PROJECT ON

RIDGE V. BALDWIN
AN ANALYSIS
SUBMITTED TO:
DR. KAUMUDHI CHALLA

SUBMITTED BY:
POONAM SONWANI
SEMESTER VII
JUDICIAL REVIEW (HONS-II)
ROLL NO. 94

Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur (C.G.)

CERTIFICATE

I Poonam Sonwani hereby declare that the project work entitled Ridge v. Baldwin: An
analysis submitted in Hidaytaullah National Law University is a record of an original work
done by me under the guidance of Dr. Kaumudhi Challa, Faculty of Judicial Review ( Hons.) in
H.N.L.U, Raipur.

Research Guide:
Dr. Kaumudhi Challa
[Faculty: Judicial Review (Hons.)]

DECLARATION

I Poonam Sonwani hereby declare that the project work entitled Ridge v. Baldwin: An
Analysis submitted to Dr. Kaumudhi Challa, Faculty of Judicial Review in Hidayatullah
National Law University, Raipur, is a record of an original work done by me. Any help taken
from sources has been properly cited as footnotes and is added into the bibliography.

Poonam Sonwani
Roll. No. 94
Semester.VII

AKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I owe a great many thanks to a great many people who helped and supported me during the
writing of this project. My deepest thanks to our Judicial Review Teacher, Dr. Kaumudhi Challa,
the Guide of the project, for assigning me this topic and providing me with an opportunity to
analyze one of the most landmark case on Judicial Review of administrative action.
Also, my deep sense of gratitude and thanks and appreciation to the helpful seniors at
Hidayatullah National Law University for their support and guidance.
I would also thank my Institution and staff of HNLU for the infrastructure in the form our library
and IT Lab that was a source of great help for the completion of this project without which this
project would have been a distant reality. I also extend my heartfelt thanks to my family, friends
and well wishers.

Poonam Sonwani
Sem. VII

TABLE OF CASES

Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] AC 40, [1963] UKHL 2

R. v. University of Cambridge (1723) 1 Str. 557
Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works, 14 C.B.N.S. 180, 143 E.R. 414.
In Local Government Board v Arlidge, 1915 AC 120
Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne, 1951 AC 66
Rex v. Electricity Commissioners. Ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Company
Limited, and Others [1924] 1 K.B. 171.
De Verteuil v. Knaggs [1918] A.C. 557).
Wood v. Woad, L.R. 9 Ex. 190.
Ex pane Ramshay, (1852) 21 L.J. 238
Roncarelli v Duplessis [1959] SCR 121
Padfieldv. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, [1968] AC 997
Anesminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission, 1969(1) All ER 208.
A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, 1969(2) SCC 262.
State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Ict, AIR 1967 SC 1269

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Certificate . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Declaration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Acknowledgements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Table of Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .
Chapter 1: Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Research Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.4 Review of Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.5 Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
1.6 Nature and Type of study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
1.7 Sources of data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.8 Limitation of study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.9 Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Chapter 2: Background of Ridge v. Baldwin . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1 Facts of Ridge v. Baldwin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Issues Raised . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 Arguments advanced . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
o Case Presented by Plaintiff
o Arguments given by Respondents
2.4 Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5 Principle laid down . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
Chapter 3: Significance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Chapter 5: Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

I.INTRODUCTION
Ridge v Baldwin1 is one of the most landmark cases in the development of administrative law in
UK.2 It was a UK labour law case heard by the House of Lords and one of the most important
cases to have been decided on the general principles governing Judicial Review of administrative
1 [1964] AC 40, [1963] UKHL 2

actions.3 In this case, the judges hearing the case for the first time extended the doctrine
of natural justice (procedural fairness) into the realm of administrative decision making. 4 5As a
result, the case has been described as the landmark decision that ended a long era of restrictive
application of audi alterem partem rule i.e. rule of fair hearing6 that has never been extended
to administrative decision making.
The House of Lords held that committee had violated the doctrine of natural justice, overturning
the principle outlined by the Donoughmore Committee thirty years before that the doctrine of
natural justice could not be applied to administrative decisions.7
This case is very significant in the sense that it was the first time that the doctrine had been used
to overturn a non-judicial (or quasi-judicial) decision. 8 In fact, this case is also important from
2 Gillian Peele (2004). Governing the UK: British politics in the 21st century (4th ed.).
3 Slapper, Gary (2008-06-24). "The cases that changed Britain: 1955-1971". The Times. Retrieved 4
September 2014
4 See generally Bernard Schwartz (1953),"Administrative Procedure and Natural Law", Notre Dame
Lawyer 28 (2): 169, cited in Shauer, "English Natural Justice and American Due Process", p. 51, n. 24.
5 Lord Woolf; Jowell, Jeffrey; Le Sueur, Andrew, eds. (2007), "Procedural Fairness: Introduction, History
and Comparative Perspectives", De Smith's Judicial Review (6th ed.), London: Sweet & Maxwell,
pp. 317354.
6 De Smith's Judicial Review, p. 322.
7 The Donoughmore Committee on Ministers Powers (1932) analyzed the characteristics of a true
judicial decision and summed up the attributes, presence or absence of which stamped a decision as
administrative decision or quasi judicial decision. The committee was of the view that a true judicial
decision presupposes a lis between parties. There is ascertainment of question of facts by giving evidence
and on the basis of legal arguments, decisions is given by applying the law to the facts. In administrative
decisions, there is no legal obligation to consider and weigh submissions or arguments or to collect
evidence. The ground upon which the action is taken is left entirely to the discretion of the authority.
8 In administrative law this term [quasi-judicial] may have any one of three meanings. It may describe a function
that is partly judicial and partly administrative. It may, alternatively, describe the "judicial" element in a composite
function. Or it may describe the nature of a discretionary act itself where the actor's discretion is not unfettered.

