Professional Documents
Culture Documents
support to the petition. Thus, when the petition was filed on March
18, 1994, it did not have the required consent of the employees
within the bargaining unit. Another factor which militates against
the petition is the fact that actually there are 1,020 rank and file
workers in the bargaining unit. Twenty-five percent (25%) of this is
255, but admittedly only 248 union members had originally
authorized the filing of the petition. The law expressly requires that
a petition for certification election should be supported by the
written consent of at least 25% of all the employees in the
bargaining unit at the time of the filing thereof.
In view of the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we are
constrained to order the dismissal of the instant petition.
Furthermore, it would be in the interest of industrial peace to deny
the holding of a certification election among the rank and file
workers of respondent Company during the effectivity of the new
CBA it appearing that out of 1,020 rank and file employees, 897
have ratified the same and the benefits of which are currently being
enjoyed by all covered employees of respondent Company. 5
The OTCWU-FFW appealed this ruling to the Labor Secretary. On
June 18, 1994, however, during the pendency of the appeal, said
union staged a strike that prevented the free ingress and egress of
non-striking employees, delivery trucks and other vehicles to and
from the company's premises. Upon complaint of the company, the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) issued a writ of
preliminary injunction on July 19, 1994, on the ground that the
strike caused the company to incur daily losses amounting to P3.6
million.
Meanwhile, on July 15, 1994, Undersecretary Bienvenido E.
Laguesma, acting on the appeal of the OTCWU-FFW, issued a
resolution 6 holding that:
An examination of the records of this case shows that the subject
CBA was concluded during the 60-day freedom period of the old
CBA which expired on 15 April 1994, and registered with the
the petition for certification election will not affect the petition. On
the contrary, the presumption arises that the withdrawal was not free
but was procured through duress, coercion or for a valuable
consideration. Hence, the subsequent disaffiliation of the six (6)
employees from the union will not be counted against or deducted
from the previous number who had signed up for certification . . . 20
(Citations omitted)
The support requirement is a mere technicality which should be
employed in determining the true will of the workers 21 instead of
frustrating the same. Thus, in Port Workers Union of the Philippines
(PWUP) v. Laguesma, 22 this Court declared that:
In line with this policy (that the holding of a certification election is
a certain and definitive mode of arriving at the choice of the
employees' bargaining representative), we feel that the
administrative rule requiring the simultaneous submission of the
25% consent signatures upon the filing of the petition for
certification election should not be strictly applied to frustrate the
determination of the legitimate representative of the workers.
Significantly, the requirement in the rule is not found in Article 256,
the law it seeks to implement. This is all the more reason why the
regulation should at best be given only a directory effect.
Accordingly, we hold that the mere filing of a petition for
certification election within the freedom period is sufficient basis
for the issuance of an order for the holding of a certification
election, subject to the submission of the consent signatures within
a reasonable period from such filing.
All doubts as to the number of employees actually supporting the
holding of a certification election should, therefore, be resolved by
going through such procedure. It is judicially settled that a
certification election is the most effective and expeditious means of
determining which labor organizations can truly represent the
working force in the appropriate bargaining unit of the company. 23
If the OTCLU wanted to be retained as the rank-and-file employees'
reiterated the issue in its Notice to Strike, alleging that it was duly
registered with the Bureau of Labor Relations under Registry No.
10312-LC with a total membership of 87 regular salesmen
(nationwide) out of 117 regular salesmen presently employed by the
company as of November 30, 1985 and that since the registration of
the Union up to the present, more than 2/3 of the total salesmen
employed are already members of the Union, leaving no doubt that
the true sentiment of the salesmen was to form and organize the
Colgate-Palmolive Salesmen Union. The Union further alleged that
the company is unreasonably delaying the recognition of the union
because when it was informed of the organization of the union, and
when presented with a set of proposals for a collective bargaining
agreement, the company took an adversarial stance by secretly
distributing a "survey sheet on union membership" to newly hired
salesmen from the Visayas, Mindanao and Metro Manila areas,
purposely avoiding regular salesmen who are now members of the
union; that in the accomplishment of the form, District Sales
Managers, and Sales Supervisors coerced salesmen from the
Visayas and Mindanao by requiring them to fill up and/or
accomplish said form by checking answers which were adverse to
the union; that with a handful of the survey sheets secured by
management through coercion, it now would like to claim that all
salesmen are not in favor of the organization of the union, which
acts are clear manifestations of unfair labor practices.
On August 9,1985, respondent Minister rendered a decision which:
(a) found no merit in the Union's Complaint for unfair labor
practice allegedly committed by petitioner as regards the alleged
refusal of petitioner to negotiate with the Union, and the secret
distribution of survey sheets allegedly intended to discourage
unionism,
(b) found the three salesmen, Peregrino Sayson, Salvador Reynante
& Cornelio Mejia "not without fault" and that "the company 1 has
grounds to dismiss above named salesmen"
and at the same time respondent Minister directly certified the
respondent ALU as the sole bargaining age it of all the rank and file
employees of petitioner corporation Thus, this Petition for certiorari
wherein petitioner seeks to set aside the said Decision, posing the
following issues.
(1) Did the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations of the
Ministry of Labor commit grave abuse of discretion by abruptly
reversing his two previous resolutions for the holding of a
certification election?
(2) Are petitioner's employees entitled to choose their sole and
exclusive bargaining representative with petitioner thru a
certification election? and
(3) Is petitioner entitled to file the petition for certification election?
It is not disputed that after the filing of the petition for direct
certification by respondent Union, a written manifestation duly
signed by about 80% of the employees concerned, retracting their
membership from said union, was submitted by them to the MOLE.
Respondent Union submits, however, that the employees were
merely pressured by management into withdrawing their
membership. On the other hand, petitioner corporation argues that
the retraction by the employees cast a serious doubt on the alleged
majority representation of the Union. In ultimately resolving the
issue in the Union's favor, public respondent held that the
withdrawal of membership from the Union subsequent to the filing
of the petition for direct certification did not affect the same nor did
it divest it of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition.
We find for petitioner.
The employees have the constitutional right to choose the labor
organization which it desires to join. 1 The exercise of such right
would be rendered nugatory and ineffectual if they would be denied
the opportunity to choose in a certification election, which is not a
litigation, but a mere investigation of a non-adversary character, 2
the bargaining unit to represent them. 3 The holding of a
certification election is a statutory policy that should not be
circumvented. 4
The Case
This is the simple query brought before this Court by Petitioner
Katipunan ng mga Manggagawa sa Daungan (KAMADA) via a
petition[1] for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Order[2] dated February 27, 1992 of Public
Respondent Pura Ferrer-Calleja, Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR), in BLR Case No. A-4-12-91 (NCR-0D-M-90-10007) which reversed the resolution[3] of Med-Arbiter Edgardo De
la Cruz. Public respondent disposed as follows:[4]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office having found that
no ground exists for the cancellation of the union registration of
ASTEOU [sic], the decision of Med-Arbiter de la Cruz is hereby
reversed. Let, therefore, the certificate of registration of ASTEOU
[sic] (Associated Skilled and Technical Employees Union of OTSI)
The Facts
Petitioner claims to be the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for
all workers in Ocean Terminal Services, Inc. (OTSI).[6] After a
certification election, it concluded a collective bargaining
agreement with the company. Soon thereafter, in September 1990,
private respondent union (ASTEUO) -- allegedly composed also of
OTSI workers -- was registered.
The Issue
Petitioner accuses public respondent of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction and gross ignorance of the law. It
argues that private respondent, contrary to Section 4 (f), Rule II,
Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, obtained its
union registration beyond the last sixty (60) days of the existing
CBA, and after participating in the certification election where it
lost.
More specifically, petitioner raises in its Memorandum dated May
3, 1993, the following three grounds to reverse public respondents
Order:[9]
1. That there was already an existing certified bargaining agent
when it obtained its registration;
2. The same cannot be considered as a labor productive activity
under PD 1391; and
3. It is against the policy of one union in one company.
The Courts Ruling
Petitioners contentions are utterly devoid of merit.
following grounds:
(a) That no charter certificate evidencing the organization of a
local union therein was attached to the petition or submitted to the
DOLE at the time the petition was filed;
(b) That the respondent Union has not presented any proof that it is
a legitimate labor organization; and
(c) That the Regional Office No. IV of the DOLE has no
jurisdiction over the petition since petitioner Company's place of
business is located at Cubao, Quezon City, which is outside the
jurisdiction of the said Regional Office. Consequently, it is the
National Capital Region or NCR of the DOLE which has
jurisdiction over said petition (Rollo, p. 7).
On September 27, 1991, respondent Med-Arbiter rendered a
decision in favor of private respondent, pertinent portion of which
reads as follows:
Anent the first issue on the status of the petitioner, it is established
that the petitioner is a legitimate organization with Dole
Registration Certificate No. 11106 LC (FED) and has a local
chapter in the respondent's company located at Cainta, Rizal. The
existence of a local union is likewise undisputed as the same is
evidenced by Charter Certificate No. 82 issued to it by the
petitioner, United Filipino Workers, and submitted to this Office
which automatically forms part of the records of this case.
