Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Behavior
Okol filed her written explanation. However, Slimmers World found Okol's
explanation to be unsatisfactory. Through a letter signed by its president
Moy, Slimmers World terminated Okol's employment.
Okol filed a complaint with the Arbitration branch of the NLRC against
Slimmers World, Behavior Modifications, Inc. and Moy for illegal
suspension, illegal dismissal, unpaid commissions, damages and
attorney's fees.
Petitioner insists that the CA erred in ruling that she was a corporate
officer and that the case is an intra-corporate dispute falling within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts. Petitioner asserts that even as vicepresident, the work that she performed conforms to that of an employee
rather than a corporate officer.
Issue:
Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case filed
by petitioner.
Held:
NO. The charges of illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, unpaid commissions,
reinstatement and back wages imputed by petitioner against respondents
fall squarely within the ambit of intra-corporate disputes.
Before, intra-corporate disputes fall within the jurisdiction of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). Subsection 5.2, Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 8799, transferred to RTCs the SEC's jurisdiction over all cases listed in
Section 5 of PD 902-A.
The determination of the rights of a director and corporate officer dismissed
from his employment as well as the corresponding liability of a corporation, if
any, is an intra-corporate dispute subject to the jurisdiction of the regular
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courts. Thus, the appellate court correctly ruled that it is not the NLRC but
the regular courts which have jurisdiction over the present case.
In the motion, respondents attached the General Information Sheet, Minutes
of the meeting of the Board of Directors and Secretary's Certificate, and the
Amended By-Laws of Slimmers World as submitted to the SEC to show that
petitioner was a corporate officer whose rights do not fall within the NLRC's
jurisdiction. The GIS and minutes of the meeting of the board of directors
indicated that petitioner was a member of the board of directors, holding one
subscribed share of the capital stock, and an elected corporate officer.
The Court ruled that an "office" is created by the charter of the corporation
and the officer is elected by the directors or stockholders. On the other hand,
an "employee" usually occupies no office and generally is employed not by
action of the directors or stockholders but by the managing officer of the
corporation who also determines the compensation to be paid to such
employee.
2. VIRGILIO G. ANABE vs. ASIAN CONSTRUCTION (ASIAKONSTRUKT)
G.R. No. 183233 December 23, 2009
FACTS:
The petitioner was hired by respondent Asian Construction (Asiakonstrukt) as
radio technician/operator . His services were terminated on the ground of
retrenchment. He thus filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and illegal
deduction of his pay.
Because Asiakonstrukt failed to submit financial statements to prove losses,
the Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner was not validly dismissed.
Respondents are ordered to pay Virgilio Anade his 13th month pay, illegal
deductions and overtime pay
When the case was elevated to the NLRC, Asiakonstrukt submitted the
certified true copies of the Audited Financial Statements from 1998 to 2000,
NLRC modified the Labor Arbiters Decision by holding that petitioner was not
illegally dismissed and reduced the reimbursable amount of illegal
deductions.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. He then
appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision rendered by
the NLRC.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners dismissal on the ground of retrenchment was
justified
RULING:
The SC granted the petition and remanded the case to the NLRC for
recomputation of the monetary award. Retrenchment is the termination of
employment initiated by the employer through no fault of and without
prejudice to the employees. It is resorted to during periods of business
recession and is recognized by Article 283 of the Labor Code
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December 4, 2009
FACTS:
Respondent Mario Valcueba filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal and
nonpayment of wage differential, 13th month pay differential, holiday pay,
premium pay for holidays and rest days, and service incentive leaves with
claims for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees, against Hilario
Ramirez. Valcueba claimed that Ramirez hired him as mechanic and was paid
per day from 1999 to 2006. On Feb. 27, 2006, Valcueba was advised not to
return to work unless he would agree to work on a pakyaw basis. On the
other hand, Ramirez contended that Valcueba fails to obey the formers
lawful order when he had an emergency call and requested Valcueba to
report to Calawisan Station to repair a taxi unit of Ramirez since the
mechanic assigned in the said station was absent. Ramirez insisted that he
did not terminate the complainant, it was the latter who abandoned his job
following his absence the following day after the emergency call without any
leave of absence. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding Ramirez not
guilty of illegal dismissal and awarded complainant for 13th month pay and
wage differential for a total of P45, 825.98 and the reinstatement of
complainant. Ramirez filed a memorandum of appeal with urgent motion to
reduce bond before the NLRC. For failure to post a reasonable amount and to
offer meritorious grounds, NLRC dismissed his appeal. He went to the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition outright for failure of
Ramirez to properly verify his petition and to state material dates. Hence,
this petition.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not Ramirez has complied with the requirements to perfect his
appeal.
