TATEL VS. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC [207 SCRA 157; G.R. No.

40243; 11 Mar 1992]

Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of Virac.
Complaints were received by the municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of
the abaca bailing machine inside petitioners warehouse. A committee was then appointed by the
municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within the
warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the people in the
neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal council declaring said warehouse
as a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. According to respondent
municipal officials, petitioners warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of
1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or
barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid
loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance
No. 13 is unconstitutional.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioners warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning Article 694 of the Civil
Code
(2) Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional
and void.

Held: The storage of abaca and copra in petitioners warehouse is a nuisance under the provisions of
Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council
of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets the criteria for a valid municipal
ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be unfair or
oppressive, 3) must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade, 5)
must be general and consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. The purpose of
the said ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is one of the primordial
obligation of government. The lower court did not err in its decision.

PUBCORP CASES

SALVADOR VILLACORTA vs. GREGORIO BERNARDOFACTS:

Ordinance 22 entitled AN ORDINANCE REGULATING SUBDIVISION PLANS OVER PARCELS
OF LAND IN THE CITY OFDAGUPAN was enacted by the municipal board of Dagupan City. The said
ordinance was imposing additional requirements to that of the national law Act 496. Ordinance 22 was
annulled by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals whose decision
reads as follows: Section 1 of said ordinance clearly conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the
latter law does not require subdivision plans to be submitted to the City Engineer before the same is submitted
for approval to and verification by the General Land Registration Office or by the Director of Lands as provided for in
Section 58 of said Act. Section 2 of the same ordinance also contravenes the provisions of Section 44 of Act
496, the latter being silent on a service fee of PO.03 per square meter of every lot subject of such subdivision
application; Section 3 of the ordinance in question also conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law
does not mention of a certification to be made by the City Engineer before the Register of Deeds allows registration
of the subdivision plan; and the last section of said ordinance imposes a penalty for its violation, which Section 44 of
Act 496 does not impose. In other words, Ordinance 22 of the City of Dagupan imposes upon a subdivision owner
additional conditions.
ISSUE
: Were the decisions of the CFI and CA to annul the said ordinance was correct?
HELD:
Yes. To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating
national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional requirements
for the issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize carnaping; the
execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of passports, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of
speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. This advice is especially addressed to the local governments which
exercise the police power only by virtue of a valid delegation from the national legislature under the general
welfare clause. In the instant case, Ordinance No. 22 suffers from the additional defect of violating this authority for
legislation in contravention of the national law by adding to its requirements.

Lina v. Pao
G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001
Quisumbing, J.
Facts:
Private respondent Tony Calvento, was appointed agent by PCSO to install a terminal for the operation of
lotto, applied for a mayors permit to operate a lotto outlet in San Pedro,Laguna. It was denied on the ground that an
ordinance entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Laguna prohibited gambling in the province,including the operation of lotto. With the denial of his application,
private respondent
fileda n a c t i o n f o r d e c l a r a t o r y r e l i e f w i t h p r a y e r f o r p r e l i m i n a r y i n j u n c t i o n a n d t e m p o r a r y restrain
ing order. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent enjoiningpetitioners from implementing or
enforcing the subject resolution.
Issue:
whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Lagunaand the denial of a mayors permit
based thereon are valid

Held:
No. The questioned ordinance merely states the objection of the council to the saidgame. It is but a mere policy
statement on the part of the local council, which is not self- executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to
prohibit the operation of the lotto
systemi n t h e p r o v i n c e o f L a g u n a . A s a p o l i c y s t a t e m e n t e x p r e s s i n g t h e l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t s o b j
e c t i o n t o t h e l o t t o , s u c h r e s o l u t i o n i s v a l i d . T h i s i s p a r t o f t h e l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t s autonomy to
air its views which may be contrary to that of the national governments.However, this freedom to
exercise contrary views does not mean that local governmentsmay actually enact ordinances that go
against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given thispremise, the assailed resolution in this case could
not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.Moreover,
ordinances should not contravene statutes as municipal governments
arem e r e l y a g e n t s o f t h e n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t . T h e l o c a l c o u n c i l s e x e r c i s e o n l y d e l e g a t e d legisl
ative powers which have been conferred on them by Congress. The delegate cannot besuperior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter. This being thecase, these councils, as delegates, cannot be superior
to the principal or exercise powershigher than those of the latter. The question of whether gambling should be
permitted is forCongress to determine, taking into account national and local interests. Since Congress hasallowed
the PCSO to operate lotteries which PCSO seeks to conduct in Laguna, pursuant toits legislative grant of authority,
the province's Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot nullify theexercise of said authority by preventing something
already allowed by Congress.

THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL v. THE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, HON. JOSE ATIENZA, JR., and
THE CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA. G.R. No. 154599. January 21, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay National is the national organization of all the barangays in the
Philippines, which pursuant to Section 492 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local
Government Code of 1991, constitutes the duly elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities, provincial
chapters, the metropolitan Manila Chapter, and metropolitan political subdivision chapters. Section
493 of the LGC provides that the ligas directly elect a president, a vice-president, and five (5)
members of the board of directors. All other matters not provided for in the law affecting the internal
organization shall be governed by their respective constitution and by-laws. The Liga then adopted and
ratified its own Constitution and by-laws to govern its internal organization. One the provisions was:
"There shall be nationwide synchronized elections for the provincial, metropolitan, and HUC/ICC
chapters to be held on the third Monday of the month immediately after the month when the
synchronized elections". The Liga thereafter came out with its Calendar of Activities and Guidelines in
the Implementation of the Liga Election Code of 2002, setting on 21 October 2002 the synchronized
elections for highly urbanized city chapters, such as the Liga Chapter of Manila, together with
independent component city, provincial, and metropolitan chapters. Respondent then enacted enacted
Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002, providing, among other things, for the election of representatives
of the District Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila and setting the elections for both chapters thirty
days after the barangay elections. The ordinance was transmitted to then Mayor Lito Atienza, which he
signed even if the Liga requested him to veto the ordinance as it encroached upon, or even assumed,
the functions of the Liga through legislation, a function which was clearly beyond the ambit of the
powers of the City Council.
ISSUE: Whether respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction when he signed and passed Ordinance No. 8039.
RULING:

No. First, the respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor arrogated unto
themselves any judicial or quasi-judicial prerogatives. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a special civil action that may be invoked only against a tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Elsewise stated, for a writ of certiorari to
issue, the following requisites must concur:
(1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine what the
law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions
and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is a term
which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as
a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. Before a tribunal, board,
or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise
to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made,
and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with
power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending
parties. The Court agreed that respondent's act was in the exercise of legislative and executive
functions, respectively, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. On this score alone, certiorari will
not lie. Second, the Court concludes that petitioners seek the declaration by this Court of the
unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of
the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original,
jurisdiction. The Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question. (Italics supplied).
As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a
petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved. Third, the Court stated that
petitioner clearly disregarded the hierarchy of courts. There is no reason or circumstance given by
petition on why direct recourse to the Court be allowed.The Court has decided that disregard to the
hierarchy of courts can be allowed by two reasons:
(1) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and
(2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of
cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum
under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a
trier of facts. (Santiago v. Vasquez)

GORDON VS. VERIDIANOFACTS:

Private respondent Rosalinda Yambao owned two drug stores in Olongapo City, the San Sebastian Drug Store and
the Olongapo CityDrug Store. A joint team from the Food & Drug Administration (FDA) and Philippine Constabulary
conducted a "test buy" at San Sebastian DrugStore of Valium without a doctor's prescription. Consequently,
Mayor Gordon (petitioner) issued a letter revoking mayor's permit of SanSebastian Drug Store for rampant
violation of R.A. 5921, otherwise known as the Pharmacy Law and R.A. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
FDA Administrator likewise directed the closure of the drug store for 3 days and its payment of a fine
and was allowed to resumeoperations after 3 days. Yambao wrote a letter to the petitioner seeking
reconsideration of the revocation of mayor's permit but got no reply.They filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City a complaint for mandamus. Meanwhile, Yambaos request of permission from the FDAto exchange the
locations of the San Sebastian Drug Store and the Olongapo City Drug was granted. But when petitioner came to
know aboutit, he disapproved it and suspended also the mayors permit of the other drug store. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the Yambaos tothe FDA was denied. The RTC judge rendered decision declaring the
revocation of the mayors permit for San Sebastian Drug Store as null andvoid and thereafter denied the
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
May the mayor revoke the mayors permit of the San Sebastian Drug Store based on the above-stated facts?
HELD:
FDA was created under R.A. No. 3720 and vested with all drug inspection functions in line with "the policy of the
State to insure safeand good quality supply of food, drug and cosmetics, and to regulate the production,
sale and traffic of the same to protect the health of thepeople. P.D. No. 280 gave more teeth to the powers of
the FDA in regulating the drugstores in the sale or dispensation of drugs, or rules and regulations issued pursuant
thereto. For the mayor, it was granted by the charter of Olongapo the power to to arrest violators of health
laws,ordinances, rules and regulations and to recommend the revocation or suspension of the permits
of the different establishments to the City Mayor for violation of health laws, ordinances, rules and
regulations. A study of the said laws will show that the authorization to operate issued by the FDA is a
condition precedent to the grant of a mayor's permit to the drug store seeking to operate within the limits of the city.
This requirement is imperative. The power to determine if the opening of the drug store is conformable to the national
policy and the laws on the regulation of drug sales belongs to the FDA. Hence, a permit issued by the mayor to
a drug store not previously cleared with and licensed by the said agency will be a nullity. Thus, if the
FDA grants a license upon its finding that the applicant drug store has complied with the requirements
of the general laws and the implementing administrative rules and regulations, it is only for their
violation that the FDA may revoke the said license. By the same token, having granted the permit upon
his ascertainment that the conditions thereof as applied particularly to Olongapo City have been complied with, it is
only for the violation of such conditions that the mayor may revoke the said permit. Conversely, the mayor may not
revoke his own permit on the ground that the compliance with the conditions laid down and found satisfactory by the
FDA when it issued its license is in his own view not acceptable. This very same principle also operates on the FDA.
The FDA may not