BRETT KIMBERLI IN THE CIRCUIT COURT Plaintiff, | FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY G NATIONAL BLOGGERS CLUB, et al., Defendants. CaseNo.: 403868V DEFENDANTS THE BLAZE INC., MERCURY RADIO ARTS, AND GLENN BECK’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION RECEIVED sep 2920'5 Clerk of the Circuit Court Montgomery County, Md.TABLE OF AUTHORITIES... PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...so BACKGROUND... ARGUMENT. 1 H, m. IV, CONCLUSION. TABLE OF CONTENTS KIMBERLIN CANNOT SATISFY THE THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS FOR A MOTIGN FOR RECONSIDERATION ..... KIMBERLIN REPEATS MERITLESS ARGUMENTS THAT FAIL NOW FOR THE SAME REASONS THEY FAILED PREVIOUSLY... THE COURT SHOULD DISREGARD KIMBERLIN’S NEW FACTUAL ASSERTIONS AND LEGAL ARGUMENTS THAT HE, COULD HAVE RAISED BEFORE BUT DID NOT........ oo A. Kimberlin’s Conclusory Factual Assertions Concerning the Local Maryland Radio Stations Are Baseless. enn B Even under His Purportedly New Legal Theory, This Court Would Still Lack Personal Jurisdiction over the Blaze Defendants... C. Kimberlin Is Not Entitled to Jurisdictional Discovery... ‘THE COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN SANCTIONING KIMBERLIN .. 10TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases ALS Scan, Inc, v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc, 293 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2002) conn 7 ae Androutsos v, Fairfax Hosp, 323 Md. 634, 549 A.24 574 (1991) 9 Armstrong ¥. Nat'l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia, No. CIV.A. ELH-13-03702, 2015 WL 751344 (D. Md, Feb. 20, 2015). 9 US. ex rel, Becker v, Westinghouse Savannah River Co. 305 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2002) wnnenee . Beyond Sys,, Inc. v. Realtime Gaming Holding Oo, 388 Md. 1, 878 A.2d 567 (2005)... Carefirst of Maryland, Ine. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Cer, 334 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 2003) . 9 CSR, Lid v. Taylor, 411 Md. 457, 983 A.2d 492 (2009) ne 5 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v, Brown, 131 S. Ct, 2846 (2011). Griffin Whitaker, LLC v. Torres, ‘No. DKC-10-0725, 2010 WL 3895384 (D. Me. Oct. 1, 2010) sane Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939 (4th Cir. 1994)... Lewron Television, Inc. v. Int'l Alliance of Theatrical Stage Emp. & Moving Picture Mach. Operators of US. & Can, 37 Md. App. 662, 378 A.2d 728 (1977) . Mackey v. Compass Miig., Inc., 391 Md. 117,892 A.2d 479 (2006) .......... paves Reed In Union of United Auto, Aerospace & Agric, Implant eres of Am, 945 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1991) vs . nt iSchlotzhauer v. Morton, 119 A.34 121, 2015 WL 4598331 (Md. App. Joly 30, 2015) suns Station Maint. Solutions, Inc. . Two Farms, Inc., 209 Md. App. 464, 60 A.3d 72 (2013) Steinhoff. Sommerfelt, 144 Md. App. 463, 798 A.2d 1195 (2002) Void v. One W. Bank, No. CIV.A. DKC 11-0838, 2012 WL 113443 (D. Md. Jan. 12, 2012) Weinstock v, Levin, No. CCB-06-3034, 2007 WL 776676 (D. Md. Mar. 13, 2007).. Windsor v. Spinner Indus. Co., Ltd., 825 F. Supp. 2d 632 (D. Md. 2011 fiPRELIMINARY STATEMENT Plaintiff Brett Kimberlin’s (“Kimberlin”) Motion for Reconsideration is yet another fruitless attempt to revise a case that — as the Court recognized — has no jurisdictional foundation or substantive metit, Indeed, the motion improperly recycles several of the baseless arguments this Court already rejected, and simultaneously attempts to make new (yet equally misguided) arguments that could have been raised before. In characteristic fashion, Kimberlin’s claims against The Blaze Inc., Mercury Radio Arts, and Glenn Beck (collectively tre “Blaze Defendants”) are based on misapplication of the law, unsupported anc immaterial factual allegations, and outright misrepresentation of arguments made by the Blaze Defendants and of statements made by this Court, Kimberlin’s rehashed arguments ccncerning personal jurisdiction — general, specific, and conspiracy-based — and his points related to defamation offer nothing new, and they fail for the same reasons that the Blaze Defendants articulated in their motion to dismiss and at ora] argument. Kimberlin’s belated “new” arguments and factual assertions regarding jurisdiction and jurisdictional discovery deserve no consideration at all given their untimetiness. Moreover, they fail on their merits for reasons similar to Kimberlin’s prior ill-fated theories. Accordingly, the motion should be denied. BACKGROUND ‘The Blaze Defendants respectfully refer the Court to their memorandum of law in support of their motion to dismiss [D.E. 4S] for the statement of facts, which the Blaze Defendants incorporate herein by reference. The Blaze Defendants argued in their papers{and before the Court on September 3, 2015), inter atia, that they are not subject to personel jurisdiction in Meryland simply by virtue of the availability of content on the Intemet that can be accessed in Maryland and that happens to relate to a Maryland resid and that Kimberlin failed to plausibly allege the existence of a conspiracy. The Blaze Defendants also reiterated that this lawsuit is really a defamation case in disguise, and that no such claim wes, or could be raised against the Blaze Defendants. ‘The Court, at oral argument, ordered this case dismissed with prejudice as to the Blaze Defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for the reasons set forth in the Blaze Defendants’ motion papers (with the exception of the Blaze Defendants’ statute-of-Jimitations and anti-SLAPP arguments). [See DE. 81 & motion hearing audio record.] Kimberlin filed a “Motion for Reconsideration/Relief from Judgment” on September 14, 2015. [D.E.90.] ARGUMENT L _ KIMBERLIN CANNOT SATISFY THE THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS FOR A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION Kimberlin bears @ heavy burden to establish that he is entitled to reconsideration of this Court's ruling dismissing Kimberlin’s case against the Blaze Defendants, and he does not meet this high threshold. A motion for reconsideration is “not the proper place” for Kimberlin “to relitigate [his] case after the court has ruled against [him], as mere disagreement with a court’s rulings will not support granting such a request.” Void v. One WW. Bank, No. CIV.A. DKC 11-0838, 2012 WL 113443, at #2 (D. Md. Jan. 12, 2012) (internal citations omitted); see US. ex rel. Becker v. Westinghouse Savarnah River Co., 305 F.3d 284,290 (4th Cit. 22002), See also Steinhoff v. Sommerfelt, 144 Md. App. 463, 484, 798 A.24 1195, 1207 (2002). Yet much of Kimberlin's Motion for Reconsideration is a bid to rehash the same ‘arguments and misleading factual assertiors that Kimberlin made in his complaint, in his ‘opposition to the Blaze Defendants’ motion to dismiss, end at oral argument. ‘And, to the extent Kimberlin is requesting reconsideration as a result of “new arguments that [he] could have raised before the court ruled, the court has almost limitless discretion not to consider those argument{s].” Schlotzhauer v. Morton, 119 A.3d 121, 129, 2015 WL 4598331, at *6 (Md. App. July 30, 2015); Steinhoff, 798 A.2d at 1207 (losing parties “do not enjoy carte blanche, through post-trial motions, to replay the game as a matter of right” based on issues that could have been raised earlier). Indeed, Kimberlin must show that there was some post judgment development directly related to the facts of the case that could not possibly have been raised earlier, such as an intervening change in the controlling law or newly discovered facts which could not have been unearthed before. See Schlotzhauer, 2015 WL 4598331, at *6; Steinhoff, 798 A.2d at 1207. Neither of these exceptional scenarios is applicable here. I. _ KIMBERLIN REPEATS MERITLESS ARGUMENTS THAT FAIL NOW. FOR THE SAME REASONS THEY FAILED PREVIOUSLY ‘The Court soundly rejected Kimberlin’s positions regarding personal jurisdiction as well as the substantive merits of his claims with respect to the Blaze Defendants and should do so again faced with Kimberlin’s attempt to relitigate his case. While he now seeks to establish jurisdiction under the guise of three local radio stations that may carry some of the Blaze Defendants’ content, Kinberlin’s underlying theory is essentially unchanged: that the mere transmission of electronic signals by the Blaze Defendants that 3happened to reach Maryland residents (ané residents of the other 49 states) is sufficient for personal jurisdiction. This theory fails for the reasons stated in the Blaze Defendants briefs and at oral argument. (See Blaze Defs. Mot. to Dismiss at 7-11.) Kimberlin also repeats his flawed “conspiracy” theory of personal jurisdiction, but in doing so, blatantly misstates the Coun’s findings thereon. As the Blaze Defendants argued in their motion papers end before the Court, Kimberlin does not plausibly allege a conspiracy against the Blaze Defendants, and therefore there can be no conspiracy-based personal jurisdiction. See Mackey