As regards the second and third issues on whether or not the herein
petition is duly filed or not, the allegation of the respondent that the
same is defective in form and substance since no charter certificate
and signatories were attached thereto at the time of filing of this
petition is unmeritorious and without legal basis.
The respondent is an unorganized establishment which is governed
by Article 257 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6715,
which read as follows:
Petitions in unorganized establishments. In any establishment
where there is no certified bargaining agent, a certification election
shall automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the filing
of a petition by a legitimate labor organization (Rollo, pp. 74-75).
Petitioner appealed the said order to the DOLE. The latter, thru
respondent Undersecretary, upheld the order of respondent MedArbiter.
Not satisfied with the decision of the DOLE, petitioner filed the
instant petition and assigned the following errors:
1
RESPONDENT UNDERSECRETARY GRAVELY ABUSED HIS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN
AFFIRMING A PATENTLY NULL AND VOID DECISION OF
THE MED-ARBITER HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FOR
CERTIFICATION ELECTION WAS FILED BY A LEGITIMATE
LABOR ORGANIZATION.
2
RESPONDENT UNDERSECRETARY GRAVELY ABUSED HIS
DISCRETION AND COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR
IN LIMITING THE CERTIFICATION ELECTION TO
PETITIONER'S EMPLOYEES AT CAINTA, THEREBY
DISENFRANCHISING THE OTHER REGULAR RANK-ANDFILE EMPLOYEES OF PETITIONER COMPANY AND INSPITE
OF A FINAL ORDER CALLING FOR A CERTIFICATION
ELECTION TO BE PARTICIPATED IN BY ALL REGULAR
RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES.
3
RESPONDENT UNDERSECRETARY ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN HE AMENDED OUT OF HIS OWN
WILL AND
DERIVED
A PROVISION
OF
THE
IMPLEMENTING RULES WITHOUT ANY BASIS OR
AUTHORITY IN THE LABOR CODE, AS AMENDED.
II
As to the first assigned error, petitioner avers that private
respondent is not a legitimate labor organization, "considering that
its local or chapter, at the time said petition was filed, did not
undergo the rudiments of registration required under Section 3,
Rule II, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
consideration the fact that there are many companies with factories
located in places different from places where the corporate offices
are located.
The worker, being the economically-disadvantaged party whether as
complainant, petitioner or respondent, as the case may be, the
nearest governmental machinery to settle a labor dispute must be
placed at his immediate disposal and the employer must in no case
be allowed a choice in favor of another competent agency sitting in
another place to the inconvenience of the worker (Nestle
Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 209
SCRA 834 [1992]).
Petitioner has not shown how it will be prejudiced by the hearing on
the petition for certification election before the Regional Office No.
IV, which has its offices in Quezon City, the same city where the
principal place of business of petitioner is located. Petitioner is,
therefore, being unreasonable in demanding that the petition for
certification election be filed with the National Capital Region
Office, which holds offices in Manila.
Unlike in the Rules governing the procedure before Regional
Offices, the New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor
Relations Commission prescribes that all cases in which labor
arbiters have jurisdiction should be filed in the branch office which
has territorial jurisdiction over the "workplace of the
complainant/petitioner" (Rule IV, Sec. 1[a]). The NLRC Rules
defines the workplace as follows:
For purposes of venue, workplace shall be understood as the place
or locality where the employee is regularly assigned when the cause
of action arose. It shall include the place where the employee is
supposed to report back after a temporary detail, assignment or
travel. . . .
The Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code has no provision
as to when an objection to improper venue may be raised. The MedArbiter ruled that where the employer had appeared twice at the
hearing of the petition for certification election without questioning
the venue, said employer was barred from raising the issue in the
in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines-TUCP ("NACUSIPTUCP") filed with the Department of Labor and Employment
("DOLE") Regional Office No. VI, Bacolod City, a petition for
direct certification or for certification election to determine the sole
and exclusive collective bargaining representative of the
supervisory employees of herein petitioner, Lopez Sugar
Corporation ("LSC"), at its sugar central in Fabrica, Sagay, Negros
Occidental.
In its petition, docketed Case No. RO6-MA-021-89, NACUSIPTUCP averred that it was a legitimate national labor organization;
that LSC was employing 55 supervisory employees, the majority of
whom were members of the union; that no other labor organization
was claiming membership over the supervisory employees; that
there was no existing collective bargaining agreement covering said
employees; and that there was no legal impediment either to a direct
certification of NACUSIP-TUCP or to the holding of a certification
election. 1
In its comment and opposition, dated 14 August 1989, LSC
contended, among other things, that the petition was bereft of any
legal or factual basis; that the petition was nothing more than a
useless scrap of paper designed to harass the company; and that its
employees above the rank-and-file category were in truth unaware
of the petition. 2
On 18 August 1989, the Commercial and Agro-Industrial Labor
Organization ("CAILO"), a registered labor organization also
claiming to count substantial membership among the LSC
supervisory employees, moved to intervene. 3 The motion was
granted. 4
On 22 August 1989, NACUSIP-TUCP submitted Charter
Certificate No. 003-89, dated 20 July 1989, of the NACUSIP-TUCP
Lopez Sugar Central Supervisory Chapter. 5 LSC, on its part,
submitted a list of its employees above the rank-and-file status
LSC appealed to the DOLE and asseverated that the order was a
patent nullity and that the Med-Arbiter acted with grave abuse of
discretion. 11
In denying the appeal, the Secretary of Labor, in his Decision of 06
March 1990, has likewise ruled that the holding by the Med-Arbiter
of a certification election is mandatory under Article 257 of the
Labor
Code;
that
the
subsequent
withdrawals
and
disauthorization/disaffiliation of some supervisory personnel in the
petition for certification election could not bar its being granted;
and that a certification election is still the most appropriate means
to finally settle the issue of representation. 12
Hence, this petition for certiorari; it is argued that
Public Respondent Honorable Secretary of Labor and Employment
(has) committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it refused to dismiss a petition for certification
election despite clear lack of legal and factual basis for holding the
same. 13
The Solicitor General agrees with public respondent in arguing that
the tenor of Article 257 (supra) of the Labor Code is one of
command. He cites paragraph 2, Section 6, Rule V, Book V, of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code, to the
effect that once "a petition (is) filed by a legitimate organization
involving an unorganized establishment, the Med-Arbiter shall
immediately order the conduct of a certification election," which is
designed, he continues, to give substance to the workers' right to
self- organization. 14 Petitioner promptly retorts that it has no quarrel
with public respondent on the objectives of the law but it points out
that the application of Article 257 clearly must first be occasioned
by a genuine petition from a legitimate labor organization.
Not too long ago, the Court already had an opportunity to pass upon
this very issue in Progressive Development Corporation vs.
Article 256 is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. The mere
filing of a petition for certification election within the freedom
period is sufficient basis for the respondent Director to order the
holding of a certification election.
Was the petition filed by NAFLU instituted within the freedom
period? The record speaks for itself. The previous CBA entered into
by petitioner ALU was due to expire on April 1, 1987. The petition
for certification was filed by NAFLU on March 23, 1987, well
within the freedom period.
The contract bar rule is applicable only where the petition for
certification election was filed either before or after the freedom
period. Petitioner, however, contends that since the new CBA had
already been ratified overwhelmingly by the members of the
bargaining unit and that said CBA had already been consummated
and the members of the bargaining unit have been continuously
enjoying the benefits under the said CBA, no certification election
may be conducted, 10 citing, Foamtex Labor Union-TUPAS vs.
Noriel, 11 and Trade Unions of the Phil. and Allied Services vs.
Inciong. 12
The reliance on the aforementioned cases is misplaced. In Foamtex
the petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the order of the
Director of Labor Relations which in turn affirmed the order of the
Med-Arbiter calling for a certification election was dismissed by
the Court on the ground that although a new CBA was concluded
between the petitioner and the management, only a certified CBA
would serve as a bar to the holding of a certification election, citing
Article 232 of the Labor Code.
Foamtex weakens rather than strengthens petitioner's stand. As
pointed out by public respondent, the new CBA entered into
between petitioner on one hand and by the management on the
other has not been certified as yet by the Bureau of Labor Relations.
There is an appreciable difference in Trade Unions of the Phil. and
Allied Services (TUPAS for short). Here, as in Foamtex the CBA
was not yet certified and yet the Court affirmed the order of the
Sec. 2. The Company and the Union agree to create and establish a
Grievance Committee composed of two (2) representatives from the
Company and two (2) from the Union to receive complaint,
grievance or dispute from the workers and/or from the Company
with the view to settle it amicably.
Sec. 3. In case a complaint or grievance has been filed by either the
Union or the Company, the grievance committee shall discuss the
same and have (sic) to settle it. If after the meeting of the grievance
committee no satisfactory settlement is reached the matter shall be
referred to the top officers of the Union and the Company for the
settlement of the said grievance or dispute.
Sec. 4. Within five (5) days from the time the top officers of the
Union and the Company has (sic) failed to reach an amicable
settlement of the grievance or dispute, the same shall be submitted
for voluntary arbitration. The arbitrator or arbitrators shall be
chosen by lottery and the union and the Company shall avail (sic)
the list of arbitrators of the Honorable Bureau of Labor Relations.