HELD:
Under Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of NLRC which explicitly
reaffirms the jurisdictional principle in Art. 223 of the Labor Code, appeals
involving monetary awards are perfected only upon compliance with the
following mandatory requisites, namely: (1) payment of the appeal fees; (2)
filing of the memorandum of appeal; and (3) payment of the required cash or
surety bond. The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an
appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the decision of the labor
arbiter. Clearly, the filing of the bond is not only mandatory but also a
jurisdictional requirement that must be complied with in order to confer
jurisdiction upon the NLRC. Non-compliance with the requirement renders the
decision of the Labor Arbiter final and executory. While the bond may be
reduced upon motion by the employer, this is subject to the conditions that
(1) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious grounds;
and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by
the appellant; otherwise, the filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not
stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal. The NLRC was justified in
denying the motion for there was no meritorious grounds offered by the
appellant and the P10, 000.00 bond posted by the latter is not a reasonable
amount in relation to the monetary award of P45, 825.98.
Ramirezs failure to verify and state material dates as required under the
rules warranted the outright dismissal of his petition before the Court of
Appeals. In an actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate
the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or
resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was
received. Failure to comply shall be a ground for dismissal.
Hence, the Supreme Court finds no sufficient justification to set aside the
NLRC and Court of Appeals resolutions. Thus, the decision of the Labor
Arbiter is already final and executory and binding upon this Court.
Facts:
The present petition traces its roots to the complaint for illegal dismissal filed
by the respondent against petitioners CRC Agricultural Trading and its owner,
Rolando B. Catindig (collectively, petitioners), before the Labor Arbiter. In his
Sinumpaang Salaysay, the respondent alleged that the petitioners employed
him as a driver. The respondent worked for the petitioners until he met an
accident, after which the petitioners no longer allowed him to work. After six
years, the petitioners again hired the respondent as a driver and offered him
to stay inside the companys premises.
Sometime in March 2003, the petitioners ordered respondent to have the
alternator of one of its vehicles repaired. The respondent brought the vehicle
to a repair shop and subsequently gave the petitioners two receipts issued
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by the repair shop. The latter suspected that the receipts were falsified and
stopped talking to him and giving him work assignments. Petitioners no
longer gave him any salary after that. As a result, the respondent and his
family moved out of the petitioners compound. The respondent claimed that
the petitioners paid him a daily wage of P175.00, but did not give him
service incentive leave, holiday pay, rest day pay, and overtime pay. He also
alleged that the petitioners did not send him a notice of termination.
Issue:
Was respondents dismissal justified?
RULING:
No. To justify the dismissal of an employee for a just cause, the employer
must furnish the worker with two written notices. The first is the notice to
apprise the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought. This may be loosely considered as the charge against the
employee. The second is the notice informing the employee of the
employers decision to dismiss him. This decision, however, must come only
after the employee is given a reasonable period from receipt of the first
notice within which to answer the charge, and ample opportunity to be heard
and defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
The requirement of notice is not a mere technicality, but a requirement of
due process to which every employee is entitled.
The employer clearly failed to comply with the two-notice requirement.
Nothing in the records shows that the company ever sent the employee a
written notice informing him of the ground for which his dismissal was
sought. It does not also appear that the company held a hearing where the
employee was given the opportunity to answer the charges of abandonment.
Neither did the company send a written notice to the employee informing
him that his service had been terminated and the reasons for the termination
of his employment. Under these facts, the respondents dismissal was illegal.
5. ARSENIO S. QUIAMBAO, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
G.R. No. 171023 December 18, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner was employed as branch teller by respondent Manila Electric
Company-Mandaluyong Office for the handling and processing of payments.
Petitioner has repeatedly
violated the Company Code
of
Employee
Discipline specifically excessive unauthorized absences. Through a Notice of
Dismissal, petitioners employment was terminated effective March 29,
2000.On July 3, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint before the Arbitration
Branch of the NLRC against respondent assailing the legality of his dismissal.
