Bill of Rights

Case Digests (Sections 5-9)

1. AGLIPAY Vs. RUIZ

G.R. No. L-45459

March 13, 1937

FACTS: The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio

Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine
Independent Church, seeks the issuance
from this court of a writ of prohibition to
prevent the respondent Director of Posts
from issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative
of
the
Thirty-third
International Eucharistic Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts
announced in the dailies of Manila that he
would order the issues of postage stamps
commemorating the celebration in the City
of Manila of the Thirty-third international
Eucharistic Congress, organized by the
Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in
the fulfillment of what he considers to be a
civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq.,
member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce
the matter to the President of the
Philippines. In spite of the protest of the
petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly
announced having sent to the United States
the designs of the postage stamps for
printing
ISSUE : WON the selling of stamps in
commemorating
the
Thirty-third
International
Eucharistic
Congress.
constitutional
HELD: YES .The stamps were not issue
and sold for the benefit of the Roman
Catholic Church. Nor were money derived
from the sale of the stamps given to that
church. On the contrary, it appears from the
latter of the Director of Posts of June 5,
1936, incorporated on page 2 of the
petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose
in issuing and selling the stamps was "to
advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourist to this country." The officials

concerned merely, took advantage of an

event
considered
of
international
importance "to give publicity to the
Philippines and its people
2. Gerona, et. al v
EDUCATION
106 Phil 2 Aug. 12, 1959

SEC.

OF

FACTS:
1. Petitioners belong to the Jehovas
Witness whose children were expelled from
their schools when they refused to salute,
sing the anthem, recite the pledge during
the conduct of flag ceremony. DO No. 8
issued by DECS pursuant to RA 1265 which
called for the manner of conduct during a
flag ceremony. The petitioners wrote the
Secretary of Education on their plight and
requested to reinstate their children. This
was denied.
2. As a result, the petitioners filed for a writ
of preliminary injunction against the
Secretary and Director of Public Schools to
restrain them from implementing said DO
No. 8.
3. The lower court (RTC) declared DO 8
invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not DO 8 is valid or
constitutional
DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a
religious ritual and it is for the courts to
determine, not a religious group, whether or
not a certain practice is one.
1. The court held that the flag is not an
image but a symbol of the Republic of the
Philippines, an emblem of national
sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion
and of freedom and liberty which it and the
Constitution
guarantee
and
protect.
Considering the complete separation of
church and state in our system of
government, the flag is utterly devoid of any
religious significance. Saluting the flag
consequently does not involve any religious
ceremony.

After all, the determination of whether a

certain ritual is or is not a religious
ceremony must rest with the courts. It
cannot be left to a religious group or sect,
much less to a follower of said group or
sect; otherwise, there would be confusion
and misunderstanding for there might be as
many interpretations and meanings to be
given to a certain ritual or ceremony as
there are religious groups or sects or
followers.
2. The freedom of religious belief
guaranteed by the Constitution does not
and cannot mean exemption form or noncompliance with reasonable and nondiscriminatory laws, rules and regulations
promulgated by competent authority. In
enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners,
there was absolutely no compulsion
involved, and for their failure or refusal to
obey school regulations about the flag
salute they were not being persecuted.
Neither were they being criminally
prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion. If
they chose not to obey the flag salute
regulation, they merely lost the benefits of
public education being maintained at the
expense of their fellow citizens, nothing
more. According to a popular expression,
they could take it or leave it. Having elected
not to comply with the regulations about the
flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend
public schools.
3. The Filipino flag is not an image that
requires religious veneration; rather it is
symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, of
sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty
and national unity; that the flag salute is not
a religious ceremony but an act and
profession of love and allegiance and
pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the
flag stands for; that by authority of the
legislature, the Secretary of Education was
duly authorized to promulgate Department
Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the
requirement of observance of the flag
ceremony or salute provided for in said
Department Order No. 8, does not violate

the Constitutional provision about freedom

of religion and exercise of religion; that
compliance with the non-discriminatory and
reasonable rules and regulations and school
discipline, including observance of the flag
ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in
public schools; and that for failure and
refusal to participate in the flag ceremony,
petitioners were properly excluded and
dismissed from the public school they were
attending.
3. Ebralinag, et al vs. Div. Supt. of
Schools of Cebu
G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993
Facts:
In 1989, DECS Regional Office in Cebu
received complaints about teachers and
pupils belonging to the Jehovahs Witness,
and enrolled in various public and private
schools, which refused to sing the Phil.
National Anthem, salute the flag and recite
the patriotic pledge.
Division Superintendent of schools, Susana
B. Cabahug of the Cebu Division of DECS
and
her
Assistant
issued
Division
Memorandum No. 108, dated Nov. 17,
1989, directing District Supervisors, High
School Principals and Heads of Private
Educational institutions to remove from
service, after due process, teachers and
school employees, and to deprive the
students and pupils from the benefit of
public education, if they do not participate in
daily flag ceremony and doesnt obey flag
salute rule.
Members of the Jehovahs Witness sect find
such memorandum to be contrary to their
religious belief and choose not to obey.
Despite
a
number
of
appropriate
persuasions made by the Cebu officials to
let them obey the directives, still they opted
to follow their conviction to their belief. As a
result, an order was issued by the district
supervisor of Daan Bantayan District of
Cebu, dated July 24, 1990, ordering the

dropping from the list in the school register

of all Jehovahs Witness teachers and
pupils from Grade 1 to Grade 6 who opted
to follow their belief which is against the
Flag Salute Law, however, given a chance
to be re-accepted if they change their mind.
Some
Jehovahs
Witness
members
appealed to the Secretary of Education but
the latter did not answer to their letter.
On Oct. 31, 1990, students and their
parents filed special civil actions for
Mandamus, Certiorari and prohibition,
alleging that the respondents acted without
or in excess of their jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion in ordering their
expulsion without prior notice and hearing,
hence, in violation of their right to due
process, their right to free public education
and their right to freedom of speech, religion
and worship. Petitioners prayed for the
voiding of the order of expulsion or
dropping from the rolls issued by the
District Supervisor; prohibiting and enjoining
respondent from barring them from classes;
and compelling the respondent and all
persons acting for him to admit and order
their(Petitioners) re-admission I their
respective schools.
On November 27, 1990, Court issued a
TRO and writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, commanding the respondents to
immediately re-admit the petitioners to their
respective classes until further orders.
On May 31, the Solicitor General filed a
consolidated comment to the petitions
defending the expulsion orders issued by
the respondents.
Petitioners stressed that while they do not
take part in the compulsory flag ceremony,
they do not engage in external acts or
behavior that would offend their countrymen
who believe in expressing their love of
country through observance of the flag
ceremony. They quietly stand at attention
during the flag ceremony to show their
respect for the right of those who choose to

