ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES

Alternative circumstances are those which

must be taken into consideration as
AGGRAVATING or MITIGATING according to
the nature and effects of the crime and the
other conditions attending its commission.
Art. 15. Their concept. Alternative
circumstances are those which must be
taken into consideration as aggravating or
mitigating according to the nature and
effects of the crime and the other conditions
attending its commission. They are the
relationship, intoxication and the degree of
instruction and education of the offender.
The
alternative
circumstance
of
relationship shall be taken into consideration
when the offended party in the spouse,
ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural,
or adopted brother or sister, or relative by
affinity in the same degrees of the offender.
The intoxication of the offender shall be
taken into consideration as a mitigating
circumstances when the offender has
committed a felony in a state of intoxication,
if the same is not habitual or subsequent to
the plan to commit said felony but when the
intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall
be
considered
as
an
aggravating
circumstance.
The alternative circumstances are:
a. RELATIONSHIP
b. INTOXICATION
c. DEGREE OF INSTRUCTION AND
EDUCATION OF THE OFFENDER
a. RELATIONSHIP
This is taken into consideration when
the offended party is the:
a. spouse
b. ascendant
c. descendant
d. legitimate, natural or adopted
brother or sister
e. relative by affinity in the same
degree of the offender
Other relatives included
As a rule, relationship is MITIGATING in
crimes against property by analogy to the
provisions of Art. 332.
- Under Art. 332 of the RPC, no
criminal, but only civil, liability shall result
from commission of the crime of theft,
swindling or malicious mischief committed or
caused mutually by spouses, ascendants,
and descendants, or relatives by affinity in
the same line; brothers and sisters and
brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living
together.
- Relationship becomes actually an
exempting circumstance since there is no

occasion to consider a mitigating or an

aggravating circumstance because there is
no criminal liability.
It is aggravating in CRIMES AGAINST
PERSONS in cases where the offended party
is a relative of a higher degree than the
offender, or when the offender and the
offended party are relatives of the same
level, as killing a brother, a brother-in-law, a
half-brother or adopted brother.
When the CRIME AGAINST PERSONS is any
of the SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES (Art. 263),
even if the offended party is a descendant of
the offender, relationship is an AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE.
- But the serious physical injuries must
not be inflicted by a parent upon his child by
excessive chastisement.
When the crime is less serious physical
injuries or slight physical injuries, ordinary
rule applies; relationship is MITIGATING if the
offended party is a relative of lower degree
and AGGRAVATING if the offended party is a
relative of a higher degree than the offender.
When the crime against persons is
homicide
or
murder,
relationship
is
aggravating even if the victim of the crime is
a relative of lower degree.
Relationship is mitigating in trespass to
dwelling.
Relationship is neither mitigating nor
aggravating, when relationship is an element
of the offense.
In crimes against chastity, relationship is
always aggravating.
- Because of the nature and effect of
the crime committed, it is considered
AGGRAVATING although the offended party is
a relative of lower degree.
b. INTOXICATION
MITIGATING
a. if intoxication is not habitual, or
b. if intoxication is not subsequent to
the plan to commit a felony.
AGGRAVATING
a. if intoxication is habitual; or
b. if it is intentional (subsequent to
the plan to commit a felony)
- It is intentional when the
offender drinks liquor fully knowing its
effects, to find in the liquor a stimulant
to commit a crime or a means to
suffocate any remorse.
When the offender has committed a felony
in a state of intoxication.
Page | 1

- This clause means that the offenders

mental faculties must be affected by
drunkenness.
- The accuseds state of intoxication
must be proved.
WHEN THE INTOXICATION IS HABITUAL
- A habitual drunkard is one given to
intoxication by excessive use of intoxicating
drinks. The habit should be actual and
confirmed, but it is not necessary that it be
continuous or by daily occurrence.
PEOPLE v. RENEJANE [158 SCRA 258
(1988)]
Nature: Appeal from a decision of RTC Cebu.
FACTS: On Nov 1, 1981, at 11PM, Laborte
and Maraasin were invited to the house of
Beniano to partake of some food and drinks.
After a considerable length of time, Paulino
Laborte stabbed policeman Mario de Jesus.
It was followed by another stabbing done by
Beniano Renejane.
Likewise, the police
officers companion, Regino Maraasin was
also stabbed by Rodolfo Ripdos.
It was alleged that previously, in Oct, the
police officer apprehended Renejane for
illegal possession of marijuana and that
Maraasin was suspected of having been the
informer.
Renejane, as his motive, must
have harbored a grudge against the
comrades.
HELD: Denials made and alibi advanced by
the appellant cannot prevail over their
positive
identification.
Furthermore,
Renejane had a motive in the killing.
Intoxication is aggravating if it is habitual
or intention. The fact that the accused drank
liquor prior to the commission of the crime
did not necessarily qualify such action as an
aggr circumstance.
The affair was an
ordinary drinking party. Neither can this be
considered as a mitigating circumstance in
the absence of proof that the intake of
alcoholic drinks was of such quantity as to
blur the appellants reason and deprive him
of a certain degree of control. This has been
strengthened by the fact that treachery has
been established. Therefore, the means of
execution employed were deliberately or
consciously adopted. Moreover, the aggr
circumstance of the act being in disregard of
rank is appreciable in the case at bar.
Wherefore, judgment appealed from is
affirmed. Penalty modified from reclusion
perpetua to reclusion temporal in its max
period to reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE v. CAMANO [115 SCRA 688 (1982)]

Nature:
Mandatory review from the
judgment of CFI Camarines Sur

Feb. 17, 1970 bet. 4 & 5 p.m. in

Nato, Sagnay, Camarines Sur: Camano,
after drinking liquor, stabbed Godofredo
Pascua w/a bolo while the latter was
walking along the barrio street almost in
front of the store of one Socorro Buates.
Pascua sustained 2 mortal wounds w/c
caused his death. Afterwards, Camano
went to the seashore of the barrio where
he found Mariano Buenaflor leaning at the
gate of the fence of his house in a
kneeling position w/both arms on top of
the fence & his head stooping down.
Camano then hacked Buenaflor w/the
same bolo sustaining 8 wounds w/c
caused latters death. No proof of any
altercation between the accused & victims
prior to the incidents.

3 yrs before the incident, the

victims had a misunderstanding w/the
accused. Camano asked for Pascua to tow
his fishing boat w/the motorboat owned by
Buenaflor but the two refused to do so.
Camano resented such refusal. Even if
they were seen drinking together later on,
the friendly attitude was more artificial
than real. Camano refused to associate
w/the 2 & a neighbors attempt to
reconcile the 3 was repeatedly refused.
And in instances when Camano was drunk,
hed even challenge Buenaflor to a fight &
announce his evil intention to kill them.

Prosecution: Camano surrendered

upon demand of the peace officers. He
admitted that he owned the bolo used in
the killing & such was hidden under the
table of his house. Patrolman Baluyot
found the bolo at the place indicated by
Camano. The bolo was still stained
w/human blood. He likewise admitted that
killed Pascua & Buenaflor in self-defense
but he refused to sign his statement. He
was charged w/murder attended by
evident premeditation & treachery.

Defense: Camano claims that he

went fishing early morning of Feb. 17.
Buenaflor, upon seeing that he had a big
catch, demanded a percentage for the
fishery commission. Camano refused to
pay & saw Buenaflor called him hard
headed. He went home afterwards. After
dinner, he prepared to go out to sea again.
While standing in the yard of his house, he
saw Buenaflor & Pascua having a drinking
session w/a group of men at the score of
Socorro Buates. He claims that the
Buenaflors group approached him & w/o
any provocation, Pascua boxed him.
Buenaflor punched him also. He claims
that when Pascua was about to bolo him,
he was able to grab the bolo from Pascua.
Pascua then fell on the ground & the rest
Page | 2

of the group ran away except for

Buenaflor who approached him. Buenaflor
was also armed w/a bolo w/c prompted
Camano to bolo him. Buenaflor ran away
once he was wounded but Camano ran
after him claiming that former had a gun
at home w/c he might use to shoot
Camano later on. Thus, he hacked
Buenaflor to death. He denies killing
Pascua & claims that the fight was due to
a heated argument & their drunkenness.
CFI Camrines Sur: sentenced
Camano to death. Claims of Camano are
w/o evidentiary support & are mere
fictions. His cousin & lone witness,
Nemesio Camano is not credible either. His
testimonies had a lot of inconsistencies.
Besides, if Camano were really innocent,
he should have produced more witnesses
considering that the crime was committed
in
broad
daylight
w/many
people
witnessing it. But only Nemesio was
presented.
Nemesio
&
Camanos
testimonies were changed many times
too. Evidence show that he is guilty of
murder
beyond
reasonable
doubt
w/evident premeditation, treachery, abuse
of superior strength & intoxication.
Appeal: Camanos counsel claims
that the accused is only guilty of homicide
& not murder.

