Management

Communication Quarterly
Volume 20 Number 1
August 2006 39-62
2006 Sage Publication
10.1177/0893318906288277
http://mcq.sagepub.com
hosted at
http://online.sagepub.com

Habermass Discourse
Ethics and Principle of
Universalization as a Moral
Framework for Organizational
Communication
Rebecca J. Meisenbach
University of MissouriColumbia

The author argues for the potential of discourse ethics as a framework

for guiding and assessing ethical action in organizational communication.
Habermass discourse ethics offers an intersubjective procedure for developing and challenging ethical norms through reasoned public communication.
After examining the development of discourse ethics and reviewing existing
organizational applications of Habermass ideas, the author then forms the
principle of universalization into five steps necessary for an organization to
enact a discourse ethic. These steps are used to assess the ethical problems
and to identify alternative courses of action relating to the American Red
Crosss Liberty Fund case.
Keywords: discourse ethics; principle of universalization; Habermas;
organizational communication; American Red Cross

W.

Charles Redding (1996), often referred to as the father of organizational communication, titled a speech and paper, Ethics and the Study
of Organizational Communication: When Will We Wake Up? Redding charged
that organizational communication scholarship rarely addressed ethical issues,
even though organizational life is saturated with ethical (or moral) problems

Authors Note: Earlier versions of this article were presented at National Communication
Associations annual convention in 2003 in Miami, Florida, and at the 8th annual
Communication Ethics Conference at Duquesne University in 2004. The author would like to
thank Charley Conrad and the anonymous reviewers whose comments helpfully guided the
revision of this article. Please send correspondence regarding this article to Rebecca
Meisenbach, University of MissouriColumbia, 115 Switzler Hall, Columbia, MO 65211-2310;
e-mail: meisenbachr@missouri.edu.
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(p. 18). Although ethical problems are potentially created every time organizations send and receive messages (Johannesen, 2002), relatively few attempts in
the discipline exist that develop and consider moral theory in organizational
behavior (e.g., Anderson & Englehardt, 2000; Conrad, 1993; Seeger, 1997).
A review of organizational ethics studies reveals a tendency to focus on
addressing pragmatic microethical issues such as being an ethical consultant
(Lippitt, 1982; Redding, 1979), whistle-blower (Bok, 1982), or public relations
practitioner (Thomsen, 1998). These studies address how particular individuals
and roles may act ethically within organizations, but there are also broader
issues of how collective organizational actors and organizations may act
ethicallythat is, the ethics of organizational actors and organizations as they
interact with internal and external publics (Edgett, 2002; Seeger, 1997).
Scholars who study and consider corporate social responsibility are addressing
such macro-level ethical issues (e.g., Buchholz, 1990; Cheney, May, & Roper,
in press; Townsley & Stohl, 2003). Yet May and Zorn (2003) have suggested
that interest in corporate responsibility ebbs and flows along with media attention to corporate scandals. Furthermore, these studies often start and end with
prescriptions for ethical courses of action in a particular situation, rather than
richly and broadly considering theoretical and philosophical bases of a moral
theory for organizational behavior.
Perhaps it is the complexity of determining how a collective, yet individualistic entity behaves or should behave that has kept organizational
scholars from making the desired progress in macro-level organizational
ethics. Whatever the reason, organizational scholars have yet to answer
fully Reddings call to wake up to the importance of organizational ethics
or to realize May and Zorns hope for sustained interest in corporate
responsibility. I argue that to better justify and articulate specific ethical
courses of action, scholars should begin with moral theory and a process for
moral argumentation before moving into practical ethics.
German critical philosopher Jrgen Habermass (1984, 1987, 1990, 1993,
1996) theory of communicative action led him to the development of a discourse ethics that provides such a moral grounding. This moral theory does
not prescribe what is ethical; rather it describes an intersubjective procedure
for developing norms of behavior through reasoned public communication.
He argued that through competent speakers, speech acts raise validity claims
to truth, rightness, and sincerity, and that these claims can be challenged,
rejected, and accepted in discourse by other listeners and speakers.
Discourse ethics is a form of practical argument for discursively testing
norms. With its communicative approach, discourse ethics has valuable
potential for organizational ethics. I suggest that it offers both explanations

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of current organizational failures and guidelines for ethical interactions that

are highly relevant today. Although scholars have explored Habermass ideal
speech situation, legitimation, and communicative action (e.g., Burleson &
Kline, 1979; Deetz, 1992; Francesconi, 1986; Jacobson & Storey, 2004),
Habermas formal presentation of discourse ethics was only published in
English in 1990, and few scholars have explored its implications for communication theory (e.g., Arens, 1997; Gunson & Collins, 1997; Haas &
Deetz, 2000; Leeper, 1996). French and Allbright (1998), in their critical
assessment of Habermass suggestion of links between high levels of moral
reasoning and discursive communicative action, argued that his discourse
ethics requires an operators manual as well as a proactive implementation
if it is to be of use to business (p. 191).
In this article, therefore, I investigate the potential of Habermass discourse ethics for the development of moral theory in organizational communication with a goal of articulating specific ways that it can be interpreted
and implemented. I argue that Habermass discourse ethics and his principle
of universalization (Principle U) offer a communication-centered moral
framework within which ethical standards may be developed and challenged
by individuals and organizations. First, I introduce Habermass conceptualization of the lifeworld, communicative action, and validity claims. Then I
present Habermass discourse ethics and Principle U, considering challenges
and difficulties of his ethic. Third, I briefly review how these ideas have been
taken up by communication scholars thus far. Fourth, I articulate five steps
necessary for an organization to enact discourse ethics. Finally, I consider
how this procedure could apply to a specific organizational situation and the
difficulties that may arise. Through this analysis, I offer one way in which
discourse ethics may frame and guide ethical organizational behavior.

