G.R. No.

116751 August 28, 1998

ORIENTAL TIN CAN LABOR UNION, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, ORIENTAL
TIN CAN WORKERS UNION FEDERATION OF FREE
WORKERS [OTCWU-FFW] and ORIENTAL TIN CAN AND
METAL SHEET MANUFACTURING, respondents.
G.R. No. 116779 August 28, 1998
ORIENTAL
TIN
CAN
AND
METAL
SHEET
MANUFACTURING CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, UNDERSECRETARY
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, ORIENTAL TIN CAN
WORKERS UNION FFW and ORIENTAL TIN CAN
LABOR UNION, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Respondent (in G.R. No. 116751) and petitioner (in sister case G.R.
No. 116779), Oriental Tin Can and Metal Sheet Manufacturing
Company, Inc. (the company) is engaged in the manufacture of tin
can containers and metal sheets. On March 3, 1994, it entered into a
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with petitioner Oriental Tin
Can Labor Union (OTCLU) as the existing CBA was due to expire
on April 15, 1994. Four days later, 248 of the company's rank-andfile employees authorized the Federation of Free Workers (FFW) to
file a petition for certification election. 1 On March 10, 1994,
however, this petition was repudiated via a written waiver 2 by 115
of the signatories who, along with other employees totalling 897,
ratified the CBA on the same date.
On March 18, 1994, armed with Charter Certificate No. IV-MEE089, respondent Oriental Tin Can Workers Union Federation of
Free Workers (OTCWU-FFW) filed a petition for certification
election with the National Capital Region office of the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE), pursuant to Article 256 of the

Labor Code. Purporting to represent the regular rank-and-file

employees of the company, the petition was accompanied by the
"authentic signatures" of 25% of the employees/workers in the
bargaining unit.
The OTCLU filed a manifestation and motion on April 15, 1994,
praying for the dismissal of the petition for certification election on
the ground that it was not endorsed by at least 25% of the
employees of the bargaining unit. Some of the employees who
initially signed the petition had allegedly withdrawn in writing such
support prior to the filing of the same.
The OTCWU-FFW filed a reply to said manifestation and motion,
claiming that the retraction of support for the petition was "not
verified under oath" and, therefore, had no legal and binding effect.
It further asserted that the petition had the required support of more
than 25% of all the employees in the bargaining unit.
For its part, the company filed a comment alleging inter alia that the
new CBA was ratified by 897 out of the 1,020 rank-and-file
employees within the bargaining unit. The OTCLU then filed a
motion to dismiss and/or position paper reiterating its position that
the petition did not comply with the 25% signature requirement and
maintaining that the new CBA was a bar to a certification election.
To said comment and motion to dismiss, the OTCWU-FFW filed a
consolidated reply, alleging that "an employer has no legal
personality to oppose a petition for certification election; that there
are only 882 rank and file workers in the bargaining unit and not
1,020 which included supervisors and workers hired after the filing
of the petition; that those who gave their support to the filing of the
petition did not withdraw or retract the same before or after the
petition was filed; the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
between respondent company and Forced Intervenor (OTCLU) is a
sweetheart contract and concluded within the freedom period; and
that additional employees gave their support to the petition after the
same was filed." 3
The company filed a rejoinder to said consolidated reply, asserting

its objection to the petition for certification election because the

case at bar "involves a collective bargaining agreement which was
ratified by 897 employees including the 245 workers who had
earlier given their consent to the filing of the petition; that the
benefits provided for therein are being enjoyed by the workers
themselves; that a certification election would impair the said
contract; that the officers of (OTCWU-FFW) were among those
who ratified the CBA; and (OTCWU-FFW) failed to name the
supervisors and workers hired after the filing of the petition that
were allegedly included in the list of rank and file employees." 4
In the meantime, on April 18, 1994, the DOLE issued a certificate
of registration of the CBA pursuant to Article 231 of the Labor
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715. It showed that the
CBA between the company and the OTCLU would have the force
and effect of law between the parties that had complied with the
requirements and standards for registration thereof.
On June 1, 1994, the officers of the OTCWU-FFW walked out of
their jobs, prompting the company to require them to explain in
writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for
walking out en masse. The following day, said union filed a notice
of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) grounded on the alleged dismissal of union
members/officers. Two days later, the company directed said
officers to report back to work within 48 hours, but none of them
did.
In an order dated June 7, 1994, Med-Arbiter Renato D. Parugo
dismissed the petition for certification election for lack of merit.
Noting that the petition was filed after the valid retractions were
made, he concluded that by the withdrawal of support to the petition
by 115 workers, the remaining 133 of the 1,020 employees were
clearly less than the 25% subscription requirement. Thus, he
opined:
There is merit to the Company's contention that by subsequently
ratifying the CBA, the employees in effect withdrew their previous

support to the petition. Thus, when the petition was filed on March
18, 1994, it did not have the required consent of the employees
within the bargaining unit. Another factor which militates against
the petition is the fact that actually there are 1,020 rank and file
workers in the bargaining unit. Twenty-five percent (25%) of this is
255, but admittedly only 248 union members had originally
authorized the filing of the petition. The law expressly requires that
a petition for certification election should be supported by the
written consent of at least 25% of all the employees in the
bargaining unit at the time of the filing thereof.
In view of the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we are
constrained to order the dismissal of the instant petition.
Furthermore, it would be in the interest of industrial peace to deny
the holding of a certification election among the rank and file
workers of respondent Company during the effectivity of the new
CBA it appearing that out of 1,020 rank and file employees, 897
have ratified the same and the benefits of which are currently being
enjoyed by all covered employees of respondent Company. 5
The OTCWU-FFW appealed this ruling to the Labor Secretary. On
June 18, 1994, however, during the pendency of the appeal, said
union staged a strike that prevented the free ingress and egress of
non-striking employees, delivery trucks and other vehicles to and
from the company's premises. Upon complaint of the company, the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) issued a writ of
preliminary injunction on July 19, 1994, on the ground that the
strike caused the company to incur daily losses amounting to P3.6
million.
Meanwhile, on July 15, 1994, Undersecretary Bienvenido E.
Laguesma, acting on the appeal of the OTCWU-FFW, issued a
resolution 6 holding that:
An examination of the records of this case shows that the subject
CBA was concluded during the 60-day freedom period of the old
CBA which expired on 15 April 1994, and registered with the

Regional Office of this Department on 18 April 1994 while the

petition for certification election was filed on 18 March 1994. It is
therefore, crystal clear that, the present petition was filed during the
freedom period and no registered CBA in the respondent
establishment could be invoked (to) pose as a bar to the holding of a
certification election. In other words, when the said CBA was
registered there was a pending representation case. Consequently,
said CBA cannot bar the election being prayed for. This is the rule
contained in Section 4, Rule V of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, which provides that:
Sec. 4. Effects of early agreements. The representation case shall
not, however, be adversely affected by a collective bargaining
agreement registered before or during the last sixty (60) days of a
subsisting agreement or during the pendency of the representation
case. (Emphasis supplied)
On the issue of whether the 25% support requirement for filing the
petition for certification election had been met, Undersecretary
Laguesma opined thus:
The rule being followed in case of alleged retractions and
withdrawals, as appellant correctly pointed out, is that the best
forum for determining whether there was (sic) indeed retractions is
the certification election itself wherein the workers can freely
express their choice in a secret ballot. (Atlas Free Workers Union
vs. Noriel, et al., 104 SCRA 565) The argument of (OTCLU) that
since the withdrawal was made prior to the filing of the petition it
should be presumed voluntary and therefore, has adversely affected
the petition, lacks merit. The Supreme Court ruling cited in support
of the argument (i.e. La Suede Cigar and Cigarette Factory, et al. vs.
Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, et al., 123 SCRA 679) is
not squarely applicable in the present case. For while in the said
case it was undisputably (sic) shown that 31 members have
withdrawn their support to the petition, in the present case, the
employees who supposedly withdrew from the union executed joint
statements (Sama-samang Pahayag) declaring that the "WAIVER"

document they signed has no force and effect considering that it

was the product of duress, force and intimidation employed by the
company after it learned of the petition for certification election,
and reiterating their wish to be given the opportunity to choose the
union of their choice. Said statements raised doubts on the
voluntariness of the retractions, destroyed the presumption that
retractions made before the filing of the petition are deemed
voluntary and consequently brought the present case outside the
mantle of the Atlas ruling
He added that even if there were 1,020 rank-and-file employees in
the bargaining unit, the signatures gathered sufficed to meet the
25% support requirement because the Sama-samang Pahayag
invalidating the previous "Waiver," contained 359 signatures which,
when added to the 165 signatures submitted by the OTCWU-FFW
on May 27, 1994, brought the total to 524, much more than the
required 25% of the alleged 1,020 rank-and-file employees.
Moreover, in case of doubt, the DOLE tends to favor the conduct of
certification election, for the rule on simultaneous submission of the
consent signatures and the petition should be liberally interpreted.
As such, "contracts where the identity of the authorized
representative of the workers is in doubt must be rejected in favor
of a more certain indication of the will of the workers. Any stability
that does not establish the type of industrial peace contemplated by
the law must be subordinated to the employees' freedom to choose
their real representative." Accordingly, Undersecretary Laguesma
disposed of the appeal as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the petitioner is hereby granted and
the Order of the Med-Arbiter is hereby set aside. In lieu thereof, a
new order is hereby issued directing the conduct of a certification
election among the regular rank and file employees of the Oriental
Tin Can and Metal Sheet Manufacturing, with the following as
choices:
1. Oriental Tin Can Workers Union Federation of Free Workers
(OTCWU-FFW);

2. Oriental Tin Can Labor Union (OTCLU);

3. No Union.
Let therefore, the entire records of this case be forwarded to the
Regional Office of origin for the immediate conduct of certification
election, subject to the usual pre-election conference. The payrolls
three (3) months before the filing of the petition shall be the basis of
the list of eligible voters.
SO RESOLVED.
Herein petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of said
resolution, but this was denied for lack of merit in the resolution
dated August 22, 1994. From this resolution, the company and the
OTCLU filed separate petitions for certiorari before this Court.
G. R. No. 116779
In assailing the resolution of July 15, 1994, the company raises in
issue the following grounds to show that the Labor Secretary,
through Undersecretary Laguesma, gravely abused his discretion in:
(a) ordering the conduct of a certification election even though the
employees who signed the petition therefor had withdrawn their
support by ratifying the CBA and even though no certification
election could be conducted without the written consent of at least
25% of all the employees in the bargaining unit, and (b) ruling, in
effect, "that the provision of Article 256 of the Labor Code takes
precedence over that of Article 253 of the same Code."
The company concedes that, as an employer, it should "remain a
bystander in the entire process of selection by the employees of
their bargaining representative, since the exercise is indisputably an
all-employee affair." Nonetheless, it justifies its "right to question
the filing of the petition for certification election" by the situation
"where, the small number of employees, the very ones who had
earlier supported the petition for certification election, subsequently
changed their mind, and ratified the CBA and thereafter reaped
from its bounty." 7 Thus, in its desire to maintain industrial peace,
the company deemed it necessary to challenge the propriety of
holding a certification election.

This argument is misleading.

It is a well-established rule that certification elections are
exclusively the concern of employees; hence, the employer lacks
the legal personality to challenge the same. 8 In Golden Farms, Inc.
v. Secretary of Labor, 9 the Court declared:
. . . Law and policy demand that employers take a strict, hands-off
stance in certification elections. The bargaining representative of
employees should be chosen free from any extraneous influence of
management. A labor bargaining representative, to be effective,
must owe its loyalty to the employees alone and to no other.
The only instance when an employer may concern itself with
employee representation activities is when it has to file the petition
for certification election because there is no existing CBA in the
unit and it was requested to bargain collectively, pursuant to Article
258 of the Labor code. 10 After filing the petition, the role of the
employer ceases and it becomes a mere bystander. 11 The company's
interference in the certification election below by actively opposing
the same is manifestly uncalled-for and unduly creates a suspicion
that it intends to establish a company union. 12 On this score, it is
clear that the perceived grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Labor Secretary is non-existent and G.R. No. 116779 should,
consequently, be dismissed. This case will now proceed and decided
on the merits of the issues raised in G.R. No. 116751.
G.R. No. 116751
The OTCLU contends that the Labor Secretary acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion: (a) in "imposing upon
the employees the manner of choosing their collective bargaining
representative by ordering a certification election notwithstanding
the fact that the overwhelming majority of the employees have
already decided to retain the petitioner (OCTLU) as their collective
bargaining representative," and (b) in giving due course to the
petition for certification election even though it lacked the required
support of 25% of the employees.

(a) The OTCLU maintains that the Labor Secretary improperly

prescribed the mode of picking a collective bargaining agent upon
the employees who effectively repudiated the "notion" of a
certification election by ratifying the CBA entered into during the
freedom period
This contention is without merit as it runs counter to the policy of
the State on the matter.
Undersecretary Laguesma, by authority of the Secretary of the
DOLE, was exercising the function of the Department to "(e)nforce
social and labor legislation to protect the working class and regulate
the relations between the worker and his employee" 13 when he
issued the resolution being assailed in the instant petition. As will
be shown shortly, he was merely applying the law applicable to the
appeal raised before his office.
The Labor Code imposes upon the employer and the representative
of the employees the duty to bargain collectively. 14 Since the
question of right of representation as between competing labor
organizations in a bargaining unit is imbued with public interest, 15
the law governs the choice of a collective bargaining representative
which shall be the duly certified agent of the employees concerned.
An official certification becomes necessary where the bargaining
agent fails to present adequate and reasonable proof of its majority
authorization and where the employer demands it, or when the
employer honestly doubts the majority representation of several
contending bargaining groups. 16 In fact, Article 255 of the Labor
Code allows the majority of the employees in an appropriate
collective bargaining unit to designate or select the labor
organization which shall be their exclusive representative for the
purpose of collective bargaining.
The designation or selection of the bargaining representative
without, however, going through the process set out by law for the
conduct of a certification election applies only when representation
is not in issue. There is no problem if a union is unanimously
chosen by a majority of the employees as their bargaining
representative, but a question of representation arising from the

presence of more than one union in a bargaining unit aspiring to be

the employees' representative, can only be resolved by holding a
certification election under the supervision of the proper
government authority. Thus:
It bears stressing that no obstacle must be placed to the holding of
certification elections, for it is a statutory policy that should not be
circumvented. We have held that whenever there is doubt as to
whether a particular union represents the majority of the rank-andfile employees, in the absence of a legal impediment, the holding of
a certification election is the most democratic method of
determining the employees' choice of their bargaining
representative. It is the appropriate means whereby controversies
and disputes on representation may be laid to rest, by the
unequivocal vote of the employees themselves. Indeed, it is the
keystone of industrial democracy. 17
Given these premises, the filing of a petition for certification
election by one of the two unions in the bargaining unit is enough
basis for the DOLE, through its authorized official, to implement
the law by directing the conduct of a certification election.
Art. 253-A of the Labor Code explicitly provides that the aspect of
a union's representation of the rank-and-file employees contained in
the CBA shall be for a term of five (5) years and that "(n)o petition
questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent
shall be entertained and no certification election shall be conducted
by the Department of Labor and Employment outside of the sixtyday period immediately before the date of expiry of such five year
term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement." Accordingly, Section
3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code provides that "(i)f a collective bargaining agreement has been
duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a
petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can
only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of
such agreement."

It is uncontroverted that the petition for certification election in this

case was filed on March 18, 1994, twenty-eight days before the
expiration of the existing CBA on April 15, 1994, and well within
the 60-day period provided for by the Code. The OTCLU, however,
is concerned with the effect of the employees' ratification of the
new CBA on the timely filing of the petition for certification
election. Would such ratification nullify the petition?
The law dictates a negative reply. The filing of a petition for
certification election during the 60-day freedom period gives rise to
a representation case that must be resolved even though a new CBA
has been entered into within that period. This is clearly provided for
in the aforequoted Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code. The reason behind this rule is
obvious. A petition for certification election is not necessary where
the employees are one in their choice of a representative in the
bargaining process. Moreover, said provision of the Omnibus Rules
manifests the intent of the legislative authority to allow, if not
encourage, the contending unions in a bargaining unit to hold a
certification election during the freedom period. Hence, the Court
held in the case of Warren Manufacturing Workers Union
(WMWU) v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 18 that the agreement
prematurely signed by the union and the company during the
freedom period does not affect the petition for certification election
filed by another union.
(b) As regards the 25% support requirement, we concur with public
respondent's finding that said requisite has been met in this case.
With regard to the finding that the "waiver" document executed by
the employees "was the product of duress, force and intimidation
employed by the company after it learned of the petition for
certification election," 19 the following pronouncement of the Court
is relevant:
. . . Even doubts as to the required 30% being met warrant (the)
holding of the certification election. In fact, once the required
percentage requirement has been reached, the employees'
withdrawal from union membership taking place after the filing of

the petition for certification election will not affect the petition. On
the contrary, the presumption arises that the withdrawal was not free
but was procured through duress, coercion or for a valuable
consideration. Hence, the subsequent disaffiliation of the six (6)
employees from the union will not be counted against or deducted
from the previous number who had signed up for certification . . . 20
(Citations omitted)
The support requirement is a mere technicality which should be
employed in determining the true will of the workers 21 instead of
frustrating the same. Thus, in Port Workers Union of the Philippines
(PWUP) v. Laguesma, 22 this Court declared that:
In line with this policy (that the holding of a certification election is
a certain and definitive mode of arriving at the choice of the
employees' bargaining representative), we feel that the
administrative rule requiring the simultaneous submission of the
25% consent signatures upon the filing of the petition for
certification election should not be strictly applied to frustrate the
determination of the legitimate representative of the workers.
Significantly, the requirement in the rule is not found in Article 256,
the law it seeks to implement. This is all the more reason why the
regulation should at best be given only a directory effect.
Accordingly, we hold that the mere filing of a petition for
certification election within the freedom period is sufficient basis
for the issuance of an order for the holding of a certification
election, subject to the submission of the consent signatures within
a reasonable period from such filing.
All doubts as to the number of employees actually supporting the
holding of a certification election should, therefore, be resolved by
going through such procedure. It is judicially settled that a
certification election is the most effective and expeditious means of
determining which labor organizations can truly represent the
working force in the appropriate bargaining unit of the company. 23
If the OTCLU wanted to be retained as the rank-and-file employees'

bargaining representative, it should have sought their vote, not

engaged in legal sophistry. The selection by the majority of the
employees of the union which would best represent them in the
CBA negotiations should be achieved through the democratic
process of an election. 24
The fear expressed by the OTCLU that granting the petition for
certification election would be prejudicial to all the employees since
the new CBA would run the risk of being nullified and the
employees would be required to restitute whatever benefits they
might have received under the new CBA, is to be dismissed as
being baseless and highly speculative.
The benefits that may be derived from the implementation of the
CBA prematurely entered into between the OTCLU and the
company shall, therefore, be in full force and effect until the
appropriate bargaining representative is chosen and negotiations for
a new collective bargaining agreement is thereafter concluded. 25 A
struggle between contending labor unions must not jeopardize the
implementation of a CBA that is advantageous to employees.
WHEREFORE, both petitions for certiorari are hereby
DISMISSED. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 73681 June 30, 1988
COLGATE PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINES, Inc., petitioners,
vs.
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, COLGATE PALMOLIVE SALES
UNION, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for certiorari seeking to set aside and annul
the Order of respondent Minister of Labor and Employment
(MOLE) directly certifying private respondent as the recognized
and duly-authorized collective bargaining agent for petitioner's

sales force and ordering the reinstatement of three employees of

petitioner.
Acting on the petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary
restraining order, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining respondents from enforcing and/or carrying out the
assailed order.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On March 1, 1985, the respondent Union filed a Notice of Strike
with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of unfair
labor practice consisting of alleged refusal to bargain, dismissal of
union officers/members; and coercing employees to retract their
membership with the union and restraining non-union members
from joining the union.
After efforts at amicable settlement proved unavailing, the Office of
the MOLE, upon petition of petitioner assumed jurisdiction over the
dispute pursuant to Article 264 (g) of the Labor Code, Thereafter
the case was captioned AJML-3-142-85, BLR-3-86-85 "In Re:
Assumption of Jurisdiction over the Labor Dispute at Colgate
Palmolive Philippines, Inc." In its position paper, petitioner pointed
out that
(a) There is no legal basis for the charge that the company refused
to bargain collectively with the union considering that the alleged
union is not the certified agent of the company salesmen;
(b) The union's status as a legitimate labor organization is still under
question because on 6 March 1985, a certain Monchito Rosales
informed the BLR that an overwhelming majority of the salesmen
are not in favor of the Notice of Strike allegedly filed by the Union
(Annex "C");
(c) Upon verification of the records of the Ministry of Labor and
Employment, it appeared that a petition for cancellation of the
registration of the alleged union was filed by Monchito Rosales on
behalf of certain salesmen of the company who are obviously
against the formation of the Colgate Palmolive Sales Labor Union
which is supposed to represent them;
(d) The preventive suspensions of salesmen Peregrino Sayson,

Salvador Reynante and Cornelio Mejia, and their eventual dismissal

from the employ of the company were carried out pursuant to the
inherent right and prerogative of management to discipline erring
employees; that based on the preliminary investigation conducted
by the company, there appeared substantial grounds to believe that
Sayson, Reynante and Mejia violated company rules and
regulations necessitating their suspension pending further
investigation of their respective cases;
(e) It was also ascertained that the company sustained damages
resulting from the infractions committed by the three salesmen, and
that the final results of the investigation fully convinced the
company of the existence of just causes for the dismissal of the
three salesmen;
(f) The formation of the union and the membership therein of
Sayson, Reynante and Mejia were not in any manner connected
with the company's decision to dismiss the three; that the fact that
their dismissal came at a time when the alleged union was being
formed was purely coincidental;
(g) The union's charge therefore, that the membership in the union
and refusal to retract precipitated their dismissal was totally false
and amounted to a malicious imputation of union busting;
(h) The company never coerced or attempted to coerce employees,
much less interferred in the exercise of their right to selforganization; the company never thwarted nor tried to defeat or
frustrate the employees' right to form their union in pursuit of their
collective interest, as long as that right is exercised within the limits
prescribed by law; in fact, there are at present two unions
representing the rank and file employees of the company-the
factory workers who are covered by a CBA which expired on 31
October 1985 (which was renewed on May 31, 1985) and are
represented by Colgate Palmolive Employees Union (PAFLU);
whereas, the salaried employees are covered by a CBA which will
expire on 31 May 1986 represented by Philippine Association of
Free Labor Union (PAFLU)-CPPI Office Chapter. (pp. 4-6, Rollo)
The respondent Union, on the other hand, in its position paper,

reiterated the issue in its Notice to Strike, alleging that it was duly
registered with the Bureau of Labor Relations under Registry No.
10312-LC with a total membership of 87 regular salesmen
(nationwide) out of 117 regular salesmen presently employed by the
company as of November 30, 1985 and that since the registration of
the Union up to the present, more than 2/3 of the total salesmen
employed are already members of the Union, leaving no doubt that
the true sentiment of the salesmen was to form and organize the
Colgate-Palmolive Salesmen Union. The Union further alleged that
the company is unreasonably delaying the recognition of the union
because when it was informed of the organization of the union, and
when presented with a set of proposals for a collective bargaining
agreement, the company took an adversarial stance by secretly
distributing a "survey sheet on union membership" to newly hired
salesmen from the Visayas, Mindanao and Metro Manila areas,
purposely avoiding regular salesmen who are now members of the
union; that in the accomplishment of the form, District Sales
Managers, and Sales Supervisors coerced salesmen from the
Visayas and Mindanao by requiring them to fill up and/or
accomplish said form by checking answers which were adverse to
the union; that with a handful of the survey sheets secured by
management through coercion, it now would like to claim that all
salesmen are not in favor of the organization of the union, which
acts are clear manifestations of unfair labor practices.
On August 9,1985, respondent Minister rendered a decision which:
(a) found no merit in the Union's Complaint for unfair labor
practice allegedly committed by petitioner as regards the alleged
refusal of petitioner to negotiate with the Union, and the secret
distribution of survey sheets allegedly intended to discourage
unionism,
(b) found the three salesmen, Peregrino Sayson, Salvador Reynante
& Cornelio Mejia "not without fault" and that "the company 1 has
grounds to dismiss above named salesmen"
and at the same time respondent Minister directly certified the

respondent Union as the collective bargaining agent for the sales

force in petitioner company and ordered the reinstatement of the
three salesmen to the company on the ground that the employees
were first offenders.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by
respondent Minister in his assailed Order, dated December 27,
1985. Petitioner now comes to Us with the following:
Assignment of Errors
I
Respondent Minister committed a grave abuse of discretion when
he directly certified the Union solely on the basis of the latter's selfserving assertion that it enjoys the support of the majority of the
sales force in petitioner's company.
II
Respondent Minister committed a grave abuse of discretion when,
notwithstanding his very own finding that there was just cause for
the dismissal of the three (3) salesmen, he nevertheless ordered
their reinstatement. (pp. 7-8, Rollo)
Petitioner concedes that respondent Minister has the power to
decide a labor dispute in a case assumed by him under Art. 264 (g)
of the Labor Code but this power was exceeded when he certified
respondent Union as the exclusive bargaining agent of the
company's salesmen since this is not a representation proceeding as
described under the Labor Code. Moreover the Union did not pray
for certification but merely for a finding of unfair labor practice
imputed to petitioner-company.
The petition merits our consideration. The procedure for a
representation case is outlined in Arts. 257-260 of the Labor Code,
in relation to the provisions on cancellation of a Union registration
under Arts. 239-240 thereof, the main purpose of which is to aid in
ascertaining majority representation. The requirements under the
law, specifically Secs. 2, 5, and 6 of Rule V, Book V, of the Rules
Implementing the Labor Code are all calculated to ensure that the
certified bargaining representative is the true choice of the
employees against all contenders. The Constitutional mandate that

the State shall "assure the rights of the workers to self-organization,

collective bargaining, security of tenure and just and humane
conditions of work," should be achieved under a system of law such
as the aforementioned provisions of the pertinent statutes. When an
overzealous official by-passes the law on the pretext of retaining a
laudable objective, the intendment or purpose of the law will lose
its meaning as the law itself is disregarded. When respondent
Minister directly certified the Union, he in fact disregarded this
procedure and its legal requirements. There was therefore failure to
determine with legal certainty whether the Union indeed enjoyed
majority representation. Contrary to the respondent Minister's
observation, the holding of a certification election at the proper time
is not necessarily a mere formality as there was a compelling legal
reason not to directly and unilaterally certify a union whose
legitimacy is precisely the object of litigation in a pending
cancellation case filed by certain "concerned salesmen," who also
claim majority status. Even in a case where a union has filed a
petition for certification elections, the mere fact that no opposition
is made does not warrant a direct certification. More so as in the
case at bar, when the records of the suit show that the required proof
was not presented in an appropriate proceeding and that the basis of
the direct certification was the Union's mere allegation in its
position paper that it has 87 out of 117 regular salesmen. In other
words, respondent Minister merely relied on the self-serving
assertion of the respondent Union that it enjoyed the support of the
majority of the salesmen, without subjecting such assertion to the
test of competing claims. As pointed out by petitioner in its petition,
what the respondent Minister achieved in rendering the assailed
orders was to make a mockery of the procedure provided under the
law for representation cases because:
(a) He has created havoc by impliedly establishing a procedural
short-cut to obtaining a direct certification-by merely filing a notice
of strike.
(b) By creating such a short-cut, he has officially encouraged
disrespect for the law.

(c) By directly certifying a Union without sufficient proof of

majority representation, he has in effect arrogated unto himself the
right, vested naturally in the employees, to choose their collective
bargaining representative.
(d) He has in effect imposed upon the petitioner the obligation to
negotiate with a union whose majority representation is under
serious question. This is highly irregular because while the Union
enjoys the blessing of the Minister, it does not enjoy the blessing of
the employees. Petitioner is therefore under threat of being held
liable for refusing to negotiate with a union whose right to
bargaining status has not been legally established. (pp. 9-10, Rollo)
The order of the respondent Minister to reinstate the employees
despite a clear finding of guilt on their part is not in conformity
with law. Reinstatement is simply incompatible with a finding of
guilt. Where the totality of the evidence was sufficient to warrant
the dismissal of the employees the law warrants their dismissal
without making any distinction between a first offender and a
habitual delinquent. Under the law, respondent Minister is duly
mandated to equally protect and respect not only the labor or
workers' side but also the management and/or employers' side. The
law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither
oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. To order the
reinstatement of the erring employees namely, Mejia, Sayson and
Reynante would in effect encourage unequal protection of the laws
as a managerial employee of petitioner company involved in the
same incident was already dismissed and was not ordered to be
reinstated. As stated by Us in the case of San Miguel Brewery vs.
National Labor Union, 2 "an employer cannot legally be compelled
to continue with the employment of a person who admittedly was
guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance towards his employer, and
whose continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to
his interest."
In the subject order, respondent Minister cited a cases 3 implying
that "the proximity of the dismissal of the employees to the
assumption order created a doubt as to whether their dismissal was

really for just cause or due to their activities." 4

This is of no moment for the following reasons:
(a) Respondent Minister has still maintained in his assailed order
that a just cause existed to justify the dismissal of the employees.
(b) Respondent Minister has not made any finding substantiated by
evidence that the employees were dismissed because of their union
activities.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and
SETTING ASIDE the Order of the respondent Minister, dated
December 27, 1985 for grave abuse of discretion. However, in view
of the fact that the dismissed employees are first offenders,
petitioner is hereby ordered to give them separation pay. The
temporary restraining order is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-51602 January 17, 1985
GEORGE & PETER LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU) HON. CARMELO
NORIEL, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS,
MINISTRY OF LABOR, respondents.
Manuel B. Pastrana for petitioner.
Gerardo E. Gestopa Jr. for private respondent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Petitioner George and Peter Lines, Incorporated, is a domestic
corporation engaged in shipping, while respondent Associated
Labor Unions (ALU) is a legitimate labor organization duly
registered with the Ministry of Labor.
On July 6, 1978, a Petition for Direct Certification was filed by
respondent ALU with Region VII, Cebu City, of the Ministry of
Labor, praying that it be certified as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of all the rank and file employees of
petitioner corporation there being no labor union organized thereat.