Sec. 5. The mutually agreed or chosen arbitrator shall proceed to try
and hear the case and for (sic) the reception of evidence and to call
witnesses to testify and after the submission of the case by both
parties an award or order shall be issued in accordance with the
rules and guidelines promulgated by the Honorable Department of
Labor and Employment based on the pertinent laws and established
jurisprudence. The expenses of the arbitration proceedings shall be
borned (sic) equally by the Company and the Union.[19]
By filing the petition for certification election it is clear that
KAPATIRAN did not avail of the abovementioned grievance
procedure.
It is further argued that the CBA has no binding force since it
was entered into by KAMAPI as a federation and not by the local
union. Perusal of the agreement proves the contention flawed. The
signatories for KAMAPI consisted of its national president and of
the duly elected officers of the local union. Thus the fact that
KAMAPI was particularly mentioned as the bargaining party
petition be dismissed.
By an order dated February 8, 1989, the Med-Arbiter denied the
motion to dismiss filed by private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU
and directed the conduct of certification election among the rank
and file workers of Dacongcogon, the dispositive portion of which
provides as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss the
present petition is, as it is hereby DENIED. Let therefore a
certification election among the rank and file employees/workers of
the Dacongcogon Sugar and Rice Milling Co., situated at
Kabankalan, Neg. Occ., be conducted with the following choices:
(1) National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the
Philippines (NACUSIP-TUCP);
(2) National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW);
(3) No Union.
The designated Representation Officer is hereby directed to call the
parties for a pre-election conference to thresh out the mechanics of
the election and to conduct and supervise the same within twenty
(20) days from receipt by the parties of this Order. The latest payroll
shall be used to determine the list of qualified voters.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 34)
On February 9, 1989, private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration and/or appeal alleging that the Honorable MedArbiter misapprehended the facts and the law applicable amounting
to gross incompetence. Hence, private respondent prayed that the
order of the Med-Arbiter be set aside and the motion to dismiss be
reconsidered.
On February 27, 1989, petitioner filed its opposition to the motion
for reconsideration praying that the motion for reconsideration
and/or appeal be denied for lack of merit.
On June 26, 1989, respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations rendered a resolution reversing the order of the MedArbiter, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order of the Med-Arbiter
dated 8 February 1989 is hereby set aside and vacated, and a new
one issued dismissing the above-entitled petition for being filed out
of time.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 46)
Hence, this petition raising four (4) issues, to wit:
I. RESPONDENT HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, IN HER
CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR
RELATIONS, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN RENDERING HER RESOLUTION DATED 26 JUNE 1989
REVERSING THE ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 8, 1989 OF
MED-ARBITER FELIZARDO SERAPIO.
II. THAT THE AFORESAID RESOLUTION DATED 26 JUNE
1989 OF RESPONDENT PURA FERRER-CALLEJA IS
CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
III. THAT THE AFORESAID RESOLUTION DATED 26 JUNE
1989 OF RESPONDENT DIRECTOR PURA FERRER-CALLEJA
DENIES THE RANK AND FILE EMPLOYEES OF THE
DACONGCOGON SUGAR & RICE MILLING COMPANY, AND
THE HEREIN PETITIONER NACUSIP-TUCP, THEIR LEGAL
AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
IV. THAT RESPONDENT DIRECTOR PURA FERRERCALLEJA, IN RENDERING HER SAID RESOLUTION DATED
26 JUNE 1989 WAS BIASED AGAINST PETITIONER
NACUSIP-TUCP. (Rollo,
p. 2)
The controversy boils down to the sole issue of whether or not a
petition for certification election may be filed after the 60-day
freedom period.
Petitioner maintains that respondent Director Calleja committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in
rendering the resolution dated June 26, 1989 setting aside, vacating
and reversing the order dated February 8, 1989 of Med-Arbiter
Serapio, in the following manner:
1) by setting aside and vacating the aforesaid Order dated
February 8, 1989 of Med-Arbiter Felizardo Serapio and in effect
dismissing the Petition for Direct or Certification Election of
seeking the
ground for cancellation of registration (see Article 239 (a), (c) and
(d)); it is also a ground for a criminal charge of perjury.
The certification and attestation requirements are preventive
measures against the commission of fraud. They likewise afford a
measure of protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured
into joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole
purpose is to control union funds or to use the union for dubious
ends.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . It is not this Court's function to augment the requirements
prescribed by law in order to make them wiser or to allow greater
protection to the workers and even their employer. Our only
recourse is, as earlier discussed, to exact strict compliance with
what the law provides as requisites for local or chapter formation.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court's conclusion should not be misconstrued as impairing the
local union's right to be certified as the employees' bargaining agent
in the petitioner's establishment. We are merely saying that the local
union must first comply with the statutory requirements in order to
exercise this right. Big federations and national unions of workers
should take the lead in requiring their locals and chapters to
faithfully comply with the law and the rules instead of merely
snapping union after union into their folds in a furious bid with rival
federations to get the most number of members
Furthermore, the Labor Code itself grants the Bureau of Labor
Relations a period of thirty (30) days within which to review all
applications for registration. Article 235 provides:
Art. 235. Action on application. The Bureau shall act on all
applications for registration within thirty (30) days from filing.
All requisite documents and papers shall be certified under oath by
the secretary or the treasurer of the organization, as the case may
be, and attested to by its president.
The thirty-day period in the aforecited provision ensures that any
action taken by the Bureau of Labor Relations is made in
consonance with the mandate of the Labor Code, which, it bears
respondent Bureau is left with no choice but to order it, and the
power of such governmental agency precisely entrusted with the
implementation of the collective bargaining process to determine,
considering the likelihood that there may be several unions within a
bargaining unit to order such an election precisely for the purpose
of ascertaining which of them shall be the exclusive bargaining
representative. The decision of respondent bureau of April 14, 1975
was intended for that purpose. That was why not only petitioner but
also the Philippine Federation of Labor, the National Labor Union,
the National Federation of Labor Unions and the Samahan ng mga
Manggagawa at Kawani sa AG&P were included in the list of Labor
Unions that could be voted on. To reiterate a thought already
express what could be more appropriate than such a procedure if the
goal desired is to enable labor to determine which of the competing
organizations should represent if for the purpose of a collective
bargaining contract? How then can it be seriously asserted that the
decision now appealed could be stigmatized as contrary to law?"6
3. Such a holding reinforces the correctness of a decision arrived at
by respondent Director and negates even more conclusively the
imputation of arbitrariness. It is not amiss to state that petitioner has
the same office address as Philippine Association of Free Labor
Unions in Tondo, Manila. So with its counsel, Attorney Julius A.
Magno. While it is a different member of the bar who appeared for
such labor organization in the case abovecited, it thus appears that a
more diligent study of pertinent decisions could have avoided the
filing of this suit and thus hasten the effective and speedy
implementation of the statutory scheme to have a certification
election conducted precisely for the purpose of living true to the
concept of industrial democracy. For the present, it suffices tip call
the attention of counsel to the desirability of being acquainted with
applicable decisions, especially one that strikes so close to home,
even if, or perhaps more precisely when, the ruling is adverse to
one's claim. That is to live true to his duty as an officer of the court
on whose trustworthiness reliance may be placed.
4. No much attention need be paid, as pointed out in the comment
of the election.
SO ORDERED. (p. 25, Rollo)
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied, they
filed the instant petition for "Certiorari and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction" with a Prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order enjoining public respondents from
conducting any further proceedings in the said five cases.
The petition was given due course and the parties were required to
submit simultaneously their respective memoranda.
In assailing the aforesaid Order of public respondents, petitioners
alleged that
I. Public respondents (Director Calleja and Med-Arbiter Cruz)
gravely erred in considering employees with less than one year of
service, and even probationaries as qualified participants in a
certification election process; in direct violation of the ruling of this
Honorable Court in the Tarnate vs. Noriel case;
II. Public respondents gravely erred in not considering proven
disaffiliation and resignations from a petitioning union worse, from
the company, and valid termination for cause from the service as
material consideration to support a petition for certification and/or
election.
III. Public respondent Director Calleja gravely misinterpreted the
ruling of this Honorable Court in the case of Albano vs. Noriel, 85
SCRA 499, even as she held that, notwithstanding the absence of
the statutory consent requirement of 30% (now 20%), the Bureau of
Labor Relations can in every such case still order a certification
election, giving the wrong impression that such exercise of
discretion is absolute. (pp. 12-15, Rollo)
Thus, petitioners argue that the public respondents committed grave
abuse of discretion when they considered (a) employees with less
than one year of service and even (b) probationary employees as
qualified participants in the certification election process. They
contend that "by the very fact that such (probationary)-employees
have not earned regular status, they are not of the bargaining unit".
(Reply, p. 21). Petitioners maintain that this, "directly violates" the
ruling of this Court in Tarnate vs. Noriel, (100 SCRA 93) where it
held that "at least one year of service is required for an employee to
enjoy the benefits of membership in any labor union."