3.

WON evident premeditation should

be appreciated.

NO. Evident Premeditation is present

when the offender had carefully planned
the killing.

Requisites: a) time when offender

determined to commit the crime; b) act
manifestly indicating that the culprit had
clung to his determination; c) sufficient
lapse of time bet the determination &
execution of the crime to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act &
to allow his conscience to overcome the
resolution of his will.

No proof of the requisites in this

case. Trial court merely concluded that
crime was premeditated due to the incident
w/c occurred 3 yrs ago. But such did not
establish the time when Camano decided to
commit the crime. It can only establish his
motive for killing the victims. Previous
incidents wherein Camano challenged
Buenaflor to a fight did not reveal a
persistence of criminal design since theres
no proof that he was making plans in
between those threats & the consummation
of the crime.

2.

WON treachery should be appreciated

YES. Amado Payago, one of the men
drinking w/Pascua & Buenaflor during the
incident, testified that Camano attacked
Pascua from behind. Such is a measure w/c

WON abuse of superior strength

should be absorbed in treachery. YES.

4.

WON the alternative circumstance

of intoxication should be appreciated
as an aggravating circumstance.

NO. ITS MITIGATING. Camanos

counsel claims that there was no proof
of accuseds intoxication at the time of
the
killing
other
than
Payagos
testimony that he saw Camano drinking
in his house about 30 meters away. No
police report/doctors certification was
presented either. Furthermore, theres
no proof that accused purposefully got
drunk to facilitate the commission of
the offense. If intoxication should be
appreciated it should be used as
mitigating
circumstance
since
it
diminished his capacity to know the
injustice of his acts & comprehend fully
the consequence of his acts.

Mitigating if accidental, not

habitual
or
intentional
&
not
subsequent to the plan to commit the
crime. It must be indubitably proven.

Aggravating
if
habitual
or
intentional. Habitual drunkard is one
given to intoxication by excessive use
of intoxicating drinks. Habit should be
actual & confirmed. Not necessarily a
daily occurrence but it must lessen the
individuals resistance to evil thought &
undermine will power making its victim
a potential evildoer.

No proof that Camano was a

habitual drinker although he used to get
drunk every now & then. Even Pagayos
testimony does not establish the
habitual drinking of Camano. The
intoxication not being habitual & since
accused was in a state of intoxication at
the time of the commission of the
crime,
intoxication
should
be
appreciated
as
a
mitigating
circumstance.

Issues & Ratio:

1.

ensures the accomplishment of criminal act

w/o any risk to the perpetrator arising from
the defense that his victim may put up
characterizing
treachery.
Payagos
testimony is further strengthened by the
nature & location of the wounds sustained
by Pascua w/c show that the point of entry
of the stab wounds were at the back & point
of exit were in front.
Buenaflor was hacked while he was
in a kneeling position. The attack was
sudden, unexpected & lethal such as to
disable & incapacitate him from putting up
any defense.

5.

WON death is a cruel & unusual

penalty & not proper in the case at bar.

NO. Camanos counsel claims that

the penalty violates Art. IV, Sec. 21 of the
Consti w/c provides that excessive fines
shall not be imposed nor cruel or unusual
punishment inflicted.
Page | 3

Harden vs. Dir of Prisons: DP is not

cruel, unjust or excessive. Punishments are
cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death but the punishment of death
is not cruel w/in the meaning of that word
as used in the Consti. It implies something
inhuman & barbarous, something more that
the mere extinguishments of life.

Held: Camano guilty of murder, there being

1 MC & no AC, penalty of RT imposed.
Aquino
dissenting:
Premeditation
aggravating
thus accused
should
sentenced to 2 RPs.

is
be

however unlettered or uncultured he may

be
(4) murder because to kill is forbidden
by natural law which every rational being is
endowed to know and feel.
HIGH
DEGREE
AGGRAVATING

OF

INSTRUCTION,

AS

Degree of instruction is aggravating

when the offender availed himself or took
advantage of it in committing the crime.

Makasiar concurring: Voluntary surrender

will also mitigate guilt of the accused. He had
a choice to surrender or not when demanded
by the policemen who didnt place him under
arrest nor did they have any arrest warrant.
c. DEGREE OF INSTRUCTION AND
EDUCATION OF THE OFFENDER
Low degree of
instruction
and
education or lack of it is generally mitigating.
High degree of instruction and education is
aggravating, when the offender avails
himself of his learning in committing the
crime.
LACK OF INSTRUCTION, AS
MITIGATING
- Lack of instruction cannot be taken
into account where the defendant admitted
that he studied in the first grade in a public
elementary school. Art. 15 applies only to
him who really has not received any
instruction.
Not illiteracy alone, but also lack of
sufficient intelligence are necessary to
invoke the benefit of the alternative
circumstance of lack of instruction, the
determination of which is left to the trial
court.
Lack of sufficient instruction is not
mitigating when the offender is a city
resident who knows how to sign his name.
Lack of instruction must be proved
positively and directly and cannot be based
on mere deduction or inference.
The question of lack of instruction cannot
be raised for the first time in appellate court.
Ordinarily, LOW DEGREE OR LACK OF
INSTRUCTION IS MITIGATING IN ALL CRIMES.
Exceptions:
(1) crimes against property such as
estafa, theft, robbery arson except theft of
large cattle and robbery with homicide.
(2) crimes against chastity
(3) treason because love of country
should be a natural feeling of every citizen,
Page | 4

ABSOLUTORY CAUSES AND OTHER

SPECIAL SITUATIONS
Absolutory causes are those where the
act committed is a crime but for reasons of
public policy and sentiment there is no
penalty imposed.
a. ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION
ENTRAPMENT
Ways and means are
resorted to for the
purpose of trapping
and capturing the
lawbreaker in the
execution of his
criminal plan
The means originate
from the mind of the
criminal.

A person has
planned or is about
to commit a crime
and ways and
means are resorted
to by a public officer
to trap and catch
the criminal.
Not a bar to the
prosecution and
conviction of the
lawbreaker.

INSTIGATION
The instigator
practically induces the
would-be accused into
the commission of the
offense and himself
becomes a coprincipal.
The law enforcer
conceives the
commission of the
crime and suggests to
the accused who
adopts the idea and
carries it into
execution.
A public officer or a
private detective
induces an innocent
person to commit a
crime and would arrest
him upon or after the
commission of the
crime by the latter.
The accused must be
acquitted.

ARANETA v. CA [142 SCRA 532 (1986)]

Nature: Petition to review the decision of
CA.
FACTS: Complainant Gertrudes Yoyongco is
the widow of Antonio Yoyongco, an employee
of NIA. She approached the appellant, Atty
Aquilina Araneta, a hearing officer of the
Workmens
Compensation
Unit
at
Cabanatuan City, to inquire about the
procedure for filing a claim for death
compensation.
Learning the reqirements,
Yoyongco prepared the forms and filed them
at the Unit. When she went again to follow
up on the status of the application, she was
told by the appellant that she had to pay
PhP100 so that her claim would be acted
upon. She told the officer that she had no
money then but if she would process her
claim, Yoyongco would give her the PhP100
upon approval. To this, Atty Araneta refused
and said that on previous occasions certain
claimants made similar promises but they
failed to live up to them.

Yoyongco then went to her bro-in-law, Col.