Habermass Communicative Action

and Validity Claims
Habermas (1984, 1987) developed his discourse ethics out of his theory
of communicative action, which focuses on how people act within the lifeworld (see Deetz, 1992; Leeper, 1996, for a fuller discussion). Habermas
(1990) promoted an ideal realm of cultural rationality that is developed
through communicative action, calling interactions communicative when
the participants coordinate their plans of action consensually, with the agreement reached at any point being evaluated in terms of the intersubjective
recognition of validity claims (p. 58). Thus, communicative action or

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mutual understanding is a process of the intersubjective consideration of

appeals to validity claims. Habermas posited that when agreement is reached
linguistically by relying on the processes of cultural rationality, the speakers
have made three kinds of successful validity claims associated with different
value spheres.1
Cultural rationality consists of three value spheres (cognitive, moral, and
aesthetic), each with its own type of validity claim, suggesting alternative
ways of presenting the propositional content (Heath, 2001, p. 116, emphasis in the original). When a speaker makes a statement or utterance, he or she
is simultaneously making appeals to each kind of validity: the truth of the
statement (cognitive), the rightness of the statement (moral), and the truthfulness or sincerity of the statement (aesthetic; Habermas, 1990).2 The
appealing suggestion of the copresence of the validity claims is that the truth
or falsity of a statement does not stand separate from its rightness and sincerity. If I say, I give money to the United Way, I am arguing (cognitively)
that it is true that I donate money to the United Way. On a moral level, I am
also claiming that donating to the United Way is right or just in this situation
and that it is ethical for me to present such an argument. Finally, I am claiming on the aesthetic level to be truthful or sincere (rather than sarcastic or
contradictory to my other statements and actions) in my utterance. All three
claims are present in my utterance, ready to be defended. Habermas (1990)
noted, In the case of claims to truth or rightness, the speaker can redeem his
[claims] discursively, that is, by adducing reasons; in the case of claims to
truthfulness [sincerity] he does so through consistent behavior (p. 59).
According to his discourse ethics, validity of claims is publicly and discursively debated by all those who would be affected by the outcome of the
claims. Thus, I turn now to Habermass discourse ethics to understand how
these ideas may frame organizational ethics.

Discourse Ethics
Habermass work on discourse ethics is extremely relevant to management
communication scholars, because it suggests that structures and procedures
of communication are central to identifying and grounding moral principles.
His discourse ethics focuses on developing a procedural moral theory, leaving specific ethical judgments up to the participants in communication; it
involves movement between universal and local levels. Habermas (1990)
argued that, The principle of discourse ethics prohibits singling out with
philosophical authority any specific normative contents (as for example,

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certain principles of distributive justice) as the definitive content of moral

theory (p. 122). It does not say it is right to protect yourself. Rather, the
principle of universalization (Principle U) sets up the intersubjective moral
argumentation procedure necessary to justify such statements, stating that a
valid norm must meet the following condition:
All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general
observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyones interests (and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation). (p. 65)

In discourse ethics, Habermas communicatively grounded and revised

Kants categorical imperative, which he viewed as incorrectly monologic,
abstract, and strategic. Habermas argued that all studies of moral argumentation logic arrive at some form of the categorical imperative. However,
whereas Kant argued that valid norms are those that one individual could
decide should be universal law after solitarily considering the consequences
for everyone, Habermas (1990) argued that valid moral norms must be publicly and discursively defendable. He did not believe that one person should
decide what others would will or what the consequences of an action will be
for others. Instead, Habermas supported Principle U, compelling the universal exchange of roles (p. 65). All parties must engage in this exchange,
not just organizational management. As Habermas (1996) stated, If we construe the universalist claim of the moral principle intersubjectively, then we
must relocate ideal role taking, which, according to Kant, each individual
undertakes privately, to a public practice implemented by all persons in
common (pp. 109-110).
Benhabibs (1992) development of discourse ethics challenges this key
distinction between Kant and Habermas, arguing that moral conversation can
occur either through actual dialogue or imagined conversation with others.
But at the point of imagined conversation, the moral discussion reverts to
a Kantian, monological, and hypothetical process, limiting the valuable
toggling between universal morality and cultural-specific ethics available
in discourse ethics. Principle U assumes that the justification of norms and
commands requires that a real discourse be carried out and thus cannot occur
in a strictly monological form, i.e., in the form of a hypothetical process of
argumentation occurring in the individual mind (Habermas, 1990, p. 68).
Therefore, Habermas has revised the solitarily adjudicated categorical
imperative such that a potential maxim is submitted to all others who will be
affected by its potential outcome to discursively test its universality. By