Petitioner corporation OPPOSED the petition stating that

respondent Union does not represent the majority of the employees
concerned; and that more than 80% of the licensed and unlicensed
crew of its vessels claim that they are not members of any union
and have no desire to join any. It then filed on August 17, 1978, a
Petition for Certification Election to determine once and for all
whether the employees concerned wanted respondent ALU to be
their sole bargaining representative.
On August 25, 1978, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order directly
certifying respondent ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of the licensed and unlicensed employees of petitioner
corporation, opining that the majority membership status of any
union is determined before or at the time of filing of the petition
and not thereafter, otherwise, the union can be ousted anytime.
Petitioner corporation moved for reconsideration alleging that the
employees concerned, consisting of about 80%, denied their
membership with respondent Union, and that a certification election
should be called in the interest of fairness and justice.
The entire records of the case were forwarded to the Director of the
Bureau of Labor Relations. On February 5, 1979, the BLR Director
modified the Order of August 25, 1978 by directing a certification
election among the rank and file employees of petitioner
corporation. Reconsideration sought by respondent Union was
denied by the BLR Director on May 31, 1979, on the ground that
there exists a doubt regarding the majority status of respondent
ALU because of the withdrawal of membership by the workers, and
directing the Labor Relations Division of the Regional Office of
origin to hold a pre-election conference, and to conduct the
certification election.
Respondent Union, in its Second Motion for Reconsideration,
argued that public respondent erred in finding its majority status
doubtful as the same was proven during the hearing of the case
before the Med-Arbiter.
The BLR Director, in its questioned Decision of August 13, 1979,
reconsidered its Resolution of May 31, 1979, and directly certified

respondent ALU as the sole bargaining age it of all the rank and file
employees of petitioner corporation Thus, this Petition for certiorari
wherein petitioner seeks to set aside the said Decision, posing the
following issues.
(1) Did the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations of the
Ministry of Labor commit grave abuse of discretion by abruptly
reversing his two previous resolutions for the holding of a
certification election?
(2) Are petitioner's employees entitled to choose their sole and
exclusive bargaining representative with petitioner thru a
certification election? and
(3) Is petitioner entitled to file the petition for certification election?
It is not disputed that after the filing of the petition for direct
certification by respondent Union, a written manifestation duly
signed by about 80% of the employees concerned, retracting their
membership from said union, was submitted by them to the MOLE.
Respondent Union submits, however, that the employees were
merely pressured by management into withdrawing their
membership. On the other hand, petitioner corporation argues that
the retraction by the employees cast a serious doubt on the alleged
majority representation of the Union. In ultimately resolving the
issue in the Union's favor, public respondent held that the
withdrawal of membership from the Union subsequent to the filing
of the petition for direct certification did not affect the same nor did
it divest it of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition.
We find for petitioner.
The employees have the constitutional right to choose the labor
organization which it desires to join. 1 The exercise of such right
would be rendered nugatory and ineffectual if they would be denied
the opportunity to choose in a certification election, which is not a
litigation, but a mere investigation of a non-adversary character, 2
the bargaining unit to represent them. 3 The holding of a
certification election is a statutory policy that should not be
circumvented. 4

As the right of respondent Union to represent the employees is

seriously put in doubt by the withdrawal of 80% of the membership,
which the Union claims to be involuntary, the best forum to
determine if there was, indeed, undue pressure exerted upon the
employees to retract their membership is in the certification election
itself, wherein they can freely express their choice in a secret ballot.
5
Certification election is the best and most appropriate means of
ascertaining the will of the employees as to their choice of an
exclusive bargaining representative. 6 That there are no competing
Unions involved should not alter that principle, the freedom of
choice by the employees being the primordial consideration besides
the fact that the employees can still choose between ALU and No
Union. Even if the withdrawals of the employees concerned were
submitted after the Petition for direct certification had been filed,
the doubt as to the majority representation of the Union has arisen
and it is best to determine the true sentiment of the employees
through a certification election. If respondent Union is confident
that it commands the majority of the workers, there is no reason
why it should object to the holding of a certification election.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of August 17, 1979 is hereby
SET ASIDE. The Regional Office concerned of the Ministry of
Labor and Employment is hereby directed to cause the holding of a
certification election within thirty (30) days from notice.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 96425 February 4, 1992
PROGRESSIVE
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, MED-ARBITER EDGARDO
DELA CRUZ and PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG PAGGAWA
(KILUSAN)-TUCP, respondents.
Beltran, Bacungan & Candoy for petitioner.
Jimenez & Associates co-counsel for petitioner.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The controversy in this case centers on the requirements before a
local or chapter of a federation may file a petition for certification
election and be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent
of the petitioner's employees.
Petitioner Progressive Development Corporation (PDC) filed this
petition for certiorari to set aside the following:
1) Resolution dated September 5, 1990, issued by respondent MedArbiter Edgardo dela Cruz, directing the holding of the certification
election among the regular rank-and-file employees of PDC:
2) Order dated October 12, 1990, issued by the respondent
Secretary of Labor and Employment, denying PDC's appeal; and
3) Order dated November 12, 1990, also issued by the respondent
Secretary, denying the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
On June 19, 1990, respondent Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa
(KILUSAN) -TUCP (hereinafter referred to as Kilusan) filed with
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a petition for
certification election among the rank-and-file employees of the
petitioner alleging that it is a legitimate labor federation and its
local chapter, Progressive Development Employees Union, was
issued charter certificate No. 90-6-1-153. Kilusan claimed that there
was no existing collective bargaining agreement and that no other
legitimate labor organization existed in the bargaining unit.
Petitioner PDC filed its motion to dismiss dated July 11, 1990
contending that the local union failed to comply with Rule II
Section 3, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as
amended, which requires the submission of: (a) the constitution and
by-laws; (b) names, addresses and list of officers and/or members;
and (c) books of accounts.
On July 16 , 1990, respondent Kilusan submitted a rejoinder to
PDC's motion to dismiss claiming that it had submitted the
necessary documentary requirements for registration, such as the
constitution and by-laws of the local union, and the list of
officers/members with their addresses. Kilusan further averred that

no books of accounts could be submitted as the local union was

only recently organized.
In its "Supplemental Position Paper" dated September 3, 1990, the
petitioner insisted that upon verification with the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR), it found that the alleged minutes of the
organizational meeting was unauthenticated, the list of members did
not bear the corresponding signatures of the purported members,
and the constitution and by-laws did not bear the signature of the
members and was not duly subscribed. It argued that the private
respondent therefore failed to substantially comply with the
registration requirements provided by the rules. Additionally, it
prayed that Med-Arbiter Edgardo dela Cruz inhibit himself from
handling the case for the reason that he allegedly had prejudged the
same.
In his September 5, 1990 resolution, Med Arbiter dela Cruz held
that there was substantial compliance with the requirements for the
formation of the chapter. He further stated that mere issuance of the
charter certificate by the federation was sufficient compliance with
the rules. Considering that the establishment was unorganized, he
maintained that a certification election should be conducted to
resolve the question of representation.
Treating the motion for reconsideration filed by the PDC as an
appeal to the Office of the Secretary, Undersecretary Laguesma
held that the same was merely a "reiteration of the issues already
ventilated in the proceedings before the Med-Arbiter, specifically,
the matter involving the formal organization of the chapter." (Rollo,
p. 20) PDC's motion for reconsideration from the aforementioned
ruling was likewise denied. Hence, this petition.
In an order dated February 25, 1991, the Court resolved to issue a
temporary restraining order enjoining the public respondents from
carrying out the assailed resolution and orders or from proceeding
with the certification election. (Rollo, pp. 37-39)
It is the petitioner's contention that a labor organization (such as the
Kilusan) may not validly invest the status of legitimacy upon a local
or chapter through the mere expedient of issuing a charter

certificate and submitting such certificate to the BLR (Rollo, p. 85)

Petitioner PDC posits that such local or chapter must at the same
time comply with the requirement of submission of duly subscribed
constitution and by-laws, list of officers and books of accounts.
(Rollo, p. 35) PDC points out that the constitution and by-laws and
list of officers submitted were not duly subscribed. Likewise, the
petitioner claims that the mere filing of the aforementioned
documents is insufficient; that there must be due recognition or
acknowledgment accorded to the local or chapter by BLR through a
certificate of registration or any communication emanating from it.
(Rollo, p. 86)
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the public respondent, avers that
there was a substantial compliance with the requirements for the
formation of a chapter. Moreover, he invokes Article 257 of the
Labor Code which mandates the automatic conduct by the MedArbiter of a certification election in any establishment where there
is no certified bargaining agreement.
The Court has repeatedly stressed that the holding of a certification
election is based on a statutory policy that cannot be circumvented.
(Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, 180 SCRA 749 [1989];
Belyca Corporation v. Ferrer-Calleja, 168 SCRA 184 [1988];
George and Peter Lines, Inc. v. Associated Labor Unions, 134
SCRA 82 [1986]). The workers must be allowed to freely express
their choice in a determination where everything is open to their
sound judgment and the possibility of fraud and misrepresentation
is eliminated.
But while Article 257 cited by the Solicitor General directs the
automatic conduct of a certification election in an unorganized
establishment, it also requires that the petition for certification
election must be filed by a legitimate labor organization. Article 242
enumerates the exclusive rights of a legitimate labor organization
among which is the right to be certified as the exclusive
representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective
bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining.
Meanwhile, Article 212(h) defines a legitimate labor organization as

"any labor organization duly registered with the DOLE andincludes

any branch or local thereof." (Emphasis supplied) Rule I, Section 1
(j), Book V of the Implementing Rules likewise defines a legitimate
labor organization as "any labor organization duly registered with
the DOLE and includes any branch, local or affiliate thereof.
(Emphasis supplied)
The question that now arises is: when does a branch, local or
affiliate of a federation become a legitimate labor organization?
Ordinarily, a labor organization acquires legitimacy only upon
registration with the BLR. Under Article 234 (Requirements of
Registration):
Any applicant labor organization, association or group of unions or
workers shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the
rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor
organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based
on the following requirements:
(a) Fifty-pesos (P50.00) registration fee;
(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address
of the labor organization, the minutes of the organizational meeting
and the list of the workers who participated in such meetings;
(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty 20%
percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seek to
operate;
(d) If the applicant has been in existence for one or more years,
copies , of its annual financial reports; and
(e) Four copies of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant
union, the minutes of its adoption or ratification and the list of the
members who participated in it.
And under Article 235 (Action on Application)
The Bureau shall act on all applications for registration within thirty
(30) days from filing.
All requisite documents and papers shall be certified under oath by
the secretary or the treasurer of the organization, as the case may
be, and attested to by its president.
Moreover, section 4 of Rule II, Book V of the Implementing Rules

requires that the application should be signed by at least twenty

percent (20%) of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit
and be accompanied by a sworn statement of the applicant union
that there is no certified bargaining agent or, where there is an
existing collective bargaining agreement duly submitted to the
DOLE, that the application is filed during the last sixty (60) days of
the agreement.
The respondent Kilusan questions the requirements as too stringent
in their application but the purpose of the law in prescribing these
requisites must be underscored. Thus, in Philippine Association of
Free Labor Unions v. Secretary of Labor, 27 SCRA 40 (1969), the
Court declared:
The theory to the effect that Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875
unduly curtails the freedom of assembly and association guaranteed
in the Bill of Rights is devoid of factual basis. The registration
prescribed in Paragraph (b) of said section is not a limitation to the
right of assembly or association, which may be exercised with or
without said registration. The latter is merely a condition sine qua
non for the acquisition of legal personality by the labor
organizations, associations or unions and the possession of the
"rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor
organizations." The Constitution does not guarantee these rights and
the privileges, much less said personality, which are mere statutory
creations, for the possession and exercise of which registration is
required to protect both labor and the public against abuses, fraud or
impostors who pose as organizers, although not truly accredited
agents of the union they purport to represent. Such requirement is a
valid exercise of the police power, because the activities in which
labor organizations, associations and unions of workers are engaged
affect public interest, which should be protected. Furthermore, the
obligation to submit financial statements, as a condition for the noncancellation of a certificate of registration, is a reasonable
regulation for the benefit of the members of the organization,
considering that the same generally solicits funds or membership, as
well as oftentimes collects, on behalf of its members, huge amounts

of money due to them or to the organization. (Emphasis supplied)

But when an unregistered union becomes a branch, local or chapter
of a federation, some of the aforementioned requirements for
registration are no longer required. The provisions governing union
affiliation are found in Rule II, Section 3, Book V of the
Implementing Rules, the relevant portions of which are cited below:
Sec. 3. Union affiliation; direct membership with national union.
An affiliate of a labor federation or national union may be a local or
chapter thereof or an independently registered union.
a) The labor federation or national union concerned shall issue a
charter certificate indicating the creation or establishment of a local
or chapter, copy of which shall be submitted to the Bureau of Labor
Relations within thirty (30) days from issuance of such charter
certificate.
b) An independently registered union shall be considered an affiliate
of a labor federation or national union after submission to the
Bureau of the contract or agreement of affiliation within thirty (30)
days after its execution.
xxx xxx xxx
e) The local or chapter of a labor federation or national union shall
have and maintain a constitution and by laws, set of officers and
books and accounts. For reporting purposes, the procedure
governing the reporting of independently registered unions,
federations or national unions shall be observed.
Paragraph (a) refers to the local or chapter of a federation which did
not undergo the rudiments of registration while paragraph (b) refers
to an independently registered union which affiliated with a
federation. Implicit in the foregoing differentiation is the fact that a
local or chapter need not be independently registered. By force of
law (in this case, Article 212[h]); such local or chapter becomes a
legitimate labor organization upon compliance with the
aforementioned provisions of Section 3.
Thus, several requirements that are otherwise required for union
registration are omitted, to wit:
(1) The requirement that the application for registration must be

signed by at least 20% of the employees in the appropriate

bargaining unit;
2) The submission of officers' addresses, principal address of the
labor organization, the minutes of organizational meetings and the
list of the workers who participated in such meetings;
3) The submission of the minutes of the adoption or ratification of
the constitution and by the laws and the list of the members who
participated in it.
Undoubtedly, the intent of the law in imposing lesser requirements
in the case of the branch or local of a registered federation or
national union is to encourage the affiliation of a local union with
the federation or national union in order to increase the local union's
bargaining powers respecting terms and conditions of labor.
The petitioner maintains that the documentary requirements
prescribed in Section 3(c), namely: the constitution and by-laws, set
of officers and books of accounts, must follow the requirements of
law. Petitioner PDC calls for the similar application of the
requirement for registration in Article 235 that all requisite
documents and papers be certified under oath by the secretary or the
treasurer of the organization and attested to by the president.
In the case at bar, the constitution and by-laws and list of officers
submitted in the BLR, while attested to by the chapter's president,
were not certified under oath by the secretary. Does such defect
warrant the withholding of the status of legitimacy to the local or
chapter?
In the case of union registration, the rationale for requiring that the
submitted documents and papers be certified under oath by the
secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, and attested to by
president is apparent. The submission of the required documents
(and payment of P50.00 registration fee) becomes the Bureau's
basis for approval of the application for registration. Upon
approval, the labor union acquires legal personality and is entitled
to all the rights and privileges granted by law to a legitimate labor
organization. The employer naturally needs assurance that the union
it is dealing with is a bona fideorganization, one which has not

submitted false statements or misrepresentations to the Bureau. The

inclusion of the certification and attestation requirements will in a
marked degree allay these apprehensions of management. Not only
is the issuance of any false statement and misrepresentation a
ground for cancellation of registration (see Article 239 (a), (c) and
(d)); it is also a ground for a criminal charge of perjury.
The certification and attestation requirements are preventive
measures against the commission of fraud. They likewise afford a
measure of protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured
into joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole
purpose is to control union funds or to use the union for dubious
ends.
In the case of the union affiliation with a federation, the
documentary requirements are found in Rule II, Section 3(e), Book
V of the Implementing Rules, which we again quote as follows:
(c) The local chapter of a labor federation or national union shall
have and maintain a constitution and by-laws, set of officers and
books of accounts. For reporting purposes, the procedure governing
the reporting of independently registered unions, federations or
national unions shall be observed. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the "procedure governing the reporting of independently
registered unions" refers to the certification and attestation
requirements contained in Article 235, paragraph 2, it follows that
the constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books of accounts
submitted by the local and chapter must likewise comply with these
requirements. The same rationale for requiring the submission of
duly subscribed documents upon union registration exists in the
case of union affiliation. Moreover, there is greater reason to exact
compliance with the certification and attestation requirements
because, as previously mentioned, several requirements applicable
to independent union registration are no longer required in the case
of formation of a local or chapter. The policy of the law in
conferring greater bargaining power upon labor unions must be
balanced with the policy of providing preventive measures against
the commission of fraud.

A local or chapter therefore becomes a legitimate labor organization

only upon submission of the following to the BLR:
1) A charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the
labor federation or national union, and
2) The constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers,
and the books of accounts all of which are certified under oath by
the secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or
chapter, and attested to by its president.
Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or
chapter does not become a legitimate labor organization.
In the case at bar, the failure of the secretary of PDEU-Kilusan to
certify the required documents under oath is fatal to its acquisition
of a legitimate status.
We observe that, as borne out by the facts in this case, the formation
of a local or chapter becomes a handy tool for the circumvention of
union registration requirements. Absent the institution of
safeguards, it becomes a convenient device for a small group of
employees to foist a not-so-desirable federation or union on
unsuspecting co-workers and pare the need for wholehearted
voluntariness which is basic to free unionism. The records show
that on June 16, 1990, Kilusan met with several employees of the
petitioner. Excerpts of the "Minutes of the Organizational/General
Membership Meeting of Progressive Development Employees
Union (PDEU) Kilusan," are quoted below:
The meeting was formally called to order by Bro. Jose V. Parungao,
KILUSAN secretary for organization by explaining to the general
membership the importance of joining the union. He explained to
the membership why they should join a union, and briefly explained
the ideology of the Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa-TUCP as a
democratically based organization and then read the proposed
Constitution and By-Laws, after which said Constitution and ByLaws was duly and unanimously ratified after some clarification.
Bro. Jose Parungao was also unanimously voted by the group to act
as the chairman of the COMELEC in holding the organizational
election of officers of the union.

Bro. Jose Parungao, officially opened the table for nomination of

candidates after which the election of officers followed by secret
balloting and the following were the duly elected officers. (Original
Record, p. 25)
The foregoing shows that Kilusan took the initiative and
encouraged the formation of a union which automatically became
its chapter. On June 18, 1990, Kilusan issued a charter certificate in
favor of PDEU-KILUSAN (Records, page 1). It can be seen that
Kilusan was moving very fast.
On June 19, 1990, or just three days after the organizational
meeting, Kilusan filed a petition for certification election (Records,
pages 2 and 3) accompanied by a copy each of the charter
certificate, constitution and by-laws and minutes of the
organizational meeting. Had the local union filed an application for
registration, the petition for certification election could not have
been immediately filed. The applicant union must firstly comply
with the "20% signature" requirement and all the other requisites
enumerated in Article 234. Moreover, since under Article 235 the
BLR shall act on any application for registration within thirty (30)
days from its filing, the likelihood is remote that, assuming the
union complied with all the requirements, the application would be
approved on the same day it was filed.
We are not saying that the scheme used by the respondents is per se
illegal for precisely, the law allows such strategy. It is not this
Court's function to augment the requirements prescribed by law in
order to make them wiser or to allow greater protection to the
workers and even their employer. Our only recourse is, as earlier
discussed, to exact strict compliance with what the law provides as
requisites for local or chapter formation.
It may likewise be argued that it was Kilusan (the mother union)
and not the local union which filed the petition for certification
election and, being a legitimate labor organization, Kilusan has the
personality to file such petition.
At this juncture, it is important to clarify the relationship between
the mother union and the local union. In the case of Liberty Cotton

Mills Workers Union v. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc., 66 SCRA 512

[1975]), the Court held that the mother union, acting for and in
behalf of its affiliate, had the status of an agent while the local
union remained the basic unit of the association, free to serve the
common interest of all its members subject only to the restraints
imposed by the constitution and by-laws of the association. Thus,
where as in this case the petition for certification election was filed
by the federation which is merely an agent, the petition is deemed
to be filed by the chapter, the principal, which must be a legitimate
labor organization. The chapter cannot merely rely on the legitimate
status of the mother union.
The Court's conclusion should not be misconstrued as impairing the
local union's right to be certified as the employees' bargaining agent
in the petitioner's establishment. We are merely saying that the local
union must first comply with the statutory requirements in order to
exercise this right. Big federations and national unions of workers
should take the lead in requiring their locals and chapters to
faithfully comply with the law and the rules instead of merely
snapping union after union into their folds in a furious bid with rival
federations to get the most number of members.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolution
and orders of respondent Med-Arbiter and Secretary of Labor and
Employment, respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary
restraining order dated February 25, 1991 is made permanent.
G.R. Nos. 113204-05 September 16, 1996
BARBIZON PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NAGKAKAISANG
SUPERVISOR
NG
BARBIZON
PHILIPPINES, INC. NAFLU AND THE HON.
UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR BIENVENIDO E.
LAGUESMA, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court to set aside and annul the decision and

orders of the public respondent dated 11 February 1993, 4 March

1993, 16 June 1993 and 25 November 1993, respectively.
The facts which gave rise to the present petition are as follows:
On 27 June 1988, petitioner (formerly the Philippine Lingerie
Corporation) filed a petition for certification election among its
rank-and-file employees (docketed as NCR-OD-M-6-349-88). As a
consequence thereof, two (2) unions sought recognition, namely:
PHILIPPINE LINGERIE WORKERS UNION-ALAB and
BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA NG PHILIPPINE LINGERIE
CORPORATION.
In one of the pre-election conferences, PHILIPPINE LINGERIE
WORKERS UNION-ALAB moved for the exclusion of a number
of employees who were allegedly holding supervisory positions.
Only 28 July 1988, Med-Arbiter Rasidali C. Abdullah issued an
order denying the motion of PHILIPPINE LINGERIE
CORPORATION WORKERS UNION-ALAB for lack of merit.
Said order was appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR)
which issued an Order on 16 November 1988, the dispositive
portion of which declares:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 28 July 1988
is hereby affirmed. Accordingly, to ensure fairness to all the parties
and in order to hasten the proceedings, let the election be conducted
under the supervision of the Labor Organization Division, this
Office, which is hereby directed to immediately set this case for
pre-election conference.
SO ORDERED. 1
PHILIPPINE LINGERIE WORKERS UNION-ALAB filed two (2)
separate motions for reconsideration of the above order which were
consolidated and treated in an Order dated 22 December 1988, the
decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the twin motions for
reconsideration are hereby deemed denied for lack of merit.
Accordingly, let the pre-election conference preparatory to the

certification election proceed without further delay.

No further motion of similar nature shall be hereafter entertained.
SO ORDERED. 2
No further appeal of the above-quoted order was interposed, thus it
became final and executory.
On 3 May 1989, a certification election was conducted with the
votes of "supervisors and confidential" employees being
challenged. Thus, the certification election showed the following
results:
1. Philippine Lingerie Workers Union-ALAB 318 votes
2. Buklod Ng Manggagawa Ng Philippine
Lingerie Corporation 412 votes
3 No Union 17 votes
4. Challenged Supervisors/Confidential
Employees 99 votes

TOTAL VALID VOTES CAST 855 votes

SPOILED BALLOTS 12 votes
PHILIPPINE LINGERIE WORKERS UNION-ALAB filed an
election protest which was later formalized on 25 May 1989. In the
meantime, on 9 May 1989, BUKLOD moved for the opening of the
challenged ballots.
On 20 July 1989, the BLR, through its director Pura Ferrer-Calleja,
issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the protest and challenged
(sic) of the Alyansang Likha Ng Mga Anak Ng Bayan (ALAB) are
hereby denied for lack of merit.
Accordingly, let the challenged votes of the supervisors and
confidential employees be opened in the presence of the parties
under the supervision of the Labor Organization Division (LOD) on
26 July 1989 at 9:00 A.M., Bureau of Labor Relations.
SO ORDERED. 3

With the above-quoted order, the challenged votes were opened on

3 August 1989 and the results were as follows:
Philippine Lingerie Workers Union-ALAB 4 votes
Buklod Ng Manggagawa Ng Phil. Lingerie
Corp. 84 votes
No Union 6 votes
Spoiled 5 votes
TOTAL VOTES CAST 99 votes
PHILIPPINE LINGERIE WORKERS UNION-ALAB filed a
motion for reconsideration of the BLR's Order of 20 July 1989
which, however, was denied in an Order dated 22 August 1989, the
pertinent portion of which states:
xxx xxx xxx
This time movant should now be convinced that the alleged
supervisory and confidential employees are more rank-and-file
employees.
As early as Resolution dated 16 November 1988, the Bureau had
already ruled that the alleged supervisors are not managerial
employees (rec. p. 154, First Folder). On motion for reconsideration
the Bureau affirmed the aforementioned Resolution in its Order
dated 22 December 1988 (rec. p. 302. First Folder). And on 20 July
1989, when R.A. 6715 was already in full force and effect, the
Bureau in resolving the protest of ALAB declared that the job
descriptions of the alleged supervisors and confidential employees
do not in any way suggest that they are indeed supervisors or
managerial employees (rec. p. 39, Second Folder).
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied and
the Buklod Ng Manggagawa Ng Philippine Lingerie Corporation
(now, Barbizon Philippines, Inc.) is hereby certified as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of all the regular rank-and-file
employees of Barbizon Philippines, Inc. (formerly Philippine
Lingerie Corporation).
The management of Barbizon Philippines, Inc. is hereby directed to

immediately start negotiating for a collective bargaining agreement

(CBA) with the said union.
No further motion of any nature shall hereinafter be entertained by
this Office.
SO ORDERED. 4
Not satisfied with the aforequoted order, PHILIPPINE LINGERIE
WORKERS UNION-ALAB appealed to the Secretary of Labor but
on 26 September 1989, the same was withdrawn and a motion to
dismiss appeal with prejudice was filed by the same union. There
being no more obstacle to collective bargaining, petitioner
negotiated with BUKLOD as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative.
A Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) was signed by petitioner
and BUKLOD which was effective for five (5) years or until 18
November 1994. 5
While the CBA was still in force, several employees organized
themselves into the Nagkakaisang Supervisors Ng Barbizon
Philippines, Inc. (NSBPI) and the 0Nagkakaisang Excluded
Monthly Paid Employees Ng Barbizon, Philippines, Inc.
(NEMPEBPI) allegedly because they were excluded from the
coverage of the existing CBA between petitioner and BUKLOD.
Two (2) separate petitions for certification election were filed by
NSBPI and NEMPEBPI. The petition of the former was raffled to
Med-Arbiter Renato D. Parungo and the latter to Med-Arbiter
Paterno D. Adap. Both cases were dismissed 6
NSBPI appealed to the Office of the Secretary of Labor. On 29
December 1992, public respondent Undersecretary Bienvenido
Laguesma denied the same for lack of merit. NSBPI moved for
reconsideration on 15 January 1993.
On 11 February 1993, the Office of the Secretary of Labor, through
public respondent rendered the questioned Decision, the dispositive

portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE the Motion for Reconsideration of Nagkakaisang
Superbisor ng Barbizon Philippines, Inc. (NSBPI) and the appeal of
Nagkakaisang Excluded Monthly Paid Employees ng Barbizon
Philippines, Inc. (NEMPEBPI) are hereby granted and the Orders of
this Office and the Med-Arbiter dated 29 December 1992 and 01
September 1992, respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, a new Order is hereby entered in the above-captioned
cases directing the conduct of certification election among the
subject employees excluded from the coverage of the bargaining
unit of the existing CBA of rank and file employees aforestated, not
otherwise excluded/disqualified by law. The choices are as follows:
1. Nagkakaisang Superbisor ng Barbizon Philippines, Inc. (NSBPI)
2. Nagkakaisang Excluded Monthly Paid Employees ng Barbizon
Philippines, Inc. (NEMPEBPI); and,
3. No Union.
Let, therefore, the entire records of these consolidated cases be
forwarded to the Regional Office of origin for the immediate
conduct of certification election, subject to the usual pre-election
conference.
SO ORDERED. 7
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied 8 A second motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner
but it was likewise denied, this time, with finality. 9 Undaunted,
petitioner filed a third motion for reconsideration which was also
denied for lack of merit. 10
Hence, this petition wherein the following issues were raised:
A
THE RESPONDENT "SUPERVISORS" LOCAL UNION
CANNOT FORM A SUPERVISORS UNION, WHEN THEIR
MEMBERS
ARE
INCOMPATIBLY
"RANK-AND-FILE
EMPLOYEES";
MUCH
LESS,
CAN
IT
SEEK

REPRESENTATION STATUS FOR SUPERVISORS, WHEN THE

EMPLOYEES THEY WANT TO REPRESENT FOR
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PURPOSES BELONG IN THE
"APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT" OF RANK-AND-FILE
EMPLOYEES ON THE "EMPLOYER WIDE UNIT", WHICH
ALREADY HAS A CERTIFIED BARGAINING AGENT:
BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA NG PHILIPPINE LINGERIE
CORPORATION.
B
WORSE, SINCE THE MEMBERS OF THE RESPONDENT
LOCAL UNION BELONG TO THE APPROPRIATE
BARGAINING UNIT OF RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES, THE
EXISTING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
WHICH COVERS THEM, IS (A) "BAR" TO ITS
CERTIFICATION ELECTION PETITION 11
Barbizon Philippines, Inc. alleges that this petition only assails the
resolution of the public respondent regarding NSBPI and does not
include the NEMPEBPI, the union of the excluded monthly paid
employees because the separate motion for reconsideration it filed
in connection with the latter has not yet been resolved by the
NLRC.
On 8 February 1994, this Court issued a temporary restraining
order, enjoining the Bureau of Labor Relations from setting the preelection conference in Case No. OS-MA-A-215-92-93 entitled "In
Re: Petition for Certification Election among the Supervisory
Employees of Barbizon Philippines, Inc., Nagkakaisang Supervisor
Ng Barbizon Philippines, Inc. OBRERO" and from conducting
further proceedings in the aforesaid cases. 12
During the pendency of the petition, the CBA expired. However, no
other agreement between the parties was made known to this Court,
thus, in accordance with Article XX of the CBA, it continues to be
in force and shall govern the relations between the parties thereto. 13

We find no merit in the petition.