Jurisprudential point of view as it provides evidence on the way judges evaluate the facts and
decide whether a particular principal is applicable or not and how sympathic judgment took place
in this case. As a result the decision had a significant effect not only on the vital interest of the
appellant in this case, but also on the whole state of administrative law in Britain.
The research project is a complete analysis of the case Ridge v. Baldwin. The main focus of the
study is to discuss whether principles of natural justice are applicable to such administrative
bodies and whether decisions in violation of such principles will be void or voidable.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:

This research methodology adopted in dealing with the topic is doctrinal in approach. It is largely
based on secondary & electronic sources of data. Books, case laws, journals & other reference as
guided by faculty are primarily helpful for the completion of this project.
Problem: The project deals with the basic issue whether the rule of natural justice in particular
the rule of fair hearing will be applicable to Quasi judicial decisions or administrative actions
and whether such decisions in violation of the principles will be reviewed by courts or not.
Rationale: Ridge v. Baldwin: An analysis is important as it discusses the applicability of the
principle of natural justice in the judicial, quasi judicial and administrative actions. Views of
House of Lords clear out the various controversial issues of administrative decisions which were
prevalent in U.K prior to this case.

OBJECTIVES:
The main objective of the study is:

To study the historical background of the application of principle of natural justice in U.K
prior to Ridge v. Baldwin.

To discuss the facts of Ridge v. Baldwin in detail and to understand the concept of natural

justice.
To find out whether the principle of Natural Justice, in particular rule of fair hearing will

be applicable to decisions of administrative actions.

To find out whether such administrative authorities have unfettered discretionary power
while deciding a case and whether violation of such principles is subject to judicial
review by courts or not.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE:
The following books have been very helpful in the study of the principle of natural justice and its
application in administrative and quasi judicial decisions. Constitutional and Administrative Law
by Elizabeth Giussani, This book has been referred to understand the judicial review of quasi
judicial actions, Administrative Law by H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth discusses in detail the case
of Ridge vs. Baldwin. This book has been referred to study the pre Ridge situations in U.K. Book
on Administrative Law by I.P. Massey and C.K. Takwani also has been referred to study the
judicial review of judicial, quasi judicial and administrative actions and the application of
principle of natural justice in quasi judicial and administrative actions. In addition to this, book
by Justice Bhagabati Prosad Banerjee & Bhaskar Prosad Banerjee titled Judicial Control of
Administrative Action has been also referred for studying the principle of natural justice from
Indian point of view.

HYPOTHESIS:
Justice must not be done but also seen to be done. Rule of fair hearing is very important for
giving fair judgment in any case. Whenever rights of an individual are in question, the decision
making authority must follow the rules of Natural Justice and he should be given fair chance of
hearing before giving final decision. If such authority fails to follow such procedure, such actions
need to be reviewed by Court to give justice to the affected person.

NATURE AND TYPE OF STUDY:

The nature of research is doctrinal in nature and secondary & electronic sources of data has been
used and also since there is no field work involved while producing this research, it largely
involves study of the principal of natural justice as laid down in the judicial decisions. The type
of study is historical as it is the study of judicial decision in Ridge v. Baldwin.

SOURCES OF DATA:
Data that were used for the completion of this research project are secondary data such as books
from library, journals articles etc. Secondary sources of data also includes online sources and as
far as case laws are concerned these cannot be said to be primary sources since they are not firsthand information or judgment reports but a modified form found in books or journals.

SCOPE AND LIMITATION:

The scope of study is limited to the application of the principle of natural justice in
administrative actions only and it does not deal with any other kinds of actions. The case laws
cited are almost U. K based case laws and since the project deals with only an analysis of Ridge
v Balwin, the project is restricted in dealing with any other principal or case laws from other
countries. The research project also suffers from certain limitations, for eg. The limited access to
sources of data and materials, limitations with respect to time and also with respect to space in
which the research is limited.

CONTRIBUTION :
Ridge v. Baldwin: An Analysis is very important as it provides a complete anaysis of this
landmark case. The project clears out the controversy whether the adminstrative authoriteis have
unfetterred discretionary power or not. The project is also important as it highlights how judges
evaluate the circumstances of a case and give their judgments.
ORAGANIZATION OF STUDY:

The project is divided into three sections comprising of introduction in first section ; Historical
background of the case including facts and issues raised, arguments advances and judgment to be
dealt in second chapter ;Significancce in the third and finally conclusion and bibliography at
last.The first section i.e. introduction throws light upon case Ridge v. Baldiwin and its imortance
in the field of administrative law. The second section comprising of various topic in reseach
project which will be dealt with. The 1 st topic deals with historical background of Ridge vs
Baldwin. It mainly involves cases or situation prior to Ridge v. Baldwin, the 2 nd topic deals with
facts of the case, the 3rd topic deals with the issues raised and arguments given both plaintiff and
defendants.And finally the final judgment given by House of Lords. The thirds chapter deals
with Significance of the case, consisiting of Post ridge cases. At last, Conclusion and
Bibliography.