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anchoring moral autonomy in social dialectic, Habermas insisted that the

justification of norms requires actual discourse and community.
A key point in accepting Habermass (1990) articulation of discourse ethics
is the justification of the universality of Principle U: every argumentation,
regardless of the context in which it occurs, rests on pragmatic presuppositions
from whose propositional content the principle of universalism (U) can be
derived (p. 82). He argued that Principle U is implied by presuppositions of
argument in general, such that anyone who engages in argument is necessarily assuming Principle U. In other words, even an argument against Principle
U would have to engage in the procedure described by Principle U, thereby
engaging in a performative contradiction and negating the challenge.
Another challenge to discourse ethics stems from questions about the
interactions among universalizable moral principles and culturally grounded
ethical principles. Habermass (1990, 1993) early development of discourse
ethics was characterized as privileging the universal (Haas & Deetz, 2000).
Indeed, Habermas (1993) suggested that universalizable moral discussion
should occur prior to specific ethical applications.3 Scholars have argued that
this sequencing means that Habermas problematically advocated that the
initial consideration of valid norms should be based on a generalized (universal) other, leaving the viewpoint of the concrete (contextually sensitive)
other unattended until it is used in a specific context (Benhabib, 1992; Haas
& Deetz, 2000).
Instead, Benhabib (1992) argued that moral discussion should simultaneously consider generalized and concrete others. Habermas (1996) seemed to
acknowledge this simultaneity in his later development of discourse ethics, as
he discussed how laws seeking legitimation must harmonize with the moral
principles of universal justice and solidarity as well as with the ethical principles of a consciously projected life conduct (p. 99). In fact, the title of his
book, Between Facts and Norms, highlights the necessary tensions between
context and universal claims of reason and points to how a claim to validity
raised here and now, and perhaps justified according to local standards, ultimately points beyond a particular community (Rehg, 1996, p. xiv). Indeed
Habermas (1996) wrote of the process of norm application as weaving
together a description of the circumstances and a concretization of general
norms (p. 218).4 Habermas (2003) also advocated a morality where individuation and generalization interpenetrate (p. 56). Thus, discourse ethics
allows exploration of movement between the local and universal. But
although Habermas was very interested in articulating and justifying the procedure of discourse ethics, he left using and implementing it in actual situations to others (French & Allbright, 1998). Therefore, it is appropriate for

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communication scholars to consider and critique the actions of organizations

on both ethical and moral levels through discourse ethics.

Communication Scholars and Habermass Discourse Ethics

Taking up this invitation, several communication scholars have considered the implications of Habermass work, including his Principle U, for
communicative ethics. Before Habermas even published his books on discourse ethics, Burleson and Kline (1979) posited that Habermass axiology
should prove to be particularly attractive to speech communication scholars
since its locus of values is intrinsic to the nature of communication itself
(p. 427). In particular, communication scholars have turned to discourse
ethics as a source of ethical frameworks for public relations (Leeper, 1996)
and media (Arens, 1997).5
Organizational scholar Stan Deetz (e.g., 1992; Haas & Deetz, 2000) has
taken the most thorough look at the moral implications of Habermass work
for the study of organizational communication. Specifically, Deetz (1992)
described Habermass ideal speech situation as a moral process, but one
that can and should encourage conflict (p. 8). Haas and Deetz (2000) discussed Habermass theory of communicative action and discourse ethics in
light of Benhabibs (1992) challenges and revisions. Arguing that management needs to ensure ethical procedures for identifying stakeholders and for
representing these stakeholders, they suggested that the validity claims can
help delineate ethical interactions between corporate managers and stakeholders. However, their treatment of Habermas focused more on his earlier
articulated ideal speech situation and four validity claims than on Principle
U. Also, as discussed above, Habermas (1996) has further developed discourse ethics in Between Facts and Norms, answering some of the earlier
challenges to the perspective. The current article builds on this work to
develop discourse ethics for communication study by offering a specific
concrete plan for enacting Principle U in organizational settings.

Enacting Discourse Ethics in Organizations

Therefore, I will now describe how Habermass Principle U and justification of validity claims can be enacted from a communicative perspective.
Based on his articulation of Principle U, I suggest five steps for enacting
discourse ethics (see Table 1). These steps are designed to realize the moral
principle in communicative action and can be followed by both individual
and organizational rhetors.

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Table 1
Steps of Enacting Discourse Ethics
Steps

Description

Issues

Step 1

Generate an utterance or potential norm

Step 2

Determine who is potentially affected by

the enactment of the utterance
Articulate the utterance to all parties
identified in Step 2
All parties discursively debate the
consequences and their acceptability
Make a judgment about the validity and
acceptability of the proposed
utterance or norm

Defining terms, meaning; use of

strategic ambiguity
Rhetor control and bias; determining
expanding circles of those affected
Dialogic articulation of utterance;
practicality
Equal and full participation;
practicality
Handling disagreement;
privileging consensus

Step 3
Step 4
Step 5

First, the rhetor identifies and/or generates an utterance that contains

claims to normative validity. Organizations consist of seemingly endless
chains of utterances; communication is their lifeblood. And every utterance
that offers a choice entails ethical elements (Johannesen, 2002). But does
every utterance signify the start of discourse ethics? The potential exists,
but utterances that are best suited for a discourse ethics procedure are those
that have both local and universal import. For example, decisions about a
companys waste disposal policy affect the local community and broader
expectations of treatment of communities. Mahoney (2002) argued that
only those interests and actions that bear on others standing as equal
members of the moral community require a rational justification within a
moral discourse (p. 303). From these perspectives, not every decision is
subject to the rules of discourse ethics.
In generating an utterance in Step 1, organizations are defining their
terms (e.g., What do we mean by proper disposal or high quality education?). Strategic ambiguity and polysemy may come into play here as
rhetors seek to imbue different meanings in their utterances for different
audiences or stakeholders (Ceccarelli, 1998; Eisenberg, 1984). An interesting finding was that such strategy entails simultaneously constructing the
claim and considering the stakeholders (Step 2).
Second, the rhetor determines who is potentially affected by the enactment
of a particular claim. This step relates directly to research on stakeholders
(e.g., Carroll, 1989; Deetz, 1995; Freeman, 1984) and involves managing tensions between being practical yet inclusive. Ideally this determination of