He also claimed that he was denied due process. The Labor Arbiter dismissed
the complaint for a lack of merit. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which
affirmed the legality of his dismissal due to habitual absenteeism. On appeal
to the Court of Appeals, the CA nullified the NLRCs Decision and reinstated
the Labor Arbiters Decision dismissing the complaint. It ruled that the award
of separation pay is neither justified nor warranted under the circumstances
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied, hence this petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE:
5 | Page
Assistant Principal Loy even stated that Santoss improvement was a result
of her positive attitude in approaching her growth plan. Unfortunately,
though, Santos could not sustain this progress. Not long after, the School
administrators were again admonishing Santos for her vague lesson plans
that lacked specifics.
However, based on records, the inadequacies of Santos as a teacher did not
stem from a reckless disregard of the welfare of her students or of the issues
raised by the School regarding her teaching. Far from being tainted with bad
faith, Santoss failings appeared to have resulted from her lack of necessary
skills, in-depth knowledge, and expertise to teach the Filipino language at the
standards required of her by the School. Consequently, defendants
sufficiently proved the charge of gross inefficiency, which warranted the
dismissal of Santos from the School.
As previously held, it is the prerogative of the school to set high standards
of efficiency for its teachers since quality education is a mandate of the
Constitution. As long as the standards fixed are reasonable and not arbitrary,
courts are not at liberty to set them aside. Further, this is also in in line with
the academic freedom accorded to schools.
Going further, the CBA between ISAE and the School for the years 19921995 also recognized the exclusive right of the School to hire and appoint
qualified faculty subject to such reasonable rules and regulations as it may
prescribe, as well as the right of the School to discipline its faculty and
determine reasonable levels of performance. Section 8 of Appendix A of the
CBA also states that [a]ll faculty members must meet the high standard of
performance expected by the SCHOOL and abide by all its policies,
procedures and contractual terms.
Here, it is not accurate to state that Santos was dismissed by the School for
inefficiency on account of the fact that she was caught only once without a
lesson plan. The documentary evidence submitted by [defendants], the
contents of which we laid down in detail in our statement of facts, pointed to
the numerous instances when Santos failed to observe the prescribed
standards of performance set by the School in several areas of concern, not
the least of which was her lack of adequate planning for her Filipino classes.
Said evidence established that the School administrators informed Santos of
her inadequacies as soon as they became apparent; that they provided
constructive criticism of her planning process and teaching performance; and
that regular conferences were held between Santos and the administrators in
order to address the latters concerns. In view of her slow progress, the
School required her to undergo the remediation phase of the evaluation
process through a Professional Growth Plan. Despite the efforts of the School
administrators, Santos failed to show any substantial improvement in her
planning process. Having failed to exit the remediation process successfully,
the School was left with no choice but to terminate her employment.
Lastly, it must be pointed out that Santos voluntarily agreed to teach the
Filipino classes given to her when she came back from her leave of absence.
Said classes were not forced upon her by the School. This much she admitted
in the hearing of the case before the Labor Arbiter. She stated therein that
for the school year 1993-1994, she was given the option to teach only one
Spanish class and not have any Filipino teaching loads. She, however, said
that if she took that option she would have been underpaid and her salary
would not have been the same. Moreover, for the school years 1994-1995
and 1995-1996, she made known to the School that she did not prefer a
change in teaching assignment. Thus, when she consented to take on the
Filipino classes, it was Santoss responsibility to teach them well within the
8 | Page
February 5, 2014
Facts
Complainant Raul C. Cosare instituted a labor complaint primarily for
constructive dismissal against his employer defendant Broadcom Asia, Inc.,
and its president defendant Dante Arevalo.
Complainant claimed that sometime in April 1993, he was employed as a
salesman by Arevalo, who was then in the business of selling broadcast
equipment needed by television networks and production houses. In
December 2000, Arevalo set up the company Broadcom, still to continue the
business of trading communication and broadcast equipment. Cosare was
named an incorporator of Broadcom In October 2001, Cosare was
promoted to the position of Assistant Vice President for Sales (AVP for Sales)
and Head of the Technical Coordination, having a monthly basic net salary
and average commissions of P18,000.00 and P37,000.00, respectively.
Thereafter, sometime in 2003, Alex F. Abiog (Abiog) was appointed as
Broadcoms Vice President for Sales and thus, became Cosares immediate
superior. On March 23, 2009, Cosare sent a confidential memo to Arevalo to
inform him of the following anomalies which were allegedly being committed
by Abiog against the company: (a) he failed to report to work on time, and
would immediately leave the office on the pretext of client visits; (b) he
advised the clients of Broadcom to purchase camera units from its
competitors, and received commissions therefor; (c) he shared in the under
the-table dealings or confidential commissions which Broadcom extended
to its clients personnel and engineers; and (d) he expressed his complaints
and disgust over Broadcoms uncompetitive salaries and wages and delay in
the payment of other benefits, even in the presence of office staff. Cosare
ended his memo by clarifying that he was not interested in Abiogs position,
but only wanted Arevalo to know of the irregularities for the corporations
sake.
