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G.R. No.

197788

February 29, 2012

RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,1 Respondent.

out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while
the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.3
Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of
"Not guilty" to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial
was terminated on 24 September 2003, after which, trial ensued.

DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set
aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18
February 20112 and Resolution dated 8 July 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the
version of the prosecution, are as follows:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of
the Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that
on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 oclock in the morning, he saw the
accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and
going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet;
that this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal
ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while
driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside their
sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in
front of the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were
issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that
the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket;
that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of
the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the
accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket
which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3)
inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one
(1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused
to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a
cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the
accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned

During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist
testified for the prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner testified for
himself and raised the defense of planting of evidence and extortion.
In its 19 February 2009 Decision, 4 the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs5committed on 10 March 2003. It found the
prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested
for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the
discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu.
The RTC also found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak, selfserving and unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its Decision held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y
ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of Section
11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and
(1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a
fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P 300,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency for its proper disposition and destruction in
accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.6
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition
for Review on Certiorari dated 1 September 2011. In a Resolution dated 12
October 2011, this Court required respondent to file a comment on the
Petition. On 4 January 2012, the latter filed its Comment dated 3 January
2012.

Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:


(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS
INVALID.
(ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
DUTY OF THE POLICE OFFICER CANNOT BE RELIED UPON IN THIS
CASE.
(iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ALLEGED
SUBJECT SPECIMEN HAS BEEN COMPROMISED.
(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVEN
BEYOND THE REASONABLE DOUBT (sic).7
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because
there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a
lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket
or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a
valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the search
conducted upon him.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the
RTC held thus:
It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and apprehended
in this case by Police Officers Alteza and Brillante for violation of City
Ordinance No. 98-012, an ordinance requiring the use of crash helmet by
motorcycle drivers and riders thereon in the City of Naga and prescribing
penalties for violation thereof. The accused himself admitted that he was
not wearing a helmet at the time when he was flagged down by the said
police officers, albeit he had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there is
legal basis on the part of the apprehending officers to flag down and arrest
the accused because the latter was actually committing a crime in their
presence, that is, a violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012. In other words,
the accused, being caught inflagrante delicto violating the said Ordinance,
he could therefore be lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending
officers. x x x.8

We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular
reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide
open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though
unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial courts
decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as
errors.9
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for
committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this
reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be
bound to answer for the commission of an offense. 10 It is effected by an
actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary
submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the
application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical
restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that
there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other,
and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the
belief and impression that submission is necessary. 11
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general
procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the
offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. Law enforcement and
peace officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in
apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued
pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations not contrary to
any provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the driver concerned
and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor which
shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not
exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of said
receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall
become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within
fifteen days from the date of apprehension will be a ground for the
suspension and/or revocation of his license.

Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual 12 provides


the following procedure for flagging down vehicles during the conduct of
checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in
Mobile Car. This rule is a general concept and will not apply in hot pursuit
operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the following, when
applicable: x x x
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket
(TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in prolonged,
unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver or any of the
vehicles occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket,
petitioner could not be said to have been "under arrest." There was no
intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty,
or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period
during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized
merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza
himself testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-station
was that petitioner had been flagged down "almost in front" of that place.
Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting
there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty, the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court
discussed at length whether the roadside questioning of a motorist
detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered custodial
interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does not fall under
custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue
of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the
officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted. It ruled as
follows:
13

It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly


curtails the "freedom of action" of the driver and the passengers, if any, of
the detained vehicle. Under the law of most States, it is a crime either to
ignore a policemans signal to stop ones car or, once having stopped, to
drive away without permission. x x x

However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the


Miranda opinion emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine
announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those
types of situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are
implicated. Thus, we must decide whether a traffic stop exerts upon a
detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his
privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his
constitutional rights.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person
questioned will be induced "to speak where he would not otherwise do so
freely," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First, detention of a motorist
pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief. The vast
majority of roadside detentions last only a few minutes. A motorists
expectations, when he sees a policemans light flashing behind him, are
that he will be obliged to spend a short period of time answering questions
and waiting while the officer checks his license and registration, that he
may then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be
allowed to continue on his way. In this respect, questioning incident to an
ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse interrogation,
which frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware
that questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators the
answers they seek. See id., at 451.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such
that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police. To be sure,
the aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the
knowledge that the officer has some discretion in deciding whether to issue
a citation, in combination, exert some pressure on the detainee to respond
to questions. But other aspects of the situation substantially offset these
forces. Perhaps most importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least
to some degree. x x x
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a socalled "Terry stop," see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), than to a formal
arrest. x x x The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of
this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry
stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive
aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily
detained pursuant to such stops are not "in custody" for the purposes of
Miranda.

xxx

xxx

xxx

We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not
come to pass. It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda
become applicable as soon as a suspects freedom of action is curtailed to
a "degree associated with formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U. S.
1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If a motorist who has been detained
pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders
him "in custody" for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full
panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda. See Oregon v. Mathiason,
429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). (Emphasis supplied.)
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was
only subjected to modest questions while still at the scene of the traffic
stop, he was not at that moment placed under custody (such that he
should have been apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can
treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of
a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner here be considered "under
arrest" at the time that his traffic citation was being made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was
violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a
motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant
of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an
offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither
can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation.
Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to
deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former
may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the
officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the
possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed
"arrested" upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and while
awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest
were not complied with.

This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the
duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest
and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be
informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and
that any statement they might make could be used against them. 14 It may
also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were
complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested
for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must
also be given to a person apprehended due to a traffic violation:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that
the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve
the "inherently compelling pressures" "generated by the custodial setting
itself," "which work to undermine the individuals will to resist," and as
much as possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual
cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions
were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in-custody
questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanors as they are by
questioning of persons suspected of felonies.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed "arrested" when he was
flagged down for a traffic violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then
there would have been no need for him to be arrested for a second time
after the police officers allegedly discovered the drugsas he was already
in their custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted
from it was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in
"plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless
search; (v) customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent
and emergency circumstances.15 None of the above-mentioned instances,
especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be
inadvertently discovered, was not in "plain view." It was actually concealed

inside a metal container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly, the evidence


was not immediately apparent.16
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is
not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence. 17 It
must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is,
the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims
that petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged
accession does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact,
the RTC found that petitioner was merely "told" to take out the contents of
his pocket.18
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to
be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this
determination are the following characteristics of the person giving
consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the
defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded
location; (3) whether the defendant objected to the search or passively
looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the
presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendants belief that no
incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and
(9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is
the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony,
that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and voluntarily
given.19 In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at
the police station at three in the morning, accompanied by several police
officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid
consent to a warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk" rule. While the
rule normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual
conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot,
the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for
weapons.20
In Knowles v. Iowa,21 the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer
stops a person for speeding and correspondingly issues a citation instead
of arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize the officer to
conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein held that there was no

justification for a full-blown search when the officer does not arrest the
motorist. Instead, police officers may only conduct minimal intrusions, such
as ordering the motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown:
In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the "search
incident to arrest" exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to
take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use
at trial. x x x But neither of these underlying rationales for the search
incident to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in the present
case.
We have recognized that the first rationaleofficer safetyis "both
legitimate and weighty," x x x The threat to officer safety from issuing a
traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial
arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves "danger to an
officer" because of "the extended exposure which follows the taking of a
suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station." 414 U. S.,
at 234-235. We recognized that "[t]he danger to the police officer flows
from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and
uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest." Id., at 234, n. 5. A
routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and
"is more analogous to a so-called Terry stop . . . than to a formal arrest."
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy,
412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) ("Where there is no formal arrest . . . a person
might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous,
immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence").
This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of
a routine traffic stop.1wphi1 It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110;
Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while the concern for officer safety in this
context may justify the "minimal" additional intrusion of ordering a driver
and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often
considerably greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype search. Even
without the search authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent
bases to search for weapons and protect themselves from danger. For
example, they may order out of a vehicle both the driver, Mimms, supra, at
111, and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a "patdown" of a
driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be
armed and dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a "Terry
patdown" of the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable
suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control

of a weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even


conduct a full search of the passenger compartment, including any
containers therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest, New York v. Belton, 453
U. S. 454, 460 (1981).
Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search
incident to arrestthe need to discover and preserve evidence. Once
Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence
necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further
evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either on the person of
the offender or in the passenger compartment of the car. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have
failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a
waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of
the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest. 22
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures.23 Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search
and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be
exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional
rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. 24
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. 25 The
drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls
for the acquittal of the accused.26
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming the judgment of
conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial
Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby
ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released from detention, unless his
continued confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 145566

March 9, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,


vs.
DINDO "BEBOT" MOJELLO, appellant.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On automatic review is a decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bogo,
Cebu, Branch 61, finding appellant Dindo "Bebot" Mojello guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide defined and penalized
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, and sentencing him to the supreme penalty of death. 1
Appellant Dindo Mojello, alias "Bebot" was charged with the crime of rape
with homicide in an Information dated May 22, 1997, as follows: 2
That on the 15th day of December 1996, at about 11:00 o'clock in
the evening, at Sitio Kota, Barangay Talisay, Municipality of Santa
Fe, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, moved by lewd
design and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having
carnal knowledge with Lenlen Rayco under twelve (12) years of
age and with mental deficiency, against her will and consent, and
by reason and/or on the occasion thereof, purposely to conceal the
most brutal act and in pursuance of his criminal design, the abovenamed accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent to kill, treacherously and employing
personal violence, attack, assault and kill the victim Lenlen Rayco,
thereby inflicting upon the victim wounds on the different parts of
her body which caused her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Appellant was arraigned on July 24, 1997, entering a plea of "not guilty."
Trial followed.
On January 21, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, and
sentencing him to suffer the death penalty.

From the facts found by the court a quo, it appears that on December 15,
1996, at or around 9:00 p.m., Rogelio Rayco was having some drinks with a
group which included Roger Capacito and his wife and the spouses Borah
and Arsolin Illustrismo at the Capacito residence located at Barangay
Talisay, Sta. Fe, Cebu.3
Rogelio Rayco left the group to go home about an hour later. On his way
home, he saw his niece, Lenlen Rayco, with appellant Dindo Mojello, a
nephew of Roger Capacito, walking together some thirty meters away
towards the direction of Sitio Kota. 4 Since he was used to seeing them
together on other occasions, he did not find anything strange about this.
He proceeded to his house.5
On December 16, 1996, between 5:00 to 6:00 a.m., the Rayco family was
informed that the body of Lenlen was found at the seashore of Sitio Kota.
Rogelio Rayco immediately proceeded to the site and saw the lifeless,
naked and bruised body of his niece. Rogelio was devastated by what he
saw. A remorse of conscience enveloped him for his failure to protect his
niece. He even attempted to take his own life several days after the
incident.6
Appellant was arrested at Bantayan while attempting to board a motor
launch bound for Cadiz City. On an investigation conducted by SPO2
Wilfredo Giducos, he admitted that he was the perpetrator of the dastardly
deed. Appellant was assisted by Atty. Isaias Giduquio during his custodial
interrogation. His confession was witnessed by Barangay Captains Wilfredo
Batobalanos and Manolo Landao. Batobalanos testified that after it was
executed, the contents of the document were read to appellant who later
on voluntarily signed it.7 Appellant's extrajudicial confession was sworn
before Judge Cornelio T. Jaca of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Sta. Fe-Bantayan.8 On December 21, 1996, an autopsy was conducted on
the victim's cadaver by Dr. Nestor Sator of the Medico-Legal Branch of the
PNP Crime Laboratory, Region VII.9
Dr. Sator testified that the swelling of the labia majora and hymenal
lacerations positively indicate that the victim was raped. 10 He observed
that froth in the lungs of the victim and contusions on her neck show that
she was strangled and died of asphyxia. 11 He indicated the cause of death
as cardio-respiratory arrest due to asphyxia by strangulation and physical
injuries to the head and the trunk.12
In this automatic review, appellant raises two issues: whether the
extrajudicial confession executed by appellant is admissible in evidence;
and whether appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape with homicide.

