Lebanese University

Faculty of Law and political and administrative Sciences

Section Two

Humanitarian Intervention: the need for legitimacy

Prepared by:
Leila Nicolas Rahbany
 May 2007

Index

Introduction

1) Human values change traditional concept of sovereignty

a- The concept of humanitarian intervention: problems of definition
b- Approaches to humanitarian intervention: Solidarism vs. Pluralism
c- From sovereign impunity to national and international
accountability

2) From the “right to intervene” to “responsibility to protect”

a- The responsibility to prevent
b- The responsibility to react
c- The responsibility to rebuild

3) - UN Human rights council: practice and the need of effectiveness-

Suggestions

Conclusion

2
Introduction:
The decade and a half since the end of the Cold War has witnessed the
rise, albeit at first ever so tentatively, of the idea of the “humanitarian
intervention,” followed by an extensive and rather sophisticated
debate concerning its legality and ethics.
A dilemma was raised between the concept of humanitarian
intervention and the classic Westphalian concept of state sovereignty,
canonized in the UN Charter, in which the autonomy in the domestic
sphere of each independent state was absolute—a modern version of
the late medieval maxim of “rex imperator in regno suo” which means
“each king is an emperor in his own kingdom, he recognized no
superior authority”.(1)
In many states, the result of the end of the Cold War has been a new
emphasis on democratization, respect for human rights and good
governance. But in too many others, the result has been internal war
or civil conflict – more often than not with political and humanitarian
repercussions.
Humanitarian intervention poses the hardest test for an international
society built on principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, and non
use of force. Sovereign states are expected to act as guardians of their
citizens’ security and rights, but what happens if these states act as
gangsters towards their people, treating sovereignty as a license to
kill? Should the international community intervene to help save people
from their dictators, or the state sovereignty concept prohibits this
intervention for it is considered as pure domestic jurisdiction? This
became the subject of controversy of local and international levels as
on the theoretical and practical level.
Humanitarian intervention has been controversial in international
relations both when it happens, and when it has failed to happen. For
example, the case of Rwanda in 1994 exposed the full horror of
inaction. Reports said that
“The United Nations Secretariat and some permanent members of
the Security Council has knew that officials connected to the
government were planning genocide; UN forces were present, though
not in sufficient number at the outset; and credible strategies were
available to prevent, or at least greatly mitigate, the slaughter which
followed. But the Security Council refused to take the necessary action.
That was a failure of international will at the highest level. Its
consequence was not merely a humanitarian catastrophe for Rwanda;
however, the genocide destabilized the entire Great Lakes region(2).

(1)
C. A. J. Coady, The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, United States Institute of Peace,
Peace work No. 45, July 2002,p.20
(2)
The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention & State
Sovereignty, Dec. 2001,p.1

3
 In the aftermath, many African people concluded that, despite of all
speeches that talk about the universality of human rights, some human
lives are of great deal to the international community than others, and
others considered that lack of action was an indication of Great
powers’ policies to cut down the increasing population of poor
countries.
Another intervention did take place in Kosovo in 1999. In an article
entitled “The Short, Unhappy Life of Humanitarian War,” Charles
Krauthammer writes in scathing terms about humanitarian military
intervention and concludes by remarking the “successful” Kosovo
intervention, “This is what happens when you win”.(3)However, this
operation raised major questions about the legitimacy of military
intervention in a sovereign state. Was the cause just? Were the human
rights abuses committed severe enough to deserve outside
involvement or did the media- or what is considered as “CNN effect”-
play the major role in creating a public opinion keen on intervention?
Did those seeking secession manipulate external intervention to
advance their political purposes? Were all peaceful means of resolving
the conflict fully explored and exhausted? If the NATO has not
intervened, would Kosovo have been at best the site of an ongoing,
bloody and destabilizing civil war?
This debate raised an important question regarding the effectiveness
of the use of force in promoting respect for humanitarian values and
long term reconstruction in murderous and failed states. Then there
was also the issue whether states can be trusted with the responsibility
to act as agents of common humanity, and to what extent can the
international community hold the states responsible for the lack of
respect of human rights. Do these sanctions solve the problem or add
to peoples’ suffering like the case of Iraq? Who is really punished: the
victim or the criminal?
Some argued the international community is not intervening enough;
for others it is intervening much too often. For some, the only real
issue is in ensuring that coercive interventions are effective; for others,
questions about legality, process and the possible misuse of precedent
loom much larger. For some, the new interventions herald a new world
in which human rights trumps state sovereignty; for others, it ushers in
a world in which big powers ride over the smaller ones, manipulating
the rhetoric of humanitarianism and human rights. The controversy has
laid bare basic divisions within the international community. In the
interest of all those victims who suffer and die when leadership and
institutions fail, it is crucial that these divisions be resolved.
Discussing of these issue constitute the core concern of this paper. The
first part will set up the definition, theories, and changes in concepts of
humanitarian intervention, human security and state sovereignty. The
(3)
Charles Krauthammer, “The Short, Unhappy Life of Humanitarian War,” in National Interest, no. 57,
fall 1999, p. 8.

4
second will discuss the change in terminology from “right to intervene”
to responsibility to protect” and all its effects. The final part will review
the practice of the Human Rights Council and make some suggestions
for increasing its effectiveness and try to find mechanisms for
legitimizing humanitarian intervention.