participate in the solemn proceedings. Since

they do not engage in disruptive behavior,
there is no warrant for their expulsion.
Issue:
Whether or not the expulsion of the
members of Jehovahs Witness from the
schools violates right receive free
education.
Held:
The expulsion of the members of Jehovahs
Witness from the schools where they are
enrolled will violate their right as Philippine
citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to
receive free education, for it is the duty of
the state to protect and promote the right of
all citizens to quality education, and to make
such education accessible to all (Sec. I, Art
XIV). Nevertheless, their right not to
participate in the Flag Ceremony does not
give them a right to disrupt such patriotic
exercises. If they quietly stand at attention
during flag ceremony while their classmates
and teachers salute the flag, sing the
national anthem and recite the patriotic
pledge, we do not see how such conduct
may possibly disturb the peace, or pose a
grave and present danger of a serious evil
to public safety, public morals, public health
or any legitimate public interest that the
state has a right and duty to prevent.
It is appropriate to recall the Japanese
occupation of our country in 1942-1944
when every Filipino, regardless of religious
persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted
the Japanese flag and bowed before every
Japanese soldier, perhaps if petitioners had
lived through that dark period of our history,
they would not quibble now about saluting
the Phil. Flag.
The petitions for certiorari and prohibition
are granted and expulsion orders are
hereby annulled and set aside.
4.

4. PAMIL VS TELSON
86 SCRA 413 Political Law
Inviolability of the Separation of
Church and State
In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest,
won the election for mayoralty in
Alburquerque, Bohol. He was later
proclaimed as mayor therein. Fortunato
Pamil, a rival candidate filed a quo warranto
case against Gonzaga questioning the
eligibility of Gonzaga. He argued that as
provided for in Section 2175 of the 1917
Revised Administrative Code:
in no case shall there be elected or
appointed
to
a
municipal
office
ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service,
persons receiving salaries or compensation
from provincial or national funds, or
contractors for public works of the
municipality.
In this case, the elected mayor is a priest.
However, Judge Victorino Teleron ruled that
the Administrative Code is repealed by the
Election Code of 1971 which now allows
ecclesiastics to run.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2175 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917 is no
longer operative?
HELD: The Supreme Court decision was
indecisive. Under the 1935 Constitution, No
religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights. If the the
doctrine of constitutional supremacy is to be
maintained, then Section 2175 shall not
prevail, thus, an ecclesiastic may run for
elective office. However, this issue proved
to have divided the Supreme Court because
it failed to obtain the majority vote of eight
(8) which is needed in order to declare
Section 2175 of the RAC to be
unconstitutional. For this, the petition filed
by Pamil must be granted and the decision
of the lower court reversed and set aside.
Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered to vacate the
mayoralty position.

It was also pointed out (in the dissenting

opinions) that how can one who swore to
serve the Churchs interest above all be in
duty to enforce state policies which at times
may conflict with church tenets. This is in
violation of the separation of the church and
state. The Revised Administrative Code still
stands because there is no implied repeal.
Dissenting Opinion
J. Teehankee The Comelec ruled that
soldiers in active service and persons
receiving salaries or compensation from
provincial or national funds are obviously
now allowed to run for a public elective
office because under Sec. 23 of the Election
Code of 1971 every person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active
members of the Armed Forces shall ipso
facto cease in their office or position on the
date they file their certificates of candidacy.
This implies that they are no longer
disqualified from running for an elective
office. The Comelec further ruled that as to
the two remaining categories formerly
banned under the Revised Administrative
Code, ecclesiastics and contractors for
public works of the municipality are allowed
to run for municipal elective offices under
the maxim, Inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius, they being not included in the
enumeration of persons ineligible under the
New Election Code. The rule is that all
persons
possessing
the
necessary
qualifications, except those expressly
disqualified by the election code, are eligible
to run for public office.
5. Taruc vs. Bishop Dela Cruz
G.R. No. 144801. March 10, 2005
Facts:
Petitioners were lay members of the
Philippine Independent Church (PIC). On
June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared
petitioners expelled/excommunicated from
the
Philippine
Independent
Church.
Because
of
the
order
of
expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed
a complaint for damages with preliminary

injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before

the Regional Trial Court.They contended
that their expulsion was illegal because it
was done without trial thus violating their
right to due process of law.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a violation of
religious rights in this case?
Held:
No. The expulsion/excommunication of
members
of
a
religious
institution/organization is a matter best left
to the discretion of the officials, and the laws
and canons, of said institution/organization.
It is not for the courts to exercise control
over church authorities in the performance
of their discretionary and official functions.
Rather, it is for the members of religious
institutions/organizations to conform to just
church regulations. Civil Courts will not
interfere in the internal affairs of a religious
organization except for the protection of civil
or property rights. Those rights may be the
subject of litigation in a civil court, and the
courts have jurisdiction to determine
controverted claims to the title, use, or
possession of church property. Obviously,
there was no violation of a civil right in the
present case.
6. ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR A.M. No.
P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
FACTS:
Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to
Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., requesting for
an investigation of rumors that respondent
Soledad Escritor, court interpreter, is living
with a man not her husband. They allegedly
have a child of eighteen to twenty years old.
Estrada is not personally related either to
Escritor or her partner. Nevertheless, he
filed the charge against Escritor as he
believes that she is committing an immoral
act that tarnishes the image of the court,
thus she should not be allowed to remain
employed therein as it might appear that the
court condones her act.