There appears to be no response from Defendant Arevalo regarding the
above accusations. Cosare claimed that he was instead called for a meeting
by Arevalo on March 25, 2009, wherein he was asked to tender his
resignation in exchange for financial assistance in the amount of
P300,000.00. Cosare refused to comply with the directive, as signified in a
letter dated March 26, 2009 which he sent to Arevalo.
9 | Page
employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent
without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) there must have been a clear
intention on the part of the employee to sever the employer-employee
relationship manifested by some overt act.
Here, complainants failure to report to work beginning April 1, 2009 was
neither voluntary nor indicative of an intention to sever his employment with
Broadcom. It was illogical to be requiring him to report for work, and
imputing fault when he failed to do so after he was specifically denied access
to all of the companys assets.
As there is constructive dismissal in this case, an illegally or constructively
dismissed employee is entitled to: (1) either reinstatement, if viable, or
separation pay, if reinstatement is no longer viable; and (2) backwages. The
award of exemplary damages was also justified given the NLRCs finding that
the respondents acted in bad faith and in a wanton, oppressive and
malevolent manner when they dismissed Cosare. It is also by reason of such
bad faith that Arevalo was correctly declared solidarily liable for the
monetary awards.
8. INTEL TECHNOLOGY PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION AND JEREMIAS CABILES
G.R. No. 200575
February 5, 2014
Facts
Complainant Jeremias Cabiles filed a labor complaint primarily to recover
retirement benefits from his employer Defendant Intel Technology
Philippines, Inc. Cabiles was initially hired by Intel Phil. on April 16, 1997 as
an Inventory Analyst. He was subsequently promoted several times over the
years and was also assigned at Intel Arizona and Intel Chengdu. He later
applied for a position at Intel Semiconductor Limited Hong Kong (Intel HK).
He was offered by the latter the position of Finance Manager.
Prior to accepting the post, Complainant sent an email to Defendant which
read:
Are there any clearance requirements I need to fulfil as I move as a local
hire to Hong Kong starting February 1?? I am still on my expat assignment in
Chengdu till it ends January 31. Then immediately I become a HK local
employee so I dont technically repatriate and work back to my home site
Philippines at all.
Nevertheless, I still need to close I think my employment there and so that
all my ES benefits and clearance will be closed like conversion of my
vacation leaves to cash, carry over of my service tenure in CV to HK etc.
Please do let me know what process I need to go through or would an email
notification be enough?
Another issue I would like to clarify is with regard to my retirement benefits.
Will celebrate my 10th year of service with Intel on April 16, 2007. However,
because I will be moving to Hong Kong as a local hire starting February 1,
would I still be entitled to retirement benefits?? Do we round up the years of
service if its close enough to 10 years?? If not, what other alternatives I have
or do I just lose my years of service at Intel Philippines? Any possibility that I
keep my 9.5 years and start it from there when I work in the Philippines
again in the future?? [Emphases supplied]
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In response, Defendant stated that Complainant was not yet entitled to the
retirement benefit as he has not yet rendered at least 10 years of service.
Afterwards, Complainant received his final pay and executed a Release,
Waiver, and Quitclaim (Waiver). After seven (7) months with Intel HK,
Complainant resigned. Two years after that, he filed the present labor case
alleging non-payment of retirement benefits and for moral and exemplary
damages. He insists that he has been employed with by Intel for 10 years
and 5 months, including his Intel HK stint.
HELD
Complainant was not entitled to his retirement benefits as he did not render
10 years of service. Complainant resigned prior to making it on his 10th year.
Resignation is the formal relinquishment of an office, the overt act of which
is coupled with an intent to renounce. This intent could be inferred from the
acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation.
Here, [Complainant], while still on a temporary assignment in Intel
Chengdu, was offered by Intel HK the job of a Finance Manager.
In his letter, it showed two of Complainants main concerns: a) clearance
procedures; and b) the probability of getting his retirement pay despite the
non-completion of the required 10 years of employment service. Beyond
these concerns, however, was his acceptance of the fact that he would be
ending his relationship with Intel Phil. as his employer. The words he used
local hire, close, clearance denote nothing but his firm resolve to
voluntarily disassociate himself from Intel Phil. and take on new
responsibilities with Intel HK.