1) Human values change traditional concept of sovereignty

A - The concept of humanitarian intervention: problems of

definition
In his classical definition of intervention R.J. Vincent suggests that it is:
”an activity undertaken by state, a group within a state, a group of
states or an international organization which interferes coercively in the
domestic affairs of another state. It is a discrete event having a
beginning and an end, and it is aimed at the authority structure of the
target state. It is not necessarily lawful or unlawful, but it does break a
conventional pattern of international relations”(1).
Vincent was not writing specifically of humanitarian intervention but
his definition sums up the traditional view. The phrase “humanitarian
intervention” is usually used as a term to focus attention on one
particular category of interventions – namely, those undertaken for the
purpose of protecting or assisting people at risk. As Murphy describes
it: “the use of military force by one state or a group of states against another state
not for the purpose of self defense but rather for the purpose of preventing the
widespread deprivation of human rights(2).
However, the militarization of the word “humanitarian” was strongly
opposed expressed by humanitarian agencies, humanitarian
organizations and humanitarian workers. Those organizations had a
great desire to separate the aid and help they were offering to people
from the military intervention by states, even it was carried out
necessary for saving human lives. They regarded that whatever the
motives of those states engaging in the intervention, it is anathema for
the humanitarian relief and assistance to describe any kind of military
action by “humanitarian”. Also some political authors suggested that
the use of the word “humanitarian” in this context tends to prejudge
the issue in question– that is, whether the intervention is in fact
defensible. For all these reasons, many authors besides the
“International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty”
found it appropriate to use the term “military intervention,” for human
protection purposes instead of “humanitarian intervention”(1).
Conventionally, humanitarian intervention is defined in terms of
military intervention motivated by humanitarian considerations, but

(1)
John Bailys, the Globalization of World Politics, Oxford University press, New York, 2001, p472.
(2)
Sean Murphy, Sovereignty and Intervention: Are International legal Norms Changing? , George
Washington University, 2000, p.1.
(1)
The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention & State
Sovereignty, op. cit, p9.

5
this raises the question as to what counts as humanitarian? The Red
Cross defines humanitarian acts as “those that prevent and alleviate
human suffering”. This definition assumes that humanitarian acts are
the same across time and space, denying the fact that there is
controversy over the universalism or relativism of human rights and
humanitarianism. It implies that a capacity for humanitarianism is
naturally inherent in all humans by virtue of a common human nature.
Critics of this position argue that what counts human suffering changes
from one historical epoch to another. There is nothing natural or
inevitable about who gets defined as human\ inhuman. Thus, slavery
was regarded as perfectly natural in one century and identified as a
scourge against humanity in the next(2).
This illustrates that the concept of humanitarianism is culturally
specific and it is differently stated and accepted according to culture,
religion, time, region, political interests.. and has its own biases.

b- Approaches to humanitarian intervention: Solidarism vs.

Pluralism
In 1859 John Stuart Mill suggested that there are ‘assuredly cases in
which it is allowable to go to war, without having been ourselves
attacked or threatened with attack’.(3)
Some political philosophers, regarded as cosmopolitans, say that
nations should not intervene for national welfare reasons, they should
not intervene in preemptive self-defense, or for any other national
welfare enhancement reason except when acting in self-defense from
an actual (or perhaps imminent) armed attack. Interventions for
humanitarian reasons, by contrast, are sometimes justified.
Interventions that are genuinely motivated by other factors-regarding
humanitarian concerns may be technically illegal, but are nonetheless
legitimate when done to halt massive human rights abuses. Some
cosmopolitan theorists go further and claim that nations sometimes
have a duty, not just a right, to intervene to stop such abuses.
Some authors referring to cosmopolitan tradition in international
relations argue that militaries in a globalized world have a new role in
what has been variously described as ‘cosmopolitan law enforcement’
or the ‘new military humanism’(4). They point to the fact that military
forces are already being employed less and less in the defense of the
state and more and more on broader regional and international
security and humanitarian tasks.
They ask for the consecration of a new norm in international relations
which recognizes and sanctions a right to intervene in the internal
(2)
John Baylis, op cit, p.472.
(3)
Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order,
University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1996, p. xix.
(4)
Ulrich Beck in Noam Chomsky, The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo, Pluto Press,
London, 1999, p. 4.