Respondent Escritor testified that when she

entered the judiciary in 1999, she was
already a widow, her husband having died
in 1998. She admitted that she has been
living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the
benefit of marriage for twenty years and that
they have a son. But as a member of the
religious sect known as the Jehovah's
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible
Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is
in conformity with their religious beliefs. In
fact, after ten years of living together, she
executed on July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness," insofar as the
congregation is concerned, there is nothing
immoral about the conjugal arrangement
between Escritor and Quilapio and they
remain members in good standing in the
congregation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found
guilty of the administrative charge of "gross
and immoral conduct."
HELD:
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that
government must pursue its secular goals
and interests but at the same time strives to
uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent
possible within flexible constitutional limits.
Thus, although the morality contemplated
by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality
could allow for accommodation of morality
based on religion, provided it does not
offend compelling state interests. It still
remains to be seen if respondent is entitled
to such doctrine as the state has not been
afforded the chance has demonstrate the
compelling state interest of prohibiting the
act of respondent, thus the case is
remanded to the RTC.
Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the
Free Exercise Clause as far as it prohibits
such exercise given a compelling state
interest. It is the respondents stance that
the respondents conjugal arrangement is
not immoral and punishable as it comes
within the scope of free exercise protection.
Should the Court prohibit and punish her
conduct where it is protected by the Free
Exercise Clause, the Courts action would

be an unconstitutional encroachment of her

right to religious freedom. The Court cannot
therefore simply take a passing look at
respondents claim of religious freedom, but
must instead apply the compelling state
interest test. The government must be
heard on the issue as it has not been given
an opportunity to discharge its burden of
demonstrating the states compelling
interest which can override respondents
religious belief and practice.
7. Villavicencio vs Lukban - A case
digest
G.R.
No.
L-14639
March
25,
1919ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL.
vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL.
Issue:
The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the
petitioner, with the prayer that the
respondent produce around 170 women
whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to
Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised
versus the power of the executive of the
Municipality in deporting the women without
their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.
Facts:
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor
together with Anton Hohmann, the city's
Chief of Police, took custody of about 170
women at the night of October 25 beyond
the latters consent and knowledge and
thereafter were shipped to Mindanao
specifically in Davao where they were
signed as laborers. Said women are
inmates of the houses of prostitution
situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of
Sampaloc.
That when the petitioner filed for habeas
corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss
the case saying that those women were
already out of their jurisdiction and that , it
should be filed in the city of Davao instead.

The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with

the instructions;
For the respondents to have fulfilled the
court's order, three optional courses were
open: (1) They could have produced the
bodies of the persons according to the
command of the writ; or (2) they could have
shown by affidavit that on account of
sickness or infirmity those persons could not
safely be brought before the court; or (3)
they could have presented affidavits to
show that the parties in question or their
attorney waived the right to be present.
Held:
The court concluded the case by granting
the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos
each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage
due to contempt of court. Reasoning further
that if the chief executive of any municipality
in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally
take a private citizen and place him beyond
the boundaries of the municipality, and then,
when called upon to defend his official
action, could calmly fold his hands and
claim that the person was under no restraint
and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction
over this other municipality.
We believe the true principle should be that,
if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of
the court and has it in his power to obey the
order of the court and thus to undo the
wrong that he has inflicted, he should be
compelled to do so. Even if the party to
whom the writ is addressed has illegally
parted with the custody of a person before
the application for the writ is no reason why
the writ should not issue. If the mayor and
the chief of police, acting under no authority
of law, could deport these women from the
city of Manila to Davao, the same officials
must necessarily have the same means to
return them from Davao to Manila. The
respondents, within the reach of process,
may not be permitted to restrain a fellow
citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change
her domicile and to avow the act with
impunity in the courts, while the person who
has lost her birthright of liberty has no

effective recourse. The great writ of liberty

may not thus be easily evaded.
8. YAP VS CA
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of
the crime of estafa for misappropriating
amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00. After
the records of the case were transmitted to
the Court of Appeals, he filed a motion to fix
bail pending appeal. The CA granted the
motion and allowed Yap to post bail in the
amount of P5,500,000 on condition that he
will secure a certification/guaranty from the
Mayor of the place of his residence that he
is a resident of the area and that he will
remain to be so until final judgment is
rendered or in case he transfers residence,
it must be with prior notice to the court and
private complainant. He sought the
reduction of the bail but it was denied.
Hence, he appealed to the SC. He
contended that the CA, by setting bail at a
prohibitory amount, effectively denied him
his right to bail. He also contests the
condition imposed by the CA that he secure
a certification/guaranty, claiming that the
same violates his liberty of abode and
travel.
Issue:
1. Whether the proposed bail of
P5,500,000.00 was violative of petitioner's
right against excessive bail.
2. Whether the condition imposed by the CA
violative of the liberty of abode and right to
travel.

be high enough to assure the presence of

the accused when required but no higher
than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent
to the civil liability of which petitioner is
charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is to
permit the impression that the amount paid
as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that
accused is charged of; this we cannot allow
because bail is not intended as a
punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil
liability which should necessarily await the
judgment of the appellate court.
2. The right to change abode and travel
within the Philippines, being invoked by
petitioner, are not absolute rights. Section
6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
The liberty of abode and of changing the
same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to
travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law.
The order of the Court of Appeals releasing
petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful
order as contemplated by the above
provision. The condition imposed by the
Court of Appeals is simply consistent with
the nature and function of a bail bond, which
is to ensure that petitioner will make himself
available at all times whenever the Court
requires his presence. Besides, a closer
look at the questioned condition will show
that petitioner is not prevented from
changing abode; he is merely required to
inform the court in case he does so. (Yap vs
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141529, June 6,
2001)

Held:
1. The setting of the amount at
P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive,
and constitutes an effective denial of
petitioners right to bail. The purpose for bail
is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the court. The amount should