Yoyongco (hala ka), the Chief of Criminal
Investigation Service, Phil Constabulary, and
informed him the demand of the appellant.
The Col then gave her 2 PhP50 bills and
instructed her to go to Col Laureaga. The
latter concocted a plan to entrap the
appellant. The 2 PhP50 bills were marked w/
notations
CC-NE-1
and
CC-NE-2,
photographed and dusted w/ ultra-violet
powder.
The complainant went to the officer along w/
CIC Balcos who pretended to be her nephew.
She again requested the officer to process
her claim but was again asked if she already
had P100. In answer, Yoyongco brought out
the 2 P50 bills & handed them to the
appellant. As she took hold of the money,
CIC Balcos grabbed her hand & arrested her.
In the PC headquarters, Atty Aranetas hands
were examined for the presence of UV
powder & result was positive.
Appellant contends that the bills, w/c she
never accepted, were rubbed against her
hand and dress.
HELD: There is entrapment when law
officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure
the apprehension of the criminal while in the
actual commission of the crime. There is
instigation when the accused was induced
to commit the crime. The difference in the
nature of the two lies in the origin of the crim
intent.
In entrapment, the mens rea
originates from the mind of the criminal. The
idea and the resolve to commit the crime
comes from him. In instigation, the law
officer conceives the commission of the
crime and suggests to the accused who
adopts the idea and carries it into execution.
Wherefore, appellant is guilty of the crime of
bribery, a violation of Sec 3 RA No 3019
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Considering though that this
case was pending since 1971 and she is a
mother of four and the amount involved is
only PhP100, it is recommended that
petitioner be granted either executive
clemency or the privilege of probation if she
is qualified. Decision affirmed.
CABRERA v. PAJARES [142 SCRA 127
(1986)]
Nature: Administrative Matters in the SC

Cabrera is the defendant in a civil

case w/c Pajares was trying. The case filed
by Cabrera's dad & half-siblings for the
annulment of the sale made to Cabrera of
28 ha. of land in Camarines Sur. Cabrera
was
advised
by
his
counsel
to
accommodate any request for money from
Page | 5

the judge so that latter won't give him a

hard time
Sept. 1984: Pajares intimated
that he needed money & so Cabrera gave
him P1k.
After 2 mos/before Christmas of
84: Pajares & Cabrera met in front of the
Naga Hall of Justice & the Pajares told
Cabrera that he needed money again. This
time, Cabrera asked the assistance of the
NBI in entrapping Pajares. He submitted
10 P100 bills for marking to be used in the
entrapment. Such bills were marked
w/orange flourescent crayon & dusted
w/orange flourescent crayon by the NBI. A
female agent bet 35 & 40 yrs old was sent
to Naga to take part in the operations.
Jan. 22, 1985, 8:15 a.m.: Cabrera
went to Pajares chamber w/NBI agent
Angelica Somera who pretended to be
Cabreras wife. Cabrera told the judge that
he decided not to settle the case but
instead he filed a MFR appointing a
surveyor to delineate a portion of the land
in dispute for his half-siblings in settlement.
Then Pajares asked O ano ngayon ang
atin. Cabrera then got the envelope w/the
marked money & gave it Pajares. Cabrera
then rushed out of the chamber on the
pretext that he forgot the keys in the car as
a signal to the other NBI agents. As soon as
they got in, Somera pointed out where the
money was. It was inserted between the
pages of a diary on the judges table.
Photos were taken. NBI Forensic Chemist
Vallado established that the envelope & the
money in it were those marked by the NBI.
Pajares & his diary were both found
positive of orange fluorescent powder. (so
thats how they do it! Hehehe.)
Pajares defense: he took the
money thinking that it was for the
surveyor. (yeah, yeah!) And he claims that
when he realized it was for the surveyor,
he threw it back to Cabrera telling him,
Bakit mo sa kin yan ibibigay? Ikaw na ang
magbigay
niyan
kay
Surveyor
Palaypayon. He further claims that the
envelope fell on the open pages of his
diary & thats where the NBI agents found
it.

Issues & Ratio:

1. WON

Pajares
accepted
the
money
knowing that it was given to him by
reason of his office.

YES. Surveyors fee was P2k & it

would have been paid by Cabrera & the
plaintiffs equally at P500 each & not by
Cabrera alone. Besides, Pajares had no
reason to believe that the money was
Cabreras share of the surveyors fees. His
claim that a survey plan was needed for the
final disposition of the case has no basis
either because the plaintiffs were seeking
the annulment of the sale, thus a survey
was not necessary.

Evidence shows that judge did not

really try to return the envelope to Cabrera
but instead, he placed it between the pages
of his diary. Such evidence is based on:
o Someras testimony & affidavit.
o Photos showing that the envelope was
placed between the pages of the judges
diary. A hand was shown in one of the
photographs & was identified as that of
NBI agent Artemio Sacaguing. Sacaguing
confirmed this claiming that he was in
the act of picking the diary from the
table.
o Testimony of Manuel Tobias, chief agent
of NBI sub-office in Legaspi
o Melquiades Volante, Pajares branch clerk
of court, corroborated Pajares statement
claiming that the judge did try to return
the envelope to Cabrera. However, he
issued another affidavit repudiating his
first testimony. He claims that he was
just pressured by Pajares to testify & that
he did not really see the incident.
o Constancio
Elquiero,
a
janitor,
corroborates
Pajares
statement.
However, the testimonies of the 3 law
enforcement agents should be given
more credence since theyre presumed
to have acted in the reg performance of
their duties.
o Photos appear to have been taken as
soon as the agents got into the judges
chamber. Even the judge himself
complained that as soon as the agents
barged into his office, they began to take
pictures. This rules out the possibility
that the agents were responsible for
putting the envelope in his diary. The
photos look like snapshots rather than
formal pictures.

The plan to entrap the judge was

cleared w/Exec. Judge Hon. Juan Llaguno
before whom Cabrera swore to his
statement. Not likely for a judge to approve
a frame-up of a colleague. Not likely either
for NBI Regional Dir. Epimaco Velasco to
authorize a frame-up considering that
according to Pajares himself, Velasco is his
close friend.

There was a discussion about how

the envelope was folded, etc. But its
probable that the judge unfolded it when it
was handed to him.

Pajares claims that he was

outraged by the frame-up & that he
protested. But the photos of his arrest show
that he was smiling. He claims it was in
derision (mockery, scorn) & that hes jolly
by nature. But a smile is not a normal
reaction to express outrage. (I dont quite
understand why this should be mentioned.
So what if he was smiling?)

2. Whether this was an entrapment or

instigation operation.

ENTRAPMENT.
Instigation
&
entrapment distinguished:
o Instigation: officers of the law/their
agents incite, induce, instigate or
lure an accused into committing an
offense w/c he otherwise wouldnt
commit & has no intention of
Page | 6

committing. Accused cannot be held

liable. Its a trap for unwary innocent.
o Entrapment: criminal intent/design to
commit
the
offense
charged
originates in the mind of the accused
& law enforcement officials merely
facilitate the commission of the
crime, the accused cannot justify his
conduct. Trap for the unwary
criminal.

Instigation is not actually an issue

since Pajares claims that this was a
frame-up. However, this claim has no
basis as proven by the evidence
presented.
3. WON Pajares is guilty of acts unbecoming
of a judge.

NO. GUILTY ONLY OF INDIRECT BRIBERY.

Evidence only shows that he accepted the
money & that he knew it was being given to
him by reason of his office as per the
investigation conducted by Investigating
Justice Mendoza. Unfortunate since the
Court has always stressed that members of
the judiciary should display not only the
highest integrity but must at all times
conduct themselves in such manner as to
be beyond reproach & suspicion. For the
judge to return the peoples regard of him
as an intermediary of justice between 2
conflicting parties, he must be the first to
abide by the law & weave an example for
the others to follow. He should be studiously
careful to avoid even the slightest infraction
of law. But Mendozas recommendation of
merely suspending the judge for 2 yrs & 4
mos as the proper administrative penalty by
virtue of Pajares serious misconduct
prejudicial to the judiciary & public interest
cannot be upheld.

Court
approves
Mendozas
recommendation to acquit Pajares for lack
of evidence of the 2nd charge of having
committed acts unbecoming of a member
of the judiciary.

Held: Pajares dismissed from the service

w/forfeiture of all retirement benefits & pay &
w/prejudice to reinstatement in any branch
of the govt or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities. Clerk of Court ordered to
return the ten marked P100.00 bills to
Cabrera.
b. EFFECT OF PARDON
RPC, Art. 23. Effect of pardon by the
offended party. A pardon of the offended
party does not extinguish criminal action
except as provided in Article 344 of this
Code; but civil liability with regard to the
interest of the injured party is extinguished
by his express waiver.
R.A. No. 8353. Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon The subsequent valid marriage between the
offender and the offended party shall

extinguish the criminal action or the penalty

imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the
offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the
wife as the offended party shall extinguish
the criminal action or the penalty. Provided,
That the crime shall be extinguish or the
penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is
void ab initio.
A pardon by the offended party does
not extinguish criminal action because a
crime is an offense against the State. In
criminal cases, the intervention of the
aggrieved parties is limited to being
witnesses for the prosecution.
Compromise does not extinguish
criminal liability.
The offended party in crimes of
adultery and concubinage cannot institute
criminal prosecution, if he shall have
consented or pardoned the offenders.
- the pardon here may be implied, as
continued inaction of the offended party
after learning the offense.
- both offenders must be pardoned by
the offended party.
c. ABSOLUTORY CAUSES
Art. 6(3). - There is an attempt when the
offender commences the commission of a
felony directly or over acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some
cause or accident other than this own
spontaneous desistance.
Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt
from criminal liability. The penalties
prescribed for accessories shall not be
imposed upon those who are such with
respect to their spouses, ascendants,
descendants,
legitimate,
natural,
and
adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by
affinity within the same degrees, with the
single exception of accessories falling within
the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article.

