social (2005-2007)

Family Allowances /Asignaciones Familiares (2008 -)
Ti Manman Cheri (2012)

Haiti

Source: the authors and Kauchakje (2014). Data of Cecchini; Madariaga (2011); Fiszbein
(2009)

The first modalities of CCTs nationwide were implemented in 18 of 20

countries of Latin America. In ten (55.61%) the program was initiated by
governments to the right or center-right and in eight (44.4%) by to the left
governments or center-left (Table 3 and Figure 3).
Table 3. Partisan-ideological position of governments in Latin America that have
implemented policies of CCT type nationwide from the 1990s (initial year of implementation
and in 2014)
Country/
CCT

Year of implementation

2014

Partisan-ideological
position of
governments

Partisan-ideological
position of
governments

Honduras
Mexico
Ecuador
Nicaragua
Costa Rica
Colombia

1990
1997
1998
2000
2000
2001

R
L
R
L
R
R

R
L
R
Disabled
R
R

Dominican
Republic

2001

2001
2002
2002
2005
2005
2005
2005
2006
2006
2008
2012

R
L
L
R
L
R
R
L
L
L
R
8L-10R

L
L
L
L
L
L
R
L
R
L
R
9L-8R

Brazil
Chile
Argentina
Peru
Uruguay
El Salvador
Paraguay
Bolivia
Panama
Guatemala
Haiti
Total

Source: elaborated by the authors. Data of Cecchini; Madariaga (2011); Fiszbein (2009)

20
18
16
14
12
Total a year
10

Right/ Center-right (D-CD)

Left/ Center-left (E-CE)

8
6
4
2
0
1990 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2008 2012 total

Figure 3. Partisan-ideological position of governments in Latin America that have

implemented policies of CCT type nationwide from the 1990s (initial year of implementation)
Source: elaborated by the authors from data of Cecchini; Madariaga (2011); Fiszbein (2009)
(excludes ECLAC)

From the 2000s there is the rise of a wave of to the left governments in Latin
America and jointly during this period, compared to the previous decade, there is a
wave of CCTs diffusion in the region. The data presented do not demonstrate a
causal connection of time. However, the rise to the left causes a quantitative
inversion at the end of the period examined in relation to the initial years of CCTs
implementation, because in 2014 from the seventeen13 Latin American countries
that have implemented this policy, eight (47.1%) have governments to the right or
center-right and nine (52.9%) to the left or center-left. The ideological-partisan
position of most governments did not change when only observed the year of initial
implementation of this policy and the current year. The change occurred in four
countries with governments to the left: Brazil, El Salvador and Peru. There was also
a change in Panama, however, the ideological position of the ruling party that
implemented CCT was to the left and in 2014 it is to the right (Figure 4).

13

Nicaragua has implemented two CCTs, one in 2000 and another in 2005 (both active until 2006).

10

E/CE 2014

D/CD 2014

Guatemala

Panama

Bolivia

Paraguay

El Salvador

Uruguay

Peru

Chile

Argentina

Brazil

Colombia

Dominican Republic

Costa Rica

Nicaragua

Ecuador

Mexico

Honduras

Left/ Center-Left
E/CE-
Implementation
Right/ Center-
Right D/CD-
Implementation

Figure 4. Partisan-ideological position of governments in Latin America that have

implemented policies of CCT type nationwide from the 1990s (initial year of implementation
and in 2014)
Source: elaborated by the authors data of Cecchini; Madariaga (2011); Fiszbein (2009);
ECLAC (2011)

Weyland (2011, 2010), Lanzaro (2013) and Silva (2009), among others, have
worked the differences and similarities of current Latin American to the left
governments and their classification in moderate (or social democratic) and radical
(or populist). This classification is based both on objective elements of trajectory of
party, political preferences and policies implemented, as in normative elements.
The moderate left - Governments of Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Nicaragua and
perhaps Argentina - is pragmatic, advocates gradual reforms, consents to economic
liberalism and formulates economic and social policies stimulating the economy,
focused on income security of impoverished groups to the reduction of inequality. Its
ideas and practices can be inserted on the list of social democracy that is, seeking to
introduce redistributive reform within the sociopolitical generator market of
concentration of wealth system. They are institutionalized left parties that make
adjustments of their programs to electoral strategies within institutionalized party and
electoral systems, in other words, they have a duration, stability, legitimacy and
strength of organization (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995).
In turn, the radical left - governments of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador question the representative liberal democracy and market economy, and also
formulate social and economic policies that prioritize people who have paths of
impoverishment assigned to the dynamics of economic relations, ethnic and social
laws. The countries representatives of this left type have electoral and partisan
systems with a comparatively lesser degree of institutionalization.