II.BACKGROUND OF RIDGE V BALDWIN

The case Ridge v. Baldwin9 in the House of Lords may be considered as a watershed in the
development of British administrative law in relation to the scope of application of the rules of
natural justice, particularly in relation to the rule requiring a hearing. 10 Application of natural
justice in the decisions of administrative actions was at low ebb prior to this case.11
However several centuries ago, the court took their stand on the broad principle that bodies
entrusted with legal power could not validly exercise it without first hearing the person who was
going to suffer. This view was very widely applied to administrative as well a judicial acts.
An ancient rule of wide applications:
This was in Bentleys case12, in which The University of Cambridge had deprived a scholar of his
degrees on account of his misconduct in insulting the vice chancellors court, but he was
reinstated on a mandamus from the court of the kings bench on the ground that the deprivation
was unjustifiable and that in any case he should have received a notice so that he could make his
defense, as required by law of Gods and Man. This is a nice example of the old conception of
natural justice as divine and eternal law. It was similarly held that penalty was unjustified, in the

9 [1964] AC 40, [1963] UKHL 2

10 Wade, H[enry] W[illiam] R[awson]; Forsyth, C[hristopher] F. (2009), Administrative Law (10th ed.),
Oxford; New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, pp. 369470
11 Cf. S. A. De Smith: Judicial Review of Administrative Action, second edition.
12 R. v. University of Cambridge (1723) 1 Str. 557 (Fortescue J).

absence of any special power of disfranchisement and that even if there had been such power, the
removal would be void because it was not shown that a hearing had been first given.13
The early decisions mainly concerned restoration to offices. 14 It was clear from the decisions of
this kind that the courts would apply the principle of natural justice to cases of administrative
character; subsequently this doctrine found a fruitful field of application in protecting members
an office from unfair expulsion and other penalties.

A classic Example:
The numerous new administrative authorities, both local and central came into being in the
nineteenth and twentieth century and opened up a large new territory for the principle of natural
justice. The character of the authority was not mattered, what mattered was the character of
power exercised.15 If it adversely affected the legal rights or interest, it must be exercised fairly.
In Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works, Under an Act 1855, it was provided that no one might
put up a building in London without giving seven days notice to the local boards of works and if
one did do, the board might have the building demolished. A builder never the less, began to
erect a house without having given due notice. The board did exactly what the act said and
demolished the building. Their action was purely administrative. However, the owner was
successful in bringing an action for damages for the injury to his building merely on the ground
that the board had no power to act without first asking him what he had to say for himself.
Byles J said that It seems to me that the board is wrong whether they acted judicially or
ministerial. I conceive that they acted judicially, because they had to determine the offence and
they had to apportion the punishment as well as the remedy.

13 See Baggs Case (1615) 11 Co. Rep. 93b.

14 See Protector v. Colchester (1655) Style 452.
15 Wade & Forsyth, p. 405.

The above quote showed very clearly how the courts justified their intervention. They held that
every judicial act is subject to the procedure required by natural justice. Natural justice must be
observed in both judicial and administrative acts. And Every administrative act is judicial if it
adversely affected any persons rights.
The Arlidge Case:
In the 19th century, however the law took an important turn. In Local Government Board v
Arlidge16, A public inquiry had been held on appeal to the local government board by the owner
of the house against which the Hampsted Borough Council had made a closing order on the
ground that it was unfit for human habitation. The owner complained to the court that the board
had dismissed his appeal without fair hearing 17 because he was not allowed to appear before the
officer who made the decision. However the court favored the board and stressed on the limits
that must be set to the administrative procedure. The Arlidge case was therefore a turning point
in which the law failed to keep the standards of fairness required.
A line of other housing cases dealt with the same dilemma and particularly with the question that
how far government department could retain its normal administrative freedom while at the same
time performing its quasi judicial function. The series of notorious decision threatened to undo
all good work of earlier judges.18 Thus, in the first half of the twentieth-century, the rule of
16 1915 AC 120
17 David Phillip Jones; Anne S. de Villars (2009), "Natural Justice and the Duty to be Fair", Principles
of Administrative Law(5th ed.), Carswell, pp. 208223 at 209,
18 See Venicoff's case, (1920) 3 KB 72, Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne, 1951 AC 66, In that case the Controller
ofTextiles in Ceylon made an order cancelling the Appellant's license to act as a dealer, and the Appellant sought to
have that order quashed. The Controller acted under a Defense Regulation which empowered him to cancel a license
"where the Controller has reasonable grounds to believe that any dealer is unfit to be allowed to continue as a
dealer ". The Privy Council regarded that as "imposing a condition that there must in fact exist such reasonable
grounds, known to the Controller, before he can validly exercise the power of cancellation ". But according to their
judgment certiorari did not lie, and no other means was suggested whereby the appellant or anyone else in his
position could obtain redress even if the Controller acted without a shred of evidence. Lord Reid reached a similar
conclusion regarding the Nakkuda case in his opinion in Ridge, being "forced to the conclusion" that the rule of the
judgment concerning the application of the rules of natural justice "was given under a serious misapprehension of
the effect of the older authorities and therefore cannot be regarded as authoritative."
Also see, Rex v. Electricity Commissioners. Ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Company (1920),
Limited, and Others [1924] 1 K.B. 171.

natural justice which requires hearing the person affected by an administrative decision had a
very restricted application.19 Unlike in some nineteenth century cases, the courts began to draw a
strict line between administrative and judicial or quasi-judicial decisions with the effect of
limiting the application of a right to hearing.20
However, the tide once again turned in 1963, when the House of Lords went back to the classic
authorities in Ridge v. Baldwin, a case which is an important landmark.

2.1 Facts of Ridge v. Baldwin:

The Appellant, Mr. Ridge, was appointed as Chief Constable of the County Borough of Brighton
in 1956, after serving in the Brighton Police Force for some thirty-three years. The appointment
was to be subject to Police Acts and Regulations. The Appellant and two police officers had
been arrested on 25th October, 1957, and subsequently tried on a charge of conspiring with the
senior members of his force and others to obstruct the course of justice, and the appellant had
been suspended from duty on 26th October on the basis that the Watch Committee had received a
report or allegation from which it appeared that the Chief Constable may have committed one or
more of the offences set out in the Discipline Code contained in the Police (Discipline)
Regulations, 1952. It followed that the suspension would continue either until it was decided that
he would not be charged with an offence against discipline or until any disciplinary proceedings
were concluded. During the prosecution, no evidence was offered against him. Thus, he was
acquitted on 28th February, but the other two members of the force were convicted. However, the
trial Judge, Donovan, J., made certain observations against the appellant while acquitting him of
the charges leveled against him which included grave reflections on the Appellant's conduct.

