DOMDOM VS.

SANDIGANBAYAN
GR 182382-83, 24 FEBRUARY 2010
FACTS:
By Affidavit of February 15, 2002, Hilconeda P. Abril, State Auditor V of the Commission on Audit
requested the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary investigation on the transactions-bases
of the claims of Jaime S. Domdom miscellaneous and extraordinary expenses as a Director of Philippine
Crop Insurance Corporation (PCIC), the receipts covering which were alleged to be tampered. After
preliminary investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause to charge petitioner with
nine counts of estafa through falsification of documents in view of irregularities in nine supporting
receipts for his claims for miscellaneous and extraordinary expenses, after verification with the
establishments he had transacted with. It thus directed the filing of the appropriate Informations with the
Sandiganbayan.
The informations were raffled and lodged among the 5 divisions of the Sandiganbayan. 3 divisions
granted petitioners motion for consolidation while 2 others disallowed it. Petitioner thus seeks relief from
this Court via the present Petition for Certiorari, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction, to enjoin the different divisions of the Sandiganbayan from further proceeding
with the cases against him during the pendency of this petition. Petitioner argues that, among other
things, all the cases against him arose from substantially identical series of transactions involving alleged
overstatements of miscellaneous and extraordinary expenses.
ISSUE: Whether or not a motion for extension of time to file a petitione for certiorari is allowed?
RULING: YES.
On the Peoples argument that a motion for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari is no longer
allowed, the same rests on shaky grounds. Supposedly, the deletion of the following provision in Section 4
of Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC evinces an intention to absolutely prohibit motions for extension:
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason
and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.
The full text of Section 4 of Rule 65.
Sec. 4. When and where to file the petition. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely
filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days
counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.
That no mention is made in the above-quoted amended Section 4 of Rule 65 of a motion for
extension, unlike in the previous formulation, does not make the filing of such pleading absolutely
prohibited. If such were the intention, the deleted portion could just have simply been reworded to state
that no extension of time to file the petition shall be granted. Absent such a prohibition, motions for
extension are allowed, subject to the Courts sound discretion. The present petition may thus be allowed,
having been filed within the extension sought and, at all events, given its merits.

CITY ENGINEER OF BAGUIO ET.AL VS. ROLANDO BANIQUED,

GR 150270, 26 NOVEMBER 2008
FACTS:
Petitioners Leo Bernardez, Jr. and Mauricio Domogan question by way of appeal under Rule 45 the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) which set aside the Order of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) dismissing the complaint for prohibition with temporary restraining order (TRO)/injunction
filed by private respondent Rolando Baniqued.
Generoso Bonifacio, acting as the attorney-in-fact of Purificacion de Joya, Milagros Villar, Minerva
Baluyut and Israel de Leon filed a complaint with the Office of the Mayor of Baguio City seeking the
demolition of a house built on a parcel of land. On May 19, 1999, Domogan, the then city mayor of
Baguio City, issued Notice of Demolition No. 55, Series of 1999, against spouses Rolando and Fidela
Baniqued. (The Anti-Squatting Committee in its Resolution No. 52-4)
Petitioners claim that Baniqued incorrectly availed of the remedy of prohibition
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the writ of prohibition valid?
RULING: YES.
Baniqued correctly availed of the remedy of prohibition. Prohibition or a writ of prohibition is that
process by which a superior court prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or
exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law. As its name indicates, the writ is
one that commands the person or tribunal to whom it is directed not to do something which he or she is
about to do. The writ is also commonly defined as one to prevent a tribunal possessing judicial or quasijudicial powers from exercising jurisdiction over matters not within its cognizance or exceeding its
jurisdiction in matters of which it has cognizance. At common law, prohibition was a remedy used when
subordinate courts and inferior tribunals assumed jurisdiction which was not properly theirs.
It is very clear that before resorting to the remedy of prohibition, there should be no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus, jurisprudence teaches that resort
to administrative remedies should be had first before judicial intervention can be availed of.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an iron-clad rule. It admits of several
exceptions. Jurisprudence is well-settled that the doctrine does not apply in cases (1) when the question
raised is purely legal; (2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; (3) when the act complained of is
patently illegal; (4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; (5) when the claim involved is
small; (6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy; (8) when strong public interest is involved; (9) when the subject of the proceeding is
private land; (10) in quo warranto proceedings; and (11) where the facts show that there was violation of
due process.
Here, there was an urgent need for judicial intervention. The filing of a motion for reinvestigation or
reconsideration would have been a useless exercise. The notice of demolition is very clear and speaks for
itself. City Mayor Domogan already made up his mind that the house of Baniqued was illegally built and
was thus subject to demolition. It could reasonably be assumed that a motion for reinvestigation or
reconsideration would have also been denied outright. The irreparable damage to Baniqued in case his
house was demolished cannot be gainsaid.
The Mayor, although performing executive functions, also exercises quasi-judicial function which may be
corrected by prohibition.