Art. 247. Death or physical injuries

inflicted
under
exceptional
circumstances. Any legally married
person who having surprised his spouse in
the act of committing sexual intercourse with
another person, shall kill any of them or both
of them in the act or immediately thereafter,
or shall inflict upon them any serious
physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of
destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical
injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt
from punishment.
Page | 7

These rules shall be applicable, under

the same circumstances, to parents with
respect to their daughters under eighteen
years of age, and their seducer, while the
daughters are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or
facilitate the prostitution of his wife or
daughter, or shall otherwise have consented
to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not
be entitled to the benefits of this article.

Art. 280. Qualified trespass to

dwelling. Any private person who shall
enter the dwelling of another against the
latter's will shall be punished by arresto
mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
If the offense be committed by means of
violence or intimidation, the penalty shall be
prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine not exceeding
1,000 pesos.
The provisions of this article shall not
be applicable to any person who shall enter
another's dwelling for the purpose of
preventing some serious harm to himself, the
occupants of the dwelling or a third person,
nor shall it be applicable to any person who
shall enter a dwelling for the purpose of
rendering some service to humanity or
justice, nor to anyone who shall enter cafes,
taverns, inn and other public houses, while
the same are open.
Art. 332. Persons exempt from
criminal liability. No criminal, but only
civil liability, shall result from the commission
of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious
mischief committed or caused mutually by
the following persons:
1.
Spouses,
ascendants
and
descendants, or relatives by affinity in the
same line.
2. The widowed spouse with respect to
the property which belonged to the deceased
spouse before the same shall have passed
into the possession of another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothersin-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.
The exemption established by this
article shall not be applicable to strangers
participating in the commission of the crime.
Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of
adultery,
concubinage,
seduction,
abduction,
rape
and
acts
of
lasciviousness. The crimes of adultery
and concubinage shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the
offended spouse.
The offended party cannot institute
criminal prosecution without including both

the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor,

in any case, if he shall have consented or
pardoned the offenders.
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or
acts of lasciviousness, shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by
the offended party or her parents,
grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case,
if the offender has been expressly pardoned
by the above named persons, as the case
may be.
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts
of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of
the offender with the offended party shall
extinguish the criminal action or remit the
penalty already imposed upon him. The
provisions of this paragraph shall also be
applicable to the co-principals, accomplices
and accessories after the fact of the abovementioned crimes.
d. ACTS NOT COVERED BY LAW AND IN
CASE OF EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENT
Art. 5. Duty of the court in
connection with acts which should be
repressed but which are not covered by
the law, and in cases of excessive
penalties. Whenever a court has
knowledge of any act which it may deem
proper to repress and which is not
punishable by law, it shall render the proper
decision, and shall report to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of
Justice, the reasons which induce the court to
believe that said act should be made the
subject of legislation.
In the same way, the court shall
submit to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, such statement as
may be deemed proper, without suspending
the execution of the sentence, when a strict
enforcement of the provisions of this Code
would result in the imposition of a clearly
excessive penalty, taking into consideration
the degree of malice and the injury caused
by the offense.
PEOPLE v. VENERACION [249 SCRA 244
(1995)]
Nature: Petition for certiorari to review a
decision of RTC of Manila

Aug 2, 1994 - cadaver of a young

girl identified as Angel Alquiza was seen
floating along Del Pan St. near the corner of
Lavesares St., Binondo, Manila. She was
wrapped in a sack & yellow table cloth tied
with a nylon cord with both feet & left hand
protruding from it was seen floating along.

Abundio Lagunday, a.k.a. Jr.

Jeofrey and Henry Lagarto y Petilla were
later charged with the crime of Rape with
Homicide in an Information dated August 8,
Page | 8

1994 filed with the Regional Trial Court of

Manila, National Capital Judicial Region
Trial Court - rendered a decision
on January 31, 1995 finding the defendants
Henry Lagarto y Petilla and Ernesto Cordero
y Maristela guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Rape with Homicide and
sentenced both accused with the "penalty
of reclusion perpetua with all the
accessories provided for by law."
February
8,
1995

City
Prosecutor of Manila filed a Motion for
Reconsideration praying that the Decision
be "modified in that the penalty of death be
imposed" against respondents Lagarto and
Cordero, in place of the original penalty
(reclusion perpetua). Feb. 10, 1995 the
motion was denied by the court.

Issue: WON the respondent judge acted with

grave abuse of discretion and in excess of
jurisdiction when he failed and/or refused
to impose the mandatory penalty of death
under RA 7659, after finding the accused
guilty of the crime of Rape with Homicide.

YES. No question on the guilt of

the accused.

A government of laws, not of

men excludes the exercise of broad
discretionary powers by those acting under
its authority. Under this system, judges are
guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to
protect and enforce it without fear or
favor,"
resist
encroachments
by
governments, political parties, or even the
interference of their own personal beliefs.

The RTC judge found the accused

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape and homicide. 11 of RA No. 7659
provides:

on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall

be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the
rape, a homicide is committed, the
penalty shall be death. . .

Under the law the penalty

imposable for the crime of rape with
homicide is NOT reclusion perpetua but
Death.
The law provides that when by
reason or on the occasion of rape, a
homicide is committed, the penalty shall
be death
A court of law is no place for a
protracted debate on the morality or
propriety of the sentence, where the law
itself provides for the sentence of death as
a penalty in specific & well-defined
instances.
People vs. Limaco - as long as
that penalty remains in the statute books,
and as long as our criminal law provides
for its imposition in certain cases, it is the
duty of judicial officers to respect and
apply the law regardless of their private
opinions. It is a well settled rule that the
courts are not concerned w/ the wisdom,
efficacy or morality of laws.
Rules of Court mandates that
after an adjudication of guilt, the judge
should impose the proper penalty and civil
liability provided for by the law on the
accused.

Article 335 of the same Code is hereby

amended to read as follows:
Art. 335. When and how rape is
committed. Rape is committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation.
2. When the woman is deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under 12 years of
age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is
committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the
rape, the victim has become insane, the
penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated
and a homicide is committed by reason or
Page | 9

V. PERSONS WHO INCUR CRIMINAL

LIABILITY
Art. 16. Who are criminally liable.
The following are criminally liable for
grave and less grave felonies:
1. Principals.
2. Accomplices.
3. Accessories.
The following are criminally liable for light
felonies:
1. Principals
2. Accomplices.
The treble division of persons criminally
responsible for an offense rests upon the
very nature of their participation in the
commission of the crime.
The ACCESSORIES are not liable for
light felonies because in the commission of
light felonies, the social wrong as well as the
individual prejudice is so small that penal
sanction is deemed not necessary for
accessories
RULES RELATIVE TO LIGHT FELONIES:
a. Light felonies are punishable only
when they have been consummated.
b. But when light felonies are
committed against persons or property, the
are punishable even if they are only in the
attempted or frustrated stage of the
execution.
c. Only principals and accomplices are
liable for light felonies.
d. Accessories are not liable for light
felonies, even if they are committed against
persons or property.
Only natural persons can be the
active subject of crime because of the highly
personal nature of the criminal responsibility.
Only a natural person can be the
offender because:
a. The RPC requires that the culprit
should have acted with personal malice or
negligence. An artificial or juridical person
cannot act with malice or negligence.
b.
A
juridical
person,
like
a
corporation, cannot commit a crime in which
a willful purpose or a malicious intent is
required.
c. There is substitution of deprivation
of liberty (subsidiary imprisonment) for
pecuniary penalties in case of in case of
insolvency of the accused.
d. Other penalties consisting in
imprisonment and other deprivation of
liberty like destierro, can be executed only
against individuals.
Officers, not the corporation, are
criminally liable.