v. Compass Miig., Inc., 391 Md, 117, 147, 892 A.2d 479, 497 (2006); (Blaze Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 26-28). Indeed, this Court acknowledged at oral argument ~ referencing Judge Hazel's dismissal of Kimberlin’s federal RICO claim for lack of an “enterprise” — that Kimberlin failed to allege a conspiracy against the Blaze Defendants. Kimberlin’s false statement that the Court left the conspiracy claim alive as to the Blaze Defendants (see Pl. Br. at 10) merits no consideration. Further, Kimberlin improperly uses his Motion for Reconsideration as a second bite at the apple on the merits of his case, which he predicates on the repetition of demonstrably false factual allegations, including that Mr. Beck and his call-in guests “assert[ed] that Plaintiff swatted them” (Pl. Br. at 9).' Kimberlin conveniently ignores the fact that the Court dismissed the case against the Blaze Defendants alternatively for * Kimberlin also slyly introduces articles that were never mentioned in his complaint. (See id (referencing article entitled “Red State Editor in Chief Claims Family Was Subject to Possible Kimberlin-Related Attack Sunday” which was mentioned for te first time during oral argument fon September 3, 2015).) The Court should not permit Kimberiin to constantly change the scope of complaint against partes that have been subject to his defamation suit since October 2013. 4the reasons set forth in the Blaze Defendants” briefs (excepting statute-of-limitations or anti-SLAPP arguments), which renders his attempts at re-argument futile. [See D.E. 81 & motion hearing audio record]? Nonetheless, Kimberlin dedicates four pages of his motion to focus on the Court’s purported misapplication of Maryland libel law, but as the Blaze Defendants have mentioned before, Jmberlin has asserted no libel claim against the Blaze Defendants. The remainder of his motion fails to raise any issues relevant to the claims against the Blaze Defendants. Thus, Kimberlin in effect concedes that, as 10 the Blaze Defendants, there is nothing to reconsider. UI. THE COURT SHOULD DISREGARD KIMBERLIN’S NEW FACTUAL ASSERTIONS AND LEGAL ARGUMENTS THAT HE COULD HAVE RAISED BEFORE BUT DID NOT Kimberlin bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over the Bleze Defendants, see CSR, Ltd. v. Taylor, 411 Md. 457, 467 n.2, 983 A.2d 492, 498 1.2 (2009), and his theory of jurisdiction has always been based on the Blaze Defendants’ Intemet presence; he never even mentioned radio stations in his complaint. However, ‘Kimberlin now asserts that he is entitled te reconsideration on the issue of personal jurisdiction simply because he has Jearned of the existence of three local radio stations in Maryland that may carry the Blaze Defendents’ content. The Court should exercise its “almost limitless discretion” to reject Kimberlin’s new factual contentions and legal * Kimbertin again mentions a “defamatory graphic” that Mr. Beck purportedly drew during his television program. (See Cplt. 4 80; see also Fl. Br. at 10 & Exh. B.) While he referenced this graphic in his complaint (see Cpl. § 80), until now Kimberlin has never provided a copy of the traphic, and it does not appear in any of the videos or articles referenced in his complaint. Its unclear where Kimberlin acquired the image in Exhibit B to his Motion for Reconsideration, ‘hea it was created, or who created it; accordingly, it eannot be trusted and should be given no ‘weight. Moreover, the substance of the drawing is no more “defamatory” than anything else Kimberiin previously identified in his claims egainst the Blaze Defendants, which did not include defamation in the first place.arguments because he “could have raised [them] before the court ruled” on the Blaze Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Schlotzhauer, 2015 WL 4598331, at *6, and because they are nonetheless without any factual basis or legal merit. A. Kimberlin’s Conclusory Factual Assertions Concerning the Local Maryland Radio Stations Are Baseless. Asan initial matter, the radio statins’ existence was a public fact Kimberlin could have discovered and raised long ago’ and he does not explain why he failed to do so. Regardless, contrary to Kimberlin’s cenjectural statement, the three radio stations at issue are not “legal affiliates” of the Blaze Defendants. In fact, they are not related at all to the Blaze Defendants and even carry other political commentators” content (see Declaration of Scott J. Sholder dated September 29, 2015 (“Sholder Deci.”) Exh. A (true and correct