SPOUSES YUSAY VS. CA,

GR 156684, 6 APRIL 2011
FACTS:
The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 square meters. Half of their land they used as
their residence, and the rest they rented out to nine other families. Allegedly, the land was their only
property and only source of income.
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, to authorize
then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land
of the petitioners for the purpose of developing it for low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving
city inhabitants.
Notwithstanding that the enactment of Resolution No. 552 was but the initial step in the Citys exercise of
its power of eminent domain granted under Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the
petitioners became alarmed, and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC, praying for the
annulment of Resolution No. 552 due to its being unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without
force and effect.
The City countered that Resolution No. 552 was a mere authorization given to the City Mayor to initiate
the legal steps towards expropriation, which included making a definite offer to purchase the property of
the petitioners; hence, the suit of the petitioners was premature.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action for certiorari and prohibition commenced by the petitioners in the
RTC was a proper recourse of the petitioners?
RULING: NO.
For certiorari to prosper, therefore, the petitioner must allege and establish the concurrence of the
following requisites, namely:
(a) The writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(b) Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(c) There is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.6
It is further emphasized that a petition for certiorari seeks solely to correct defects in jurisdiction, 7 and
does not correct just any error or mistake committed by a court, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions unless such court, board, or officer thereby acts without jurisdiction or in excess
of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Prohibition does not lie against expropriation
The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to
provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice.14 The writ of prohibition is directed against
proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there
being no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 15 For grave
abuse of discretion to be a ground for prohibition, the petitioner must first demonstrate that the tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions,
has exercised its or his power in an arbitrary or despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal
hostility, which must be so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion, or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.16 On the other hand, the term excess of
jurisdiction signifies that the court, board, or officer has jurisdiction over a case but has transcended such
jurisdiction or acted without any authority.17

The petitioner must further allege in the petition and establish facts to show that any other existing
remedy is not speedy or adequate.18 A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the
petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the tribunal or inferior
court.191avvphi1
The rule and relevant jurisprudence indicate that prohibition was not available to the petitioners as a
remedy against the adoption of Resolution No. 552, for the Sangguniang Panglungsod, by such adoption,
was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but only expressing its collective
sentiment or opinion.
Verily, there can be no prohibition against a procedure whereby the immediate possession of the land
under expropriation proceedings may be taken, provided always that due provision is made to secure the
prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation to the owner. 20 This bar against prohibition
comes from the nature of the power of eminent domain as necessitating the taking of private land
intended for public use,21 and the interest of the affected landowner is thus made subordinate to the
power of the State. Once the State decides to exercise its power of eminent domain, the power of judicial
review becomes limited in scope, and the courts will be left to determine the appropriate amount of just
compensation to be paid to the affected landowners. Only when the landowners are not given their just
compensation for the taking of their property or when there has been no agreement on the amount of just
compensation may the remedy of prohibition become available. Here, however, the remedy of prohibition
was not called for, considering that only a resolution expressing the desire of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod to expropriate the petitioners property was issued. As of then, it was premature for the
petitioners to mount any judicial challenge, for the power of eminent domain could be exercised by the
City only through the filing of a verified complaint in the proper court.22 Before the City as the
expropriating authority filed such verified complaint, no expropriation proceeding could be said to exist.
Until then, the petitioners as the owners could not also be deprived of their property under the power of
eminent domain