Petitioners' contentions are untenable. It is Our holding in the case
of B.F. Goodrich Phils., Inc. vs. B.F. Goodrich Confidential &
Salaried Employees Union-NATU (49 SCRA 532) that the
objectives of the Industrial Peace Act would be sooner attained if at
the earliest opportunity the employees, all of them, in an
appropriate bargaining unit be pooled to determine which labor
organization should be its exclusive representative. This Court had
made it clear that We should give discretion to the Court of
Industrial Relations, or in this case, the Bureau of Labor Relations
in deciding whether or not to grant a petition for certification
election considering the facts and circumstances of which it has
intimate knowledge. Moreover, a perusal of Art. 258 of the Labor
Code as amended by Presidential Decree No. 442 reveals that
compliance with the 30% requirement (now 20%) makes it
mandatory upon the Bureau of Labor Relations to order the holding
of a certification election in order to determine the exclusivebargaining agent of the employees. Stated otherwise, it means that
with such, the Bureau is left without any discretion but to order the
holding of certification election. Parenthetically, where the petition
is supported by less than 30% (now 20%) the Bureau of Labor
Relations has discretion whether or not to order the holding of
certification election depending on the circumstances of the case.
Thus, it is Our holding in LVN Pictures vs. Musicians Guild, et al.
(1 SCRA 132) that in connection with certification election, the
Court of Industrial Relations enjoys a wide discretion in
determining the procedure necessary to insure a fair and free choice
of bargaining representatives by employees, and having exercised
its sound discretion, this Court cannot interfere. (Arguelles v.
Young, 153 SCRA 690).
In a certification election all rank-and-file employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit are entitled to vote. This principle is
clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the
PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a special civil action for certiorari, questioning the
order of respondent Director dated 27, July 1987,.which in part
states:
xxx
Without going into the merits of the above-entitled case this office
finds that the best forum to determine once and for all whether or
not herein appellant-intervenor commands support of the rank-andfile in the unit is through the process of a certification election.
WHEREFORE, in view thereof, Appellant-Intervenor, Kalipunan
ng Manggagawang Pilipino is hereby included as one of the
contending unions.
Let, therefore, a certification election proceed without any further
delay, with the following choices:
1. Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hundred Island
Chemical Corporation;
2. Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (September
Convention) and 3. Kalipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 26-27, Rollo)
The basic facts of this case are undisputed:
A petition for certification election among the rank-and-file workers
of the Hundred Island Chemical Corporation was filed with the
Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) by respondent Malayang
Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hundred Island Chemical
Corporation (Samahan, for short) and was docketed as BLR Case
Med-Arbiter shall grant the petition upon verification that the same
is supported by the written consent of at least twenty (20%) of all
the employees in the collective bargaining unit, the twenty (20%)
support shall be satisfied upon the filing of the petition for
certification election, otherwise, the petition shall be dismissed. In
either case, he shall cite the ground.
Pertinent to the above rule is Section 7 of E.O. 111 to which the
former relates, and which provides:
SEC. 7. Articles 257 and 258 of the Labor Code of the Philippines
are hereby amended to read as follows:
xxx
Art. 258. Petitions in unorganized establishments. In any
establishment where there is no certified bargaining agent, the
petition for certification election filed by a legitimate labor
organization shall be supported by the written consent of at least
twenty (20%) percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit.
Upon receipt of such petition, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically
order the conduct of a certification election.
Considering the above provisions of law, We rule to dismiss the
instant petition for certiorari. The respondent Director did not abuse
her discretion in issuing the contested order. It is crystal clear from
the said provisions that the requisite written consent of at least 20%
of the workers in the bargaining unit applies to petitioners for
certification election only, and not to motions for intervention.
Nowhere in the aforesaid legal provisions does it appear that a
motion for intervention in a certification election must be
accompanied by a similar written consent. Not even in the
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code (see Rule V, Rules
Implementing the Labor Code). Obviously, the percentage
requirement pertains only to the petition for certification election,
the election was held today, December 16, 1988 is only four days
prior to the scheduled certification election.
By agreement of petitioner and TUPAS, workers whose names were
inadvertently omitted in the list of qualified voters were allowed to
vote, subject to challenge (p. 263, NLRC, Records). Thirty eight of
them voted on election day.
Initial tally of the election results excluding the challenged votes
showed the following:
Total No. of the Votes 291
Yes votes 40
No votes 38
Spoiled 7
Challenged (Regular) 38
Total No. of Votes Cast 123
On January 6, 1989, Management and TUPAS agreed to have the
36 challenged votes of the regular rank-and-file employees opened
and a canvass thereof showed:
Yes votes 20
No votes 14
Spoiled 4
Total 38
Added to the initial election results of December 16, 1988, the
canvass of results showed:
Yes 60
No 52
Spoiled 11
Total 123
Based on the foregoing results, the yes votes failed to obtain the
majority of the votes cast in said certification election, hence, the
necessity of opening the 168 challenged votes to determine the true
will of the employees.
On January 20, 1989, petitioner filed a position paper arguing
against the opening of said votes mainly because said voters are not
Total 168
On February 23, 1989, petitioner formally filed a Protest (pp.
284-287, NLRC, Records) claiming that the required five day
posting of notice was not allegedly complied with and that the list
of qualified voters so posted failed to include fifty five regular
workers agreed upon by the parties as qualified to vote. The Protest
further alleged that voters who were ineligible to vote were allowed
to vote.
Med-Arbiter Basa, in his Order dated March 7, 1989, dismissed
said Protest which Order was affirmed on appeal in the Resolution
dated December 12, 1989 of then Secretary of Labor, Franklin
Drillon.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit
in public respondent's Order dated February 28, 1990.
(pp. 84-88, Rollo) 3
The instant petition has, for its Assignment of Errors, the following:
Petitioner would likewise bring into issue the fact that the notice of
certification election was posted only on December 12, 1988 or four
days before the scheduled elections on December 16, 1988, instead
of the five-day period as required under Section 1 of Rule VI, Book
V of the Implementing Rules. But it is not disputed that a
substantial number, or 291 of 322 qualified voters, of the employees
concerned were informed, thru the notices thus posted, of the
elections to be held on December 16, 1988, and that such
employees had in fact voted accordingly on election day. Viewed
thus in the light of the substantial participation in the elections by
voter-employees, and further in the light of the all-too settled rule
that in interpreting the Constitution's protection to labor and social
justice provisions and the labor laws and rules and regulations
implementing the constitutional mandate, the Supreme Court adopts
the liberal approach which favors the exercise of labor rights, 8 We
find the lack of one day in the posting of notices insignificant, and
hence, not a compelling reason at all in nullifying the elections.
As regards the second assignment of error, the public respondent
Secretary of Labor did not completely disregard the issue as to the
voting rights of the alleged separated employees for precisely, he
affirmed on appeal the findings of the Med-Arbiter when he ruled
The election results indicate that TUPAS obtained majority of the
valid votes cast in the election 60 plus 165, or a total of 225
votes out of a possible total of 291.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby denied
and the Med-Arbiter's order dated 7 March 1989 affirmed.
Petitioner TUPAS is hereby certified as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all regular rank-and-file and seasonal workers at
Philippine Fruits and Vegetable Industries, Inc. 9 (p. 26, Rollo)
At any rate, it is now well-settled that employees who have been
improperly laid off but who have a present, unabandoned right to or
expectation of re-employment, are eligible to vote in certification
elections. 10 Thus, and to repeat, if the dismissal is under question,
as in the case now at bar whereby a case of illegal dismissal and/or
unfair labor practice was filed, the employees concerned could still
qualify to vote in the elections. 11
And finally, the Court would wish to stress once more the rule
which it has consistently pronounced in many earlier cases that a
certification election is the sole concern of the workers and the
employer is regarded as nothing more than a bystander with no
right to interfere at all in the election. The only exception here is
where the employer has to file a petition for certification election
pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code because it is requested to
bargain collectively. Thus, upon the score alone of the "Bystander
Rule", the instant petition would have been dismissed outright.
WHEREFORE, the petition filed by Philippine Fruits and Vegetable
Industries, Inc. (PFVII) in hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA FILSYSTEMS
(SAMAFIL-NAFLU-KMU), petitioner, vs. HON. SECRETARY
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and FILSYSTEMS, INC.,
respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Assailed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the Resolution
and Order[1] of the public respondent, dated June 28, 1996 and
November 18, 1996, respectively, dismissing petitioner's petition
for certification election.
It appears that petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa
Filsystems (SAMAFIL-NAFLU-KMU) is a registered labor union
with Certificate of Registration No. NCR-UR-10-1575-95 issued by
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on October 25,
1995. On November 6, 1995, petitioner union filed a Petition for
Certification Election among the rank-and-file employees of private
respondent FILSYSTEMS, Inc. before the DOLE - National Capital
Region (NCR).[2] Attached as annexes to the petition are the
Certificate of Registration issued by the DOLE, copies of union
"A close examination of the records of the case does not reveal
that the federation and the independent union have executed a
contract or agreement of affiliation, nor had it shown that it has
submitted its charter certificate to the Bureau of Labor Relations,
within thirty (30) days from issuance of such charter certificate as
amended by the rules.