screen shots of local radio station websites; corporate names in the website foovers are circled in red).) Similarly, Kiraberlin states no factual basis for his conclusory allegation that the Blaze Defendants and these radio stations have any direct “contractual business relationships” or that the Blaze Defendants receive “substantial revenue” therefrom. (See Pl. Br. at 2.) In fact, Kimberlin weakens his own position concerning jurisdiction because he provides no factual support for his assumption thet the Blaze Defendants" supposedly injurious content was actually transmitted by any of these three radio stations. Cf Windsor v. Spinner Indus. Co., Ltd., 825 F. Supp. 2d 632, 639 (D. Ma. 2011) (Gnding no personal jurisdiction over a Taiwanese corporation that maintained a “web presence in Maryland” and marketed and sold their products in Maryland and throughout the United ® See generally wow glennbeck.com/contenveffilistes/ 6States, because plaintiffs “offered no details about the particular chain of distribution that ‘brought the allegedly defective [product]” into Maryland), B, Even under His Purportedly New Legal Theory, This Court Would Still Lack Personal Jurisdiction over the Blaze Defendants. Kimberlin predictably attempts to blame his failure to carry his jurisdictional burden of proof on the Blaze Defendants by mischaracterizing their legal position. However, the Blaze Defendants have never disputed that their content is available in Maryland (and “globally,” to use Kimberlin’s words) but have maintained that such availability is insufficient to establish juristictionally meaningful contacts with the stat. ‘The Blaze Defendants ~ like most major media companies ~ have local affiliate stations all over the country (see Sholder Decl. Exh. B (true and correct screen shots from ‘www. glennbeck.com of the Glenn Beck Redio Program local affiliate map)), but this does not make them amenable to suit in every state. Cf Reed v. Int'l Union of United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 945 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[TJhe mere fact that [a local union] is affliated with the Intemational [union] should not justify jurisdiction; otherwise local unions would be required to defend suits in every state where their intemational union has a presence.”).* Indeed, the radio stations simply “ While the Blaze Defendants have not found any binding case law in Maryland on personal jurisdiction in the context of affiliate radio stations, several courts have declined to exercise Jurisdiction in analogous situations. See, e.g, Lewron Television, Inc. v. Int Alliance of Theatrical Stage Emp. & Moving Picture Maca. Operators of US. & Can., 37M. App. 662, 673, 378 A2d 728, 735 (1977) (international labor union was not subject to personal jurisdiction jn Maryland as a result of the actions of its local affiliates); Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 945 (4th Cir. 1994) (“To permit astate to assert jurisdiction over any person in the ‘country whose product is sold in the state simply because a person must expect that to happen ‘would subject defendants to judgment in locations based on the activity of third persons and not the deliberate conduct of the defendant.”); Weinstock v. Levin, No. CCB-06-3034, 2007 WL 776676, at *4 (D. Md. Mar. 13, 2007) (“Advertisements placed on national television that are not 7camry content made available nationwide, and are no more Maryland-focused than the Internet; their presence among hundreds of other affilieies across the country (see Sholder Decl. Exh. B), does not amount to the “continuous and systematic” contacts necessary to make the Blaze Defendants “at home” in Maryland for purposes of general jurisdiction. ALS Sean, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Ine., 293 F.34 707, 712 (4th Cir. 2002); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, $.4. v. Brown, 131 S, Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011); (See also Blaze Defs. Mot. to Dismiss at 7-11). Finally, even if Kimberlin could substantiate the direct contractual relationships he believes exist between the Blaze Defendants and the local radio stations, as a legal snalter, the mere presence of contractual errangement, without more, is insufficient to establish general personal jurisdiction. See Weinstock. 