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stakeholders would rely on widespread input. Haas and Deetz (2000)

have suggested that determination of the stakeholders in a decision is best
accomplished by having management acknowledge its biases and simultaneously take the stance of a generalized and concrete other, seeking differences and commonalities with a managerial perspective. Yet Haas and
Deetz noted that practicality necessitates grouping individuals into concrete other stakeholder groups rather than truly considering everyone individually. In this way, the rhetor determines who must be involved in the
remaining steps. For example, if a corporation was announcing a plan to
eliminate its retirement plan, stakeholders might include a board of directors, employees, former employees, and government regulators. This is one
individuals list, but a second perspective may well generate important
additional stakeholders. At minimum, organizations should have distinct
internal individuals work together to identify stakeholders, but issues
remain of whether an organization is capable internally of fully identifying
stakeholders.
Third, once the stakeholders are determined, the rhetor articulates the
claim to those individuals and/or organizations believed to be affected. The
method of this articulation can take many forms in todays media-saturated
society, as long as the stakeholders actually hear and interpret the utterance.
Of course some communication channels invite dialogic interaction more
than others (Haas & Deetz, 2000; Thompson, 1995). Organizations frequently articulate utterances, if they share them with stakeholders at all, in
monologic ways, such as television advertisements. But discourse ethics
requires that articulation of the utterance be offered dialogically in a manner, such as in a face-to-face interaction, conference call, or internet chat
that invites the discussion outlined in the remaining steps.
Fourth, together, these participants discursively anticipate the consequences of the utterance. Although this is a step that Benhabib (1992) suggested could be imagined, Habermasian discourse ethics requires actual
participation and discussion. The real participation of those potentially
affected is essential to identifying and seeing the various benefits and problems of a particular utterance. Logistically, finding the time and space for discussion could be extremely difficult. Furthermore, participants must ensure
the equal recognition of all voices during this process (Haas & Deetz, 2000).
Finally, the participants make a judgment about whether the claim and
its consequences are acceptable to all affected and are, therefore, ethical.
Here is where at least three kinds of judgments are being made. The truth
of the content, the rightness, and the sincerity with which the utterance of
the statement is offered are all decided. Yet how disagreement over validity

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is resolved is not immediately clear. Habermas seems to suggest that what

discourse ethics does is bring all of the necessary information to the discussion and that with this shared information everyone in the group will
come to the same conclusion and consensus. In this scenario the ethic privileges a logically derived form of justice. On the other hand, if the discussion can end in the identification of unreconciled differences, discourse
ethics is still useful. The original rhetor and dissenting stakeholders are
likely to have at least a better understanding of each others positions. The
organization can decide to proceed with its planthat is, stand by its utterance while being aware of the challenges to its utterance so that the stakeholders can make informed decisions about their future interactions with
that organization.
These steps represent and realize Habermass Principle U, making it practical and useful for communication scholars and organizational actors. Given
all the potential difficulties noted here, organizations may neglect a discourse ethics procedure. However, if Principle U is indeed universal, then the
procedure is occurring, and organizations are left only with deciding whether
they are consciously and intentionally participating. I will explore how these
steps can be enacted and the potential difficulties that may be encountered
in doing so or not doing so by applying them to the American Red Crosss
(ARC) handling of its Liberty Fund after the September 11, 2001 attacks on
the World Trade Center and Pentagon.

The ARC and the Liberty Fund

The ARC is a well-established organization in the United States with an
operating budget in 2001 of $3 billion. Established in 1881, the ARC is
devoted to providing relief to disaster victims and serves as the countrys
primary supplier of blood and blood products. Traditionally, the ARC
accepts donations to local chapters, to its disaster relief fund, and to its
international relief fund. When a disaster occurs, money is taken from the
appropriate fund to provide assistance and relief.
Shortly after the September 11th attacks, the ARC, led by president and
CEO Dr. Bernadine Healy, took the unusual step of establishing a separate
fund, called the Liberty Fund. According to a link that appeared on the ARC
Web page on October 8, all funds donated to the ARC since the attacks were
placed in the Liberty Fund, which would support the immediate and emerging efforts of the ARC to alleviate human suffering brought on by the attacks
of September 11 (American Red Cross, 2001b).6 Donations poured in. On

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October 12, the ARC issued a press release that drew negative attention with
its predictions of how the ARC would use donated funds:
. . . toll-free nationwide hotlines now being operated by the Red Cross to provide immediate help to callers, information systems, database management,
contribution processing, public information and communication, expanded
audit services, accounting services and around-the-clock activation of the Red
Cross Disaster Operations Center. (American Red Cross, 2001d)

Two weeks later, Healy announced her retirement from the ARC amid
speculation about the boards displeasure with her establishment of the
Liberty Fund (Williams, 2001). On the same day, the ARC published
another story on its Web site, repeating the distribution plans and adding a
line that received a lot of attention in the press: The Red Cross also will
pull resources from the Liberty Relief Fund to prepare and mitigate in the
event of more attacks (Kriner, 2001). Negative news coverage and public
outcry surrounded Healys departure and the announced plans for the funds.
By the end of October, the fund had collected $547 million in public donations (Greenberg, 2001). Harold Decker, the interim ARC CEO, announced
that the organization would no longer solicit donations for the Liberty
Fund, and the ARC posted a new link on its Web site titled Myth and facts:
How your money is being spent (American Red Cross, 2001a). Healy and
other ARC spokespersons argued to the press that the ARC had never
promised that all of the donations would go to victims families and stood
by the ARCs distribution plan (Levine, 2001).
However, publics and donors felt that they had been misled about how
their funds were going to be used. Negative media stories continued, and the
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Commerce and Energy held
a subcommittee oversight hearing on November 6 that focused heavily on
and criticized the intentions and actions of the ARC. Just more than a week
after the hearing, Decker led a press conference announcing the ARCs decision to alter its planned uses of the Liberty Fund, pledging that The people
affected by this terrible tragedy have been our first priority, and beginning
today, they will be the only priority of the Liberty Fund (American Red
Cross, 2001c). The ARC paid for full-page advertisements in major newspapers across the United States to further publicize the changes and ask the
public to trust them again. In June, 2002, the ARC announced a new Donor
DIRECT plan designed to ensure better understanding of donor and organization intent. This same June, the ARC hired the CEO of Girl Scouts of
America, Marsha Johnson Evans, as its new CEO. I will now look at how