11

It is worth remembering that with more or less institutionalized and despite the
ideological-partisan position, preferences and behavior of governments are
structured for electoral and partisan systems. Government policies - within the
decision-making process - can be seen as conduct that expresses preferences.
According to Przeworski (1995), the state capacity is the ability to formulate
goals and to implement those goals. Skocpol (1985:9) for example, defines state
capacity as its ability to "Implement goals, especially over the actual or potential
opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socioeconomic
circumstances". Government policies thus, reflect the capacity of governments to
convert the potential of a set of institutions, resources and political practices "in
ability to define, implement and sustain policies" (Santos 1997: 5).
Evidence of preference based on ideological-partisan position of rulers may
elucidate the capacity of governments to shape and implement policies (CCTs)
according to formulated goals. In the processes that lead to the convergence of
CCTs in Latin America the interests, preferences and multiple objectives seem to be
absorbed in the formulation of the same type of policy. However, it is possible that
different and conflicting conceptions regarding the role of the state, program
purpose, target population and definition of poverty, for example, are wrapped in the
same set of conditional cash transfer programs. These elements may be able to
shape themselves variations in CCT.
In this sense, despite the apparent convergent homogeneity of CCTs in the
region there would be differences in the way how the left and right governments
compatibilize and incorporate the institutional components and principles of this
policy. The disposition to the right to formulate CCTs may be linked to preference for
implementing policies that require low investment and targeted coverage that
minimizes universal principles of social policy. Paradoxically, these same aspects
are appealing to the left, because on the one hand, the call for reduction or
eradication of poverty is compatible with its political project and, secondly, the focus
(rather than, for example, the universal income of citizenship) and low cost enable
the government to implement the policy without increasing taxes that unpleased the
economic sectors.
The adoption of CCTs by governments to the left (used as a comparison
parameter) tends to be normatively and assumption justified in terms of i) social
citizenship and strengthening of the capacity of the state to carry out economic and
social policies (in order to articulate the economic policy under a social policy, and
not the opposite), ensuring untied income from work and also change the pattern of
the labor market and the distribution and appropriation of property; ii) poverty as a
violation of rights and the effect of socioeconomic dynamics of long duration and no
accountability or individual disability; iii) universality via articulation of targeted
policies with universal principles policies and also the inclusion of CCTs in the
system and in the legislation of social protection and; iv) political project, in some
countries, to establish or strengthen social democrat institutions, and others to
leverage steps toward structural change.
Such values and "soft" components of CCTs can have varying degrees of
compatibility with various parties and governments to the left. It is assumed that the
distance of this congruence is smaller within the set of these governments than
those governments to the right, existing proximity when positioned around the center
(following the general political behavior discussed in Downs, 1999 and Bobbio,
1995).

