Professional Documents
Culture Documents
197788
out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while
the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.3
Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of
"Not guilty" to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial
was terminated on 24 September 2003, after which, trial ensued.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set
aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18
February 20112 and Resolution dated 8 July 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the
version of the prosecution, are as follows:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of
the Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that
on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 oclock in the morning, he saw the
accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and
going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet;
that this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal
ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while
driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside their
sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in
front of the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were
issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that
the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket;
that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of
the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the
accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket
which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3)
inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one
(1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused
to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a
cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the
accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned
During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist
testified for the prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner testified for
himself and raised the defense of planting of evidence and extortion.
In its 19 February 2009 Decision, 4 the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs5committed on 10 March 2003. It found the
prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested
for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the
discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu.
The RTC also found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak, selfserving and unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its Decision held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y
ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of Section
11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and
(1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a
fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P 300,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency for its proper disposition and destruction in
accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.6
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition
for Review on Certiorari dated 1 September 2011. In a Resolution dated 12
October 2011, this Court required respondent to file a comment on the
Petition. On 4 January 2012, the latter filed its Comment dated 3 January
2012.
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular
reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide
open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though
unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial courts
decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as
errors.9
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for
committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this
reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be
bound to answer for the commission of an offense. 10 It is effected by an
actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary
submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the
application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical
restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that
there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other,
and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the
belief and impression that submission is necessary. 11
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general
procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the
offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. Law enforcement and
peace officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in
apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued
pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations not contrary to
any provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the driver concerned
and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor which
shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not
exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of said
receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall
become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within
fifteen days from the date of apprehension will be a ground for the
suspension and/or revocation of his license.
xxx
xxx
xxx
We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not
come to pass. It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda
become applicable as soon as a suspects freedom of action is curtailed to
a "degree associated with formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U. S.
1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If a motorist who has been detained
pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders
him "in custody" for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full
panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda. See Oregon v. Mathiason,
429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). (Emphasis supplied.)
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was
only subjected to modest questions while still at the scene of the traffic
stop, he was not at that moment placed under custody (such that he
should have been apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can
treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of
a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner here be considered "under
arrest" at the time that his traffic citation was being made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was
violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a
motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant
of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an
offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither
can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation.
Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to
deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former
may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the
officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the
possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed
"arrested" upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and while
awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest
were not complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the
duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest
and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be
informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and
that any statement they might make could be used against them. 14 It may
also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were
complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested
for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must
also be given to a person apprehended due to a traffic violation:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that
the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve
the "inherently compelling pressures" "generated by the custodial setting
itself," "which work to undermine the individuals will to resist," and as
much as possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual
cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions
were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in-custody
questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanors as they are by
questioning of persons suspected of felonies.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed "arrested" when he was
flagged down for a traffic violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then
there would have been no need for him to be arrested for a second time
after the police officers allegedly discovered the drugsas he was already
in their custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted
from it was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in
"plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless
search; (v) customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent
and emergency circumstances.15 None of the above-mentioned instances,
especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be
inadvertently discovered, was not in "plain view." It was actually concealed
justification for a full-blown search when the officer does not arrest the
motorist. Instead, police officers may only conduct minimal intrusions, such
as ordering the motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown:
In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the "search
incident to arrest" exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to
take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use
at trial. x x x But neither of these underlying rationales for the search
incident to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in the present
case.
We have recognized that the first rationaleofficer safetyis "both
legitimate and weighty," x x x The threat to officer safety from issuing a
traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial
arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves "danger to an
officer" because of "the extended exposure which follows the taking of a
suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station." 414 U. S.,
at 234-235. We recognized that "[t]he danger to the police officer flows
from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and
uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest." Id., at 234, n. 5. A
routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and
"is more analogous to a so-called Terry stop . . . than to a formal arrest."
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy,
412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) ("Where there is no formal arrest . . . a person
might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous,
immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence").
This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of
a routine traffic stop.1wphi1 It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110;
Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while the concern for officer safety in this
context may justify the "minimal" additional intrusion of ordering a driver
and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often
considerably greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype search. Even
without the search authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent
bases to search for weapons and protect themselves from danger. For
example, they may order out of a vehicle both the driver, Mimms, supra, at
111, and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a "patdown" of a
driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be
armed and dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a "Terry
patdown" of the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable
suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 145566
March 9, 2004
From the facts found by the court a quo, it appears that on December 15,
1996, at or around 9:00 p.m., Rogelio Rayco was having some drinks with a
group which included Roger Capacito and his wife and the spouses Borah
and Arsolin Illustrismo at the Capacito residence located at Barangay
Talisay, Sta. Fe, Cebu.3
Rogelio Rayco left the group to go home about an hour later. On his way
home, he saw his niece, Lenlen Rayco, with appellant Dindo Mojello, a
nephew of Roger Capacito, walking together some thirty meters away
towards the direction of Sitio Kota. 4 Since he was used to seeing them
together on other occasions, he did not find anything strange about this.
He proceeded to his house.5
On December 16, 1996, between 5:00 to 6:00 a.m., the Rayco family was
informed that the body of Lenlen was found at the seashore of Sitio Kota.
Rogelio Rayco immediately proceeded to the site and saw the lifeless,
naked and bruised body of his niece. Rogelio was devastated by what he
saw. A remorse of conscience enveloped him for his failure to protect his
niece. He even attempted to take his own life several days after the
incident.6
Appellant was arrested at Bantayan while attempting to board a motor
launch bound for Cadiz City. On an investigation conducted by SPO2
Wilfredo Giducos, he admitted that he was the perpetrator of the dastardly
deed. Appellant was assisted by Atty. Isaias Giduquio during his custodial
interrogation. His confession was witnessed by Barangay Captains Wilfredo
Batobalanos and Manolo Landao. Batobalanos testified that after it was
executed, the contents of the document were read to appellant who later
on voluntarily signed it.7 Appellant's extrajudicial confession was sworn
before Judge Cornelio T. Jaca of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Sta. Fe-Bantayan.8 On December 21, 1996, an autopsy was conducted on
the victim's cadaver by Dr. Nestor Sator of the Medico-Legal Branch of the
PNP Crime Laboratory, Region VII.9
Dr. Sator testified that the swelling of the labia majora and hymenal
lacerations positively indicate that the victim was raped. 10 He observed
that froth in the lungs of the victim and contusions on her neck show that
she was strangled and died of asphyxia. 11 He indicated the cause of death
as cardio-respiratory arrest due to asphyxia by strangulation and physical
injuries to the head and the trunk.12
In this automatic review, appellant raises two issues: whether the
extrajudicial confession executed by appellant is admissible in evidence;
and whether appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape with homicide.