Even if there was no favorable response to that letter, Complainant still
accepted the Intel HK post. His acceptance of the offer meant letting go of
the retirement benefits he now claims as he was informed through email
correspondence that his 9.5 years of service with Intel Phil. would not be
rounded off in his favor. He, thus, placed himself in this position, as he chose
to be employed in a company that would pay him more than what he could
earn in Chengdu or in the Philippines.
Complainant made a choice. The choice of staying with Intel Phil. vis--vis a
very attractive opportunity with Intel HK put him in a dilemma. If he would
wait to complete ten (10) years of service with Intel Phil. (in about 4 months)
he would enjoy the fruits of his retirement but at the same time it would
mean forfeiture of Intel HKs compensation offer in the amount of HK $
942,500.00, an amount a lot bigger than what he would receive under the
plan. He decided to forfeit and became Intel HKs newest hire.
As such, Complainant did resign. All these are indicative of the clearest
intent of Cabiles to sever ties with Intel Phil. He chose to forego his tenure
with Intel Phil., with all its associated benefits, in favor of a more lucrative job
for him and his family with Intel HK.
Regarding his claim that he was merely assigned Intel HK or an extension of
his employment with Intel Phil., there is no such secondment contract. The
continuity, existence or termination of an employer-employee relationship in
a typical secondment contract or any employment contract for that matter is
measured by the following yardsticks: 1. the selection and engagement of
the employee; 2. the payment of wages; 3. the power of dismissal;
and 4. the employers power to control the employees conduct.
12 | P a g e
Applying the four-fold test, Intel HK became the new employer. It provided
Cabiles his compensation. Cabiles then became subject to Hong Kong labor
laws, and necessarily, the rights appurtenant thereto, including the right of
Intel HK to fire him on available grounds. Lastly, Intel HK had control and
supervision over him as its new Finance Manager. Evidently, Intel Phil. no
longer had any control over him.
Complainants Waiver was valid. Citing jurisprudence, [n]ot all waivers and
quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was
voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding
on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of
mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from
an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are
unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable
transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so
voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the
consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction
must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking.
9. GOYA Inc. vs GOYA Inc. Employees Union FFW
G.R. No. 170054 : January 21, 2013
Facts
Petitioner Goya Inc. (Goya) hired contractual employees from PESO
Resources Development Corporation (PESO). This prompted Goya, Inc.
Employees Union-FFW (Union) to request for a grievance conference on the
ground that the contractual workers do not belong to the categories of
employees stipulated in their CBA. The Union also argued that hiring
contractual employees is contrary to the union security clause embodied in
the CBA.
When the matter remained unresolved, the grievance was referred to the
NCMB for voluntary arbitration. The Union argued that Goya is guilty of ULP
for gross violation of the CBA. The voluntary arbitrator dismissed the Unions
charge of ULP but Goya was directed to observe and comply with the CBA.
While the Union moved for partial consideration of the VA decision, Goya
immediately filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals to set
aside the VAs directive to observe and comply with the CBA commitment
pertaining to the hiring of casual employees. Goya argued that hiring
contractual employees is a valid management prerogative. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition.
ISSUE
Whether the act of hiring contractual employees is a valid exercise of
management prerogative?
HELD
The petition must fail.
LABOR LAW:
agreement.
management
prerogative;
ULP;
collective
bargaining
The CA did not commit serious error when it sustained the ruling that the
hiring of contractual employees from PESO was not in keeping with the intent
and spirit of the CBA. In this case, a complete and final adjudication of the
dispute between the parties necessarily called for the resolution of the
related and incidental issue of whether the Company still violated the CBA
13 | P a g e
but without being guilty of ULP as, needless to state, ULP is committed only if
there is gross violation of the agreement.
Goya kept on harping that both the VA and the CA conceded that its
engagement of contractual workers from PESO was a valid exercise of
management prerogative. It is confused. To emphasize, declaring that a
particular act falls within the concept of management prerogative is
significantly different from acknowledging that such act is a valid exercise
thereof. What the VA and the CA correctly ruled was that the Companys act
of contracting out/outsourcing is within the purview of management
prerogative. Both did not say, however, that such act is a valid exercise
thereof. Obviously, this is due to the recognition that the CBA provisions
agreed upon by Goya and the Union delimit the free exercise of management
prerogative pertaining to the hiring of contractual employees.