We now resolve.
Appellant alleges that the lower court gravely erred in admitting in
evidence the alleged extrajudicial confession which he executed on
December 23, 1996. In his Brief, appellant avers that the confession which
he executed was not freely, intelligently and voluntarily entered into. 13 He
argues that he was not knowingly and intelligently apprised of his
constitutional rights before the confession was taken from him. 14 Hence, his
confession, and admissions made therein, should be deemed inadmissible
in evidence, under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
We are not convinced.
At the core of the instant case is the application of the law on custodial
investigation enshrined in Article III, Section 12, paragraph 1 of the
Constitution, which provides:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
The above provision in the fundamental Charter embodies what
jurisprudence has termed as "Miranda rights" stemming from the landmark
decision of the United States Supreme Court, Miranda v. Arizona.15 It has
been the linchpin of the modern Bill of Rights, and the ultimate refuge of
individuals against the coercive power of the State.
The Miranda doctrine requires that: (a) any person under custodial
investigation has the right to remain silent; (b) anything he says can and
will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has the right to talk to an
attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel present when
being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be
provided before any questioning if he so desires.
In the Philippines, the right to counsel espoused in the Miranda doctrine
was based on the leading case of People v. Galit16 and Morales, Jr. v.
Enrile,17 rulings subsequently incorporated into the present Constitution.
TheMiranda doctrine under the 1987 Charter took on a modified form
where the right to counsel was specifically qualified to mean competent
and independent counsel preferably of the suspect's own choice. Waiver of
the right to counsel likewise provided for stricter requirements compared

to its American counterpart;


the presence of counsel.

it

must

be

done in

writing,

and

in

Verily, it may be observed that the Philippine law on custodial investigation


has evolved to provide for more stringent standards than what was
originally laid out in Miranda v. Arizona. The purpose of the constitutional
limitations on police interrogation as the process shifts from the
investigatory to the accusatory seems to be to accord even the lowliest
and most despicable criminal suspects a measure of dignity and respect.
The main focus is the suspect, and the underlying mission of custodial
investigation to elicit a confession.
The extrajudicial confession executed by appellant on December 23, 1996,
applying Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act
No. 7438, Sec. 2 complies with the strict constitutional requirements on the
right to counsel. In other words, the extrajudicial confession of the
appellant is valid and therefore admissible in evidence.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, appellant was
undoubtedly apprised of his Miranda rights under the Constitution.18 The
court a quo observed that the confession itself expressly states that the
investigating officers informed him of such rights. 19 As further proof of the
same, Atty. Isaias Giduquio testified that while he was attending a
Sangguniang Bayan session, he was requested by the Chief of Police of
Sta. Fe to assist appellant. 20Appellant manifested on record his desire to
have Atty. Giduquio as his counsel, with the latter categorically stating that
before the investigation was conducted and appellant's statement taken,
he advised appellant of his constitutional rights. Atty. Giduquio even told
appellant to answer only the questions he understood freely and not to do
so if he was not sure of his answer. 21 Atty. Giduquio represented appellant
during the initial stages of the trial of the present case.
Atty. Giduquio was a competent and independent counsel of appellant
within the contemplation of the Constitution. No evidence was presented to
negate his competence and independence in representing appellant during
the custodial investigation. Moreover, appellant manifested for the record
that Atty. Giduquio was his choice of counsel during the custodial
proceedings.
The phrase "preferably of his own choice" does not convey the message
that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as
to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from
handling the defense; otherwise the tempo of custodial investigation will
be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the
progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who, for one
reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. 22

We ruled in People v. Continente23 that while the choice of a lawyer in


cases where the person under custodial interrogation cannot afford the
services of counsel or where the preferred lawyer is not available is
naturally lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the final choice
as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A
lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused
when he does not raise any objection against the counsel's appointment
during the course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter
subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer. 24
The right to counsel at all times is intended to preclude the slightest
coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer,
however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily
telling the truth. In People v. Dumalahay,25 this Court held:
The sworn confessions of the three accused show that they were
properly apprised of their right to remain silent and right to
counsel, in accordance with the constitutional guarantee.
At 8:00 in the morning of the next day, the three accused
proceeded to the office of Atty. Rexel Pacuribot, Clerk of Court of
the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. All of the three
accused, still accompanied by Atty. Ubay-ubay, subscribed and
swore to their respective written confessions. Before administering
the oaths, Atty. Pacuribot reminded the three accused of their
constitutional rights under the Miranda doctrine and verified that
their statements were voluntarily given. Atty. Pacuribot also
translated the contents of each confession in the Visayan dialect,
to ensure that each accused understood the same before signing
it.
No ill-motive was imputed on these two lawyers to testify falsely
against the accused. Their participation in these cases merely
involved the performance of their legal duties as officers of the
court. Accused-appellant Dumalahay's allegation to the contrary,
being self-serving, cannot prevail over the testimonies of these
impartial and disinterested witnesses.
More importantly, the confessions are replete with details which
could possibly be supplied only by the accused, reflecting
spontaneity and coherence which psychologically cannot be
associated with a mind to which violence and torture have been
applied. These factors are clear indicia that the confessions were
voluntarily given.

When the details narrated in an extrajudicial confession are such


that they could not have been concocted by one who did not take
part in the acts narrated, where the claim of maltreatment in the
extraction of the confession is unsubstantiated and where
abundant evidence exists showing that the statement was
voluntarily executed, the confession is admissible against the
declarant. There is greater reason for finding a confession to be
voluntary where it is corroborated by evidence aliunde which
dovetails with the essential facts contained in such confession.
The confessions dovetail in all their material respects. Each of the
accused gave the same detailed narration of the manner by which
Layagon and Escalante were killed. This clearly shows that their
confessions could not have been contrived. Surely, the three
accused could not have given such identical accounts of their
participation and culpability in the crime were it not the truth.
Concededly, the December 17, 1996 custodial investigation upon
appellant's
apprehension
by
the
police
authorities
violated
the Miranda doctrine on two grounds: (1) no counsel was present; and (2)
improper waiver of the right to counsel as it was not made in writing and in
the presence of counsel. However, the December 23, 1996 custodial
investigation which elicited the appellant's confession should nevertheless
be upheld for having complied with Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1. Even though
improper interrogation methods were used at the outset, there is still a
possibility of obtaining a legally valid confession later on by properly
interrogating the subject under different conditions and circumstances
than those which prevailed originally.26
The records of this case clearly reflect that the appellant freely, voluntarily
and intelligently entered into the extrajudicial confession in full compliance
with the Miranda doctrine under Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 of the Constitution
in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2. SPO2 Wilfredo Abello Giducos, prior
to conducting his investigation, explained to appellant his constitutional
rights in the Visayan dialect, notably Cebuano, a language known to the
appellant, viz:27
PASIUNA (PRELIMINARY) : Ikaw karon Dindo Mojello ubos sa usa ka
inbestigasyon diin ikaw gituhon nga adunay kalabutan sa
kamatayon ni LENLEN RAYCO ug nahitabong paglugos kaniya.
Ubos sa atong Batakang Balaod, ikaw adunay katungod sa
pagpakahilom ning maong inbesigasyon karon kanimo ug aduna
usab ikaw ug katungod nga katabangan ug usa ka abogado nga
motabang karon kanimo ning maong inbestigasyon. Imo ba
nasabtan kining tanan? (DINDO MOJELLO, you are hereby reminded
that you are under investigation in which you were suspected

about the death and raping of LENLEN RAYCO. Under the


Constitution you have the right to remain silent about this
investigation on you now and you have also the right to have
counsel of your own choice to assist you in this investigation now.
Have you understood everything?)
TUBAG (ANSWER) : Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)
PANGUTANA (QUESTION) : Human ikaw sayri sa imong katungod
ubos sa atong Batakang Balaod sa pagpakahilom, gusto ba nimo
nga ipadayon nato kining inbestigasyon karon kanimo? (After you
have been apprised of your rights under our Constitution to remain
silent, do you want to proceed this investigation on you now?)
TUBAG (QUESTION) : Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)
PANGUTANA (QUESTION) : Gusto ba usab nimo ug abogado nga
makatabang kanimo ning maong inbestigasyon? (Do you want
counsel to assist you in this said investigation?)
TUBAG (ANSWER) : Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)
APPEARANCE : Atty. Isaias Giduquio is appearing as counsel of the
affiant.
PANGUTANA (QUESTION) : Ako usab ikaw pahinumdoman nga unsa
man ang imo isulti karon dinhi magamit pabor o batok kanimo sa
Hukmanan, nasabtan ba nimo kining tanan mo nga mga katungod
nga walay naghulga, nagpugos o nagdagmal kanimo o nagsaad ba
ug ganti sa kaulihan? (You are also hereby reminded that all your
statements now will be used as evidence against or in your favor in
any court of justice. Have you understood all your rights with
nobody coercing or forcing you, or mauling or promising a reward
in the end?)
TUBAG (ANSWER) : Oo (Yes.)
PANGUTANA (QUESTION) : Andam ka nga mohatag ug libre ug
boluntaryo nga pamahayag? (Are you now ready to give your free
and voluntary statement?)
TUBAG (ANSWER) : Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)
xxx

xxx

xxx

(START OF CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION)


xxx

xxx

x x x.

The trial court observed that as to the confession of appellant, he was fully
apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and his right to
counsel, as contained in such confession. 28 Appellant was properly assisted
by Atty. Isaias Giduquio. The extrajudicial confession of appellant was
subscribed and sworn to before Judge Cornelio T. Jaca, Municipal Judge of
Medellin-Daanbantayan and acting Judge of MCTC Sta. Fe-Bantayan and
Madredijos. Judge Jaca declared that he explained to the appellant the
contents of the extrajudicial confession and asked if he understood it. He
subsequently acknowledged that when appellant subscribed to his
statement, Atty. Giduquio, witness Batobalonos and his Clerk of Court were
present as well as other people.29
The extrajudicial confession executed by the appellant followed the rigid
requirements of the Miranda doctrine; consequently, it is admissible as
evidence. The lower court was correct in giving credence to the
extrajudicial confession of the appellant.
On cross-examination, appellant Mojello claimed his life was threatened,
thereby inducing him to execute an extrajudicial confession, yet he
neither filed any case against the person who threatened him, nor
he report this to his counsel. He further claimed that he did not
understand the contents of the confession which was read in the Visayan
dialect, yet he admits that he uses the Visayan dialect in his daily
discourse.
In People v. Pia,30 we held that "where appellants did not present evidence
of compulsion or duress or violence on their persons; where they failed to
complain to officers who administered the oaths; where they did not
institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged
maltreatment; where there appears no marks of violence on their bodies
and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable
physician to buttress their claim, all these should be considered as factors
indicating voluntariness of confessions." The failure of the appellant to
complain to the swearing officer or to file charges against the persons who
allegedly maltreated him, although he had all the chances to do so,
manifests voluntariness in the execution of his confessions. 31 To hold
otherwise is to facilitate the retraction of his statements at the mere
allegation of threat, torture, coercion, intimidation or inducement, without
any proof whatsoever. People v. Enanoria further declared that another
indicium of voluntariness is the disclosure of details in the confession
which could have been known only to the declarant.32

10

The confessant bears the burden of proof that his confession is tainted with
duress, compulsion or coercion by substantiating his claim with
independent evidence other than his own self-serving claims that the
admissions in his affidavit are untrue and unwillingly executed. 33 Bare
assertions will certainly not suffice to overturn the presumption. 34
The test for determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether the
defendant's will was overborne at the time he confessed. 35 In cases where
the Miranda warnings have been given, the test of voluntariness should be
subsequently applied in order to determine the probative weight of the
confession.
Accordingly, the presumption of voluntariness of appellant's confession
remains unrebutted by his failure to present independent evidence that the
same was coerced.
It cannot be gainsaid that the constitutional duty of law enforcement
officers is to ensure that a suspect has been properly apprised of
his Miranda rights, including the right to counsel. It is in the paramount
public interest that the foundation of an effective administration of criminal
justice relies on the faithful adherence to the Miranda doctrine. Compliance
with Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 by police authorities is central to the criminal
justice system; Miranda rights must in every case be respected, without
exception.
Thus, the confession, having strictly complied with the constitutional
requirements under Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1, is deemed admissible in
evidence against appellant. It follows that the admission of culpability
made therein is admissible. It is therefore not "fruit of the poisonous tree"
since the tree itself is not poisonous.
Appellant also alleges that the lower court gravely erred in holding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide,
thereby sentencing him to suffer the death penalty despite the glaring
insufficiency of circumstantial evidence against him. In his Brief, he argues
that the evidence against him is insufficient to warrant his conviction of
rape with homicide.
The categorical admission of the appellant to the crime of rape, coupled
with the corpus delicti as established by the Medico-Legal Report and the
testimony of Rogelio Rayco, leads us to no other conclusion than that of
appellant's guilt for the rape of Lenlen Rayco on December 15, 1996. It
passes the test of moral certainty and must therefore be sustained.

However, the records do not adequately show that appellant admitted to


killing the victim. Neither is the circumstantial evidence sufficient to
establish that by reason or on the occasion of the rape a homicide was
committed by the appellant. The lack of physical evidence further
precludes us from connecting the slaying of the victim to her sexual
assault, given the quantum of proof required by law for conviction. No
estimated time of death was given, which is essential in making a
connection with the appellant's story that he went home after a night of
drinking. The time when he and the victim were headed towards the
seashore at or about 9:00 to 10:00 p.m. of December 15, 1996 until the
time when the victim's lifeless body was found at or about 4:00 a.m. of
December 16, 1996 had a time variance of between six to seven hours.
Although the circumstances may point to the appellant as the most likely
perpetrator of the homicide, the same do not constitute an unbroken chain
of events which would lead us to a reasonable conclusion that appellant
was guilty of killing the victim. In other words, there are gaps in the
reconstruction of facts and inferences surrounding the death of Lenlen.
Appellant only admitted to boxing the victim when she shouted, then
hurriedly ran away. The cause of death of Lenlen was cardio-respiratory
attack due to asphyxiation and physical injuries; she was strangled to
death and left on the seashore as manifested by the frothing in her lungs.
No physical, scientific or DNA evidence was presented to pinpoint appellant
as the person who killed the victim. Fingerprints, if available, would have
determined who committed the homicide. Thus, appellant cannot be
convicted of rape with homicide considering the insufficiency of evidence
which thereby created a reasonable doubt as to his guilt for the said
special complex crime.
Appellant should instead be held liable only for the crime of statutory rape,
the victim Lenlen Rayco being then eleven years old. The sexual assault
was necessarily included in the special complex crime charged in the
Information dated May 22, 1997.
The trial court should have awarded damages to the heirs of the victim.
Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 is awarded upon the finding of
the fact of rape.36 Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 may
likewise be given to the heirs of the victim without need of proof in
accordance with current jurisprudence.37
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Bogo, Cebu, Branch 61 in Criminal Case No. B-00224 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Appellant Dindo Mojello is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim, Lenlen Rayco, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as
moral damages.