We now resolve.
Appellant alleges that the lower court gravely erred in admitting in
evidence the alleged extrajudicial confession which he executed on
December 23, 1996. In his Brief, appellant avers that the confession which
he executed was not freely, intelligently and voluntarily entered into. 13 He
argues that he was not knowingly and intelligently apprised of his
constitutional rights before the confession was taken from him. 14 Hence, his
confession, and admissions made therein, should be deemed inadmissible
in evidence, under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
We are not convinced.
At the core of the instant case is the application of the law on custodial
investigation enshrined in Article III, Section 12, paragraph 1 of the
Constitution, which provides:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
The above provision in the fundamental Charter embodies what
jurisprudence has termed as "Miranda rights" stemming from the landmark
decision of the United States Supreme Court, Miranda v. Arizona.15 It has
been the linchpin of the modern Bill of Rights, and the ultimate refuge of
individuals against the coercive power of the State.
The Miranda doctrine requires that: (a) any person under custodial
investigation has the right to remain silent; (b) anything he says can and
will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has the right to talk to an
attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel present when
being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be
provided before any questioning if he so desires.
In the Philippines, the right to counsel espoused in the Miranda doctrine
was based on the leading case of People v. Galit16 and Morales, Jr. v.
Enrile,17 rulings subsequently incorporated into the present Constitution.
TheMiranda doctrine under the 1987 Charter took on a modified form
where the right to counsel was specifically qualified to mean competent
and independent counsel preferably of the suspect's own choice. Waiver of
the right to counsel likewise provided for stricter requirements compared
it
must
be
done in
writing,
and
in
xxx
xxx
xxx
x x x.
The trial court observed that as to the confession of appellant, he was fully
apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and his right to
counsel, as contained in such confession. 28 Appellant was properly assisted
by Atty. Isaias Giduquio. The extrajudicial confession of appellant was
subscribed and sworn to before Judge Cornelio T. Jaca, Municipal Judge of
Medellin-Daanbantayan and acting Judge of MCTC Sta. Fe-Bantayan and
Madredijos. Judge Jaca declared that he explained to the appellant the
contents of the extrajudicial confession and asked if he understood it. He
subsequently acknowledged that when appellant subscribed to his
statement, Atty. Giduquio, witness Batobalonos and his Clerk of Court were
present as well as other people.29
The extrajudicial confession executed by the appellant followed the rigid
requirements of the Miranda doctrine; consequently, it is admissible as
evidence. The lower court was correct in giving credence to the
extrajudicial confession of the appellant.
On cross-examination, appellant Mojello claimed his life was threatened,
thereby inducing him to execute an extrajudicial confession, yet he
neither filed any case against the person who threatened him, nor
he report this to his counsel. He further claimed that he did not
understand the contents of the confession which was read in the Visayan
dialect, yet he admits that he uses the Visayan dialect in his daily
discourse.
In People v. Pia,30 we held that "where appellants did not present evidence
of compulsion or duress or violence on their persons; where they failed to
complain to officers who administered the oaths; where they did not
institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged
maltreatment; where there appears no marks of violence on their bodies
and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable
physician to buttress their claim, all these should be considered as factors
indicating voluntariness of confessions." The failure of the appellant to
complain to the swearing officer or to file charges against the persons who
allegedly maltreated him, although he had all the chances to do so,
manifests voluntariness in the execution of his confessions. 31 To hold
otherwise is to facilitate the retraction of his statements at the mere
allegation of threat, torture, coercion, intimidation or inducement, without
any proof whatsoever. People v. Enanoria further declared that another
indicium of voluntariness is the disclosure of details in the confession
which could have been known only to the declarant.32
10
The confessant bears the burden of proof that his confession is tainted with
duress, compulsion or coercion by substantiating his claim with
independent evidence other than his own self-serving claims that the
admissions in his affidavit are untrue and unwillingly executed. 33 Bare
assertions will certainly not suffice to overturn the presumption. 34
The test for determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether the
defendant's will was overborne at the time he confessed. 35 In cases where
the Miranda warnings have been given, the test of voluntariness should be
subsequently applied in order to determine the probative weight of the
confession.
Accordingly, the presumption of voluntariness of appellant's confession
remains unrebutted by his failure to present independent evidence that the
same was coerced.
It cannot be gainsaid that the constitutional duty of law enforcement
officers is to ensure that a suspect has been properly apprised of
his Miranda rights, including the right to counsel. It is in the paramount
public interest that the foundation of an effective administration of criminal
justice relies on the faithful adherence to the Miranda doctrine. Compliance
with Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 by police authorities is central to the criminal
justice system; Miranda rights must in every case be respected, without
exception.
Thus, the confession, having strictly complied with the constitutional
requirements under Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1, is deemed admissible in
evidence against appellant. It follows that the admission of culpability
made therein is admissible. It is therefore not "fruit of the poisonous tree"
since the tree itself is not poisonous.
Appellant also alleges that the lower court gravely erred in holding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide,
thereby sentencing him to suffer the death penalty despite the glaring
insufficiency of circumstantial evidence against him. In his Brief, he argues
that the evidence against him is insufficient to warrant his conviction of
rape with homicide.
The categorical admission of the appellant to the crime of rape, coupled
with the corpus delicti as established by the Medico-Legal Report and the
testimony of Rogelio Rayco, leads us to no other conclusion than that of
appellant's guilt for the rape of Lenlen Rayco on December 15, 1996. It
passes the test of moral certainty and must therefore be sustained.
11
in the first bag. Becoming suspicious, she took out four of the chocolate
boxes and opened one of them. Instead of chocolates, what she saw inside
was white crystalline substance contained in a white transparent plastic.
Cinco thus immediately called the attention of her immediate superiors
Duty Collector Alalo and Customs Appraiser Nora Sancho who advised her
to call the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) and the police. Thereupon, she
guided the tourists to the Intensive Counting Unit (ICU) while bringing with
her the four chocolate boxes earlier discovered.