9. VELMONTE VS BALMONTE170
SCRA 256
Facts:Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano
Belmonte Jr. on 4 June 1986, requesting to
be "furnished with the list of names of
theopposition
members
of
(the)
BatasangPambansa who were able to

secure a clean loan of P2 million each on

guaranty (sic)of Mrs.Imelda Marcos" and
also to "be furnished with the certified true
copies of the documents evidencing their
loan. Expenses inconnection herewith shall
be borne by" Valmonte, et. al. Due to
serious legal implications, President &
General Manager FelicianoBelmonte, Jr.
referred the letter to the Deputy General
Counsel of the GSIS, Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro
replied that it is his opinion"that a
confidential relationship exists between the
GSIS and all those who borrow from it,
whoever they may be; that the GSIShas a
duty to its customers to preserve this
confidentiality; and that it would not be
proper
for
the
GSIS
to
breach
thisconfidentiality unless so ordered by the
courts." On 20 June 1986, apparently not
having yet received the reply of the
GovernmentService and Insurance System
(GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, Valmonte
wrote Belmonte another letter, saying that
for failure toreceive a reply "(W)e are now
considering ourselves free to do whatever
action necessary within the premises to
pursue our desiredobjective in pursuance of
public interest." On 26 June 1986, Ricardo
Valmonte,Oswaldo Carbonell, Doy Del
Castillo, Rolando Bartolome, LeoObligar,
Jun Gutierrez, Reynaldo Bagatsing, Jun
"Ninoy" Alba,Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro,
and Rolando Fadul filed a special civil
action for mandamus with preliminary
injunction invoke theirright to information
and pray that Belmonte be directed: (a) to
furnish Valmonte, et. al. the list of the
names
of
the
BatasangPambansa
membersbelonging to the UNIDO and PDP
Laban who were able to secure clean loans
immediately before the February7 election
thru the intercession/marginal note of the
then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to
furnish petitioners with certifiedtrue copies
of the documents evidencing their
respective loans; and/or (c) to allow
petitioners access to the public records for
thesubject
information.Issue:Whether
Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and
taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on
behest loans given by the formerFirst Lady

Imelda Marcos toBatasang Pambansa

members belonging to the UNIDO and
PDP-Laban politicalparties.Held:The GSIS
is a trustee of contributions from the
government and its employees and the
administrator
of
various
insurance
programsfor the benefit of the latter.
Undeniably, its funds assume a public
character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and
46of PD 1146, asamended (the Revised
Government Service Insurance Act of
1977),provide for annual appropriations to
pay the contributions,premiums, interest
and other amounts payable to GSIS by the
government, as employer, as well as the
obligations which theRepublic of the
Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay.
Considering the nature of its funds, the
GSIS is expected to manage itsresources
with utmost prudence and in strict
compliance with the pertinent laws or rules
and regulations. Thus, one of the
reasonsthat prompted the revision of the old
GSIS law(CA 186, as amended) was the
necessity "to preserve at all times the
actuarialsolvency of the funds administered
by the Systems [Second Whereas Clause,
PD1146.] Consequently, as Feliciano
Belmontehimself admits, the GSIS "is not
supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" It is
therefore the legitimate concern of the
public to ensure thatthese funds are
managed properly with the end in view of
maximizing the benefits that accrue to the
insured governmentemployees. Moreover,
the supposed borrowers were Members of
the defunct Batasang Pambansa who
themselves appropriatedfunds for the GSIS
and were therefore expected to be the first
to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks
with the greatest degreeof fidelity and that
all its transactions were above board. In
sum, the public nature of the loanable funds
of the GSIS and the publicoffice held by the
alleged borrowers make the information
sought clearly a matter of public interest and
concern. Still, Belmontemaintains that a
confidential relationship exists between the
GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a
policy
of
confidentialityrestricts
the
indiscriminate dissemination of information.

Yet, Belmonte has failed to cite any law

granting
the
GSIS
the
privilegeof
confidentiality as regards the documents
subject of the present petition. His position
is
apparently
based
merely
onconsiderations of policy. The judiciary
does not settle policy issues. The Court can
only declare what the law is, and not what
thelaw should be. Under our system of
government, policy issues are within the
domain of the political branches of the
government,and of the people themselves
as the repository of all State power.
10. Aquino Vs Morato
FACTS : In February 1989, petitioner,
herself a member of respondent Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB), wrote its records officer
requesting that she be allowed to examine
the board's records pertaining to the voting
slips accomplished by the individual board
members after a review of the movies and
television productions. It is on the basis of
said slips that films are either banned, cut or
classified accordingly. Petitioner's request
was eventually denied by respondent
Morato on the ground that whenever the
members of the board sit in judgment over a
film, their decisions as reflected in the
individual voting slips partake the nature of
conscience votes and as such, are purely
and completely private and personal On
February 27, 1989, respondent Morato
called an executive meeting of the MTRCB
to discuss, among others, the issue raised
by petitioner. In said meeting, seventeen
(17) members of the board voted to declare
their individual voting records as classified
documents which rendered the same
inaccessible to the public without clearance
from the chairman. Thereafter, respondent
Morato denied petitioner's request to
examine the voting slips. However, it was
only much later, i.e., on July 27, 1989, that
respondent Board issued Resolution No.
10-89 which declared as confidential,
private and personal, the decision of the
reviewing committee and the voting slips of
the members.

ISSUE : WON Resolution No. 10-89 is valid

HELD : The term private has been defined
as "belonging to or concerning, an individual
person, company, or interest"; whereas,
public means "pertaining to, or belonging to,
or affecting a nation, state, or community at
large. As may be gleaned from the decree
(PD 1986) creating the respondent
classification board, there is no doubt that
its very existence is public is character. it is
an office created to serve public interest. It
being the case, respondents can lay no
valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy
belongs to the individual acting in his private
capacity and not to a governmental agency
or officers tasked with, and acting in, the
discharge of public duties. the decisions of
the Board and the individual voting slips
accomplished by the members concerned
are acts made pursuant to their official
functions, and as such, are neither personal
nor private in nature but rather public in
character. They are, therefore, public
records access to which is guaranteed to
the citizenry by no less than the
fundamental law of the land
11. Chavez v. Pea and Amari
Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public
Highways entered into a contract to reclaim
areas of Manila Bay with the Construction
and Development Corportion of the
Philippines (CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created
by President Marcos under P.D. 1084,
tasked with developing and leasing
reclaimed lands. These lands were
transferred to the care of PEA under P.D.
1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and
Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and
PEA entered into an agreement that all
future projects under the MCRRP would be
funded and owned by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special
Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA.