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the Liberty Fund situation aligns or could have aligned with Habermass
discourse ethics and his principle U as a way of explaining, understanding,
and critiquing what happened.7

How to Use the Liberty Fund: The Steps of Discourse Ethics

The first step in discourse ethics is generating and deciding on an utterance that makes claims about its validity. In looking back over the ARC situation, the Liberty Fund was created at Healys request, and according to her
testimony at the November 6th hearing, it was designed to help with accountability: [the Liberty Fund money] has to be kept separate. It is easier to audit.
It is easier to have public disclosure (House of Representatives, 107th
Congress, 2001). The main utterance for this analysis was posted on the ARC
Web site on October 8, 2001, introducing the fund: The Liberty Fund will
support the immediate and emerging efforts of the ARC to alleviate human
suffering brought on by the attacks of September 11. Remembering that
defining terms and meanings is a key part of Step 1, the communication critic
can note the potentially divergent interpretations of emerging efforts and
how the ARC might alleviate human suffering. However, the same document goes on to state the following:
The work of the American Red Cross in the aftermath and as a consequence
of September 11 will not just be about supporting disaster relief services for
victims of this and other disasters. Rather, the Liberty Fund will support an
integrated response that involves virtually all of our lines of service, and all
of our existing and new responsibilities under our Charter and the attending
statutory obligations.

Perhaps surprisingly to those familiar with the case as covered in the media,
in this last statement, the ARC directly confronted and denied implications
that the funds would only go directly to victims and their families. However,
patrons clicking on the donate now link on the site the same day would
read an option titled send a check to benefit disaster victims directly. Thus,
potential problems loomed in the first step about definitions and conflicting
interpretations of the utterance(s) from the ARC.
According to Habermas, this statement generates three different kinds of
validity claims. In this case, the press release asserted (a) that it was true
that the ARC would use the Liberty Fund donations in this way; (b) that it
was right for the ARC to use the fund in this way and to assert that it should
be used this way; and (c) that the ARC was being truthful and sincere about

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the content of the statement. According to discourse ethics, listeners can

discursively determine how well the utterance fulfills each of these claims.
Thus, I offer the October 8 statement as an utterance containing validity
claims, fulfilling the first step in the process.
Once an organization has identified an utterance, it can move to Step 2 of
fulfilling Principle U by determining who all is affected by the enactment of
the utterance. In this case, those who would potentially be affected by its
enactment include ARC employees, victims families, donors, and on a larger
scale, potential donors and individuals who could be affected by future terrorist acts. One can quickly see the difficulty of determining where to cut off
ever-broadening circles of involvement. Furthermore, Habermass procedure
seems problematically to allow that the rhetor is going to determine who is
affected by an utterance. Otherwise, the process falls into an infinite regress
with ever-expanding groups being called in to discuss and determine who
should be involved in discussion and determination of the initial utterance.
For it to work, it is necessary that exclusionary judgment occurs at some
point. It is here that discourse ethics can use Haas and Deetzs (2000) suggestion of organizations openly acknowledging their interests and biases,
rather than pretending or assuming that they can maintain a neutral stance. In
the case of the Liberty Fund, Healy apparently consulted with very few individuals and groups even within the organization about the funds creation.8
Greater input from people inside the ARC could have helped the organization
better identify and understand its stakeholders. In this retrospective analysis
of the case, it is unclear who all the ARC perceived as being affected by its
statement until the third step is considered.
Once those potentially affected are identified, in the third step, the rhetor
presents the utterance to the affected individuals and/or organizations.
The ARC encountered major problems at this stage in the process. As Healy
testified:
We repeatedly communicated to the public our range of service, through our
chapter network, through PSAs [public service announcements], through
contacts with donors, Web sites, in numerous TV appearances, press releases,
in severalin full-page ads in several major newspapers listing the range of
services, how much money we have raised and what it was being spent for.
(House of Representatives, 107th Congress, 2001)

Such a range of communication sounds impressive and quite possibly sufficient. Yet even Healy conceded, Perhaps not everyone heard it. Looking
beyond Healys assertions of what the ARC did, a search conducted using the