"Petitioner argued that it has complied with all the requirements
for certification election pursuant to the mandate of Sec. 2, Rule V
of Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code; that the
rule cited by respondent is not included in the Rule citing the
requirements for certification election.
"We disagree with petitioner's contention. The rule cited by the
petitioner, Sec. 2, Rule V, Book V, sub-paragraphs A, B, C, D, E, F
and G, refers to an independently registered labor organization
which has filed a petition for certification election.
"In the case at bar, an independently registered union has
affiliated with a federation, hence, strict compliance with the
requirements embodied in Sec. 3, paragraphs A, B and E of Rule II,
Book V of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code
should be complied with.
"Record discloses that petitioner has not shown to have
executed a contract or agreement of affiliation nor has it established
that is has submitted its charter certificate to the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR) within thirty (30) days from its execution.
"Thus, petitioner in this case having failed to comply with the
mandatory requirement, there was no valid affiliation.
Consequently, petitioner has no legal personality because the union
failed to attain the status of legitimacy for failure to comply with
the requirements of law."
Petitioner appealed to the Office of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. It reiterated its contention that as an independently
registered union, it has the right to file a petition for certification
election regardless of its failure to prove its affiliation with
NAFLU-KMU.[7]
FWU and the private respondent could not affect its pending
representation case following Section 4, Rule V of the
Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code[12] which states:
II
We shall now resolve the issue of whether the appeal filed by
the petitioner was rendered moot and academic by the subsequent
certification election ordered by the Med-Arbiter, won by the FWU
and which culminated in a CBA with private respondent.
I
We shall first resolve whether the public respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion when he effectively affirmed the
AND
TELEPHONE
as follows:
The pendency of NLRC-NCR Cases Nos. 00-08- 04708-91, 0603415092 and 00-08-04389-92 before the NLRC is not a valid
ground for the suspension of the already stalled petition for
certification election which must be resolved with dispatch.
This must be so, because the employees subject of the pending
cases before the NLRC legally remain as employees of respondent
until the motion to declare them as having lost their employment
status by reason of the illegal strike or their complaint for illegal
dismissal is finally resolved. (Rollo, pp. 181-182; emphasis
supplied)
On October 14, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution dated September 29, 1992 which
was subsequently denied by Undersecretary Laguesma on October
29, 1992 (Rollo, pp. 29-31).
Petitioner filed a Comment and Objection to the Order dated
October 29, 1992 with Urgent Motion to Dismiss the Petition for
Certification Election. Without waiting for the resolution of the
motion to dismiss, petitioner resorted to this Court by way of the
instant special civil action.
This petition is without merit.
Before the principle of res judicata can be operative, the
following requisites must be present: a) the former judgment or
order must be final; b) it must be a judgment ororder on the merits;
c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject-matter and the parties; and d) there must be, between the
first and second actions, identity of parties (Nabus v. Court of
Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]).
In the case at bench, it cannot be said that the parties in the first
and second actions were identical. The first action was dismissed by
the Med-Arbiter because it excluded parties essential to the
bargaining unit such as inspectors, inspectresses, dispatchers and
washer boys. The second petition included all the employees who
were excluded in the first petition. Therefore, the Med-Arbiter was
correct when he gave due course to the second petition for
who are not eligible to form and join a labor union for purposes of
collective bargaining were allowed to vote therein.
Respondent director and private respondent BELU on the other
hand submit that members of a cooperative who are also rank and
file employees are eligible to form, assist or join a labor union
[Comment of Respondent Director, p. 4; Rollo, p. 125; Comment of
BELU, pp. 9-10; Rollo pp. 99-100].
The Court finds the present petition meritorious.
The issue of whether or not employees of a cooperative are
qualified to form or join a labor organization for purposes of
collective bargaining has already been resolved and clarified in the
case of Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. vs. Ferrer
Calleja, et al. [G.R. No. 7795, September 26,1988] and reiterated in
the cases of Batangas-Electric Cooperative Labor Union v. Young,
et al. [G.R. Nos. 62386, 70880 and 74560 November 9, 1988] and
San Jose City Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. v. Ministry of
Labor and Employment, et al. [G.R. No. 77231, May 31, 1989]
wherein the Court had stated that the right to collective bargaining
is not available to an employee of a cooperative who at the same
time is a member and co-owner thereof. With respect, however, to
employees who are neither members nor co-owners of the
cooperative they are entitled to exercise the rights to selforganization, collective bargaining and negotiation as mandated by
the 1987 Constitution and applicable statutes.
Respondent director argues that to deny the members of petitioner
cooperative the right to form, assist or join a labor union of their
own choice for purposes of collective bargaining would amount to a
patent violation of their right to self-organization. She points out
that:
Albeit a person assumes a dual capacity as rank and file employee
and as member of a certain cooperative does not militate, as in the
instant case, against his/her exercise of the right to self-organization
and to collective bargaining guaranteed by the Constitution and
Labor Code because, while so doing, he/she is acting in his/her
capacity as rank and file employee thereof. It may be added that
Ballots ...........
.......................
..
No.
of
Challenged
19
Ballots ...........
......................
Total No. of
Votes
Cast ...............
904
.......................
.....
No. of Votes Cast for:
Acoje United
Workers Union
8
........................
........
Acoje Labor
Union11
Pelta ...............
....................
Acoje Labor
Union5
Plum ...............
.....................
National Mines
&
Allied
560
Workers'
Union .............
Acoje Workers'
Union .............278
.....................
No
Union12
desired ............
........................
..
874
Prior thereto or on June 12, 1961, petitioner Union which had
been defeated by respondent Union by a margin of 282 votes had
filed a motion to invalidate said election upon several grounds.
After due hearing, the lower court issued, on July 21, 1961, the
order appealed from holding that said motion was without merit,
and certifying respondent Union as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all the workers of the Company. A
reconsideration of said order having been denied by the Court en
banc, petitioner interposed the present appeal by certiorari, and now
maintains that the lower court should have invalidated the
aforementioned election for the same was "the result of acts of
terrorism, force, threat and intimidation employed by" agents of
respondent Union.
More specifically, petitioner alleges that, "if heard or given its day
in Court" it could have proven that: a) not less than 310 workers of
the Company were threatened the night immediately preceding the
election by agents of respondent Union individually "to cast their
vote for said Union ... or else;" b) the agents of respondent Union
were even aided by the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz, Zambales,
and his policemen, and, as a consequence, said Municipal Mayor
was suspended from office; c) the acts performed by said agents of
respondent Union "resulted into unlawful disorder, damaged
belongings, and physical injuries suffered by the workers"; d) many
workers were unable to vote for justified causes; and e) many
workers, subject of unfair labor practice case actually pending in
Court, were not allowed to vote, contrary to law.
The last two (2) grounds are clearly untenable. It appears that on
April 24, 1961, the labor unions concerned agreed, not only to the
holding of the aforementioned election, but, also, to the use of the
Company payroll of March 31, 1961, as the basis for determining
who are qualified to vote subject to the approval of the lower court.
must have cast their votes. The certification election results show
that more than a majority, i.e., 62 out of a total of 98 eligible voters
included in the list of employees obtained from the SSS, cast their
votes. Hence, the legal requirement for a valid election was met.
The bone of contention actually concerns the propriety of
utilizing the list of employees furnished by the SSS as basis for
determining the total number of eligible voters in the bargaining
unit. Petitioner claims that, according to the Implementing Rules,
the basis for the list of eligible voters should have been the payroll
three (3) months preceding the filing of the petition for certification
election and that if this was done the 62 votes cast would be short of
the majority because, instead of only 98 employees as shown in the
SSS list, there were actually 130 as alleged in MNMPPs petition for
certification election.
The contention is without merit. As petitioner itself says, the
figure 130 is based on the allegation that MNMPP made in its
petition for certification election that it was supported by at least
25% of the members of the bargaining unit. [14] Such statement was
a mere approximation of the size of the bargaining unit that the
petitioning union seeks to represent and cannot be used against
MNMPP for this reason.
It should ideally be the payroll which should have been used
for the purpose of the election. However, the unjustified refusal of a
company to submit the payroll in its custody, despite efforts to
make it produce it, compelled resort to the SSS list as the next best
source of information. After all, the SSS list is a public record
whose regularity is presumed. In Port Workers Union of the
Philippines (PWUP) v. Undersecretary of Labor and Employment,
[15]
this Court underscored the policy of the Labor Code of
encouraging the holding of a certification election as the definitive
and certain way of ascertaining the choice of employees as to the
labor organization in a collective bargaining unit. In Trade Unions
of the Philippines and Allied Services World Federation of Trade
Unions v. Laguesma, [16] we reiterated this policy thus:
[19]
an
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari seeking the annulment of
the resolution (pp. 21-23, Rollo) dated November 24, 1986 of
respondent Director in BLR Case No. A-10-247-85 which affirmed
the appealed order of the Med-Arbiter dismissing petitioner's
complaint to declare the certification election of May 21, 1986 as
null and void and the resolution (p. 20, Rollo) dated January 21,
1987 which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Asian Design and Manufacturing Corporation
(ADMACOR) is a corporation duly organized and existing by
virtue of the laws of the Philippines. It operates a rattan furniture
factory at Maguikay, Mandaue City, Cebu.