Juridical persons are criminally liable

under certain special laws.
In all crimes there are always 2
parties: ACTIVE (the criminal) and PASSIVE
(the injured party).
A. PRINCIPALS
Art. 17. Principals. The following are
considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the
execution of the act;
2. Those who directly force or induce
others to commit it;
3. Those who cooperate in the
commission of the offense by another act
without which it would not have been
accomplished.
When a single individual commits a
crime, there is no difficulty in determining
his participation in the commission
thereof.
But when 2 or more persons are
involved, it is necessary to determine the
participation of each.
PAR. 1. PRINCIPALS BY DIRECT
PARTICIPATION
The principal by direct participation
PERSONALLY TAKES PART IN THE EXECUTION
OF THE ACT constituting the crime.
Two or more persons who took part in the
commission of the crime are principals by
direct participation, when the following
requisites are present:
1.
That they participated in the
criminal resolution
2.
That they carried out their
plan and personally took part in its
execution by acts which directly
tended to the same end.
First requisite Participation in the
criminal resolution
Two or more persons are said to
have participated in the criminal resolution
when they were in conspiracy at the time of
the commission of the crime.
It is well settled that a person may
be convicted for the criminal act of another
where, between them, there has been
conspiracy or unity of purpose and intention
in the commission of the crime charged.
CONSPIRACY
A conspiracy exists when 2 or more
persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it.
The conspiracy contemplated in the
first requisite is not a felony, but only a
manner of incurring criminal liability.
In order to hold an accused guilty as
co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must
Page | 10

be established that he performed an over act

in furtherance of the conspiracy, either by
actively
participating
in
the
actual
commission of the crime, or by lending moral
assistance to his co-conspirators by being
present at the scene of the crime, or by
exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of
the conspirators as to move them to
executing the conspiracy.
Mere knowledge without cooperation
or agreement to cooperate is not enough to
constitute conspiracy.
Silence does not make one a
conspirator
The existence of conspiracy does not
require necessarily an agreement for an
appreciable length of time prior to the
execution of its purpose, since from the legal
viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of
the commission of the offense, the accused
had the same purpose and were united in its
execution.
Conspiracy arises on the very instant
the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to
commit the felony and forthwith decide to
pursue it.
Formal agreement or previous
acquaintance among several persons not
necessary in conspiracy.
Must be established by positive and
conclusive evidence.
When there is no conspiracy, each of
the offenders is liable only for the act
performed by him.
It is not enough that a person
participated in the assault made by another
in order to consider him a co-principal in the
crime committed. He must also participate in
the criminal resolution of the other.
When there is conspiracy, the act of
one is the act of all. There is collective
criminal responsibility.
Conspiracy may cover persons
previously undetermined.
A person in conspiracy with others,
who had desisted before the crime was
committed by the other, is not criminally
liable.
When there is conspiracy, it is not
necessary to ascertain the specific act of
each conspirator.
There could be no conspiracy to
commit an offense through negligence.
In cases of criminal negligence or
crimes punishable by special law, allowing or
failing to prevent an act to be performed by
another, makes one a co-principal.
Second requisite that the culprits
carried out their plan and personally
took part in its execution, by acts which
directly tended to the same end.
The principals by direct participation
must be at the scene of the crime, personally
taking part in its execution.

The acts of each offender must

directly tend to the same end.
One serving as guard pursuant to
the conspiracy is a principal by direct
participation.
When the second requisite is
lacking, there is only conspiracy.
PEOPLE v. NUNAG [173 SCRA 274 (1989)]
Nature: Appeal from the judgment of CFI
Pampanga. 1989
FACTS: Complainant, Lorenza Lopez, then
about 15.5 y.o., declared that in the 2 nd wk of
May 1978, at 730PM, while she was watch a
TV program in the house of her neighbor,
Laxamana, she saw the accused Mario
Nunag, 1 of her neighbors, coming towards
her. Nunag, staggering & drunk, came to her
& asked her to go w/ him. Because she
refused, Nunag held her by the hand &
poked a knife at her stomach & threatened
to kill her. Nunag placed something in her
mouth & led her to a nearby ricefield, about
15m. away from Laxamanas house. Very
soon thereafter, the accused was joined by 4
others, whom she knew also.
After
conspiring
in
whispers,
Mandap
&
Salangsang held her hands while Carpio &
Manalili held her feet & forced her to lie on
the ground. Nunag undressed her & had
sexual intercourse w/ her. After him, Mandap
followed.
She lost consciousness & only
regained it while Manalili was abusing her.
The 5 accused left w/ a threat that they
would kill her & her family.
After the incident, the complainant missed
her menstruation period whenit became due
and noticed that her stomach was getting
bigger. Yet she didnt tell anybody until her
family noticed. In Oct 1978, she gave birth
prematurely to female twins who died after
baptism.
Accused Nunag admitted having sexual
intercourse w/ Lopez but denied the charge
of rape. He asserted that it was while he
was sleeping when she came on to him and
they went to the ricefield to relieve their
lasciviousness. She asked money after the
act and he gave her PhP4.00 and went
home.
Accused Salangsang offers the same
testimony but asserts that he gave Lopez P2
instead. Accused Manalili also contends that
it was Lopez who came on to her but he
refused to give her money.
It was only
Carpio & Mandap who denied having sexual
intercourse w/ her.
RTC found them guilty of the charge &
sentenced Nunag, Mandap & Salangsang to
suffer reclusion perpetua while Carpio &
Manalili, who were both above 16 & below 18
at the time of the commission of the offense,
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 yrs
Page | 11

of prision mayor as min to 17 yrs & 4 mos of

reclusion temporal as max.
HELD: Finding that Lopez, a poor barrio girl
who looked timid and inexperienced in the
ways of the world, had no motive whatsoever
to testify falsely against the appellants, each
of the 5 accused must be found guilty of 3
distinct and separate crimes of rape, the first
3 men by direct act & participation & the
other 2 by indispensable cooperation. Nunag,
Mandap & Salangsang sentenced to suffer 3
penalties of reclusion perpetua while Manalili
& Carpio both being above 16 but below 18
yrs at that time, sentenced to suffer 3
indeterminate penalties of 10 yrs of prision
mayor as min & 17 yrs 4 mos of reclusion
temporal as max. Judgment affirmed w/
modification.

2) BY DIRECTLY INDUCING ANOTHER

TO COMMIT A CRIME.
a. By giving price, or offering reward
or promise.
b. By using words of command.
REQUISITES:
1.
That the inducement be made directly
with the intention of procuring the
commission of the crime; and
a.
A
thoughtless
expression without intention to
produce the result is not an
inducement to commit a crime.
b.
The inducement may
be by acts of command, advice, or
through influence, or agreement for
consideration.
2.

PEOPLE V. DELA CERNA [1967]

FACTS: Rafael filed an ejectment suit
against dela Cernas father wherein the court
ruled in his favor. Later he was shot by the
accused while the former and his family were
bringing sacks of corn. He was taken away
by his family to tend his wounds but Dela
Cerna and company followed them and
Rafael was shot again resulting to his death.
Maquiling, one companion of Dela Cerna,
shot Casiano, a relative of Rafael.
HELD: Dela Cerna cannot be held liable for
the death of Casiano because the conspiracy
was to kill Rafael only. The rule has always
been: co-conspirators are liable only for acts
done pursuant to the conspiracy; for other
acts done outside the contemplation of the
co-conspirators or which are not the
necessary and logical consequence of the
intended crime, only the actual perpetrators
are liable. Although Maquiling got the gun
from Dela Cerna, the latter only gave it to
the former as per their agreement to shoot
Rafael
As to the other companions, facts
prove their active participation in the killing.
They are all principals.
PAR. 2. PRINCIPALS BY INDUCTION
Those who directly force or induce
others to commit it.
The principal by induction becomes
liable only when the principal by direct
participation committed the act induced.
2 WAYS OF BECOMING PRINCIPAL BY
INDUCTION
1) BY DIRECTLY FORCING ANOTHER
TO COMMIT A CRIME
a. By using IRRESISTIBLE FORCE
b. By causing UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR

That
such
inducement
be
the
determining cause of the commission of
the crime by the material executor.
- The words of advice of the influence
must have actually moved the hands of
the principal by direct participation.