A collective bargaining agreement is the law between the parties. A
collective bargaining agreement or CBA refers to the negotiated contract
between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages,
hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a
bargaining unit. As in all contracts, the parties in a CBA may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient
provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy. Thus, where the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it becomes the
law between the parties and compliance therewith is mandated by the
express policy of the law.
As repeatedly held, the exercise of management prerogative is not unlimited;
it is subject to the limitations found in law, collective bargaining agreement
or the general principles of fair play and justice.
Petition is DENIED.
10. GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION vs VIOLETA L. VIAJAR
G.R. No. 181738 : January 30, 2013
Facts
GMC is a domestic corporation with principal office in Makati City and a
manufacturing plant in Lapu-Lapu City. GMC terminated the services of
thirteen (13) employees for redundancy, including herein respondent, Violeta
Viajar (Viajar). GMC alleged that it has been gradually downsizing its Vismin
(Visayas-Mindanao) Operations in Cebu where a sizeable number of positions
became redundant over a period of time. When Viajar reported for, a month
before the effectivity of her severance from the company, the guard on duty
barred her fromentering GMCs premises. She was also denied access to her
office computer and was restricted from punching her daily time record in
the bundy clock. Viajar was then invited to the HRD Cebu Office where she
was asked to sign certain documents, which turned out to be an "Application
for Retirement and Benefits." The respondent refused to sign and sought
clarification because she did not apply for retirement and instead asserted
that her services were terminated for alleged redundancy. Viajar also claimed
that between the period of July 4, 2003 and October 13, 2003, GMC hired
fifteen (15) new employees which aroused her suspicion that her dismissal
was not necessary. For its part, GMC insisted that Viajars dismissal was due
to the redundancy of her position. GMC reasoned out that it was forced to
terminate the services of the respondent because of the economic setbacks
14 | P a g e
the company was suffering which affected the companys profitability, and
the continuing rise of its operating and interest expenditures. Redundancy
was part of the petitioners concrete and actual cost reduction measures.
GMC also presented the required "Establishment Termination Report" which it
filed before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on October 28,
2003, involving thirteen (13) of its employees, including Viajar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Viajar was validly dismissed on the ground of redundancy
RULING:
Article 283 of the Labor Code provides that redundancy is one of the
authorized causes for dismissal. It reads:
Article 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel.
The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to
the installment of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent
losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or
undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the
provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the worker and the
Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the
intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of laborsaving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled
to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least
one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of
retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of
operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business
losses or reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month
pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever
is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1)
whole year.
From the above provision, it is imperative that the employer must comply
with the
requirements for a valid implementation of the companys redundancy
program, to wit:
(a) the employer must serve a written notice to the affected employees
and the DOLE at least one (1) month before the intended date of
retrenchment;
(b) the employer must pay the employees a separation pay equivalent
to at least one month pay or at least one month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher;
(c) the employer must abolish the redundant positions in good faith;
and
(d) the employer must set fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining
which positions are redundant and may be abolished.
Furthermore, the Court cannot overlook the fact that Viajar was prohibited
from entering the company premises even before the effectivity date of
termination; and was compelled to sign an "Application for Retirement and
Benefits." These acts exhibit the petitioners bad faith since itcannot be
denied that the respondent was still entitled to report for work until
November 30, 2003. The demand for her to sign the "Application for
Retirement and Benefits" also contravenes the fact that she was terminated
due to redundancy. Indeed, there is a difference between voluntary
retirement of an employee and forced termination due to authorized causes.
11. ELEAZAR S. PADILLO vs. RURAL BANK OF NABUNTURAN, INC.,
and MARK S. OROPEZA
G.R. No. 199338 : January 21, 2013
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FACTS:
Petitioner, the late Eleazar Padillo (Padillo), was an employee of respondent
Rural Bank of Nabunturan, Inc. (Bank) as its SA Bookkeeper. Due to liquidity
problems in 2003, the Bank took out retirement/insurance plans with
Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company (Philam Life) for all
its employees in anticipation of its possible closure and the concomitant
severance of its personnel. Respondent Mark Oropeza is the president and
major stockholder of the bank.