At the ICU, Cinco called the tourists one after the other using the
passenger manifest and further examined their bags. The bag of Law Ka
Wang was first found to contain three chocolate boxes. Next was
petitioners bag which contains nothing except for personal effects. Cinco,
however, recalled that two of the chocolate boxes earlier discovered at the
express lane belong to him. Wu Hing Sums bag followed and same yielded
three chocolate boxes while the baggages of Ho Kin San, Chan Chit Yue
and Tin San Mao each contained two or three similar chocolate boxes. All in
all, 18 chocolate boxes were recovered from the baggages of the six
accused.
NARCOM Agent Neowillie de Castro corroborated the relevant testimony of
Cinco pertaining to the presence of the chocolate boxes. According to him,
he conducted a test on the white crystalline substance contained in said
chocolate boxes at the NAIA using the Mandelline Re-Agent Test. 10 The
result of his examination11 of the white crystalline substance yielded
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Thereafter, the
chocolate boxes were bundled together with tape, placed inside a plastic
bag and brought to the Inbond Section.
The following day, September 7, 1991, the 13 tourists were brought to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further questioning. The
confiscated stuff were turned over to the Forensic Chemist who weighed
and examined them. Findings show that its total weight is 31.1126
kilograms and that the representative samples were positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.12 Out of the 13 tourists, the NBI found
evidence for violation of R.A. No. 6425 only as against petitioner and his
five co-accused.
Accordingly, six separate Informations all dated September 19, 1991 were
filed against petitioner and his co-accused. These Informations were
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 91-1591 to 97. Subsequently, however,
12
petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation 13 which the trial court granted.
The reinvestigation conducted gave way to a finding of conspiracy among
the accused and this resulted to the filing of a single Amended
Information14under Criminal Case No. 91-1592 and to the withdrawal of the
other Informations.15 The Amended Information reads:
That on or about September 6, 1991 in Pasay City, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry and transport into the
country without lawful authority, 31.112 kilograms, more or less, of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, also popularly known as "SHABU", a
regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.16
After pleading not guilty to the crime charged, 17 all the accused testified
almost identically, invoking denial as their defense. They claimed that they
have no knowledge about the transportation of illegal substance (shabu)
taken from their traveling bags which were provided by the travel agency.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On April 6, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision 18 finding all the accused
guilty of violating Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, the
decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Court finds the accused
LAW KA WANG, CHAN CHIT yue, ho wai pang, wu hing sum, tin sun mao,
and kin san ho (ho kin san) guilty of Conspiracy in violating Section 15,
Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended for having conspired to
transport into the Philippines 31.112 kilograms of methamp[h]etamine
hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu, and they are hereby sentenced to
suffer the PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT OF SIX (6) [sic] RECLUSION
PERPETUA AND TO PAY EACH (SIC) THE AMOUNT OF THIRTY (30)
THOUSAND PESOS (p30,000.00) each as FINE, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is being imposed pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659 considering
its applicability to the accused though retroactively for having a less
stricter penalty than that of life imprisonment provided in Republic Act No.
6425. The fine ofP30,000.00 for each accused is imposed pursuant to R.A.
No. 6425 it being more favorable to the accused [than] that provided in
R.A. No. 7659 WITH IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION AFTER SERVICE OF
SENTENCE. The penalty of death cannot be imposed since the offense was
committed prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659.
Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against accused WONG KOK WAH @
SONNY WONG, CHAN TAK PIU, HO WAI LING AND INOCENCIA CHENG.
SO ORDERED.19
From this judgment, all the accused appealed to this Court where the case
records were forwarded to per Order of the RTC dated May 10,
1995.20 Later, all the accused except for petitioner, filed on separate dates
their respective withdrawal of appeal. 21 This Court, after being satisfied
that the withdrawing appellants were fully aware of the consequences of
their action, granted the withdrawal of their respective appeals through a
Resolution dated June 18, 1997.22 Per Entry of Judgment, 23 said Resolution
became final and executory on July 7, 1997. Consequently, petitioner was
the only one left to pursue his appeal.
Petitioner filed his Brief24 on April 6, 1998 while the brief 25 for the
respondent People of the Philippines was filed on August 27, 1998 through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Per Resolution 26 dated August 30,
2004, this Court referred the appeal to the CA for proper disposition and
determination pursuant to this Courts ruling in People v. Mateo. 27
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 16, 2006, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the Decision of
the RTC. While conceding that petitioners constitutional right to counsel
during the custodial investigation was indeed violated, it nevertheless went
on to hold that there were other evidence sufficient to warrant his
conviction. The CA also rebuked petitioners claim that he was deprived of
his constitutional and statutory right to confront the witnesses against him.
The CA gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
quoted with favor the trial courts ratiocination regarding the existence of
conspiracy among the accused.
Undeterred, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 28 which the CA
denied in its Resolution29 dated January 16, 2007.
13
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
THAT PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE
EXISTENCE OF A CONSPIRACY.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PRESENT PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO OVERTURN THE PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE ACCORDED TO PETITIONER BY THE CONSTITUTION. 30
OUR RULING
The petition lacks merit.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution prohibits as evidence only
confessions and admissions of the accused as against himself.
Anent the error first assigned, petitioner takes issue on the fact that he
was not assisted by a competent and independent lawyer during the
custodial investigation. He claimed that he was not duly informed of his
rights to remain silent and to have competent counsel of his choice. Hence,
petitioner faults the CA in not excluding evidence taken during such
investigation.
While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a
custodial questioning by the customs authorities and the NBI in violation of
his constitutional right under Section 12 31 of Article III of the Constitution,
we must not, however, lose sight of the fact that what said constitutional
provision prohibits as evidence are only confessions and admissions of the
accused as against himself. Thus, in Aquino v. Paiste, 32 the Court
categorically ruled that "the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights
render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made
during custodial investigation. The admissibility of other evidence,
provided they are relevant to the issue and [are] not otherwise excluded by
law or rules, [are] not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of
custodial investigation."
In the case at bench, petitioner did not make any confession or admission
during his custodial investigation. The prosecution did not present any
extrajudicial confession extracted from him as evidence of his guilt.