2007 WL 776676, at *3. Further, no specific jurisdiction would exist here besause this case does not arise out of any contractual relationships or, for that matter, any other acts of the local radio stations. C. Kimberlin Is Not Entitled to Jurisdictional Discovery. Kimberlin’s request for jurisdictional discovery comes too late in his Motion for Reconsideration. He was required to make this request before the motion to dismiss was fully briefed. See, e.g., Griffin Whitaker, LLC v. Torres, No. DKC-10-0725, 2010 WL 3895384 (D. Md. Oct, 1, 2010) (denying motion for reconsideration that included request. targeted at Maryland residents, even if seen by some Maryland residents, do not... in and of themselves suppor a finding of general jurisdiction.” * The test for personal jurisdiction i, of course, not whether a defendant has “nore than minimal contacts” with the forum state, as Kimberlin seems to believe. (Pl Br. at 7.) * Beyond Sys, Inc. Realtime Gaming Holding Co., 388 Md. 1, 878 A.2d $67 (2005), does not stand for the proposition that “contractual relationships demonstrate prima face evidence of jurisdiction.” (PI. Br. at 2.) Rather, that case dealt primarily with agency relationships, and the court there found that no such contractual or agency relationship existed 8for jurisdictional discovery, noting that such a request should have been made in opposition to defendant's motion to dismi Even if it were timely, Kimberlin’s request for discovery is misguided because he failed to “establish a prima facie case [for personel jurisdiction),” and the “record lacks any credible indicia of minimum contacts” by the Blaze Defendants with Maryland, Armstrong v. Nat'l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia, No. CIV.A. ELH-13-03702, 2015 WL 751344, at *14-15 (D. Md. Feb. 20, 2015) i ing Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 676-77 (4th Cir.1989)). When, as here, a plaintiff “offers only speculation of conclusory assertions about contacts with a forum state, a court is within its discretion in denying jurisdictional discovery.” Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Cir., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 402 (4th Cir. 2003).” IV. THE COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN SANCTIONING KIMBERLIN Despite Kimberlin's fabricated allegation that he was “misled” as to the date of the Court's July 17, 2015 scheduling conference, the fact remains that he violated this, Court’s April 22, 2015 order stating that he must appear for the scheduling conference on pain of dismissal or sanctions, (See Sholder Decl. Exh. C at 2 (a true and correct copy of the April 22, 2015 Notice of Scheduling Hearing and Order of Court).) The Blaze Defendants defer to this Court's discretion to award sanctions for violations of its orders; "The thicket of cases Kimberlin cites is comprised wholly of authority that isnot binding on this Court. (See Pl. Br. at 4-5.) The one binding cese Kimberlin references — Androutsos v. Fairfax Hosp. 323 Md. 634, 549 A.2d 574 (1991) — is distinguishable because the plaintiff in that case, unlike Kimberti, had served discovery demands and established some indicia of personal Jurisdiction in Maryland based on the existing -ecord. See id.; Armstrong, 2015 WL 751344, at +14.should the Court determine that it is constrained from shifting attomey’s fees, the Blaze Defendants request that the Court instead issue a monetary sanction not tied specifically ‘to counsel’s expenses for appearing at the scheduling conference. See Station Maint. Solutions, Inc. v. Two Farms, Inc., 209 Md. App. 464, 478, 60 A.3d 72, 80 (2015). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Kimberlin’s Motion for Reconsideration should be denied. Dated: New York, New York September 29, 2015 10 Respectfully submitted, COWAN DeBAETS ABRAHAMS. as) !Lackman (pro hac vice) Scott J. Sholder (pro hac vice) 41 Madison Avenue, 34" Floor ‘New York, New York 10010 Tel: (212) 974-7474 Fax: (212) 974.8474 ELackman@edas.com BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP Washington Square, Suite 1100 1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20036 Tel: (202) 861-1500 Fax: (202) 861-1763 MBailen@bakerlaw.com Attorneys for defendants The Blaze Inc., Mercury Radio Arts, and Glenn BeckCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE certify that, on this 29th day of September 2015, I served a copy of the Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, with accompanying exhibits, via U.S. first-class mail, postage prepaid, to Brent innber! ‘Bethesda, MD 20817 1 further certify that, on this 29th dey of September 2015, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing via e-mail, by agreement, on the following parties