19 This was seen in cases such as Local Government Board v. Arlidge [1915] A.C. 120, H.L. (United
Kingdom); and R. v. Leman Street Police Station Inspector, ex parte Venicoff [1920] 3 K.B. 72, H.C.
(K.B.) (England & Wales).
20 A further reason for non applicability of the rules of natural justice was said to be if the decision
maker was acting in a disciplinary manner: Ex p. fry (1954) 1 W.L.R. 730, at 733 thought cf. the
reasoning of the appeal court at 736.

Following the statements, the Watch Committee (headed by George Baldwin) met on 7 th March,
1958 and ultimately it was resolved that he should be dismissed.
The appellant therefore submitted an appeal against the summary dismissal from service but the
Home Secretary dismissed the appeal confirming the order passed by the Watch Committee. The
Court of Appeal took a different view and held that the watch committee was not bound by the
principles of natural justice to hold an inquiry of quasi-judicial nature in taking the
administrative action of dismissing their chief constable. Thus, The High Court dismissed his
claim so also the court of Appeal. Lastly the matter went before the House of Lords.

2.2 Issues Raised

The first issue is in this case was whether an administrative body (In this case, the Brighton
Watch Committee) was obliged to act judicially, or in conformity with the principles of natural
justice or not?
In this case, the principle which is at question is a principle of natural justice. Before looking at
the issue involved in this case, it is important to clarify the meaning of natural justice. Natural
justice implies fairness, reasonableness, equity and equality. It is a concept of natural law
developed by judges which every administrative agency must follow when taking any decision
adversely affecting the rights of a private individual. The concept of natural justice has two main
principles. They are: Nemo in propria causa judex esse debet which means that No one
should be made a judge in his own cause or the rule against bias. And the second important
principle which related to this case is Audi alteram partem. It means Rule of fair hearing or the
rule that No one should be condemned unheard.21 This is the second long arm of natural justice
which protects the common man from the arbitrary administrative actions whenever his right to
person or property is jeopardized. Thus, one of the objectives of giving a fair hearing is to see
that an illegal action or decision does not take place. Any wrong order may adversely affect a
person and it is essentially for this reason that a reasonable opportunity may be granted before

21 Wade & Forsyth, p. 402.

passing a decision.22 The expression Audi alteram partem simply means that a person must be
given an opportunity to defend himself.
In this case, the decision to dismiss the appellant was taken by the Watch Committee which is an
administrative agency exercising adjudicatory powers. Administrative decision making or quasi
judicial decision may be defined as a power to perform acts administrative in character, but
requiring characteristics of judicial traditions. Disciplinary proceedings against an employee
come under quasi judicial functions.
So, the main issue in this case was whether the Brighton Watch Committee was obliged to act
judicially or in conformity to the rules of natural justice or not.
The second issue in this case was whether such administrative bodies have unfettered
discretionary powers and whether the violation of such principals of natural justice by decisions
of such administrative bodies or quasi judicial decisions are subject to judicial Review.23 Judicial
review is a procedure in English administrative law by which the courts in England and
Wales supervise the exercise of public power on the application of an individual. A person who
feels that an exercise of such power by a government authority, such as a minister, the local
council or a statutory tribunal, is unlawful, perhaps because it has violated his or her rights, may
apply to the Court for judicial review of the decision and have it set aside (quashed) and possibly
obtain damages. A court may also make mandatory orders or injunctions to compel the authority
to do its duty or to stop it from acting illegally. One of the grounds of Judicial Review is
procedural impropriety. A decision suffers from procedural impropriety if in the process of its
making the procedures prescribed by statute have not been followed or if the 'rules of natural
justice' have not been adhered to. The issue in this case was whether the administrative body has
unfettered discretion while deciding a case and whether such actions are subject to judicial
review by courts or not.

22 Thio Li-ann (1999), "Law and the Administrative State", in Kevin Y[ew] L[ee] Tan, The Singapore
Legal System(2nd ed.), Singapore: Singapore University Press, pp. 160229 at 192193.
23 Maurici, James (December 2007), "The Modern Approach to Bias", Judicial Review 12 (4): 251260

Ridge v. Baldwin is a very significant case in the sense that it clearly gave the answers to the
following issues.
2.3 Arguments Advanced:
Case presented by Plaintiff: Although appellant was finally acquitted by the jury on the criminal
charges against him, the watch committee decided that he had been negligent in the discharge of
his duties as chief constable and dismissed him from that office. The appellant was not present at
the said meeting, nor was the charged with or he was given notice of the proposal to dismiss him
or particulars of the grounds on which it was based or an opportunity of putting his case. Thus,
the chief constable main argument was that that his dismissal was illegal because the dismissal
was contrary to principles of natural justice and that his right to be heard was violated. The
Appellant's case is that in proceedings under the Act of 1882 the Watch Committee was bound to
observe the principles of natural justice. Before attempting to reach any decision they were
bound to inform him of the grounds on which they proposed to act and give him a fair
opportunity of being heard in his own defense. The appellant claimed that purported dismissal
from service was void and illegal and also claimed that he was entitled to payment of salary and
pension or alternatively damages.
Arguments by Respondents:
The respondents (Brighton Watch Committee) main contention was that they were not under a
duty to act according to the principles of natural justice. According to the respondents, the power
of dismissal is contained in section 191 (4) of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882 which
provides a statutory provision regarding dismissal, and the Respondents purported to act under it.
It is in these terms: The watch committee, or any two justices having jurisdiction in the
borough, may at any time suspend, and the watch committee may at any time dismiss, any
borough constable whom they think negligent in the discharge of his duty, or otherwise unfit for
the same."24
It maintained that when deciding on the case the watch committee was not bound by the rules of
natural justice. They argued that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to bodies
24 Municipal Corporation Act. 1882. Sec. 191 (4). Cited in: A.C. [1964].43.