PRINCIPAL BY
PROPOSAL TO
INDUCEMENT
COMMIT THE FELONY
There is an inducement to commit a crime.
The principal by
The mere proposal to
inducement
commit
a
felony
is
becomes liable
punishable in treason
only when the
and rebellion. The person
crime is
to whom the proposal is
committed by the made should not commit
principal by direct the crime; otherwise, the
participation.
proponent becomes a
principal by inducement.
The
inducement The proposal to be
involves
any punishable must involve
crime
only treason or rebellion.
EFFECTS OF ACQUITTAL OF PRINCIPAL
BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION UPON THE
LIABILITY
OF
PRINCIPAL
BY
INDUCEMENT
1) Conspiracy is negated by the acquittal
of co-defendant.
2) One cannot be held guilty of having
instigated the commission of a crime
without first being shown that the
crime has been actually committed by
another.
PEOPLE v. DE LA CRUZ [97 SCRA 385
(1980)]
Agapito de la Cruz was found guilty as
principal by inducement of the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention,
and sentencing him to death.
The facts are such that Agapito met up w/
Mohamad Sagap Salip, Alih Itum and a
certain Asmad and proposed to them the
Page | 12

killing of Antonio Yu & the kidnapping of

the Antonios younger bro Yu Chi Chong, for
ransom. Agapito happened to be the
oversser of Antonios rubber & coconut
land for no less than 10 yrs
He gave them instructions as to how and
where to locate the Yu brothers at a given
time and how they were to ambush the
brothers. (But he didnt directly participate
in actual crime)
But Antonio had to go somewhere and so
the younger Yu went with Isabelo
Mancenido to Isabela (Isabelo Isabela
hehe.. funny..). The younger Yu was
ambushed as instructed but when Yu Chi
Chong tried to escape by striking Angih
with a piece of wood, Angih got so pissed
he shot Yu several times, killing him.
The gun shots alerted the villagers so the
kidnappers fled. When the villagers left
after seeing the body (they said theyll
come back in the morning with police in
tow), the kidnappers took the body and
threw it in the ocean.
Antonio testified and provided the possible
motive for Agapito to commit such crime.
Agapito was assigned manager and
administrator of the farm but when the
younger Yu came back, Agapito was
demoted to overseer. Further, profits were
higher with Yu as manager and Antonio
became stricter with Agapito. Agapito was
convicted as mastermind or principal by
inducement

Issue: WON Agapito should be convicted as

mastermind or principal by inducement in
the absence of the elements of conspiracy to
the crime charged.
HELD: NO. The requisites necessary in order
that a person may be convicted as a
principal by inducement are:
o
That the inducement be made
directly with the intention of procuring
the commission of the crime; and
o
That such inducement be the
determining cause of the commission of
the crime by the material executor
The foregoing requisites are indubitable
present in this case
Jamas Jumaidi & Oyong Asidin, 2
discharged witnesses, testified that Asmad
& Amil contected them to go to Basilan to
do a job for Agapito.
When the group was brought face to face
with him, he lost no time in lating down
the strategy for the killing of Antonio Yu
and the kidnapping of Yu Chi Chong for
ransom.
It was he who knew when the truck of the
intended victims would go to Latawan to
load the copra to be delivered to Isabela.
He knew the route the truck would take &
the approximate time that it was to pass
by. He even selected the ambush place.

Clearly, he had positive resolution to

procure the commission of the crime. He,
too, presented the strongest kind of
temptation, a pecuniary gain in the form
of ransom, w/c was the determining factor
of the commission of the crime by his coaccused.
W/o him, the crime would not have been
conceived, much less committed. Clearly,
he was a principal by induction, with
collective criminal responsibility with the
material executors.
One is induced to commit a crime either by
a
commans
(precepto)
or
for
a
consideration (pacto), or by any other
similar act w/c constitutes the real and
moving cause of the crime & w/c was done
for the purpose of inducing such criminal
act & was sufficient for that purpose. The
person who gives promises, or offers the
consideration & the one who actually
commits the crime by reason of such
promise, remuneration or reward are both
principals.
The inducer need not take part in the
commission of the offense. 1 who induces
another to commit a crime is guilty as
principal even though he might have taken
no part in its material execution.
PAR. 3. PRINCIPALS BY INDISPENSABLE
COOPERATION
Those who cooperate in the
commission of the offense by another act
without which it would not have been
accomplished.
REQUISITES:
1. Participation in the criminal resolution,
that is, there is either anterior
conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose
and intention immediately before the
commission of the crime charged; and
2. Cooperation in the commission of the
offense by performing another act,
without which it would not have been
accomplished.
To be liable as principals, the offender
must fall under any of the three concepts
defined in Article 17.
There
is
collective
criminal
responsibility when the offenders are
criminally liable in the same manner and to
the same extent. The penalty to be imposed
must be the same for all.
Principals by direct participation have
collective criminal responsibility. Principal by
induction, except that who directly forced
another to commit a crime, and principal by
direct participation have collective criminal
responsibility. Principal by indispensable
cooperation
has
collective
criminal
Page | 13

responsibility with the principal by direct

participation.
PEOPLE v. MONTEALEGRE [161 SCRA 700
(1988)]
Edmundo Abadilla was eating in a resto
when he detected the smell of marijuana
smoke coming from a nearby table.
Intending to call a policeman, he quietly
went outside and saw Pfc. Renato
Camantigue. Camantigue joined Abadilla
in the resto and they both smelled the
marijuana smoke from the table of Vicente
Capalad and Napoleon Montealegre.
Camantigue collared the 2 & said
Nagmamarijuana kayo, ano? He forced
them up, holding 1 in each hand but
Capalad pulled out a knife & started
stabbing
Camantigue
at
the
back.
Camantigue let go of Montealegre to get
his gun but Montealegre restrained
Camantigues hand to prevent the latter
from defending himself.
They grappled & fell on the floor. Capalac
fled and Camantigue pursued him firing
some shots. Then he stopped and asked to
be brought to a hospital. Capalac was
found slumped in the street, with a bullet
to his chest. Both he and Camantigue died
the next day. Montealegre on the other
hand, escaped through the confusion. He
was later apprehended.
Issue: WON Montealegre was rightly
considered
a
co-principal
for
having
corroborated with Capalad in the killing of
the police officer.
YES. The two acted in concert, with
Capalad actually stabbing Camantigue 7
times and Montealegre holding on to
victims hands to prevent him from
drawing the pistol and defending himseld,
as Abadilla had testified.
While it is true that Montealegre did not
himself commit the act of stabbing, he
was nonetheless equally guilty thereof for
having prevented Camantigue for resisting
the attack against him.
Montealegre
was
a
principal
by
indispensable cooperation under A17(3),
RPC. The requisites of this provision
o
Participating
in
the
criminal
resolution, i.e., theres either anterior
conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose
& intention immediately before the
commission of the crime charged; &
o
Cooperation in the commission of
the offense by performing another act
w/o w/c it would not have been
accomplished.
But although there was no evidence of
prior agreement between Capalad &
Montealegre, their subsequent acts should
prove the presence of such conspiracy.
The Court has consistently upheld such

view in previous cases (People

Laganson, People v. Cercano, People
Garcia Cabarse, Dacanay v. People)
Montealegre was correctly convicted
the complex crime of murder, qualified
treachery, w/ assault upon a person
authority.

v.
v.
of
by
of

PEOPLE vs. QUILLOSA [G.R. No. 115687,

Feb. 17, 2000]
FACTS: On Jan.1, 1991, at about 5 AM,
prosecution witness Roberto Vasquez was on
his way to church when he saw the victim
Ambrosio Ilocto, also known as "Mang
Bosiong", walking some four or five meters
ahead of him. Suddenly, three men blocked
Mang Bosiongs way. While appellant
Reynaldo Quillosa held Mang Bosiongs right
hand, the second man held his left hand, and
the third man stabbed Mang Bosiong, with a
knife, three times. When Mang Bosiong fell,
appellant remarked, "Leo that is enough, he
would die." Then the three (3) men fled.
Quillosa was apprehended, charged and later
the RTC convicted Quillosa of the murder of
Ambrosio Ilocto, imposing upon him the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering
him to indemnify the heirs of the victim the
amount of P50,000.00.
HELD: We have long held that the
testimony of a single eyewitness is sufficient
to support a conviction so long as it is clear,
straightforward and worthy of credence by
the trial court. Minor and inconsequential
flaws in the testimony of the witness
strengthen rather than impair his credibility.
As to appellants participation in the killing,
the Court in previous cases have held that
holding the hand of the victim to render
him immobile while he is being stabbed
amounts to an act of indispensable
cooperation without which the crime
would not have been accomplished.
Appellants act of holding the right arm of
the victim, while another held the left arm,
thus enabling their third companion to stab
the victim, shows that they acted together
with one purpose and design to kill the
victim.
As to the crime committed, we find that
treachery attended the commission of the
offense, hence the crime is murder. For
treachery to be present, two conditions must
be shown: (1) the employment of means of
execution that give the person attacked no
opportunity to defend or retaliate; and (2)
the deliberate or conscious adoption of the
means of execution.In this case, appellant
and another person held the hands of the
victim to enable their companion to stab him
while he was in a defenseless position. While
Page | 14

abuse of superior strength was alleged in the

Information, it is already absorbed in
treachery and need not be appreciated
separately. Evident premeditation was not
proven by the prosecution.
B. ACCOMPLICES
Art. 18. Accomplices. Accomplices are
those persons who, not being included in Art.
17, cooperate in the execution of the offense
by previous or simultaneous acts.