It was followed by the transfer of three Titles

(7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of
Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the
three reclaimed islands known as the
FREEDOM ISLANDS.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint
venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a
Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the
Freedom Islands. Along with another 250
hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA
which would later transfer said lands to
AMARI. This caused a stir especially when
Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement,
claiming that such lands were part of public
domain (famously known as the mother of
all scams).
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a
taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of
preliminary injunction and a TRO against
the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to
AMARI and from implementing the JVA.
Following these events, under President
Estradas admin, PEA and AMARI entered
into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim
that the contract is null and void.
Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed
or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations
in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and
PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising
the issue of whether the amended joint
venture
agreement
is
grossly
disadvantageous to the government.
Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating
the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands
comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of
PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may lease these lands to
private corporations but may not sell or
transfer ownership of these lands to private
corporations. PEA may only sell these lands
to Philippine citizens, subject to the

ownership
limitations
in
Constitution and existing laws.

the

1987

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas

of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain until
classified as alienable or disposable lands
open to disposition and declared no longer
needed for public service. The government
can
make
such
classification
and
declaration only after PEA has reclaimed
these submerged areas. Only then can
these lands qualify as agricultural lands of
the public domain, which are the only
natural resources the government can
alienate. In their present state, the 592.15
hectares
of
submerged
areas
are
inalienable and outside the commerce of
man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer
to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership
of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom
Islands, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution
which
prohibits
private
corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to
transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares111 of still submerged areas of
Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of
natural resources other than agricultural
lands of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas.
Thereafter, the government can classify the
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable,
and further declare them no longer needed
for public service. Still, the transfer of such
reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain to AMARI will be void in view of
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain.

12. BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiffappellee, vs. ELIZALDE ROPE

WORKERS UNION and ELIZALDE
ROPE FACTORY.
GRN L-25246 September 12, 1974
FACTS:
Benjamin Victoriano (Appellee), a member
of the religious sect known as the Iglesia ni
Cristo, had been in the employ of the
Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (Company)
since 1958. He was a member of the
Elizalde Rope Workers Union (Union) which
had with the Company a CBA containing a
closed shop provision which reads as
follows: Membership in the Union shall be
required as a condition of employment for
all permanent employees workers covered
by this Agreement.
Under Sec 4(a), par 4, of RA 975, prior to its
amendment by RA 3350, the employer was
not precluded from making an agreement
with a labor organization to require as a
condition of employment membership
therein, if such labor organization is the
representative of the employees. On June
18, 1961, however, RA 3350 was enacted,
introducing an amendment to par 4
subsection (a) of sec 4 of RA 875, as
follows: xxx but such agreement shall not
cover members of any religious sects which
prohibit affiliation of their members in any
such labor organization.
Being a member of a religious sect that
prohibits the affiliation of its members with
any labor organization, Appellee presented
his resignation to appellant Union. The
Union wrote a formal letter to the Company
asking the latter to separate Appellee from
the service because he was resigning from
the Union as a member. The Company in
turn notified Appellee and his counsel that
unless the Appellee could achieve a
satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the
Company would be constrained to dismiss
him from the service.

Appellee filed an action for injunction to

enjoin the Company and the Union from
dismissing Appellee. The Union invoked the
union security clause of the CBA and
assailed the constitutionality of RA 3350 and
contends it discriminatorily favors those
religious sects which ban their members
from joining labor unions.
ISSUE:
Whether Appellee has the freedom of
choice in joining the union or not.
RULING:
YES. The Constitution and RA 875
recognize freedom of association. Sec 1 (6)
of Art III of the Constitution of 1935, as well
as Sec 7 of Art IV of the Constitution of
1973, provide that the right to form
associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Section 3 of RA 875 provides that
employees shall have the right to selforganization and to form, join of assist labor
organizations of their own choosing for the
purpose of collective bargaining and to
engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining and other
mutual aid or protection. What the
Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act
recognize and guarantee is the right to
form or join associations. A right
comprehends at least two broad notions,
namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the
absence of legal restraint, whereby an
employee may act for himself without being
prevented by law; and second, power,
whereby an employee may, as he pleases,
join or refrain from joining an association. It
is, therefore, the employee who should
decide for himself whether he should join or
not an association; and should he choose to
join, he himself makes up his mind as to
which association he would join; and even
after he has joined, he still retains the liberty
and the power to leave and cancel his
membership with said organization at any
time. The right to join a union includes the
right to abstain from joining any union. The

law does not enjoin an employee to sign up

with any association.
The right to refrain from joining labor
organizations recognized by Section 3 of
the Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited.
The legal protection granted to such right to
refrain from joining is withdrawn by
operation of law, where a labor union and
an employer have agreed on a closed shop,
by virtue of which the employer may employ
only members of the collective bargaining
union, and the employees must continue to
be members of the union for the duration of
the contract in order to keep their jobs. By
virtue of a closed shop agreement, before
the enactment of RA 3350, if any person,
regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to
be employed or to keep his employment he
must become a member of the collective
bargaining union. Hence, the right of said
employee not to join the labor union is
curtailed and withdrawn.
To that all-embracing coverage of the closed
shop arrangement, RA No.3350 introduced
an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a)
(4) of the Industrial Peace Act the following
proviso: but such agreement shall not
cover members of any religious sects which
prohibit affiliation of their members in any
such labor organization. Republic Act No.
3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the
application and coverage of the closed shop
agreement the employees belonging to any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of
their members with any labor organization.
What the exception provides is that
members of said religious sects cannot be
compelled or coerced to join labor unions
even when said unions have closed shop
agreements with the employers; that in spite
of any closed shop agreement, members of
said religious sects cannot be refused
employment or dismissed from their jobs on
the sole ground that they are not members
of the collective bargaining union. It does
not prohibit the members of said religious
sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still
leaves to said members the liberty and the
power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with