Moreover, no statement was taken from petitioner during his detention and
subsequently used in evidence against him. Verily, in determining the guilt
of the petitioner and his co-accused, the trial court based its Decision on
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and on the existence of the
confiscated shabu. As the Court held in People v. Buluran, 33 "[a]ny
allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant
and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or
confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their
conviction." Hence, petitioners claim that the trial court erred in not
excluding evidence taken during the custodial investigation deserves scant
consideration.
Petitioner cannot take refuge in this Courts ruling in People v. Wong Chuen
Ming34 to exculpate himself from the crime charged. Though there are
semblance in the facts, the case of Ming is not exactly on all fours with the
present case. The disparity is clear from the evidence adduced upon which
the trial courts in each case relied on in rendering their respective
decisions. Apparently in Ming, the trial court, in convicting the accused,
14
relied heavily on the signatures which they affixed on the boxes of Alpen
Cereals and on the plastic bags. The Court construed the accuseds act of
affixing their signatures thereon as a tacit admission of the crime charged.
And, since the accused were not informed of their Miranda rights when
they affixed their signatures, the admission was declared inadmissible
evidence for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional rights.
In ruling against the accused, the trial court also gave credence to the sole
testimony of the customs examiner whom it presumed to have performed
his duties in regular manner. However, in reversing the judgment of
conviction, the Court noted that said examiners testimony was not
corroborated by other prosecution witnesses.
On the other hand, petitioners conviction in the present case was on the
strength of his having been caught inflagrante delicto transporting shabu
into the country and not on the basis of any confession or admission.
Moreover, the testimony of Cinco was found to be direct, positive and
credible by the trial court, hence it need not be corroborated. Cinco
witnessed the entire incident thus providing direct evidence as eyewitness
to the very act of the commission of the crime. As the Court held in People
v Dela Cruz,35 "[n]o rule exists which requires a testimony to be
corroborated to be adjudged credible. x x x Thus, it is not at all uncommon
to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a single
witness despite the lack of corroboration, where such testimony is found
positive and credible by the trial court. In such a case, the lone testimony
is sufficient to produce a conviction."
Indeed, a ruling in one case cannot simply be bodily lifted and applied to
another case when there are stark differences between the two cases.
Cases must be decided based on their own unique facts and applicable law
and jurisprudence.
Petitioner was not denied of his right to confrontation.
Turning now to the second assigned error, petitioner invokes the pertinent
provision of Section 14(2) of Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
providing for the right to confrontation, viz:
Section 14. x x x
15
16
17
accused than the original provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, should be
accorded retroactive application, x x x.
And, since "reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment,
and considering the rule that criminal statutes with a favorable effect to
the accused, have, as to him, a retroactive effect",51 the penalty imposed
by the trial court upon petitioner is proper. Consequently, the Court
sustains the penalty of imprisonment, which is reclusion perpetua, as well
as the amount of fine imposed by the trial court upon petitioner, the same
being more favorable to him.
WHEREFORE premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed
June 16, 2006 Decision and January 16, 2007 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01459 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186228
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA ALIAS TERIO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before Us for final review is the trial courts conviction of the appellant for
the rape of his thirteen-year old daughter.
Consistent with the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto, 1 the real
name and the personal circumstances of the victim, and any other
information tending to establish or compromise her identity, including
those of her immediate family or household members, are not disclosed in
this decision.
The Facts
Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his
underwear.24 He invited appellant to the police station, 25 to which appellant
obliged. At the police outpost, he admitted to him that he raped AAA
because he was unable to control himself.26
The following day, AAA submitted herself to physical examination. 27 Dra.
Josefa Arlita L. Alsula, Municipal Health Officer of x x x, Bukidnon, issued
the Medical Certificate, which reads:
hyperemic vulvae with 4 oclock & 6 oclock freshly lacerated hymen; (+)
minimal to moderate bloody discharges 2 to an alleged raping incident 28
On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense. He believed
that the charge against him was ill-motivated because he sometimes
physically abuses his wife in front of their children after engaging in a
heated argument,29 and beats the children as a disciplinary measure. 30 He
went further to narrate how his day was on the date of the alleged rape.
He alleged that on 15 March 2000, there was no food prepared for him at
lunchtime.31 Shortly after, AAA arrived.32 She answered back when
confronted.33 This infuriated him that he kicked her hard on her buttocks. 34
Appellant went back to work and went home again around 3 oclock in the
afternoon.35 Finding nobody at home,36he prepared his dinner and went to
sleep.37
Later in the evening, he was awakened by the members of the "Bantay
Bayan" headed by Moises Boy Banting.38They asked him to go with them to
discuss some matters.39 He later learned that he was under detention
because AAA charged him of rape.40
On 8 July 2006, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Malaybalay City,
Bukidnon, rendered its decision 41 in Criminal Case No. 10372-0, finding
appellant guilty of rape qualified by relationship and minority, and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 42 It also ordered
him to indemnify AAA P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity with exemplary damages of P25,000.00.43
On 30 September 2008, the decision of the trial court was AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS44 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00456-
18
MIN.45 The appellate court found that appellant is not eligible for parole and
it increased both the civil indemnity and moral damages from P50,000.00
to P75,000.00.46
On 24 November 2008, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the
appellants notice of appeal.47 This Court required the parties to
simultaneously file their respective supplemental briefs, 48 but both
manifested that they will no longer file supplemental pleadings. 49
The lone assignment of error in the appellants brief is that, the trial court
gravely erred in finding him guilty as charged despite the failure of the
prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, 50 because: (1)
there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother
BBB;51 (2) his extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy Banting was
without the assistance of a counsel, in violation of his constitutional
right;52 and (3) AAAs accusation was ill-motivated.53
Our Ruling
Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession
with a "bantay bayan" and the credibility of the witnesses for the
prosecution.
Admissibility in Evidence of an Extrajudicial Confession before a
"Bantay Bayan"
Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting,
a "bantay bayan," the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he
was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such
requirement.54
The case of People v. Malngan 55 is the authority on the scope of the
Miranda doctrine provided for under Article III, Section 12(1) 56 and (3)57 of
the Constitution. In Malngan, appellant questioned the admissibility of her
extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman and a neighbor of
the private complainant. This Court distinguished. Thus:
Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this
particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for
purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution.
19
20
not have possibly witnessed the hacking incident since she was with
Vicente at that time.
Here, the testimony of AAA does not run contrary to that of BBB. Both
testified that they sought the help of a "bantay bayan." Their respective
testimonies differ only as to when the help was sought for, which this Court
could well attribute to the nature of the testimony of BBB, a shortcut
version of AAAs testimony that dispensed with a detailed account of the
incident.