Upon petition of Buklod ng Manggagawang Pilipino (BMP), one of
several labor unions at ADMACOR'S factory, the Labor Relations
Division, Regional Office VII (Cebu City) ordered a certification
election to be conducted on May 21, 1986, a regular business day.
On May 19,1986, several factory workers of ADMACOR held a
strike. No previous notice of strike was filed by the factory workers
with the Bureau of Labor Relations Regional Office. On May
20,1986, ADMACOR filed a petition (pp. 42-44, Rollo) for the
indefinite resetting of the scheduled certification election, which
petition was not acted upon by the Labor Relations Division.
On May 21, 1986, the scheduled certification election was
conducted, despite the strike. Of the 423 workers who voted, 413
voted for Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL) as their
exclusive bargaining agent (p. 82, Rollo), On the same day,
ADMACOR filed a complaint for illegal strike (RAB Vll-0136- 88;
pp. 37-41, Rollo) and for illegal picketing (RAB-040886; pp. 34-36,
Rollo) with the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII, Cebu City.
On May 23, 1986, ADMACOR filed a petition to declare the
certification election conducted on May 21, 1986 as null and void
on the ground that there being a strike by some workers in the
premises of the factory on the day of the certification election, such
day cannot be considered a regular business day, pursuant to
Section 2, Rule VI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
devoid of merit. The records further show that during the preelection conference the contending parties agreed that the election
should be conducted on May 21, 1986 winch was, on that time, a
determined regular business day of the company. This was in
accordance with Section 2, Rule VI Book V, of the Implementing
Rules of the Labor Code which explicitly provides:
The election shall be set during the regular business day of the
company unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties.
The alleged strike and/or picketing of some employees at the
company's premises which coincided with the actual conduct of
certification election might, perhaps have affected the actual
performance of works by some employees, but did not necessarily
make said date an irregular business day of the company to go
against the aforesaid Rule (p. 22, Rollo).
We agree with the said ruling of respondent Director upholding the
validity of the certification election despite the strike. In the first
place, since petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of the Bureau when
it filed its election protest before the Med-Arbiter, it cannot now be
allowed to repudiate the same jurisdiction after failing to obtain
affirmative relief. Moreover, it can not be denied that an actual
election was conducted on said date where, of the 423 workers who
voted, 413 voted for SPFL as its exclusive bargaining agent. In the
"Minutes of the Certification Election among the Rank and File
Employees of Asian Design Manufacturing Corp.", the
representatives of the contending unions, and of the Ministry of
Labor even attested that the election was peaceful and orderly (pp.
79-83, Rollo) and none of the parties registered any protest on any
matter concerning the election proceedings. There is thus, no valid
reason to annul the certification election.
On the pretext that the issue deposited in this petition is the lack of
jurisdiction of the Bureau in dismissing its protest against the
certification election despite the pendency of the case before the
Labor Arbiter on the validity of the strike, petitioner seeks
exception to the rule that an employer has no standing to question a
certification election. We reiterate the rule that such concern over
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR RELATIONS;
CERTIFICATION ELECTION; AS A GENERAL RULE,
EMPLOYER IS NOT A PARTY THERETO; EXCEPTION. In a
long line of decisions, this Court has undeviatingly ruled that the
employer is not a party to a certification election which is the sole
or exclusive concern of the workers (Rizal Workers Union v. FerrerCalleja, 186 SCRA 431). In the choice of their collective bargaining
representative, the employer is definitely an intruder. His
participation, to put it mildly, deserves no encouragement
(Consolidated Farms, Inc. v. Noriel, 84 SCRA 469; Filipino Metals
Corp. v. Ople, 107 SCRA 211). The only instance when the
employer may be involved in that process is when it is obliged to
file a petition for certification election on its workers request to
bargain collectively pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code.
After the order for a certification election issues, the employers
involvement ceases, and it becomes a neutral bystander.
DECISION
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
This petition for certiorari * seeks to set aside the resolution **
dated September 17, 1990 of the Undersecretary of Labor in the
case entitled, "National Federation of Labor v. Hercules Industries,
Inc." denying the herein petitioners appeal from respondent MedArbiters Order dated May 25, 1990 declaring the National
Federation of Labor (NFL) as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of the rank and file workers/employees of Hercules
Industries, Inc.
its filing of this petition for certiorari with us, must be rejected. The
employers intervention in the certification election of its workers is
frowned upon by law.
In any event, petitioners challenge against the validity of the
certification election of May 4, 1990 is devoid of merit. Its
allegations that no notice of the certification election had been
issued, hence, no copies of said notice were given to it, nor posted
in conspicuous places within the companys premises; that the
payroll of July 1987 was not used as the basis of the voters list; and
that only fifteen (15) out of the ninety eight (98) voters signed their
names showing that they actually voted, were belied by the minutes
of the pre-election conference (Annex "A" of Comment of private
respondent) which showed that petitioner was duly notified of the
conference and attended the same, and that during said conference
the Med-Arbiter set the certification election on May 4,
1990.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
The minutes of the certification election (Annex "C" of private
respondents Comment) also show that "the list of the names of the
voters were (sic) copied from the payroll of 1987 per order of the
Director, Bureau of Labor Relations, Manila, . . ." (p. 188, Rollo).
Finally, the same minutes certified that: "The certification election
just concluded was conducted in the most just, honest and freely
(sic) manner without untoward happening. Further, we certify that
the result above is true and correct" (p. 188, Rollo) thereby refuting
petitioners allegation that only fifteen (15) out of ninety eight (98)
workers signed the master list to show that they actually voted
again.
Besides, neither the records of the case nor the minutes of the
certification election show that petitioner protested the conduct of
the certification election as provided in Section 3 of Rule VI
(ELECTIONS) of Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
The petitioner in the special civil action of certiorari at bar prays for
nullification of the Resolutions of the Bureau of Labor Relations
dated September 9, 1986 1 and September 30, 1986 2 sustaining
that of Med-Arbiter Danilo Reynante dated July 3, 1986, 3 which
granted the petition for election of officers of the labor organization
known as Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Associated Anglo
American Tobacco Corporation.
The petitioner, Emmanuel Timbungco, was the president of the
above named union (hereafter, simply Kapisanan), composed of
employees of Associated Anglo American Tobacco Corporation.
The union had a three-year collective bargaining agreement with
said Corporation (hereafter, simply AAATC). The stipulated
expiration date was August 24, 1984.
On July 15, 1984 or within the so-called "freedom period" of
sixty (60) days a general meeting of all the members of
theKapisanan was convoked by Timbungco. At that meeting the
body unanimously approved, among others, the disaffiliation of the
Kapisanan from the mother union, Federacion FOITAF, and the
amendment of its constitution and by-laws. A new set of officers
was also elected which included Timbungco, who was re-elected
president without opposition. These events are set forth in the
minutes drawn up by the Kapisanan's Secretary, which also
recorded that the body had agreed to dispense with the formation of
a COMELEC (committee on elections) and the preparation of a
tally sheet showing the number of votes received by each candidate,
the members simply having entered individual nominations to the
different positions and listed their choices therefor.
On July 23, 1984 Timbungco submitted to the Bureau of Labor
Relations the following documents:
1) a certified copy of the Kapisanan's amended constitution and bylaws;
2) an affidavit jointly executed by him and the union secretary
declaring that the Kapisanan was the sole collective bargaining
agent in AAATC;
In the first place, it does not at all appear that the dispensing by the
membership of the Kapisanan with certain technical requirements
or formalities in relation to the election of July 15, 1984 had
resulted in the deprivation of any substantial right or prerogative of
anyone, or caused the perpetration of a fraud or other serious
anomaly, or more importantly, precluded the expression and
ascertainment of the popular will in the choice of officers. In the
second place, as the Office of the Solicitor General points out, the
private respondents' objections to the elections of July 15, 1984
have come too late, and they must be deemed in the premises to
have forfeited their right to impugn the same. Under the Rules
implementing the Labor Code, protests against elections should be
formalized before the med-arbiter within (5) days from the close of
the election proceedings and must be decided by the latter within
twenty (20) working days. 13 In this case, the protest against the
election was presented to the med-arbiter only after the lapse of
almost two (2) years after it was held. And in that interval, no
informal protest, oral or written, was ever presented against the
election. Indeed, there was tacit acceptance of the regularity of the
elections and the results thereof, for during that period of almost
two (2) years, certain significant events took place without demur
or objection of any sort on the part of private respondents and the
rest of the members of the Kapisanan: Timbungco officially made
known to the Bureau of Labor Relations the Kapisanan's
disaffiliation from the Federacion FOITAF and obtained a new
certificate of registration for the union after complying with the
requisites prescribed therefor; he and the other officers of the
Kapisanan negotiated with the AAATC management and succeeded
in bringing about the execution of a new collective bargaining
agreement which was afterwards filed with the Bureau of Labor
Relations in accordance with pertinent regulations; and Timbungco
and the entire membership of the Kapisanan accepted benefits
granted and assumed the obligations set out in said collective
bargaining agreement.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Bureau of Labor Relations
comment set forth the following: "Petitioner UEUGIP did not lodge
any protest concerning the alleged misprinting or omission of its
name in the Notice of Certification Election in the Sample Ballot ...
before the election, during the election or shortly after the election,
[but merely questioned] the presence of the priests and nuns, over
which it filed a protest with the BLR, [not the alleged misprinting]
or omission of its name in the election notice and the sample ballot;
10. The fact is, when GATCORD petitioned for the certification
election (NLRC Case No. LR-4891, later numbered as BLR Case
No. 256) in July, 1974, the United Employees Union of Gelmart
Industries Philippines(UEUGIP) intervened, as represented by
Ruben Escreza, the union's duly elected president, [with] Antonio
Diaz, herein alleged representative of UEUGIP, [intervening] then
not for UEUGIP but for UEUGIP-Workers' Faction; 11. Since Mr.