Padillo suffered a mild stroke due to hypertension which consequently
impaired his ability to effectively pursue his work. He wrote a letter
addressed to Oropeza expressing his intention to avail of an early retirement
package. Despite several follow-ups, his request remained unheeded. Not
having received his claimed retirement benefits, Padillo filed with the NLRC a
complaint for the recovery of unpaid retirement benefits.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed Padillos complaint on the ground that the latter
did not qualify to receive any benefits under Article 300 of the Labor Code as
he was only fifty-five (55) years old when he resigned, while the law
specifically provides for an optional retirement age of sixty (60) and
compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65).
Padillo elevated the matter to the NLRC. The NLRC reversed the Labor
Arbiters ruling. Aggrieved, Oropeza and the Bank filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA. The CA reversed the NLRCs ruling but with modification. It
directed the respondents to pay Padillo the amount of P50,000.00 as
financial assistance exclusive of the P100,000.00 Philam Life Plan benefit.
Displeased with the CAs ruling, Padillo (now substituted by his legal heirs due
to his death) filed the instant petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Padillo is entitled to claim for separation and retirement
benefits under the Labor Code?
HELD:
The petition is partly meritorious.
least six (6) months being considered as one whole year. Notably, these age
and tenure requirements are cumulative and non- compliance with one
negates the employees entitlement to the retirement benefits under Article
300 of the Labor Code altogether.
In this case, it is undisputed that there exists no retirement plan, collective
bargaining agreement or any other equivalent contract between the parties
which set out the terms and condition for the retirement of employees, with
the sole exception of the Philam Life Plan which premiums had already been
paid by the Bank.
Unfortunately, while Padillo was able to comply with the five (5) year tenure
requirement as he served for twenty-nine (29) years he, however, fell short
with respect to the sixty (60) year age requirement given that he was only
fifty-five (55) years old when he retired. Therefore, without prejudice to the
proceeds due under the Philam Life Plan, petitioners claim for retirement
benefits must be denied.
Nevertheless, the Court concurs with the CA that financial assistance should
be awarded but at an increased amount. With a veritable understanding that
the award of financial assistance is usually the final refuge of the laborer,
considering as well the supervening length of time which had sadly
overtaken the point of Padillos death an employee who had devoted twentynine (29) years of dedicated service to the Bank the Court, in light of the
dictates of social justice, holds that the CAs financial assistance award
should be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, still exclusive of the
P100,000.00 benefit receivable by the petitioners under the Philam Life Plan
which remains undisputed.
CIVIL LAW: abuse of right; damages
Finally, the Court finds no bad faith on the part of the Bank and Oropeza as
they were within their right, absent any proof of its abuse, to ignore Padillos
misplaced claim for retirement benefits. Oropezas and the Banks obstinate
refusal to accede to Padillos request is precisely justified by the fact that
here lies no basis under any applicable agreement or law which accords the
latter the right to demand any retirement benefits from the Bank. While the
Court mindfully notes that damages may be recoverable due to an abuse of
right under Article 21 in conjunction with Article 19 of the Civil Code the
following elements must, however, obtain: ( 1) there is a legal right or duty;
(2) exercised in bad faith; and (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another. Records reveal that none of these elements exists in the case at bar
and thus, no damages on account of abuse of right may he recovered.
PARTLY GRANTED.
FACTS:
In 1992, DECS issued the Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools,
which requires college faculty members to have a master's degree as a
minimum educational qualification for acquiring regular status.
University of the East hired respondent Mariti D. Bueno (Bueno) in 1997 and
respondent Analiza F. Pepanio (Pepanio) in 2000, both on a semester-tosemester basis to teach in its college. During this time, the 1994 CBA was
still in force. It provided that UE shall extend only semester-to-semester
appointments to college faculty staffs who did not possess the minimum
qualifications. Meantime, DECS-CHED-TESDA-DOLE Joint Order 1 was issued
which provides that teaching or academic personnel who do not meet the
minimum academic qualifications shall not acquire tenure or regular status.
Then in 2001, UE and the faculty union entered into a new CBA that would
have the school extend probationary full-time appointments to full-time
faculty members who did not yet have the required postgraduate degrees
provided that the latter would obtain such requirement during their
probationary period. Hence, UE extended probationary appointments to
Bueno and Pepanio. The two, however, failed to obtain post-graduate
degrees.
UE informed Bueno and Pepanio that their probationary status is about to
expire since they lack the required post-graduate qualification. However,
Bueno and Pepanio demanded that they should be considered as regular
employees since they were hired in 1997 and 2000, when what was in force
was the 1994 CBA which did not require a masters degree before attaining
regular status. UE did not heed to their demands.