6
affairs of states. More specifically and with a more direct focus on the
human security interests of people, it has been considered as a ‘right
to secure the delivery of humanitarian assistance by force(1)’. This
involves more than new coercive missions or new justifications for
intervention. It shows how ‘solidarity with strangers … can be made
possible(2)’. The solidarist theory moral argument rests on the
assumption that an order based on individual rights, rather than state
sovereignty, would endorse humanitarian intervention.
These contemporary accounts suggest that in the twentieth century,
many people were killed by their own governments or died in
international and civil wars in the same period. It is therefore
legitimate to ask not just how we should respond to what Axel Honneth
calls ‘morally uncurbed aggression’(3) but also to ask upon what ethical
basis we do so as well as how best and in what ways to intervene, and
this refers specifically to the old concept of” just war” theory that deals
with the justification of why (The Jus Ad Bellem) and how (The
Principles Of Jus In Bello) wars are fought. This “just war” theory was
first raised by Augustine, St.Thomas Aquinas and developed by Kant in
his “Perpetual Peace”, was raised again by the academics after the
terrorist attacks on the USA on 9/11 in order to reveal how just was the
war on Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq.
The arguments of cosmopolitan writers known also as solidarists,
elaborated in a range of literatures can be summarized as follows:
First, humankind is ultimately bound together as a single moral
community (a community of fate) with shared and equally-valued
rights and obligations which ‘transcend the morally parochial world of
the sovereign state(4)’. The consequence of such a morally unified
world is (as Immanuel Kant avowed) “that a right violated anywhere is
felt everywhere. We therefore have a moral commitment to those who
are not our co-nationals”.
Richard Falk refers to this as an ‘ethos of responsibility and solidarity(5)’
which is fundamental to a contemporary cosmopolitan ethic.
Second, this compassion to ‘outsiders’ goes beyond Kant’s
cosmopolitan right of hospitality to include a powerful normative
(
1 Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in
International Society, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000.
(2)
Ulrich Beck, ‘the Cosmopolitan Perspective: Sociology of the Second Age of
Modernity’, in British Journal of Sociology, London 2000, pp. 79–105.
(3)
Axel Honneth, ‘Is Universalism a Moral trap? The Presuppositions and
Limits of Human Rights’, in James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, eds,
Perpetual peace: Essays on Kant’s cosmopolitanism, The MIT Press, Cambridge,1997,
p. 159.
(
4)Andrew Linklater, ‘Cosmopolitan Citizenship’, Citizenship Studies, USA, 1998,
pp. 23–41.
(5)
Lorraine Elliott& Graeme Chessman, Cosmopolitan theory, militaries and the
deployment of force ,
Canberra, November 2002, p.3.

7
commitment to the creation of democratic or humane forms of global
governance. This cosmopolitan democratic imperative requires new
forms of global political community based on the principles of dialogue
and consent rather than power and force, and on the construction of
universal frameworks of communication(6). This ensures that those who
are most vulnerable, powerless and marginalized are empowered to
refuse, renegotiate and contest. This is not simply an intellectual
account of the good political community. Rather, as Anthony McGrew
points out, it ‘identifies the political possibilities inherent in the
present’(7) and, as Graeme Chessman observes ‘seeks to put in place
the means to translate these into future actualities(8)’.
Third, these political arrangements are embedded in a growing body
of international law which embodies both democratic and humanitarian
principles including those of international humanitarian law, the related
laws of warfare and international human rights law. Among other
things, this cosmopolitan law is argued to permit and facilitate (and
perhaps require) intervention ‘in the internal affairs of each state in
order to protect certain basic rights(1)’.
However, objections that have been advanced by scholars and
international lawyers to this cosmopolitan theory and to forcible
humanitarian intervention are five.
These objections are not mutually exclusive, but rather can be found in
many scholars’ publications: (2)
First: states don’t intervene for only humanitarian reasons:
Realists tell us that states only pursue their national interests. As
Goldsmith explains: “Liberal democracies rarely if ever engage in
humanitarian interventions to stop human rights abuses that lack a
local-welfare-enhancing justification”(3).
Second: States are not allowed to risk their soldiers’ lives on
humanitarian crusades:
Realists argue that leaders don’t have the moral right to shed blood on
behalf of suffering humanity, and voters in democratic states do not
generally support humanitarian interventions. Even when opinion polls
(6)
Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical
Foundations of the post-
Westphalian Era, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1998.
(7)
Anthony McGrew, ‘Democracy Beyond Borders? Globalization and the
Reconstruction of Democratic Theory and Practice’, in Anthony McGrew, ed.,
the transformation of democracy? The Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1997, p.
252
(8)
Graeme Chessman, ‘Defending the “Other”: Military Force(s) and the
Cosmopolitan Project’, paper presented to the Chief of Army Land Warfare
Conference 2001, Australian Defense Force Academy, 2001: www.google.com.
(1)
Danielle Archibugi, ‘Immanuel Kant, Cosmopolitan Law and Peace’, in European
Journal of
International Relations, 1995, pp. 429–56.
(2)
John Baylis, op.cit, pp472-474.
(3)
Jack Goldsmith, “Democracy prudence and intervention”. In www.google.com.

8
show support for some types of humanitarian intervention, voter
preferences for intervention are not intense. They are conditioned on
guarantees of success, and do not extend to humanitarian
interventions that are costly in terms of blood and treasure, this
explains the rise of public demands for the withdrawal from Iraq after
the death of more than 3500 American soldiers in Iraq.
Third: the problem of abuse:
Realists argue that in the absence of an impartial mechanism for
deciding when humanitarian intervention is permissible, states may
espouse humanitarian motives as a pretext to cover pursuit of national
self- interest. Leaders always premise international acts on an
instrumental cost-benefit analysis, and the cost-benefit analysis
focuses primarily on whether the international act will enhance or
protect national welfare. Such a calculus obviously does not preclude
other-regarding actions, but it tends to limit such other-regarding
actions to those that also enhance national welfare.
“This problem of abuse leads some to say that humanitarian
intervention will always be a weapon that the strong will use against
the weak”.(4).
Fourth: selectivity of response:
Because states will be governed by what they judge to be their
national interest, they will intervene only when they deem this to be at
stake. The problem of selectivity arises when an agreed moral principle
is at stake in more than one situation, but national interests dictate a
divergence of responses(5).This explains the West’s long delay in
intervening to stop the atrocities in Bosnia, and why the United States
pulled out of Somalia when Americans began to suffer casualties, and
why the West declined to intervene in Rwanda or Sudan. And it is also
the lesson of the Kosovo intervention where humanitarian concerns
were present- of course- and important there, but preservation of
NATO’s credibility, the prevention of broader conflicts in central
Europe, the domination of ex- Eastern Europe, and the settlement of
American bases in Europe… were equally important public
justifications. The Kosovo example shows that democracies intervene
to prevent atrocities when there is a coincident national welfare
enhancement rationale.