labor unions. If, notwithstanding their

religious beliefs, the members of said
religious wets prefer to sign up with the
labor union, they can do so. If in deference
and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse
to sign up, they can do so; the law does not
coerce them to join; neither does the law
prohibit them from joining, and neither may
the employer or labor union compel them to
join.
The Company was partly absolved by law
from the contractual obligation it had with
the Union of employing only Union
members in permanent positions. It cannot
be denied, therefore, that there was indeed
an impairment of said union security clause.
The prohibition to impair the obligation of
contracts is not absolute and unqualified.
The prohibition is general. The prohibition is
not to be read with literal exactness, for it
prohibits unreasonable impairment only. In
spite of the constitutional prohibition, the
State continues to possess authority to
safeguard the vital interests of its people.
Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said
interests may modify or abrogate contracts
already in effect. For not only are existing
laws read into contracts in order to fix the
obligations as between the parties, but the
reservation of essential attributes of
sovereign power is also read into contracts
as a postulate of the legal order. The
contract clause of the Constitution. must be
not only in harmony with, but also in
subordination to, in appropriate instances,
the reserved power of the state to safeguard
the vital interests of the people. This has
special application to contracts regulating
relations between capital and labor which
are not merely contractual, and said labor
contracts, for being impressed with public
interest, must yield to the common good.
The purpose to be achieved by RA 3350 is
to insure freedom of belief and religion, and
to promote the general welfare by
preventing discrimination against those
members of religious sects which prohibit
their members from joining labor unions,

confirming thereby their natural, statutory

and constitutional right to work, the fruits of
which work are usually the only means
whereby they can maintain their own life
and the life of their dependents.
The individual employee, at various times in
his working life, is confronted by two
aggregates of power collective labor,
directed by a union, and collective capital,
directed by management. The union, an
institution developed to organize labor into a
collective force and thus protect the
individual employee from the power of
collective capital, is, paradoxically, both the
champion of employee rights, and a new
source of their frustration. Moreover, when
the Union interacts with management, it
produces yet a third aggregate of group
strength from which the individual also
needs protection the collective bargaining
relationship.
The free exercise of religious profession or
belief is superior to contract rights. In case
of conflict, the latter must yield to the former.
The purpose of RA 3350 is to serve the
secular
purpose
of
advancing
the
constitutional right to the free exercise of
religion, by averting that certain persons be
refused work, or be dismissed from work, or
be dispossessed of their right to work and of
being impeded to pursue a modest means
of livelihood, by reason of union security
agreements. To help its citizens to find
gainful employment whereby they can make
a living to support themselves and their
families is a valid objective of the state. The
Constitution even mandated that the State
shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment and equality in employment,
ensure equal work opportunities regardless
of sex, race or creed and regulate the
relation between workers and employers.

employees against the aggregate force of

the collective bargaining agreement, and
relieving certain citizens of a burden on their
religious beliefs; and by eliminating to a
certain extent economic insecurity due to
unemployment, which is a serious menace
to the health, morals, and welfare of the
people of the State, the Act also promotes
the well-being of society. It is our view that
the exemption from the effects of closed
shop agreement does not directly advance,
or diminish, the interests of any particular
religion. Although the exemption may
benefit those who are members of religious
sects that prohibit their members from
joining labor unions, the benefit upon the
religious sects is merely incidental and
indirect.
The purpose of RA 3350 was not to grant
rights to labor unions. The rights of labor
unions are amply provided for in Republic
Act No. 875 and the new Labor Code.
The Act does not require as a qualification,
or condition, for joining any lawful
association membership in any particular
religion or in any religious sect; neither does
the Act require affiliation with a religious
sect that prohibits its members from joining
a labor union as a condition or qualification
for withdrawing from a labor union. Joining
or withdrawing from a labor union requires a
positive act Republic Act No. 3350 only
exempts members with such religious
affiliation from the coverage of closed shop
agreements. So, under this Act, a religious
objector is not required to do a positive actto exercise the right to join or to resign from
the union. He is exempted ipso jure without
need of any positive act on his part.
WHEREFORE,
dismissed.

the

instant

13. GSIS vs. Kapisanan

The primary effects of the exemption from
closed shop agreements in favor of
members of religious sects that prohibit their
members from affiliating with a labor
organization, is the protection of said

appeal

is

take private property for public use and is

inseparable from sovereignty and inherent
in government.

14. Masikip v. City of Pasig

G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006
- the power of eminent domain is not
inherent in LGU and must be expressly
provided for by statute
FACTS:
Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered
owner of a parcel of land, which the City of
Pasig sought to expropriate a portion
thereof for the sports development and
recreational activities of the residents of
Barangay Caniogan. This was in January
1994. Masikip refused.
On March 23, 1994, City of Pasig sought
again to expropriate said portion of land for
the alleged purpose that it was in line with
the program of the Municipal Government to
provide land opportunities to deserving poor
sectors of our community.
Petitioner protested, so City of Pasig filed
with the trial court a complaint for
expropriation. The Motion to Dismiss filed
by Masikip was dismissed by the rial court
on the ground that there was genuine
necessity to expropriate the property. Case
was elevated to the Court of Appeals, which
dismissed petition for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N there was genuine
expropriate the property

necessity

to

HELD:
Eminent domain is the right of a
government to take and appropriate private
property to the public use, whenever the
public exigency requires it, which can be
done only on condition of providing a
reasonably compensation therefor. It is the
power of the State or its instrumentalities to

This power is lodged in the legislative

branch of government. It delegates the
power thereof to the LGUs, other public
entities and public utility corporations,
subject only to constitutional limitations.
LGUs have no inherent power of eminent
domain and may exercise it only when
expressly authorized by statute.
Sec. 19, LGC: LGU may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use, purpose or welfare
for the benefit of the poor and landless,
upon payment of just compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws.
Provided:
(1) power of eminent domain may not be
exercised unless a valid and definite offer
has been previously made to the owner and
such offer was not accepted;
(2) LGU may immediately take possession
of the property upon the filing of
expropriation proceedings and upon making
a deposit with the proper court of at least
15% fair market value of the property based
on the current tax declaration; and
(3) amount to be paid for expropriated
property shall be determined by the proper
court, based on the fair market value at the
time of the taking of the property
There is already an established sports
development and recreational activity center
at Rainforest Park in Pasig City. Evidently,
there is no genuine necessity to justify the
expropriation. The records show that the
Certification issued by the Caniogan
Barangay Council which became the basis
for the passage of Ordinance No. 4,
authorizing the expropriation, indicates that
the intended beneficiary is the Melendres
Compound Homeowners Association, a

private, non-profit organization, not the

residents of Caniogan.
15. REPUBLIC
CASTELLVI,

VS.