similar to the watch committees and the principles of natural justice are relevant only where the
body has the duty to act judicially.25

26

Further they argued that the legislator has given an

unfettered discretion to the watch committee to dismiss any body whom they think negligent in
the discharge of his duty, or otherwise unfit for the same as it is given in the statute itself. The
members of the watch committee took a decision to dismiss the chief constable for alleged
misconduct in accordance with legal rules in pursuing the public interest. 27 Although the decision
was taken without bringing specific charges and a hearing, the committee argued that they had
allowed the solicitor for the chief constable to be heard later and since the applicant was aware of
the content of the charges, and, anyway, a hearing would not change their decision because of the
public interest in having a trustworthy chief constable. The Committee further argued that strict
observance of the rules of natural justice itself would not change the original decision.
Decision by Court of Appeal:
Streatfeild J, the judges of the Court of Appeal held the case in favor of the respondents and
argued that the decision of the committee was a rational decision, because there was a need to
uphold the moral prestige of police forces. That the chief constable was aware of the charges,
and although he had been acquitted by the jury in criminal proceedings, it did not prevent the
committee from dismissing the chief constable because its decision did not require the criteria of
'beyond reasonable doubt' in establishing his misdeeds. He further argued that the Committee
was only applying the law, that their decisions are in compliance with the principles of justice,
fairness, and procedural due process as accepted by the community. He further held that
25 In R. v. Electricity Commissioners, ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920),
Ltd. (1923), Lord Atkin observed that the right only applied where decision-makers had "the duty to act
judicially".
26 Harman, L.J. was of opinion that the Watch Committee were acting in exercise of their administrative functions
just as they were when they made the appointment under section 191 (1) of the Act and that the principles of natural
justice did not come into the case. He pointed out that the defendants were not deciding a question between two
opposing parties and that there was no lis and nothing to decide. Davies, L.J. said that the exercise by the Watch
Committee of their powers under section 191 (4) of the Act of 1882 was not a quasi-judicial but an executive one,
emphasising the words "whom 'they think" as being very strong indeed and much stronger than the sort of words to
be found in most of the authorities cited to the Court such as "on sufficient grounds shown to his satisfaction " (De
Verteuil v. Knaggs [1918] A.C. 557).

27

following the procedure prescribed by natural justice would be unnecessary because firstly the
case was clear that the chief constable should be dismissed, secondly, there was a grave
emergency requiring the Committee to act promptly, and thirdly, the dismissal was the only
reasonable decision.
Thus, the matter was held in favor of the respondents and the case finally went before the House
of Lords.
2.4 Judgment:
Finally the matter went to House of Lords before Lords Reid; Evershed; Morris of Borth-y-Gest;
Hodson; on 14th March 1963. In this case, the majority upheld the chief Constable rights and
held that the initial dismissal was not only a breach of the principles of natural justice but it was
also contrary to the express provisions of the statutory regulations governing police discipline,
which in case of misconduct, required notice of the charge and an opportunity for self defense.
According to Lord Morris, In Wood v. Woad28, in speaking of the "rule expressed in the maxim
audi alteram partem" said "This rule is not confined to the conduct of strictly legal tribunals, but
is applicable to every tribunal or body of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon
matters involving civil consequences to individuals."
He cited the case of Cooper v. The Wandsworth Board of Works29 and stated "A long course of
decisions, beginning with Dr. Bentley's case, and ending with some very recent cases, establish
that although there are no positive words in a statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet
the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature.
Being of the view that even if there had been no applicable Regulations, a decision to dismiss the
Appellant for neglect of duty ought only to have been taken in the exercise of a quasi-judicial
function which demanded an observance of the rules of natural justice. According to Lord

28 L.R. 9 Ex. 190.

29 14 C.B.N.S. 180, 143 E.R. 414, Court of Common Pleas (England).

Morris, such rules were not observed and therefore he held that decision of the watch Committee
must be regarded as of no effect and invalid and so can be declared by the Court to be void.
Lord Hudson also allowed the appeal upon the ground that the Appellant was entitled to and did
not receive natural justice at the hands of the Watch Committee of Brighton when he was
dismissed on the 7th March, 1958.
In words of Lord Reid who gave a very significant decision in this case, the principle audi
alteram partem goes back many centuries in our law and appears in a multitude of judgments of
judges of the highest authority. In modern times opinions have sometimes been expressed to the
effect that natural justice is so vague as to be practically meaningless. But I would regard these
as tainted by the perennial fallacy that because something cannot be cut and dried or nicely
weighed or measured therefore it does not exist.
Holding the appeal, Lord Reid leading speech inevitably exposed the fallacies into which the
decisions of the 1950s had lapsed. He attacked the problem at its roots by demonstrating how the
term judicial had been misinterpreted as requiring some superadded characteristic over and
above the characteristic that the power affected some persons rights. 30 The mere fact that the
power affects some person interest is what makes it judicial and is subject to the principles of
natural justice.31 32In other words, a power which affects rights must be exercised judicially i.e.
fairly and the fact that the power is administrative does not make it any less than judicial for this
purpose.
30 In R. v. Electricity Commissioners, ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920),
Ltd. [1924] 1 K.B. 171, H.C. (K.B.) (England & Wales). Lord Akin observed that the right only applied
where decision-makers had "the duty to act judicially". [60] In natural justice cases this dictum was
generally understood to mean that a duty to act judicially was not to be inferred merely from the impact of
a decision on the rights of subjects; such a duty would arise only if there was a "superadded" express
obligation to follow a judicial-type procedure in arriving at the decision. [61]
31 Wade & Forsyth, pp. 413415.
32 See also Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Police Commissioners 1978 CANLII 24, [1979] 1
S.C.R. 311, S.C. (Canada)