Thus, they filed a case for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. The LA
ruled in their favor. Dissatisfied, UE appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC
reversed the LAs ruling.
On petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision
reinstating the LAs Decision by reason of technicality. This prompted UE to
file the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bueno and Pepanio were validly terminated from their
employment?
HELD:
Petition is granted.
LABOR LAW: collective bargaining agreement
The policy requiring postgraduate degrees of college teachers was provided
in the Manual of Regulations as early as 1992. Indeed, recognizing this, the
1994 CBA provided even then that UE was to extend only semester- tosemester appointments to college faculty staffs, like Bueno and Pepanio, who
did not possess the minimum qualifications for their positions.
Besides, as the Court held in Escorpizo v. University of Baguio, a school CBA
must be read in conjunction with statutory and administrative regulations
governing faculty qualifications. Such regulations form part of a valid CBA
without need for the parties to make express reference to it. While the
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showing that the Greek technician spearheaded nor had any participation in
the complaint of Colonial Shipping against petitioner.
14.
JAVIER
(DANILO
P.
JAVIER),
CORPORATION/FLORDELYN CASTILLO,
G.R. No. 192558 February 15, 2012
vs.
FLY
ACE
Facts:
1. Since 2007, Danilo Bitoy Javier was an employee of Fly Ace
As he was begging the security guard to let him enter, he saw Mr. Ong,
whom he approached and asked why he was being barred from
entering
Bitoy discovered that Mr. Ong had been courting his daughter Annalyn;
that Annalyn tried to talk to Mr. Ong and convince him to spare Bitoy
from trouble, but he refused; that Mr. Ong then fired Bitoy
3. May 23, 2008: Bitoy filed a complaint with the NLRC for underpayment of
salaries and other labor standard benefits
Fly Ace said it was in the business of importation and sales of groceries
o That Bitoy was contracted by Mr. Ong as extra helper on a pakyaw
basis for 5-6 times a month, whenever the vehicle of its contracted
hauler, Milmar Hauling Services, was unavailable;
o Rate was P300 (increased to P325)
o That on April 30, they no longer needed his services
o That Bitoy was not their employee, and there was no illegal dismissal
o Evidence: Agreement with Milmar Hauling Services (the contracted
hauler) and copies of acknowledgment receipts evidencing payment
to Javier daily manpower (pakyaw/piece rate pay)
4. LA: Dismissed, Bitoy failed to present proof he was a regular employee of
Fly Ace
Bitoy was contracted on pakiao basis because Fly Ace has a regular
hauler to deliver its products
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Just because the work done was not directly related to the trade or
business or the work was considered as extra, it does not follow that
Bitoy is a job contractor, rather than an employee
Bitoy is entitled to security of tenure; Fly Ace did not present proof for
a valid cause of termination, so it is liable for illegal dismissal,
backwages, and separation pay
6. CA: Annulled the NLRC, reinstated the LA
The facts alleged by Bitoy did NOT pass the control test
o He contracted work outside the premises
o He was not required to observe definite hours
o He was not required to report daily
o He was free to accept work elsewhere
7. Appeal to the SC
Issues:
1. WON Bitoy is a regular employee
2. WON he is entitled to his monetary claims
Held:
1. NO, he is not a regular employee; affirmed CA
- Bitoy: Fly Ace has nothing to substantiate that he was engaged on a
pakyaw basis; and assuming he was hird on pakyaw basis, it does not
preclude his regular employment; acknowledgement receipts with his
signature do not show true nature of employment (relied on Chavez v.
NLRC)
o His tasks as pahinante are related to Fly Airs business
o He was subject to the control and supervision of the company
(reported M to S, 7AM to 5PM)
o List of deliverable goods prepared by Fly Ace Bitoy was subject to
compliance with company rules
o He was illegally dismissed by Fly Ace
- Fly Ace: Bitoy had no substantial evidence to prove ER-EE relationship
o Despite having Milmar Hauling under service contract, they
contracted Bitoy as an extra helper or pahinante, on a mere per trip
basis
o Bitoy and the company driver would have the vehicle and products in
their custody, and when they left company premises, they use their
own means, method, best judgment and discretion (i.e., no control by
Fly Ace)
o Claims of employment by Bitoy are BASELESS, and nothing was
presented to substantiate this
o Lopez v. Bodega City: In an illegal dismissal case, the burden of proof
is upon the complainant w ho claims to be an employee. It is
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