VDA.

DE

In the case at bar, these elements were not

present when the government entered and
occupied the property under a contract of
lease.
16. Republic Vs Sarabia

GR # L-20620 August 15, 1974

(Constitutional Law Eminent Domain,
Elements of Taking)
FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land
that has been rented and occupied by the
government in 1947 refused to extend the
lease, the latter commenced expropriation
proceedings
in
1959.
During
the
assessment of just compensation, the
government argued that it had taken the
property when the contract of lease
commenced and not when the proceedings
begun. The owner maintains that the
disputed land was not taken when the
government commenced to occupy the said
land as lessee because the essential
elements of the taking of property under
the power of eminent domain, namely (1)
entrance and occupation by condemnor
upon the private property for more than a
momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a
public use in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property, are not present.
ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of
property has taken place when the
condemnor has entered and occupied the
property as lesse.
HELD: No, the property was deemed taken
only when the expropriation proceedings
commenced in 1959.
The essential elements of the taking are: (1)
Expropriator must enter a private property,
(2) for more than a momentary period, (3)
and under warrant of legal authority, (4)
devoting it to public use, or otherwise
informally appropriating or injuriously
affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially
to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment thereof.

17. EPZA vs Dulay

Facts: The four parcels of land which are
the subject of this case is where the Mactan
Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu
(EPZA) is to be constructed. Private
respondent San Antonio Development
Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in
which these lands are registered under,
claimed that the lands were expropriated to
the government without them reaching the
agreement as to the compensation.
Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an
order for the appointment of the
commissioners to determine the just
compensation. It was later found out that
the payment of the government to San
Antonio would be P15 per square meter,
which was objected to by the latter
contending that under PD 1533, the basis of
just compensation shall be fair and
according to the fair market value declared
by the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever

is lower. Such objection and the subsequent

Motion for Reconsideration were denied and
hearing was set for the reception of the
commissioners report. EPZA then filed this
petition for certiorari and mandamus
enjoining the respondent from further
hearing the case.
Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and
mandatory mode of determining just
compensation
in
PD
1533
is
unconstitutional.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the
mode of determination of just compensation
in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
The
method
of
ascertaining
just
compensation constitutes impermissible
encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It
tends to render the courts inutile in a matter
in which under the Constitution is reserved
to it for financial determination. The
valuation in the decree may only serve as
guiding principle or one of the factors in
determining just compensation, but it may
not substitute the courts own judgment as
to what amount should be awarded and how
to arrive at such amount. The determination
of just compensation is a judicial function.
The executive department or the legislature
may make the initial determination but when
a party claims a violation of the guarantee in
the Bill of Rights that the private party may
not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the courts
findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the justness of
the decreed compensation.
18. Sumulong vs Guerrero
Facts: On December 5, 1997 the National
Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint
for expropriation of parcels of land for the
expansion of Bagong Nayon Hosing Project

to provide housing facilities to low-salaried

government
employees,
covering
approximately twenty five (25) hectares in
Antipolo, Rizal. This included the lots of
petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong (6,667 sq.m.)
and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing (3,333 sq.m.).
The land sought to be expropriated were
valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per
square meter adopting the market value
fixed by the provincial assessor in
accordance with presidential decrees
prescribing the valuation of property in
expropriation proceedings.
Together with the complaint was a motion
for immediate possession of the properties.
The NHA deposited the amount of
P158,980.00 with the Phil. Natl Bank,
representing the total market value of the
subject 25 ha. of land, pursuant to P.D. No.
1224 which defines the policy on the
expropriation of private property for
socialized housing upon payment of just
compensation.
On January 17, 1978, respondent Judge
Buenaventura S. Guerrero issued a writ of
possession pertaining to the subject parcels
of land. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration on the ground that they had
been deprived of the possession of their
property without due process of law. This
was however, denied. Hence, this petition
challenging the orders of respondent Judge
and assailing the constitutionality of P.D.
No. 1224, as amended.
Petitioners contend that the taking of their
property subsumed under the topics of
public use, just compensation, and due
process.
Issues:
(1) Whether socialized housing as defined
in P.D. 1224, as amended, for the purpose
of condemnation proceedings is not public
use since it will benefit only a handful of
people, bereft of public character, hence it
is not a valid exercise of the States power
of eminent domain.

(2) Whether NHA has the discretion to

determine the size of the property/properties
to be expropriated.
(3) Whether P.D. 1224, as amended, allows
unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed
by government assessors.
(4) Whether petitioners were denied due
process because their parcels of land were
immediately possessed by the NHA by
virtue of the writ of possession ordered by
the respondent judge.
Held:
(1) P.D. 1224 defines socialized housing
as, the construction of dwelling units for the
middle and lower class members of our
society, including the construction of the
supporting
infrastructure
and
other
facilities. The public use requirement for a
valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain is a flexible and evolving concept
influenced by changing conditions. The
taking to be valid must be for public use. As
long as the purpose of the taking is public,
then the power of eminent domain comes
into play. It is accurate to state then that at
present, whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies
the requirement of public use. Ergo,
socialized housing falls within the confines
of public use.
(2) The State acting through the NHA is
vested with broad discretion to designate
the particular property/properties to be
taken for socialized housing purposes and
how much thereof may be expropriated.
Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith,
or gross abuse of discretion, which
petitioners failed to demonstrate, the Court
will give due weight to and leave
undisturbed the NHAs choice and the size
of the site for the project. The right to use,
enjoyment and disposal of private property
is tempered by and has to yield to the
demands of the common good.
(3)
Yes.
The
provisions
on
just
compensation found in Presidential Decrees