Fifth: disagreement on what principles should govern a right of

humanitarian intervention:
Hudley Bull defined this conception as “one in which states are capable
of agreement only for certain minimum purposes, the most crucial
being reciprocal recognition of sovereignty and the norm of non-
intervention. He was worried that in the absence of a consensus on
what principles should govern the right of individual or collective
(4)
John Baylis, op.cit, pp.472-474.
(5)
ibid.

9
humanitarian intervention; such a right would undermine international
order. And as suggested by Chris Brown: “the general problem here is
that humanitarian intervention is always going to be based on the
cultural predilections of those with the power to carry it out”(1).
Scholars, philosophers and politicians are still divided and have not
reached a consensus yet about legitimizing the humanitarian
intervention which made it controversial and debated.
c -from sovereign impunity to national and international
accountability
In this new world which is marked by inequalities of power, wealth and
resources, sovereignty is regarded for many states their best – and
sometimes seemingly their only – line of defense. But sovereignty is
more than just a functional principle of international relations, it is also
recognition of equal worth and dignity for many states and peoples, a
protection of their unique identities and their national freedom, and an
affirmation of their right to shape and determine their own destiny. In
recognition of this, the principle that all states are equally sovereign
under international law was established as a cornerstone of the UN
Charter and the basis of international relations for many decades since
the treaty of Westphalia.
However, the conditions under which sovereignty is exercised – and
intervention is practiced – have changed dramatically since 1945.
Evolving international law has set many constraints on what states can
do and not do, and this was not limited to the realm of human rights.
The defense of state sovereignty, by even its strongest supporters,
does not include any claim to the unlimited power of a state to do what
it wants either to its own people or to others.
Sovereignty as responsibility implies:
Externally – it is a corresponding obligation that the state should
respect other state’s sovereignty, and refrain from intervening in
domestic affairs of other states (Article 2.7 of the UN Charter),
Internally, it exercises exclusive and total jurisdiction within its
territorial borders and must respect the dignity and basic rights of all
the people within the state.
In international human rights covenants, in UN practice, and in state
practice itself, sovereignty is now understood as embracing this dual
responsibility. Sovereignty as responsibility has become the minimum
content of good governance as well as international citizenship(2).
The Ex UN Secretary-General kofi Anan has discussed the dilemma in
the conceptual language of the two notions of sovereignty, one vested
in the state, the second in the people and individuals. His approach
reflects the ever-increasing commitment around the world to
democratic government (of, by and for the people) and greater
freedoms and human rights. The second notion of sovereignty to which
(1)
ibid.
(2
) H.spruyt, the Sovereign States and its Competitors, Princeton university press, Princeton, 1994,p.324.

10
he refers should not be seen as any kind of challenge to the traditional
notion of state sovereignty, rather it is a way of saying that the more
traditional notion of state sovereignty should be able to embrace
comfortably the goal of greater self-empowerment and freedom for
people, both individually and collectively.
Thinking of sovereignty as responsibility, in a way that is being
increasingly recognized in state practice, has three major implications:
First, it implies that the state authorities are responsible for protecting the
safety and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare.
Second, it suggests that the national political authorities are responsible to
the citizens internally and to the international community through the UN.
And third, it means that the agents of state are liable for their actions; that
is to say, they are accountable for their acts of commission and omission. The
case for thinking of sovereignty in these terms is strengthened by the ever-
increasing impact of international human rights norms, and the increasing
impact in international discourse of the concept of “human security”.(1).
The traditional, narrow perception of security leaves out the most
elementary and legitimate concerns of ordinary people regarding
security in their daily lives. It made states divert enormous amounts of
national wealth and resources into armaments and armed forces, while
countries fail to protect their citizens from chronic insecurities of
hunger, disease, inadequate shelter, crime, unemployment… this was
the case of many states in the Middle East as well as in many regions.
The awareness of today’s challenges and when rape is used as an
instrument of war and ethnic cleansing, when thousands are killed by
floods resulting from a ravaged countryside and when citizens are
killed by their own security forces, it is just insufficient to think of
security in “traditional” terms. “This implies that states will not enjoy
development without security, will not enjoy security without
development, and will not enjoy either without respect for human
rights”(2).
The meaning and scope of security have become much broader since
the UN Charter was signed in 1945 where the main concern of its
founders was with “State security” in the traditional military sense.
They wanted to build a system of collective security in which states
join together and pledge that aggression against one is aggression
against all, and commit themselves in that event to react collectively.
In the opening words of the Charter, the United Nations was created
“to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights” and “to promote social
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”. This meant
that the founders of the UN understood well, long before the idea of
human security gained currency, the indivisibility of security, economic
development and human freedom and this was the direct cause of
establishing the ECOSOC.