Lord Reid further distinguished the cases of dismissal into three categories: Dismissal by a
master of a servant33, Dismissal from an office held during the Crown's pleasure 34 and Dismissal
from an office where there must be something against a man to warrant his dismissal. In first
case, a servant contract may be terminated any time for any reason, the question of hearing being
irrelevant. In second case, there is no right to a hearing as no reasons need be given. In third, an
officer cannot be dismissed without first telling him what is alleged against him and giving him a
hearing
Lord Reid cited unbroken line of authorities to the effect that an officer cannot lawfully be
dismissed without first telling him what is alleged against him and hearing his defense or
explanation 35.In the case of Ex pane Ramshay 36and stated It dealt with the removal from office
of a county court judge, and the form of the legislation which authorized the Lord Chancellor to
act is hardly distinguishable from the form of section 191 which confers powers on the Watch
Committee. The Lord Chancellor was empowered if he should think fit to remove on the ground
of inability or misbehavior, but Lord Campbell, C.J. said that this was "only on the implied
condition prescribed by the principles of eternal justice.
Further, In Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works37, The Board maintained that their discretion
to order demolition was not a judicial discretion and that any appeal should have been to the
33 There cannot be specific performance of a contract of service, and the master can terminate the contract with his
servant at any time and for any reason or for none. But if he does so in a manner not warranted by the contract he
must pay damages for breach of contract.

34 See Terrell v. Secretary of State for the Colonies and Another [1953] 2 Q.B. 482), Rex v. Mayor of Stratford, 1
Lev. 291, Darlington School case (1844) 6 Q.B. 682, Dean v. Bennett, 6 Ch. App. 489, Willis v. Childe, 13 B. 117.

35 See Bagg's case (1615) 11 Co. Rep. 93b, Rex v. Gaskin (1799) 8 Durn & East 209, Reg. v. Smith (1844)5 Q.B.
614, Osgood v. Nelson, L.R. 5 H.L. 636, Fisher v. Jackson [1891] 2 Ch. 84, Cooper v. Wilson and Others [1937] 2
K.B. 309, Hogg v. Scon [1947]
K.B. 759.

36 (1852) 21 L.J. 238

37 (1863) 14 C.B.N.S. 180; Hopkins v. Smethwick Local Board of Health. (1890) 24 Q.B.D. 713.

Metropolitan Board of Works. But the Court decided unanimously in favor of the owner. 38 Erie,
C.J. held that the power was subject to a qualification repeatedly recognized that no man is to be
deprived of his property without his having an opportunity of being heard.
Byles, J. said that although there are no positive words in a statute requiring that the party
shall be heard yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature "
Thus, Lord Reid held that a duty to act fairly is just like a duty to act reasonably was enforced as
an consistently implied statutory requirement, so that failure to observe it meant that the
administrative act or decision was outside the statutory power, unjustified by law and therefore
ultra vires and void.
Further, Lord Reid said that there was considerable argument whether in the result the Watch
Committee's decision is void or merely voidable. He stated Time and again in the cases I have
cited it has been stated that a decision given without regard to the principles of natural justice is
void, and that was expressly decided in Wood v. Woad. I see no reason to doubt these
authorities. He said that the body with the power to decide cannot lawfully proceed to make a
decision until it has afforded to the person affected a proper opportunity to state his case. It had
always been previously held that a breach of rules of natural justice resulted in the determination
being null and void.
Lord Morris and Lord Hudson also held that the decision of the watch committee was void 39 and
could be called voidable only when the chief constable contested it.
However, Lord Evershed evaluated the facts of the case in a different manner. Dissenting in the
House of Lords, Lord Evershed put the consequentialist argument in the following form that
because the watch committee had a duty to the citizens of Brighton "to act and to act at once so
38 Chief Justice William Erle went so far as to state that the lack of notice and hearing afforded to
Cooper could be said to be a form of abuse, as he had been treated as if he did not matter.
39 (See Bagg's case (supra), The King v. University of Cambridge (supra), Wood v. Woad, L.R. 9 Exch. Cas. 190,
Fisher v. Keane, L.R. 11 Ch. D. 353.)

as to give effect to what the trial judge had after so long a hearing in effect determined", the
requirement of natural justice was not applicable. The conduct of the appellant had been the
subject of a public trial lasting 19 days, and the observations of the judge during this trial
contained the charges of misconduct. Thus, in the opinion of Lord Evershed who accepted the
position of the Court of Appeal, everyone was aware of the content of the charges, therefore it
was not practical to give a hearing to the appellant even though he was acquitted by the jury.40
In the House of Lords there was only Lord Evershed who took the perspective of the Court of
Appeal, and accepted that the decision of the judge Streatfeild. He further said that "having
considered the whole matter with the greatest care of which I am capable, I conclude that justice
was here done - or, at least, that there was no 'real substantial miscarriage of justice".41
At last the verbal confusion cleared away and thus, the House of Lords restored the classic
doctrine of Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of works42, that the right to hearing was of universal
application and that the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature.43
The House of Lords in Ridge v.Baldwin re-affirmed that in the absence of clear statutory words
to the contrary, every authority having the power or duty to decide on the merits of an issue must
exercise those powers judicially.44 Thus, the majority of the House of Lords in this case, decided
entirely consistently holding expressly that the chief constable dismissal was void. It was also
40 In the court of h t instance Strestfeild J. had held that the watch committee was obliged to observe the rules of
natural justice and had observed them; in the Court of Appeal none of the Lords Justices held that the committee was
obliged to obseme them, though Holroyd Pearce and Davies L.JJ. were of the opinion that if the committee had been
under such an obligation it had failed to discharge it. Lord Evershed and Lord Devlin expressed no concluded view
on the question whether (apart from the regulations) there was a duty to observe natural justice, but Lord Evershed
held that in any event there had been no violation of natural justice.