11

G.R. No. 176229

October 19, 2011

HO WAI PANG, Petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation or the
so-called Miranda Rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial
confession or admission made during such investigation. 1 "The
admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and
is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained
or taken in the course of custodial investigation."2
Petitioner Ho Wai Pang (petitioner) in this present recourse assails the June
16, 2006 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01459 affirming the April 6, 1995 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 118 of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 91-1592, finding him
and his co-accused, namely, Law Ka Wang, Chan Chit Yue, 5 Wu Hing Sum,
Tin San Mao6 and Kin San Ho7 guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation
of Section 15, Article III 8 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Also assailed is the January 16, 2007 CA
Resolution9 denying the motion for reconsideration thereto.
Factual Antecedents
On September 6, 1991, at around 11:30 in the evening, United Arab
Emirates Airlines Flight No. 068 from Hongkong arrived at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA). Among the passengers were 13 Hongkong
nationals who came to the Philippines as tourists. At the arrival area, the
group leader Wong Kwok Wah (Sonny Wong) presented a Baggage
Declaration Form to Customs Examiner Gilda L. Cinco (Cinco), who was
then manning Lane 8 of the Express Lane. Cinco examined the baggages
of each of the 13 passengers as their turn came up. From the first traveling
bag, she saw few personal belongings such as used clothing, shoes and
chocolate boxes which she pressed. When the second bag was examined,
she noticed chocolate boxes which were almost of the same size as those

in the first bag. Becoming suspicious, she took out four of the chocolate
boxes and opened one of them. Instead of chocolates, what she saw inside
was white crystalline substance contained in a white transparent plastic.
Cinco thus immediately called the attention of her immediate superiors
Duty Collector Alalo and Customs Appraiser Nora Sancho who advised her
to call the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) and the police. Thereupon, she
guided the tourists to the Intensive Counting Unit (ICU) while bringing with
her the four chocolate boxes earlier discovered.
At the ICU, Cinco called the tourists one after the other using the
passenger manifest and further examined their bags. The bag of Law Ka
Wang was first found to contain three chocolate boxes. Next was
petitioners bag which contains nothing except for personal effects. Cinco,
however, recalled that two of the chocolate boxes earlier discovered at the
express lane belong to him. Wu Hing Sums bag followed and same yielded
three chocolate boxes while the baggages of Ho Kin San, Chan Chit Yue
and Tin San Mao each contained two or three similar chocolate boxes. All in
all, 18 chocolate boxes were recovered from the baggages of the six
accused.
NARCOM Agent Neowillie de Castro corroborated the relevant testimony of
Cinco pertaining to the presence of the chocolate boxes. According to him,
he conducted a test on the white crystalline substance contained in said
chocolate boxes at the NAIA using the Mandelline Re-Agent Test. 10 The
result of his examination11 of the white crystalline substance yielded
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Thereafter, the
chocolate boxes were bundled together with tape, placed inside a plastic
bag and brought to the Inbond Section.
The following day, September 7, 1991, the 13 tourists were brought to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further questioning. The
confiscated stuff were turned over to the Forensic Chemist who weighed
and examined them. Findings show that its total weight is 31.1126
kilograms and that the representative samples were positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.12 Out of the 13 tourists, the NBI found
evidence for violation of R.A. No. 6425 only as against petitioner and his
five co-accused.
Accordingly, six separate Informations all dated September 19, 1991 were
filed against petitioner and his co-accused. These Informations were
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 91-1591 to 97. Subsequently, however,

12

petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation 13 which the trial court granted.
The reinvestigation conducted gave way to a finding of conspiracy among
the accused and this resulted to the filing of a single Amended
Information14under Criminal Case No. 91-1592 and to the withdrawal of the
other Informations.15 The Amended Information reads:
That on or about September 6, 1991 in Pasay City, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry and transport into the
country without lawful authority, 31.112 kilograms, more or less, of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, also popularly known as "SHABU", a
regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.16
After pleading not guilty to the crime charged, 17 all the accused testified
almost identically, invoking denial as their defense. They claimed that they
have no knowledge about the transportation of illegal substance (shabu)
taken from their traveling bags which were provided by the travel agency.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On April 6, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision 18 finding all the accused
guilty of violating Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, the
decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Court finds the accused
LAW KA WANG, CHAN CHIT yue, ho wai pang, wu hing sum, tin sun mao,
and kin san ho (ho kin san) guilty of Conspiracy in violating Section 15,
Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended for having conspired to
transport into the Philippines 31.112 kilograms of methamp[h]etamine
hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu, and they are hereby sentenced to
suffer the PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT OF SIX (6) [sic] RECLUSION
PERPETUA AND TO PAY EACH (SIC) THE AMOUNT OF THIRTY (30)
THOUSAND PESOS (p30,000.00) each as FINE, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is being imposed pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659 considering
its applicability to the accused though retroactively for having a less
stricter penalty than that of life imprisonment provided in Republic Act No.
6425. The fine ofP30,000.00 for each accused is imposed pursuant to R.A.

No. 6425 it being more favorable to the accused [than] that provided in
R.A. No. 7659 WITH IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION AFTER SERVICE OF
SENTENCE. The penalty of death cannot be imposed since the offense was
committed prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following


grounds:

Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against accused WONG KOK WAH @
SONNY WONG, CHAN TAK PIU, HO WAI LING AND INOCENCIA CHENG.

WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS


CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION BOTH BY THE CUSTOMS OFFICIALS AND BY THE NBI
INVESTIGATORS, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT EXCLUDING EVIDENCE TAKEN DURING THE CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION.

SO ORDERED.19
From this judgment, all the accused appealed to this Court where the case
records were forwarded to per Order of the RTC dated May 10,
1995.20 Later, all the accused except for petitioner, filed on separate dates
their respective withdrawal of appeal. 21 This Court, after being satisfied
that the withdrawing appellants were fully aware of the consequences of
their action, granted the withdrawal of their respective appeals through a
Resolution dated June 18, 1997.22 Per Entry of Judgment, 23 said Resolution
became final and executory on July 7, 1997. Consequently, petitioner was
the only one left to pursue his appeal.
Petitioner filed his Brief24 on April 6, 1998 while the brief 25 for the
respondent People of the Philippines was filed on August 27, 1998 through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Per Resolution 26 dated August 30,
2004, this Court referred the appeal to the CA for proper disposition and
determination pursuant to this Courts ruling in People v. Mateo. 27
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 16, 2006, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the Decision of
the RTC. While conceding that petitioners constitutional right to counsel
during the custodial investigation was indeed violated, it nevertheless went
on to hold that there were other evidence sufficient to warrant his
conviction. The CA also rebuked petitioners claim that he was deprived of
his constitutional and statutory right to confront the witnesses against him.
The CA gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
quoted with favor the trial courts ratiocination regarding the existence of
conspiracy among the accused.
Undeterred, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 28 which the CA
denied in its Resolution29 dated January 16, 2007.

13

II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
THAT PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE
EXISTENCE OF A CONSPIRACY.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PRESENT PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO OVERTURN THE PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE ACCORDED TO PETITIONER BY THE CONSTITUTION. 30
OUR RULING
The petition lacks merit.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution prohibits as evidence only
confessions and admissions of the accused as against himself.

Anent the error first assigned, petitioner takes issue on the fact that he
was not assisted by a competent and independent lawyer during the
custodial investigation. He claimed that he was not duly informed of his
rights to remain silent and to have competent counsel of his choice. Hence,
petitioner faults the CA in not excluding evidence taken during such
investigation.
While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a
custodial questioning by the customs authorities and the NBI in violation of
his constitutional right under Section 12 31 of Article III of the Constitution,
we must not, however, lose sight of the fact that what said constitutional
provision prohibits as evidence are only confessions and admissions of the
accused as against himself. Thus, in Aquino v. Paiste, 32 the Court
categorically ruled that "the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights
render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made
during custodial investigation. The admissibility of other evidence,
provided they are relevant to the issue and [are] not otherwise excluded by
law or rules, [are] not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of
custodial investigation."
In the case at bench, petitioner did not make any confession or admission
during his custodial investigation. The prosecution did not present any
extrajudicial confession extracted from him as evidence of his guilt.
Moreover, no statement was taken from petitioner during his detention and
subsequently used in evidence against him. Verily, in determining the guilt
of the petitioner and his co-accused, the trial court based its Decision on
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and on the existence of the
confiscated shabu. As the Court held in People v. Buluran, 33 "[a]ny
allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant
and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or
confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their
conviction." Hence, petitioners claim that the trial court erred in not
excluding evidence taken during the custodial investigation deserves scant
consideration.
Petitioner cannot take refuge in this Courts ruling in People v. Wong Chuen
Ming34 to exculpate himself from the crime charged. Though there are
semblance in the facts, the case of Ming is not exactly on all fours with the
present case. The disparity is clear from the evidence adduced upon which
the trial courts in each case relied on in rendering their respective
decisions. Apparently in Ming, the trial court, in convicting the accused,

14

relied heavily on the signatures which they affixed on the boxes of Alpen
Cereals and on the plastic bags. The Court construed the accuseds act of
affixing their signatures thereon as a tacit admission of the crime charged.
And, since the accused were not informed of their Miranda rights when
they affixed their signatures, the admission was declared inadmissible
evidence for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional rights.
In ruling against the accused, the trial court also gave credence to the sole
testimony of the customs examiner whom it presumed to have performed
his duties in regular manner. However, in reversing the judgment of
conviction, the Court noted that said examiners testimony was not
corroborated by other prosecution witnesses.
On the other hand, petitioners conviction in the present case was on the
strength of his having been caught inflagrante delicto transporting shabu
into the country and not on the basis of any confession or admission.
Moreover, the testimony of Cinco was found to be direct, positive and
credible by the trial court, hence it need not be corroborated. Cinco
witnessed the entire incident thus providing direct evidence as eyewitness
to the very act of the commission of the crime. As the Court held in People
v Dela Cruz,35 "[n]o rule exists which requires a testimony to be
corroborated to be adjudged credible. x x x Thus, it is not at all uncommon
to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a single
witness despite the lack of corroboration, where such testimony is found
positive and credible by the trial court. In such a case, the lone testimony
is sufficient to produce a conviction."
Indeed, a ruling in one case cannot simply be bodily lifted and applied to
another case when there are stark differences between the two cases.
Cases must be decided based on their own unique facts and applicable law
and jurisprudence.
Petitioner was not denied of his right to confrontation.
Turning now to the second assigned error, petitioner invokes the pertinent
provision of Section 14(2) of Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
providing for the right to confrontation, viz:
Section 14. x x x

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent


until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure
the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of his right to know and understand
what the witnesses testified to. According to him, only a full understanding
of what the witnesses would testify to would enable an accused to
comprehend the evidence being offered against him and to refute it by
cross-examination or by his own countervailing evidence.
In refutation, the OSG countered that petitioner was given the opportunity
to confront his accusers and/or the witnesses of the prosecution when his
counsel cross-examined them. It is petitioners call to hire an interpreter to
understand the proceedings before him and if he could not do so, he
should have manifested it before the court. At any rate, the OSG contends
that petitioner was nevertheless able to cross-examine the prosecution
witnesses and that such examination suffices as compliance with
petitioners right to confront the witnesses against him.
We agree with the OSG.
As borne out by the records, petitioner did not register any objection to the
presentation of the prosecutions evidence particularly on the testimony of
Cinco despite the absence of an interpreter. Moreover, it has not been
shown that the lack of an interpreter greatly prejudiced him. Still and all,
the important thing is that petitioner, through counsel, was able to fully
cross-examine Cinco and the other witnesses and test their credibility. The
right to confrontation is essentially a guarantee that a defendant may
cross-examine the witnesses of the prosecution. In People v. Libo-on, 36 the
Court held:
The right to confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by
the Constitution to the person facing criminal prosecution who should
know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a chance to

15

cross-examine them on their charges. The chief purpose of the right of


confrontation is to secure the opportunity for cross-examination, so that if
the opportunity for cross-examination has been secured, the function and
test of confrontation has also been accomplished, the confrontation being
merely the dramatic preliminary to cross-examination.
Under the circumstances obtaining, petitioners constitutional right to
confront the witnesses against him was not impaired.
Conspiracy among the accused was duly established.
Respecting the third assigned error, we uphold the trial courts finding of
conspiracy which was quoted by the appellate court in its assailed
Decision, and which we once again herein reproduce with approval:
On the allegation of conspiracy, the Court finds [no] direct evidence to
conclude conspiracy. However, just like in other cases where conspiracy is
not usually established by direct evidence but by circumstantial evidence,
the Court finds that there are enough circumstantial evidence which if
taken together sufficiently prove conspiracy. First, it cannot be denied that
the accused somehow have known each other prior to their [departure] in
Hong Kong for Manila. Although Law Ka Wang denied having known any of
the accused prior to the incident in NAIA, accused Ho Wai Pang identified
him as the one who assisted him in the supposed tour in the Philippines to
the extent of directly dealing with the travel agency and [that] Law Ka
Wang was the one who received the personal things of Ho Wai Pang
allegedly to be place[d] in a bag provided for by the travel agency. Accused
Wu Hing Sum has been known to accused Ho Kin San for about two to
three years as they used to work as cooks in a restaurant in Hong Kong.
Accused Ho Wai Ling, who is still at large, is know[n] to accused Chan Chit
Yue, Wu Hing Sum and Ho Kin San. These relationships in a way can lead to
the presumption that they have the capability to enter into a conspiracy.
Second, all the illegal substances confiscated from the six accused were
contained in chocolate boxes of similar sizes and almost the same weight
all contained in their luggages. The Court agrees with the finding of the
trial prosecutor that under the given circumstances, the offense charged
[c]ould have been perpetrated only through an elaborate and methodically
planned conspiracy with all the accused assiduously cooperating and
mutually helping each other in order to ensure its success. 37

We find no cogent reason to reverse such findings.