who have entered an appearance in this matter: ‘Michael F. Smith Counsel for Michelle Malkin and Twitchy Patrick F. Ostronic Counsel for William Hoge Bruce T. Godfrey Counsel for Mandy Nagy Christina P. Sirois Counsel for DB Capitol Strategies and Dan Backer Defendant Aaron Walker Prose 1BRETT KIMBERLIN, IN THE CIRCUIT COURT Plaintiff, | FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY Case No. 403868V NATIONAL BLOGGERS CLUB, et al., Defendants. DECLARATION OF SCOTT J. SHOLDER IN SUPPORT OF THE BLAZE INC.. MERCURY RADIO ARTS, AND GLENN BECK’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION SCOTT J. SHOLDER hereby declares as follows: 1, Tam an associate with the law firm of Cowan, DeBaets, Abrabams & Sheppard LLP, attomeys for defendants The Blaze Inc., Mereury Radio Arts, and Glenn Beck (the “Blaze Defendants”), and have heen pranted special admission before this Court to appear on behalf of the Blaze Defendants in the above-captioned action. I submit this declaration in support of the Blaze Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, 2, Attached hereto as Exhibit A are true and correct screen shots from the Maryland local radio stations’ websites. Corporate names in the website footers have been circled in red by the undersigned, 3. Attached hereto as Exhibit B are true and correct screen shots from www-glennbeck.com of the Glenn Beck Radio Program local affiliate map showing the program's nationwide affiliate stations. 4. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the Court's April 22, 2015 Notice of Scheduling Hearing and Order of Court.T declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. Dated: New York, New York September 29, 2015 Scott J. Sholder (pro hac vice)EXHIBIT Ary Wore Ear) = im a Tra rn La aren CS aor uteta Listen Now! ~EXHIBIT B103.7 WEEO-FM, 1230 WEVA.AM, 1300 WKCY-AM,=e sme = 1920 KXRO-AM, 1230 WFVA.AM, 4110 KFAB-AM, OmahaEXHIBIT CIN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGO' 4ERY COUNTY, MARYLAND WRIT OF SUMMONS Coe (248) fee'o ey Carers” GBF Case No: 403868-V f (Service Address) Race QR OHH an (Same as addressee) MACON GA 31210 You are hereby summoned to file a written response by pleading or motion in this court to the attached complaint filed by: BRETT KIMBERLIN within 60 days after service of this summons upon you. Witness, the Honorable Chief Judge of the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Maryland. TO THE PERSON SUMMONED: 1, Failure to respond within the time allowed may result in a default judgment or the granting of the relief sought against you. 2. If you have been served with a Scheduling Order, your appearance is required pursuant to the Scheduling Order, regardless of the date your response is due. 3. If you have questions, you should see an attorney immediately. If you need help finding an attorney, you may contact the Bar Association of Montgomery County's Lawyer Referral Service online at www.barmont.ora or by calling (301) 279-9100. Bot Barbara H. Meikisjohn CLERK of the Circuit Court Montgomery County, Maryland ‘50 Maryland Avenue Rockville, MD 20850-2393 Date Issued: 04/22/2015 NOTE: 1. This summons is effective for service only if served within 60 days after the date it is issued. 2. Proof of service shall set out the name of the person served, the date, and the particular place and manner of service. If service is not made, please state the reason(s). 3. Return of served or unserved process shall be made promptly and in accordance with Rule 4. If this summons is served by private process, process server shall file a separate affida required by Rule 2-126(a). RETURN [ 1 Served on at Tan Ba TehyiSiarCounn {1 Summons and [ ] Show Cause Order and [| Complaint/Petition/Motion Served [1 Unserved Baa ‘eseonr U1 Sheriff TBignareyBarbara H. Meiklejohn Clerk of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland "0 Maryland Avenue Rocke, Marylané 208502397 April 22, 2015 RE: Notice of New Case Number for BRETT KIMBERLIN vs NATIONAL BLOGGERS CLUB, BT AL Reference Caseff: Case Type: DEFAMATION OF CHARACTER (836) Dear Sir/Madam Please be advised that the above referenced case was received on April 15, 2015, in the office of the Clerk for Montgomery County. ‘This matter has been assigned case number 403868-V Please include this case number on all future papers to be filed in this case. sincerely, 3oh-—— Glerk of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Naryland MACON GA 31210IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND. BRETT KIMBERLIN Plaintiff