Diaz was representing only a faction of UEUGIP, which faction had
no legal personality separate from UEUGIP which was duly
represented by Mr. Escreza, the order of the Bureau dated 15
January 1975 included only UEUGIP as one of the contending
unions, without including UEUGIP-Workers' Faction; 12.
Subsequently, the Philippine Transport and General Workers
Organization (PTGWO) intervened and, claiming that UEUGIP had
affiliated with PTGWO, moved for a correction of the name
UEUGIP in the order, making it UEUGIP-PTGWO, ...;13. During
the first two pre-election conferences in connection with the
certification election held on February 14 and 17, 1975, Mr. Diaz
appeared, but he was no longer representing UEUGIP-Workers'
Faction; he entered a new union - the Philippine Social Security
Labor Union (PSSLU); ... 14. In the succeeding pre-election
conferences, however, Mr. Diaz, apparently out to create trouble,
began claiming to represent UEUGIP and abandoned representation
of PSSLU [with the result that] UEUGIP had two representatives
often clashing with each other; Mr. Escreza and Mr. Diaz; 15. On
19 May 1975 the Bureau of Labor Relations caused the posting of
'Notice of Certification Election' with a 'Sample Ballot', [with said
posting being made at a time when] the parties had not yet agreed
as to how their names should appear in the ballot, ... 16. It was only
on 20 May 1974, after the election notice was already posted with
the original sample ballot, that the parties came to discuss how their
respective names should appear in the ballot,[at which time] the
parties had agreed that the names of the contending unions should
be printed in the ballots as they were printed, that is, with UNITED
EMPLOYEES
UNION
OF
GELMART
INDUSTRIES
PHILIPPINES (UEUGIP) there and without PSSLU." 11 Private
respondent then considered the following as the pertinent questions:
"If Mr. Diaz felt that the posting of the election notice and the
original sample ballot was erroneous and it was prejudicial to his
group, why did he not raise this question early enough? He could
have raised it soon after the posting was made, especially
considering that two more pre-election conferences, on May 20, 22
and 23 were held. Or he could have raised the question during the
election day. But he did not. Is it because he did not really care then,
is it because his people inside the company did not really care, or is
it because he had really no people inside to bother at all about said
'error?' If they were that disinterested in correcting the 'error' at least
during the last four days before the election, how could Mr. Diaz
claim now that his group was adversely affected by the alleged
'error' and that if said 'error' was not made, his group could have
won the election?" 12 The comment ended on a statement rather
rhetorical in character: "The truth is, Mr. Diaz had but a droplet of
support, which, dream as he would, could never match, much less
overcome, the raging torrents of GATCORD." 13 The comment on
behalf of respondent Director Noriel and the respondent
Representation Officer Eduvala stressed a grave abuse of discretion
to certify an action for certiorari. Petitioner sought permission to
reply and was granted. There was, as could be expected, a stout
denial of the recital of facts of private respondent, but it cannot be
said that it is impressed with a high degree of persuasiveness..
At any rate, after the Court considered the comments as answers
and set the case for hearing, with arguments coming from both
counsel Benito Fabie for petitioner and Jose W. Diokno for private
their motion for intervention. On the other hand, HPI claimed that it
was not informed or properly represented at the pre-election
conference. It alleged that, if it was represented at all in the preelection conference, its representative acted beyond his authority
and without its knowledge. Private respondent also alleged that the
certification election was marred by massive fraud and irregularities
and that out of 1,692 eligible voters, 913, representing 54% of the
rank-and-file workers of private respondent, were not able to vote,
resulting in a failure of election.
On January 10, 1990, Acting Labor Secretary Dionisio dela Serna
directed the Med-Arbiter, Phibun D. Pura, to investigate the
company's claim that 54% of the rank-and-file workers were not
able to vote in the certification election.
In his Report and Recommendation, dated February 9, 1990, Pura
stated:
1. A majority of the rank-and-file workers had been disfranchised in
the election of August 20, 1989 because of confusion caused by the
announcement of the company that the election had been postponed
in view of the appeals of ULGWP and Hijo Labor Union (HLU)
from the order denying their motions for intervention. In addition,
the election was held on a Sunday which was non-working day in
the company.
2. There were irregularities committed in the conduct of the
election. It was possible that some people could have voted for
those who did not show up. The election was conducted in an open
and hot area. The secrecy of the ballot had been violated.
Management representatives were not around to identify the
workers.
3. The total number of votes cast, as duly certified by the
representation officer, did not tally with the 41-page listings
submitted to the Med-Arbitration Unit. The list contained 1,008
names which were checked or encircled (indicating that they had
voted) and 784 which were not, (indicating that they did not vote),
or a total of 1,792. but according to the representation officer the
total votes cast in the election was 1,012.
motion for interventions. The same was however, denied for being
filed unseasonably, and as a result it was not included as one of the
choices in the said election. After it has been so disqualified thru an
order which has become final and executory, ALU filed a second
motion for intervention when a second balloting was ordered
conducted. Clearly, said second motion is proforma and intended to
delay the proceedings. Being so, its appeal from the order of denial
did not stay the election and the Med-Arbiter was correct and did
not violate any rule when he proceeded with the election even with
the appeal. In fact, the Med-Arbiter need not rule on the motion as
it has already been disposed of with finality.
The same is true with the motion for intervention of ULGWP. The
latter withdrew as a party to the election on September 1988 and its
motion to withdraw was granted by the Med-Arbiter on October
motion for intervention filed before the conduct of a second
balloting where the choices has already been pre-determined.
Let it be stressed that ULGWP and HLU were disqualified to
participate in the election through valid orders that have become
final and executory even before the first certification election was
conducted. Consequently, they may not be allowed to disrupt the
proceeding through the filing of nuisance motions. Much less are
they possessed of the legal standing to question the results of the
second election considering that they are not parties thereto.
The DOLE gave no weight to the report of the Med-Arbiter that the
certification election was marred by massive fraud and
irregularities. Although affidavits were submitted showing that the
election was held outside the company premises and private
vehicles were used as makeshift precincts, the DOLE found that
this was because respondent company did not allow the use of its
premises for the purpose of holding the election, company guards
were allegedly instructed not to allow parties, voters and DOLE
representation officers to enter the company premises, and notice
was posted on the door of the company that the election had been
postponed.
Nor was weight given to the findings of the Med-Arbiter that a
furnish election paraphernalia like the polling place and the ballot
box and that the election supervisors declared the election closed in
spite of ALU's objection.
Taneo prayed that the votes should not be counted, that another day
be scheduled for the continuation of the election and that the
company be ordered to allow its workers to vote (Rollo pp. 29-35).
At around seven-thirty in the evening, the votes cast were
canvassed. Of the 692 votes cast, ALU got 366 votes as against
CCLU's 313 votes, or a margin of 53 votes. There were 1,010
voters. Because ALU won, its representative, Taneo, withdrew his
protest or manifestation by writing on the minutes of the proceeding
that his protest or manifestation was withdrawn "before the close of
the proceedings". On the other hand, the CCLU representatives
refused to sign the minutes of the election.
On the following day, November 7, CCLU through its
representative, Juan L. Fresnoza filed with the Bureau of Labor
Relations a protest wherein he prayed that the November 6
certification election as well as the "continuation of the election" on
November 7 be annulled.
Fresnoza alleged that the previous day's certification election was
irregular and disorderly because (a) no booths were provided for by
the company; (b) the election started much later than the hour
agreed upon by the parties, and (c) ALU distributed white T-shirts
printed with "ALU TAYO", gave free tricycle rides to ALU voters
and hired around fifteen husky men and around twenty-five women
who "forced" voters to vote for ALU.
According to Fresnoza, when he and Oscar Sanchez, the acting
president of Redson Employees and Laborers Association (RELACCLU), protested against those activities before election supervisor
Margarita C, Enriquez, the latter allegedly retorted, "Wala akong
magagawa, magagalit na naman si Mr. Taneo" (,Rollo, pp. 36-37).
On November 10, 1980, Fresnoza and Sanchez filed with the
Bureau of labor Relations a joint affidavit attesting to what
transpired during the certification election as alleged in the
aforesaid protest and added therein that when they protested before
the election supervisors, the latter told them to "place their protest
in writing so that they (supervisors) could consolidate the protests
in their election report" (Rollo, pp. 38-39).