12

Finally, the characteristics of CCTs - low cost and target group defined in the
population in the range of poverty or misery, for example - have made such policies
attractive to governments from right to left in a Latin American context. This context
was marked, internally, by the consolidation of democratic procedures, and,
externally, by the existence of a consensus sponsored by international financial
institutions (Fagnani, 2005) about the supposed need for deconstruction of universal
social policies combined with the deregulation of the economy and the alleviation of
poverty. In other words, in a society with indicators of poverty and inequality
compared accented, both the regularity of electoral competition and the possibility of
alternation of power (which brings demand of responsiveness of rulers in the sense
of rational calculation14) as the international incentive for targeted policies favored
spreading the CCT policies type.
One form of pressure and stimulation to the diffusion and transfer of policy are
international agreements on targets on poverty. 15 In particular, it highlights the
dissemination by international financial institutions (IFIs) of information about positive
impacts of CCTs and their suitability to the prospect of state with less comprehensive
and less economic regulation social policies. Studies of Gonnet (2012), in line with
what is argued here, indicate that, although in some cases the requirements of
International Organizations may have had coercive character, they seem to have
served more as a political force to build domestic support and consensus on cash
transfer policies in this regional bloc.
Along with documents, material and personal disclosure from international
organizations, the processes of lesson-drawing and emulation from countries taken
as successful examples (such as Mexico and Brazil) seem to be important for the
dissemination and transfer of CCTs.
International organizations - especially in this case for institutions of the
United Nations system and the World Bank - can be inserted in what Kingdon (2003)
calls the hidden clusters participants, communities that generate ideas and circulate
(policy communities).
The IOs alter the structure of political decisions configuring themselves as
collective instances involving actors such as states and the pressure groups of
international operations (Held, 1991:170). Some of these organizations have an
"almost legislative power" (Mazzuoli, 2013) in a spectrum ranging from the
suggestion to the coercion, the creation of guidelines, recommendations, guidelines
or requirements to be met16. They also have a role in the exchange of information

14

The idea of responsiveness refers to the conditions and democratic institutions treated by Dahl
(1997) and rational calculation is linked to the establishment of electoral connection, as the
relationship between government policies and voting discussed by Downs (1999). The possible
connection between CCTs and outcome of elections is questioned by Correa (2012).
15
It can be registered as landmarks the Washington Consensus 1989, whose protagonists are the
World Bank and the IMF-International Monetary Funding- and the Millennium Goals declared in the
UN.
16
Among the sources of International Law are the Treaties constituting international legal norms that
have imperative nature and binding on the signatories (hard law) and statements (soft law) that
originally are not cogent and have no binding force. The Treaty also called Convention, Pact,
Protocol, Letter, Agreement, Trade Instruments, among others (Piovesan, 2013; Henkin, 1990;
Rezek, 1996).In order to speak of a "treaty" in the generic sense, an instrument has to meet various
criteria. First of all, it has to be a binding instrument, which means that the contracting parties
intended to create legal rights and duties. Secondly, the instrument must be concluded by states or
international organizations with treaty-making power. Thirdly, it has to be governed by international
law. Finally the engagement has to be in writing. Even before the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, the word "treaty" in its generic sense had been generally reserved for engagements

13

and experiences, establishment of requirements and recommendations,

dissemination of good practices, provide technical assistance, support the action of
States and other members of the international community, as demonstrated by
studies on social security of Weyland (2006) and Stone (2004) and on CCTs of
Gonnet (2012).
At this stage of research we observed that, in the region and period in focus,
the first CCTs type policies were in the modalities school grant and food allowance
in defined territories; later, the population coverage was expanded and expanded
to the national territory without specifications of rural or urban medium (table 2).
This corresponds to the issues and recommendations found in documents17
such as Human Development Report (UNDP, 1990), issued by the UNDP - United
Nations Development Program, which indicated the option for food stamps instead
of cash transfers food. The report pointed out that "rather than disapprove of food
subsidies across-the-board policy makers should devote their energy to designing
food subsidy packages that redistribute income efficiently without hurting the
efficiency of resource allocation" (UNDP, 1990:63). In subsequent document Human Development Report (UNDP, 1997:112) there was the following
reservation on policies of the cash transfer type: "poverty can be eradicated only
through pro-poor growth, not through transfers.
Agenda 21 (document originated in the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development Rio-92) explained the need to eradicate poverty and
brought the idea of poverty as a multidimensional issue of national and international
origin, as well as the recommendation of supported domestic policies by global
initiatives such as programs to generate income.
The World Development Report - Poverty (World Bank, 1990) cites food
subsidies as a way of support, but, unlike the documents mentioned above,
highlights the monetary transfers to state that: "often cash transfers are more
effective than rations "(World Bank, 1990: 103).
The World Bank intensified its stimulus for policies to deal with poverty in a
period coinciding with its role in favor of social and economic policies that ascribe,
less to the state and more to the market, the task of allocation and distribution of
resources in society. In this double movement, the World Bank seems to have driven
the spread of CCTs in Latin America. For example, the document called Evaluation
of Assistance to Brazil (World Bank, 2003:5, 41) reports that in the period from 1990
to 2002, the institution served less in terms of funding and more as a source of
knowledge and technical assistance in strategies such as tackling the poverty.
According to An Evaluation of World Bank Support - 2000-2010, Safety Nets
of IEG - Independent Evaluation Group (IEG, 2011: 22), "In late 2006 client countries
with the most developed CCT programs in the region (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El
Salvador, and Mexico) asked the World Bank to act as a regional facilitator of