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Internet archive (waybackmachine.org) shows that although an explanation

of the Liberty Fund appeared on the ARC Web page on October 8, 2001,
there is no record of a formal ARC press release announcing the fund.
Furthermore, most of the methods that she listed can be classified as monologic forms of communication. Even though it departed significantly from
previous ARC policies and procedures, the creation of the Liberty Fund did
not generate any significant print news coverage at the time, suggesting that
key stakeholders may not have heard the message or that the media assumed
there was no conflict of understanding. A search of national newspapers
reveals only one brief mention of the Funds existence on October 10th. The
first ARC press release to mention the Liberty Fund was released on October
12th, detailing estimated costs of services associated with the disaster. The
fund was only mentioned in the last line of the release, linking long-term
relief efforts to the fund. Healys resignation and Kriners (2001) October
26th story on the ARC Web site, which offered greater detail on how funds
would be designated, signals the moment when the media began reporting on
the Liberty Fund (e.g., Ibarguen, 2001; Levine, 2001) and publics began to
voice their concerns. In contrast, the simultaneously created September 11th
Fund and its managers explicitly focused on public relations and communication of needs, goals, and plans for fund distribution from the outset. In fact,
this second non-ARC fund also faced challenges about how it was using
funds but responded more quickly, dialogically, and openly than the ARC did
(discussed below, see also, Seessel, 2002).
The poor public presentation of the Liberty Fund utterance may be
explained by suggestions that Healy established the fund to make sure that
local chapters could not misuse the funds. In fact, local chapters, which are
allowed to dip into the National Disaster Relief Fund, were unable to use
any funds from the Liberty Fund (Attkisson, 2002). Thus, as a separate fund
only accessible through national headquarters, the Liberty Fund would have
very clear accountability. If the fund was designed to control potential
internal misuse, the ARCs lack of publicity about the funds existence may
make sense from the organizations perspective. Publicizing the fund might
have highlighted issues of internal mistrust and conflict in the ARC.
Thus, it seems that the ARC failed to fulfill this crucial third step of a discourse ethic. In the best-case scenario, it can be judged as having tried to
share the utterance and failing.9 Alternatively, the organization may not have
identified publics and donors as being affected. Another possibility is that
the ARC overestimated how familiar the various stakeholders already were
with the intent of the ARC and its various funds (Gotbaum, 2003). A final
possible explanation is that the ARC knew its message was not reaching
publics in a significant way and intentionally maintained this stance to hide

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issues of internal mistrust. Regardless of the reasons, the failure to dialogically communicate the utterance to publics caused problems for the ARC.
In terms of Step 4, there was little, if any, discussion when the utterance
was first articulated. Thus, the ARC and stakeholders did not successfully
carry out Step 4 as I have laid it out here. All those affected by the outcome
of the utterance did not discursively anticipate the consequences of the
utteranceat least not successfully. It is of course plausible that Healy and
ARC executives anticipated the consequences among themselves, but this
does not fit Habermass discourse ethics. Instead, such a private discussion
represents a Kantian internal consideration of how others will be affected.
In addition, it exemplifies Deetzs (1992) charge that private organizations
are becoming the locus of public decisions. Media and other stakeholders
negotiated their way into discussion over the utterance gradually. The outcry highlights the problems with making decisions for others and making
assumptions about what they know and how they will react. Additionally,
by violating the procedure, the discussion happened in segments: first the
ARC, then the media, and finally donors, victims, and government.
The best example of a true face-to-face moral deliberation in this example
occurred on November 6, 2001, at a congressional oversight hearing in
Washington, D.C. Individuals present included Healy, congressional representatives, two widows whose husbands died in the attacks, the New York State
Attorney General, and the president of the United Way. The meeting offered
formal time-regulated segments for each person to talk and then involved periods of questioning. The discussion highlighted the divergent opinions about
the content and meaning of the utterance in question. Part of the problem for
the ARC was that, at this point, much of the focus was not on determining
whether it was right for the ARC to use the funds as it planned but on whether
they had actually clearly expressed the intended use of the funds.
Chairman Tauzin: Dr. Healy, if the Red Cross had announced that it wanted
Americans to donate for this and other terrorist events and
future events
Ms. Healy:
That is what we have announced repeatedly.
Chairman Tauzin: If the Red Cross announced that. . . What is at issue here is
that a special fund was established for these families
Ms. Healy:
No. It was established for
Chairman Tauzin: It was especially funded for this event, for September 11, and it
is being closed now because we are told enough money has
been raised in it, but we are also being told parenthetically, by
the way, we are going to give two thirds of it away to other
important Red Cross needs. (House of Representatives, 107th
Congress, 2001)

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If the organization had willfully engaged in the process of discourse ethics

earlier, the focus and outcome of such a hearing might have better served
the organization and other stakeholders.10 Again as a contrast, when the
September 11th Fund faced controversy about its intended fund dispersement,
the organization conducted an online poll as early as October 1 and conducted
a telephone survey a month later to determine public opinion toward and
understanding of the funds goals and plans (Seessel, 2002). The surveys
revealed that 80% of respondents supported the funds goals of taking a broad
understanding of who should be helped, and the fund communicated these
findings as justification for its plans, avoiding the ARCs public difficulties.
The final step of enacting Principle U involves judging the validity of the
utterances claims. The ARC or even Healy by herself may have solitarily
judged the utterance to be acceptable. Of course, the organization painfully
learned that many stakeholders did not agree that the utterance was valid and
acceptable. The truth element of the validity claim became particularly muddied. The ARC thought it was true that it was dispersing funds as outlined in
the utterance, but the public contested the meaning of the utterance and
found the ARCs claim to propositional truth to be invalid, arguing that it
was not true that the ARC was using the funds as described in the utterance.
In addition, it seems that the utterance was judged as morally wrong (at least
by congressional representatives and media coverage), violating the second
value sphere and claim to moral validity. These groups did not believe it was
right or just for the ARC to use the funds for anything other than helping the
victims and their families directly.11 Furthermore, the sincerity of the ARC
was questionable, considering its initially confusing and reticent stance on
presenting the utterance. Earlier incidents of mistrust of the ARC and nonprofit organizations may also have contributed to doubt about the ARCs
sincerity in its intentions through this utterance (Seessel, 2002).
Also worthy of note is that the hearing did not end in consensus. Stakeholders were able to present their perspectives and hear alternative positions.
Disagreement and dissent abounded at times during the hearing and led to outcomes such as the ARCs decision to change its policy about the dispersal of
the Liberty Fund money. The ARC had made its own internal decision prior to
this discussion about the validity of its course of action, but at a high cost. By
omitting or failing at the middle steps of discourse ethics, particularly by shortcircuiting actual participation by stakeholders, the organization violated the
procedure. The outcome highlights the importance of the procedural and
inclusive nature of discourse ethics. Thus, Habermass discourse ethics as outlined by a breakdown of his Principle U offers a useful heuristic for examining and explaining the troubled reception of the Liberty Fund.