"Conspiracy is [the] common design to commit a felony." 38 "[C]onspiracy
which determines criminal culpability need not entail a close personal
association or at least an acquaintance between or among the participants
to a crime."39 "It need not be shown that the parties actually came together
and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common
design."40 "The assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the
crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken
together, indicate that they are parts of some complete whole" as we ruled
in People v. Mateo, Jr.41 Here, it can be deduced from petitioner and his coaccuseds collective conduct, viewed in its totality, that there was a
common design, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments in
bringing about the crime committed.
Petitioners guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Finally, petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. He makes capital on the contention that no
chocolate boxes were found in his traveling bag when it was examined at
the ICU. He claimed that it was his co-accused Sonny Wong who took
charge in ascribing upon him the possession of the two chocolate boxes.
Petitioners contentions fail to persuade.
True, when principal prosecution witness Cinco first testified on June 3,
1992, she declared that she did not see any chocolate boxes but only
personal effects in petitioners bag. 42 Nonetheless, she clarified in her
succeeding testimony that she recalls taking the two chocolate boxes from
petitioners bag when they were still at the counter. This sufficiently
explained why Cinco did not find any chocolate boxes from petitioners bag
when they were at the ICU.43 To us, this slight clash in Cincos statements
neither dilute her credibility nor the veracity of her testimony.
The trial courts words on this matter when it resolved petitioners
Demurrer to Evidence in its Order 44 of February 16, 1993 is quite
enlightening. Thus
In claiming that the evidences [sic] presented by the prosecution is
insufficient to command conviction, the Demurrer went on to say that the

16

testimony of Hilda Cinco is either conjectural or hearsay and definitely


missed its mark in incriminating accused, Ho Wai Pang, because she even
testified that she found nothing inside the hand-carried luggage of Ho Wai
Pang (pp. 48-49, TSN, June 3, 1992). But that was when investigation was
going on at the Intensive Counting Unit (ICU). However, the same Hilda
Cinco later on testified that from the express lane in going to the ICU, after
the discovery of shabu, she was already carrying with her four (4)
chocolate boxes, two of [which] taken from the bag of Tin Sun Mau and the
other two retrieved from the luggage of herein movant, Ho Wai Pang.
Categorically, Cinco admitted it was the reason that at the ICU, Ho Wai
Pangs bag was already empty (pp. 53-54, TSN, June 3, 1992), but she
nonetheless recognized the bag and could recall the owner thereof,
pointing to Ho Wai Pang. Such testimony is not hearsay evidence. They are
facts from the personal perception of the witness and out of her personal
knowledge. Neither is it conjectural.45
Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his
testimony must be considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts.
The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its
isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. "In
ascertaining the facts established by a witness, everything stated by him
on direct, cross and redirect examinations must be calibrated and
considered."46 Also, where there is nothing in the records which would show
a motive or reason on the part of the witnesses to falsely implicate the
accused, identification should be given full weight. Here, petitioner
presented no evidence or anything to indicate that the principal witness for
the prosecution, Cinco, was moved by any improper motive, hence her
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.1avvphi1
Verily, the evidence adduced against petitioner is so overwhelming that
this Court is convinced that his guilt has been established beyond
reasonable doubt. Nothing else can speak so eloquently of his culpability
than the unassailable fact that he was caught red-handed in the very act of
transporting, along with his co-accused, shabu into the country. In stark
contrast, the evidence for the defense consists mainly of denials.
Petitioner tried to show that he was not aware of the shabu inside his
luggage considering that his bag was provided by the travel agency.
However, it bears stressing that the act of transporting a prohibited drug is
a malum prohibitum because it is punished as an offense under a special
law. As such, the mere commission of the act is what constitutes the

offense punished and same suffices to validly charge and convict an


individual caught committing the act so punished regardless of criminal
intent. Moreover, beyond his bare denials, petitioner has not presented any
plausible proof to successfully rebut the evidence for the prosecution. "It is
basic that affirmative testimony of persons who are eyewitnesses of the
events or facts asserted easily overrides negative testimony." 47
All told, we are convinced that the courts below committed no error in
adjudging
petitioner
guilty
of
transporting
methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu into the country in violation of Section 15, Article III
of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
Penalty
As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the
appellate court, we find the same in accord with law and jurisprudence. It
should be recalled that at the time of the commission of the crime on
September 6, 1991, Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425 was already amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1683.48 The decree provided that for violation of
said Section 15, the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 shall be imposed. Subsequently,
however, R.A. No. 7659 49 further introduced new amendments to Section
15, Article III and Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
Under the new amendments, the penalty prescribed in Section 15 was
changed from "life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
fromP20,000.00 to P30,000.00" to "reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million". On the other hand, Section 17 of
R.A. No. 7659 amended Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425 in that the
new penalty provided by the amendatory law shall be applied depending
on the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved.
The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the penalty of reclusion
perpetua under R.A. No. 7659 rather than life imprisonment ratiocinating
that R.A. No. 7659 could be given retroactive application, it being more
favorable to the petitioner in view of its having a less stricter punishment.
We agree. In People v. Doroja,50 we held:
In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994) this Court ruled
(a) that the amendatory law, being more lenient and favorable to the

17

accused than the original provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, should be
accorded retroactive application, x x x.
And, since "reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment,
and considering the rule that criminal statutes with a favorable effect to
the accused, have, as to him, a retroactive effect",51 the penalty imposed
by the trial court upon petitioner is proper. Consequently, the Court
sustains the penalty of imprisonment, which is reclusion perpetua, as well
as the amount of fine imposed by the trial court upon petitioner, the same
being more favorable to him.
WHEREFORE premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed
June 16, 2006 Decision and January 16, 2007 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01459 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186228

March 15, 2010

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA ALIAS TERIO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before Us for final review is the trial courts conviction of the appellant for
the rape of his thirteen-year old daughter.
Consistent with the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto, 1 the real
name and the personal circumstances of the victim, and any other
information tending to establish or compromise her identity, including
those of her immediate family or household members, are not disclosed in
this decision.
The Facts

In an Information dated 21 September 2000, 2 the appellant was accused of


the crime of QUALIFIED RAPE allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in the evening, at Barangay
xxx, municipality of xxx, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the
father of AAA with lewd design, with the use of force and intimidation, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally have carnal knowledge
with his own daughter AAA, a 13 year[s]old minor against her will. 3
On 12 October 2000, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. 4 During the pretrial conference, the prosecution and the defense stipulated and admitted:
(a) the correctness of the findings indicated in the medical certificate of the
physician who examined AAA; (b) that AAA was only thirteen (13) years old
when the alleged offense was committed; and (c) that AAA is the daughter
of the appellant.5 On trial, three (3) witnesses testified for the prosecution,
namely: victim AAA;6 her brother BBB;7 and one Moises Boy Banting,8 a
"bantay bayan" in the barangay. Their testimonies revealed the following:
In the afternoon of 15 March 2000, AAA was left alone at home. 9 AAAs
father, the appellant, was having a drinking spree at the neighbors
place.10 Her mother decided to leave because when appellant gets drunk,
he has the habit of mauling AAAs mother. 11 Her only brother BBB also
went out in the company of some neighbors.12
At around 10:00 oclock in the evening, appellant woke AAA up; 13 removed
his pants, slid inside the blanket covering AAA and removed her pants and
underwear;14 warned her not to shout for help while threatening her with
his fist;15 and told her that he had a knife placed above her head. 16 He
proceeded to mash her breast, kiss her repeatedly, and "inserted his penis
inside her vagina."17
Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying. 18 Appellant claimed he
scolded her for staying out late.19 BBB decided to take AAA with
him.20 While on their way to their maternal grandmothers house, AAA
recounted her harrowing experience with their father. 21 Upon reaching their
grandmothers house, they told their grandmother and uncle of the
incident,22 after which, they sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting. 23

Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his
underwear.24 He invited appellant to the police station, 25 to which appellant
obliged. At the police outpost, he admitted to him that he raped AAA
because he was unable to control himself.26
The following day, AAA submitted herself to physical examination. 27 Dra.
Josefa Arlita L. Alsula, Municipal Health Officer of x x x, Bukidnon, issued
the Medical Certificate, which reads:
hyperemic vulvae with 4 oclock & 6 oclock freshly lacerated hymen; (+)
minimal to moderate bloody discharges 2 to an alleged raping incident 28
On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense. He believed
that the charge against him was ill-motivated because he sometimes
physically abuses his wife in front of their children after engaging in a
heated argument,29 and beats the children as a disciplinary measure. 30 He
went further to narrate how his day was on the date of the alleged rape.
He alleged that on 15 March 2000, there was no food prepared for him at
lunchtime.31 Shortly after, AAA arrived.32 She answered back when
confronted.33 This infuriated him that he kicked her hard on her buttocks. 34
Appellant went back to work and went home again around 3 oclock in the
afternoon.35 Finding nobody at home,36he prepared his dinner and went to
sleep.37
Later in the evening, he was awakened by the members of the "Bantay
Bayan" headed by Moises Boy Banting.38They asked him to go with them to
discuss some matters.39 He later learned that he was under detention
because AAA charged him of rape.40
On 8 July 2006, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Malaybalay City,
Bukidnon, rendered its decision 41 in Criminal Case No. 10372-0, finding
appellant guilty of rape qualified by relationship and minority, and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 42 It also ordered
him to indemnify AAA P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity with exemplary damages of P25,000.00.43
On 30 September 2008, the decision of the trial court was AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS44 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00456-

18

MIN.45 The appellate court found that appellant is not eligible for parole and
it increased both the civil indemnity and moral damages from P50,000.00
to P75,000.00.46
On 24 November 2008, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the
appellants notice of appeal.47 This Court required the parties to
simultaneously file their respective supplemental briefs, 48 but both
manifested that they will no longer file supplemental pleadings. 49
The lone assignment of error in the appellants brief is that, the trial court
gravely erred in finding him guilty as charged despite the failure of the
prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, 50 because: (1)
there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother
BBB;51 (2) his extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy Banting was
without the assistance of a counsel, in violation of his constitutional
right;52 and (3) AAAs accusation was ill-motivated.53
Our Ruling
Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession
with a "bantay bayan" and the credibility of the witnesses for the
prosecution.
Admissibility in Evidence of an Extrajudicial Confession before a
"Bantay Bayan"
Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting,
a "bantay bayan," the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he
was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such
requirement.54
The case of People v. Malngan 55 is the authority on the scope of the
Miranda doctrine provided for under Article III, Section 12(1) 56 and (3)57 of
the Constitution. In Malngan, appellant questioned the admissibility of her
extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman and a neighbor of
the private complainant. This Court distinguished. Thus:
Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this
particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for
purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution.

19

When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning


of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the
fire that destroyed several houses x x x. She was, therefore, already under
custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by x x x [the]
Constitution should have already been observed or applied to her.
Accused-appellants confession to Barangay Chairman x x x was made in
response to the interrogation made by the latter admittedly conducted
without first informing accused-appellant of her rights under the
Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the
confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman x x x, as well
as the lighter found x x x in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against
her x x x.1avvphi1
[But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal. x x x [T]he
constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to
those not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but
given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits x x x as
x x x in the case at bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita
Mendoza,
one
of
the
neighbors
x
x
x
[of
the
private
complainant].58 (Emphasis supplied)
Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs to
ascertain whether or not a "bantay bayan" may be deemed a law
enforcement officer within the contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the
Constitution.
In People of the Philippines v. Buendia, 59 this Court had the occasion to
mention the nature of a "bantay bayan," that is, "a group of male residents
living in [the] area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their
community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP."60
Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of
Executive Order No. 309 issued on 11 November 1987, as amended, a
Peace and Order Committee in each barangay shall be organized "to serve
as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the
Barangay level."61 The composition of the Committee includes, among
others: (1) the Punong Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman of
the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4)
a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least three (3) Members of existing BarangayBased Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non Government
Organization Representative well-known in his community. 62

This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer


organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the "bantay
bayan," are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions
relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus,
without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting,
and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay
bayan," particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation,
any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and
objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights
provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise
known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was
taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.
Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction
of the appellant was not deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial
confession but "from the confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt."63
Credibility of the Witnesses for the Prosecution
Appellant assails the inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her
brother BBB. AAA testified that BBB accompanied her to the house of their
grandmother. Thereafter, they, together with her relatives, proceeded to
look for a "bantay bayan." On the other hand, BBB testified that he brought
her sister to the house of their "bantay bayan" after he learned of the
incident.
Citing Bartocillo v. Court of Appeals, 64 appellant argues that "where the
testimonies of two key witnesses cannot stand together, the inevitable
conclusion is that one or both must be telling a lie, and their story a mere
concoction."65
The principle, however, is not applicable in the case at bar. In Bartocillo,
the two testimonies could not simply stand together because:
On one hand, if we are to believe Susan, Orlando could not have possibly
seen the hacking incident since he had accompanied Vicente home. On the
other hand, if we are to accept the testimony of Orlando, then Susan could