At any rate, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the assailed
inconsistency is too trivial to affect the veracity of the testimonies. 66 In
fact, inconsistencies which refer to minor, trivial or inconsequential
circumstances even strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as they
erase doubts that such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed. 67
Appellants contention that AAA charged him of rape only because she
bore grudges against him is likewise unmeritorious. This Court is not
dissuaded from giving full credence to the testimony of a minor
complainant by motives of feuds, resentment or revenge. 68 As correctly
pointed out by the Court of Appeals:
Indeed, mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong enough to make
daughters in a Filipino family invent a charge that would not only bring
shame and humiliation upon them and their families but also bring their
fathers into the gallows of death.69 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that it is unbelievable for a daughter to charge her own father with rape,
exposing herself to the ordeal and embarrassment of a public trial and
subjecting her private parts to examination if such heinous crime was not
in fact committed.70 No person, much less a woman, could attain such
height of cruelty to one who has sired her, and from whom she owes her
very existence, and for which she naturally feels loving and lasting
gratefulness.71 Even when consumed with revenge, it takes a certain
amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story
which would put her own father to jail for the most of his remaining life and
drag the rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of shame. 72 It is
highly improbable for [AAA] against whom no proof of sexual perversity or
loose morality has been shown to fake charges much more against her own
father. In fact her testimony is entitled to greater weight since her accusing
words were directed against a close relative.73
Elements of Rape
Having established the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution, We
now examine the applicability of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 74 to the case at
bar.
The law provides, in part, that rape is committed, among others, "[b]y a
man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman" "through force, threat
or intimidation."75 The death penalty shall be imposed if it is committed
with aggravating/qualifying circumstances, which include, "[w]hen the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent." 76
The consistent and forthright testimony of AAA detailing how she was
raped, culminating with the penetration of appellants penis into her
vagina, suffices to prove that appellant had carnal knowledge of her. When
a woman states that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape was committed. 77Further, when such
testimony corresponds with medical findings, there is sufficient basis to
conclude that the essential requisites of carnal knowledge have been
established.78
The Court of Appeals pointed out that the element of force or intimidation
is not essential when the accused is the father of the victim, inasmuch as
his superior moral ascendancy or influence substitutes for violence and
intimidation.79 At any rate, AAA was actually threatened by appellant with
his fist and a knife allegedly placed above AAAs head. 80
It may be added that the self-serving defense of appellant cannot prevail
over the positive and straightforward testimony of AAA. Settled is the rule
that, "alibi is an inherently weak defense that is viewed with suspicion
because it is easy to fabricate."81 "Alibi and denial must be supported by
strong corroborative evidence in order to merit credibility." 82 Moreover, for
the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must establish two elements
(1) he was not at the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed;
and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time
of its commission.83 Appellant failed in this wise.
Aggravating/Qualifying Circumstances
21
22
(s) Felipe
(Printed)
At the investigation of February 9, 1986, conducted by the PAL Branch
Manager in Baguio City, Edgardo R. Cruz, in the presence of Station Agent
Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop
Steward Cristeta Domingo, Felipe Ramos was informed "of the finding of
the Audit Team." Thereafter, his answers in response to questions by Cruz,
were taken down in writing. Ramos' answers were to the effect inter alia
that he had not indeed made disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the
Audit Team's findings, that the proceeds had been "misused" by him, that
although he had planned on paying back the money, he had been
prevented from doing so, "perhaps (by) shame," that he was still willing to
settle his obligation, and proferred a "compromise x x to pay on staggered
basis, (and) the amount would be known in the next investigation;" that he
desired the next investigation to be at the same place, "Baguio CTO," and
that he should be represented therein by "Shop stewardees ITR Nieves
Blanco;" and that he was willing to sign his statement (as he in fact
afterwards did). 4 How the investigation turned out is not dealt with the
parties at all; but it would seem that no compromise agreement was
reached much less consummated.
About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos
charging him with the crime of estafa allegedly committed in Baguio City
during the period from March 12, 1986 to January 29, 1987. In that place
and during that time, according to the indictment, 5 he (Ramos)
.. with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did then
and there willfully ... defraud the Philippine Airlines, Inc.,
Baguio Branch, ... in the following manner, to wit: said
accused ... having been entrusted with and received in
trust fare tickets of passengers for one-way trip and roundtrip in the total amount of P76,700.65, with the express
23
have excluded the People's Exhibits A and K. It will now proceed to resolve
it.
At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, 11 to which respondent Judge has given a construction that is
disputed by the People. The section reads as follows:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights,
dealt with in the section, namely:
1) the right against self-incrimination i.e., the right of a
person not to be compelled to be a witness against himself
set out in the first sentence, which is a verbatim
reproduction of Section 18, Article III of the 1935
Constitution, and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth
Amendment of the American Constitution, 12 and
2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the
rights of every suspect "under investigation for the
commission of an offense."
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the
individuality and disparateness of these rights. It has placed the rights in
separate sections. The right against self- incrimination, "No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself," is now embodied in Section 17,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The lights of a person in custodial
interrogation, which have been made more explicit, are now contained in
Section 12 of the same Article III. 13
Right Against Self-Incrimination
24
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second right,
or better said, group of rights. These rights apply to persons "under
investigation for the commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" under
investigation by police authorities; and this is what makes these rights
different from that embodied in the first sentence, that against selfincrimination which, as aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person
testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or administrative.
This provision granting explicit rights to persons under investigation for an
offense was not in the 1935 Constitution. It is avowedly derived from the
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 19 a decision
described as an "earthquake in the world of law enforcement." 20
Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the
commission of an offense"-1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel,
and to be informed of such right, 21
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him; 22 and
3) any confession obtained in violation of x x (these rights
shall be inadmissible in evidence. 23
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards
laid down for a person in police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being
regarded as the commencement of an adversary proceeding against the
suspect.24
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that
he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford
an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him
throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such
opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently
waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless
and until such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution
25
The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a
witness against himself' signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or
produce evidence in the criminal case in which he is the accused, or one of
the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other
process or order of the Court. He cannot be required to be a witness either
for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for himself. 33 In other
words unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action) who may
be compelled to testify by subpoena, having only the right to refuse to
answer a particular incriminatory question at the time it is put to him-the
defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify altogether. He can
refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn, answer any question. 34 And, as
the law categorically states, "his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not
in any manner prejudice or be used against him." 35
If he should wish to testify in his own behalf, however, he may do so. This
is his right. But if he does testify, then he "may be cross- examined as any
other witness." He may be cross-examined as to any matters stated in his
direct examination, or connected therewith . 36 He may not on crossexamination refuse to answer any question on the ground that the answer
that he will give, or the evidence he will produce, would have a tendency
to incriminate him for the crime with which he is charged.