Case No. 403868-V Judge: NATIONAL BLOGGERS CLUB, ET AL Defendant NOTICE OF SCHEDULING HEARING AND ORDER OF COURT - TRACK 3 (838) COMPLAINT FILED ON 04/15/2015, SCHEDULING HEARING, 07/17/2015, 9:30 AM COURTROOM , ATTENDANCE REQUIRED PLUS ‘DEADLINE: PLT EXPERTS IDENTIFIED: 07/17/2015 It is by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, hereby ORDERED as follows: 1) Proof of Service. Within sixty-five (66) days of the filing of the Complaint, Plaintitf must file proof of service on each of the Defendants of tte following: copies of the Summons, the Complaint, and this Notice of Scheduling Hearing and Order. @) As to any Defendant for whom such proof of service has not been filed, the Court will consider dismissing the Complaint without prejudice at the time of the Scheduling Hearing, b) As to any Defendant not served at the time cf the initial Scheduling Hearing, the Court may. sever the case against that party. ©) A motion for alternative service as to any unserved Defendant may not be filed after the 121st day after filing of the complaint: DEADLINE: 08/14/2015 4) Defendants who are not served by the 12st day after filing of the complaint dismissal under Rule 2-507. @) As to any Defendant served with the Summcns and Complaint, within thirty (30) days of service, the Defendant must file the Defendant's Civil Information Form with the initial pleading and a copy mailed to Pleinti. 2) Answer or Other Responsive Pleading. Within tye time permitted under Maryland Rules, each Defendant must respond to the Complaint by filing an Answer or other responsive pleading. ‘Those pleadings must be filed in accordance with Rule 2-321. If no timely response has been filed, the Court may enter an Order of Default pursuant to Rule 2-613 at the time of the initial Scheduling Hearing. © subject to 3) Initial Discovery. No later than ten (10) days before the initial Scheduling Hearing, the parties, shall: complete sufficient initial discovery to enable them to participate in the hearing ‘meaningfully and in good faith and to make decisions regarding (a) settlement, (b) consideration of available and appropriate forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) [PLEASE SEE PARAGRAPH 7 BELOWI, (c) limitation of issues, (d) stipulations, (e) any Issues relating to preserving discoversble information, (f) any issues relating to discovery of electronically stored information, including the form in which it is to be produced, (g) any issues relating to cleims of 5 MACON GA 31210 Page One of Three ————Case No. 403868-V privilege or of protection, and (h) other matters that may be considered at the hearing, including: a) Initial Disclosure of the Plaintiff's Experts to occur no later than the Scheduling Hearing: The deadline for the disclosure of Plaintiff's experts coincides with the Scheduling Hearing. Given the early stage of discovery, while disclosure of the area of expertise is expected, some flexibility will be applied as to the specific opinion of the expert. The obligation to supplement the information provided by this deadline continues and must be provided without delay as soon as it is known to the Plaintiff, but no later than thirty (30) days after the ‘Scheduling Hearing without leave of the Court, including any substence of the findings and opinions, grounds for each opinion on which the expert is expected to testify, as well 2s copies of all reports received from each expert witness. Under no circumstances may this information be withheld. 4) Discovery of Electronic Information. Further, with regard to the discovery of electronic Information, the Parties shall confer in person ot by telephone and attempt to reach agreement, for narrow the areas of disagreement, as to the preservation of electronic information, if any, and the necessity and manner of conducting discovery regarding electronic information, and the parties shall be prepared to address the followirg at the Scheduling Hearing: €) Identification and retention of discoverable e’ectronic information and what, if any, initial discovery and any party requests in order to identify discoverable electronic information; b) Exchange of discoverable information in electronic format where appropriate, including: i) The format of production, i.e., PDF, TIFF or JPEG file or native formats such as Microsoft Word, Word Perfect, etc., and the manne’ in which the information shall be exchanged such as CD-ROM disks or otherwise; and {i) Whether separate indices will be exchangad and whether the documents and information exchanged will be electronically numbered, ©) Whether the parties agree as to the apportionment of costs for production of electronic information that is not maintained on a party's active computers, computer servers or databases; 4) The manner of handling inadvertent production of privileged materials; and ) Whether the parties agree to refer electronic discovery disputes to a Special Master for resolution. The parties shell reduce all areas of agreement, including any agreements regarding inadvertent disclosure of privilaged materials, to a stipulated order to be presented to the court at or before the Scheduling Hearing. 