20

not have possibly witnessed the hacking incident since she was with
Vicente at that time.
Here, the testimony of AAA does not run contrary to that of BBB. Both
testified that they sought the help of a "bantay bayan." Their respective
testimonies differ only as to when the help was sought for, which this Court
could well attribute to the nature of the testimony of BBB, a shortcut
version of AAAs testimony that dispensed with a detailed account of the
incident.
At any rate, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the assailed
inconsistency is too trivial to affect the veracity of the testimonies. 66 In
fact, inconsistencies which refer to minor, trivial or inconsequential
circumstances even strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as they
erase doubts that such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed. 67
Appellants contention that AAA charged him of rape only because she
bore grudges against him is likewise unmeritorious. This Court is not
dissuaded from giving full credence to the testimony of a minor
complainant by motives of feuds, resentment or revenge. 68 As correctly
pointed out by the Court of Appeals:
Indeed, mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong enough to make
daughters in a Filipino family invent a charge that would not only bring
shame and humiliation upon them and their families but also bring their
fathers into the gallows of death.69 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that it is unbelievable for a daughter to charge her own father with rape,
exposing herself to the ordeal and embarrassment of a public trial and
subjecting her private parts to examination if such heinous crime was not
in fact committed.70 No person, much less a woman, could attain such
height of cruelty to one who has sired her, and from whom she owes her
very existence, and for which she naturally feels loving and lasting
gratefulness.71 Even when consumed with revenge, it takes a certain
amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story
which would put her own father to jail for the most of his remaining life and
drag the rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of shame. 72 It is
highly improbable for [AAA] against whom no proof of sexual perversity or
loose morality has been shown to fake charges much more against her own
father. In fact her testimony is entitled to greater weight since her accusing
words were directed against a close relative.73

Elements of Rape
Having established the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution, We
now examine the applicability of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 74 to the case at
bar.
The law provides, in part, that rape is committed, among others, "[b]y a
man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman" "through force, threat
or intimidation."75 The death penalty shall be imposed if it is committed
with aggravating/qualifying circumstances, which include, "[w]hen the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent." 76
The consistent and forthright testimony of AAA detailing how she was
raped, culminating with the penetration of appellants penis into her
vagina, suffices to prove that appellant had carnal knowledge of her. When
a woman states that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape was committed. 77Further, when such
testimony corresponds with medical findings, there is sufficient basis to
conclude that the essential requisites of carnal knowledge have been
established.78
The Court of Appeals pointed out that the element of force or intimidation
is not essential when the accused is the father of the victim, inasmuch as
his superior moral ascendancy or influence substitutes for violence and
intimidation.79 At any rate, AAA was actually threatened by appellant with
his fist and a knife allegedly placed above AAAs head. 80
It may be added that the self-serving defense of appellant cannot prevail
over the positive and straightforward testimony of AAA. Settled is the rule
that, "alibi is an inherently weak defense that is viewed with suspicion
because it is easy to fabricate."81 "Alibi and denial must be supported by
strong corroborative evidence in order to merit credibility." 82 Moreover, for
the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must establish two elements
(1) he was not at the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed;
and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time
of its commission.83 Appellant failed in this wise.
Aggravating/Qualifying Circumstances

21

The presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship


with the offender in the instant case has likewise been adequately
established. Both qualifying circumstances were specifically alleged in the
Information, stipulated on and admitted during the pre-trial conference,
and testified to by both parties in their respective testimonies. Also, such
stipulation and admission, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals,
are binding upon this Court because they are judicial admissions within the
contemplation of Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court. It
provides:
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a
party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
Penalty
Finally, in increasing the amount of civil indemnity and damages each
from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, the Court of Appeals correctly considered
controlling jurisprudence to the effect that where, as here, the rape is
committed with any of the qualifying/aggravating circumstances
warranting the imposition of the death penalty, the victim is entitled
to P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto 84 and P75,000.00 as moral
damages.85 However, the award of exemplary damages should have been
increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.86 Also, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in lieu of death was correctly imposed considering that the
imposition of the death penalty upon appellant would have been
appropriate were it not for the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, or An
Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines. 87 We
further affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals on appellants noneligibility for parole. Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 clearly provides that
"persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose
sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, shall
not be eligible for parole."
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September
2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00456-MIN is hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant
Antonio Lauga is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape, and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility
for
parole
and
to
pay
AAAP75,000.00
as
civil

indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary


damages.

THE UNDERSIGNED WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT HE IS


WILLING TO SETTLE IRREGULARITIES ALLEGEDLY CHARGED
VS. HIM IN THE AMT. OF P 76,000 (APPROX.) SUBJECT TO
CONDITIONS AS MAY BE IMPOSED BY PAL ON OR BEFORE
1700/9 FEB 86.

G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989


THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, Presiding over Branch 6, Regional Trial
Court,
First
Judicial
Region,
Baguio
City,
and
FELIPE
RAMOS, respondents.
Nelson Lidua for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
What has given rise to the controversy at bar is the equation by the
respondent Judge of the right of an individual not to "be compelled to be a
witness against himself" accorded by Section 20, Article III of the
Constitution, with the right of any person "under investigation for the
commission of an offense . . . to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right," granted by the same provision. The relevant facts
are not disputed.
Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine
Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station. It having allegedly come
to light that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane
tickets, 1 the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be
conducted into the matter of February 9, 1986. That investigation was
scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and
the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine
Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. 2
On the day before the investigation, February 8,1986, Ramos gave to his
superiors a handwritten notes 3 reading as follows:
2-8-86
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

22

(s) Felipe

(Printed)
At the investigation of February 9, 1986, conducted by the PAL Branch
Manager in Baguio City, Edgardo R. Cruz, in the presence of Station Agent
Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop
Steward Cristeta Domingo, Felipe Ramos was informed "of the finding of
the Audit Team." Thereafter, his answers in response to questions by Cruz,
were taken down in writing. Ramos' answers were to the effect inter alia
that he had not indeed made disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the
Audit Team's findings, that the proceeds had been "misused" by him, that
although he had planned on paying back the money, he had been
prevented from doing so, "perhaps (by) shame," that he was still willing to
settle his obligation, and proferred a "compromise x x to pay on staggered
basis, (and) the amount would be known in the next investigation;" that he
desired the next investigation to be at the same place, "Baguio CTO," and
that he should be represented therein by "Shop stewardees ITR Nieves
Blanco;" and that he was willing to sign his statement (as he in fact
afterwards did). 4 How the investigation turned out is not dealt with the
parties at all; but it would seem that no compromise agreement was
reached much less consummated.
About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos
charging him with the crime of estafa allegedly committed in Baguio City
during the period from March 12, 1986 to January 29, 1987. In that place
and during that time, according to the indictment, 5 he (Ramos)
.. with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did then
and there willfully ... defraud the Philippine Airlines, Inc.,
Baguio Branch, ... in the following manner, to wit: said
accused ... having been entrusted with and received in
trust fare tickets of passengers for one-way trip and roundtrip in the total amount of P76,700.65, with the express

obligation to remit all the proceeds of the sale, account for


it and/or to return those unsold, ... once in possession
thereof and instead of complying with his obligation, with
intent to defraud, did then and there ... misappropriate,
misapply and convert the value of the tickets in the sum of
P76,700.65 and in spite of repeated demands, ... failed and
refused to make good his obligation, to the damage and
prejudice of the offended party .. .
On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of "Not
Guilty," and trial thereafter ensued. The prosecution of the case was
undertaken by lawyers of PAL under the direction and supervision of the
Fiscal.
At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a written
offer of evidence dated June 21, 1988, 6which included "the (above
mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on February 9,
1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office," which had been marked as Exhibit
A, as well as his "handwritten admission x x given on February 8, 1986,"
also above referred to, which had been marked as Exhibit K.
The defendant's attorneys filed "Objections/Comments to Plaintiff s
Evidence." 7 Particularly as regards the peoples' Exhibit A, the objection
was that "said document, which appears to be a confession, was taken
without the accused being represented by a lawyer." Exhibit K was
objected to "for the same reasons interposed under Exhibits 'A' and 'J.'
By Order dated August 9, 1988, 8 the respondent judge admitted all the
exhibits "as part of the testimony of the witnesses who testified in
connection therewith and for whatever they are worth," except Exhibits A
and K, which it rejected. His Honor declared Exhibit A "inadmissible in
evidence, it appearing that it is the statement of accused Felipe Ramos
taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office, in an
investigation conducted by the Branch Manager x x since it does not
appear that the accused was reminded of this constitutional rights to
remain silent and to have counsel, and that when he waived the same and
gave his statement, it was with the assistance actually of a counsel." He
also declared inadmissible "Exhibit K, the handwritten admission made by
accused Felipe J. Ramos, given on February 8, 1986 x x for the same
reason stated in the exclusion of Exhibit 'A' since it does not appear that
the accused was assisted by counsel when he made said admission."

23

The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration. 9 It was denied,


by Order dated September 14, 1988. 10 In justification of said Order,
respondent Judge invoked this Court's rulings in Morales, Jr. v. Juan Ponce
Enrile, et al., 121 SCRA 538, People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 467, People. v.
Sison, 142 SCRA 219, and People v. Decierdo, 149 SCRA 496, among
others, to the effect that "in custodial investigations the right to counsel
may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel," and the explicit precept in the present Constitution
that the rights in custodial investigation "cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel." He pointed out that the
investigation of Felipe Ramos at the PAL Baguio Station was one "for the
offense of allegedly misappropriating the proceeds of the tickets issued to
him' and therefore clearly fell "within the coverage of the constitutional
provisions;" and the fact that Ramos was not detained at the time, or the
investigation was administrative in character could not operate to except
the case "from the ambit of the constitutional provision cited."
These Orders, of August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988 are now assailed
in the petition for certiorari and prohibition at bar, filed in this Court by the
private prosecutors in the name of the People of the Philippines. By
Resolution dated October 26, 1988, the Court required Judge Ayson and
Felipe Ramos to comment on the petition, and directed issuance of a
"TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER . . . ENJOINING the respondents from
proceeding further with the trial and/or hearing of Criminal Case No. 3488R (People ... vs. Felipe Ramos), including the issuance of any order,
decision or judgment in the aforesaid case or on any matter in relation to
the same case, now pending before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Br. 6, First Judicial Region." The Court also subsequently required the
Solicitor General to comment on the petition. The comments of Judge
Ayson, Felipe Ramos, and the Solicitor General have all been filed. The
Solicitor General has made common cause with the petitioner and prays
"that the petition be given due course and thereafter judgment be
rendered setting aside respondent Judge's Orders . . . and ordering him to
admit Exhibits 'A' and 'K' of the prosecution." The Solicitor General has
thereby removed whatever impropriety might have attended the institution
of the instant action in the name of the People of the Philippines by
lawyers de parte of the offended party in the criminal action in question.
The Court deems that there has been full ventilation of the issue of
whether or not it was grave abuse of discretion for respondent Judge to

have excluded the People's Exhibits A and K. It will now proceed to resolve
it.
At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, 11 to which respondent Judge has given a construction that is
disputed by the People. The section reads as follows:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights,
dealt with in the section, namely:
1) the right against self-incrimination i.e., the right of a
person not to be compelled to be a witness against himself
set out in the first sentence, which is a verbatim
reproduction of Section 18, Article III of the 1935
Constitution, and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth
Amendment of the American Constitution, 12 and
2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the
rights of every suspect "under investigation for the
commission of an offense."
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the
individuality and disparateness of these rights. It has placed the rights in
separate sections. The right against self- incrimination, "No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself," is now embodied in Section 17,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The lights of a person in custodial
interrogation, which have been made more explicit, are now contained in
Section 12 of the same Article III. 13
Right Against Self-Incrimination

24

The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article


IV of the 1973 Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives
evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any
civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. 14 The right is NOT to "be
compelled to be a witness against himself"
The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning. 15 It
prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not
a prohibition of inquiry." 16 It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a
party or not, the right to refue to answer any particular incriminatory
question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him
for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific
question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It
cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to
disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time
appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a
subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and
answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to him,
the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense, that he may
refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does
not impose on the judge, or other officer presiding over a trial, hearing or
investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a witness of his right
against self-incrimination. It is a right that a witness knows or should know,
in accordance with the well known axiom that every one is presumed to
know the law, that ignorance of the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in
the very nature of things, neither the judge nor the witness can be
expected to know in advance the character or effect of a question to be
put to the latter. 17
The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically
operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the
witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right
may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the
appropriate time. 18
Rights in Custodial Interrogation

Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second right,
or better said, group of rights. These rights apply to persons "under
investigation for the commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" under
investigation by police authorities; and this is what makes these rights
different from that embodied in the first sentence, that against selfincrimination which, as aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person
testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or administrative.
This provision granting explicit rights to persons under investigation for an
offense was not in the 1935 Constitution. It is avowedly derived from the
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 19 a decision
described as an "earthquake in the world of law enforcement." 20
Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the
commission of an offense"-1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel,
and to be informed of such right, 21
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him; 22 and
3) any confession obtained in violation of x x (these rights
shall be inadmissible in evidence. 23
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards
laid down for a person in police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being
regarded as the commencement of an adversary proceeding against the
suspect.24
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that
he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford
an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him
throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such
opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently
waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless
and until such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution

25

at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used


against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in
a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement
without full warnings of constitutional rights." 25
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial
interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of accused persons." 26 And, as
this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is meant
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way." 27 The situation contemplated has also been more
precisely described by this Court." 28
.. . After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation
begins a confrontation arises which at best may be tanned
unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or
police headquarters and there questioned and "crossexamined" not only by one but as many investigators as
may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds
himself in strange and unfamiliar surroundings, and every
person he meets he considers hostile to him. The
investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work.
They employ all the methods and means that experience
and study have taught them to extract the truth, or what
may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are
unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional rights.
And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive
presence of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere
overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of the Bill of
Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance.
Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some
crime is within the scope of the constitutional protection. If not made
"under custodial interrogation," or "under investigation for the commission
of an offense," the statement is not protected. Thus, in one case, 29 where
a person went to a police precinct and before any sort of investigation
could be initiated, declared that he was giving himself up for the killing of
an old woman because she was threatening to kill him by barang, or
witchcraft, this Court ruled that such a statement was admissible,

compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation not


being exigible under the circumstances.
Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case
As Regards Giving of Testimony
It is pertinent at this point to inquire whether the rights just discussed, i.e.,
(1) that against self-incrimination and (2) those during custodial
interrogation apply to persons under preliminary investigation or already
charged in court for a crime.
It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary
investigation is not under custodial interrogation. His interrogation by the
police, if any there had been would already have been ended at the time of
the filing of the criminal case in court (or the public prosecutors' office).
Hence, with respect to a defendant in a criminal case already pending in
court (or the public prosecutor's office), there is no occasion to speak of his
right while under "custodial interrogation" laid down by the second and
subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, for
the obvious reason that he is no longer under "custodial interrogation."
But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing preliminary
investigation before the public prosecutor), in common with all other
persons, possesses the right against self- incrimination set out in the first
sentence of Section 20 Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, i.e., the right to
refuse to answer a specific incriminatory question at the time that it is put
to him. 30
Additionally, the accused in a criminal case in court has other rights in the
matter of giving testimony or refusing to do so. An accused "occupies a
different tier of protection from an ordinary witness." Under the Rules of
Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, 31 and 2) to testify as
witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may be
cross-examined as any other witness; however, his neglect or refusal to be
a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him. 32

The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a
witness against himself' signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or
produce evidence in the criminal case in which he is the accused, or one of
the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other
process or order of the Court. He cannot be required to be a witness either
for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for himself. 33 In other
words unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action) who may
be compelled to testify by subpoena, having only the right to refuse to
answer a particular incriminatory question at the time it is put to him-the
defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify altogether. He can
refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn, answer any question. 34 And, as
the law categorically states, "his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not
in any manner prejudice or be used against him." 35
If he should wish to testify in his own behalf, however, he may do so. This
is his right. But if he does testify, then he "may be cross- examined as any
other witness." He may be cross-examined as to any matters stated in his
direct examination, or connected therewith . 36 He may not on crossexamination refuse to answer any question on the ground that the answer
that he will give, or the evidence he will produce, would have a tendency
to incriminate him for the crime with which he is charged.
It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal action be
asked a question which might incriminate him, not for the crime with which
he is charged, but for some other crime, distinct from that of which he is
accused, he may decline to answer that specific question, on the strength
of the right against self-incrimination granted by the first sentence of
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (now Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution). Thus, assuming that in a prosecution for murder, the
accused should testify in his behalf, he may not on cross-examination
refuse to answer any question on the ground that he might be implicated
in that crime of murder; but he may decline to answer any particular
question which might implicate him for a different and distinct offense, say,
estafa.
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently
charged with its commission in court, has the following rights in the matter
of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public
prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after having

26

been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty


in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the
police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel,
and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force,
violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which
vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in
violation of these rights rejected; and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT

37

a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever
result to him by such refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to
cross-examination by the prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a
specific
question
which
tends
to
incriminate him for some crime other than
that for which he is then prosecuted.
It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent Judge has
misapprehended the nature and import of the disparate rights set forth in
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has taken them as
applying to the same juridical situation, equating one with the other. In so
doing, he has grossly erred. To be sure, His Honor sought to substantiate
his thesis by arguments he took to be cogent and logical. The thesis was
however so far divorced from the actual and correct state of the
constitutional and legal principles involved as to make application of said
thesis to the case before him tantamount to totally unfounded, whimsical
or capricious exercise of power. His Orders were thus rendered with grave
abuse of discretion. They should be as they are hereby, annulled and set
aside.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not
in any sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly
understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the
discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a

27

hand. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation


under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore
come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that
Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of
the administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the
proceedings should be recorded, the record having thereafter been marked
during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against him as
Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K) that
he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the day before the
investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged
irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may
not be excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not
been accorded to Ramos.
His Honor adverts to what he perceives to be the "greater danger x x (of)
the violation of the right of any person against self-incrimination when the
investigation is conducted by the complaining parties, complaining
companies, or complaining employers because being interested parties,
unlike the police agencies who have no propriety or pecuniary interest to
protect, they may in their over-eagerness or zealousness bear heavily on
their hapless suspects, whether employees or not, to give statements
under an atmosphere of moral coercion, undue ascendancy and undue
influence." It suffices to draw attention to the specific and peremptory
requirement of the law that disciplinary sanctions may not be imposed on
any employee by his employer until and unless the employee has been
accorded due process, by which is meant that the latter must be informed
of the offenses ascribed to him and afforded adequate time and
opportunity to explain his side. The requirement entails the making of
statements, oral or written, by the employee under such administrative
investigation in his defense, with opportunity to solicit the assistance of
counsel, or his colleagues and friends. The employee may, of course,
refuse to submit any statement at the investigation, that is his privilege.
But if he should opt to do so, in his defense to the accusation against him,
it would be absurd to reject his statements, whether at the administrative
investigation, or at a subsequent criminal action brought against him,
because he had not been accorded, prior to his making and presenting
them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be informed
thereof, etc.) which, to repeat, are relevant only in custodial investigations.
Indeed, it is self-evident that the employee's statements, whether called
"position paper," "answer," etc., are submitted by him precisely so that

they may be admitted and duly considered by the investigating officer or


committee, in negation or mitigation of his liability.
Of course the possibility cannot be discounted that in certain instances the
judge's expressed apprehensions may be realized, that violence or
intimidation, undue pressure or influence be brought to bear on an
employee under investigation or for that matter, on a person being
interrogated by another whom he has supposedly offended. In such an
event, any admission or confession wrung from the person under
interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence, on proof of the vice or
defect vitiating consent, not because of a violation of Section 20, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution, but simply on the general, incontestable
proposition that involuntary or coerced statements may not in justice be
received against the makers thereof, and really should not be accorded
any evidentiary value at all.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting aside
the Orders of the respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. 3488-R, dated
August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988, and he is hereby ordered to
admit in evidence Exhibits "A" and "K" of the prosecution in said Criminal
Case No. 3488-R, and thereafter proceed with the trial and adjudgment
thereof. The temporary restraining order of October 26, 1988 having
become functus officio, is now declared of no further force and effect.
G.R. No. L-51770 March 20, 1985
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO GALIT, defendant-appellant.

CONCEPCION, JR., J:
1. The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a
robbery. He had been detained and interrogated almost continuously for
five days, to no avail. He consistently maintained his innocence. There was
no evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously, something drastic had to
be done. A confession was absolutely necessary. So the investigating
officers began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the prisoner
insisted on his innocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must be
obtained. So they continued to maltreat and beat him. 'They covered his

28

face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste.
The prisoner could not take any more. His body could no longer endure the
pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer. His will had been
broken. He admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit
and he signed the confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he
posed for pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a
reenactment.
2. This incident could have happened in a Russian gulag or in Hitler's
Germany. But no it did not. It happened in the Philippines. In this case
before Us.
3. The Revised Penal Code punishes the maltreatment of prisoners as
follows:
ART. 235. Maltreatment of prisoners. The penalty
of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, in addition to his
liability for the physical injuries or damage caused, shall be
imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall
over do himself in the correction or handling of a prisoner
or detention prisoner under his charge, by the imposition of
punishments in a cruel and humiliating manner.
If the purpose of the maltreatment is to extort a
confession, or to obtain some information from the
prisoner, the offender shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum period, temporary special
disqualification and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, in
addition to his liability for the physical injuries or damage
caused.
4. This Court in a long line of decisions over the years, the latest being the
case of People vs. Cabrera, 1 has consistently and strongly condemned the
practice of maltreating prisoners to extort confessions from them as a
grave and unforgivable violation of human rights. But the practice persists.
Fortunately, such instances constitute the exception rather than the
general rule.
5. Before Us for mandatory review is the death sentence imposed upon the
accused Francisco Galit by the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, in
Crim. Case No. CCC-VII-2589 of said court.
6. The record shows that in the morning of August 23, 1977, Mrs. Natividad
Fernando, a widow, was found dead in the bedroom of her house located at

Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal, as a result of seven (7) wounds inflicted


upon different parts of her body by a blunt instrument. 2 More than two
weeks thereafter, police authorities of Montalban picked up the herein
accused, Francisco Galit, an ordinary construction worker (pion) living in
Marikina, Rizal, on suspicion of the murder. On the following day, however,
September 8, 1977, the case was referred to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) for further investigation in view of the alleged limited
facilities of the Montalban police station. Accordingly, the herein accused
was brought to the NBI where he was investigated by a team headed by
NBI Agent Carlos Flores. 3 NBI Agent Flores conducted a preliminary
interview of the suspect who allegedly gave evasive answers to his
questions. 4 But the following day, September 9, 1977, Francisco Galit
voluntarily executed a Salaysay admitting participation in the commission
of the crime. He implicated Juling Dulay and Pabling Dulay as his
companions in the crime. 5 As a result, he was charged with the crime of
Robbery with Homicide, in an information filed before the Circuit Criminal
Court of Pasig, Rizal, committed as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of August 1977 in the
municipality of Montalban, province of Rizal, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together with Juling Doe and Pabling Doe, whose true
Identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and
three of them mutually helping and aiding one another,
with intent of gain and by means of force, intimidation and
violence upon the person of one Natividad Fernando while
in her dwelling, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously take, steal and carry away from the person of
said Natividad Fernando, cash money of an undetermined
amount, belonging to said Natividad Fernando, thereby
causing damage and prejudice to the latter in an
undetermined amount; that by reason or on the occasion of
said robbery, and for purpose of enabling them (accused)
to take, steal and carry away the said cash money in
pursuance of their conspiracy and for the purpose of
insuring the success of their criminal act, with intent to kill,
did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
attack, assault and stab with a dagger said Natividad
Fernando on the different parts of her body, thereby
inflicting multiple injuries on the head and extremities,
which directly caused her death, and the total amount of
the loss is P10,000.00 including valuables and cash.
Trial was held, and on August 11, 1978, immediately after the accused had
terminated the presentation of his evidence, the trial judge dictated his
decision on the case in open court, finding the accused guilty as charged

29

and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty; to indemnify the heirs of
the victim in the sum of P110,000.00, and to pay the costs. Hence, the
present recourse.
7. The incriminatory facts of the case, as found by the trial court, are as
follows:
From the evidence adduced in this case, it was gathered
that in the early morning of August 23, 1977, a 70-year old
woman named Natividad Fernando, widow, in the twilight
of her life, was robbed and then hacked to death by the
accused and two others in her (victim's) own residence at
Montalban, Rizal.
Prosecution witness Florentino Valentino testified that he
heard accused Francisco Galit and his wife having an
argument in connection with the robbery and killing of the
victim, Natividad Fernando. It appears that on August 18,
1977, accused Galit and two others, namely, Juling Dulay
and a certain "Pabling" accidentally met each other at
Marikina, Rizal, and in their conversation, the three agreed
to rob Natividad Fernando; that it was further agreed
among them to enter the premises of the victim's house at
the back yard by climbing over the fence; that once inside
the premises, they will search every room, especially the
aparador and filing cabinets, with the sole aim of looking
for cash money and other valuables.
Witness Valentino further testified that on August 22, 1977,
at around 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon, accused Francisco
Galit and his two companions, Juling Dulay and Pabling, as
per their previous agreement, met at the place where they
formerly saw each other in Mariquina, Rizal; that the three
conspirators took a jeepney for Montalban and upon
passing the Montalban Municipal Building, they stopped
and they waited at the side of the road until the hour of
midnight; that at about 12:00 o'clock that night, the three
repaired to the premises of the victim, Natividad Fernando;
that they entered the said premises through the back wall
of the house; that while entering the premises of said
house, Juling Dulay saw a bolo, lying near the piggery
compound, which he picked up and used it to destroy the
back portion of the wall of the house; that it was Juling
Dulay who first entered the house through the hole that
they made, followed by the accused Galit and next to him
was "Pabling", that it was already early dawn of August 23,

1977 when the three were able to gain entrance into the
house of the victim; as the three could not find anything
valuable inside the first room that they entered, Juling
Dulay destroyed the screen of the door of the victim,
Natividad Fernando; that upon entering the room of the
victim, the three accused decided to kill first the victim,
Natividad Fernando, before searching the room for
valuables; that Juling Dulay, who was then holding the
bolo, began hacking the victim, who was then sleeping,
and accused Galit heard a moaning sound from the victim;
that after the victim was killed, the three accused began
searching the room for valuables; that they helped each
other in opening the iron cabinet inside the room of the
victim, where they found some money; that when the three
accused left the room of the victim, they brought with
them some papers and pictures which they threw outside;
that after killing and robbing the victim, the three accused
went out of the premises of the house, using the same way
by which they gained entrance, which was through the
back portion of the wall; that the three accused walked
towards the river bank where they divided the loot that
they got from the room of the victim; that their respective
shares amount to P70.00 for each of them; and that after
receiving their shares of the loot, the three accused left
and went home.

8. The accused, upon the other hand, denied participation in the


commission of the crime. He claimed that he was in his house in Marikina,
Rizal, when the crime was committed in Montalban, Rizal. He also assailed
the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession extracted from him
through torture, force and intimidation as described earlier, and without
the benefit of counsel.