Petitioner maintains its stance that the petition for certification
election filed by the Nagkakaisang Supervisor ng Barbizon
Philippines, Inc. NAFLU (NSBPI) must necessarily fail because
the employees designated as "supervisors" cannot legally form a
supervisors' union by virtue of the BLR's final decision dated 22
August 1989 declaring the abovementioned employees mere rank
and file workers. Being part of the rank and file, petitioner avers
that said employees belong to the "employer wide unit," which is
the appropriate bargaining unit of all its rank and file employees
and which is represented by the Buklod ng Manggagawa ng
Philippine Lingerie Corporation (BUKLOD) as the sole certified
bargaining agent.
Petitioner further asserts that the Undersecretary of Labor
committed grave abuse of discretion in granting NSBPI's petition
for certification election as this was tantamount to an unjustifiable
reversal of the BLR's final ruling that the subject employees are not
supervisory employees, but merely rank and file, due to the nature
of their duties and functions.
Petitioner's reasoning is flawed, proceeding as it does from the
wrong premise. Petitioner obstinately believes that NSBPI's petition
for certification election was granted because the employees
carrying the appellation "supervisor" were deemed supervisory
employees. The status of the subject employees, however, is not the
issue in the case at bar. Their status as "supervisors" is not in
dispute. The aforestated decision of the BLR dated 22 August 1989
has settled with finality that said employees are merely rank and file
and this fact has been accepted by the petitioning union NSBPI. 14
NSBPI's petition for certification election was granted because the
subject employees, including petitioner's monthly paid employees,
were expressly excludedfrom the bargaining unit and from the
coverage of the CBA executed between petitioner and BUKLOD, as
clearly stated therein. 15 This is the real reason behind the
certification election in question. Unfortunately, this was not

successfully debunked by petitioner, which chose to focus, albeit

erroneously, on the status of the subject employees.
The exclusion of petitioner's "supervisors" from the bargaining unit
of the rank-and-file employees indiscriminately curtailed the right
to these employees to self-organization and representation for
purposes of collective bargaining, a right explicitly mandated by
our labor laws 16 and "accorded the highest consideration." 17 In the
recent case of Golden Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 18 we aptly
declared:
In the case at bench, the evidence established that the monthly paid
rank-and-file employees of petitioner primarily perform
administrative or clerical work. In contradistinction, the petitioner's
daily paid rank-and-file employees mainly work in the cultivation
of bananas in the fields. It is crystal clear the monthly paid rankand-file employees of petitioner have very little in common with its
daily paid rank-and file employees in terms of duties and
obligations, working conditions, salary rates, and skills. To be sure,
the said monthly paid rank-and-file employees have even been
excluded from the bargaining unit of the daily paid rank-and-file
employees. This dissimilarity of interests warrants the formation of
a separate and distinct bargaining unit for the monthly paid rankand-file employees of the petitioner. To rule otherwise would deny
this distinct class of employees the right to self-organization for
purposes of collective bargaining. Without the shield of an
organization, it will also expose them to the exploitations of
management. . . . (Emphasis ours)
In the case at bar, BUKLOD cannot successfully act as the
bargaining agent of and duly represent petitioner's "supervisor"
employees since the latter were expressly excluded from the
appropriate bargaining unit.
Petitioner's reliance on the case of Pagkakaisa ng mga Manggagawa
sa Triumph Int'l.-United Lumber and General Workers of the Phils.
v. Ferrer-Calleja 19 is misplaced. The aforecited case upholds the
"one union-one company" policy, thus:
Once again, we enunciate that the proliferation of unions in an

employer unit is discouraged as a matter of policy unless

compelling reasons exist which deny a certain and distinct class of
employees the right to self-organization for purpose of collective
bargaining. (See General Rubber & Footwear Corporation v.
Bureau of Labor Relations, 155 SCRA 283 [1987].) 20(Emphasis
ours.)
As clearly indicated in the aforequoted decision, the "one union
one company" rule is not without exception. The exclusion of the
subject employees from the rank-and-file bargaining unit and the
CBA is indefinitely a "compelling reason" for it completely
deprived them of the chance to bargain collectively with petitioner
and are thus left with no recourse but to group themselves into a
separate and distinct bargaining unit and form their own
organization. The rationale behind the exception to the
aforementioned policy is further elucidated in Knitjoy
Manufacturing, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja: 21
1. The suggested bias of the Labor Code in favor of the one
company-one union policy, anchored on the greater mutual benefits
which the parties could derive, especially in the case of employees
whose bargaining strength could undeniably be enhanced by their
unity and solidarity but diminished by their disunity, division and
dissension, is not without exceptions.
xxx xxx xxx
The usual exception, of course, is where the employer unit has to
give way to the other units like the craft unit, plant unit, or a
subdivision thereof; the recognition of these exceptions takes into
accountant the policy to assure employees of the fullest freedom in
exercising their rights. Otherwise stated, the one company-one
union policy must yield to the right of the employees to form unions
or associations for purposes not contrary to law, to self-organization
and to enter into collective bargaining negotiations, among others,
which the Constitution guarantees. (Emphasis ours.)

The receipt by petitioner's "supervisor" employees of certain

benefits under the CBA between BUKLOD and petitioner is not
sufficient to deny the petition for certification election filed by the
labor organization formed by the excluded employees. It is not
equivalent to and does not compensate for the denial of the right of
the excluded employees to self-organization and collective
bargaining. We concur with the findings of the Undersecretary of
Labor, thus:
It is not disputed that the members of both petitioning unions
NSBPI and NEMPEBPI are excluded from the coverage of the
existing CBA entered into between the respondent BPI and Buklod
ng mga Manggagawa ng Barbizons Philippines, Inc. (BUKLOD)
(pp. 84-85, folder II, records). Thus, respondent BPI being privy to
the said exclusion has to accept the inescapable consequences of its
act of depriving the excluded employees of their right to selforganization for the purpose of collective bargaining. We find
immaterial and irrelevant the allegation of hereby respondent BPI to
the effect that the benefit being enjoyed by the rank and file
employees covered by the existing CBA are extended/accorded to
the excluded employees. Indeed, what is crucial and of paramount
consideration is the fact that the excluded rank and file employees
are afforded the right to bargain collectively.
The Supreme Court in the cases of General Rubber and Footwear
Corporation vs. Bureau of Labor Relations, et al., G.R. No. 74262,
October 29, 1987; and Manila Bay Spinning Mills, J and P Coats,
Manila Bay, Inc. vs. Hon. Pura Ferrer-Calleja, G.R. No. 80910,
August 1, 1988, ruled that the employees excluded from the
coverage of the CBA, who not being excluded by law, have the
right to bargain collectively. Further, the Supreme Court aptly
stated that:
The allegation that some benefits under the existing CBA were
extended to the monthly paid employees, even if true will not
preclude them from entering into a CBA of their own. Neither is the
inconvenience that may befall petitioner for having to administer
two CBAs an excuse for depriving the monthly paid employees of

their constitutionally guaranteed right to collective bargaining.

(Emphasis supplied.) 22

The petition for certification election cannot likewise be deterred by

the "contract-bar rule," 23 which finds no application in the present
case. The petitioning union NSBPI is not questioning the majority
status of Buklod as the incumbent bargaining agent of petitioner's
rank and file employees. The petition for certification election is
addressed to a separate bargaining unit the excluded employees
of petitioner. We agree with the ruling of the Undersecretary of
Labor, thus:
Certainly, one who has been instrumental in the denial of a right
otherwise enjoyable by a rank and file, as in membership in its
appropriate bargaining unit, cannot now say that he ought to be
included in the existing bargaining unit of the rank and file just
because that "rank and file" employee is now seeking representation
for himself as well as those who like him were specifically
excluded from the coverage of the CBA. A rank and file employee,
irrespective of his job designation and in whatever form his wages
are paid has the unbridled right to the exercise of self-organization.
This right cannot, like a chattel, be compromised in the bargaining
table so as to deprive him of the same in violation of the
constitutional mandate. In this wise, the claim as to the applicability
of the contract bar doctrine could have not gained ground. A
contract bar applies in a situation where the petition is directed
towards one and the same bargaining unit. This does not appear to
be so in the case considering the built-in-limitation in the CBA
excluding the workers sought to be represented by herein petitioner
from its coverage, albeit, their being admittedly rank and file
employees. On the same line of reasoning, neither would the
substantial mutual interest test hold. So too, is the claim against
union turncoatism. In the latter case, the emergence thereof is

farfetched considering the defined boundaries of the bargaining

units concerned. Let it be stressed, that the certification election as
ordered would only affect those rank and file employees who are
excluded from the coverage of the existing CBA. Those who are
already represented in the existing collective bargaining agreement
may rest secured in the bargaining unit that considers them as
members of its family. 24 (Emphasis ours.)
The right to self organization and collective bargaining is an
integral part of the protection to labor provision embodied in our
Constitution, the essence of which is aptly expressed in Tropical
Hut Employees' Union-CGW v. Tropical Hut Food Market, Inc.: 25
All employees enjoy the right to self-organization and to form and
join labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of
collective bargaining and to engage in concerted activities for their
mutual aid or protection. This is a fundamental right of labor that
derives its existence from the Constitution. In interpreting the
protection to labor and social justice provisions of the Constitution
and the labor laws or rules or regulations, we have always adopted
the liberal approach which favors the exercise of labor rights.
Finally, we take this opportunity to reiterate the standing rule that a
certification election is the sole concern of the workers, hence, an
employer lacks the personality to dispute the same. In Golden
Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 26 we held:
Finally, we note that it was petitioner company that filed the motion
to dismiss the petition for election. The general rule is that an
employer has no standing to question a certification election since
this is the sole concern of the workers. Law and policy demand that
employers take a strict, hands-off stance in certification elections.
The bargaining representative of employees should be chosen free
from any extraneous influence of management. A labor bargaining
representative, to be effective, must owe its loyalty to the
employees alone and to no other.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is

DISMISSED and the Temporary Restraining Order issued on 8
February 1994 is hereby LIFTED.
G.R. No. 106446 November 16, 1993
NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION
(NAMAWU-MIF), petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF LABOR, FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS
- SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA QUALITY CONTAINER
CORPORATION
AND
QUALITY
CONTAINER
CORPORATION, respondents.
Padilla & Associates Law Office for petitioner.
Gancayco Law Offices for Quality Container Corporation.
FFW Legal Center for private respondent union.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court assailing the Decision dated August 4, 1992
of the secretary of Labor in Case No. OS-A-4-102-92. In said
decision, the Secretary of Labor affirmed the decision of the MedArbiter in Cases No. NCR-OD-M-91-09-106 and NCR-OD-M-9110-131, which granted the petition of respondent Federation of Free
Workers-Samahang Mangagawa sa Quality Container Corporation
(FFW-SMQCC), for a certification election to be conducted among
the rank and file employees of respondent Quality Container
Corporation (QCC).
Petitioner and respondent FFW-SMQCC are local chapters of labor
federations duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE). Petitioner is the exclusive bargaining agent
of all the rank and file workers of respondent QCC, a domestic
corporation engaged in the metal industry.
On September 27, 1991, 38 days before the expiration of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between petitioner and
respondent QCC, respondent FFW-SMQCC through Reynito de

Pedro filed with the DOLE Industrial Relations Division, National

Capital Region (NCR-OD-M-91-09-106) a petition for certification
election. The petition was accompanied by a list of signatures of
company employees, who signified their consent to a certification
election among the rank and file employees of QCC (Rollo, pp. 7983).
Petitioner herein moved to dismiss the petition of respondent FFWSMQCC on the grounds that: (a) the required consent to the
certification election of at least 25% of the rank and file employees
had not been met; (b) the petition was not verified as required by
law; and (c) Reynito de Pedro, who was also the president of
petitioner, had no personality to file the petition on behalf of FFWSMQCC.
On October 30, 1991, respondent FFW-SMQCC, filed a second
petition for certification election, this time signed and verified by
De Pedro (NCR-OD-91-10-131).
On January 24, 1992, the Med-Arbiter granted the petition for
certification election of respondent FFW-SMQCC in a decision, the
dispositive portion of which, reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let a certification election be
conducted among the rank-and-file employees of Quality Container
Corporation within twenty (20) days from receipt hereof with the
usual pre-election conference of the parties to thresh out the
mechanics and other details of the election. The payroll of the
company three (3) months prior to the filing of the petition shall be
used as the basis in determining the list of eligible voters.
The choices are:
a) Federation of Free Workers (FFW)- Samahang Mangagawa sa
Quality Container Corporation Chapter;
b) National Mines and Allied Workers' Union (NAMAWU); and
c) No union (Rollo, pp. 24-25).
Petitioner appealed this decision to the Secretary of Labor (OS-A-4102-92). On June 17, 1992, the Secretary of Labor rendered a
decision, denying the appeal for lack of merit and affirming the
order of the Med-Arbiter.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that the assailed decision was issued in grave
abuse of discretion for the following reasons: (1) that Reynito de
Pedro is not the authorized representative of respondent FFWSMQCC, he being the duly elected president of petitioner; (2) that
the filing of the second petition for certification election did not
cure, much less correct, the defects in the first petition; and (3) that
in the first and second petitions, the signatures of the 141
employees, who signified their support thereto, were either forged
or pre-maturely obtained prior to the 60-day period before the
expiration of the existing collective bargaining agreement.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
First, although Reynito de Pedro was the duly elected president of
petitioner, he had disaffiliated himself therefrom and joined
respondent FFW-SMQCC before the petition for certification
election was filed on September 27, 1991. The eventual dismissal of
De Pedro from the company is of no moment, considering that the
petition for certification election was filed before his dismissal on
August 22, 1992.
Second, verification of a pleading is a formal, not jurisdictional
requisite (Buenaventura v. Uy, 149 SCRA 22 [1987]; In the Matter
of the Change of Name of Antonina B. Oshita, 19 SCRA 700
[1967]). Even if verification is lacking and the pleading is formally
defective, the courts may dispense with the requirement in the
interest of justice and order of correction of the pleading
accordingly. Generally, technical and rigid rules of procedure are
not binding in labor cases; and this rule is specifically applied in
certification election proceedings, which are non-litigious but
merely investigative and non-adversarial in character (Associated
Labor Unions v. Ferrer-Calleja, 179 SCRA 127 [1989]); Tanduay
Distillery Labor Union v. NLRC, 149 SCRA 470 [1987]).
Nevertheless, whatever formal defects existed in the first petition
were cured and corrected in the second petition for certification
election.
Third, attached to the original petition for certification election was

a list of 141 supporting signatures out of the 300 employees

belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit to be represented by
respondent FFW-SMQCC. Respondent QCC sought to delete from
the list some 36 signatures which are allegedly forged and falsified.
Petitioner, likewise, submitted a joint affidavit of 13 employees,
disclaiming the validity of the signatures therein.
Granting that 36 signatures were falsified and that 13 was
disowned, this leaves 92 undisputed signatures which is definitely
more than 75 i.e., 25% of the total number of company
employees required by law to support a petition for certification
election. The disclaimer of 13 employees by their respective
signatures covers only their own personal participation and cannot
in any way be extended to include the rest of those who did not
question the same.
Moreover, the fact that the list of signatures is undated does not
necessarily mean that the signatures were obtained prior to the 60day period before the expiration of the existing collective
bargaining agreement. What is important is that the petition for
certification election must be filed during the freedom period and
that the 25% requirement of supporting signatures be met upon the
filing thereof. These requirements have been compiled by
respondent FFW-SMQCC in their first and second petitions, and it
was thus incumbent upon the Med-Arbiter to order a certification
election to be conducted among the rank and file employees of the
company (Labor Code of the Philippines, Art. 256; Warren Mfg.
Workers' Union v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 159 SCRA 387
[1988]; Samahang Mangagawa ng Pacific Mills v. Noriel, 134
SCRA 152 [1985]).
If indeed there are employees in the bargaining unit who refused to
be represented by respondent FFW-SMQCC, with all the more
reason should a certification election be held where the employees
themselves can freely and voluntarily express by secret ballot their
choice of bargaining representative. A certification election is the
most effective and expeditious way to determine which labor
organization can truly represent the working force in the appropriate

bargaining unit of the company (Central Negros Electric

Cooperative, Inc. v. Sec. of Labor, 201 SCRA 584 [1991]; National
Association of Free Trade Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 164
SCRA 12 [1988]).
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of
Labor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
KATIPUNAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA DAUNGAN
(KAMADA), petitioner, vs. HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA and
ASSOCIATED SKILLED AND TECHNICAL EMPLOYEES
UNION (ASTEUO), respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

be reinstated in the registry of Unions.

The subsequent appeal filed by the counsel for the petitioner was
treated as a motion for reconsideration and denied in the other
assailed Order[5] dated March 20, 1992. Hence, this petition before
us.

May a new labor union be organized and granted registration during

the lifetime of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between
the company and another union?

Upon learning of such fact, Petitioner KAMADA filed a suit to

cancel the registration of ASTEUO on the ground that the latters
members were already covered by the existing collective bargaining
agreement. Private respondent, on the other hand, claimed that its
existence as a union could not be disturbed, as its registration was
made during the freedom period when there was no collective
bargaining agreement concluded as yet.

The Case
This is the simple query brought before this Court by Petitioner
Katipunan ng mga Manggagawa sa Daungan (KAMADA) via a
petition[1] for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Order[2] dated February 27, 1992 of Public
Respondent Pura Ferrer-Calleja, Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR), in BLR Case No. A-4-12-91 (NCR-0D-M-90-10007) which reversed the resolution[3] of Med-Arbiter Edgardo De
la Cruz. Public respondent disposed as follows:[4]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office having found that
no ground exists for the cancellation of the union registration of
ASTEOU [sic], the decision of Med-Arbiter de la Cruz is hereby
reversed. Let, therefore, the certificate of registration of ASTEOU
[sic] (Associated Skilled and Technical Employees Union of OTSI)

The Facts
Petitioner claims to be the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for
all workers in Ocean Terminal Services, Inc. (OTSI).[6] After a
certification election, it concluded a collective bargaining
agreement with the company. Soon thereafter, in September 1990,
private respondent union (ASTEUO) -- allegedly composed also of
OTSI workers -- was registered.

Private respondents registration was cancelled by the med-arbiter in

his resolution dated November 27, 1990, finding that the
organization of another union covering the same workers can no
longer be considered as a labor protective [sic] activity under P.D.
1391[7] and that this will even be against the present policy of one
union in one company.[8]
Private respondent appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations. As
earlier stated, Public Respondent Pura Ferrer-Calleja, director of the
said office, reversed the decision of the med-arbiter and denied the
subsequent motion for reconsideration.

The Issue
Petitioner accuses public respondent of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction and gross ignorance of the law. It
argues that private respondent, contrary to Section 4 (f), Rule II,
Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, obtained its
union registration beyond the last sixty (60) days of the existing
CBA, and after participating in the certification election where it
lost.
More specifically, petitioner raises in its Memorandum dated May
3, 1993, the following three grounds to reverse public respondents
Order:[9]
1. That there was already an existing certified bargaining agent
when it obtained its registration;
2. The same cannot be considered as a labor productive activity
under PD 1391; and
3. It is against the policy of one union in one company.
The Courts Ruling
Petitioners contentions are utterly devoid of merit.

perpetuity anyone who had the good fortune, means or scheme to

beat everyone else to the punch. Second, in order to establish order
and effectively exercise this right, certain policies have been
instituted. One such policy, taken from letter (f) of Section 4 of
Rule II of Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, is
that applications for union registration are not valid if filed within
one year from certification elections and/or are done during the
effectivity of a CBA unless filed within the freedom period.
Anent the above, and the facts of this case, ASTEOUs [sic] union
registration issued last September, 1990 cannot be assailed. The
period of prohibition of union registration in relation to certification
elections starts from the final proclamation of certification election
results in a final decision of the DOLE or the Supreme Court. In the
present case, the Order of the Secretary of DOLE was issued last
October 31, 1990, a month after the registration of ASTEOU [sic].
Moreover, KAMADAs previous CBA expired on March 23, 1989,
while its new CBA was not signed until April 25, 1991.
It is settled that factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies, like the
Labor Department,[11] which have acquired expertise in matters
entrusted to their jurisdiction, are accorded by this Court not only
respect but finality if supported by substantial evidence. Substantial
evidence refers to that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind may accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[12]

First Issue: Timeliness of Registration

We quote hereunder public respondents disquisition which clearly
shows the untenable position of petitioner:[10]
A perusal of the arguments advanced in this suit shows that some
clarification is necessary regarding the present laws on union
registration. First, nowhere does the law contemplate or even
intimate that once a union of a bargaining unit has registered with
the DOLE, this prevents all other would-be union from registering.
The reasons are obvious. To establish such a rule would render
superflous (sic) certification elections, and would establish in

In this case, the findings of the public respondent, particularly those

on the dates of the registration and the signing of the CBA, are
supported by substantial evidence. In fact, petitioner does not even
contradict these findings.
Having ruled on the factual findings, we now take up the relevant
labor regulations. Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code,[13] prohibits not the registration of
a new union but the holding of a certification election within one
year from the date of issuance of a final certification election result.
Clearly, private respondents registration is not covered by the

prohibition. In any event, the union registration was effected in

September 1990, a month before the secretary of labor issued his
decision on the result of the certification election on October 31,
1990. Hence, there was yet no certified bargaining agent when the
private respondent was registered as a union.
Second Issue: Labor Productive Activity
Petitioner argues that private respondents registration cannot be
considered a labor productive activity under PD 1391, specifically
under paragraph 6 thereof which reads:
6. No petitions for certification election, for intervention or
disaffiliation shall be entertained or given due course except within
the 60-day freedom period immediately preceding the expiration of
a collective bargaining agreement.
Very clearly, the foregoing provision does not help petitioner. It has
nothing to do with the registration of a union. It deals only with
petitions for certification election, intervention or disaffiliation and
not -- we hazard being redundant -- to applications for registration
of a new union.

The present Article 245 of the Labor Code expressly allows

supervisory employees who are not performing managerial
functions to join, assist or form their separate union but bars them
from membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file
employees. It reads:
ART. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor
organization; right of supervisory employees. -- Managerial
employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for
membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees
but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their
own.
This provision obviously allows more than one union in a company.
Even Section 2 (c), Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Labor Code, which seeks to implement the
policy, also recognizes exceptions. It reads:
SEC. 2. Who may file. -- Any legitimate labor organization or the
employer, when requested to bargain collectively, may file the
petition.
The petition, when filed by a legitimate labor organization shall
contain, among others:
xxx

Third Issue: One Union in One Company

As regards petitioners battle cry of one union in one company, this
Court has already laid down in Knitjoy Manufacturing, Inc. vs.
Ferrer-Calleja[14] the exceptions to that policy. The Court, through
Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., held:
1. The suggested bias of the Labor Code in favor of the one
company-one union policy, anchored on the greater mutual benefits
which the parties could derive, especially in the case of employees
whose bargaining strength could undeniably be enhanced by their
unity and solidarity but diminished by their disunity, division and
dissension, is not without exceptions.

(c) description of the bargaining unit which shall be the employer

unit unless circumstances otherwise require; x x x. (Emphasis
supplied)
The usual exception, of course, is where the employer unit has to
give way to the other units like the craft unit, plant unit, or a
subdivision thereof; the recognition of these exceptions takes into
account the policy to assure employees of the fullest freedom in
exercising their rights. (PASCUAL. C., Labor Relations Law, 1986,
ed., 109) Otherwise stated, the one company-one union policy must
yield to the right of the employees to form unions or associations
for purposes not contrary to law, to self-organization and to enter
into collective bargaining negotiations, among others, which the

Constitution guarantees. (Section 8, Article III and Section 3,

Article XIII, 1987 Constitution).
Moreover, the issue of which union truly represents the working
force should be raised during the certification election, not during
the registration period. Indeed, a certification election provides the
most effective and expeditious mode to determine the real
representatives of the working force in the appropriate bargaining
unit.[15] It may be well to add that Section 5, Rule II, Book V[16]
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, enumerates
the grounds for the denial of registration to local unions, and the
existence of another union is not one of these grounds.
G.R. No. 107610 November 25, 1994
CRUZVALE, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, UNDERSECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, MEDARBITER ANGELI M. TUYAY AND UNION OF FILIPINO
WORKERS (UFW), respondents.
Soo, Gutierrez, Leogardo & Lee for petitioner.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order, to reverse and set aside the Decision
dated September 25, 1992 of respondent Undersecretary of Labor
and Employment and his Order dated October 13, 1992 in OS-MAA-11-334-91.
I
On July 23, 1991, private respondent, a labor union, filed with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Regional Office
No. IV, a petition for certification election among the regular rankand-file workers of petitioner, docketed as Case No. RO-400-9107RU-0107.
On August 27, 1991, petitioner filed its comment to the petition for
certification election. It sought the denial of the petition on the

following grounds:
(a) That no charter certificate evidencing the organization of a
local union therein was attached to the petition or submitted to the
DOLE at the time the petition was filed;
(b) That the respondent Union has not presented any proof that it is
a legitimate labor organization; and
(c) That the Regional Office No. IV of the DOLE has no
jurisdiction over the petition since petitioner Company's place of
business is located at Cubao, Quezon City, which is outside the
jurisdiction of the said Regional Office. Consequently, it is the
National Capital Region or NCR of the DOLE which has
jurisdiction over said petition (Rollo, p. 7).
On September 27, 1991, respondent Med-Arbiter rendered a
decision in favor of private respondent, pertinent portion of which
reads as follows:
Anent the first issue on the status of the petitioner, it is established
that the petitioner is a legitimate organization with Dole
Registration Certificate No. 11106 LC (FED) and has a local
chapter in the respondent's company located at Cainta, Rizal. The
existence of a local union is likewise undisputed as the same is
evidenced by Charter Certificate No. 82 issued to it by the
petitioner, United Filipino Workers, and submitted to this Office
which automatically forms part of the records of this case.
As regards the second and third issues on whether or not the herein
petition is duly filed or not, the allegation of the respondent that the
same is defective in form and substance since no charter certificate
and signatories were attached thereto at the time of filing of this
petition is unmeritorious and without legal basis.
The respondent is an unorganized establishment which is governed
by Article 257 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6715,
which read as follows:
Petitions in unorganized establishments. In any establishment
where there is no certified bargaining agent, a certification election
shall automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the filing
of a petition by a legitimate labor organization (Rollo, pp. 74-75).

Petitioner appealed the said order to the DOLE. The latter, thru
respondent Undersecretary, upheld the order of respondent MedArbiter.
Not satisfied with the decision of the DOLE, petitioner filed the
instant petition and assigned the following errors:
1
RESPONDENT UNDERSECRETARY GRAVELY ABUSED HIS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN
AFFIRMING A PATENTLY NULL AND VOID DECISION OF
THE MED-ARBITER HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FOR
CERTIFICATION ELECTION WAS FILED BY A LEGITIMATE
LABOR ORGANIZATION.
2
RESPONDENT UNDERSECRETARY GRAVELY ABUSED HIS
DISCRETION AND COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR
IN LIMITING THE CERTIFICATION ELECTION TO
PETITIONER'S EMPLOYEES AT CAINTA, THEREBY
DISENFRANCHISING THE OTHER REGULAR RANK-ANDFILE EMPLOYEES OF PETITIONER COMPANY AND INSPITE
OF A FINAL ORDER CALLING FOR A CERTIFICATION
ELECTION TO BE PARTICIPATED IN BY ALL REGULAR
RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES.
3
RESPONDENT UNDERSECRETARY ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN HE AMENDED OUT OF HIS OWN
WILL AND
DERIVED
A PROVISION
OF
THE
IMPLEMENTING RULES WITHOUT ANY BASIS OR
AUTHORITY IN THE LABOR CODE, AS AMENDED.
II
As to the first assigned error, petitioner avers that private
respondent is not a legitimate labor organization, "considering that
its local or chapter, at the time said petition was filed, did not
undergo the rudiments of registration required under Section 3,
Rule II, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the

Labor Code and the pronouncements made by this Court in

Progressive Development Corporation v. Secretary, Department of
Labor and Employment (205 SCRA 802) . . ." (Rollo, pp. 13-14).
The Med-Arbiter found that private respondent was issued
Certificate of Registration No. 11106 and Charter Certificate No.
82.
Findings of fact of labor officials are generally conclusive and
binding upon this Court when supported by substantial evidence
(Five J Taxi v. National Labor Relations Commission, 212 SCRA
225 [1992]).
Progressive Development Corporation, (supra.) is inappropriate to
the case at bench. Thereat, the union failed to show that it had
complied with the statutory requirements of Section 3, Rule II,
Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. The
copy of the constitution and by-laws and list of officers submitted to
the Bureau of Labor Relations by the union were not certified under
oath by the union secretary.
As to the second assigned error, petitioner claims that respondent
Undersecretary should not have limited the certification election to
petitioner's employees at the garment factory in Cainta but should
have also covered those employed in the cinema business.
We agree with the following observation made by respondent
Undersecretary in his Decision dated September 25, 1992:
As regards the question on the composition of the bargaining unit,
we stress once more that the call for the conduct of election covers
all the regular rank-and-file employees of Cruzvale, Inc. at its
garment manufacturing corporation. The use of the pronoun "all" in
our decision dated 16 December 1991 refers to all aforementioned
employees at the garment manufacturing operation based on the
finding that they were the ones sought to be represented by the
petitioner as clearly reflected on the face of the petition and as
embodied in the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated 24 April 1992
which was affirmed by this Office on appeal.
Moreover, as stated in the questioned Decision the employees at the
Cinema operation and those at the garment manufacturing operation

do not share commonality of interest as the former clearly perform

work entirely different from that of the latter. Thus, their separation
into two (2) distinct bargaining units is proper. This is in accordance
with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Belyca
Corporation v. Dir. Pura Ferrer-Calleja, et al., G.R. No. 77395, 26
November 1988 (Rollo,
p. 42; Emphasis supplied).
As to the third assigned error, petitioner contends that the petition
for certification election should have been filed with the regional
office which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the
employer in accordance with Section 1, Rule V, Book V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code (Rollo, p. 27). Said
section provides:
Where to file. A petition for certification election shall be filed with
the Regional Office which has jurisdiction over the principal office
of the Employer. The petition shall be in writing and under oath
(Emphasis supplied).
The word "jurisdiction" as used in said provision refers to the venue
where the petition for certification must be filed. Unlike
jurisdiction, which implies the power of the court to decide a case,
venue merely refers to the place where the action shall be brought
(Sulo ng Bayan, Inc. v. Araneta, Inc., 72 SCRA 347 [1976]). Venue
touches more the convenience of the parties rather than the
substance of the case (Consolidated Bank v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 198 SCRA 34 [1991]).
Section 1, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code refers only to cases where the place of work of the
employees and the place of the principal office of the employer are
within the same territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Office where
the petition for certification election is filed. The said provision
does not apply to the filing of petitions for certification election
where the place of work of the employees and the place of principal
office of the employer are located within the territorial jurisdictions
of different regional offices. We assume that in the drafting of the
Omnibus Rules, the Secretary of Labor and Employment took into

consideration the fact that there are many companies with factories
located in places different from places where the corporate offices
are located.
The worker, being the economically-disadvantaged party whether as
complainant, petitioner or respondent, as the case may be, the
nearest governmental machinery to settle a labor dispute must be
placed at his immediate disposal and the employer must in no case
be allowed a choice in favor of another competent agency sitting in
another place to the inconvenience of the worker (Nestle
Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 209
SCRA 834 [1992]).
Petitioner has not shown how it will be prejudiced by the hearing on
the petition for certification election before the Regional Office No.
IV, which has its offices in Quezon City, the same city where the
principal place of business of petitioner is located. Petitioner is,
therefore, being unreasonable in demanding that the petition for
certification election be filed with the National Capital Region
Office, which holds offices in Manila.
Unlike in the Rules governing the procedure before Regional
Offices, the New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor
Relations Commission prescribes that all cases in which labor
arbiters have jurisdiction should be filed in the branch office which
has territorial jurisdiction over the "workplace of the
complainant/petitioner" (Rule IV, Sec. 1[a]). The NLRC Rules
defines the workplace as follows:
For purposes of venue, workplace shall be understood as the place
or locality where the employee is regularly assigned when the cause
of action arose. It shall include the place where the employee is
supposed to report back after a temporary detail, assignment or
travel. . . .
The Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code has no provision
as to when an objection to improper venue may be raised. The MedArbiter ruled that where the employer had appeared twice at the
hearing of the petition for certification election without questioning
the venue, said employer was barred from raising the issue in the

subsequent proceedings. He observed:

. . . This practice of deliberately delaying the legal proceedings
cannot be countenanced any further, otherwise, the ends of justice
will forever be defeated. We don't see any reason for the respondent
to delay as it did, the proceedings of the case only to assail later on
the jurisdiction of the office. This issue could have been brought up
or objected to during the initial hearing (Rollo, p. 77).
The stance of the Med-Arbiter, that the question of the venue in
representation cases should be raised at the first hearing, was
accepted by respondent Undersecretary. We are not prepared to say
that said administrative Officials have gravely abused their
discretion.
G.R. No. 93117 August 1, 1995
LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,
NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR
INDUSTRY OF THE PHILIPPINES (NACUSIP) and
COMMERCIAL
AND
AGRO-INDUSTRIAL
LABOR
ORGANIZATION (CAILO),respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The decision of public respondent, assailed in this petition for
certiorari, is anchored on Article 257 of the Labor Code, as
amended, which provides:
Art. 257. Petitions in unorganized establishments. In any
establishment where there is no certified bargaining agent, a
certification election shall automatically be conducted by the MedArbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor
organization.
The Med-Arbiter, sustained by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, has ruled that the above provision is mandatory and
gives him no other choice than to conduct a certification election
upon the receipt of the corresponding petition.
On 26 July 1989, private respondent National Congress of Unions

in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines-TUCP ("NACUSIPTUCP") filed with the Department of Labor and Employment
("DOLE") Regional Office No. VI, Bacolod City, a petition for
direct certification or for certification election to determine the sole
and exclusive collective bargaining representative of the
supervisory employees of herein petitioner, Lopez Sugar
Corporation ("LSC"), at its sugar central in Fabrica, Sagay, Negros
Occidental.
In its petition, docketed Case No. RO6-MA-021-89, NACUSIPTUCP averred that it was a legitimate national labor organization;
that LSC was employing 55 supervisory employees, the majority of
whom were members of the union; that no other labor organization
was claiming membership over the supervisory employees; that
there was no existing collective bargaining agreement covering said
employees; and that there was no legal impediment either to a direct
certification of NACUSIP-TUCP or to the holding of a certification
election. 1
In its comment and opposition, dated 14 August 1989, LSC
contended, among other things, that the petition was bereft of any
legal or factual basis; that the petition was nothing more than a
useless scrap of paper designed to harass the company; and that its
employees above the rank-and-file category were in truth unaware
of the petition. 2
On 18 August 1989, the Commercial and Agro-Industrial Labor
Organization ("CAILO"), a registered labor organization also
claiming to count substantial membership among the LSC
supervisory employees, moved to intervene. 3 The motion was
granted. 4
On 22 August 1989, NACUSIP-TUCP submitted Charter
Certificate No. 003-89, dated 20 July 1989, of the NACUSIP-TUCP
Lopez Sugar Central Supervisory Chapter. 5 LSC, on its part,
submitted a list of its employees above the rank-and-file status

preparatory to the inclusion/exclusion proceedings. 6

On 13 September 1989, one Carlos S. Gevero, asserting a right to
represent the "supervisors of LSC," filed a motion to dismiss the
petition for lack of interest on the part of the supervisory
employees. 7
At the hearing of 20 September 1989, both NACUSIP-TUCP and
CAILO failed to appear. Hearing was re-set for 29 September 1989
8
but, again, neither NACUSIP-TUCP nor CAILO appeared. On 16
October 1989, nonetheless, Med-Arbiter Felizardo T. Serapio issued
an Order 9 granting the petition. He ruled that under Article 257 of
the Labor Code, as amended, the Med-Arbiter was left with no
option but to order the conduct of a certification election
immediately upon the filing of the petition, holding that the
subsequent disaffiliation or withdrawals of members did not
adversely affect the standing of the petition. The dispositive portion
of his Order read:
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for
certification election among the supervisory employees of the
Lopez Sugar Central, filed by the NACUSIP-TUCP is, as it is
hereby GRANTED with the following choices:
1) National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Phils.
(NACUSIP-TUCP);
2) Commercial and Agro-Industrial Labor Organization (CAILO);
3) No Union.
The designated representation officer is hereby directed to call the
parties to a pre-election conference to thresh out the mechanics of
the certification election, including the inclusion and exclusion of
voters and to conduct the election within twenty (20) days from
receipt by the parties of this Order. The list submitted by the
Employer (LSC Employees other than rank and file) shall be used
to determine the eligible voters.
SO ORDERED. 10

LSC appealed to the DOLE and asseverated that the order was a
patent nullity and that the Med-Arbiter acted with grave abuse of
discretion. 11
In denying the appeal, the Secretary of Labor, in his Decision of 06
March 1990, has likewise ruled that the holding by the Med-Arbiter
of a certification election is mandatory under Article 257 of the
Labor
Code;
that
the
subsequent
withdrawals
and
disauthorization/disaffiliation of some supervisory personnel in the
petition for certification election could not bar its being granted;
and that a certification election is still the most appropriate means
to finally settle the issue of representation. 12
Hence, this petition for certiorari; it is argued that
Public Respondent Honorable Secretary of Labor and Employment
(has) committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it refused to dismiss a petition for certification
election despite clear lack of legal and factual basis for holding the
same. 13
The Solicitor General agrees with public respondent in arguing that
the tenor of Article 257 (supra) of the Labor Code is one of
command. He cites paragraph 2, Section 6, Rule V, Book V, of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code, to the
effect that once "a petition (is) filed by a legitimate organization
involving an unorganized establishment, the Med-Arbiter shall
immediately order the conduct of a certification election," which is
designed, he continues, to give substance to the workers' right to
self- organization. 14 Petitioner promptly retorts that it has no quarrel
with public respondent on the objectives of the law but it points out
that the application of Article 257 clearly must first be occasioned
by a genuine petition from a legitimate labor organization.
Not too long ago, the Court already had an opportunity to pass upon
this very issue in Progressive Development Corporation vs.

Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, 15 where we said:

But while Article 257 cited by the Solicitor General directs the
automatic conduct of a certification election in an unorganized
establishment, it also requires that the petition for certification
election must be filed by a legitimate labor organization. Article 242
enumerates the exclusive rights of a legitimate labor organization
among which is the right to be certified as the exclusive
representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective
bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining.
Meanwhile, Article 212(h) defines a legitimate labor organization as
"any labor organization duly registered with the DOLE andincludes
any branch or local thereof." (Emphasis supplied) Rule I, Section
1(j), Book V of the Implementing Rules likewise defines a
legitimate labor organization as "any labor organization duly
registered with the DOLE and includes any branch, local or affiliate
thereof." (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the law did not reduce the Med-Arbiter to an automaton
which can instantly be set to impulse by the mere filing of a petition
for certification election. He is still tasked to satisfy himself that all
the conditions of the law are met, and among the legal requirements
is that the petitioning union must be a legitimate labor organization
in good standing.
The petition for certification election, in the case at bench, was filed
by the NACUSIP-TUCP, a national labor organization duly
registered with the DOLE render Registration Certificate No. FED402-6390-IP. The legitimate status of NACUSIP-TUCP might be
conceded; being merely, however, an agent for the local
organization (the NACUSIP-TUCP Lopez Sugar Central
Supervisory Chapter), the federation's bona fide status alone would
not suffice. The local chapter, as its principal, should also be a
legitimate labor organization in good standing. Accordingly, in
Progressive Development, we elucidated:
In the case of union affiliation with a federation, the documentary
requirements are found in Rule II, Section 3(e), Book V of the
implementing Rules, which we again quote as follows:

(c) The local or chapter of a labor federation or national union shall

have and maintain a constitution and by-laws, set of officers and
books of accounts. For reporting purposes, the procedure governing
the reporting of independently registered unions, federations or
national unions shall be observed. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the "procedure governing the reporting of independently
registered unions" refers to the certification and attestation
requirements contained in Article 235, paragraph 2, it follows that
the constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books of accounts
submitted by the local and chapter must likewise comply with these
requirements. The same rationale for requiring the submission of
duly subscribed documents upon union registration exists in the
case of union affiliation. Moreover, there is greater reason to exact
compliance with the certification and attestation requirements
because, as previously mentioned, several requirements applicable
to independent union registration are no longer required in the case
of the formation of a local or chapter. The policy of the law in
conferring greater bargaining power upon labor unions must be
balanced with the policy of providing preventive measures against
the commission of fraud.
A local or chapter therefore becomes a legitimate labor organization
only upon submission of the following to the BLR:
1) A charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the
labor federation or national union, and
2) The constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers,
and the books of accounts all of which are certified under oath by
the secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or
chapter, and attested to by its president.
Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or
chapter does not become a legitimate labor organization.16
The only document extant on record to establish the legitimacy of
the NACUSIP-TUCP Lopez Sugar Central Supervisory Chapter is a
charter certificate and nothing else. The instant petition, at least for

now, must thus be GRANTED.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Secretary of Labor,
dated 06 March 1990, affirming that of the Med-Arbiter, is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petition for certification
election is dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 97020 June 8, 1992
CALIFORNIA MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR
BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, ABD FEDERATION OF FREE
WORKERS (FFW), CALIFORNIA MFG. CORP. SUPERVISORS
UNION CHAPTER (CALMASUCO), respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeking
to annul and set aside the (a) resolution * of the Department of
Labor and Employment dated October 16, 1990 in OS-A-10-283-90
(NCR-OD-M-90-05-095) entitled "In Re: Petition for Certification
Election Among the Supervisors of California Manufacturing
Corporation, Federation of Free Workers (FFW) California Mfg.
Corp. Supervisors Union Chapter (CALMASUCO), petitionerappellee, California Manufacturing Corporation, employerappellant" which denied herein petitioner's appeal and affirmed the
order of Med-Arbiter Arsenia Q. Ocampo dated August 22, 1990
directing the conduct of a certification election among the
supervisory employees of California Manufacturing Corporation,
and (b) the Order ** of the same Department denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
As culled from the records, the following facts appear undisputed:
On May 24, 1990, a petition for certification election among the
supervisors of California Manufacturing Corporation (CMC for
brevity) was filed by the Federation of Free Workers (FFW)
California Manufacturing Corporation Supervisors Union Chapter

(CALMASUCO), alleging inter alia, that it is a duly registered

federation with registry certificate no. 1952-TTT-IP, while FFWCALMASUCO Chapter is a duly registered chapter with registry
certificate no. 1-AFBI-038 issued on May 21, 1990 (Annex "A",
Rollo, p. 63); that the employer CMC employs one hundred fifty
(150) supervisors; that there is no recognized supervisors union
existing in the company; that the petition is filed in accordance with
Article 257 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
6715; and that the petition is nevertheless supported by a substantial
member of signatures of the employees concerned (Annexes "E"
and "F", Ibid., pp. 28-29).
In its answer, CMC, now petitioner herein, alleged among others,
that the petition for the holding of a certification election should be
denied as it is not supported by the required twenty-five percent
(25%) of all its supervisors and that a big number of the supposed
signatories to the petition are not actually supervisors as they have
no subordinates to supervise, nor do they have the powers and
functions which under the law would classify them as supervisors
(Annex "D", Ibid., P. 25).
On July 24. 1990, FFWCALMASUCO filed its reply maintaining
that under the law, when there is no existing unit yet in a particular
bargaining unit at the time a petition for certification election is
filed, the 25% rule on the signatories does not apply; that the
"organized establishment" contemplated by law does not refer to a
"company" per se but rather refers to a "bargaining unit" which may
be of different classifications in a single company; that CMC has at
least two (2) different bargaining units, namely, the supervisory
(unorganized) and the rank-and-file (organized); that the signatories
to the petition have been performing supervisory functions; that
since it is CMC which promoted them to the positions, of
supervisors. it is already estopped from claiming that they are not
supervisors; that the said supervisors were excluded from the
coverage of the collective bargaining agreement of its rank-and-file
employees; and that the contested signatories are indeed supervisors
as shown in the "CMC Master List of Employees" of January 2,

1990 and the CMS Publication (Annex "G", Ibid., p 30).

On August 12, 1990, the Med-Arbiter issued an order, the decretal
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby ordered that a
certification election be conducted among the supervisory
employees of California Manufacturing Corporation within twenty
(20) days from receipt hereof with the usual pre-election conference
of the parties to thresh out the mechanics of the election The payroll
of the company three (3) months prior to the filing of the petition
shall be used as the basis in determining the list of eligible voters.
The choices are:
1. Federation of Free Workers (FFW) California Manufacturing
Corporation Supervisors Union Chapter (CALMASUCO); and
2. No union.
SO ORDERED. (Annex "H" Ibid., p. 33).
CMC thereafter appealed to the Department of Labor and
Employment which, however, affirmed the above order in its
assailed resolution dated October 16, 1990 (Annex, "B", Ibid, a 18)
CMC's subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied in its
order dated November 17, 1990 (Annex "A", Ibid., p. 15), hence,
his petition.
a) whether or not the term "unorganized establishment' in Article
257 of the tabor Code refers to a bargaining unit or a business
establishment;
b) whether or not non-supervisors can participate in a supervisor's
certification election; and
c) whether or not the two (2) different and separate plants of
herein petitioner in Paraaque and Las Pias can be treated as a
single bargaining unit.
The petition must be denied.
The Court has already categorically ruled that Article 257 of the
Labor code is applicable to unorganized labor organizations and not
to establishments where there exists a certified bargaining agent
which had previously entered into a collective bargaining
agreement with the management (Associated Labor Unions [ALU]

v. Calleja, G.R. No. 85085, November 6, 1989, 179 SCRA 127)

(Emphasis supplied). Otherwise stated, the establishment concerned
must have no certified bargaining agent (Associated Labor Unions
[ALU] v. Calleja G.R. No. 82260, July 19, 1989, 175 SCRA 490).
In the instant case, it is beyond cavil that the supervisors of CMC
which constitute a bargaining unit separate and distinct from that of
the rank-and-file, have no such agent. thus they correctly filed a
petition for certification election thru union FFW-CALMASUCO,
likewise indubitably a legitimate labor organization. CMC's
insistence on the 25% subscription requirement, is clearly
immaterial. The same has been expressly deleted by Section 24 of
Republic Act No. 6715 and is presently prescribed only in
organized establishments, that is, those with existing bargaining
agents. Compliance with the said requirement need not even be
established with absolute certainty. The Court has consistently ruled
that "even conceding that the statutory requirement of 30% (now
25%) of the labor force asking for a certification election had not
been strictly compiled with, the Director (now the Med-Arbiter) is
still empowered to order that it be held precisely for the purpose of
ascertaining which of the contending labor organizations shall be
the exclusive collective bargaining agent (Atlas Free Workers
Union (AFWU)-PSSLU Local v. Noriel, G.R. No. L-51905, May
26, 1981, 104 SCRA 565). The requirement then is relevant only
when it becomes mandatory to conduct a certification election. In
all other instances, the discretion, according to the rulings of this
Tribunal, ought to be ordinarily exercised in favor of a petition for
certification (National Mines and Allied Workers Union
(NAMAWU-UIF) v. Luna, et al., G.R. No. L-46722, June 15, 1978,
83 SCRA 607).
In any event, CMC as employer has no standing to question a
certification election (Asian Design and Manufacturing Corporation
v. Calleja, et al., G.R. No. 77415, June 29, 1989, 174 SCRA 477).
Such is the sole concern of the workers. The only exception is
where the employer has to file the petition for certification election
pursuant to Article 259 (now 258) of the Labor Code because it was

requested to bargain collectively. Thereafter, the role of the

employer in the certification process ceases. The employer becomes
merely a bystander. Oft-quoted is the pronouncement of the Court
on management interference in certification elections, thus:
On matters that should be the exclusive concern of labor, the choice
of a collective bargaining representative, the employer is definitely
an intruder, His participation, to say the least, deserves no
encouragement. This Court should be the last agency to lend
support to such an attempt at interference with purely internal affair
of labor. (Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services
(TUPAS) v. Trajano. G.R. No. L-61153 January 17, 1983, 120
SCRA 64 citing Consolidated Farms, Inc. v. Noriel, G.R No. L47752 July 31, 1978, 84 SCRA 469, 473).
G.R. No. 96635 August 6, 1992
ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY OF MANILA,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, UNDERSECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT; HON.
TOMAS F. FALCONITIN MED-ARBITER, BUREAU OF
LABOR
RELATIONS,
DEPT.
OF
LABOR
&
EMPLOYMENT; LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWA SA AG & PSMSG-NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (LAKASNFL), respondents.
Herrera, Laurel, De los Reyes, Roxas & Teehankee for petitioners.
Jose C. Espinas for private respondent.
NOCON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order to annul and set aside the Order dated December
11, 1990 of the Department of Labor and Employment affirming its
Resolution dated November 22, 1990 and the Order of the MedArbiter in ordering that a certification election among the regular
project employees of the herein petitioner Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific

Company of Manila, Inc. at its Steel and Marine Structures Group

(AG&P-SMSG) be conducted immediately.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. is
engaged in the construction and fabrication business and conducts
its construction business in different construction sites here and
abroad while its fabrication operations are conducted by its Steel
and Marine Structures Group at its Batangas Marine and
Fabrication Yard ("BMFY," for brevity) in Bauan, Batangas where
the steel structures and other heavy marine works are fabricated.
In the exercise of its management prerogative, petitioner has
adopted the practice of hiring project employees when existing
fabrication capacity cannot absorb increases in job orders for steel
structures and other heavy construction works. Said project
employees are covered by the Project Worker/Reliever Employment
Agreements which indicate the specific projects to which they are
assigned and the duration of their employment. Upon the expiration
of their contracts/agreements, the employment of these employees
is automatically terminated unless the projects to which they are
assigned have not yet been completed, in which case, they are
rehired for the remainder of the project. The positions occupied by
the regular rank-and-file employees and the project employees are
basically similar in nature and are directly related to the main line
of petitioner's business.
On June 8, 1990, petitioner executed a Collective Bargaining
Agreement with the AG&P United Rank & File Association
("URFA," for brevity) which is the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of all the regular rank-and-file employees of the petitioner. 1
Said Collective Bargaining Agreement was subsequently registered
on July 9, 1990 with the Bureau of Labor Relations and Certificate
of Registration No. BLR-90-0131 was issued.
On June 29, 1990, private respondent Lakas ng Manggagawa sa
AG&P-SMSG-National Federation of Labor ("LAKAS-NFL," for
brevity) filed a Petition for Certification Election with the MedArbitration Unit to be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining

agent of the regular non-project employees of the Steel and Marine

Structure at the BMFY representing approximately 1,000
employees or that a certification be conducted among said
employees. 2
On September 25, 1990, public respondent Med-Arbiter Tomas F.
Falconitin of the Department of Labor and Employment issued an
Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby ordered that
certification
election
among
the
regular
"Project
Workers"/employees of Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company of
Manila, Inc. at its Steel and Marine Structures Group (AG&PSMSG) be conducted immediately. The Representation Officer is
hereby directed to conduct the usual pre-election conference in
connection thereof with the following choices to consider:
1 Lakas Ng Manggagawa Sa AG&P-SMSG National Federation of
Labor (LAKAS-NFL); and
2 No Union.
SO ORDERED. 3
On October 11, 1990, petitioner filed an appeal with the
Department of Labor and Employment. 4
On October 26, 1990, 691 alleged project employees sought to be
represented by private respondent LAKAS-NFL were formally
issued regular employment appointments by the petitioner effective
November 1, 1990 which were accepted by said project employees.
Thereafter, in a Resolution dated November 22, 1990, public
respondent Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment Bienvenido E. Laguesma denied petitioner's appeal for
lack of merit.
On November 28, 1990, petitioner's project employees at its SMSG
site who were not given regular employment appointment on
October 26, 1990 went on strike and completely paralyzed

petitioner's operations in Bauan, Batangas. Said strike was settled in

a conciliation conference convened by the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board on December 8, 1990 when an Agreement
was reached by the petitioner and private respondent LAKAS-NFL
wherein petitioner agreed to formally regularize all the remaining
alleged project employees with at least one year of service pending
the final outcome of the certification election case. 5 Thereafter, 686
additional regular project employees were regularized effective
December 1, 1990 in pursuance to said Agreement.
On December 6, 1990, petitioner received a letter from URFA
informing the former about the admission into URFA of the
membership of 410 regular project employees who were formally
regularized by the petitioner effective November 1, 1990.
On that same date, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on
the Resolution dated November 22, 1990 alleging that the
employees sought to be represented by the private respondent
LAKAS-NFL are regular employees of the petitioner and are
deemed included in the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement
of the regular rank-and-file employees of the petitioner which
motion was subsequently denied by the public respondent
Undersecretary Laguesma in an Order dated December 11, 1990.
Hence, this petition assailing said Order and Resolution on the
following grounds:
I. RESPONDENT UNDERSECRETARY ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE RESOLUTION DATED 22
NOVEMBER 1990 AND THE ORDER DATED 11 DECEMBER
1990 IN THAT THEY FAILED TO HOLD THAT THE
CONTRACT-BAR RULE APPLIES TO THE INSTANT CASE
II. RESPONDENT UNDERSECRETARY ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE RESOLUTION DATED 22
NOVEMBER 1990 AND THE ORDER DATED 11 DECEMBER
1990 IN THAT THEY FAILED TO CONSIDER THE
SUPERVENING FACT THAT THE BARGAINING UNIT OF

THE ALLEGED REGULAR PROJECT WORKERS HAS

CEASED TO EXIST BY VIRTUE OF THE REGULARIZATION
OF ALL THE ALLEGED PROJECT WORKERS WITH AT
LEAST ONE YEAR OF SERVICE 6
The contentions of the petitioner are meritorious.
Section 1 of Article II of petitioner's Collective Bargaining
Agreement with URFA defined appropriate bargaining unit as
follows:
ARTICLE II
SCOPE
Sec. 1. Appropriate Bargaining Unit The appropriate bargaining
unit covered by this Agreement consists of those regular rank-andfile employees of the COMPANY who have remained as such up to
the date of execution of this Agreement, as well as those who may
hereafter acquire the same status. It is hereby understood and
agreed that the following are not within the appropriate bargaining
unit and, therefore, this Agreement is not applicable to them, to wit:
a Executives, division department and section heads, staff members,
managerial employees, and executive secretaries;
b Workers hired by the COMPANY as project employees as
contemplated by existing laws including relievers of regular
employees who are sent abroad are not covered by this Contract.
Provided, however, that regular employees who are assigned as
relievers shall continue to be covered by this Contract, and provided
further that relievers who are assigned to regular positions which
may become vacant shall be duly considered for such regular
positions after attaining the six months probationary period.
c Security personnel. 7
Although the aforementioned definition does not include
petitioner's regular project employees in the coverage of the
existing Collective Bargaining Agreement between petitioner and

the URFA, the regularization of all the regular project employees

with at least one year of service and the subsequent membership of
said employees with the URFA mean that the alleged regular project
employees whom respondent LAKAS-NFL seeks to represent are,
in fact, regular employees by contemplation of law and included in
the appropriate bargaining unit of said Collective Bargaining
Agreement consequently, the bargaining unit which respondent
LAKAS-NFL seeks to represent has already ceased to exist.
The Labor Code provides:
Art. 232. Prohibition on Certification Election. The Bureau shall
not entertain any petition for certification election or any other
action which may disturb the administration of duly registered
existing collective bargaining agreements affecting the parties
except under Articles 253, 253-A and 256 of this Code.
Paragraph 2 of Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations likewise provides:
If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in
accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification
election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within
sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of such agreement.
Consequently, the existence of a duly registered Collective
Bargaining Agreement between the petitioner and URFA, which is
the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the regular
rank-and-file employees of the petitioner including the regular
project employees with more than one year of service, bars any
other labor organization from filing a petition for certification
election except within the 60-day period prior to the expiration of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
To rule otherwise would negate the legislative intent in the
enactment of Article 232 of the Labor Code which was designed to
ensure industrial peace between the employer and its employees
during the existence of the collective bargaining agreement.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition meritorious, the assailed
Resolution of November 22, 1990 and the Order dated December
11, 1990 are hereby annuled and set aside. This temporary

restraining order issued is made permanent. Costs against

respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 85085 November 6, 1989
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU), petitioner,
vs.
HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
LABOR RELATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR
UNIONS (NAFLU), respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Is the contract bar rule applicable where a collective bargaining
agreement was hastily concluded in defiance of the order of the
med-arbiter enjoining the parties from entering into a CBA until the
issue on representation is finally resolved? This is the primary issue
in this special civil action for certiorari.
The Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation
(PASAR) is a corporation established and existing pursuant to
Philippine laws and is engaged in the manufacture and processing
of copper cathodes with a plant operating in Isabel, Leyte. It
employs more or less eight hundred fifty (850) rank-and-file
employees in its departments.
Petitioner Associated Labor Union (ALU) had a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) with PASAR which expired on April
1, 1987. Several days before the expiration of the said CBA or on
March 23, 1987, private respondent National Federation of Labor
Unions (NAFLU) filed a petition for certification election with the
Bureau of Labor Relations Regional Office in Tacloban City
docketed as MED-ARB-RO VII Case No. 3-28-87, alleging, among
others, that no certification election had been held in PASAR within
twelve (12) months immediately preceding the filing of the said
petition.
Petitioner moved to intervene and sought the dismissal of the
petition on the ground that NAFLU failed to present the necessary

signatures in support of its petition. In the order dated April 21,

1987, 1 Med-Arbiter Bienvenido C. Elorcha dismissed the petition.
However, the order of dismissal was set aside in another order dated
May 8, 1987 and the case was rescheduled for hearing on May 29,
1987. The said order likewise enjoined PASAR from entering into a
collective bargaining agreement with any union until after the issue
of representation is finally resolved. In the order dated June 1, 1987,
2
the petition for certification was dismissed for failure of NAFLU
to solicit 20"7c of the total number of rank and file employees while
ALU submitted 33 pages containing the signatures of 88.5% of the
rank and file employees at PASAR.
Private respondent appealed the order of dismissal to the Bureau of
Labor Relations. While the appeal was pending, petitioner ALU
concluded negotiations with PASAR on the proposed CBA. On July
24, 1987, copies of the newly concluded CBA were posted in four
(4) conspicuous places in the company premises. The said CBA was
ratified by the members of the bargaining unit on July 28, 1987. 3
Thereafter, petitioner ALU moved for the dismissal of the appeal
alleging that it had just concluded a CBA with PASAR and that the
said CBA had been ratified by 98% of the regular rank-and-file
employees and that at least 75 of NAFLU's members renounced
their membership thereat and affirmed membership with PEA-ALU
in separate affidavits.
In a resolution dated September 30, 1987, the public respondent
gave due course to the appeal by ordering the conduct of a
certification election among the rank-and-file employees of PASAR
with ALU, NAFLU and no union as choices, and denied petitioner
's motion to dismiss. 4
Both parties moved for reconsideration of the said resolution.
However, both motions were denied by public respondent in the
order dated April 22, 1988.
Hence, the present petition. 5
The petition is anchored on the argument that the holding of

certification elections in organized establishments is mandated only

where a petition is filed questioning the majority status of the
incumbent union and that it is only after due hearing where it is
established that the union claiming the majority status in the
bargaining unit has indeed a considerable support that a certification
election should be ordered, otherwise, the petition should be
summarily dismissed. 6 Petitioner adds that public respondent
missed the legal intent of Article 257 of the Labor Code as amended
by Executive Order No. 111. 7
In effect, petitioner is of the view that Article 257 of the Labor
Code which requires the signature of at least 20% of the total
number of rank-and-file employees should be applied in the case at
bar.
The petition is devoid of merit.
As it has been ruled in a long line of decisions, 8 a certification
proceedings is not a litigation in the sense that the term is ordinarily
understood, but an investigation of a non-adversarial and factfinding character. As such, it is not covered by the technical rules of
evidence. Thus, as provided under Article 221 of the Labor Code,
proceedings before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) are not covered by the technical rules of procedure and
evidence. The Court had previously construed Article 221 as to
allow the NLRC or the labor arbiter to decide the case on the basis
of position papers and other documents submitted without resorting
to technical rules of evidence as observed in regular courts of
justice. 9
On the other hand, Article 257 is applicable only to unorganized
labor organizations and not to establishments like PASAR where
there exists a certified bargaining agent, petitioner ALU, which as
the record shows had previously entered into a CBA with the
management. This could be discerned from the clear intent of the
law which provides that
ART. 257. Petitions in unorganized establishments. In any

establishment where there is no certified bargaining agent, the

petition for certification election filed by a legitimate labor
organization shall be supported by the written consent of at least
twenty per cent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit.
Upon receipt and verification of such petition, the Med-Arbiter
shall automatically order the conduct of a certification election.
Said article traverses the claim of the petitioner that in this case
there is a need for a considerable support of the rank-and-file
employees in order that a certification election may be ordered.
Nowhere in the said provision does it require that the petition in
organized establishment should be accompanied by the written
consent of at least twenty percent (20%) of the employees of the
bargaining unit concerned much less a requirement that the petition
be supported by the majority of the rank-and-file employees. As
above stated, Article 257 is applicable only to unorganized
establishments.
The Court reiterates that in cases of organized establishments where
there exists a certified bargaining agent, what is essential is whether
the petition for certification election wasfiled within the sixty-day
freedom period. Article 256 of the Labor Code, as amended by
Executive Order No. 111, provides:
ART. 256. Representation issue in organized establishments. In
organized establishments, when a petition questioning the majority
status of the incumbent bargaining agent is filed before the
Department within the sixty-day period before the expiration of the
collective bargaining agreement, the Med-Arbiter shall
automatically order an election by secret ballot to ascertain the will
of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. To have a valid
election, at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must
have cast their votes. The labor union receiving the majority of the
valid votes cast shall be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent
of all the workers in the unit. When an election which provides for
three or more choices results in no choice receiving a majority of
the valid votes cast, a run-off election shall be conducted between
the choices receiving the two highest number of votes.