(1)
A more secure world: Our shared responsibility Report of the High-level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change, United Nations, 2004.
(2)
ibid.

11
The new approach of Human security means the security of people –
their physical safety, their economic and social well-being, respect for
their dignity and worth as human beings, and the protection of their
human rights and fundamental freedoms(3). Secretary-General Kofi
Annan put this issue of human security at the centre of the current
debate, in his statement to the 54th session of the General Assembly
to “address the prospects for human security and intervention in the
next century.”
The central challenge for the twenty-first century is to fashion a new
and broader understanding, of what human security means and of all
its responsibilities, commitments, strategies and institutions. This
concept of human security has become an increasingly important
element in international law and international relations, providing a
conceptual framework for international action, and is now recognized
to extend to people as well as to states.
If there is to be a new security consensus, it must start with the
understanding that the front-line actors in dealing with all the threats
we face, new and old, continue to be individual sovereign States,
whose role and responsibilities, and right to be respected, are fully
recognized in the Charter of the United Nations. But in the twenty-first
century, where challenges are more than ever before and where no
State, no international organization, can stand wholly alone against
these challenges, collective strategies, collective institutions and a
sense of collective responsibility are indispensable. The essence of that
consensus is simple “we all share responsibility for the welfare of
human race”(1).

2 - From the “right to intervene” to “responsibility to protect”

Despite of all technological and economic progress, millions of human

beings remain at the mercy of civil wars, abuses of human rights,
discrimination, state repression and state collapse. Millions of ordinary
people need protection because their states are unwilling or unable to
protect them.
However, there are continuing fears at the international level about the
“right to intervene” issue. The international community has been
concerned how to develop consistent, credible and enforceable
standards to guide state and intergovernmental practice in order to
legitimize military intervention for humanitarian purposes.
The experience and aftermath of Somalia, Rwanda, Srebrenica and
Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq as well as interventions and non-
interventions in a number of other places, have provided a clear
indication that the tools, devices and thinking of international relations

(3)
ibid.
(1)
C.Thomas, Global governance: Development and human security, Pluto, London, 2000.

12
need to be reassessed, in order to meet the foreseeable needs of the
21st century.
The “International Commission on Intervention & State Sovereignty”
stated in its report that any approach to intervention on human
protection grounds needs to meet at least four basic objectives:
1. “To establish clearer rules, procedures and criteria for determining
whether, when and how to intervene;
2. To establish the legitimacy of military intervention when necessary
and after all other approaches have failed;
3. To ensure that military intervention, when it occurs, is carried out only
for the purposes proposed, is effective, and is undertaken with proper
concern to minimize the human costs and institutional damage that will
result; and
4. To help eliminate, where possible, the causes of conflict while
enhancing the prospects for durable and sustainable peace”.(2)
The commission recommended changing the language of past debates
arguing for or against a “right to intervene” by one state on the
territory of another state, and suggested changing this “right to
intervene” to a concept of a “responsibility to protect.
It stated that the “traditional language of the sovereignty–intervention
debate – in terms of “the right of humanitarian intervention” or the
“right to intervene” – is unhelpful in at least three key respects:
“First, it necessarily focuses attention on the claims, rights and
prerogatives of the potentially intervening states much more so than on
the urgent needs of the potential beneficiaries of the action.
Second, by focusing narrowly on the act of intervention, the traditional
language does not adequately take into account the need for either prior
preventive effort or subsequent follow-up assistance, both of which have
been too often neglected in practice.
And third, the familiar language does effectively operate to trump
sovereignty with intervention at the outset of the debate: it loads the
dice in favor of intervention before the argument has even begun, by
tending to label and delegitimize dissent as anti-humanitarian”(3).

The key issue in the term “the responsibility to protect” is that it

focuses attention on the human needs of those seeking protection or
assistance. It directs the attention to the costs and results of action
versus no action, and provides conceptual, normative and operational
linkages between assistance, intervention and reconstruction.
“The proposed change in terminology is also a change in perspective,
reversing the perceptions inherent in the traditional language, and
adding some additional ones:
First, the responsibility to protect implies an evaluation of the issues from
the point of view of those seeking or needing support, rather than those who
may be considering intervention. It refocuses the international searchlight
back where it should always be: on the duty to protect communities from
mass killing, women from systematic rape and children from starvation

(2)
The responsibility to protect report, op.cit,pp.11-17
(3)
.ibid.

13
 Second, the responsibility to protect acknowledges that the primary
responsibility in this regard rests with the state concerned, and that it is only
if the state is unable or unwilling to fulfill this responsibility, or is itself the
perpetrator, that it becomes the responsibility of the international community
to act in its place.
In many cases, the state will seek to acquit its responsibility in full and
active partnership with representatives of the international community.
Thus the “responsibility to protect” is more of a linking concept that
bridges the divide between intervention and sovereignty; the language
of the “right or duty to intervene” is intrinsically more confrontational.
(1)

Third, the substance of the responsibility to protect is the provision of life-

supporting protection and assistance to populations at risk. This responsibility
has three integral and essential components: not just the responsibility to
react to an actual or apprehended human catastrophe, but the responsibility
to prevent it, and the responsibility to rebuild after the event(2).