On February 19, 1981, CCLU informed the Bureau of Labor
Relations that the election was conducted without regard to the
provisions of section 6, Rule VI, Book V of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.
Carmelo C. Noriel, Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, in his resolution of February 26, 1981, dismissed
CCLU's protest for lack of merit. He observed that CCLU failed to
submit the pleadings and evidences required in the hearing on
January 19, 1981 and that CCLU failed to file a protest either
"before or during the election proceeding" and, therefore, pursuant
to section 3, Rule VI, Book V of the aforementioned rules, CCLU is
deemed to have waived its right to protest.
Noriel in his resolution of March 26, 1981, denying CCLU's motion
for reconsideration, certified ALU as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees in Redson Textile Manufacturing
Corporation.
On June 6, 1981 CCLU and RELA-CCLU filed the instant petition
for certiorari and prohibition to annul the certification election.
They complained that the certification election was conducted in
violation of the following provisions of Rule VI, Book V of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code:
SEC. 6. Duties of representation officer. Before the actual voting
commences the representation officer shall inspect the polling
place, the ballot boxes, and the polling booths to insure secrecy of
balloting. The parties shall be given opportunity to witness the
inspection proceedings. After the examination of the ballot box, the
representation officer shall lock it with three keys one of which he
shall keep and the rest forthwith given one each to the employer's
representative and the representative of the labor organization. If
more than one union is involved, the holder of the third shall be
determined by drawing of lots. The key shall remain in the
possession of the representation officer and the parties during the
officers are also enjoined to fulfill their duties under the Labor Code
and the rules and regulations implementing the same.
SO ORDERED.
mimiThe Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
MILITANTE VS NLRC
This is a petition for certiorari to reverse the Decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CA
No. 004908-93, affirming the order of the Labor Arbiter which
dismissed, for having been barred by prior judgment, NLRC-NCR
Cases Nos. 00-01-00618-93, 00-03-01784-93, and 00-03-02073-93.
I
The Golden Taxi Employees and Workers Union ANGLO
(GTEWU-ANGLO), represented by Ernesto Serrano, as union
president, filed a case against respondent Golden Taxi Cab Co.
(Company) and/or Lorenzo Zamora and Jose Zamora (NLRC-NCR
Case No. 00-05-02875-90) for illegal lock-out, violation of B.P.
Blg. 130, as amended by R.A. No. 6715, unfair labor practice, and
payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees. In his decision, Labor Arbiter Patricio P. Libo-on found that
the closure of respondent company was illegal, and ordered private
respondents to pay the members of GTEWU-ANGLO
P22,947,200.00 as separation pay and the equivalent of 10% of the
award as attorney's fees (Rollo, p.48). Upon appeal, NLRC in
NLRC NCR CA No. 003194-92, reversed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter and in lieu thereof directed private respondents to pay, as
financial assistance, the workers named in the list attached to its
decision the amount of P5,646,699.50 plus P564,669.95 as
attorney's fees (Rollo, p. 69).
On January 25, 1993, a complaint was filed by Danilo Q. Militante
against Lorenzo Zamora, Doa Nena Zamora and Doa Pacing
Zamora for illegal lockout, illegal dismissal, non-remittance of SSS
deduction, deduction for burial benefits, non-payment of premium
pay for rest day, thirteenth-month pay and separation pay with a
holding that the decision in the previous case did not prejudice but
even entitled petitioners, who are members of the exclusive
bargaining representative Philippine Agricultural Commercial and
Industrial Workers Union Trade Union Congress of the
Philippines (PACIWU-TUCP), to the award of financial assistance;
and (3) in failing to comply with its duty to use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain speedily and without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure the facts in each case.
III
We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by NLRC in
applying the principle of res judicata in NLRC NCR CA No.
004908-93 (NCR No. 00-01-00618-93; 00-03-01784-93; 00-0302073-93), subject of this petition by reason of the previous
judgment rendered in NLRC NCR CA No. 003194-92 (NLRC NCR
Case No. 00-05-02875-90).
Res Judicata has the following elements: (1) that the previous
judgment has become final; (2) that the prior judgment was
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; (3) that the first judgment was rendered on the merits;
and (4) that there was substantial identity of parties, subject matter
and causes of action, as between the prior and subsequent actions
(Diwa v. Donato, 234 SCRA 608 [1994]).
It is undisputed that the NLRC decision in NLRC NCR CA No.
003194-92 was decided on the merits and has already become final.
Petitioners insist, however, that they, being members of the rival
union PACIWU-TUCP, were not parties in the first case filed by
GTEWU-ANGLO (Rollo, p. 12). Such claim is not supported by
the records of the case. The Labor Arbiter' s decision in the
subsequent consolidated cases, which was affirmed by NLRC,
states:
It is not disputed that on May 27, 1990, the date the company filed
its notice of closure with the Department of Labor and
Employment, copy furnished the complainant Union, the said
Union was already "certified" (in fact more than a year earlier after
winning the March 17, 1989 Consent election) as "the exclusive
of the employees who are to receive financial assistance; and (2) the
amount they are entitled to receive. In conclusion, NLRC took out
those who no longer worked with respondent company before its
closure, and favored only those who actively pursued the case. It
limited the award of financial assistance only to those mentioned in
the list attached to its decision resulting in the exclusion from the
benefits of petitioners.
We cannot simply disregard these factual findings made by the
Labor Arbiter, as well as the conclusion arrived at by NLRC,
inasmuch as the same are supported by the records of the case and
in accord with law and jurisprudence. In Five J Taxi v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 235 SCRA 556 (1994), we ruled:
This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of
quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, which have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters,
are generally accorded not only respect but, at times, finality if such
findings are supported by substantial evidence. Where, however,
such conclusions are not supported by the evidence, they must be
struck down for being whimsical and capricious and, therefore,
arrived at with abuse of discretion (at p. 560).
The legal conclusion of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC on the binding
effect of the judgment in the NLRC NCR CA No. 003194-92 on
petitioners finds support in Article 255 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, as amended. Said article provides:
Exclusive bargaining representation and workers participation in
policy and decision making. The labor organization designated
or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate
collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of
the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining. . . . .
Inasmuch as GTEWU-ANGLO was certified as the exclusive
bargaining agent in the consent election conducted on March 17,
1989, petitioners cannot now claim that they were not parties in the
first case filed by GTEWU-ANGLO, which represented not only
PACIWU-TUCP but also GTEWU-ANGLO. Hence, all the
presumed to act in accordance with law but this Court will not
hesitate to pass upon their work where there is a showing of abuse
of authority or discretion in their official acts or when their
decisions or orders are tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness.
Noteworthy is the fact that a certification was issued by Executive
Labor Arbiter Celerino Grecia II on October 21, 1982 certifying
that the petition for deadlock in RAB Case No. VI-0220-82 was
forwarded to the Executive Labor Arbiter for compulsory
arbitration (see Rollo, p. 19). The respondent Director erred in
finding that the order issued by the Med-Arbiter dismissing the
petition for certification election was irregular and was merely
based on information.
All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the assailed
decision and order of the respondent Director is tainted with
arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED; the decision dated
November 18, 1983 and order dated March 21, 1984 of the
respondent Director Cresenciano B. Trajano are hereby nullified
and the order of Med-Arbiter Militante dated July 23, 1982
dismissing the petition for certification election is hereby reinstated.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-38955-56 October 31, 1974
CONFEDERATION OF CITIZENS LABOR UNIONS
(CCLU), CONTINENTAL EMPLOYEES AND LABORERS
ASSOCIATION (CELA) AND REDSON EMPLOYEES AND
LABORERS ASSOCIATION (RELA), petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, THE
SECRETARY OF LABOR, FEDERATION OF FREE
WORKERS,
CONTINENTAL
MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION
AND
REDSON
TEXTILE
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION,respondents.
O. B. Gesmundo and R. E. Maderazo for petitioners.
Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo for respondent
Redson Textile Manufacturing Corporation.
vs.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
On 7 December 1953 the Respondents, 65 in number, employees of
the Saulog Transit, Inc., filed in the Court of Industrial Relations a
petition for a certification election, alleging that the total number of
employees in the Saulog Transit, Inc. was 583; chan
made
the
following
From the evidence, the following are explicit in the pleadings and
documents as well as the testimonies submitted by the parties. It
appears that the Saulog Transit, Inc. is engaged in the transportation
business in Manila and surrounding cities and employs 583 workers
including supervisory personnel; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat
there exists in the company two unions, namely, the Buklod g
xxx
xxx
The evidence show that a total of 583 are employed in the Saulog
Transit, Inc. Out of said number, the Court holds that the following
should be excluded as they come within the disqualifying category
of supervisors, namely, one (1) assistant General Manager; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarytwo
(2)
guards;
chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryone
(1)
shift
foreman;
chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand one (1) accountant. With regards to the
28 inspectors, which counsel for Petitioners contends to be
supervisors without presenting evidence on the matter, the Court is
of the opinion that inspectors in transportation business by the
nature of their work do not fall within the category of supervisors
xxx
xxx