Article 256 is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. The mere
filing of a petition for certification election within the freedom
period is sufficient basis for the respondent Director to order the
holding of a certification election.
Was the petition filed by NAFLU instituted within the freedom
period? The record speaks for itself. The previous CBA entered into
by petitioner ALU was due to expire on April 1, 1987. The petition
for certification was filed by NAFLU on March 23, 1987, well
within the freedom period.
The contract bar rule is applicable only where the petition for
certification election was filed either before or after the freedom
period. Petitioner, however, contends that since the new CBA had
already been ratified overwhelmingly by the members of the
bargaining unit and that said CBA had already been consummated
and the members of the bargaining unit have been continuously
enjoying the benefits under the said CBA, no certification election
may be conducted, 10 citing, Foamtex Labor Union-TUPAS vs.
Noriel, 11 and Trade Unions of the Phil. and Allied Services vs.
Inciong. 12
The reliance on the aforementioned cases is misplaced. In Foamtex
the petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the order of the
Director of Labor Relations which in turn affirmed the order of the
Med-Arbiter calling for a certification election was dismissed by
the Court on the ground that although a new CBA was concluded
between the petitioner and the management, only a certified CBA
would serve as a bar to the holding of a certification election, citing
Article 232 of the Labor Code.
Foamtex weakens rather than strengthens petitioner's stand. As
pointed out by public respondent, the new CBA entered into
between petitioner on one hand and by the management on the
other has not been certified as yet by the Bureau of Labor Relations.
There is an appreciable difference in Trade Unions of the Phil. and
Allied Services (TUPAS for short). Here, as in Foamtex the CBA
was not yet certified and yet the Court affirmed the order of the

Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations which dismissed the

petition for certification election filed by the labor union. In
TUPAS, the dismissal of the petition for certification, was based on
the fact that the contending union had a clear majority of the
workers concerned since out of 641 of the total working force, the
said union had 499 who did not only ratify the CBA concluded
between the said union and the management but also affirmed their
membership in the said union so that apparently petitioners therein
did not have the support of 30% of all the employees of the
bargaining unit.
Nevertheless, even assuming for the sake of argument that the
petitioner herein has the majority of the rank-and-file employees
and that some members of the NAFLU even renounced their
membership thereat and affirmed membership with the petitioner,
We cannot, however, apply TUPAS in the case at bar. Unlike in the
case of herein petitioner, in TUPAS, the petition for certification
election was filed nineteen (19) days after the CBA was signed
which was well beyond the freedom period.
On the other hand, as earlier mentioned, the petition for certification
election in this case was filed within the freedom period but the
petitioner and PASAR hastily concluded a CBA despite the order of
the Med-Arbiter enjoining them from doing so until the issue of
representation is finally resolved. As pointed out by public
respondent in its comment, 13 the parties were in bad faith when
they concluded the CBA. Their act was clearly intended to bar the
petition for certification election filed by NAFLU. A collective
bargaining agreement which was prematurely renewed is not a bar
to the holding of a certification election. 14 Such indecent haste in
renewing the CBA despite an order enjoining them from doing so 15
is designed to frustrate the constitutional right of the employees to
self-organization. 16 Moreover, We cannot countenance the actuation
of the petitioner and the management in this case which is not
conducive to industrial peace.
The renewed CBA cannot constitute a bar to the instant petition for
certification election for the very reason that the same was not yet

in existence when the said petition was filed. 17 The holding of a

certification election is a statutory policy that should not be
circumvented. 18
Petitioner posits the view that to grant the petition for certification
election would open the floodgates to unbridled and scrupulous
petitions the objective of which is to prejudice the industrial peace
and stability existing in the company.
This Court believes otherwise. Our established jurisprudence
adheres to the policy of enhancing the welfare of the workers. Their
freedom to choose who should be their bargaining representative is
of paramount importance. The fact that there already exists a
bargaining representative in the unit concerned is of no moment as
long as the petition for certification was filed within the freedom
period. What is imperative is that by such a petition for certification
election the employees are given the opportunity to make known
who shall have the right to represent them thereafter. Not only some
but all of them should have the right to do so. 19 Petitioner's
contention that it has the support of the majority is immaterial.
What is equally important is that everyone be given a democratic
space in the bargaining unit concerned. Time and again, We have
reiterated that the most effective way of determining which labor
organization can truly represent the working force is by certification
election. 20
Finally, petitioner insists that to allow a certification election to be
conducted will promote divisiveness and eventually cause
polarization of the members of the bargaining unit at the expense of
national interest. 21
The claim is bereft of merit. Petitioner failed to establish that the
calling of certification election will be prejudicial to the employees
concerned and/or to the national interest. The fear perceived by the
petitioner is more imaginary than real. If it is true, as pointed out by
the petitioner, that it has the support of more than the majority and

that there was even a bigger number of members of NAFLU who

affirmed their membership to petitioner-union, then We see no
reason why petitioner should be apprehensive over the issue. If their
claim is true, then most likely the conduct of a certification election
will strengthen their hold as any doubt will be erased thereby. With
the resolution of such doubts, fragmentation of the bargaining unit
will be avoided, and hence coherence among the workers will likely
follow.
Petitioner's claim that the holding of a certification election will be
inimical to the national interest is far fetched. The workers are at
peace with one another and their working condition is smooth.
There has been no stoppage of work or an occurrence of a strike.
With these facts on hand, to order otherwise will be repugnant to
the well-entrenched right of the workers to unionism.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The temporary restraining order
issued by the Court in the resolution dated October 10, 1988 22 is
hereby lifted. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
SO ORDERED
PAMBANSANG KAPATIRAN NG MGA ANAK PAWIS SA
FORMEY
PLASTIC
NATIONAL
WORKERS
BROTHERHOOD, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF
LABOR, SECRETARY BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA,
FORMEY PLASTIC, INC., KALIPUNAN NG
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (KAMAPI) and MEDARBITER RASIDALI C. ABDULLAH, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The rank and file workers of Formey Plastic, Inc. (FORMEY),
formed a local union known as Pambansang Kapatiran ng mga
Anak Pawis sa Formey Plastic (KAPATIRAN) under the auspices
of the National Workers Brotherhood (NWB). They ratified their

Constitution and By-Laws on 4 April 1993.

could not be invoked.

On 22 April 1993 KAPATIRAN filed a Petition for

Certification Election[1] with the Department of Labor and
Employment Med-Arbiter Division alleging that there was no
existing and effective Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
between FORMEY and any union; neither was there any recognized
union within the company.

Pending resolution of the petition KAMAPI filed an Urgent

Motion to Dismiss[14] the instant petition contending that it had
become moot and academic due to the cancellation of
NWBs[15]certificate of registration and its delisting from the roll of
labor federations.[16] KAPATIRAN opposed the motion[17] claiming
that the cancellation and delisting were not yet final and executory
considering that it had filed a motion for reconsideration [18] with the
Bureau of Labor Relations.

FORMEY moved to dismiss the petition[2] while Kalipunan ng

Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMAPI) intervened and likewise
moved to dismiss[3] on the ground that there was already a duly
registered CBA covering the period 1 January 1992 to 31 December
1996 hence the contract bar rule[4] would apply. KAPATIRAN
opposed both motions to dismiss[5] with an Addendum[6]thereto
claiming that the CBA executed between FORMEY and KAMAPI
was fraudulently registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment and that it was defective since what was certified as
bargaining agent was KAMAPI which, as a federation, only served
as mere agent of the local union hence without any legal personality
to sign in behalf of the latter.
Med-Arbiter Rasidali C. Abdullah found that a valid and
existing CBA between FORMEY and KAMAPI effectively barred
the filing of the petition for certification election.[7]
KAPATIRAN appealed[8] imputing grave abuse of discretion to
the Med-Arbiter in applying the contract bar rule and in not
adopting the case of Progressive Development Corporation v.
Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment,[9] as authority to
disregard the CBA between FORMEY and KAMAPI. The
Secretary of Labor acting through Undersecretary Bienvenido E.
Laguesma upheld the decision of the Med-Arbiter.[10] The Motion
for Reconsideration having been denied[11] KAPATIRAN now files
this Petition for Certiorari[12] charging the Secretary of Labor with
grave abuse of discretion in applying the contract bar rule literally
and in ruling that the Progressive Development Corporation[13] case

The rule is that findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies will

not be disturbed unless there is a showing of grave abuse of
discretion. We find none in the case at bench. We therefore affirm
that there is a validly executed collective bargaining agreement
between FORMEY and KAMAPI.
Art. 253-A of the Labor Code provides that (n)o petition
questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent
shall be entertained and no certification election shall be conducted
by the Department of Labor and Employment outside of the sixty
(60) day period immediately before the date of expiry of such fiveyear term of the collective bargaining agreement. Sec. 3, Rule V,
Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code
provides that x x x (i)f a collective bargaining agreement has been
duly registered in accordance with Article .231 of the Code, a
petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can
only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of
such agreement.
The subject agreement was made effective 1 January 1992 and
is yet to expire on 31 December 1996. The petition for certification
election having been filed on 22 April 1993 it is therefore clear that
said petition must fail since it was filed before the so-called 60-day
freedom period. KAPATIRAN insists that the CBA was a fake it
having been surreptitiously registered with the Department of Labor
and Employment.

The resolution of this issue hinges on the determination of

factual matters which certainly is not within the ambit of the present
petition for certiorari. Besides, the contention is without any legal
basis at all; it is purely speculative and bereft of any documentary
support. Petitioner itself even admitted the existence of an
agreement but argued that its provisions were not being
implemented nor adhered to at all. Suffice it to mention that the
filing of the petition for certification election is not the panacea to
this allegedly anomalous situation. Violations of collective
bargaining agreements constitute unfair labor practice as provided
for under Art. 248, par. (i), of the Labor Code. In consonance
thereto, Art. 261 equips petitioner with the proper and appropriate
recourse
-Art. 261. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement x x x
Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement,
except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated
as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations
of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or
malicious refusal to comply with the economic provision of such
agreement.
The CBA entered into between FORMEY and KAMAPI
stipulates among others
Article IX - GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
Sec. 1. Any complaint, grievance, difficulty, disagreement or
dispute arising out of any section taken (sic) by the Company
and/or by the Union concerning the interpretation of the terms and
conditions of the agreement and/or which may arise regarding (sic)
the terms and conditions of employment shall be settled in the
manner provided for under this Article.

Sec. 2. The Company and the Union agree to create and establish a
Grievance Committee composed of two (2) representatives from the
Company and two (2) from the Union to receive complaint,
grievance or dispute from the workers and/or from the Company
with the view to settle it amicably.
Sec. 3. In case a complaint or grievance has been filed by either the
Union or the Company, the grievance committee shall discuss the
same and have (sic) to settle it. If after the meeting of the grievance
committee no satisfactory settlement is reached the matter shall be
referred to the top officers of the Union and the Company for the
settlement of the said grievance or dispute.
Sec. 4. Within five (5) days from the time the top officers of the
Union and the Company has (sic) failed to reach an amicable
settlement of the grievance or dispute, the same shall be submitted
for voluntary arbitration. The arbitrator or arbitrators shall be
chosen by lottery and the union and the Company shall avail (sic)
the list of arbitrators of the Honorable Bureau of Labor Relations.
Sec. 5. The mutually agreed or chosen arbitrator shall proceed to try
and hear the case and for (sic) the reception of evidence and to call
witnesses to testify and after the submission of the case by both
parties an award or order shall be issued in accordance with the
rules and guidelines promulgated by the Honorable Department of
Labor and Employment based on the pertinent laws and established
jurisprudence. The expenses of the arbitration proceedings shall be
borned (sic) equally by the Company and the Union.[19]
By filing the petition for certification election it is clear that
KAPATIRAN did not avail of the abovementioned grievance
procedure.
It is further argued that the CBA has no binding force since it
was entered into by KAMAPI as a federation and not by the local
union. Perusal of the agreement proves the contention flawed. The
signatories for KAMAPI consisted of its national president and of
the duly elected officers of the local union. Thus the fact that
KAMAPI was particularly mentioned as the bargaining party

without specifying the local union cannot strip it of its authority to

participate in the bargaining process. The local union maintains its
separate personality despite affiliation with a larger national
federation.[20]
The doctrine laid down in Progressive Development
Corporation[21] is a mere clarification of the principle enunciated in
Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc.
[22]
Both cases have provided that the mother union acting for and in
behalf of its affiliate ha(s) the status of an agent while the local
union remained the basic unit of the association free to serve the
common interest of all its members subject only to the restraints
imposed by the Constitution and By-Laws of the association.
Nonetheless, the facts and principles laid down in both cases do not
jibe squarely with the case at bench. The controversy in Progressive
Development Corporation[23] centered on the requirements before a
local or chapter of a federation may file a petition for certification
election and be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent,
while in Liberty Cotton Mills Workers[24] the issue involved was the
disaffiliation of the local union from the federation The question of
whether there was a valid and existing CBA, which is the question
being resolved in the case at bench, was never raised in the two
cited cases since it was already an accepted fact that the CBA was
validly executed and existing.
Anent the Urgent Motion to Dismiss[25] filed by KAMAPI on
the ground that the instant petition had become moot and academic
due to the cancellation by the Bureau of Labor Relations of NWBs
certificate of registration and its consequent delisting from the roll
of labor federations, suffice it to state that at this juncture we cannot
properly rule on the issue considering that KAMAPI has not proven
that the decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations has become final
and executory taking into account KAPATIRANs filing of a motion
for reconsideration with the Bureau. This notwithstanding, Sec. 9,
Rule II, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Cose requires that an appeal be filed with the Bureau, or in case of

cancellation by the Bureau, with the Secretary of Labor and

Employment whose decision shall become final and no longer
subject of appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment dated 15 August 1993
sustaining the order of the Med-Arbiter dated 31 May 1993 is
AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 89609 January 27, 1992
NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR
INDUSTRY OF THE PHILIPPINES (NACUSIP)-TUCP, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, in her capacity as Director of
the Bureau of Labor Relations; and the NATIONAL FEDERATION
OF SUGAR WORKERS (NFSW)-FGT-KMU, respondents.
Zoilo V. De la Cruz, Jr., Beethoven R. Buenaventura and Pedro E.
Jimenez for petitioner.
Manlapao, Drilon, Ymballa and Chavez for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking the nullification of the
resolution issued by the respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations Pura Ferrer-Calleja dated June 26, 1989 setting aside the
order of the Med-Arbiter dated February 8, 1989 denying the
motion to dismiss the petition and directing the conduct of a
certification election among the rank and file employees or workers
of the Dacongcogon Sugar and Rice Milling Co. situated at
Kabankalan, Negros Occidental.
The antecedent facts giving rise to the controversy at bar are as
follows:
Petitioner National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the
Philippines (NACUSIP-TUCP) is a legitimate national labor
organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment. Respondent Honorable Pura Ferrer-Calleja is
impleaded in her official capacity as the Director of the Bureau of

Labor Relations of the Department of Labor and Employment,

while private respondent National Federation of Sugar Workers
(NFSW-FGT-KMU) is a labor organization duly registered with the
Department of Labor and Employment.
Dacongcogon Sugar and Rice Milling Co., Inc. (Dacongcogon)
based in Kabankalan, Negros Occidental employs about five
hundred (500) workers during milling season and about three
hundred (300) on off-milling season.
On November 14, 1984, private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and
employer Dacongcogon entered into a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) for a term of three (3) years, which was to expire
on November 14, 1987.
When the CBA expired, private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and
Dacongcogon negotiated for its renewal. The CBA was extended
for another three (3) years with reservation to negotiate for its
amendment, particularly on wage increases, hours of work, and
other terms and conditions of employment.
However, a deadlock in negotiation ensued on the matter of wage
increases and optional retirement. In order to obviate friction and
tension, the parties agreed on a suspension to provide a cooling-off
period to give them time to evaluate and further study their
positions. Hence, a Labor Management Council was set up and
convened, with a representative of the Department of Labor and
Employment, acting as chairman, to resolve the issues.
On December 5, 1988, petitioner NACUSIP-TUCP filed a petition
for direct certification or certification election among the rank and
file workers of Dacongcogon.
On January 27, 1989, private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU moved
to dismiss the petition on the following grounds, to wit:
I
The Petition was filed out of time;
II
There is a deadlocked (sic) of CBA negotiation between forced
intervenor and respondent-central. (Rollo, p. 25)
On February 6, 1989, Dacongcogon filed an answer praying that the

petition be dismissed.
By an order dated February 8, 1989, the Med-Arbiter denied the
motion to dismiss filed by private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU
and directed the conduct of certification election among the rank
and file workers of Dacongcogon, the dispositive portion of which
provides as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss the
present petition is, as it is hereby DENIED. Let therefore a
certification election among the rank and file employees/workers of
the Dacongcogon Sugar and Rice Milling Co., situated at
Kabankalan, Neg. Occ., be conducted with the following choices:
(1) National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the
Philippines (NACUSIP-TUCP);
(2) National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW);
(3) No Union.
The designated Representation Officer is hereby directed to call the
parties for a pre-election conference to thresh out the mechanics of
the election and to conduct and supervise the same within twenty
(20) days from receipt by the parties of this Order. The latest payroll
shall be used to determine the list of qualified voters.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 34)
On February 9, 1989, private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration and/or appeal alleging that the Honorable MedArbiter misapprehended the facts and the law applicable amounting
to gross incompetence. Hence, private respondent prayed that the
order of the Med-Arbiter be set aside and the motion to dismiss be
reconsidered.
On February 27, 1989, petitioner filed its opposition to the motion
for reconsideration praying that the motion for reconsideration
and/or appeal be denied for lack of merit.
On June 26, 1989, respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations rendered a resolution reversing the order of the MedArbiter, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order of the Med-Arbiter
dated 8 February 1989 is hereby set aside and vacated, and a new

one issued dismissing the above-entitled petition for being filed out
of time.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 46)
Hence, this petition raising four (4) issues, to wit:
I. RESPONDENT HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, IN HER
CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR
RELATIONS, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN RENDERING HER RESOLUTION DATED 26 JUNE 1989
REVERSING THE ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 8, 1989 OF
MED-ARBITER FELIZARDO SERAPIO.
II. THAT THE AFORESAID RESOLUTION DATED 26 JUNE
1989 OF RESPONDENT PURA FERRER-CALLEJA IS
CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
III. THAT THE AFORESAID RESOLUTION DATED 26 JUNE
1989 OF RESPONDENT DIRECTOR PURA FERRER-CALLEJA
DENIES THE RANK AND FILE EMPLOYEES OF THE
DACONGCOGON SUGAR & RICE MILLING COMPANY, AND
THE HEREIN PETITIONER NACUSIP-TUCP, THEIR LEGAL
AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
IV. THAT RESPONDENT DIRECTOR PURA FERRERCALLEJA, IN RENDERING HER SAID RESOLUTION DATED
26 JUNE 1989 WAS BIASED AGAINST PETITIONER
NACUSIP-TUCP. (Rollo,
p. 2)
The controversy boils down to the sole issue of whether or not a
petition for certification election may be filed after the 60-day
freedom period.
Petitioner maintains that respondent Director Calleja committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in
rendering the resolution dated June 26, 1989 setting aside, vacating
and reversing the order dated February 8, 1989 of Med-Arbiter
Serapio, in the following manner:
1) by setting aside and vacating the aforesaid Order dated
February 8, 1989 of Med-Arbiter Felizardo Serapio and in effect
dismissing the Petition for Direct or Certification Election of

Petitioner NACUSIP-TUCP (Annex "A" hereof) without strong

valid, legal and factual basis;
2) by giving a very strict and limited interpretation of the
provisions of Section 6, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the Labor Code, as amended, knowing, as she
does, that the Labor Code, being a social legislation, should be
liberally interpreted to afford the workers the opportunity to
exercise their legitimate legal and constitutional rights to selforganization and to free collective bargaining;
3) by issuing her questioned Resolution of June 26, 1989 knowing
fully well that upon the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6715 on 21
March 1989 she had no longer any appellate powers over decisions
of Med-Arbiters in cases of representation issues or certification
elections;
4) by ignoring intentionally the applicable ruling of the Honorable
Supreme Court in the case of Kapisanan ng Mga Manggagawa sa
La Suerte-FOITAF vs. Noriel, L-45475, June 20, 1977;
5) by clearly failing to appreciate the significance (sic) of the fact
that for more than four (4) years there has been no certification
election involving the rank and file workers of the Company; and,
6) by frustrating the legitimate desire and will of the workers of
the Company to determine their sole and exclusive collective
bargaining representative through secret balloting. (Rollo, pp. 9-10)
However, the public respondent through the Solicitor General
stresses that the petition for certification election was filed out of
time. The records of the CBA at the Collective Agreements Division
(CAD) of the Bureau of Labor Relations show that the CBA
between Dacongcogon and private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU
had expired on November 14, 1987, hence, the petition for
certification election was filed too late, that is, a period of more
than one (1) year after the CBA expired.
The public respondent maintains that Section 6 of the Rules
Implementing Executive Order No. 111 commands that the petition
for certification election must be filed within the last sixty (60) days
of the CBA and further reiterates and warns that any petition filed

outside the 60-day freedom period "shall be dismissed outright."

Moreover, Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Rules Implementing
the Labor Code enjoins the filing of a representation question, if
before a petition for certification election is filed, a bargaining
deadlock to which the bargaining agent is a party is submitted for
conciliation or arbitration.
Finally, the public respondent emphasizes that respondent Director
has jurisdiction to entertain the motion for reconsideration
interposed by respondent union from the order of the Med-Arbiter
directing a certification election. Public respondent contends that
Section 25 of Republic Act No. 6715 is not applicable, "(f)irstly,
there is as yet no rule or regulation established by the Secretary for
the conduct of elections among the rank and file of employer
Dacongcogon; (s)econdly, even the mechanics of the election which
had to be first laid out, as directed in the Order dated February 8,
1989 of the Med-Arbiter, was aborted by the appeal therefrom
interposed by respondent union; and (t)hirdly, petitioner is estopped
to question the jurisdiction of respondent Director after it filed its
opposition to respondent union's Motion for Reconsideration
(Annex
'F,' Petition) and without, as will be seen, in any way assailing such
jurisdiction. . . ." (Rollo, p.66)
We find the petition devoid of merit.
A careful perusal of Rule V, Section 6, Book V of the Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, as amended by the rules
implementing Executive Order No. 111 provides that:
Sec. 6. Procedure . . .
In a petition involving an organized establishment or enterprise
where the majority status of the incumbent collective bargaining
union is questioned by a legitimate labor organization, the MedArbiter shall immediately order the conduct of a certification
election if the petition is filed during the last sixty (60) days of the
collective bargaining agreement. Any petition filed before or after
the sixty-day freedom period shall be dismissed outright.
The sixty-day freedom period based on the original collective

bargaining agreement shall not be affected by any amendment,

extension or renewal of the collective bargaining agreement for
purposes of certification election.
xxx xxx xxx
The clear mandate of the aforequoted section is that the petition for
certification election filed by the petitioner NACUSIP-TUCP
should be dismissed outright, having been filed outside the 60-day
freedom period or a period of more than one (1) year after the CBA
expired.
It is a rule in this jurisdiction that only a certified collective
bargaining agreement i.e., an agreement duly certified by the
BLR may serve as a bar to certification elections. (Philippine
Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Estrella, G.R. No.
45323, February 20, 1989, 170 SCRA 378, 382) It is noteworthy
that the Bureau of Labor Relations duly certified the November 14,
1984 collective bargaining agreement. Hence, the contract-bar rule
as embodied in Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the rules
implementing the Labor Code is applicable.
This rule simply provides that a petition for certification election or
a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty days
prior to the expiry date of an existing collective bargaining
agreement. Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the filing of a petition
for certification election during the existence of a collective
bargaining agreement except within the freedom period, as it is
called, when the said agreement is about to expire. The purpose,
obviously, is to ensure stability in the relationships of the workers
and the management by preventing frequent modifications of any
collective bargaining agreement earlier entered into by them in
good faith and for the stipulated original period. (Associated Labor
Unions (ALU-TUCP) v. Trajano, G.R. No. 77539, April 12, 1989,
172 SCRA 49, 57 citing Associated Trade Unions (ATU v. Trajano,
G.R. No. L-75321, 20 June 1988, 162 SCRA 318, 322-323)
Anent the petitioner's contention that since the expiration of the
CBA in 1987 private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and
Dacongcogon had not concluded a new CBA, We need only to

stress what was held in the case of Lopez Sugar Corporation v.

Federation of Free Workers, Philippine Labor Union Association
(G.R. No. 75700-01, 30 August 1990, 189 SCRA 179, 191) quoting
Article 253 of the Labor Code that "(i)t shall be the duty of both
parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect
the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties."
Despite the lapse of the formal effectivity of the CBA the law still
considers the same as continuing in force and effect until a new
CBA shall have been validly executed. Hence, the contract bar rule
still applies.
Besides, it should be emphasized that Dacongcogon, in its answer
stated that the CBA was extended for another three (3) years and
that the deadlock was submitted to the Labor Management Council.
All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent
Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in reversing the order of the Med-Arbiter.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED and the resolution of the
respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations is hereby
AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 115077 April 18, 1997
PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION-PIZZA
HUT, petitioner,
vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA, in his capacity as
Undersecretary of Labor, and NAGKAKAISANG LAKAS NG
MANGGAGAWA (NLM)-KATIPUNAN, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
On July 9, 1993, Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa (NLM)Katipunan (respondent Union) filed a petition for certification
election with the Department of Labor (National Capital Region) in
behalf of the rank and file employees of the Progressive
Development Corporation (Pizza Hut) docketed as NCR Case No.
NCR-OD-M-9307-020. 1

Petitioner filed on August 20, 1993, a verified Motion to Dismiss

the petition alleging fraud, falsification and misrepresentation in the
respondent. Union's registration making it void and invalid. The
motion specifically alleged that: a) respondent Union's registration
was tainted with false, forged, double or multiple signatures of
those who allegedly took part in the ratification of the respondent
Union's constitution and by-laws and in the election of its officers
that there were two sets of supposed attendees to the alleged
organizational meeting that was alleged to have taken place on June
26, 1993; that the alleged chapter is claimed to have been supported
by 318 members when in fact the persons who actually signed their
names were much less; and b) while the application for registration
of the charter was supposed to have been approved in the
organizational meeting held on June 27, 1993, the charter
certification issued by the federation KATIPUNAN was dated June
26, 1993 or one (1) day prior to the formation of the chapter, thus,
there were serious falsities in the dates of the issuance of the charter
certification and the organization meeting of the alleged chapter.
Citing other instances of misrepresentation and fraud, petitioner, on
August 29, 1993, filed a Supplement to its Motion to Dismiss, 2
claiming that:
1) Respondent Union alleged that the election of its officers was
held on June 27, 1993; however, it appears from the documents
submitted by respondent union to the BIR-DOLE that the Union's
constitution and by-laws were adopted only on July 7, 1993, hence,
there was no bases for the supposed election of officers on June 27,
1993 because as of this date, there existed no positions to which the
officers could be validly elected;
2) Voting was not conducted by secret ballot in violation of Article
241, section (c) of the Labor Code;
3) The Constitution and by Laws submitted in support of its petition
were not properly acknowledged and notarized. 3
On August 30, 1993, petitioner filed a Petition

seeking the

cancellation of the Union's registration on the grounds of fraud and

falsification, docketed as BIR Case No. 8-21-83. 5 Motion was
likewise filed by petitioner with the Med-Arbiter requesting
suspension of proceedings in the certification election case until
after the prejudicial question of the Union's legal personality is
determined in the proceedings for cancellation of registration.
However, in an Order dated September 29, 1993, 6 Med-Arbiter
Rasidali C. Abdullah directed the holding of a certification election
among petitioner's rank and file employees. The Order explained:
. . . Sumasaklaw sa Manggagawa ng Pizza Hut is a legitimate labor
organization in contemplation of law and shall remain as such until
its very charter certificate is canceled or otherwise revoked by
competent authority. The alleged misrepresentation, fraud and false
statement in connection with the issuance of the charter certificate
are collateral issues which could be properly ventilated in the
cancellation proceedings. 7
On appeal to the office of the Secretary of Labor, Labor
Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma in a Resolution dated
December 29, 1993 8 denied the same.
A motion for reconsideration of the public respondent's resolution
was denied in his Order 9 dated January 27, 1994, hence, this
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court where the principal issue raised is whether or not the
public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming
the Med-Arbiter's order to conduct a certification election among
petitioner's rank and file employees, considering that: (1)
respondent Union's legal personality was squarely put in issue; (2)
allegations of fraud and falsification, supported by documentary
evidence were made; and (3) a petition to cancel respondent Union's
registration is pending with the regional office of the Department of
Labor and Employment. 10
We grant the petition.

In the public respondent's assailed Resolution dated December 29,

1993, the suggestion is made that once a labor organization has
filed the necessary documents and papers and the same have been
certified under oath and attested to, said organization necessarily
becomes clothed with the character of a legitimate labor
organization. The resolution declares:
Records show that at the time of the filing of the subject petition on
9 July 1993 by the petitioner NLM-KATIPUNAN, for and in behalf
of its local affiliate Sumasaklaw sa Manggagawa ng Pizza Hut, the
latter has been clothed with the status and/or character of a
legitimate labor organization. This is so, because on 8 July 1993,
petitioner submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), this
Department, the following documents: Charter Certificate, Minutes
of the Organizational Meeting, List of Officers, and their respective
addresses, financial statement, Constitution and By-Laws (CBL,
and the minutes of the ratification of the CBL). Said documents
(except the charter certificate) are certified under oath and attested
to by the local union's Secretary/Treasurer and President,
respectively.
As to the contention that the certification election proceedings
should be suspended in view of the pending case for the
cancellation of the petitioner's certificate of registration, let it be
stressed that the pendency of a cancellation case is not a ground for
the dismissal or suspension of a representation proceedings
considering that a registered labor organization continues to be a
legitimate one entitled to all the rights appurtenant thereto until a
final valid order is issued canceling such registration. 11
In essence, therefore, the real controversy in this case centers on the
question of whether or not, after the necessary papers and
documents have been filed by a labor organization, recognition by
the Bureau of Labor Relations merely becomes a ministerial
function.
We do not agree.