In
quasi-collective
criminal
responsibility, some of the offenders in the
crime are principals and the others are
accomplices.
The participation of an accomplice
presupposes the commission of the crime b
the principal by direct participation.
When there is no conspiracy
between or among the defendants but they
were animated by one and the same purpose
to accomplish the criminal objective, those
who cooperated by previous or simultaneous
act but cannot be held liable as principals are
accomplices.
An accomplice does not have a
previous agreement or understanding or is
not in conspiracy with the principal by direct
participation.
CONSPIRATOR
ACCOMPLICE
They know and agree with the criminal
design.
Conspirators know Accomplices come to
the criminal
know about it after the
intention because principals have reached
they themselves
the decision and only
have decided
then do they agree to
upon such course
cooperate in its
of action.
execution.
Conspirators
Accomplices merely
decide that a
assent to the plan and
crime should be
cooperate in it
committed.
accomplishment
Conspirators are
Accomplices are merely
the authors of a
instruments who perform
crime
acts not essential to the
perpetration of the
offense.
REQUISITES:
That there be community of design;
that is, knowing the criminal design of
the principal by direct participation, he
concurs with the latter in his purpose;
2.
That
he
cooperates
in
the
execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts, with the intention of
supplying material or moral aid in the
execution of the crime in an efficacious
way; and
3.
That there be a relation between
the acts done by the principal and those
1.

attributed to the person charged as

accomplice.
The community of design need not
be to commit the crime actually committed.
It is sufficient if there was a common purpose
to commit a particular crime and that the
crime actually committed was a natural or
probable consequence of the intended crime.
The cooperation of an accomplice is
not due to a conspiracy.
When the acts of the accused are
not indispensable in the killing, they are
merely accomplices.
The accomplice merely supplies the
principal with material or moral aid without
conspiracy with the latter.
The wounds inflicted by an
accomplice in crimes against persons should
mot have caused the death of the victim.
RULES:
1.
The one who had the original
criminal design is the person who
committed the resulting crime.
2.
The accomplice, after concurring in
the criminal purpose of the principal,
cooperates
by
previous
or
simultaneous acts.
When
the
cooperation
is
by
simultaneous act, the accomplice
takes part while the crime is being
committed by the principal by direct
participation
or
immediately
thereafter.
3.
The accomplice in crimes against
persons does not inflict the more or
most serious wounds.
The moral aid may be through advice,
encouragement or agreement.
There must be a relation between the
criminal act of the principal and the act of
the one charged as accomplice.
PRINCIPAL by
COOPERATION
Cooperation
is
indispensable
in
the commission of
the act.

ACCOMPLICE
Cooperation
is
not
indispensable in the
commission of the act.

PEOPLE vs. MANDOLADO [123 SCRA 133

(1983)]
FACTS:
Julian Ortillano and Martin Mandolado,
appellants, as well as Conrado Erinada
and Anacleto Simon, were on a bus bound
for Midsayap, North Cotabato. All 4 were
trainees/draftees of AFP
They alighted at the bus terminal in
Midsayap. Being all in uniform, armed &
belonging to the same military outfit, they
Page | 15

got acquainted & decided to drink ESQ

rum, at the said bus terminal.
After drinking for about an hour,
Mandolado got drunk and went inside the
public market. Subsequently, he returned,
grabbed his .30 caliber machine gun and
started firing. His companions tried to
dissuade him but he nonetheless continued
firing his gun.
Sensing trouble, Conrado and Anacleto ran
away, hailed and boarded a passing Ford
Fiera with some passengers on board.
Appellants followed and boarded also the
vehicle and forced the driver of the Ford
Fiera to bring them to the Midsayap
crossing. All the while, Mandolado was
harassing the driver and firing his gun.
They for off at the Midsayap crossing and
waited for a ride. When Herminigildo
Tenorio, driving a privately owned jeep
where Nolasco Mendoza was on board,
passed by the 4 boarded the jeep. The
whole time, Mandolado was still causing
trouble and firing his gun.
Upon learning that the jeep was bound for
Cotabato City and not Pikit, North
Cotabato, appellant Mandolado got angry,
"cocked" his gun and ordered the driver to
stop. While the jeep was coming to a full
stop, Conrado and Anacleto immediately
jumped off the jeep and ran towards their
detachment camp.
Appellants also got off the jeep but then
Mandolado fired his .30 caliber machine
gun at and hit the occupants of the jeep.
Appellant Ortillano likewise, fired his
armalite, not at the occupants of said jeep
but downwards hitting the ground.
Then they ran away from the scene and
boarded another vehicle and went in so
many places until they were apprehended.
Mandolado was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder qualified by
treachery, evident premeditation and
abuse of superior strength while Ortillano
was penalized by imprisonment for being
an accessory

ISSUE: WON Ortillano is an accessory

HELD: NO. Julian Ortillano should be
convicted, not as an accessory, but as an
accomplice. An accomplice cooperates in the
execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts, provided he has no direct
participation in its execution or does not
force or induce others to commit it, or his
cooperation is not indispensable to its
accomplishment.
In the case at bar, Ortillano, by his
acts showed knowledge of the criminal
design of Mandolado. He was present when
the latter tried to attack the driver of the
Ford Fiera with a knife and fired at the
vehicle hitting a female passenger. When
Mandolado cocked his gun and ordered

Tenorio to stop the jeep, their 2 other

companion, Simon and Erinada, immediately
jumped off the jeep and ran away but
Ortillano stayed. In a display of unity with
Mandolado, Ortillano fired his armalite while
they were riding in the jeep of the victim.
And Ortillanos act of firing his gun towards
the ground manifested his concurrence with
the criminal intent. In other words, his
simultaneous acts supplied moral aid in the
execution of the crime in an efficacious way.
His
presence
served
to
encourage
Mandolado, the principal, or to increase the
odds against the victims.
PEOPLE vs. DOCTOLERO [193 SCRA 632
(1991)]
FACTS: The 3 accused, Ludovico, Conrado
and Virgilio (all surnamed Doctolero) threw
stones at Saguns house and called to all the
men in the house to come out. Epifiana and
Lolita and Jonathan (1 year old child of
Lolita) were struck and stabled by the
accused inside the house of Sagun. Epifiana
and Lolita died while Jonathan was slightly
injured. The same accused while already on
the road, hacked and stabbed Marcelo which
caused his death.
HELD: There is no question that while the 3
accused were still stoning at the house, they
heard the 2 women protesting and Ludovico
went inside and brutally killed the 2 women
inside the room of the said house. It is
impossible to claim that Virgilio and Conrado
did not know what their brother was doing.
They knew and they just stood by and did
nothing to stop their brother. Their presence
gave Ludovico encouragement in the
commission of the crime. Thus, the 2 are
accomplices. Once can be an accomplice
even if he did not know of the actual crime
intended b the principal provided he was
aware that it was an illicit act.
C. ACCESSORIES
Art. 19. Accessories. Accessories are
those who, having knowledge of the
commission of the crime, and without having
participated therein, either as principals or
accomplices, take part subsequent to its
commission in any of the following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting
the offender to profit by the effects of the
crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the
body of the crime, or the effects or
instruments thereof, in order to prevent its
discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or
assisting in the escape of the principals of
the crime, provided the accessory acts with
abuse of his public functions or whenever the
Page | 16