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Discussion
This exploration of discourse ethics and its application to the ARCs
Liberty Fund reveals several possibilities and complications inherent in
applying moral frameworks to organizational utterances. I have argued that
Habermass Principle U can be broken down into steps that offer both a
practical procedure for organizations and their rhetors to follow in pursuit
of ethical rhetorical action and an analytic framework for understanding
and critiquing the ethical actions and failures of organizations. An interesting finding was that despite the ARCs violations of the procedure in this
example, Habermass Principle U did eventually occur on at least one level.
Publics entered discussion of the validity of the ARCs claim through the
media. Major stakeholders then judged the utterances validity. The ARC
revised its original utterance into something whose validity was justified
and accepted by these stakeholders. The money of the Liberty Fund went
exclusively to assist the victims families, and a new CEO took charge of
the ARC.12
Another interpretation of this case can question whether Habermas ideal
level of communicative action and discourse ethics actually occurred even
when publics appeared to enter the discussion. Media representatives quickly
labeled the ARC as having acted inappropriately. Fuller and earlier discussion
of the original claim among all stakeholders might have led publics to agree
with the organizations original decision. Using the money to prepare for
future attacks makes sense on many levels. However, publics might have been
more open to this decision and use of their donations if they had been
included in the discussion initially. Instead, the situation fostered a belief that
the ARC tried to pull a fast one with donors. ARC protests that it had acted
in ways consistent with the original utterance were met with skepticism, if not
disregarded entirely.
Thus, a focus on discourse ethics provides both an explanation for the
difficulties the ARC encountered in this incident and a procedure by which
the organization may have avoided this particular crisis. Future research can
consider the usefulness of these steps in other situations, including even
internal communication among the ARC board, CEO, and local chapters.13
Future research can also further explore some of the difficulties of discourse ethics that became evident in this analysis. First, it remains difficult
to determine who is articulating an utterance for an organization. Is it the
public relations practitioner, the organization as an entity or actor, and/or
the CEO? Multiple utterances can contribute to conflicting interpretations
and definitions as they did for the ARC. Future research can also address

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new possibilities that organizations can use, including virtual meetings, for
the dialogic discussion required by discourse ethics.
In addition, the ARC case points out difficulties in deciding who is
affected by an utterance. Habermass setup suggests that the rhetor is initially in control of making this determination, but how can that rhetor overcome his or her biases? Just as Habermas argues that one person should not
decide how everyone else will feel, one person may not be capable of determining who all might be affected by an utterance. Some may suggest that
this step of determining who is potentially affected must also be opened to
public determination. Yet discourse ethics can run into a problem of infinite
regression if it demands public discussion of who is affected by an utterance. In other words, does discourse ethics require public discussion of who
participates in another public discussion? As a partial answer, I offer
Mahoneys (2002) argument that only actions that bear on others equal
standing demand the procedures of discourse ethics. But participants are
still left to judge when equal standing is at stake. At some point, an exclusionary judgment must be made about who should participate in any particular discussion for the desired discussion to occur. On a practical level,
if discussion reveals that someone who will be affected has been left out,
then that party can be invited to join. Haas and Deetzs (2000) suggestion
of acknowledging organizational biases should also be further investigated
in cases where scholars have greater access to the process of identifying
stakeholders.
Discourse ethics must also answer concerns that the procedure might
allow a group to judge an utterance as ethical, when outsiders view it as
wrong. Habermass discourse ethics argues against the possibility of such
an outcome because of its assumption of rational argument that privileges
the equality of all participants. Mahoney describes it as guarding against
this situation because a moral consensus is valid only if all affected had
the opportunity to participate and if the outcome of the discourse does not
erode any participants standing as an equal member of the community
(p. 303). In other words, the movement between universal moral and local
ethical levels of discourse ethics should prevent such a situation. The balancing of attention to the contextual and universal is a strength of discourse
ethics. This same strength is also how discourse ethics addresses concerns
about unequal power relations. Within the discursive realm of communicative action, all human perspectives have equal value. A decision reached
where stakeholder voices have been overpowered is not morally valid. Yet
translating this equality into organizational reality is fraught with difficulty
and requires further consideration.