In the first place, the public respondent's views as expressed in his

December 29, 1993 Resolution miss the entire point behind the
nature and purpose of proceedings leading to the recognition of
unions as legitimate labor organizations. Article 234 of the Labor
Code provides:
Art. 234. Requirements of registration. Any applicant labor
organization, association or group of unions or workers shall
acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and
privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon
issuance of the certificate of registration based on the following
requirements:
(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;
(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address
of the labor organization, the minutes of the organizational
meetings and the list of the workers who participated in such
meetings;
(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent
(20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to
operate;
(d) If the applicant union has been in existence for one or more
years, copies of its annual financial reports; and
(e) Four (4) copies of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant
union, minutes of its adoption or ratification, and the list of the
members who participated in it.
A more than cursory reading of the aforecited provisions clearly
indicates that the requirements embodied therein are intended as
preventive measures against the commission of fraud. After a labor
organization has filed the necessary papers and documents for
registration, it becomes mandatory for the Bureau of Labor
Relations to check if the requirements under Article 234 have been
sedulously complied with. If its application for registration is
vitiated by falsification and serious irregularities, especially those
appearing on the face of the application and the supporting
documents, a labor organization should be denied recognition as a
legitimate labor organization. And if a certificate of recognition has

been issued, the propriety of the labor organization's registration

could be assailed directly through cancellation of registration
proceedings in accordance with Articles 238 and 239 of the Labor
Code, or indirectly, by challenging its petition for the issuance of an
order for certification election.
These measures are necessary and may be undertaken
simultaneously if the spirit behind the Labor Code's
requirements for registration are to be given flesh and blood.
Registration requirements specifically afford a measure of
protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured into
joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is
to control union funds or use the labor organization for illegitimate
ends. 12 Such requirements are a valid exercise of the police power,
because the activities in which labor organizations, associations and
unions of workers are engaged directly affect the public interest and
should be protected. 13
Thus, in Progressive Development Corporation vs. Secretary of
Labor and Employment, 14 we held:
The controversy in this case centers on the requirements before a
local or chapter of a federation may file a petition for certification
election and be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent
of the petitioner's employees.
xxx xxx xxx
But while Article 257 cited by the Solicitor General directs the
automatic conduct of a certification election in an unorganized
establishment, it also requires that the petition for certification
election must be filed by a legitimate labor organization . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The employer naturally needs assurance that the union it is
dealing with is a bona-fide organization, one which has not
submitted false statements or misrepresentations to the Bureau. The
inclusion of the certification and attestation requirements will in a
marked degree allay these apprehensions of management. Not only
is the issuance of any false statement and misrepresentation or

ground for cancellation of registration (see Article 239 (a), (c) and
(d)); it is also a ground for a criminal charge of perjury.
The certification and attestation requirements are preventive
measures against the commission of fraud. They likewise afford a
measure of protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured
into joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole
purpose is to control union funds or to use the union for dubious
ends.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . It is not this Court's function to augment the requirements
prescribed by law in order to make them wiser or to allow greater
protection to the workers and even their employer. Our only
recourse is, as earlier discussed, to exact strict compliance with
what the law provides as requisites for local or chapter formation.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court's conclusion should not be misconstrued as impairing the
local union's right to be certified as the employees' bargaining agent
in the petitioner's establishment. We are merely saying that the local
union must first comply with the statutory requirements in order to
exercise this right. Big federations and national unions of workers
should take the lead in requiring their locals and chapters to
faithfully comply with the law and the rules instead of merely
snapping union after union into their folds in a furious bid with rival
federations to get the most number of members
Furthermore, the Labor Code itself grants the Bureau of Labor
Relations a period of thirty (30) days within which to review all
applications for registration. Article 235 provides:
Art. 235. Action on application. The Bureau shall act on all
applications for registration within thirty (30) days from filing.
All requisite documents and papers shall be certified under oath by
the secretary or the treasurer of the organization, as the case may
be, and attested to by its president.
The thirty-day period in the aforecited provision ensures that any
action taken by the Bureau of Labor Relations is made in
consonance with the mandate of the Labor Code, which, it bears

emphasis, specifically requires that the basis for the issuance of a

certificate of registration should be compliance with the
requirements for recognition under Article 234. Since, obviously,
recognition of a labor union or labor organization is not merely a
ministerial function, the question now arises as to whether or not
the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the Med-Arbiter's order in spite of the fact that the
question of the Union's legitimacy was squarely put in issue and
that the allegations of fraud and falsification were adequately
supported by documentary evidence.
The Labor Code requires that in organized and unorganized 15
establishments, a petition for certification election must be filed by
a legitimate labor organization. The acquisition of rights by any
union or labor organization, particularly the right to file a petition
for certification election, first and foremost, depends on whether or
not the labor organization has attained the status of a legitimate
labor organization.
In the case before us, the Med-Arbiter summarily disregarded the
petitioner's prayer that the former look into the legitimacy of the
respondent. Union by a sweeping declaration that the union was in
the possession of a charter certificate so that "for all intents and
purposes, Sumasaklaw sa Manggagawa sa Pizza Hut (was) a
legitimate labor organization." 16 Glossing over the transcendental
issue of fraud and misrepresentation raised by herein petitioner,
Med-Arbiter Rasidali Abdullah held that:
The alleged misrepresentation, fraud and false statement in
connection with the issuance of the charter certificate are collateral
issues which could be ventilated in the cancellation proceedings. 17
It cannot be denied that the grounds invoked by petitioner for the
cancellation of respondent Union's registration fall under paragraph
(a) and (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code, to wit:
(a) Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with
the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or
amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, the list of members

who took part in the ratification of the constitution and by-laws or

amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, the list of members
who took part in the ratification;
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection with
the election of officers, minutes of the election of officers, the list of
voters, or failure to submit these documents together with the list of
the newly elected-appointed officers and their postal addresses
within thirty (30) days from election.
xxx xxx xxx
The grounds ventilated in cancellation proceedings in accordance
with Article 239 of the Labor Code constitute a grave challenge to
the right of respondent Union to ask for certification election. The
Med-Arbiter should have looked into the merits of the petition for
cancellation before issuing an order calling for certification
election. Registration based on false and fraudulent statements and
documents confer no legitimacy upon a labor organization
irregularly recognized, which, at best, holds on to a mere scrap of
paper. Under such circumstances, the labor organization, not being
a legitimate labor organization, acquires no rights, particularly the
right to ask for certification election in a bargaining unit.
As we laid emphasis in Progressive Development Corporation
Labor, 18 "[t]he employer needs the assurance that the union it is
dealing with is a bona fide organization, one which has not
submitted false statements or misrepresentations to the Bureau."
Clearly, fraud, falsification and misrepresentation in obtaining
recognition as a legitimate labor organization are contrary to the
Med-Arbiter's conclusion not merely collateral issues. The
invalidity of respondent Union's registration would negate its legal
personality to participate in certification election.
Once a labor organization attains the status of a legitimate labor
organization it begins to possess all of the rights and privileges
granted by law to such organizations. As such rights and privileges
ultimately affect areas which are constitutionally protected, the
activities in which labor organizations, associations and unions are

engaged directly affect the public interest and should be zealously

protected. A strict enforcement of the Labor Code's requirements for
the acquisition of the status of a legitimate labor organization is in
order.
Inasmuch as the legal personality of respondent Union had been
seriously challenged, it would have been more prudent for the MedArbiter and public respondent to have granted petitioner's request
for the suspension of proceedings in the certification election case,
until the issue of the legality of the Union's registration shall have
been resolved. Failure of the Med-Arbiter and public respondent to
heed the request constituted a grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is
GRANTED and the Resolution and Order of the public respondent
dated December 29, 1993 and January 24, 1994, respectively, are
hereby SET ASIDE.
The case is REMANDED to the Med-Arbiter to resolve with
reasonable dispatch petitioner's petition for cancellation of
respondent Union's registration.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-45057 February 28, 1977
TODAY'S KNITTING FREE WORKERS UNION, petitioner,
vs.
DIRECTOR CARMELO C. NORIEL of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, TODAY'S
KNITTING
COMPANY, INC.,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL UNION COUNCIL respondents.
Julius A. Magno for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General
Reynato S. Puno and Solicitor Joselito B. Floro for respondent
Director Carmelo C. Noriel, etc.
Federico Director Carmelo C. Noriel, for respondent Today's
Knitting Company, Inc.
Roberto B. Capoon Phil. National Union Council.
FERNANDO, J.:
What is assailed in this certiorari and prohibition petition is an order

of respondent Director Carmelo C. Noriel requiring the holding of a

certification election to determine who shall be the exclusive
bargaining representative of the workers in respondent's Today's
Knitting Company, Inc. There was the imputation of arbitrariness in
its issuance, raising a procedural due process question. Petitioner
Union premised its claim on the contention that it has been the duly
recognized bargaining agent with an existing collective bargaining
contract. Respondents 1 were required to comment. On January 27,
1977, respondent Director did so in a pleading filed by Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General
Reyanto S. Puno. Such comment as well as that submitted by
respondent Philippine National Union Council were considered as
answers, and the petition was deemed submitted for decision. It is
quite evident even from a cursory perusal of the responsive
pleadings filed by the respondents that the challenged order is
precisely in accordance with Article 257 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines and is thus free from any infirmity. Much less could the
allegation of arbitrariness be taken seriously. There was in addition
the minor point raised that a memorandum circular of the
Department of Labor was not observed by respondent Director.
Outside of the well-settled principle that in certiorari proceedings,
only a grave abuse of discretion would call for a reversal of the
actuation complained of, a mere error of law not sufficing, it has
likewise been pointed out in the comment of the Solicitor General
that such memorandum circular, even on the assumption that there
was no compliance with it, was issued on September 5, 1974 prior
to the effectivity of the present Labor Code 2 which came into force
on November 1 of that year. Clearly, the petition lacks merit. It
could be that in its attempt to impart some measure of plausibility,
petitioner Union was far from precise in its allegation of facts. Such
a deficiency was remedied in the comment filed on behalf of
respondent Director. The matter in controversy started with the
Philippine National Union Council, on April 1, 1976, filing with the
Bureau of Labor Relations a petition for the holding of a
certification election. It set forth therein that its ranks comprise a

majority of membership at the Today's Knitting C company, Inc. It

was also stated that at the hearing of such petition, the signatures of
its members authorizing the filing of the petition would be
submitted. There was, on May 4, 1976, a petition for intervention
on behalf of petitioner Today's Knitting Free Workers Union. It saw
no need for a certification election, asserting that it had already
been voluntarily recognized by the management as the bargaining
representative. The Bureau of Labor Relations received on the same
day ten one-page resolutions by the rank-and-file employees of
respondent Today's Knitting Company, Inc. authorizing the filing of
the petition for certification election with a total of two hundred
(200) signatures. Respondent Company apparently looked with
favor on the claim of petitioner as shown by a pleading dated June
21, 1976. It affirmed the assertion that intervenor union, now
petitioner, had been recognized by management as representing the
minority of the workers. Respondent Union countered with the
allegation in a pleading dated June 29, 1976 that there was no legal
bar to the petition for certification. On July 19, 1976, the MedArbiter Eusebio M. Jimenez issued an order granting the petition
for certification election. The matter was then appealed to the
Bureau of Labor Relations. On September 9, 1976, respondent
Director issued the challenged order denying the appeal. It ordered
a certification election to be conducted by the Bureau within twenty
days from receipt of the resolution. Hence this certiorari and
prohibition petition with this Court. 3
As set forth at the outset, the petition cannot prosper.
1. To sustain what on its face appears to be an insubstantial claim of
failure to abide by statutory command as set forth in the Labor
Code, petitioner would interpret its Article 257 of requiring that it
be afforded the right to examine the alleged signatures of the
employees comprising at least the 30% of the bargaining unit
desirous of holding a certification election. That is a rather strained
construction. The statutory provision reads:
Requisites for certification election.Any petition for certification
election filed by any legitimate labor organization shall be

supported by the written consent of at least 30% of all the

employees in the bargaining unit. Upon receipt and verification of
such petition, it shall be mandatory for the Bureau to conduct a
certification election for the purpose of determining the
representative of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit
and certify the winner as the exclusive collective bargaining
representative of all the employees in the unit. it speaks clearly and
categorically. There is no element of ambiguity. What is required is
that the petition for certification election should have in its favor
"the written consent of at least 30% of all the employees in the
bargaining unit. 4 The duty then cast on the Detector of Labor
Relations is to ascertain whether there has been such a compliance.
There is no doubt in this case there was evidence that more than a
total of two-hundred signatures were obtained by respondent Union
in seeking such a certification election. The respondent Director
having satisfied himself that the codal requisite had been met, he
had no choice but to order such certification. In the language of the
above provision, "it shall be mandatory for the Bureau to conduct a
certification election for the purpose of determining the
representative of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit
and certify the winner as the exclusive collective bargaining
representative of all the employees in the unit." There is, therefore,
no basis for the contention that a duty is cast on respondent Director
to allow a rival labor organization, such as petitioner, to verify the
authenticity of such signatures. At any rate, if there is any doubt as
to the required number having been met, what better way is there
than the holding of a certification election to ascertain which union
really commands the allegiance of the rank-and-file employees.
2. The comment of the Solicitor General likewise included this
excerpt from this Court's recent decision in Philippine Association
of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations: 5 "Petitioner's
contention to the effect that the 30% requirement should be satisfied
suffers from an ever graver flaw. It fails to distinguish between the
right of a labor organization to be able to persuade 30% of the labor
force to petition for a certification election, in which case

respondent Bureau is left with no choice but to order it, and the
power of such governmental agency precisely entrusted with the
implementation of the collective bargaining process to determine,
considering the likelihood that there may be several unions within a
bargaining unit to order such an election precisely for the purpose
of ascertaining which of them shall be the exclusive bargaining
representative. The decision of respondent bureau of April 14, 1975
was intended for that purpose. That was why not only petitioner but
also the Philippine Federation of Labor, the National Labor Union,
the National Federation of Labor Unions and the Samahan ng mga
Manggagawa at Kawani sa AG&P were included in the list of Labor
Unions that could be voted on. To reiterate a thought already
express what could be more appropriate than such a procedure if the
goal desired is to enable labor to determine which of the competing
organizations should represent if for the purpose of a collective
bargaining contract? How then can it be seriously asserted that the
decision now appealed could be stigmatized as contrary to law?"6
3. Such a holding reinforces the correctness of a decision arrived at
by respondent Director and negates even more conclusively the
imputation of arbitrariness. It is not amiss to state that petitioner has
the same office address as Philippine Association of Free Labor
Unions in Tondo, Manila. So with its counsel, Attorney Julius A.
Magno. While it is a different member of the bar who appeared for
such labor organization in the case abovecited, it thus appears that a
more diligent study of pertinent decisions could have avoided the
filing of this suit and thus hasten the effective and speedy
implementation of the statutory scheme to have a certification
election conducted precisely for the purpose of living true to the
concept of industrial democracy. For the present, it suffices tip call
the attention of counsel to the desirability of being acquainted with
applicable decisions, especially one that strikes so close to home,
even if, or perhaps more precisely when, the ruling is adverse to
one's claim. That is to live true to his duty as an officer of the court
on whose trustworthiness reliance may be placed.
4. No much attention need be paid, as pointed out in the comment

of the Solicitor General, to the allegation in the petition that a

memorandum circular of the Secretary of Labor dated September 5,
1974 was disregarded by respondent Director. It is true there was
therein stated that where there is a bona fide union comprising the
majority voluntarily recognized and in the process of negotiating a
contract, an application for a certification election should not be
entertained. In the first place, a memorandum circular certainly
cannot prevail as against the very language of the statute. That is
merely to state the obvious. In the second place, as pointed out by
the Solicitor General, from and after November 1, 1974 when the
present Labor Code became effective, previous circulars of the
secretary of labor to take care of the transitional stage prior to its
coming into force, certainly were deemed superseded. From any
standpoint then, it cannot be gainsaid that the petition certainly
lacks juridical basis. This Court is not called upon then to exercise
its power to grant certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse
of discretion. No abuse has been shown, much less one amounting
to arbitrariness of sufficient gravity to call for the issuance of the
writs prayed for.
G.R. Nos. 94929-30 March 18, 1992
PORT WORKERS UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (PWUP),
petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, ATTY.
ANASTACIO L. BACTIN, MED-ARBITER NCR-DOLE,
Public Respondents; INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER
TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., (ICTSI) and ASSOCIATED
PORT CHECKERS AND WORKERS UNION (APCWU),
Private Respondents; SANDIGAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA
DAUNGAN
(SAMADA)
and
PORT
EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION AND LABOR UNION (PEALU), Nominal
Private Respondents, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:

There was muffled excitement among the workers of the

International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI) because its
collective bargaining agreement with private respondents Associate
Port Checkers and Workers Union (APCWU), the incumbent union,
was due to expire on April 14, 1990. Other unions were seeking to
represent the laborers in the negotiation of the next CBA and were
already plotting their moves.
The first challenge to APCWU was hurled on March 14, 1990,
when the Sandigan ng Manggagawa sa Daungan (SAMADA) filed
a petition for certification election. The consent signatures of at
least 25% of the employees in the bargaining unit were submitted
on March 26, 1990, or eleven days after the petition.
On April 2, 1990, herein petitioner Port Workers Union of the
Philippines (PWUP) filed a petition for intervention.
Still another petition for certification election was filed by the Port
Employees Association and Labor Union (PEALU), on April 6,
1990. The consent signatures were submitted on May 11, 1990, or
thirty-five days after the filing of the petition.
The petitions of SAMADA and PEALU were consolidated for joint
decision. On April 26, 1990, APCWU filed a motion to dismiss
them on the ground that they did not comply with the requirement
set forth in Section 6, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules,
quoted in part as follows:
In a petition involving an organized establishment or enterprise
where the majority status of the incumbent collective bargaining
union is questioned through a verified petition by a legitimate labor
organization, the Med-Arbiter shall immediately order the
certification election by secret ballot if the petition is filed during
the last sixty (60) days of the collective bargaining agreement and
supported by the written consent of at least twenty-five percent
(25%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit. Any petition filed
before or after the sixty-day freedom period shall be dismissed
outright. The twenty-five percent (25%) requirement shall be
satisfied upon the filing of the petition, otherwise the petition shall
be dismissed. (Emphasis supplied.)

Specifically, APCWU faulted both petitions for non-compliance

with the requirement for the 25% consent signatures at the time of
filing. This contention was upheld by the Med-Arbiter in an order
dated June 5, 1990, dismissing the consolidated petitions.1
PWUP appealed to the Secretary of Labor on June 28, 1990,
arguing that Article 256 of the Labor Code did not require the
written consent to be submitted simultaneously with the petition for
certification election. The principal petitioners did not appeal. On
August 21, 1990, DOLE Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma
affirmed the order of the Med-Arbiter and dismissed PWUP's
appeal. 2
Thereafter, ICTSI and APCWU resumed negotiations for a new
collective bargaining agreement, which was concluded on
September 28, 1990. This was ratified on October 7, 1990, by a
majority of the workers in the bargaining unit, i.e., 910 out of the
1,223 members, and subsequently registered with the DOLE.
PWUP is now before us, claiming grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the public respondent in the application of Article 256 of the
Labor Code. The article provides in part as follows:
Art. 256. Representation issue in organized establishments. In
organized establishments, when a verified petition questioning the
majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent is filed before the
Department of Labor and Employment within the sixty-day period
before the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, the
Med-Arbiter shall automatically order an election by secret ballot
when the verified petition is supported by the written consent of at
least twenty-five (25%) percent of all the employees in the
bargaining unit to ascertain the will of the employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit. . . .
The petitioner argues that under this article, the Med-Arbiter should
automatically order election by secret ballot when the petition is
supported by at least 25% of all employees in the bargaining unit.
SAMADA and PEALU substantially complied with the law when

they submitted the required consent signatures several days after

filing the petition. The petitioner complains that the dismissal of the
petitions for certification election, including its own petition for
intervention, had the effect of indirectly certifying APCWU as the
sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the ICTSI
employees.
Private respondent ICTSI maintains that the dismissal was based on
Article 256 of the Labor Code as implemented by Section 6, Rule V,
Book V of the Implementing Rules, quoted above. Moreover, under
Section 10, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, decisions of
the Secretary in certification election cases shall be final and
unappealable.
ICTSI also cites the following ruling of this Court in Tupas v.
Inciong: 3
We find no merit in the petition. As observed by the Solicitor
General, while the petition of TUPAS for a certification election
may have the written support of 30 per cent of all the workers of the
bargaining unit, it is also an undisputed fact that UMI (the rival
union of TUPAS) has a clear majority of the said workers, as shown
by the fact that 499 workers out of the total working force of 641
have not only ratified the collective bargaining agreement
concluded between UMI and LUSTEVECO, but also affirmed their
membership in UMI so that there is no more need for holding a
certification election. (Emphasis supplied.)
For its part, APCWU questions PWUP's personality in these
proceedings in view of the lack of consent signatures in its petition,
and argues as well that the petitioner has no authority to represent
SAMADA or PEALU, which had not appealed. The private
respondent also invokes Tupas and maintains that the ratification of
the new CBA by the majority of the workers was an affirmation of
their membership in the union that negotiated that agreement.
In his own Comment, the Solicitor General agrees with the
petitioner that there has been substantial compliance with the

requirements of the law. He submits that Article 256 should be

liberally interpreted pursuant to Article 4 of the Labor Code, stating
as follows:
Art. 4. Construction in favor of labor. All doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code
including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved
in favor of labor.
The Court has deliberated on the arguments of the parties in their
respective pleadings and finds for the petitioner.
We have held that pursuant to the constitutional provision
guaranteeing workers the right to self-organization and collective
bargaining, "the constant and unwavering policy of this Court" has
been "to require a certification election as the best means of
ascertaining which labor organization should be the collective
bargaining representative." 4
The certification election is the most democratic and expeditious
method by which the laborers can freely determine the union that
shall act as their representative in their dealings with the
establishment where they are working. 5 As we stressed in Belyca
Corporation vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 6 the holding of a certification
election is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented.
This Court also held in Western Agusan Workers Union-Local 101
of the United Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines vs.
Trajano: 7
. . . it has long been settled that the policy of the Labor Code is
indisputably partial to the holding of a certification election so as to
arrive in a manner definitive and certain concerning the choice of
the labor organization to represent the workers in a collective
bargaining unit. Conformably to said basic concept, this Court
recognized that the Bureau of Labor Relations in the exercise of
sound discretion, may order a certification election notwithstanding
the failure to meet the 30% requirement. (Scout Ramon V. Albano

Memorial College v. Noriel, 85 SCRA 494 [1978]; Vicmico

Industrial Wokers Asso. v. Noriel, 131 SCRA 569 [1984])
In line with the policy, we feel that the administrative rule requiring
the simultaneous submission of the 25% consent signatures upon
the filing of petition for certification election should not be strictly
applied to frustrate the determination of the legitimate
representative of the workers. Significantly, the requirement in the
rule is not found in Article 256, the law it seeks to implement. This
is all the more reason why the regulation should at best be given
only a directory effect. Accordingly, we hold that the mere filing of
a petition for certification election within the freedom period is
sufficient basis for the issuance of an order for the holding of a
certification election, 8 subject to the submission of the consent
signatures within a reasonable period from such filing.
This interpretation is consonant with Philippine Association of Free
Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 9 where we declared:
. . . even conceding that the statutory requirement of 30% of the
labor force asking for a certification election had not been strictly
complied with, respondent Director is still empowered to order that
it be held precisely for the purpose of ascertaining which (of the
contending labor organizations) shall be the exclusive collective
bargaining representative. (National Mines and Allied Workers
Union v. Luna, et al., 83 SCRA 607)
It is not denied that the petition to intervene filed by PWUP did not
carry the 25% consent signatures, but that the requirement is in fact
not applicable to a petition in intervention. We so held in PAFLU v.
Ferrer-Calleja thus: 10
It is crystal clear from the said provisions that the requisite written
consent of at least 20% of the workers in the bargaining unit applies
to petitioners for certification election only and not to motions for
intervention. . . . As long as the motion for intervention has been
properly and timely filed and the intervention would not cause any
injustice to anyone, it should not be denied and this is so even if the

eventual purpose of the Motion for Intervention is to participate in

the Certification Election. After all, the original applicant had
already met the 20% requirement.
The contention that the petitioners had no right to represent the
principal petitioners which had not appealed the dismissal order is
also not acceptable. We repeat that the certification election is not
litigation but a mere investigation of a non-adversary character
where the rules of procedure are not strictly applied. 11 Technical
rules and objections should not hamper the correct ascertainment of
the labor union that has the support of confidence of the majority of
the workers and is thus entitled to represent them in their dealings
with management.
The above-quoted decision affirms the right of PWUP to call for the
holding of the election although it was initially only an intervenor.
That recognition should not be defeated by the circumstance that
the other petitioning unions have not seen fit to appeal the dismissal
of their petitions even if such dismissal was questionable and is in
fact being reversed here. The petition for intervention was viable at
the time it was filed because the principal petitions had complied
with the requirement for the consent signatures as specified by
Article 256. Hence, its intervention should not be disallowed simply
because of the withdrawal or failure to appeal of SAMADA and
PEALU.
It is correct to say that as a matter of strict procedure, a petition for
intervention should be deemed automatically dismissed where the
principal petition itself fails. However, that technical rule should be
allowed to prevent a correct determination of the real representative
of the workers in line with their constitutional rights to selforganization and collective bargaining.
Regarding the invocation of Inciong by the private respondents, the
Court has modified that decision in Associated Labor Unions vs.
Calleja, 12 where we held:
Finally, the petitioner assails the decision of the respondent Director
on the ground that "the ratification of the collective bargaining
agreement renders the certification election moot and academic."

This contention finds no basis in law.

The petitioner was obviously referring to the contract-bar rule
where the law prohibits the holding of certification elections during
the lifetime of the collective bargaining agreement. Said agreement
was hastily and prematurely entered into apparently in an attempt to
avoid the holding of a certification election.
Deviation from the contract-bar rule is justified only where the need
for industrial stability is clearly shown to be imperative. 13Subject to
this singular exception, contracts where the identity of the
authorized representative of the workers is in doubt must be
rejected in favor of a more certain indication of the will of the
workers. As we stated in Philippine Association of Free Labor
Union vs. Estrella, 14any stability that does not establish the type of
industrial peace contemplated by the law must be subordinated to
the employees' freedom to choose their real representative.
The private respondents contend that the overwhelming ratification
of the CBA is an affirmation of their membership in the bargaining
agent, rendering the representation issue moot and academic and
conclusively barring the holding of a certification election thereon.
That conclusion does not follow. Even Tupas did not say that the
mere ratification of the CBA by the majority of the workers
signified their affirmation of membership in the negotiating union.
That case required, first, ratification of the CBA, the second,
affirmation of membership in the negotiating union. The second
requirement has not been established in the case at bar as the record
does not show that the majority of the workers, besides ratifying the
new CBA, have also formally affiliated with APCWU.
Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules implementing the
Labor Code provides that the representation case shall not be
adversely affected by a collective agreement submitted before or
during the last 60 days of a subsisting agreement orduring the
pendency of the representation case. As the new CBA was entered
into at the time when the representation case was still pending, it
follows that it cannot be recognized as the final agreement between
the ICTSI and its workers.

On the allegation that the decision of the Secretary of Labor on

certification election is final and inappealable, this Court held inSan
Miguel Corp. v. Secretary of Labor 15 that:
It is generally understood that as to administrative agencies
exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power there is an underlying
power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on
questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is
given by statute. (73, C.J.S. 506, note 56). . . . judicial review is
proper in case of lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion.
error of law, fraud or collusion (Timbancaya v. Vicente, 82 O.G.
9424; Macatangay v. Secretary of Public Works and
Communication, 63 O.G. 11236; Ortua v. Singson Encarnacion, 59
Phil. 440).
There was indeed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondents when they
dismissed the petitions for certification election because the consent
signatures had not been submitted simultaneously with the petition.
The issue of majority representation thus remains open and awaits
settlement. Following the rulings above-quoted, we hereby declare
that the newly-concluded CBA cannot constitute a bar to the
holding of a certification election.
It is possible that the APCWU will prevail in the certification
election, in which event the new CBA it concluded with ICTSI will
be upheld and recognized. It is also possible that another union will
be chosen, in which event it will have to enter into its own
negotiations with ICTSI that may result in the adoption of a new
CBA. In the meantime, however, the old CBA having expired, it is
necessary to lay down the rules regulating the relations of the
workers with the management. For this reason, the Court hereby
orders that the new CBA concluded by ICTSI and APCWU shall
remain effective between the parties, subject to the result and
effects of the certification election to be called.
The certification election is the best method of determining the will
of the workers on the crucial question of who shall represent them
in their negotiations with the management for a collective

bargaining agreement that will best protect and promote their

interests. It is essential that there be no collusion against this
objective between an unscrupulous management and a union
covertly supporting it while professing its loyalty to labor, or at
least that the hopes of labor be not frustrated because of its
representation by a union that does not enjoy its approval and
support. It is therefore sound policy that any doubt regarding the
real representation of the workers be resolved in favor of the
holding of the certification election. This is preferable to the
suppression of the voice of the workers through the prissy
observance of technical rules that will exalt procedure over
substantial justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged order
dated August 21, 1990, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
public respondent is DIRECTED to schedule and hold certification
election among the workers of the International Container Terminal
Services, Inc., this to be done with all possible dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 80612-16 December 29, 1989
AIRTIME SPECIALISTS, INC., ABSOLUTE SOUND, INC.,
COUNTRY WEALTH DEVELOPMENT CORP., AD
PLANNERS & MARKETING COUNSELLORS, INC., and
ATLAS RESOURCES & MANAGEMENT GROUP, petitioners,
vs.
HON. DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS PURA FERRERCALLEJA, LABOR REGULATION OFFICER EUSEBIO
JIMENEZ, MED-ARBITER MANASES T. CRUZ, SAMAHAN
NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA ASIA (SAMA-ASIA)-FFW
CHAPTER and PINAGBUKLOD NG MGA MANGGAGAWA
SA ATACO (PMA)-FFW CHAPTER, respondents.
Ruben F. Santos Law Office for petitioners.
PARAS, J.:

This certiorari proceeding was filed by petitioners to assail the

orders of respondent Med-Arbiter Manases T. Cruz and Director of
Labor Relations Pura Ferrer-Calleja ordering a certification
election.
The pertinent background facts are as follows:
Respondent Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Asia-FFW Chapter
(SAMA-ASIA, for short) filed with the National Capital Region,
Ministry of Labor and Employment, on May 22, 1986, two separate
petitions for direct certification and/or certification election on
behalf of the regular rank-and-file employees of the petitioners
Airtime Specialists and Absolute Sound, Inc. The other respondent
Pinagbuklod ng Manggagawa sa Ataco-FFW Chapter (PMA for
short) also filed with the same office, on the same day, similar
separate petitions in behalf of the regular rank and file employees of
petitioners Country Wealth Development, Ad Planner and
Marketing Counsellors and Atlas Resources.
All these five cases were consolidated.
Petitioners filed their position paper with motion to dismiss on the
following grounds-disaffiliation of the rank and file employees,
ineligibility of some signatories because they had less than one (1)
year of service resulting in the non-compliance with the 30%
requirement.
On March 9, 1987, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order the dispositive
portion of which reads
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a certification election is
hereby ordered conducted among the rank and file employees of the
Airtime Specialists, Inc.; Absolute Sound, Inc.; Commonwealth
Development Corporation; Ad Planners & Mktg. Corp.; and Atlas
Resources & Management Group, within 20 days from receipt of
this Order. The parties are:
1. Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Asia (SAMA-ASIA) FFW
Chapter & Pinagbuklod ng mga Manggagawa sa Ataco (PMAFFW); and
2. No union.
Pre-election conference shall be conducted to thresh out the details

of the election.
SO ORDERED. (p. 25, Rollo)
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied, they
filed the instant petition for "Certiorari and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction" with a Prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order enjoining public respondents from
conducting any further proceedings in the said five cases.
The petition was given due course and the parties were required to
submit simultaneously their respective memoranda.
In assailing the aforesaid Order of public respondents, petitioners
alleged that
I. Public respondents (Director Calleja and Med-Arbiter Cruz)
gravely erred in considering employees with less than one year of
service, and even probationaries as qualified participants in a
certification election process; in direct violation of the ruling of this
Honorable Court in the Tarnate vs. Noriel case;
II. Public respondents gravely erred in not considering proven
disaffiliation and resignations from a petitioning union worse, from
the company, and valid termination for cause from the service as
material consideration to support a petition for certification and/or
election.
III. Public respondent Director Calleja gravely misinterpreted the
ruling of this Honorable Court in the case of Albano vs. Noriel, 85
SCRA 499, even as she held that, notwithstanding the absence of
the statutory consent requirement of 30% (now 20%), the Bureau of
Labor Relations can in every such case still order a certification
election, giving the wrong impression that such exercise of
discretion is absolute. (pp. 12-15, Rollo)
Thus, petitioners argue that the public respondents committed grave
abuse of discretion when they considered (a) employees with less
than one year of service and even (b) probationary employees as
qualified participants in the certification election process. They
contend that "by the very fact that such (probationary)-employees
have not earned regular status, they are not of the bargaining unit".
(Reply, p. 21). Petitioners maintain that this, "directly violates" the

ruling of this Court in Tarnate vs. Noriel, (100 SCRA 93) where it
held that "at least one year of service is required for an employee to
enjoy the benefits of membership in any labor union."
Petitioners' contentions are untenable. It is Our holding in the case
of B.F. Goodrich Phils., Inc. vs. B.F. Goodrich Confidential &
Salaried Employees Union-NATU (49 SCRA 532) that the
objectives of the Industrial Peace Act would be sooner attained if at
the earliest opportunity the employees, all of them, in an
appropriate bargaining unit be pooled to determine which labor
organization should be its exclusive representative. This Court had
made it clear that We should give discretion to the Court of
Industrial Relations, or in this case, the Bureau of Labor Relations
in deciding whether or not to grant a petition for certification
election considering the facts and circumstances of which it has
intimate knowledge. Moreover, a perusal of Art. 258 of the Labor
Code as amended by Presidential Decree No. 442 reveals that
compliance with the 30% requirement (now 20%) makes it
mandatory upon the Bureau of Labor Relations to order the holding
of a certification election in order to determine the exclusivebargaining agent of the employees. Stated otherwise, it means that
with such, the Bureau is left without any discretion but to order the
holding of certification election. Parenthetically, where the petition
is supported by less than 30% (now 20%) the Bureau of Labor
Relations has discretion whether or not to order the holding of
certification election depending on the circumstances of the case.
Thus, it is Our holding in LVN Pictures vs. Musicians Guild, et al.
(1 SCRA 132) that in connection with certification election, the
Court of Industrial Relations enjoys a wide discretion in
determining the procedure necessary to insure a fair and free choice
of bargaining representatives by employees, and having exercised
its sound discretion, this Court cannot interfere. (Arguelles v.
Young, 153 SCRA 690).
In a certification election all rank-and-file employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit are entitled to vote. This principle is
clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the

"labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the

employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive
representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of
collective bargaining." Collective bargaining covers all aspects of
the employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the
certified union binds all employees in the bargaining unit. Hence,
all rank-and-file employees, probationary or permanent, have a
substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative.
The Code makes no distinction as to their employment status as
basis for eligibility in supporting the petition for certification
election. The law refers to "all" the employees in the bargaining
unit. All they need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong
to the "bargaining unit.".
The case of Tarnate vs. Noriel relied upon by petitioners has no
application in certification election. That case involves the right of
probationary employee to vote in the election of union officers.
Petitioner argue at length that more than a majority of the
signatories to the petitions for certification election "have
disaffiliated from the two private respondent unions (PMA-FFW
and SAMA-ASIA-FFW) and have joined another union (ADLO)."
Petitioners then contend that, with the mass disaffiliation the
petition for certification would fall short of the 20% consent
requirement of the Labor Code.
Even assuming the fact of such disaffiliation and even assuming
further that the 20% requirement is not reached, this will not defeat
the petition for certification election. On the contrary, it becomes
more imperative to conduct one. The alleged disaffiliation from the
petitioning unions (PMA-FFW and SAMA-ASIA-FFW) in favor of
the ADLO-KMU raised a genuine representation issue which can
best be tested in a certification election. In VICMICO Industrial
Workers Association (VWA) vs. The Honorable Carmelo Noriel, et
al. (131 SCRA 569) this Court ruled upon the same argument. Thus:
On the issue that more than 600 bona fide rank and file members of
VIWA had disaffiliated with respondents NFSW, this Court had
occasion to state what should be followed in case of withdrawal or

retraction of signatures. In National Mines and Allied Workers

Union vs. Luna, 83 SCRA 607, it was held that the " best forum for
determining whether there were indeed retractions from some of the
laborers is the certification election itself wherein the workers can
freely express their choice in a secret ballot ... To hold otherwise
would be violative of the liberal approach constantly followed by
this Court in matters of certification elections.
In the same vein, in George and Peter Lines, Inc. vs. ALU, et al.,
134 SCRA 82, where it was alleged that 80% of the membership of
the Union had withdrawn but the union claimed that the
withdrawals were involuntary, the Court held that "the best forum to
determine if there was indeed undue pressure exerted upon the
employees to retract their membership is in the certification election
itself."
The employees have the constitutional right to choose the labor
organization which they desire to join. The exercise of such right
would be rendered nugatory and ineffectual if they would be denied
the opportunity to choose in a certification election, which is not a
litigation, but a mere investigation of a non-adversary character, the
bargaining unit to represent them (NAMAWUMIF vs. Estrella, 87
SCRA 84). The holding of a certification election is a statutory
policy that should not be circumvented (ATU vs. Noriel, 89 SCRA
264).
G.R. No. 79347 January 26, 1989
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS
(SEPTEMBER CONVENTION), petitioner,
vs.
DIRECTOR PURA FERRER CALLEJA of the Bureau of
Labor Relations, Kalipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino
Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hundred Island
Chemical Corporation and Hundred Island Chemical
Corporation, respondents.

PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a special civil action for certiorari, questioning the
order of respondent Director dated 27, July 1987,.which in part
states:
xxx
Without going into the merits of the above-entitled case this office
finds that the best forum to determine once and for all whether or
not herein appellant-intervenor commands support of the rank-andfile in the unit is through the process of a certification election.
WHEREFORE, in view thereof, Appellant-Intervenor, Kalipunan
ng Manggagawang Pilipino is hereby included as one of the
contending unions.
Let, therefore, a certification election proceed without any further
delay, with the following choices:
1. Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hundred Island
Chemical Corporation;
2. Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (September
Convention) and 3. Kalipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 26-27, Rollo)
The basic facts of this case are undisputed:
A petition for certification election among the rank-and-file workers
of the Hundred Island Chemical Corporation was filed with the
Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) by respondent Malayang
Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hundred Island Chemical
Corporation (Samahan, for short) and was docketed as BLR Case

No. A-6-201-87. A motion to intervene, accompanied by the written

consent of twenty percent (20%) of the rank-and-file employees of
the said corporation was filed by petitioner Philippine Association
of Free Labor Unions (September Convention), or PAFLU, on 27
April 1987, Likewise the Katipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino
(KAMAPI, for brevity) flied its motion to intervene on 1 June 1987
but unaccompanied by a similar written consent of the employer's
workers. Due to such want of a written consent, PAFLU moved for
the striking out of KAMAPI's motion for intervention. Acting on
said motion, Med-Arbiter Renato D. Parungo issued an order dated
8 June 1987 denying KAMAPI's motion for intervention and
allowing PAFLU's inclusion in the certification election. On 17
June 1987, KAMAPI appealed the said Med-Arbiter's order to the
respondent Director of the BLR, who issued the afore-quoted order.
Thus, on 17 August 1987, this petition was filed. And as prayed for
in the said petition, We issued a temporary restraining order dated
24, August 1987. Respondent Samahan has contested the issuance
of said restraining order and has prayed that it be lifted since the
delay of the certification election only defeats the constitutional
right of labor to organize.
The main issue in this petition was aptly deposited by the Solicitor
General in his consolidated comment; Whether or not KAMAPI
should be allowed to participate in a certification election thru a
motion for intervention without a prior showing that it has the
required support expressed in the written consent of at least twenty
(20%) percent of all employees in the collective bargaining unit. In
taking the negative stance, petitioner cites Section 6, Rule V of the
Rules Implementing Executive Order No. 111, which reads:
SEC. 6. PROCEDURE. Upon receipt of a petition, the Regional
Director shall assign the case to a Med-Arbiter for appropriate
action. The Med-Arbiter shall have twenty (20) working days
within which to grant or dismiss the petition. In a petition filed by a
legitimate organization involving an unorganized establishment, the

Med-Arbiter shall grant the petition upon verification that the same
is supported by the written consent of at least twenty (20%) of all
the employees in the collective bargaining unit, the twenty (20%)
support shall be satisfied upon the filing of the petition for
certification election, otherwise, the petition shall be dismissed. In
either case, he shall cite the ground.
Pertinent to the above rule is Section 7 of E.O. 111 to which the
former relates, and which provides:
SEC. 7. Articles 257 and 258 of the Labor Code of the Philippines
are hereby amended to read as follows:
xxx
Art. 258. Petitions in unorganized establishments. In any
establishment where there is no certified bargaining agent, the
petition for certification election filed by a legitimate labor
organization shall be supported by the written consent of at least
twenty (20%) percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit.
Upon receipt of such petition, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically
order the conduct of a certification election.
Considering the above provisions of law, We rule to dismiss the
instant petition for certiorari. The respondent Director did not abuse
her discretion in issuing the contested order. It is crystal clear from
the said provisions that the requisite written consent of at least 20%
of the workers in the bargaining unit applies to petitioners for
certification election only, and not to motions for intervention.
Nowhere in the aforesaid legal provisions does it appear that a
motion for intervention in a certification election must be
accompanied by a similar written consent. Not even in the
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code (see Rule V, Rules
Implementing the Labor Code). Obviously, the percentage
requirement pertains only to the petition for certification election,

and nothing else.

This leads Us to the question of purpose. the reason behind the 20%
requirement is to ensure that the petitioning union has a substantial
interest in the representation proceedings ** and, as correctly
pointed out by the Solicitor General, that a considerable number of
workers desire their representation by the said petitioning union for
collective bargaining purposes. Hence, the mere fact that 20% of
the workers in the bargaining unit signify their support to the
petition by their written consent, it becomes mandatory on the part
of the Med-Arbiter to order the holding of a certification election in
an unorganized establishment (Samahang Manggagawa ng Pacific
Mills, Inc. vs. Noriel, 134 SCRA 152). The 20% requirement,
thereof, is peculiar to petitions for certification election.
In the light of the foregoing, KAMAPI must be allowed to
participate in the certification election since the essence of such
proceeding is to settle once and for all which union is preferred by
the workers to represent them (PAFLU vs. BLR, 69 SCRA 132;
PAFLU vs. BLR, 72 SCRA 396). As long as the motion for
intervention has been properly and timely filed and the intervention
would not cause any injustice to anyone, it should not be denied and
this is so even if the eventual purpose of the motion for intervention
is to participate in the certification election. After all the original
applicant had already met the 20% requirement.
G.R. No. 97568 February 4, 1992
CELINE MARKETING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, UNDERSECRETARY OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and CONFEDERATION OF
FILIPINO WORKERS (CFW), respondents.
Jesus C. Gentiles for petitioner.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
Celine Marketing Corporation filed a petition for certiorari to

review the resolution dated March 5, 1991, of the Undersecretary of

Labor and Employment, Bienvenido Laguesma, ordering the
holding of a certification election among its rank-and-file
employees, as prayed for in a petition filed on August 26, 1990, by
the Confederation of Filipino Workers (or CFW), praying that it be
certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank-and-file
employees of the petitioner.
On September 10, 1990, the petition was amended to include all the
rank-and-file employees of the petitioner in its outlets at LandmarkMakati; Shoppesville-Greenhills; SM-North: Ginza-EsperanzaShoe Mart; SM Car Park-Celine Marketing; Gold Crest-Makati;
Greenbelt-Celine: Makati Ginza-Esperanza-Tesoro Building;
Mabini-Celine, Mabini; Escolta-Celine, Escolta; and Escolta GinzaEsperanza Escolta, comprising more or less 100 employees.
The petitioner moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that the
CFW had not been authorized by a majority of the rank-and file
employees, and that it failed to submit a copy of the charter
certificate issued to the local union.
At the hearing before the Labor Arbiter on October 16, 1991, CFW
submitted a xerox copy of the charter certificate issued to its local
union, "Celine Marketing Corp. Workers Chapter-CFW."
The petitioner moved to strike it from the records for nonproduction of the original and for lack of proof that the
organizational documents of the union had been filed with the
Bureau of Labor Relations.
On October 19, 1990, the Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition on
those grounds.
The union appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, who, on March 5, 1991, through Undersecretary
Bienvenido Laguesma, granted the appeal. The dispositive portion
of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby granted and the order appealed
from set aside. A new order is hereby entered directing the conduct
of a certification election among the rank-and-file employees of
Celine Marketing Corporation/Ginza Esperanza, and all its outlets

at Landmark-Makati; Shoppesville-Greenhills: SM-North. Ginza

Esperanza Shoe Mart, SM-Car Park-Celine Marketing; Gold CrestMakati-Celine Makati; Greenbelt-Celine; Makati Ginza EsperanzaTesoro Building; Mabini-Celine Mabini; Escolta-Celine Escolta;
Escolta Ginza Esperanza Escolta with the following choices:
1. CFW-Celine Marketing Corp. Workers Chapter: and
2. No Union.
The payroll three (3) months prior to the filing of the petition shall
be the basis for determining the list of eligible voters.
Let therefore, the pertinent records of the case be forwarded to the
Office of origin for the conduct of certification election."(pp. 12-13,
Rollo.)
Hence, this petition for certiorari in which petitioner assails the
resolution of respondent Undersecretary Laguesma on the grounds
that:
1. The Undersecretary of Labor and Employment acted in excess
of jurisdiction in setting aside the Med-Arbiter's order to conduct a
certification election because the appeal of CFW was addressed to
the Secretary of Labor & Employment himself who could not
delegate the power of review to the Undersecretary.
2. The Undersecretary of Labor & Employment erred in setting
aside the Med-Arbiter's order despite the failure of the private
respondent to comply with the mandatory requirements in Section
3. Rule II. Book V of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations of the
Labor Code as amended.
The petition has no merit.
The issuance of the questioned resolution by Undersecretary of
Labor Laguesma was not irregular for he did so authority of the
Secretary of Labor & Employment. Not having been repudiated or
reversed by the head of office, that resolution has the force and
effect of a resolution of the Secretary himself. (Hannibal Bridge Co.
vs. U.S., 221 U.S. 194, 55 L. ed. 699, 31 CT. 603; Alvord vs. U.S.,
95 U.S. 356, 24 L. ed. 414; pp. 53-54, 2 Am. Jur. 2d.)
While it may be true that the petition for certification election did
not carry the authorization of a majority of the rank-and file

employees of the petitioner, their consent is not necessary when the

bargaining unit that the union seeks to represent, is still
unorganized. The petition for certification election may be filed by
any union, not by the employees. Thus, Article 257 of the Labor
Code, as amended by R.A. 6715, provides:
Art. 257.
Petitions in unorganized establishments. In any
establishment where there is no certified bargaining agent, a
certification election shall automatically be conducted by the MedArbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor
organization.
The law assumes that the union is the real party in interest in a
petition for certification election. Anyway, the certification election
itself is the appropriate forum for the employees to express their
choice of a bargaining representative or none at all.
G.R. No. 92391 July 3, 1992
PHILIPPINE FRUITS AND VEGETABLE INDUSTRIES,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment and TRADE UNION
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES (TUPAS),
respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari with prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction assails
the following:
(1) The Resolution dated December 12, 1989 of public respondent
Secretary of Labor 1 affirming on appeal the Order dated March 7,
1989 issued by Med-Arbiter Danilo T. Basa, and certifying private
respondent Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (or
TUPAS) as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all regular
rank-and-file and seasonal workers at Philippine Fruits and
Vegetable Industries, Inc. (or PFVII), petitioner herein; and
(2) The Order dated February 8, 1990 issued by public respondent

Secretary of Labor 2 denying petitioner's Urgent Motion for

Reconsideration.
Petitioner PFVII contends the questioned resolution and order are
null and void as they are contrary to law and have been issued with
grave abuse of discretion, and having no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, it filed with this
Court the petition now at hand.
The facts of the case are well-stated in the Comment filed by the
Solicitor General, and are thus reproduced hereunder, as follows:
On October 13, 1988, Med-Arbiter Basa issued an Order granting
the petition for Certification election filed by the Trade Union of the
Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS). Said order directed the
holding of a certification election among the regular and seasonal
workers of the Philippine Fruits and Vegetables, Inc. (p. 42, NLRC,
Records).
After a series of pre-election conferences, all issues relative to the
conduct of the certification election were threshed out except that
which pertains to the voting qualifications of the hundred ninety
four (194) workers enumerated in the lists of qualified voters
submitted by TUPAS.
After a late submission by the parties of their respective position
papers, Med-Arbiter Basa issued an Order dated December 9, 1988
allowing 184 of the 194 questioned workers to vote, subject to
challenge, in the certification election to be held on December 16,
1989. Copies of said Order were furnished the parties (p. 118,
NLRC, Records) and on December 12, 1988 the notice of
certification election was duly posted. One hundred sixty eight
(168) of the questioned workers actually voted on election day.
In the scheduled certification election, petitioner objected to the
proceeding, through a Manifestation (p. 262, NLRC, Records) filed
with the Representation Officer before the close of the election
proceedings. Said Manifestation pertinently reads:
The posting of the list of eligible voters authorized to participate in
the certification election was short of the five (5) days provided by
law considering that it was posted only on December 12, 1988 and

the election was held today, December 16, 1988 is only four days
prior to the scheduled certification election.
By agreement of petitioner and TUPAS, workers whose names were
inadvertently omitted in the list of qualified voters were allowed to
vote, subject to challenge (p. 263, NLRC, Records). Thirty eight of
them voted on election day.
Initial tally of the election results excluding the challenged votes
showed the following:
Total No. of the Votes 291
Yes votes 40
No votes 38
Spoiled 7
Challenged (Regular) 38
Total No. of Votes Cast 123
On January 6, 1989, Management and TUPAS agreed to have the
36 challenged votes of the regular rank-and-file employees opened
and a canvass thereof showed:
Yes votes 20
No votes 14
Spoiled 4

Total 38
Added to the initial election results of December 16, 1988, the
canvass of results showed:
Yes 60
No 52
Spoiled 11

Total 123
Based on the foregoing results, the yes votes failed to obtain the
majority of the votes cast in said certification election, hence, the
necessity of opening the 168 challenged votes to determine the true
will of the employees.
On January 20, 1989, petitioner filed a position paper arguing
against the opening of said votes mainly because said voters are not

regular employees nor seasonal workers for having allegedly

rendered work for less than 180 days.
Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS), on the
other hand, argued that the employment status of said employees
has been resolved when Labor Arbiter Ricardo N. Martinez, in his
Decision dated November 26, 1988 rendered in NLRC Case No.
Sub-Rab-01-09-7-0087-88, declared that said employees were
illegally dismissed.
In an Order dated February 2, 1989 (pp. 278-280, NLRC, Records)
Med-Arbiter Basa ordered the opening of said 168 challenged votes
upon his observation that said employees were illegally dismissed
in accordance with the foregoing Decision of Labor Arbiter
Martinez. As canvassed, the results showed
Yes votes 165
No votes 0
Spoiled 3

Total 168
On February 23, 1989, petitioner formally filed a Protest (pp.
284-287, NLRC, Records) claiming that the required five day
posting of notice was not allegedly complied with and that the list
of qualified voters so posted failed to include fifty five regular
workers agreed upon by the parties as qualified to vote. The Protest
further alleged that voters who were ineligible to vote were allowed
to vote.
Med-Arbiter Basa, in his Order dated March 7, 1989, dismissed
said Protest which Order was affirmed on appeal in the Resolution
dated December 12, 1989 of then Secretary of Labor, Franklin
Drillon.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit
in public respondent's Order dated February 28, 1990.
(pp. 84-88, Rollo) 3
The instant petition has, for its Assignment of Errors, the following:

(1) The Honorable Secretary of Labor and Employment acted with

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and
committed manifest error in upholding the certification of TUPAS
as the sole bargaining agent mainly on an erroneous ruling that the
protest against the canvassing of the votes cast by 168 dismissed
workers was filed beyond the reglementary period.
(2) The Honorable Secretary of Labor committed an abuse of
discretion in completely disregarding the issue as to whether or not
non-regular seasonal workers who have long been separated from
employment prior to the filing of the petition for certification
election would be allowed to vote and participate in a certification
election. 4
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
For it is to be noted that the formal protest of petitioner PFVII was
filed beyond the reglementary period. A close reading of Sections 3
and 4, Rule VI, Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor
Code, which read as follows:
Sec. 3. Representation officer may rule on any-on-the-spot
questions. The Representation officer may rule on any on-thespot question arising from the conduct of the election. The
interested party may however, file a protest with the representation
officer before the close of the proceedings.
Protests not so raised are deemed waived. Such protest shall be
contained in the minutes of the proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 4. Protest to be decided in twenty (20) working days. Where
the protest is formalized before the med-arbiter with five (5) days
after the close of the election proceedings, the med-arbiter shall
decide the same within twenty (20) working days from the date of
formalization. If not formalized within the prescribed period, the
protest shall be deemed dropped. The decision may be appealed to
the Bureau in the same manner and on the same grounds as
provided under Rule V. (Emphasis supplied)
would readily yield, as a matter of procedure, the following

requirements in order that a protest filed thereunder would prosper,

to wit:
(1) The protest must be filed with the representation officer and
made of record in the minutes of the proceedings before the close of
election proceedings, and
(2) The protest must be formalized before the Med-Arbiter within
five (5) days after the close of the election proceedings.
The records before Us quite clearly disclose the fact that petitioner,
after filing a manifestation of protest on December 16, 1988,
election day, only formalized the same on February 20, 1989, or
more than two months after the close of election proceedings (i.e.,
December 16, 1988). We are not persuaded by petitioner's
arguments that election proceedings include not only casting of
votes but necessarily includes canvassing and appreciation of votes
cast and considering that the canvassing and appreciation of all the
votes cast were terminated only on February 16, 1989, it was only
then that the election proceedings are deemed closed, and thus,
when the formal protest was filed on February 20, 1989, the fiveday period within which to file the formal protest still subsisted and
its protest was therefore formalized within the reglementary period.
5

As explained correctly by the Solicitor General, the phrase "close of

election proceedings" as used in Sections 3 and 4 of the pertinent
Implementing Rules refers to that period from the closing of the
polls to the counting and tabulation of the votes as it could not have
been the intention of the Implementing Rules to include in the term
"close of the election proceedings" the period for the final
determination of the challenged votes and the canvass thereof, as in
the case at bar which may take a very long period. 6 Thus, if a
protest can be formalized within five days after a final
determination and canvass of the challenged votes have been made,
it would result in an undue delay in the affirmation of the
employees' expressed choice of a bargaining representative. 7

Petitioner would likewise bring into issue the fact that the notice of
certification election was posted only on December 12, 1988 or four
days before the scheduled elections on December 16, 1988, instead
of the five-day period as required under Section 1 of Rule VI, Book
V of the Implementing Rules. But it is not disputed that a
substantial number, or 291 of 322 qualified voters, of the employees
concerned were informed, thru the notices thus posted, of the
elections to be held on December 16, 1988, and that such
employees had in fact voted accordingly on election day. Viewed
thus in the light of the substantial participation in the elections by
voter-employees, and further in the light of the all-too settled rule
that in interpreting the Constitution's protection to labor and social
justice provisions and the labor laws and rules and regulations
implementing the constitutional mandate, the Supreme Court adopts
the liberal approach which favors the exercise of labor rights, 8 We
find the lack of one day in the posting of notices insignificant, and
hence, not a compelling reason at all in nullifying the elections.
As regards the second assignment of error, the public respondent
Secretary of Labor did not completely disregard the issue as to the
voting rights of the alleged separated employees for precisely, he
affirmed on appeal the findings of the Med-Arbiter when he ruled
The election results indicate that TUPAS obtained majority of the
valid votes cast in the election 60 plus 165, or a total of 225
votes out of a possible total of 291.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby denied
and the Med-Arbiter's order dated 7 March 1989 affirmed.
Petitioner TUPAS is hereby certified as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all regular rank-and-file and seasonal workers at
Philippine Fruits and Vegetable Industries, Inc. 9 (p. 26, Rollo)
At any rate, it is now well-settled that employees who have been
improperly laid off but who have a present, unabandoned right to or
expectation of re-employment, are eligible to vote in certification
elections. 10 Thus, and to repeat, if the dismissal is under question,
as in the case now at bar whereby a case of illegal dismissal and/or

unfair labor practice was filed, the employees concerned could still
qualify to vote in the elections. 11
And finally, the Court would wish to stress once more the rule
which it has consistently pronounced in many earlier cases that a
certification election is the sole concern of the workers and the
employer is regarded as nothing more than a bystander with no
right to interfere at all in the election. The only exception here is
where the employer has to file a petition for certification election
pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code because it is requested to
bargain collectively. Thus, upon the score alone of the "Bystander
Rule", the instant petition would have been dismissed outright.
WHEREFORE, the petition filed by Philippine Fruits and Vegetable
Industries, Inc. (PFVII) in hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA FILSYSTEMS
(SAMAFIL-NAFLU-KMU), petitioner, vs. HON. SECRETARY
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and FILSYSTEMS, INC.,
respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Assailed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the Resolution
and Order[1] of the public respondent, dated June 28, 1996 and
November 18, 1996, respectively, dismissing petitioner's petition
for certification election.
It appears that petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa
Filsystems (SAMAFIL-NAFLU-KMU) is a registered labor union
with Certificate of Registration No. NCR-UR-10-1575-95 issued by
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on October 25,
1995. On November 6, 1995, petitioner union filed a Petition for
Certification Election among the rank-and-file employees of private
respondent FILSYSTEMS, Inc. before the DOLE - National Capital
Region (NCR).[2] Attached as annexes to the petition are the
Certificate of Registration issued by the DOLE, copies of union

membership signed by thirty three (33) rank-and-file employees of

respondent company, the Charter Certificate showing its affiliation
with the National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU-KMU), the
list of union officers, the certification of the union secretary of the
minutes of the general membership meeting, the Books of Accounts
and its Constitution and By-Laws.[3]
Private respondent opposed the petition. It questioned the status
of petitioner as a legitimate labor organization on the ground of lack
of proof that its contract of affiliation with the NAFLU-KMU has
been submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) within
thirty (30) days from its execution.[4]
In reply, petitioner averred that as a duly registered labor union,
it has "all the rights and privileges x x x to act as representative of
its members for the purpose of collective bargaining with
employers."[5]
On January 12, 1996, Med-Arbiter Paterno D. Adap dismissed
the petition for certification election. He ruled that petitioner, as an
affiliate of NAFLU-KMU, has no legal personality on account of its
failure to comply with paragraphs (a), (b) and (e) of Section 3, Rule
II of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code,[6] viz:
"x x x
"In matters of affiliation of an independently registered union,
the rules provide that the latter shall be considered an affiliate of a
labor federation after submission of the contract or agreement of
affiliation to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) within thirty (30)
days after its execution.
"Likewise, it mandates the federation or national union
concerned to issue a charter certificate indicating the creation or
establishment of a local or chapter, copy of which shall be
submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations within thirty (30) days
from issuance of such certificate.

"A close examination of the records of the case does not reveal
that the federation and the independent union have executed a
contract or agreement of affiliation, nor had it shown that it has
submitted its charter certificate to the Bureau of Labor Relations,
within thirty (30) days from issuance of such charter certificate as
amended by the rules.
"Petitioner argued that it has complied with all the requirements
for certification election pursuant to the mandate of Sec. 2, Rule V
of Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code; that the
rule cited by respondent is not included in the Rule citing the
requirements for certification election.
"We disagree with petitioner's contention. The rule cited by the
petitioner, Sec. 2, Rule V, Book V, sub-paragraphs A, B, C, D, E, F
and G, refers to an independently registered labor organization
which has filed a petition for certification election.
"In the case at bar, an independently registered union has
affiliated with a federation, hence, strict compliance with the
requirements embodied in Sec. 3, paragraphs A, B and E of Rule II,
Book V of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code
should be complied with.
"Record discloses that petitioner has not shown to have
executed a contract or agreement of affiliation nor has it established
that is has submitted its charter certificate to the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR) within thirty (30) days from its execution.
"Thus, petitioner in this case having failed to comply with the
mandatory requirement, there was no valid affiliation.
Consequently, petitioner has no legal personality because the union
failed to attain the status of legitimacy for failure to comply with
the requirements of law."
Petitioner appealed to the Office of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. It reiterated its contention that as an independently
registered union, it has the right to file a petition for certification
election regardless of its failure to prove its affiliation with
NAFLU-KMU.[7]

On February 26, 1996, private respondent opposed the appeal.

It argued that petitioner should have filed its petition for
certification election as an independently registered union and not
as a union affiliated with NAFLU-KMU.[8]
Meanwhile or on February 7, 1996, another union, the
Filsystem Workers Union (FWU), filed a Petition for Certification
Election in the same bargaining unit. On March 22, 1996, the MedArbitration - NCR Branch granted the petition. The certification
election held on April 19, 1996, was won by FWU which garnered
twenty six (26) votes out of the forty six (46) eligible voters. The
FWU was certified on April 29, 1996, as the exclusive bargaining
agent of all rank-and-file employees of private respondent.
Eventually, FWU and the private respondent negotiated a CBA.[9]
On June 11, 1996, the private respondent filed a Motion to
Dismiss Appeal of petitioner as it has become moot and academic.
It also invoked Section 3, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of
Book V of the Labor Code stating that "once a union has been
certified, no certification election may be held within one (1) year
from the date of issuance of a final certification election
[result]."[10]
In opposing the Motion to Dismiss Appeal, petitioner
contended that its appeal is not moot as the certification election
held on April 19, 1996, was void for violating Section 10, Rule V of
the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code,[11] viz:
"SEC. 10. Decision of the Secretary final and inappealable. The Secretary shall have fifteen (15) calendar days within which to
decide the appeal from receipt of the records of the case. The filing
of the appeal from the decision of the Med-Arbiter stays the holding
of any certification election. The decision of the Secretary shall be
final and inappealable."
Petitioner further argued that the CBA executed between the

FWU and the private respondent could not affect its pending
representation case following Section 4, Rule V of the
Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code[12] which states:

Resolution dated January 12, 1996 of the Med-Arbiter dismissing

petitioner's petition for certification election for failure to prove its
affiliation with NAFLU-KMU.