A - The responsibility to prevent

Prevention of deadly conflicts, genocides, and human sufferings is
considered first and foremost the responsibility of sovereign states and
their institutions. The failure of prevention can have wide international
consequences and costs. As such support from the international
community is recommended. Such support may take different forms. It
may come in the form of economic and social development assistance
and as support for local initiatives to advance good governance,
representative authorities, and respect of human rights, or as good
offices missions, mediators….
Thus, the essential conditions have been suggested to ensure effective
prevention of conflict, and dealing with related sources of human
misery, three essential conditions have to be met:
First, there has to be knowledge of the fragility of the situation and the
risks associated with it – so called “early warning.”…
Second, there has to be understanding of the policy measures available
that are capable of making a difference – the so-called “preventive
toolbox.”..
And third, there has to be, the willingness to apply those measures – the
issue of “political will(3).”

B - The responsibility to react:

The “responsibility to protect” implies above all else a responsibility to
react to the situations of compelling need for human protection. When
preventive measures fail to resolve or contain the situation and when a
state is unable or unwilling to redress the situation, then
interventionary measures by other members of the broader community
of states may be required. Similarly, and as it is stated in the UN
(1)
www.diana.law.yale.edu.
(2)
The responsibility to protect report ,op cit,p.18
(3)
ibid.pp19-27

14
charter, coercive measures must be proportional to the wrongful act
and ascending from political, economic or judicial measures, and in
extreme cases, they may reach military action. As a matter of first
principles, in the case of reaction just as with prevention, less intrusive
and coercive measures should always be considered before more
coercive and intrusive ones are applied.
“Tough threshold conditions should be satisfied before military intervention
is contemplated. For political, economic and judicial measures the barrier
can be set lower, but for military intervention it must be high: for military
action ever to be defensible the circumstances must be grave indeed. But
the threshold or “trigger” conditions are not the end of the matter. There
are a series of additional precautionary principles which must be satisfied, to
ensure that the intervention remains both defensible in principle and
workable and acceptable in practice(1).

C -The responsibility to rebuild:

The responsibility to protect implies the responsibility not just to
prevent and react, but to follow through and rebuild. This means that if
military intervention action is taken, there should be a genuine
commitment to help build a durable peace, and promoting good
governance and sustainable development. Conditions of public safety
and order have to be reconstituted by international agents acting in
partnership with local authorities, with the goal of progressively
transferring to them authority and responsibility to rebuild.
Lessons from earlier cases of intervention show that, the exit of the
interveners has been poorly managed, that the commitment to help
with reconstruction has been inadequate, and inhabitants have found
themselves in humanitarian catastrophes much more than the original
ones that required intervention or worse resulted from it. As such
scholars and advocates of human rights suggest that one of the
essential functions of an intervention force must be providing security
and protection for all members of a population, regardless of ethnic
origin or relation to the previous source of power in the territory. The
question on how to achieve this in the light of the conflict between
different national, ethnic, political, economic interests remain to be
answered. Iraq’s case remains the recent example of dealing with such
issues. The cost of rebuilding is usually very high. This raises important
questions as the donor’s expectations from the short and long run, and
with the fear that this may be a new recipe for domestic and
international conflicts always looming. The same issue is raised now in
Iraq.
In addition to security, the durable peace needs disarmament of
armed groups, demobilization and reintegration of local security forces.
Reintegration will usually take the longest time to achieve, but the
whole process cannot be judged to have been successful until it is
complete. It is also a necessary element of returning a country to law
(1)
ibid. p.29.

15
and order since a demobilized soldier, unless properly reintegrated into
society, with sustainable income, will probably turn to armed crime or
armed political opposition.
Another element of the same problem is the rebuilding of new national
armed forces and police, integrating as far as possible elements of the
formerly competing armed factions or military forces.
Meanwhile, Ensuring sustainable reconstruction and rehabilitation will
involve the commitment of sufficient funds and resources and close
cooperation with local people, and may mean staying in the country for
some period of time after the initial purposes of the intervention have
been accomplished. (2)

3 - UN Human rights council: practice and the need of effectiveness:

Since the very birth of the United Nations, promoting and protecting
fundamental human rights has been one of the primary objectives of
the organization.
The drafters of the Charter of the United Nations included a pledge by
member states “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and
women.”(1)
Yet the U.N.’s record in promoting fundamental human rights in recent
times has not been sufficient enough. The work of the United Nations
in the field of human rights has been traditionally grounded in a
combination of genuine concern for the need to protect the dignity of
the individual as well as reserving “national interests” of states, and
reserving the interests of big powers especially the permanent Five.

Suggestions:
If a compromise is to be reached to maintain the sovereignty of states
and at the same time guarantee the human security, we suggest the
UN organization should be given major role in this aspect.
The UN commission of human rights was replaced lately (2006) by the
Human Rights Council which is thought to be far better than the old
Commission, yet it is not perfect.
The human rights council can be given a major role in determining
when, where and how to apply the “responsibility to protect” and can
legitimize military intervention for humanitarian purposes.

(2)
ibid., p.39
(1)
www.un.org.