41 affg Osgood v. Nelson (1872) L.R. 5 H.L. 636, 646 per Baron Martin.
42 (1863) 14 C.B.N.S. 180. Also see Hopkins and Another v. Smethwick Local Board of Health, 24
Q.B.D. 712.
43 23Several of the Lords in Ridge v. Baldwin, , claimed that the doctrine can be traced at least to Bagg's Case
(1615) 11 Co. Rep. 93, 77 E.R. 1271 (K.B.).

44 Smith v. The Queen, 3 App. Cas. 614.

observed that no administrative authority has unfettered discretionary powers and they are bound
to act judicially45. Also, when there is violation of principles of natural justice, the courts have a
duty to review the legality of such action.46
Thus, Lord Reid Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest and Lord Hodson by majority maintained that
when dismissing the appellant on the ground of neglect of duty, the watch committee was bound
to observe the principles of natural justice by informing the appellant of the charges made against
him and giving him an opportunity of being heard.
2.5 Principal laid down:
The rule of natural justice was laid down in this case and the principal of natural justice i.e. rule
of fair hearing was basically laid down.
In English law, natural justice is technical terminology for the rule against bias (nemo iudex in
causa sua)47 and the right to a fair hearing (audi alteram partem).48 While the term natural
justice is often retained as a general concept, it has largely been replaced and extended by the
general "duty to act fairly". The right to a fair hearing requires that individuals should not be
penalized by decisions affecting their rights or legitimate expectations49 unless they have been
given prior notice of the case50, a fair opportunity to answer it, and the opportunity to present
their own case.51 The mere fact that a decision affects rights or interests is sufficient to subject
the decision to the procedures required by natural justice.
45 Roncarelli v Duplessis [1959] SCR 121, Rand J held In public regulation of this sort there is no such
thing as absolute and untrammeled discretion, that is that action can be taken on any ground or for any
reason that can be suggested to the mind of the administrator.
46 Kioa, pp. 584585: "What is appropriate in terms of natural justice depends on the circumstances of
the case and they will include, inter alia, the nature of the inquiry, the subject-matter, and the rules under
which the decision-maker is acting".
47 An adjudicator be disinterested and unbiased.
48 Parties be given adequate notice and opportunity to be heard.
49 The doctrine of legitimate expectation imposes in essence a duty on public authority to act fairly by
taking into consideration all relevant factors relating to such legitimate expectation.

In this case, the House of Lords laid down the principle of natural justice in particular that of fair
hearing and held that that when dismissing the appellant on the ground of neglect of duty, the
watch committee was bound to observe the principles of natural justice by informing the
appellant of the charges made against him and giving him an opportunity of being heard.

III. SIGNIFICANCE
The case Ridge v. Baldwin in the House of Lords may be considered as a watershed in the
development of British administrative law in relation to the scope of application of the rules of
natural justice, particularly in relation to the rule requiring a hearing. Application of natural
justice in the decisions of administrative actions was at low ebb prior to this case.52
Post Ridge era:
The trend in England on the whole53 has strengthened the doctrine of natural justice as an aid to
the interpretation of statute. The Court has indeed travelled a long way from Arlidge case where
the House of Lords missed an opportunity by being 'pro-administrative and anti-judicial'. In
50 The requirement of prior notice serves The interest in good outcomes giving prior notice increases the value of
the proceedings as it is only when the interested person knows the issues and the relevant information that he or she
can make a useful contribution.

51 Kioa, p. 582: "It is a fundamental rule of the common law doctrine of natural justice expressed in
traditional terms that, generally speaking, when an order is to be made which will deprive a person of
some right or interest or the legitimate expectation of a benefit, he is entitled to know the case sought to
be made against him and to be given an opportunity of replying to it ... . The reference to 'right or
interest' in this formulation must be understood as relating to personal liberty, status, preservation of
livelihood and reputation, as well as to proprietary rights and interests."
52 Endicott, Timothy [Andrew Orville] (2009), Administrative Law, New York, N.Y.: Oxford University
Press,
53 Notable exception to the rule being legislation/order on Commonwealth immigration.

England indeed there is no such thing now as unfettered discretion. In Padfieldv. Minister of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food54, the House of Lords held that the Minister's discretionary
power however wide it may seem is coupled with a duty to direct properly and mandamus was
allowed in view of the reasons for not referring the matter in question to the appropriate
Committee of investigation being considered unsatisfactory. This decision is considered a very
important land-mark in administrative justice since the Ridge case as the latter was concerned
only with procedure while Padfield case dealt with substantive powers the Executive possessed
under the statute. Thus English Law is well on its way to adopting the very useful continental
principle that the validity of administrative action is conditional upon its reasonableness.55
The Ridge case is very significant in the sense that it cleared the controversy and held that a
breach of the rule audi alteram partem made the decision of the competent authority void.
However a bias has sometimes been regarded as making a decision voidable at the option of the
Court which reviews the matter. In Anesminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission56, The
House of Lords re-affirmed that an every breach of natural justice in such an administrative body
makes a decision void.57 58

54 [1968] AC 997
55 See Vidyadaya University of Ceylon v. Silva, 1964(3) All ER 865, Durayappah v. Fernando, 1967(2) All ER, Malloch v.
Aberdeen Corp, 43[1971] I W.L.R. 1578 (H.L.).
56 1969(1) All ER 208.
57 Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans, [1982] UKHL 10, [1982] 1 W.L.R. 1155, H.L.
(United Kingdom), a chief constable required a police probationer to resign on account of allegations
about his private life which he was given no fair opportunity to rebut. The House of Lords found the
dismissal to be unlawful.
58 Also see Surinder Singh Kanda v. Government of the Federation of Malaya, Surinder Singh Kanda v.
Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] UKPC 2, [1962] A.C. 322 at 337, Privy Council(on
appeal from Malaya).