author of the crime is guilty of treason,

parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the
life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be
habitually guilty of some other crime.
An accessory does not participate in
the criminal design, nor cooperate in the
commission of the felony, but, with
knowledge of the commission of the crime,
he subsequently takes part in 3 ways:
a) by profiting from the effects of the
crime;
b) by concealing the body, effects or
instruments of the crime in order to
prevent its discovery; and
c) by assisting in the escape or
concealment of the principal of the
crime, provided he acts with abuse of
his public functions or the principal is
guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or
an attempt to take the life of the Chief
Executive, or is known to be habitually
guilt of some other crime.
knowledge of the commission of the
crime
Mere possession of stolen property
does not make the accused an accessory
where the thief was already convicted.
Entertaining suspicion that a crime
has been committed is not enough.
Knowledge of the commission of the
crime may be established by circumstantial
evidence
commission of the crime
the crime committed by the principal
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
without having participated therein
either as principals or accomplices
take
part
subsequent
to
its
commission
The accessory takes part AFTER the
crime has been committed.
SPECIFIC ACTS OF THE ACCESSORIES
1. BY PROFITING THEMSELVES OR
ASSISTING THE OFFENDER TO
PROFIT BY THE EFFECTS OF THE
CRIME
- The accessory must receive the
property from the principal. He should not
take it without the consent of the
principal, or else, he is not an accessory
but a principal in the crime of theft.
- When is profiting by the effect of
the crime punished as the act of
principal, and not the act of accessory?
When a person knowingly
acquired or received property
taken by the brigands.

2. BY CONCEALING OR DESTROYING
THE BODY OF THE CRIME TO
PREVENT ITS DISCOVERY.
BODY OF THE CRIME corpus delicti
which means that a specific offense was
in fact committed by someone
3. BY HARBORING, CONCEALING OR
ASSISTING IN THE ESCAPE OF THE
PRINCIPAL OF THE CRIME
2 CLASSES:
a. Public officers who harbor conceal or
assist in the escape of the principal of any
crime (not light felony) with abuse of his
public functions
REQUISITES:
(1) The accessory is a public
officer;
(2) He harbors, conceals, or
assists in the escape of the
principal;
(3) The public officer acts with
abuse of his public functions.
(4) The crime committed by the
principal is any crime, provided it is
not a light felony.
b. Private persons who harbor, conceal or
assist in the escape of the author of the
crime guilty of treason, parricide,
murder, or an attempt against the life of
the President, or who is known to be
habitually guilty of some other crime.
REQUISITES:
(1) The accessory is a private
person.
(2) He harbors, conceals or
assists in the escape of the author
of the crime.
(3) The crime committed by the
principal is either: (a) treason, (b)
parricide, (c) murder, (d) attempt
against the life of the president, or
(e) that the principal is known to be
habitually guilty of some other
crime.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1612

ANTI-FENCING LAW OF 1979
WHEREAS,
reports
from
law
enforcement agencies reveal that there is
rampant robbery and thievery of government
and private properties;
WHEREAS, such robbery and thievery
have become profitable on the part of the
lawless elements because of the existence of
ready buyers, commonly known as fence, of
stolen properties;
Page | 17

WHEREAS, under existing law, a fence

can be prosecuted only as an accessory after
the fact and punished lightly;
WHEREAS, is imperative to impose
heavy penalties on persons who profit by the
effects of the crimes of robbery and theft.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E.
MARCOS, President of the Philippines by
virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby order and decree as
part of the law of the land the following:
Section 1. Title. This decree shall be
known as the Anti-Fencing Law.
Section 2. Definition of Terms. The
following terms shall mean as follows:
(a) "Fencing" is the act of any person
who, with intent to gain for himself or for
another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep,
acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall
buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in
any article, item, object or anything of value
which he knows, or should be known to him,
to have been derived from the proceeds of
the crime of robbery or theft.
(b) "Fence" includes any person, firm,
association corporation or partnership or
other organization who/which commits the
act of fencing.
Section 3. Penalties. Any person
guilty of fencing shall be punished as
hereunder indicated:
(a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the
value of the property involved is more than
12,000 pesos but not exceeding 22,000
pesos; if the value of such property exceeds
the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, the penalty shall be
termed reclusion temporal and the accessory
penalty pertaining thereto provided in the
Revised Penal Code shall also be imposed.
(b) The penalty of prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods, if the
value of the property robbed or stolen is
more than 6,000 pesos but not exceeding
12,000 pesos.
(c) The penalty of prision correccional
in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the property involved is more than
200 pesos but not exceeding 6,000 pesos.
(d) The penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, if the value of the property
involved is over 50 pesos but not exceeding
200 pesos.
(e) The penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium period if such value is over five (5)
pesos but not exceeding 50 pesos.

(f) The penalty of arresto mayor in its

minimum period if such value does not
exceed 5 pesos.
Section 4. Liability of Officials of
Juridical Persons. If the fence is a
partnership, firm, corporation or association,
the president or the manager or any officer
thereof who knows or should have known the
commission of the offense shall be liable.
Section 5. Presumption of Fencing.
Mere possession of any good, article, item,
object, or anything of value which has been
the subject of robbery or thievery shall be
prima facie evidence of fencing.
Section
6.
Clearance/Permit
to
Sell/Used Second Hand Articles. For purposes
of this Act, all stores, establishments or
entities dealing in the buy and sell of any
good, article item, object of anything of
value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or
supplier thereof, shall before offering the
same for sale to the public, secure the
necessary clearance or permit from the
station commander of the Integrated
National Police in the town or city where such
store, establishment or entity is located. The
Chief of Constabulary/Director General,
Integrated National Police shall promulgate
such rules and regulations to carry out the
provisions of this section. Any person who
fails to secure the clearance or permit
required by this section or who violates any
of the provisions of the rules and regulations
promulgated
thereunder
shall
upon
conviction be punished as a fence.
Section 7. Repealing Clause. All laws
or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with
the provisions of this Decree are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 8. Effectivity. This Decree
shall take effect upon approval.
Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd
day of March, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy-nine.
ACCESSORY
DISTINGUISHED
FROM
PRINCIPAL AND FROM ACCOMPLICE
1. The accessory does not take direct
part or cooperate in, or induce, the
commission of the crime.
2. The accessory does not cooperate
in the commission of the offense by acts
either
prior
thereto
or
simultaneous
therewith.
3. That the participation of the
accessory in all cases always takes place
after the commission of the crime.
Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt
from criminal liability. The penalties
prescribed for accessories shall not be
imposed upon those who are such with
Page | 18

respect to their spouses, ascendants,

descendants,
legitimate,
natural,
and
adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by
affinity within the same degrees, with the
single exception of accessories falling within
the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article.
The exemption is based on the ties
of blood and the preservation of the
cleanliness of ones name, which compels
one to conceal crimes committed by
relatives.
An ACESSORY is exempt from
criminal liability, when the principal is his:
1. spouse,
2. ascendant,
3. descendant,
4. legitimate, natural or adopted
brother, sister or relative by affinity
within the same degree.
- even if only two of the principals guilty
of murder are the brothers of the accessory
and the others are not related to him, such
accessory is exempt from criminal liability.
- a nephew or niece is not included
An accessory is NOT EXEMPT from
criminal liability even if the principal is
related to him, if such accessory (1)
PROFITED by the effects of the crime, or (2)
assisted the offender to profit by the
effects of the crime

PEOPLE vs. TALINGDAN [84 SCRA 19

(1978)]
FACTS: Bernardo and Teresa lived together
but for quite some time their relationship has
gotten bitter. Bernardo knew that Teresa had
an illicit relationship with Talingdan. Their
child testified that on the day the killing
occurred, there were 4 men inside their
house and Bernardo knew about it but
continued plowing his field. Later, when
Bernardo came inside the kitchen, Talingdan
and Tobias fired at Bernardo and the 4
climbed the stairs of the Batalan. Seeing that
the victim was alive they fired at him again.
Teresa came out after from her room and
pulled her child to question her. Teresa
threatened to kill her if she would reveal the
incident.
HELD: One who conceals or assists in the
escape of the principal in the crime can be
held guilty as accessory. There is morally
convincing proof that Teresa is an accessory
to the offense. She was inside the room
when her husband was shot. As she came
out after the shooting, she inquired from the
child if she was able to recognize the
assailants and when the latter identified the
4 accused as the culprits, Teresa did not only
enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she
knew to anyone but she went to the extent
of warning her not to tell anyone or else she
would kill her. Later when the police came,
she claimed she had no suspects in mind.
She, thus, became active in her cooperation
with the 4 accused.

Page | 19