16
 A) The right authority to intervene:
- We suggest that the right authority to intervene or to have the
responsibility to protect must be the security council of UN.
“No doubt that there is no better or more appropriate body than the
Security Council to deal with military intervention issues for human
protection purposes. It is the Security Council which should be making
the hard decisions in the hard cases about overriding state
sovereignty. And it is the Security Council which should be making the
often even harder decisions to mobilize effective resources, including
military resources, to rescue populations at risk when there is no
serious opposition on sovereignty grounds. If international consensus
is ever to be reached about when, where, how and by whom military
intervention should happen, it is very clear that the central role of the
Security Council will have to be at the heart of that consensus. The
task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of
authority, but to make the Security Council work much better than it
has”(2).
- We suggest that all callings for interventions must be formally
requested and addressed only to human rights council (HRC), which
raises a report informing the Security Council.
- We suggest that any intervention outside the authority of Security
Council should be considered as an act of “aggression”.
-In order to do such work we suggest some amendments to the
chapter VII of the UN charter, to add this statement “in cases of severe
human rights abuses” to the title of chapter VII. so the title will be”
action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace ,
acts of aggression, and severe human rights abuses”.
-We suggest that HRC be given much more capability and authority to
request of Security Council reports to intervene when there are great
abuses of human rights which were identified and recognized by the
international commission for intervention and state sovereignty as:
1- “Large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or
not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect
or inability to act, or a failed state situation;
2. Large scale “ethnic cleansing,” actual or apprehended, whether carried
out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.
If either or both of these conditions are satisfied, the “just cause”
component of the decision to intervene is amply satisfied”(1).
– An issue remains to be addressed, however, that is the veto power
enjoyed by the present Permanent Five. As it has been said, it is that
one veto can override the rest of humanity on matters of grave
humanitarian concern.
We suggest an agreement done by the Permanent Five that they shall
refrain from using the veto with respect to actions that are needed to
(2)
The responsibility to protect report, op. cit.,p.52
(1)
ibid.

17
stop or avert a significant humanitarian catastrophes. The expression
“constructive abstention” can be used in this context.

B) The right authority to decide whether to intervene or

not:
- Ideally there must be a report, from a universally respected and
impartial non-government source which we suggest that the UN HRC;
be the only and exclusive authority to determine whether to intervene
or not. However, a report legitimizing the military intervention for
human purposes should have two thirds of affirmative votes in the
council.
– We see that it will be necessary, in each case, the HRC determine
whether events on the ground do in fact meet the criteria “actual or
threatened large scale loss of human life or ethnic cleansing”. The
primary purpose of the intervention must be to halt or avert human
suffering not to overthrow regimes and replace it by authorities’
supported by big powers.
- In many cases, competing “facts” and versions of events will be
produced – often for the specific purpose of leading or misleading
external opinion. Obtaining fair and accurate information should be
done by the “independent observers of HRC”.
- Moreover, where existence of the conditions that might warrant an
intervention for human protection purposes is in question, and time
allows, an “independent special fact-finding mission” could be sent by
HRC for the purpose of obtaining accurate information and a fair
assessment of a particular situation.
- Another job of HRC is to look at whether, and to what extent, the
intervention is actually supported by the people for whose benefit the
intervention is intended. And to look at whether, and to what extent,
the opinion of other countries in the region has been taken into
account and is supportive so as not to constitute a basis for
destabilizing the region.
- Before military intervention, the HRC should explore that every
diplomatic and non-military avenue for the prevention or peaceful
resolution of the humanitarian crisis must be explored. The
responsibility to react – with military coercion – can only be justified
when the responsibility to prevent has been fully discharged.
- The HRC should monitor the proportionality of the “responsibility to
react” and that “The scale, duration and intensity of the planned
military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the
humanitarian objective in question. The means have to be
commensurate with the ends, and in line with the magnitude of the
original provocation. The effect on the political system of the country
targeted should be limited, again, to what is strictly necessary to
accomplish the purpose of the intervention(1).
(1)
ibid.

18
- The HRC must monitor that all the rules of international humanitarian
law should be strictly observed in these situations.

C) Changes in the mechanisms of HRC

We suggest also some changes in the mechanisms of HRC to improve
its effectiveness and impartiality;
- it is needed to create an “early warning system” to enhance HRC
capacity in providing timely and accurate information to Security
Council about human rights abuses.
- To seek assistance and cooperation from INGOs. It must have some
extra mechanisms to receive and analyze data information from INGOs
and to report it directly to the Security Council.
- To be able to include an issue on the Security Council agenda.
D) Suggestions for more effectiveness of HRC
From the short practice of the council we notice that it was hindered by
many obstacles:
- The Council has no criteria for membership other than geographical
representation:
This can be solved by adopting strong criteria (the candidate’s human
rights record) to prevent human rights abusers from sitting on the new
Council.
- Members of the Council are elected by an absolute majority of the
General Assembly:
A two-thirds requirement would have set a higher hurdle for
membership and made it harder for countries with dubious human
rights records to win seats on the Council with the intention of
undermining the new body from within.
- While the Council is charged with conducting a universal periodic
review, the conclusions of the review would not prevent those
countries found complicit in human rights violations from participating
in the Council. Even if the review finds numerous and serious human
rights abuses, neither the Council nor the General Assembly is required
to take action, this actually must be changed.
- The Council has a large membership: The Council is only marginally
smaller than the previous Commission of human rights, from 53
members to 47.
- In order for the HRC to do the core job in protecting human rights and
avert human suffering, it must be an independent small body where
the staffs are nominated based on their reputation and their record in
the service of human rights, and then they must represent the council
not their governments. It must be totally independent of the states,
and from the influence of big powers. The staff must represent the
organization not their states.
- The names of the staff can be given by the states at regional basis
and by the INGOs, to make “bank of names” and then can be picked by
“lottery” process.