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Other challenges to the enactment of discourse ethics remain. Benhabib

(1992) criticized the ethics focus on and assumption of the desirability of
achieving consensus. Consensus is distinct from achieving mutual understanding, and although discourse ethics may more usefully and practically
pursue mutual understanding, it does seem to privilege consensus with its
focus on a judgment as outcome. Yet Habermas believes that the process of
moral deliberation is continuous and any conclusion is only temporary.
Furthermore, I have discussed how knowledge and understanding can be
gained through the procedure even when consensus is not reached.
Finally, full use of discourse ethics is a perhaps debilitatingly timeconsuming process in the face of unending ethical ramifications of organizational decisions. This consumption of time directly conflicts with societal
rationalitys focus on power and money (Habermas, 1984, 1987). Corporations
are not in the business of giving everyone an equal voice and chance for discussion; they are focused on increasing profit margins. Discourse ethics
requirement of the actual participation by all affected also creates logistical
difficulties for organizations. Thus, it is easy to see how the principle of
universalization is typically overlooked in organizations.
Enacting discourse ethics certainly creates some difficulties, but as the
ARC example suggests, the principle itself may be unavoidable. Even in the
Liberty Fund case, where public participation was overlooked at first,
Principle U ended up occurring at least partially. Organizations and their
managers may wish to consider this argument when choosing a procedure
regarding their own actions and utterances. If they believe that the affected
public will eventually get to challenge the validity of an utterance, organizations may be more motivated to ensure that publics get to participate in
the initial discussion of utterances before costly decisions are made.
Indeed, Healys successor, Evans, almost immediately launched a strategic
planning process for the ARC that solicited and received input from a wide
variety of publics.14 By purposively including the stakeholders during the
process, organizations may earn credibility as positive participants in cultural rationality and communicative action.

Conclusion
Overall, I have offered Habermass discourse ethics as a model for developing communicatively based organizational ethics. Discourse ethics suggests that the only universal moral principle is that rhetors follow Principle U
to make judgments about statements. I have broken this principle into five

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steps that organizations and their rhetors may follow to enact discourse
ethics. Individual and specific ethical judgments are made by the participants
in a discussion who follow this principle. Organizations may be inclined to
circumvent the procedure in pursuit of the power and profit that are promoted
by societal rationality. However, I have argued that if Habermass Principle U
is valid, then cultural rationality is still being used to interpret the lifeworld,
and participative communicative action will occur. Following discourse
ethics can help organizations maintain and engage cultural rationality. On a
practical level, discourse ethics and Principle U may have to be employed as
an overarching framework, something that is in the consciousness of an organization, something that can balance societal rationalitys nondiscursive standard of profit. Organizations and individuals can benefit from understanding
how cultural rationality, mutual understanding, and discourse ethics work.
I have explained how these principles can apply to organizations communicatively, concretely articulating how organizations and organizational
actors can enact discourse ethics in pursuit of ethical utterances and behaviors. Ideals can be impossible to realize, and aiming for ethical organizational behavior is aiming for what some may call an impossible ideal.
Yet by developing Habermass notion of discourse ethics into something
concrete and specific, organizational scholars and practitioners may have
a useful guide for how to get closer to an ideal of ethical organizational
communication.

Notes
1. In earlier work, Habermas (e.g., 1979) discussed four validity claims. The fourth claim
is to intelligibility of the claim, suggesting that the listener must be able to hear and understand
the utterance being articulated.
2. Heath (2001) advocates an interpretation of Habermass work that suggests that it
makes no sense to suppose that the agent could raise any more than a single validity claim with
any given utterance (p. 119). However, individuals frequently imbue more than one meaning
or intent in the same utterance. Therefore, I maintain the stance that speakers simultaneously
raise all three claims to validity in utterances.
3. Habermas (1993) suggested that when deciding which previously justified moral norm
to apply in a given situation, Principle U functions as a principle of appropriateness, directing
the procedure for discussion and deliberation. The implication is that the norm is valid prior
to its application to an ethical dilemma.
4. I wish to acknowledge one of the anonymous reviewers for directing me toward this
development of discourse ethics and its consequent invitation to communication scholars.
5. Both of these authors provide thorough descriptions of discourse ethics as developed by
Habermas in Moral Consciousness (1990) and Justification and Application (1993). Also see
Pearsons (1989) reliance on Habermass ideal speech situation as a basis for two-way dialogical public relations practice.

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6. The majority of the press releases referenced here are no longer available on redcross.org.
However, using www.waybackmachine.org, I was able to locate original and subsequent revisions of the various press releases regarding the Liberty Fund.
7. This case is so rich that the space allotted here does not allow room for discussion of
all of its nuances. For an overview of most of the issues, see the transcript of the November 6,
2001 oversight committee hearing, available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/Hearings/
11062001hearing414/print.htm.
8. In fact, her decision to create the fund without consulting the board of directors,
although technically allowed by the organizations structure and rules, is what likely led to her
ouster by the board (see the transcript of the November 6, 2001 hearing).
9. Although I noted above that the American Red Cross (ARC) failed to communicate the
utterance to stakeholders, the evidence of ways in which the message did exist suggests that
the stakeholders are not blameless here either.
10. The ARCs original plan for the Liberty Fund included strengthening its crisis phone
line structures. Inadequate phone support was something the organization was criticized for in
its 2005 response to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.
11. Note, too, how the moral judgment is tightly linked to the cognitive judgment of truth
or falsity, reinforcing the earlier discussion of the simultaneity of the various validity claims
and the need to consider them in concert.
12. The linkage of Evanss subsequent premature departure in December, 2005, to issues
of board management and communication suggests a concerning trend in ARC leadership that
is ripe for further study.
13. Reports that both Evans and Healy resigned from the ARC because of disagreements
with the board suggests a serious need for investigation of such internal processes.
14. Evans reported in an interview that approximately 6,000 individuals participated in the
development of the ARCs strategic plan (see Taylor, 2005).

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Rebecca J. Meisenbach (PhD, Purdue) is an assistant professor of communication at the

University of MissouriColumbia. Her research focuses on intersections among organizing,
rhetoric, and ethics, with particular attention to issues of nonprofit and gendered organizing.

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