No. 1224, 1259, and 1313 are the same

provisions found in P.D. No.s 76, 464, 794,
and
1533
which
were
declared
unconstitutional for being encroachments on
judicial prerogative. Just compensation
means the value of the property at the time
of the taking. It means a fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained. Tax values
can serve as guides but cannot be absolute
substitute for just compensation.
(4) Yes. The petitioners were denied of due
process. P.D. 1224, as amended, violates
procedural due process as it allows
immediate taking of possession, control and
disposition of property without giving the
owner his day in court. Respondent Judge
ordered the issuance of a writ of possession
without notice and without hearing.
19.Manotok v. NHA 150 SCRA 89 (1987)
F:
Petitioners are the owners of two
large estates known as the Tambunting
Estate and Sunog-Apog in Tondo, Manila,
both of which were declared expropriated in
two decrees issued by President Marcos,
PD 1669 and PD 1670. The petitioners
contend that the decrees violate their
constitutional right to due process and equal
protection since by their mere passage their
properties were automatically expropriated
and they were immediately deprived of the
ownership and possession thereof without
being given the chance to oppose such
expropriation. The government on the other
hand contends that the power of eminent
domain is inherent in the State and when
the legislature or the President through his
law-making powers exercises this power,
the public use and public necessity of the
expropriation and the fixing of the just
compensation become political in nature
and the courts must respect the decision.
HELD: The challenged decrees are unfair
in the procedures adopted and the powers
given to the NHA. The Tambunting
subdivision is summarily proclaimed a
blighted area and directly expropriated by
decree without the slightest semblance of a

hearing or any proceeding whatsoever. The

expropriation is instant and automatic to
take effect immediately upon the signing of
the decree. No deposit before the taking is
required. There is not provision for any
interest to be paid upon unpaid installments.
Not only are the owners given absolutely no
opportunity to contest the expropriation, or
question the amount of payments fixed by
the decree, but the decision of the NHA are
expressly declared beyond judicial review.
PD 1669 and 1670 are declared
unconstitutional.
Teehankee, CJ, concurring: The judgment
at bar now learly overturns the majority
ruling in JM Tuason v. LTA that the power of
Congress to designate the particular
property to be taken adn how much may be
condemned
thereof
must
be
duly
recognized, leaving only as a judicial
question whether in the exercise of such
competence, the party adversely affected is
the victim of partiality and prejudice. The SC
now rules that such singling out of
properties does not foreclose judicial
scrutiny as to whether such expropriation by
legislative act transgresses the due process
and equal protection and just compensation
guarantees of the Constitution. VV.

v. MORENO were paid; no appeal.

vi. Certificates of title were issued.
LAHUG AIRPORT CEASED OPERATIONS,
lands not utilized.
Moreno plead for repurchase of land.
i.
Filed complaint for reconveyance and
damages.
ii.
Averred that they have been
convinced not to oppose since they could
repurchase.
iii. MCIAA did not object.
ENCHUAN FILED FOR MOTION OF
TRANSFER
Acquired through deeds of assignment the
rights of land.
DPWH claimed it leased in good faith from
MCIAA to Regional Equipment Services and
Region 7 Office.
TRIAL COURT GRANTED RIGHT TO
REPURCHASE but subject to the alleged
property rights of Richard E. Enchuan and
the leasehold of DPWH.
CA reversed: rights gained by MCIAA were
indicative of ownership in fee simple
ISSUE:
Do they have right to repurchase? Or right
to reversion?
HELD:
PETITION GRANTED. CA
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

19. Heirs of Moreno vs. MACTAN

GR- 156273
October 15, 2003
FACTS:
MORENO: successors of 2 parcels of land
MACTAN wanted to acquire land:
i.
Government assured landowners that
they could repurchase their lands once
Lahug Airport was closed or its operations
transferred to Mactan Airport
ii. Moreno refused offer.
iii. Civil Aeronautics Administration as the
successor agency of the National Airport
Corporation filed a complaint with the Court
of First Instance of Cebu, for the
expropriation of land.
iv.
Trial court promulgated public use
upon payment of just compensation.

DECISION

1. Return or repurchase of the condemned

properties of petitioners could be readily
justified as the manifest legal effect or
consequence of the trial courts underlying
presumption that Lahug Airport will
continue to be in operation when it granted
the complaint for eminent domain and the
airport discontinued its activities.
2. ARTICLE 1454: If an absolute
conveyance of property is made in order to
secure the performance of an obligation of
the grantor toward the grantee, a trust by
virtue of law is established. If the fulfillment
of the obligation is offered by the grantor
when it becomes due, he may demand the
reconveyance of the property to him.

a. In the case at bar, government obliged

itself to use of land for the expansion of
Lahug Airport
i.
Failure to keep its bargain: can be
compelled
to
reconvey,
otherwise,
petitioners would be denied the use of their
properties upon a state of affairs that was
not conceived nor contemplated when the
expropriation was authorized.
3.
ARTICLE 1189: If the thing is
improved by its nature, or by time, the
improvement shall inure to the benefit of the
creditor.
a.
CREDITOR: person who stands to
receive something as a result of the process
of restitution.
I.Petitioners must pay MCIAA the
necessary expenses in sustaining the
properties and services
ii. Government may keep whatever income
or fruits it may have obtained from the
parcels of land.
iii.Petitioners need not account for the
interests that the amounts they received as
just compensation may have earned in the
meantime.
21.Manosa vs CA
G.R. NO. 106440, January 29, 1996
Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land
when the parcel was ascertained by the NHI
to have been the birth site of Felix Y.
Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it
passed Resolution No. 1, declaring the land

to be a national historical landmark.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint
on the main thesis that the intended
expropriation was not for a public purpose
and, incidentally, that the act would
constitute an application of public funds,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity,
contrary to the provision of Section 29(2),
Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the expropriation of
the land whereat Manalo was born is valid
and constitutional.
Held: Yes. The taking to be valid must be for
public use. There was a time when it was
felt that a literal meaning should be attached
to such a requirement. Whatever project is
undertaken must be for the public to enjoy,
as in the case of streets or parks.
Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It
is not so any more. As long as the purpose
of the taking is public, then the power of
eminent domain comes into play. As just
noted, the constitution in at least two cases,
to remove any doubt, determines what
public use is. One is the expropriation of
lands to be subdivided into small lots for
resale at cost to individuals. The other is the
transfer, through the exercise of this power,
of utilities and other private enterprise to the
government. It is accurate to state then that
at present whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies
the requirement of public use.