When witness Florentino Valentino was in his room, which


was adjoining that of accused Francisco Galit, he overheard
accused Galit and his wife quarreling about the intention of
accused Galit to leave their residence immediately; that he
further stated that he overheard accused Galit saying that
he and his other two companions robbed and killed
Natividad Fernando.

10. This Court, in the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 7 laid down the
correct procedure for peace officers to follow when making an arrest and in
conducting a custodial investigation, and which We reiterate:

As a result of the killing, the victim, Natividad Fernando,


suffered no less than seven stab wounds. There was
massive cerebral hemorrhage and the cause of death was
due to shock and hemorrhage, as evidenced by the
Medico-Legal Necropsy Report (Exhs. 'C' and 'C-2'), and the
pictures taken of the deceased victim (Exhs. 'E', 'E-1' and
'E-2').

30

9. After a review of the records, We find that the evidence presented by the
prosecution does not support a conviction. In fact, the findings of the trial
court relative to the acts attributed to the accused are not supported by
competent evidence. The principal prosecution witness, Florentino
Valentino merely testified that he and the accused were living together in
one house in Marikina, Rizal, on August 23, 1977, because the mother of
his wife is the wife of the accused; that when he returned home at about
4:00 o'clock in the morning from the police station of Marikina, Rizal, the
accused and his wife were quarreling (nagtatalo); that he heard that the
accused was leaving the house because he and his companions had
robbed "Aling Nene", the owner of a poultry farm and piggery in
Montalban, Rizal; that the wife of the accused was imploring him not to
leave, but the latter was insistent; that he saw the accused carrying a bag
containing about two handfuls (dakot) of coins which he had taken from
Aling Nene; that upon learning of what the accused had done, he went to
the Montalban police the next day and reported to the police chief about
what he had heard; and that a week later, Montalban policemen went to
their house and arrested the accused. 6

7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of


the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the
arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any.
He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might
make could be used against him. The person arrested shall
have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative,
or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by
telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall
be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that
this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged
by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel
may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless

made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement


obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part,
shall be inadmissible in evidence.
11. There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused,
no state witnesses, and not even fingerprints of the accused at the scene
of the crime. The only evidence against the accused is his alleged
confession. It behooves Us therefore to give it a close scrutiny. The
statement begins as follows:

13. The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment
are inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in a manner
contrary to law.
14. Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances
surrounding the taking of any confession, especially where the prisoner
claims having been maltreated into giving one. Where there is any doubt
as to its voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.
15. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Minister of Justice for
whatever action he may deem proper to take against the investigating
officers.

I. TANONG: Ipinagbibigay-alam ko sa inyo ang inyong mga


16. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby,
karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang-Batas ng Pilipinas na kung inyong
SET ASIDE, and another one entered ACQUITTING the accused Francisco
nanaisin ay maaaring hindi kayo magbigay ng isang salaysay, na
Galit of the crime charged. Let him be released from custody immediately
hindi rin kayo maaaring pilitin o saktan at pangakuan upang
unless held on other charges. With costs de oficio.
magbigay ng naturang salaysay, na anuman ang inyong sasabihin
sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring laban sa inyo sa anumang
SO ORDERED.
usapin na maaaring ilahad sa anumang hukuman o17.
tribunal
dito sa
Pilipinas, na sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring katulungin mo ang
isang manananggol at kung sakaling hindi mo kayang
bayaran ang
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, appellee,
isang manananggol ay maaaring bigyan ka ng isa vs.
ng NBI. Ngayon
at alam mo na ang mga ito nakahanda ka bang magbigay ng isang
ABELARDO PENILLOS y LUCINDO @ GUILLERMO "BILLY" PENILLOS,
kusang-loob na salaysay sa pagtatanong na ito?
MARIANO MARAO y MENDEZ, JOSE NUYDA y MARMEDA and
ROMEO NUYDA y PEDROSA, accused. ABELARDO PENILLOS y
LUCINDO @ GUILLERMO "BILLY" PENILLOS, accused-appellant.
SAGOT: Opo.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
12. Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not
satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several
short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a
dialect or language known to the person under investigation. Accused is
from Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog.
Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and
other relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for
This is an appeal from the decision 1 of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court
investigation and it was only about two weeks after he had executed
(RTC) of Legazpi City, in Criminal Case No. 2144 entitled "People of the
the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement
does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the
Philippines vs. Abelardo Penillos, et al.," promulgated on 28 September
investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment,
1983, convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of Robbery with
again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute
Homicide and Attempted Homicide pursuant to Article 294 of the Revised
gross violations of his rights.
Penal Code and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of "reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment."

31

The information prepared by the then assistant city fiscal charges the
above-named accused with the crime of "Robbery with Homicide and
Attempted Homicide" committed as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about the 31st day of July, 1981, in the City of
Legazpi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another for a common
purpose, with intent of gain (sic) and by means of violence
against or intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of the spouses
APRONIANO LLADONES and EPIFANIA LOPEZ LLADONES
and once inside, forcibly take the amount of P1,000.00
from the said spouses and by reason of or on occasion of
the robbery and with intent to kill, attacked, assaulted,
hogtied and stabbed APRONIANO LLADONES inflicting
injuries upon the latter which directly caused his untimely
death; while EPIFANIA LOPEZ LLADONES was hacked on her
shoulder, thus accused commenced the commission of the
crime directly by overt acts but did not perform all the acts
of execution which could produce the crime of Homicide
upon said EPIFANIA LOPEZ LLADONES by reason of causes
other than their spontaneous desistance. 2
xxx xxx xxx
Only accused-appellant Abelardo Penillos was apprehended. The others
remain at large. 3
Accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and was
given a separate trial.
The court a quo summarized the evidence for the prosecution, upon which
it based its conviction of appellant, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

32

Four defendants are charged with the offense of "Robbery


with Homicide and Attempted Homicide." Among them,
only one was apprehended and a separate trial was held.
On June 18, 1982, defendant Abelardo Penillos pleaded
"Not Guilty."
The following facts are not disputed. On July 31, 1981, in
the early hours of the evening or thereabouts (sic), at Sitio
Naontogan, Bariis, Legazpi (sic) City, Aproniano Lladones
and spouse Epifania Lopez were awakened as four (4)
persons suddenly entered their house. The intruders
demanded money from the couple and when Aproniano
Lladones refused to accede he was carried outside his
dwelling by the four persons. He was later on found
hogtied and lifeless suffering (sic) from multiple stab
wounds. His wife, Epifania LIadones Lopez was also hacked
with a bolo by one of the entrants (sic) as she tried to
follow to find out where her husband was being taken. The
following morning Abelardo Penillos was apprehended and
after giving an extra-judicial confession, the present
complaint was filed against him and his co-conspirators,
Mariano Marao, Romeo Nuyda and Jose Nuyda. The last
three defendants remained at-large hence Abelardo
Penillos was afforded a separate trial.
Testifying for the prosecution, Epifania Lopez Lladones
narrated that on the night in question while she and her
husband were asleep inside their house they were
awakened by the entry of four persons who demanded
money from them; that one of the intruders even sat on
the belly of her husband who was caught still lying down
and at that moment she was able to recognize one of them
as Abelardo Penillos because of the illumination coming
from a kerosene lamp in the kitchen adjoining the sala;
that Abelardo Penillos was one of the four persons who
brought her husband outside the house and as she tried to
follow she was hacked by one of them whose identity she
cannot tell; that she suffered a hack wound and later on
she came to know that her husband, hogtied, was found
dead from stab wounds; that she crawled in the dark to the
house of her neighbor Celerino Nudo who reported the

incident to the barangay captain who in turn lost no time in


notifying the police authorities; that recollecting the
robbery she discovered the loss of P1,000.00 kept in a
bamboo basket and during the time she was confined at
the hospital she recognized Abelardo Penillos as one of the
perpetrators when brought to her for confrontation.
Celerino Nudo also testifying recalls that in the evening of
July 31, 1981 Epifania Lopez then seriously injured from a
hack wound arrived at his house to seek his help regarding
an incident in their house; that she mentioned a certain
Billy Penillos as one of the men who forcibly entered their
dwelling while they were asleep; that he at once reported
the matter to the barangay captain and rushed Epifania
Lladones to the hospital. 4
xxx xxx xxx
Upon the other hand, appellant relied on alibi as his defense, which is
summarized by the trial court as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Penillos testified that on July 3l, 1981, he was in the
house of his grandmother at Barangay Esperanza, Putiao,
Sorsogon, in the morning until six o'clock in the evening;
that he left Barangay Esperanza thereafter riding on a
carabao sledge loaded with coconuts and arrived at
Barangay Imalnod, Legaspi City, a distance of about 4
kilometers at past eight o'clock in the evening; that he
proceeded to the house of his father-in-law where he spent
the night because he was already tired; that he was able to
surmise the time of his arrival because he overheard from
the radio that the drama serial Zimatar had just been
concluded. 5
After trial, the lower court rendered the challenged decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
xxx xxx xxx

33

All the foregoing and EVIDENCE considered, and finding the


guilt of the defendant beyond reasonable doubt, Abelardo
"Billy" Penillos @ Guillermo Penillos is sentenced to suffer
the penalty ofReclusion Perpetua or life imprisonment and
to indemnify the heirs of Aproniano Lladones in the amount
of P20,000; further, defendant to pay Epifania Lopez
Lladones the amount of Pl,000.00, cash stolen, in both
instances without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
Credit the defendant the full time of any preventive
imprisonment in the service of his sentence in accordance
with law. 6
xxx xxx xxx
Appellant immediately filed a Notice of Appeal 7 wherein he manifested
that he is appealing the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court. In
view of the penalty imposed, the appeal should have been made to this
Court. The records of the case were erroneously transmitted to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) which properly
forwarded the same to this Court on 24 November 1983. 8 On 20
December 1983, We required the appellant to file his Brief, 9 which he
complied with on 16 July 1984 10 after being granted several extensions.
The appellee, on the other hand, submitted its Brief on 15 November
1984. 11
Appellant submits the following assignment of errors:
I
THAT THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO
THE IDENTIFICATION OF APPELLANT BY THE COMPLAINT.
II.
THAT THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING THE STATEMENT
OF APPELLANT GREAT WEIGHT WHEN SAID STATEMENT
WAS
TAKEN
IN
DEROGATION
OF
APPELLANT'S

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND IN CONTRAVENTION OF


PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED BY JURISPRUDENCE.
In support of the first assigned error, appellant insists that Epifania
Lladones could not have made a proper identification of the offenders
because: (1) The only illumination at the scene of the incident was a gas
lamp which was placed in the kitchen. There were partitions between both
the kitchen and the sala and the sala and the bedroom where she and her
deceased husband were sleeping. There could not have been enough light
for her to properly recognize the accused. (2) Having just been roused from
sleep by one of the perpetrators who sat on the deceased's belly, she was
most probably "in a state of shock or terror" and thus positive identification
of the accused is highly improbable. Besides, she testified that the very
reason for her rushing to the kitchen upon waking up was to get the gas
lamp in order to see who her husband's attacker was. (3) Even when
Epifania was overtaken by the accused and pinned under a table, visibility
was still not sufficient as both were still some distance from the kitchen,
the only source of illumination. (4) Finally, her claim that she had known
the accused prior to the incident should have compelled the latter to have
at least worn a mask so he would not be recognized.
Appellant also takes exception to the procedure undertaken by the police
authorities on the day after the incident when he was brought to the
hospital to be identified by Epifania Lladones. He laments that:

The evidence for the prosecution also pointed out that on


the following morning of the incident (August 1, 1981),
Abelardo was made to face Epifania while the latter was
still confined at the Albay Provincial Hospital for medical
treatment of the hack wound she sustained and that
Epifania pointed to Abelardo as one of the perpetrators of
the offense charged. The defense submits that this
particular procedure undertaken by the police in showing
the victim, Epifania, a single person and asking her
whether or not that man is one of those who perpetrated
the offense, is most unfair and violative of the
constitutional rights of the accused. The proper procedure
should have been an identification in a line-up, whereby
the suspect is made to line up with other persons who are
not suspects at all, and then the victim is asked to point to
whoever he or she recognize as the perpetrator of the
offense. 12
Anent the second assigned error, appellant claims that his constitutional
rights to remain silent, to be entitled to counsel and to be informed of such
rights "had no longer any meaning or purpose." This is because before
giving his confession to the police investigator, he was interviewed by
other policemen. The prosecution failed to show that in the said interview,
the accused was apprised of his constitutional rights. He further avers that
he initially disclaimed responsibility for the crime but when manhandled,
boxed and struck with a piece of wood on the head, he was forced to
confess. Thus, the confession he prepared on 1 August 1981 (Exh. "B") is a
mere formality in spite of his having been informed by the police
investigator during the formal investigation of his constitutional rights.
And even conceding the absence of coercion during the initial interview,
the signed confession would still be inadmissible as it does not appear that
a waiver of the right to counsel was made by the accused.
In the People's Brief, the Solicitor General asserts the view that the
principal issue to be resolved is whether or not the appellant was
sufficiently identified as one of the culprits responsible for the offense.
Appellee avers, and We agree, that Epifania was able to sufficiently identify
Abelardo Penillos as the person who sat on her husband's belly and
demanded money from her. She testified that she was able to recognize

34

Penillos when the latter pinned her down under the table; such
identification was aided by her having known Penillos long before the
incident, when the latter would go to the Lladones' house. 13 She was even
able to declare that Penillos was wearing short pants at the time of the
commission of the crime. 14
Furthermore, the illumination provided by the kerosene lamp was enough
for Epifania to have recognized Penillos. This Court has held in the past
that illumination produced by kerosene (gasera) lamps is sufficient for the
identification of persons. 15 Where conditions of visibility are favorable, the
ability of a witness to identify the malefactor should be upheld. 16
The frenetic efforts of the appellant's counsel to cast doubt on the positive
identification by Epifania, characterized by attempts to mislead the latter,
proved to be a bad gamble for it only provided the prosecution a rare
opportunity to elicit the details for the positive identification, to wit:
Q How were you able to say that it was
Billy Penillos who sat on the stomach of
your husband and pointed the knife when
you said there were two persons present
inside your bedroom?
A I recognized him; he was then wearing
short-pant while his other companions was
(sic) wearing long pants.
Q And according to you after you ran away
to get the lamp in the kitchen before you
reached the kitchen, Billy Penillos twisted
your arm and pinned you under a table. Is
that correct?
FISCAL:
No. It is misleading, Your Honor please,
because she was already in the kitchen.
Before she could get hold of the lamp, that
was the time when Abelardo Penillos

35

twisted her right arm, she was already in


the kitchen.
COURT:
Witness may answer. She is under crossexamination.
A He placed me under the table.
BENDAA:
Q And it was under the table that you
recognized the face of Billy Penillos?
A While inside, I already recognized him
inside. Before I have (sic) already
recognized him.
Q Did you not testify a while ago that you
ran towards the kitchen to get a lamp, so
that, you can recognize the persons inside
the room?
A Yes, sir.
Q And do you want to impress the (sic)
Court that before you could get the lamp
from the kitchen, you were already able to
recognize Billy Penillos?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you were able to recognize Billy
Penillos although at that time you were
running towards the kitchen and Billy
Penillos was behind inasmuch as he was
sitting on the stomach of your husband?