This case is also important from the view in abolishing the judicial, quasi-judicial and
administrative trichotomy, and as suggesting that the requirement of natural justice will also exist
in certain kinds of administrative processes.59
The case is also important from jurisprudential point of view as it serves a great example on how
judges evaluate the facts and apply their minds in deciding such case. The differences in
evaluation of the circumstances in Ridge v. Baldwin illustrate very well the different states of
Judges Conscience: deontological, consequentialist and sympathy conscience and how finally
sympathic judgment took place in this case. The sympathy approach grasps the uniqueness of
the situation and seeks to understand the motives of the persons involved. The deontological
approach expresses a commitment to apply a principle or rule whatever the consequences. At the
same time, there is also a different evaluation of the principle of natural justice. The issue may be
not only whether the present circumstances justify application of the principle of natural justice,
it may also be how far the principle of natural justice should be implemented whatever the
circumstances are.
In India also, the judges have inherited the English rule of law that power should be subjected to
legal control and that the mechanism of control should be just and efficient. 60 The decision in A.
K. Kraipak v. Union of India61, indeed confirmed our belief in this regard. This case was literally
59 It must be admitted that the abolition of the distinction between "judicial" (or "quasi-judicial") and
"administrative" for the purpose of applying the rules of natural justice has not yet been fully accomplished, and that
there are English decisions that continue to rely on the distinction, whereby the rules of natural justice are applied to
acts of the first type, while regarding the other types, the duty "to act fairly" is applied. See, e.g., Pearlberg v. Varty,
[1972] 1 W.L.R. 534, 547 (H.L.) (discussing the question of application of the rules of natural justice). "A tribunal to
whom judicial or quasi-judicial functions are entrusted is held to be required to apply those principles in performing
those functions unless there is a provision to the contrary. But where some person or body is entrusted by Parliament
with administrative or executive functions there is no presumption that compliance with the principles of natural
justice is required, although, as 'Parliament is not to be presumed to act unfairly,' the courts may be able in suitable
cases (perhaps always) to imply an obligation to act with fairness."
Criticism has been leveled against this
judicial approach because it heralds the return to the pre-Ridge era. See, e.g., H. WHITMORE, supra note 39, at
120; Gravells, Fairness as the Basis of Procedure for Decision-Making Bodies, 39 MOD. L. REV. 342 (1976);

60 The Problems of Administrative Justice by S. K. Das Gupta, Lecturer, University College of Law,
Calcutta Delegate from Calcutta University to the 4th Commonwealth Law Conference, New Delhi,
January 6-13, 1971.
61 1969(2) SCC 262.

a ringing reiteration of the concept of rule of law which the Court stated, would lose its vitality if
the instrumentalities of the state are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a
fair and just manner. The Court laid down that: (i) whenever a complaint is made before a Court
that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the Court has to decide whether the
observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case, (ii) it was
neither possible nor desirable to fix the limits of a quasi-judicial power, and (iii) arriving at a just
decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. It was
held therefore, selection list prepared by a Selection Board where one member of the Board was
himself a candidate for selection though he had not taken part in deliberations of the Board at the
time of his own selection, was vitiated in view of the reasonable likelihood of bias.
The Court again re-affirmed the finding in State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Ict62, which
dealt with an enquiry made as regards the correct age of a Government servant, viz., even an
administrative order which involves evil consequences must be made consistently with the rules
of natural justice.63
Thus, the Case of Ridge v Baldwin is very important and landmark judgment on the development
of the principle of Natural justice in the field of administrative decision making.

62 AIR 1967 SC 1269

63 But the Supreme Court appears to have cried a halt to the process of extension of natural justice in
India with the case ofUnion of India v. Col. J. N. Sinha, 1970 (2) SCC 458. The Court relied on the
express words of the rule : that the appropriate authority has the absolute right to retire a Government
servant if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so. The Court emphasized that rules of
natural justice are not embodied rules nor can they be elevated to the position of fundamental rights.
These can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made; they do not suppliant the law they
only supplement it.

CONCLUSION
Justice must not be done but also seen to be done and rule of fair hearing is very important for
giving fair judgment in any case. Ridge v. Baldwin is one of the landmark decision that ended a
long era of restrictive application of audi alterem partem rule i.e. rule of fair hearing that has
never been extended to administrative decision making.
The case of Ridge v. Baldwin helped us to see the way the judges can use their powers in the
situation when the legal authorities do not provide a one answer to the matter. It is true that the
legal authorities are not in confusion in every case. However, the other aspect of the Ridge v.
Baldwin, that is an application of a general rule i.e. that of hearing to the particular circumstances
makes it a valuable example of operation of sympathy judgment even in the cases where legal
authorities are more certain on the question of law. The opinion of Lord Reid also shows that a
sympathy judgment can be an effective means of understanding previous case law, its context
and how the scope of the previous case law can be applied to the present matter.
The case can be construed as abolishing the judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative
trichotomy, and as suggesting that the requirement of natural justice will exist in every kind of
decision making action. This judgment consistently brought new vitality on the aspect of
principles of natural justice that did not only clear the picture about fair hearing before
imposing any punishment, but the same also repudiated the judicial fallacy of acting
administratively.
However, little positive guidance is to be found in the case as to when natural justice should
apply. The closest to nay general formulation is that application of natural justice will be
dependent on the nature of the power exercised and its effect upon the individual concerned. This
is not a criticism of the decision. It is notoriously difficult to lay down what the boundaries of
natural justice should be. It is rather by way of explanation for what followed Ridge v. Baldwin.
In the years following Ridge v. Baldwin, the courts were faced with a host of cases concerned
now just with the content of natural justice, but with the criterion for its applicability.

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