5) Attorneys* Fees. If a party intends to assert a “substantial claim" for attorneys" fees, counsel shall provide a written statement to the Court, at the Scheduling Hearing, setting forth whether the claim is pursuant to law, statute or contract, identifying the legal theory, statute or contract provision, and whether the claim is triable by jury. The Court, at the Scheduling Hearing, will determine whether to require enhanced documentation, quarterly statements, or other procedures permitted by Maryland Rules. If table by jury, the Court will determine the necessity of a separate discovery schedule, to include, if appropriate, the designation of experts relating to this issue. (See Rules 2-703, 2-704 and 2-705.) 6) On the dete and time noted above, all counsel end any unrepresented parties shall appear before the assigned judge at an initial Scheduling Hearing to discuss the possibilities of settlement, ADR, and to establish a schedule for the complation of all proceedings. This Order is the only notice that parties and counsel will receive concerning this hearing. Failure to appear may result In sanctions. Where the Plaintiff does not appear, failure to appear may result in dismissal of the ‘complaint, EVEN IF DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN SERVED OR HAVE NOT YET ANSWERED. 7) Mediation. PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT THE COURT WILL ORDER MEDIATION IN THE ABOVE- CAPTIONED CASE. PLEASE DISCUSS ADR/MEDIATION WITH THE OPPOSING PARTY (OR Questions? Please see www.montaomerycountymd.gov/circultcourtDCM or call the DCM coordinator at 240-777-9358. Page Two of ThreeCase No, 403868-V COUNSEL, IF APPLICABLE) PRIOR TO THE SCHEDULING HEARING. Parties choosing a mediator ‘must pay the rate agreed upon by the parties and the mediator. Where the court designates a ‘mediator, pursuant to Rule 17-208, the parties will pay the hourly rate established by the court, Counsel/parties may abject to participating in mediation either at the Scheduling Hearing, or in ‘accordance with Rule 17-202(f), within thirty (30) days after entry of the order, may file (A) en ‘objection to the referral, (B) an alternative proposal, or (C) a "Request to Substitute ADR. Practitioner” substantially in the form set forth in Rule 17-202(g). 8) Postponement of the Scheduling Hearing. Upon advice that the date noted above Is In conflict with another required appearance for any attorrey of record or unrepresented party, the Hearing may be postponed once for no more than two (2) weeks, with the consent of all parties. No other postponement of the Hearing will be granted except upon motion for good cause shown. Feilure to appear at the Scheduling Hearing may result in a dismissal andjor default judgment, Date: 04/22/2015 RW. Dabelius I Circuit Administrative Judge Possession and use of cell phones, computers, other elactronic devices, and cameras may be limited or Prohibited in designated areas of the court facility. The use of any camera, cell phone, or any electronic device for taking, recording, or transmitting photograpts, videos, or other visual images is prohibited in the court facility at all times, unless the court expressly grants permission in a specific instance. Questions? Please see ywww.montaomerycountymd.qov/circuitcourtDCM or call the DCM coordinator at 240-777-9358, Page Three of ThreeCircuit Court for Tats CIVIL - NON-DOMESTIC CASS INFORMATION REPORT [rmacrrons: Plabsift This Informotion Repos ms b comp jl our case is exnptedsiom the regret by th Chi age of 4 capy must Be included for eccl dafendont tobe served Deferdans Tou mat file on formston Repo es reurad by Role 23036) LESEORMATION REPORT CANNOT BB ACCEPTED 48 4N ANSWER OR RESTON: pormriepsy: (J Lavi [| DEENDOT case NinEe aed ond esta tthe compl fil wih Court ef¢ypeats purrucn to 2 Clerk of Court ule 213 (0, Icasews juvDEaAND: Ye. 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