concluded in written form. According to the UN, the term "statement" is used for various international
instruments, Its main feature is to not bind the parts. They are documents that indicate that the parts
did not intend to establish binding obligations, but only declare certain aspirations. Statements can
also be treaties, which aim to be binding under International Law, which implies a complex task, which
is the analysis in casu, in order to verify the intent of the parts when the contract. Some statements
although not originally intending to have binding force, became a source of International Law at a later
time, and thus acquired the status of cogent instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (1948). https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Overview.aspx?path=overview/definition/page1_en.xml.
17 The documents checked so far are from ECLAC, UN and the World Bank cited as sources of data
and references.

14

knowledge, learning, and innovation for CCT programs". In the document there is the
evaluation that this initiative, implemented through the creation of a Learning Circle
(CCT Learning Community), influenced the decision-making to implement or
increment of CCTs in the participating countries, it influenced in the expansion of
Opportunities (Mexico) to urban areas (the same occurred in El Salvador, based on
the Mexican experience), in the integration of Solidary Chile to the Chilean system of
social protection program, and improvements in the Family Grant program (Brazil)
based on learning about the Chilean experience.
Comparatively, to the case of CCTs, the UN has played a diffuser role of
consensus reasoned in principles anchored in treaties and declarations and the
dissemination of good practices, especially; the World Bank, besides promoting
conditions for these soft transfer processes, it acts through the transference of
institutional arrangements and of implementation instruments, in other words, CCTs
models (hard transfer). Anyway, with their specificities, these two organizations are
relevant in the dynamics of spreading of CCTs in different realities.
These organizations have operated as facilitators of the transfer process and
the dissemination of policies, through which their innovations have spread, wholly or
partially, in a given context to other different realities (Rose, 1993; Mintron, 1997;
Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, Stone, 1999). They have assumed the role of "transfers
entrepreneurs" (Dolowitz, Marsh, 1996:345), transferring the content that sustains
policies, promoting debate, building the intellectual infrastructure for transnational
learning and creating justifications for the transfer.
VI. Conclusion
The discussion presented in this paper was guided by theoretical approaches
on policy transfer and policy diffusion and the hypothesis that the spread of CCT
programs in Latin America is due to a combination of inductors and facilitating
factors, including, especially, the characteristics of the policy, ideological-political
position of rulers and incentives of IOs.
The literature review and preliminary results suggest that it is not a simple
combination or multicausality by the sum of elements, but a convergence of factors
in the sense of mutual relationship and empowerment. The international consensus
over the need to constrain the scope of public social protection and on tackling
poverty through targeted public policies find resonance in the characteristics of
CCTs. Meanwhile, governments to the left and to the right are receptive and feeders
of that consensus and of the implementation of a policy considered internationally
successful and that, despite the internal political culture that generates controversy,
has low political and budgetary cost and, also, meets the motives and specific
preferences of each position on the political spectrum.
Therefore, CCTs in Latin America are not only examples of the convergence
of a policy but also the convergence of variables. The development of the research
may indicate the explanatory weight of each one and possibly to strengthen the
relationship of convergence meaning that one factor would be unable to propagate
the policy if the other was not present in that specific context.
To move in this direction, we consider insufficient the theoretical fundaments
and methodological supports that the theories of policy diffusion and policy transfer
offer. Our choice will be to continue the investigation on the basis of the interpretive
explanation method associated with the comparative method. This is equivalent to

15

saying that the comprehensive perspective will be supplemented by causal and

comparative analysis.
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