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 Conclusion:
The United Nations was created in 1945 above all else “to save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war” - to ensure that the
horrors of the World Wars were never repeated. Sixty two years later,
we know all too well that the biggest security threats we face now, and
in the decades ahead, go far beyond States waging aggressive war.
They extend to poverty, infectious disease and environmental
degradation; the spread and possible use of nuclear, radiological,
chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational
organized crime and above all war and violence within states and
abuses of human rights. We notice increased threats from non-State
actors as well as States, to human security as well as State security.
Globalization has affected the response to human rights abuses, and
the INGOs have succeeded to include many new issues to the
international relations like development, environment, women’s rights
and human rights in general which lead to many military interventions.
However, the first question that comes to mind about "humanitarian
intervention" is whether the category exists. Are states moral agents?
Or the case just as Machiavelli, Adam Smith, and a host of others
concluded “states commonly act with concern and respect of interests
of their domestic power”. A second obvious question has to do with
those who are to be in charge of global humanity, and of the respect
and progress of human race: what do their institutions and record
leads us to expect? The record of states and international
organizations based on states was full of abuses and selectivity of
response to human rights catastrophes.
In fact, the media effect had the major influence on interventions
because of the increase awareness human rights abuses it made.
Television, internet, and all media pictures of starving people, or
human rights abuses done by dictators play a major role in
interventions, but once the people see the consequences of this
intervention in terms of human and soldiers’ losses, the public opinion
will force for the withdrawal of troops. This demonstrates that “CNN
factor” is double edged sword: it can pressurize governments into
humanitarian interventions, yet with equal rapidity, pictures of
casualties arriving home can lead to public disillusionment and calls for

20
withdrawal and this is the major problem that faces Bush
administration in case of Iraq.
However, the “loud emergencies” of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and
famine receive media attention and command limited resources of the
international donor community. This conception of humanitarianism is
not rooted in objective facts; instead, it is the product of globally
dominant beliefs and values which privilege the “loud emergencies”
and exclude the silent emergency of slow death through poverty and
malnutrition.
An important question can be raised for the future is: why the
eradication of global poverty is not as urgent a subject for
humanitarian intervention as deaths of those killed by men in uniform
with machine guns?
Lots of action must be done for saving humanity. States, international
organizations, INGOs, public society…. All must take into consideration
that saving lives and the respect of human rights is the main issue for
development and security all over the world.

List of references

Books:
- Bailys John, the globalization of world politics, oxford university
press, New York, 2001,
- Beck Urich, The new military humanism: Lessons from Kosovo,
in - Noam Chomsky Ed, Pluto Press, London, 1999.
- Coady C. A. J., The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention,
United States Institute of Peace, Peace works No. 45, July 2002.
- Elliott Lorraine & Graeme Chessman, Cosmopolitan theory,
militaries and the deployment of force, Canberra, November
2002.
- Honneth Axel, ‘Is universalism a moral trap? The
presuppositions and limits of human rights’, in James Bohman
and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, eds, Perpetual peace: Essays on Kant’s
cosmopolitanism, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1997.
- Krauthammer Charles, “The Short, Unhappy Life of Humanitarian
War,” in National Interest, no. 57, Fall 1999.

21
- Linklater Andrew, The transformation of political community:
Ethical foundations of the post-Westphalian era, Polity Press,
Cambridge, 1998.
- Linklater Andrew, ‘Cosmopolitan citizenship’, Citizenship Studies,
USA, 1998.
- Murphy Sean, Sovereignty and intervention: Are International
legal norms changing, George Washington University, 2000.
- McGrew Anthony, ‘Democracy beyond borders? Globalization
and the reconstruction of democratic theory and practice’, in
Anthony McGrew, ed., the transformation of democracy? The Open
University Press, Milton Keynes, 1997.
- Murphy Sean D., Humanitarian intervention: The United
Nations in an evolving world order, University of Pennsylvania
Press, Philadelphia, 1996.
- Spruyt H., the sovereign states and its competitors, Princeton
University press, Princeton, 1994.
- Thomas C., Global governance: Development and human
security, Pluto, London, 2000.
- Wheeler Nicholas, Saving strangers: Humanitarian intervention
in international society, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000.
Periodicals:
- Archibugi Daniele, ‘Immanuel Kant, cosmopolitan law and peace’, in
European Journal of International Relations, 1995.
- Beck Ulrich, ‘the cosmopolitan perspective: Sociology of the second
age of modernity’, in British Journal of Sociology, London 2000.
Reports and internet Sites:
- The responsibility to protect, report of the international commission
on intervention & state sovereignty Dec. 2001.
- A more secure world: Our shared responsibility Report of the High-
level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, United Nations, 2004.
- www.diana.law.yale.edu.
- Chessman Graeme, ‘Defending the “other”: Military force(s)
and the cosmopolitan project’, paper presented to the Chief of
Army Land Warfare Conference 2001, in (www. Google.com)
- Jack Goldsmith, “Democracy prudence and intervention. In
www.google.com.

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