It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal action be
asked a question which might incriminate him, not for the crime with which
he is charged, but for some other crime, distinct from that of which he is
accused, he may decline to answer that specific question, on the strength
of the right against self-incrimination granted by the first sentence of
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (now Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution). Thus, assuming that in a prosecution for murder, the
accused should testify in his behalf, he may not on cross-examination
refuse to answer any question on the ground that he might be implicated
in that crime of murder; but he may decline to answer any particular
question which might implicate him for a different and distinct offense, say,
estafa.
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently
charged with its commission in court, has the following rights in the matter
of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public
prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after having
26
37
a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever
result to him by such refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to
cross-examination by the prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a
specific
question
which
tends
to
incriminate him for some crime other than
that for which he is then prosecuted.
It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent Judge has
misapprehended the nature and import of the disparate rights set forth in
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has taken them as
applying to the same juridical situation, equating one with the other. In so
doing, he has grossly erred. To be sure, His Honor sought to substantiate
his thesis by arguments he took to be cogent and logical. The thesis was
however so far divorced from the actual and correct state of the
constitutional and legal principles involved as to make application of said
thesis to the case before him tantamount to totally unfounded, whimsical
or capricious exercise of power. His Orders were thus rendered with grave
abuse of discretion. They should be as they are hereby, annulled and set
aside.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not
in any sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly
understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the
discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a
27
CONCEPCION, JR., J:
1. The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a
robbery. He had been detained and interrogated almost continuously for
five days, to no avail. He consistently maintained his innocence. There was
no evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously, something drastic had to
be done. A confession was absolutely necessary. So the investigating
officers began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the prisoner
insisted on his innocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must be
obtained. So they continued to maltreat and beat him. 'They covered his
28
face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste.
The prisoner could not take any more. His body could no longer endure the
pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer. His will had been
broken. He admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit
and he signed the confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he
posed for pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a
reenactment.
2. This incident could have happened in a Russian gulag or in Hitler's
Germany. But no it did not. It happened in the Philippines. In this case
before Us.
3. The Revised Penal Code punishes the maltreatment of prisoners as
follows:
ART. 235. Maltreatment of prisoners. The penalty
of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, in addition to his
liability for the physical injuries or damage caused, shall be
imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall
over do himself in the correction or handling of a prisoner
or detention prisoner under his charge, by the imposition of
punishments in a cruel and humiliating manner.
If the purpose of the maltreatment is to extort a
confession, or to obtain some information from the
prisoner, the offender shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum period, temporary special
disqualification and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, in
addition to his liability for the physical injuries or damage
caused.
4. This Court in a long line of decisions over the years, the latest being the
case of People vs. Cabrera, 1 has consistently and strongly condemned the
practice of maltreating prisoners to extort confessions from them as a
grave and unforgivable violation of human rights. But the practice persists.
Fortunately, such instances constitute the exception rather than the
general rule.
5. Before Us for mandatory review is the death sentence imposed upon the
accused Francisco Galit by the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, in
Crim. Case No. CCC-VII-2589 of said court.
6. The record shows that in the morning of August 23, 1977, Mrs. Natividad
Fernando, a widow, was found dead in the bedroom of her house located at
29
and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty; to indemnify the heirs of
the victim in the sum of P110,000.00, and to pay the costs. Hence, the
present recourse.
7. The incriminatory facts of the case, as found by the trial court, are as
follows:
From the evidence adduced in this case, it was gathered
that in the early morning of August 23, 1977, a 70-year old
woman named Natividad Fernando, widow, in the twilight
of her life, was robbed and then hacked to death by the
accused and two others in her (victim's) own residence at
Montalban, Rizal.
Prosecution witness Florentino Valentino testified that he
heard accused Francisco Galit and his wife having an
argument in connection with the robbery and killing of the
victim, Natividad Fernando. It appears that on August 18,
1977, accused Galit and two others, namely, Juling Dulay
and a certain "Pabling" accidentally met each other at
Marikina, Rizal, and in their conversation, the three agreed
to rob Natividad Fernando; that it was further agreed
among them to enter the premises of the victim's house at
the back yard by climbing over the fence; that once inside
the premises, they will search every room, especially the
aparador and filing cabinets, with the sole aim of looking
for cash money and other valuables.
Witness Valentino further testified that on August 22, 1977,
at around 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon, accused Francisco
Galit and his two companions, Juling Dulay and Pabling, as
per their previous agreement, met at the place where they
formerly saw each other in Mariquina, Rizal; that the three
conspirators took a jeepney for Montalban and upon
passing the Montalban Municipal Building, they stopped
and they waited at the side of the road until the hour of
midnight; that at about 12:00 o'clock that night, the three
repaired to the premises of the victim, Natividad Fernando;
that they entered the said premises through the back wall
of the house; that while entering the premises of said
house, Juling Dulay saw a bolo, lying near the piggery
compound, which he picked up and used it to destroy the
back portion of the wall of the house; that it was Juling
Dulay who first entered the house through the hole that
they made, followed by the accused Galit and next to him
was "Pabling", that it was already early dawn of August 23,
1977 when the three were able to gain entrance into the
house of the victim; as the three could not find anything
valuable inside the first room that they entered, Juling
Dulay destroyed the screen of the door of the victim,
Natividad Fernando; that upon entering the room of the
victim, the three accused decided to kill first the victim,
Natividad Fernando, before searching the room for
valuables; that Juling Dulay, who was then holding the
bolo, began hacking the victim, who was then sleeping,
and accused Galit heard a moaning sound from the victim;
that after the victim was killed, the three accused began
searching the room for valuables; that they helped each
other in opening the iron cabinet inside the room of the
victim, where they found some money; that when the three
accused left the room of the victim, they brought with
them some papers and pictures which they threw outside;
that after killing and robbing the victim, the three accused
went out of the premises of the house, using the same way
by which they gained entrance, which was through the
back portion of the wall; that the three accused walked
towards the river bank where they divided the loot that
they got from the room of the victim; that their respective
shares amount to P70.00 for each of them; and that after
receiving their shares of the loot, the three accused left
and went home.