A Yes. I already recognized him.

Q So, you are now telling the Court that the


lamp is (sic) near the sala and not in the
kitchen?

Q So, your statement a while ago that you


prefer (sic) in giving to the kitchen to get a
lamp was to recognize who the persons
were inside your house is not correct?

A It is (sic) inside the kitchen but near the


door leading to the sala.

A He was the very first one to get inside


the house while his companions who were
wearing long pants followed him. So I tried
to recognize them.

Q But your bedroom is inside a room which


has a partition separating it from the sala,
Is there a partition?
A Yes, sir.

Q Is there a partition between the kitchen


and your room?

Q So, you were not able to recognize the


companions of Abelardo Penillos?

A Yes, sir.
A No, sir. I was not able to recognize the
companions of Abelardo Penillos because
when Abelardo Penillos ran to hold my
husband
and
then
suddenly
his
companions entered.17

Q And you said the lamp is (sic) situated


inside the kitchen?
A Yes, sir, because there was (sic) a door
leading to that place.
xxx xxx xxx
Q How far is the kitchen to your bed?

Q But the direct light of the lamp is (sic)


being
obstructed
by
the
partition
separating the bedroom and the kitchen?

Q So, the only moment that you were able


to recognize Billy Penillos was while you
were inside the room, and while Abelardo
Penillos was demanding from you some
money while you were being pinned under
the table?

p The gas lamp was situated near the door.

A Yes, sir.

Q Is it the door of the room or near the


door of the kitchen?

Q And in these two instances where (sic)


according to you, you recognized the face
of Abelardo Penillos, first, when you were in
the room, the room was still dark because
the lamp was in the kitchen. Is that
correct?

A Very near.

A Near the door of the sala.

36

A Yes, sir.
Q And the second time that you recognized
Billy Penillos was while you were being
pinned under the table, and under the
table it was also dark at that time. Is that
correct?
A No, not dark, because the light from the
kitchen was illuminating the place wherein
I was being pinned under the table. It was
not dark.
Q The table where you said you were
pinned by Abelardo Penillos, how far was it
from the kitchen?
A About two meters.
Q How big is the table?
A It is small, we use it, for our eating
purposes. 18
This Court cannot yield to the postulations of the appellant that Penillos
would have worn a mask during the incident knowing as he did that
Epifania was familiar with him and that the latter was impelled by evil
motives in implicating him in the commission of the offense.

The first theory assumes that the wearing of masks to hide one's identity is
a universal practice resorted to by criminals who are known to their
prospective victims and who exercise utmost prudence and care in
ensuring that no witness would be able to identify them while committing a
crime. These assumptions are, of course, without any empirical basis and
are, at best, speculative. On the other hand, the evil motive ascribed to
Epifania by reason of an alleged prior verbal exchange between Penillos
and her is a mere figment of the former's imagination. Such verbal
disagreement allegedly arising from the refusal by Epifania to allow
Penillos to use her yard as a pathway, even if true, is inconsequential,
trivial and insufficient to move one to accuse another of committing
robbery with homicide.
With his positive identification, appellant's defense of alibi must fail.
We defer to the conclusion by the court a quo that the protestations of the
appellant "held in contrast with the positive identification made by Epifania
Lopez on his complicity in the commission of the offense could not provide
a justifiable ground to extricate him." 19
Appellant testified that between 6:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. on 31 July 1981,
the day of the incident, he was travelling by carabao from Sitio Esperanza
to Nauntogan, the place of the incident, a distance of about four (4)
kilometers. He was allegedly accompanied by one Victor Marao. Arriving
at his destination at around 8:00 p.m., he proceeded to the house of his
father-in-law, co-accused Mariano Marao, which is about thirty (30)
meters away from the residence of the victims. At the house of Mariano,
appellant also encountered his other co-accused, Jose Nuyda and Romeo
Nuyda. While having supper therein, appellant overheard Mariano and the
Nuydas talking about something that they would divide among
themselves. 20
Appellee easily demolishes this defense by alleging that: Penillos' alleged
travel from Esperanza to Nauntogan was not even corroborated by his
supposed companion, Victor Marao, who was not presented as a witness;
Penillos' presence at the house of his co-accused, a mere thirty (30) meters
away from the scene of the crime, militates against his defense in view of
the positive identification by Epifania; and that it was not physically
impossible for the appellant to have been at the place of the incident
during the commission of the crime.

37

Settled is the rule that alibi cannot prevail over a positive identification
made by a prosecution witness. 21 For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to
prove that the accused was somewhere when the crime was committed
but that he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him
to have been at the scene of the crime. 22

Question:
After
having
been informed of your
constitutional rights do you
wish to proceed with this
investigation?

Appellant also questions the manner in which he was initially identified by


Epifania Lladones in the hospital while the latter was recuperating from her
injury. The former contends that the procedure for conducting a police lineup should have been strictly followed. In People vs. Espiritu, 23 We ruled
that there is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper
identification. Clearly then, this argument must also fail.

Answer: Yes sir.

And now on the second assigned error. In respect to the allegation that the
signed confession (Exh. "B") was defective and should not have been
admitted in evidence, the appellee practically concedes the irregularity
when it avers thus:
xxx xxx xxx
From the record, it appears that appellant's sworn
statement was executed in a manner not in full accord with
his right to the assistance of counsel. This may be seen in
the preliminary portion of the sworn statement, on which
appellant was:
". . . reminded that under the new rules of
the Constitution you have the right to
remain silent and the right to have counsel
of your own choice. You are also reminded
that whatever you say here might be used
for or against you in any court proceedings.
Is this clearly understood by you?
Answer: Yes sir.

Question: Are you ready to


give
free
voluntary
statement?
Answer: Yes sir. (Folder of
Exhibits, p. 2)."
Neither the preliminary portion aforecited nor the
testimony of the investigating officer showed an
affirmative offer to provide appellant with counsel de
oficio if he could not retain counsel of his choice.
Consequently, the sworn statement may very well be
inadmissible and may not be utilized against appellant. 24
Indeed it does not appear that constitutional safeguards afforded an
accused under investigation for the commission of an offense were
complied with. Aside from the Solicitor General's observations, it is clear
that waiver of the right to counsel was not made in the presence of
counsel. On cross-examination, police investigator Demosthenes Martillano
testified:
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q Why did you not place in the
investigation that the witness is waiving his
right to a (sic) counsel?
A That is my error.
BENDAA:

38

Q Why? What do you mean by that answer


of yours that it was your error? Will you
please explain to us that answer of yours?
A All I know is that if the suspect does not
need a counsel, I think, it was (sic) also
suffice.
Q Tell the court whether or not during the
investigation Billy Penillos did not waive his
right to a (sic) counsel?
FISCAL
It is already stated, Your Honor please, in
his statement that when the affiant chose
to proceed with the investigation, to
answer all questions, he in effect is waiving
his right to a (sic) counsel after having
been informed of all his rights.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
The witness had already admitted that he
did not place specifically that portion of
waiver. But it does not mean that he did
not ask the suspect. It is a matter of
interpretation how you are going to
interpret that portion of your question. The
court under that respect will sustain the
objection of the Fiscal. 25
Even if the confession of an accused is gospel truth, if it was made without
the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the
absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. 26 The same
would necessarily apply to a waiver of the right to counsel not made in the
presence of counsel.

39

In Morales vs. Enrile, et al., 27 this Court, applying and interpreting Section
20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, which provides as follows:
Sec. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself. Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
laid down the duties of an investigator during custodial interrogation and
ruled that the waiver of the right to counsel shall not be valid unless made
with the assistance of counsel, thus:
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of
the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the
arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any.
He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might
make could be used against him. The person arrested shall
have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative,
or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by
telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be
the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that
this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged
by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel
may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless
made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part,
shall be inadmissible in evidence.
We
reiterated
the
above
ruling
in People
vs. Galit, 28 People
29
30
vs. Lumayok, People vs. Albofera and People vs.Marquez. 31 In view
therefore of the law and jurisprudence, the sworn statement of appellant,
Exhibit "B", is hereby declared inadmissible in evidence and should have

been rejected by the trial court even if it is not in fact a confession for, as
correctly observed by the People, it is exculpatory in nature. Just the same,
since it was taken in violation of appellant's constitutional right to counsel,
its exculpatory character did not cure the fatal defect.
We wish to underscore that Section 12(l) of Article III of the present
Constitution has gone further to protect, promote and enhance the right to
counsel of any person under investigation by expressly providing that such
is a right "to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice" and that it "cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel."
Be that as it may, We affirm the judgment of conviction by the trial court
on the basis of the testimonies of the witnesses presented by the
prosecution. Concluded the lower court: "The truth and as clearly borne by
the evidence is: the defendant was among the perpetrators of the heinous
offense. The robbery, left in its wake the death of Aproniano Lladones and
the wounding of his wife Epifania Lopez Lladones." 32
A trial court's findings of facts carry great weight for it has the privilege of
examining the deportment and demeanor of witnesses and, therefore, can
discern if such witnesses are telling the truth or not. 33 In the light of the
evidence presented in the proceedings below, We do not see any reason to
disturb the lower court's factual conclusions.
We, however, modify the designation of the offense the appellant was
convicted for on the basis of the information prepared by the then
assistant city fiscal. The information should have charged the appellant
simply with the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. This Court has consistently held that
this offense is denominated as such regardless of the number of the
homicides or injuries committed. These other circumstances merely serve
as generic aggravating circumstances which can be offset by other
mitigating circumstances. 34 There is no crime of robbery with homicide
and frustrated homicide 35 or robbery with homicide and attempted
homicide. 36 The term "homicide" in paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code is to be understood in its generic sense; it includes murder and
slight physical injuries committed during the robbery which crimes are
merged in the crime of robbery with homicide. 37

40

The trial court, however, should have taken into consideration the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling. Dwelling is aggravating in robbery
with homicide because this type of robbery could be committed without
the necessity of transgressing the sanctity of the home. 38 It is indisputably
clear from the pleadings and the decision of the trial court that although
the homicide was committed outside the house of the deceased, the
principal offense of robbery was perpetrated inside; the killing thus
occurred as a result of the initial evil design to steal.
The penalty for robbery with homicide and physical injuries defined under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code isreclusion perpetua to death.
Considering the presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the
greater penalty, which is death, shall be applied. 39 However, in view of the
abolition of the death penalty, the appellant is entitled to the reduced
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As noted from the dispositive portion of the challenged decision, the trial
court imposed the penalty of "reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment."
Evidently, it considered the latter as the English translation of the former,
which is not the case. Both are different and distinct penalties. In the
recent case of People vs. Baguio, 40 this Court held:
The Code 41 does not prescribe the penalty of "life
imprisonment" for any of the felonies therein defined, that
penalty being invariably imposed for serious offenses
penalized not by the Revised Penal Code but by special
laws. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least
thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible
for pardon, it also carries with it accessory penalties,
namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc. It is not the
same as "life imprisonment" which, for one thing, does not
carry with it any accessory penalty, and for another, does
not appear to have any definite extent or duration.
As early as 1948, in People vs. Mobe, 42 reiterated in People vs.
Pilones, 43 and in the concurring opinion of Justice Ramon Aquino in People
vs. Sumadic, 44 this Court already made it clear that reclusion
perpetua is not the same as imprisonment for life or life imprisonment.
Every judge should take note of the distinction and this Court expects,
that, henceforth, no trial judge should mistake one for the other.

Finally, conformably with the stated policy of this Court, the award of civil
indemnity in the amount of P20,00.00 is increased to P50,000.00. 45
WHEREFORE, except as modified in its dispositive portion to specify that
appellant Abelardo Penillo's penalty is to be reclusion perpetua, to remove
the alternative reference therein to "life imprisonment" and to increase the
indemnity for the death of Aproniano Lladones to be paid by him to the
heirs of said deceased, the judgment of the trial court in Criminal Case No.

41

2144 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects. The attempted homicide aspect


of the charge is likewise deemed absorbed in one special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, defined and penalized under Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, and the civil indemnity for the death of Aproniano
Lladones is hereby increased to P50,000.00.

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