10. This Court, in the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 7 laid down the
correct procedure for peace officers to follow when making an arrest and in
conducting a custodial investigation, and which We reiterate:
30
9. After a review of the records, We find that the evidence presented by the
prosecution does not support a conviction. In fact, the findings of the trial
court relative to the acts attributed to the accused are not supported by
competent evidence. The principal prosecution witness, Florentino
Valentino merely testified that he and the accused were living together in
one house in Marikina, Rizal, on August 23, 1977, because the mother of
his wife is the wife of the accused; that when he returned home at about
4:00 o'clock in the morning from the police station of Marikina, Rizal, the
accused and his wife were quarreling (nagtatalo); that he heard that the
accused was leaving the house because he and his companions had
robbed "Aling Nene", the owner of a poultry farm and piggery in
Montalban, Rizal; that the wife of the accused was imploring him not to
leave, but the latter was insistent; that he saw the accused carrying a bag
containing about two handfuls (dakot) of coins which he had taken from
Aling Nene; that upon learning of what the accused had done, he went to
the Montalban police the next day and reported to the police chief about
what he had heard; and that a week later, Montalban policemen went to
their house and arrested the accused. 6
13. The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment
are inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in a manner
contrary to law.
14. Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances
surrounding the taking of any confession, especially where the prisoner
claims having been maltreated into giving one. Where there is any doubt
as to its voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.
15. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Minister of Justice for
whatever action he may deem proper to take against the investigating
officers.
31
The information prepared by the then assistant city fiscal charges the
above-named accused with the crime of "Robbery with Homicide and
Attempted Homicide" committed as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about the 31st day of July, 1981, in the City of
Legazpi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another for a common
purpose, with intent of gain (sic) and by means of violence
against or intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of the spouses
APRONIANO LLADONES and EPIFANIA LOPEZ LLADONES
and once inside, forcibly take the amount of P1,000.00
from the said spouses and by reason of or on occasion of
the robbery and with intent to kill, attacked, assaulted,
hogtied and stabbed APRONIANO LLADONES inflicting
injuries upon the latter which directly caused his untimely
death; while EPIFANIA LOPEZ LLADONES was hacked on her
shoulder, thus accused commenced the commission of the
crime directly by overt acts but did not perform all the acts
of execution which could produce the crime of Homicide
upon said EPIFANIA LOPEZ LLADONES by reason of causes
other than their spontaneous desistance. 2
xxx xxx xxx
Only accused-appellant Abelardo Penillos was apprehended. The others
remain at large. 3
Accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and was
given a separate trial.
The court a quo summarized the evidence for the prosecution, upon which
it based its conviction of appellant, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
32
33
34
Penillos when the latter pinned her down under the table; such
identification was aided by her having known Penillos long before the
incident, when the latter would go to the Lladones' house. 13 She was even
able to declare that Penillos was wearing short pants at the time of the
commission of the crime. 14
Furthermore, the illumination provided by the kerosene lamp was enough
for Epifania to have recognized Penillos. This Court has held in the past
that illumination produced by kerosene (gasera) lamps is sufficient for the
identification of persons. 15 Where conditions of visibility are favorable, the
ability of a witness to identify the malefactor should be upheld. 16
The frenetic efforts of the appellant's counsel to cast doubt on the positive
identification by Epifania, characterized by attempts to mislead the latter,
proved to be a bad gamble for it only provided the prosecution a rare
opportunity to elicit the details for the positive identification, to wit:
Q How were you able to say that it was
Billy Penillos who sat on the stomach of
your husband and pointed the knife when
you said there were two persons present
inside your bedroom?
A I recognized him; he was then wearing
short-pant while his other companions was
(sic) wearing long pants.
Q And according to you after you ran away
to get the lamp in the kitchen before you
reached the kitchen, Billy Penillos twisted
your arm and pinned you under a table. Is
that correct?
FISCAL:
No. It is misleading, Your Honor please,
because she was already in the kitchen.
Before she could get hold of the lamp, that
was the time when Abelardo Penillos
35
A Yes, sir.
A No, sir. I was not able to recognize the
companions of Abelardo Penillos because
when Abelardo Penillos ran to hold my
husband
and
then
suddenly
his
companions entered.17
A Yes, sir.
A Very near.
36
A Yes, sir.
Q And the second time that you recognized
Billy Penillos was while you were being
pinned under the table, and under the
table it was also dark at that time. Is that
correct?
A No, not dark, because the light from the
kitchen was illuminating the place wherein
I was being pinned under the table. It was
not dark.
Q The table where you said you were
pinned by Abelardo Penillos, how far was it
from the kitchen?
A About two meters.
Q How big is the table?
A It is small, we use it, for our eating
purposes. 18
This Court cannot yield to the postulations of the appellant that Penillos
would have worn a mask during the incident knowing as he did that
Epifania was familiar with him and that the latter was impelled by evil
motives in implicating him in the commission of the offense.
The first theory assumes that the wearing of masks to hide one's identity is
a universal practice resorted to by criminals who are known to their
prospective victims and who exercise utmost prudence and care in
ensuring that no witness would be able to identify them while committing a
crime. These assumptions are, of course, without any empirical basis and
are, at best, speculative. On the other hand, the evil motive ascribed to
Epifania by reason of an alleged prior verbal exchange between Penillos
and her is a mere figment of the former's imagination. Such verbal
disagreement allegedly arising from the refusal by Epifania to allow
Penillos to use her yard as a pathway, even if true, is inconsequential,
trivial and insufficient to move one to accuse another of committing
robbery with homicide.
With his positive identification, appellant's defense of alibi must fail.
We defer to the conclusion by the court a quo that the protestations of the
appellant "held in contrast with the positive identification made by Epifania
Lopez on his complicity in the commission of the offense could not provide
a justifiable ground to extricate him." 19
Appellant testified that between 6:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. on 31 July 1981,
the day of the incident, he was travelling by carabao from Sitio Esperanza
to Nauntogan, the place of the incident, a distance of about four (4)
kilometers. He was allegedly accompanied by one Victor Marao. Arriving
at his destination at around 8:00 p.m., he proceeded to the house of his
father-in-law, co-accused Mariano Marao, which is about thirty (30)
meters away from the residence of the victims. At the house of Mariano,
appellant also encountered his other co-accused, Jose Nuyda and Romeo
Nuyda. While having supper therein, appellant overheard Mariano and the
Nuydas talking about something that they would divide among
themselves. 20
Appellee easily demolishes this defense by alleging that: Penillos' alleged
travel from Esperanza to Nauntogan was not even corroborated by his
supposed companion, Victor Marao, who was not presented as a witness;
Penillos' presence at the house of his co-accused, a mere thirty (30) meters
away from the scene of the crime, militates against his defense in view of
the positive identification by Epifania; and that it was not physically
impossible for the appellant to have been at the place of the incident
during the commission of the crime.
37
Settled is the rule that alibi cannot prevail over a positive identification
made by a prosecution witness. 21 For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to
prove that the accused was somewhere when the crime was committed
but that he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him
to have been at the scene of the crime. 22
Question:
After
having
been informed of your
constitutional rights do you
wish to proceed with this
investigation?
And now on the second assigned error. In respect to the allegation that the
signed confession (Exh. "B") was defective and should not have been
admitted in evidence, the appellee practically concedes the irregularity
when it avers thus:
xxx xxx xxx
From the record, it appears that appellant's sworn
statement was executed in a manner not in full accord with
his right to the assistance of counsel. This may be seen in
the preliminary portion of the sworn statement, on which
appellant was:
". . . reminded that under the new rules of
the Constitution you have the right to
remain silent and the right to have counsel
of your own choice. You are also reminded
that whatever you say here might be used
for or against you in any court proceedings.
Is this clearly understood by you?
Answer: Yes sir.
38
39
In Morales vs. Enrile, et al., 27 this Court, applying and interpreting Section
20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, which provides as follows:
Sec. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself. Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
laid down the duties of an investigator during custodial interrogation and
ruled that the waiver of the right to counsel shall not be valid unless made
with the assistance of counsel, thus:
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of
the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the
arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any.
He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might
make could be used against him. The person arrested shall
have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative,
or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by
telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be
the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that
this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged
by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel
may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless
made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part,
shall be inadmissible in evidence.
We
reiterated
the
above
ruling
in People
vs. Galit, 28 People
29
30
vs. Lumayok, People vs. Albofera and People vs.Marquez. 31 In view
therefore of the law and jurisprudence, the sworn statement of appellant,
Exhibit "B", is hereby declared inadmissible in evidence and should have
been rejected by the trial court even if it is not in fact a confession for, as
correctly observed by the People, it is exculpatory in nature. Just the same,
since it was taken in violation of appellant's constitutional right to counsel,
its exculpatory character did not cure the fatal defect.
We wish to underscore that Section 12(l) of Article III of the present
Constitution has gone further to protect, promote and enhance the right to
counsel of any person under investigation by expressly providing that such
is a right "to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice" and that it "cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel."
Be that as it may, We affirm the judgment of conviction by the trial court
on the basis of the testimonies of the witnesses presented by the
prosecution. Concluded the lower court: "The truth and as clearly borne by
the evidence is: the defendant was among the perpetrators of the heinous
offense. The robbery, left in its wake the death of Aproniano Lladones and
the wounding of his wife Epifania Lopez Lladones." 32
A trial court's findings of facts carry great weight for it has the privilege of
examining the deportment and demeanor of witnesses and, therefore, can
discern if such witnesses are telling the truth or not. 33 In the light of the
evidence presented in the proceedings below, We do not see any reason to
disturb the lower court's factual conclusions.
We, however, modify the designation of the offense the appellant was
convicted for on the basis of the information prepared by the then
assistant city fiscal. The information should have charged the appellant
simply with the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. This Court has consistently held that
this offense is denominated as such regardless of the number of the
homicides or injuries committed. These other circumstances merely serve
as generic aggravating circumstances which can be offset by other
mitigating circumstances. 34 There is no crime of robbery with homicide
and frustrated homicide 35 or robbery with homicide and attempted
homicide. 36 The term "homicide" in paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code is to be understood in its generic sense; it includes murder and
slight physical injuries committed during the robbery which crimes are
merged in the crime of robbery with homicide. 37
40
The trial court, however, should have taken into consideration the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling. Dwelling is aggravating in robbery
with homicide because this type of robbery could be committed without
the necessity of transgressing the sanctity of the home. 38 It is indisputably
clear from the pleadings and the decision of the trial court that although
the homicide was committed outside the house of the deceased, the
principal offense of robbery was perpetrated inside; the killing thus
occurred as a result of the initial evil design to steal.
The penalty for robbery with homicide and physical injuries defined under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code isreclusion perpetua to death.
Considering the presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the
greater penalty, which is death, shall be applied. 39 However, in view of the
abolition of the death penalty, the appellant is entitled to the reduced
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As noted from the dispositive portion of the challenged decision, the trial
court imposed the penalty of "reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment."
Evidently, it considered the latter as the English translation of the former,
which is not the case. Both are different and distinct penalties. In the
recent case of People vs. Baguio, 40 this Court held:
The Code 41 does not prescribe the penalty of "life
imprisonment" for any of the felonies therein defined, that
penalty being invariably imposed for serious offenses
penalized not by the Revised Penal Code but by special
laws. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least
thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible
for pardon, it also carries with it accessory penalties,
namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc. It is not the
same as "life imprisonment" which, for one thing, does not
carry with it any accessory penalty, and for another, does
not appear to have any definite extent or duration.
As early as 1948, in People vs. Mobe, 42 reiterated in People vs.
Pilones, 43 and in the concurring opinion of Justice Ramon Aquino in People
vs. Sumadic, 44 this Court already made it clear that reclusion
perpetua is not the same as imprisonment for life or life imprisonment.
Every judge should take note of the distinction and this Court expects,
that, henceforth, no trial judge should mistake one for the other.
Finally, conformably with the stated policy of this Court, the award of civil
indemnity in the amount of P20,00.00 is increased to P50,000.00. 45
WHEREFORE, except as modified in its dispositive portion to specify that
appellant Abelardo Penillo's penalty is to be reclusion perpetua, to remove
the alternative reference therein to "life imprisonment" and to increase the
indemnity for the death of Aproniano Lladones to be paid by him to the
heirs of said deceased, the judgment of the trial court in Criminal Case No.
41