"SEC. 4. Effects of early agreements. - The representation case

shall not, however, be adversely affected by a collective bargaining
agreement registered before or during the last 60 days of the
subsisting agreement or during the pendency of the representation
case."
On June 28, 1996, respondent Secretary dismissed the appeal
interposed by petitioner on the ground that it has been rendered
moot by the certification of FWU as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file workers of respondent
company. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied in an
Order dated November 18, 1996.[13]

The reasoning of the public respondent and the Med- Arbiter is

flawed, proceeding as it does from a wrong premise. Firstly, it must
be underscored that petitioner is an independently registered labor
union as evidenced by a Certificate of Registration issued by the
DOLE. As a legitimate labor organization, petitioner's right to file a
petition for certification election on its own is beyond question.[14]
Secondly, the failure of petitioner to prove its affiliation with
NAFLU-KMU cannot affect its right to file said petition for
certification election as an independent union. At the most,
petitioner's failure will result in an ineffective affiliation with
NAFLU-KMU. Still, however, it can pursue its petition for
certification election as an independent union. In our rulings, we
have stressed that despite affiliation, the local union remains the
basic unit free to serve the common interest of all its members and
pursue its own interests independently of the federation.[15] In fine,
the Med-Arbiter erred in dismissing petitioner's petition for
certification election on account of its non-submission of the charter
certificate and the contract of affiliation with the NAFLU-KMU
with the BLR. The public respondent gravely abused his discretion
in sustaining the Med-Arbiter's Resolution.

Before this Court, petitioner contends:

I
Public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in holding
that the pending appeal in the representation case was rendered
moot and academic by a subsequently enacted collective bargaining
agreement in the company.
II
Public respondent committed a serious legal error and gravely
abused its discretion in failing to hold that the legal personality of
petitioner as a union having been established by its Certificate of
Registration, the same could not be subjected to collateral attack.
The petition is meritorious.

II
We shall now resolve the issue of whether the appeal filed by
the petitioner was rendered moot and academic by the subsequent
certification election ordered by the Med-Arbiter, won by the FWU
and which culminated in a CBA with private respondent.

I
We shall first resolve whether the public respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion when he effectively affirmed the

Public respondent's ruling is anchored on his finding that there

exists no pending representation case since the petition for
certification election filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the

Med-Arbiter. According to the public respondent, the legal effect of

the dismissal of the petition was to leave the playing field open
without any legal barrier or prohibition to any petitioner; thus, other
legitimate labor organizations may file an entirely new petition for
certification election.
We reject public respondent's ruling. The order of the MedArbiter dismissing petitioner's petition for certification election was
seasonably appealed. The appeal stopped the holding of any
certification election. Section 10, Rule V of the Implementing Rules
of Book V of the Labor Code is crystal clear and hardly needs any
interpretation.
Accordingly, there was an unresolved representation case at the
time the CBA was entered between FWU and private respondent.
Following Section 4, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book V
of the Labor Code, such CBA cannot and will not prejudice
petitioner's pending representation case or render the same moot.
[16] This rule was applied in the case of Associated Labor Unions
(ALU-TUCP) v. Trajano[17] where we held that "[t]here should be
no obstacle to the right of the employees to petition for a
certification election at the proper time, that is, within sixty (60)
days prior to the expiration of the life of a certified collective
bargaining agreement x x x, not even by a collective agreement
submitted during the pendency of the representation case."
Likewise, in Associated Labor Unions (ALU) v. Ferrer-Calleja,[18]
we held that a prematurely renewed CBA is not a bar to the holding
of a certification election.
Finally, we bewail private respondent's tenacious opposition to
petitioner's certification election petition. Such a stance is not
conducive to industrial peace. Time and again, we have emphasized
that when a petition for certification election is filed by a legitimate
labor organization, it is good policy for the employer not to have
any participation or partisan interest in the choice of the bargaining

representative. While employers may rightfully be notified or

informed of petitions of such nature, they should not, however, be
considered parties thereto with an inalienable right to oppose it. An
employer that involves itself in a certification election lends
suspicion to the fact that it wants to create a company union. Thus,
in Consolidated Farms, Inc. II v. Noriel,[19] we declared that "[o]n
a matter that should be the exclusive concern of labor, the choice of
a collective bargaining representative, the employer is definitely an
intruder. His participation, to say the least, deserves no
encouragement. This Court should be the last agency to lend
support to such an attempt at interference with a purely internal
affair of labor. x x x [While] it is true that there may be
circumstances where the interest of the employer calls for its being
heard on the matter, x x x sound policy dictates that as much as
possible, management is to maintain a strictly hands-off policy. For
if it does not, it may lend itself to the legitimate suspicion that it is
partial to one of the contending unions. That is repugnant to the
concept of collective bargaining. That is against the letter and spirit
of welfare legislation intended to protect labor and promote social
justice. The judiciary then should be the last to look with tolerance
at such efforts of an employer to take part in the process leading to
the free and untrammeled choice of the exclusive bargaining
representative of the workers."
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Resolution and Order of the public respondent are set
aside. The Bureau of Labor Relations is ORDERED to hold a
certification election in respondent company with petitioner as a
contending union. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 101730 June 17, 1993
PHILIPPINE
TELEGRAPH
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.

AND

TELEPHONE

HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA and PT & T

SUPERVISORY
EMPLOYEES
UNION-APSOTEU,
respondents.
Leonard U. Sawal for private respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Can a petition for certification election filed by supervisory
employees of an unorganized establishment one without a
certified bargaining agent be dismissed on the ground that these
employees are actually performing managerial functions?
This is the issue for reconsideration in this petition for certiorari and
mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order, of
the Resolution of 11 June 1991 1 of then Acting Secretary of Labor
and Employment Nieves D. Confesor dismissing the appeal from
the Order of 11 December 1990 2 of the Med-Arbiter which granted
the petition for certification election, and of the Order of 15 August
1991 3 denying reconsideration.
On 22 October 1990, private respondent PT&T Supervisory
Employees Union-APSOTEU (UNION, for brevity) filed a petition
before the Industrial Relations Decision of the Department of Labor
and Employment praying for the holding of a certification election
among the supervisory employees of petitioner Philippine
Telegraph & Telephone Corporation (PT&T, for brevity). On 29
October 1990, UNION amended its petition to include the
allegation that PT&T was an unorganized establishment employing
roughly 100 supervisory employees from whose ranks will
constitute the bargaining unit sought to be established.
On 22 November 1990, PT&T moved to dismiss the petition for
certification election on the ground that UNION members were
performing managerial functions and thus were not merely
supervisory employees. Moreover, PT&T alleged that a certified
bargaining unit already existed among its rank-and-file employees
which barred the filing of the petition.
On 27 November 1990, respondent UNION opposed the motion to

dismiss, contending that under the Labor Code supervisory

employees are not eligible to join the Labor organization of the
rank-and-file employees although they may form their own.
On 4 December 1990, PT&T filed its reply to the opposition and
manifested that it is the function of an employee which is
determinative of whether said employee is a managerial or
supervisory employee.
On 11 December 1990, the Med-Arbiter granted the petition and
ordered that "a certification election . . . (be) conducted among the
supervisory personnel of the Philippine Telegraph & Telephone
Corporation (PT&T)." 4 Petitioner PT&T appealed to the Secretary
of Labor and Employment.
On 24 May 1991, PT&T filed its supplemental appeal and attached
copies of the job descriptions and employment service records of
these supervisory employees, including samples of memoranda and
notices they made which purportedly illustrate their excercise of
management prerogatives. On 31 May 1991, petitioner submitted
more job descriptions to further bolster its contention.
On 11 June 1991, the Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment
Nieves R. Confesor denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit.
However, she did not rule on the additional evidence presented by
PT&T. Instead, she directed that the evidence "should be
scrutinized and . . . considered during the exclusion-inclusion
proceedings where the employees who should be part of the
bargaining unit . . . will be determined." 5
On 15 August 1991, respondent Undersecretary of Labor and
Employment Bienvenido E. Laguesma denied reconsideration of
the resolution dismissing the appeal. Hence, the instant petition
anchored on the ground that public respondent committed grave
abuse of discretion in failing to rule on the additional evidence
submitted by petitioner which would have buttressed its contention
that there were no supervisory employees in its employ and which,
as a consequence, would have barred the holding of a certification
election.

The petition is devoid of merit.

The applicable provision of law in the case at bar is Art. 257 of the
Labor Code. It reads
Art. 257. Petitions in unorganized establishments. In any
establishment where there is no certified bargaining agent, a
certification election shall automatically be conducted by the MedArbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor
organization (emphasis supplied).
The supervisory employees of PT&T did not yet have a certified
bargaining agent to represent them at the time the UNION, which is
legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Department of
Labor and Employment, 6 filed the petition for certification election.
Since no certified bargaining agent represented the supervisory
employees, PT&T may be deemed an unorganized establishment
within the purview of Art. 257 of the Labor Code.
The fact that petitioner's rank-and-file employees were already
represented by a certified bargaining agent doe not make PT&T an
organized establishment vis-a-vis the supervisory employees. After
all, supervisory employees are "not . . . eligible for membership in a
labor organization of the rank-and-file employees." 7
Consequently, the Med-Arbiter, as sustained by public respondent,
committed no grave abuse of discretion in granting the petition for
certification election among the supervisory employee of petitioner
PT&T because Art. 257 of the Labor Code provides that said
election should be automatically conducted upon filing of the
petition. In fact, Sec. 6 of Rule V, Book V, of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations makes it mandatory for the Med-Arbiter to
order the holding of a certification election. It reads
Sec. 6. Procedure. Upon receipt of a petition, the Regional
Director shall assign the case to a Med-Arbiter for appropriate
action. The Med-Arbiter, upon receipt of the assigned petition, shall
have twenty (20) working days from submission of the case for
resolution within which to dismiss or grant the petition.
In a petition filed by a legitimate organization involving an

unorganized establishment, the Med-Arbiter shall immediately

order the conduct of a certification election . . . (emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, PT&T did not possess the legal personality to file a
motion to dismiss the petition for certification election even if based
on the ground that its supervisory employees are in reality
managerial employees. It is well-settled that an employer has no
standing to question a certification election 8 since this is the sole
concern of the workers. 9 The only exception to this rule is where
the employer has to file the petition for certification election itself
pursuant to Art. 258 10 of the Labor Code because it was requested
to bargain collectively. But, other that this instance, the choice of a
collective bargaining agent is purely the internal affair of labor. 11
What PT&T should have done was to question the inclusion of any
disqualified employee in the certification election during the
exclusion-inclusion proceedings before the representation officer.
Indeed, this is precisely the purpose of the exclusion-inclusion
proceedings, i.e., to determine who among the employees are
entitled to vote and be part of the bargaining unit sought to be
certified.
Then Acting Secretary Nieves D. Confesor therefore did not abuse
her discretion when she opted not to act upon the additional
evidence by petitioner PT&T. For, the holding of a certification
election in an unorganized establishment is mandatory and must
immediately be ordered upon petition by a legitimate labor
organization, which is the case here.
At any rate, the additional evidence presented by petitioner failed to
sufficiently show that the supervisory employees who sought to be
included in the bargaining unit were in fact performing managerial
functions. On the contrary, while these supervisory employees did
excercise independent judgment which is not routinary or clerical in
nature, their authority was merely recommendatory in character. In
all instances, they were still accountable for their actions to a
superior officer, i.e., their respective superintendents. The Solicitor
General succinctly puts it thus

A perusal of petitioner's annexes . . . would readily show that the

power of said supervisors in matters relating to the excercise of
prerogatives for or against rank-and-file employees is not absolute
but merely recommendatory in character. Note that their reports
recommending or imposing disciplinary action against rank-and-file
employees always bore the concurrence of one or two superiors . . .
and the job descriptions . . . clearly stated that these supervisors
directly reported to a superior and were accountable to the latter 12
(emphasis supplied).
As the Med-Arbiter himself noted, "It is incredible that only rankand-file and managerial employees are the personnel of respondent
firm, considering the line of service it offers to the public" 13 and the
fact that it employed 2,500 employees, more or less, all over the
country.
A word more. PT&T alleges that respondent UNION is affiliated
with the same national federation representing its rank-and-file
employees. Invoking Atlas Lithographic Services, Inc. v.
Laguesma, 14 PT&T seeks the disqualification of respondent
UNION. Respondent, however, denied it was affiliated with the
same national federation of the rank-and-file employees union, the
Associated Labor Union or ALU. It clarified that the PT&T
Supervisory Employees Union is affiliated with Associated
Professional, Supervisory Office, Technical Employees Union or
APSOTEU, which is a separate and distinct national federation
from ALU.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order is DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 106830 November 16, 1993
R. TRANSPORT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. BIENVIENIDO E. LAGUESMA. in his capacity as

Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and Employment,

CHRISTIAN LABOR ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
(CLOP), NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS
(NAFLU), and ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU-TUCP),
respondents.
Gaspar V. Tagalo for petitioner.
Jose Torregoza for Christian Labor Organization of the
Philippines.
Joji Barrios for intervenor ALU-TUCP.
Villy Cadiz for National Federation of Labor Unions.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court which seeks to set aside the Resolutions of the
Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) dated July 22, 1992, affirming the order of the MedArbiter calling for the conduct of the certification election, and
August 25, 1992, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On January 4, 1991, respondent Christian Labor Organization
of the Philippines (CLOP), filed with the Med-Arbitration Unit of
the DOLE a petition for certification election among the rank and
file employees of the petitioner (NCR-OD-M-91-01-002).
On April 8, 1991, Med-Arbiter A. Dizon dismissed the petition
on the ground that the bargaining unit sought to be represented by
respondent did not include all the eligible employees of petitioner
but only the drivers, conductors and conductresses to the exclusion
of the inspectors, inspectresses, dispatchers, mechanics and
washerboys.
On May 10, 1991, respondent. CLOP rectified its mistake and
filed a second petition for certification election,which included all
the rank and file employees of the company, who hold nonmanagerial. and non-supervisorial positions.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the second petition and
contended that the dismissal of the first petition constituted res
judicata. Petitioner argued that respondent CLOP should have

interposed an appeal to the dismissal of the first petition and its

failure to do so barred it from filing another petition for certification
election.
On July 3, 1991, Med-Arbiter R. Parungo rendered a decision,
which ordered that a certification election among the regular rank
and file workers of petitioner company be conducted (Rollo, pp. 8791).
On October 16, 1991, the Associated Labor Unions (ALUTUCP) filed a motion for intervention (NCR OD-M-91-01-002) and
alleged that it has members in the proposed bargaining unit.
Subsequently, the National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU)
filed a separate petition for certification election (NCR-OD-M-9110-058) and a motion to consolidate related cases to avoid
confusion.
Dissatisfied with the Decision dated July 3, 1991 rendered by
Med-Arbiter R. Parungo, petitioner appealed to the DOLE
Secretary, who, through Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma,
affirmed the Med-Arbiter in its Resolution dated July 22, 1992
calling for the conduct of the certification election (Rollo, pp. 2528). The Resolution, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The defense of res judicata is not obtaining in the present
petition for certification election. It is settled that for res judicata to
apply there must be a final judgment on the merits on matters put in
issue. In the instant case, it could not be said that there is a final
judgment on the merits of the petition simply because the
composition of the present proposed bargaining unit is different
from that in the first petition. Moreover, there are now other parties
involved, and therefore, it would not be correct to say that the
parties in the said two cases are identical.
xxx xxx xxx
With regard however, to the question on propriety of
consolidation, there is merit in the argument of respondentappellant on the need to consolidate the separate petitions for
certification election because they involve the same bargaining unit.

Case No. NCR-OD-M-91-10-058 should be consolidated with that

of Case No. NCR- OD-M-91-05-062, where the petition of NAFLU
should be treated as an intervention and resolved by the MedArbiter together with the intervention of ALU-TUCP.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Order of the Med-Arbiter
calling for the conduct of the certification election is hereby
affirmed subject to the resolution of the Med-Arbiter of the motions
for intervention aforementioned (Rollo, pp. 27-28; emphasis
supplied).
On July 31, 1992, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, again stressing the principle of res judicata.
Petitioner further argued that the second petition for a certification
election by respondent CLOP, NAFLU and ALU-TUCP were
barred at least for a period of one year from the time the first
petition of CLOP was dismissed pursuant to Section Rule V, Book
V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code as amended.
On August 25, 1991, Undersecretary Laguesma denied the
motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 32-34).
On September 3, 1992, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings based on Prejudicial Questions as an Addendum to the
Motion for Reconsideration filed on July 31, 1992. Petitioner
argued that the present case must be indefinitely suspended until the
following cases are resolved by the NLRC and the Supreme Court:
a) NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-08-04708-91 entitled "R". Transport
Corporation v. Jose S. Torregaza, et. al., wherein Labor Arbiter de
Castro declared the strike staged by respondent CLOP illegal and
ordered the strikers to pay petitioner the amount of P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages; b) NLRC-NCR Case No. 06-03415092 filed
by respondent CLOP and its members for illegal dismissal; and
NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-08-04389-92 filed by respondent CLOP
in behalf of its affected members for illegal dismissal (Rollo, pp.
139-145).
On September 29, 1992, Undersecretary Laguesma in a
resolution denied the motion to suspend the conduct of the
certification election. The pertinent portion of said resolution reads

as follows:
The pendency of NLRC-NCR Cases Nos. 00-08- 04708-91, 0603415092 and 00-08-04389-92 before the NLRC is not a valid
ground for the suspension of the already stalled petition for
certification election which must be resolved with dispatch.
This must be so, because the employees subject of the pending
cases before the NLRC legally remain as employees of respondent
until the motion to declare them as having lost their employment
status by reason of the illegal strike or their complaint for illegal
dismissal is finally resolved. (Rollo, pp. 181-182; emphasis
supplied)
On October 14, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution dated September 29, 1992 which
was subsequently denied by Undersecretary Laguesma on October
29, 1992 (Rollo, pp. 29-31).
Petitioner filed a Comment and Objection to the Order dated
October 29, 1992 with Urgent Motion to Dismiss the Petition for
Certification Election. Without waiting for the resolution of the
motion to dismiss, petitioner resorted to this Court by way of the
instant special civil action.
This petition is without merit.
Before the principle of res judicata can be operative, the
following requisites must be present: a) the former judgment or
order must be final; b) it must be a judgment ororder on the merits;
c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject-matter and the parties; and d) there must be, between the
first and second actions, identity of parties (Nabus v. Court of
Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]).
In the case at bench, it cannot be said that the parties in the first
and second actions were identical. The first action was dismissed by
the Med-Arbiter because it excluded parties essential to the
bargaining unit such as inspectors, inspectresses, dispatchers and
washer boys. The second petition included all the employees who
were excluded in the first petition. Therefore, the Med-Arbiter was
correct when he gave due course to the second petition for

certification election after respondent CLOP corrected its mistake.

Likewise untenable is petitioner's contention that the second
petition for certification election should have been filed after one
year from the dismissal of the first petition certification election
under Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code as amended. Said section provides as
follows:
When to file In the absence of collective bargaining
agreement duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the
Code, a petition for certification election may be filed any time.
However, no certification election may be held within one year
from the date of the issuance of a final certification election result
(Emphasis supplied).
Apparently, petitioner misread the above-mentioned provision
of law. The phrase "final certification election result" means that
there was an actual conduct of election i.e. ballots were cast and
there was a counting of votes. In this case, there was no certification
election conducted precisely because the first petition was
dismissed, on the ground of a defective petition which did not
include all the employees who should be properly included in the
collective bargaining unit.
Devoid of merit is petitioner's contention that the employment
status of the members of respondent CLOP who joined the strike
must first be resolved before a certification election can be
conducted.
As held in the case of Philippine Fruits and Vegetables
Industries, Inc. v. Torres, 211 SCRA 95 (1992):
At any rate, it is now well-settled that employees who have
been improperly laid-off but who have a present, unabandoned right
to or expectation of re-employment, are eligible to vote in
certification elections (Rothenberg on Labor Relations, p. 548).
Thus, and to repeat, if the dismissal is under question, as in the case
now at bar whereby a case of illegal dismissal and/or unfair labor
practices was filed, the employees concerned could still qualify to
vote in the elections.

Therefore, the employees of petitioner who participated in the

strike, legally remain as such, until either the motion to declare their
employment status legally terminated or their complaint for illegal
dismissal is resolved by the NLRC.
It should be noted that it is the petitioner, the employer, which
has offered the most tenacious resistance to the holding of a
certification election. This must not be so for the choice of a
collective bargaining agent is the sole concern of the employees.
The employer has no right to interfere in the election and is merely
regarded as a bystander (Divine Word University of Tacloban v.
Secretary of Labor and Employment, 213 SCRA 759 [1992]).
Finally, petitioner's Comment and Objection to the Order dated
October 29, 1992 with Urgent Motion to Dismiss the Petition for
Certification Election is still pending with the Undersecretary of
Labor. The resort to judicial action by petitioner is premature.
Hence, it is also guilty of forum-shopping in pursuing the same
cause of action involving the same issue, parties and subject matter
before two different fora.
G.R. No. L-48931 July 16, 1979
ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM), petitioner,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS, TRADE UNION
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL MILLING
CORPORATION, and ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS,
respondents.
Feliciano C. Tumale & Leonardo C. Rodriguez for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for the Public respondents.
AQUINO, J.:1wph1.t
This is a certification election case. On June 24, 1976, or within
sixty days prior to the expiration on August 19, 1976 of the
unregistered collective bargaining agreement between the
Associated Labor Unions and the General Milling Corporation, the
Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa, a duly registered labor union, filed

with Regional Office No. 7 at Cebu City of the Ministry of Labor a

petition for certification election.
The med-arbiter in his order of October 12, 1976 granted the
petition. He ordered the holding of a certification election within
twenty days from notice among the rank-and-file employees of the
company at Lapu-Lapu City. The Associated Labor Unions
appealed from that order to the Director of Labor Relations.
Instead of deciding the appeal promptly, the Director turned over
the record of the case to the Trade Union Congress of the
Philippines TUCP a federation of labor unions, allegedly by virtue
of an arrangement between the Ministry of Labor and the said
federation that cases involving its member-unions must first be
referred to it for possible settlement in accordance with its Code of
Ethics.
The TUCP has not decided the controversy. On September 14,
1978, or more than twenty months after the federation received the
record of the case, the Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa filed in this
Court the instant petition for mandamus to compel the Director of
Labor Relations to decide the case, or, in the alternative, to require
the TUCP to return to the Director the record of the case.
The petitioner accused the TUCP of sitting indefinitely on the
appeal because its president and the president of appellant
Associated Labor Unions are the same person. The TUCP admits
that its president is also the president of the Associated Labor
Unions but it clarifies that its executive board, not its president, will
decide the controversy.
The Director of Labor Relations manifested in his comment that he
is willing to decide the appeal. He prays that the TUCP be ordered
to return to him immediately the record of the case.
Respondent employer, the General Milling Corporation, revealed in
its comment that it has a registered collective bargaining agreement
with the Associated Labor Unions which will expire on August 19,
1979. Presumably, that agreement was a renewal of the unregistered
collective bargaining agreement which expired on August 19, 1976.
It was the impending expiration of that agreement which provoked

the Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa to file its petition for

certification election in June, 1976.
The petitioner in its reply to the TUCP's comment alleged that it
was affiliated with the TUCP only in 1978 or long after the
certification case was appealed to the Director of Labor Relations.
The petitioner further manifested that other certification cases
referred in 1976 to the TUCP have not been acted upon by it up to
this time and that the delay is a denial of labor justice.
The issue is whether it was legal and proper for the Director of
Labor Relations to refer to the TUCP the appeal of the Associated
Labor Unions in a certification election case.
We hold that the referral of the appeal to the TUCP is glaringly
illegal and void. The Labor Code never intended that the Director of
Labor Relations should abdicate delegate and relinquish his
arbitrational prerogatives in favor of a private person or entity or to
a federation of trade unions. Such a surrender of official functions is
an anomalous, deplorable and censurable renunciation of the
Director's adjudicatory jurisdiction in representation cases.
Article 226 of the Labor Code provides in peremptory terms that
the Bureau of Labor Relations and the labor relations divisions in
the regional offices of the Ministry of Labor "shall have original
and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request
of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts,
and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting
labor-management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural
or non-agricultural, except those arising from the implementation or
interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be
the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration."
Article 259 of the Labor Code provides that "all certification cases
shall be decided within twenty (20) working days." Article 260 of
the same Code provides that the Bureau of Labor Relations should
decide appeals in representation cases, within fifteen (15) working
days", or twenty working days, according to section 10, Rule V,
Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor
Code. Section 10 further provides that "the decision of the Bureau

in all cases shall be final and unappealable."

Those provisions are mandatory and should be strictly adhered to.
They are part and parcel of the adequate administrative machinery
established by the Labor Code for the expeditious settlement of
labor disputes. The Director's act of referring the appeal of the
Associated Labor Unions to the TUCP is not only contrary to law
but is a patent nullification of the policy of the Labor Code to avoid
delay in the adjudication of labor controversies.
There is another aspect of this case which should be underscored.
And that is that the Labor Code never intended that the original
record of a labor case, an official public record, should be removed
from the legitimate custodian thereof and entrusted to a private
person or entity. It should be obvious that the delivery of an official
public record to a private person is fraught with mischievous
consequences. (See sec. 27, Rule 132, Rules of Court on
irremovability of public record.)
Respondent Director of Labor Relations in imprudently and
illegally delivering to the TUCP the record of the certification
election case (instead of a transcript thereof) placed himself in the
pitiable, lamentable and ridiculous situation of having to beg the
TUCP for the return of the record and then to ask for a court order
to compel its return since the TUCP has cavalierly not heeded its
request.
The petitioner and the Director could have reconstituted the record
and the Director could have decided the appeal on the basis of the
reconstituted record instead of awaiting the pleasure of the TUCP's
officers for the return of the original record.
WHEREFORE, the president, secretary, or any responsible officer
of the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines, Marvex Bldg.,
South Harbor, Port Area, Manila, is ordered to return to the Director
of Labor Relations within forty-eight hours from notice the original
record of BLR Case No. A-536-76 (LRD Case No. CE-0018).
The Director is directed to decide the appeal within ten days from
the receipt of the record. Costs against respondent TUCP
G.R. No. 79025. December 29, 1989.

BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, Director of the Bureau of
Labor Relations, and BENECO EMPLOYEES LABOR
UNION,respondents.
E.L. Gayo & Associates for petitioner.
CORTES, J.:
On June 21, 1985 Beneco Worker's Labor Union-Association of
Democratic Labor Organizations (hereinafter referred to as BWLUADLO) filed a petition for direct certification as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file
employees of Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. (hereinafter
referred to as BENECO) at Alapang, La Trinidad, Benguet alleging,
inter alia, that BENECO has in its employ two hundred and
fourteen (214) rank and file employees; that one hundred and
ninety-eight (198) or 92.5% of these employees have supported the
filing of the petition; that no certification election has been
conducted for the last 12 months; that there is no existing collective
bargaining representative of the rank and file employees sought to
represented by BWLU- ADLO; and, that there is no collective
bargaining agreement in the cooperative.
An opposition to the petition was filed by the Beneco Employees
Labor Union (hereinafter referred to as BELU) contending that it
was certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of
the subject workers pursuant to an order issued by the med-arbiter
on October 20,1980; that pending resolution by the National Labor
Relations Commission are two cases it filed against BENECO
involving bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice; and, that
the pendency of these cases bars any representation question.
BENECO, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss the petition
claiming that it is a non-profit electric cooperative engaged in
providing electric services to its members and patron-consumers in
the City of Baguio and Benguet Province; and, that the employees
sought to be represented by BWLU-ADLO are not eligible to form,

join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing because

they are members and joint owners of the cooperative.
On September 2, 1985 the med-arbiter issued an order giving due
course to the petition for certification election. However, the medarbiter limited the election among the rank and file employees of
petitioner who are non-members thereof and without any
involvement in the actual ownership of the cooperative. Based on
the evidence during the hearing the med-arbiter found that there are
thirty-seven (37) employees who are not members and without any
involvement in the actual ownership of the cooperative. The
dispositive portion of the med-arbiter's order is as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a certification election should
be as it is hereby ordered to be conducted at the premises of
Benguet, Electric Cooperative, Inc., at Alapang, La Trinidad,
Benguet within twenty (20) days from receipt hereof among all the
rank and file employees (non-members/consumers and without any
involvement in the actual ownership of the cooperative) with the
following choices:
1. BENECO WORKERS LABOR UNION-ADLO
2. BENECO EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION
3. NO UNION
The payroll for the month of June 1985 shall be the basis in
determining the qualified voters who may participate in the
certification election to be conducted.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, pp. 22-23.]
BELU and BENECO appealed from this order but the same was
dismissed for lack of merit on March 25,1986. Whereupon
BENECO filed with this Court a petition for certiorari with prayer
for preliminary injunction and /or restraining order, docketed as
G.R. No. 74209, which the Supreme Court dismissed for lack of
merit in a minute resolution dated April 28, 1986.
The ordered certification election was held on October 1, 1986.
Prior to the conduct thereof BENECO's counsel verbally manifested
that "the cooperative is protesting that employees who are
members-consumers are being allowed to vote when . . . they are

not eligible to be members of any labor union for purposes of

collective bargaining; much less, to vote in this certification
election." [Rollo, p. 28]. Petitioner submitted a certification
showing that only four (4) employees are not members of BENECO
and insisted that only these employees are eligible to vote in the
certification election. Canvass of the votes showed that BELU
garnered forty-nine (49) of the eighty-three (83) "valid" votes cast.
Thereafter BENECO formalized its verbal manifestation by filing a
Protest. Finding, among others, that the issue as to whether or not
member-consumers who are employees of BENECO could form,
assist or join a labor union has been answered in the affirmative by
the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 74209, the med-arbiter dismissed
the protest on February 17, 1987. On June 23, 1987, Bureau of
Labor Relations (BLR) director Pura Ferrer-Calleja affirmed the
med-arbiter's order and certified BELU as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees of BENECO.
Alleging that the BLR director committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction BENECO filed the
instant petition for certiorari. In his Comment the Solicitor General
agreed with BENECO's stance and prayed that the petition be given
due course. In view of this respondent director herself was required
by the Court to file a Comment. On April 19, 1989 the Court gave
due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.
The main issue in this case is whether or not respondent director
committed grave abuse of discretion in certifying respondent BELU
as the sole and exclusive bargaining representtative of the rank and
file employees of BENECO.
Under Article 256 of the Labor Code [Pres. Decree 442] to have a
valid certification election, "at least a majority of all eligible voters
in the unit must have cast their votes. The labor union receiving the
majority of the valid votes cast shall be certified as the exclusive
bargaining agent of all workers in the unit." Petitioner BENECO
asserts that the certification election held on October 1, 1986 was
null and void since members-employees of petitioner cooperative

who are not eligible to form and join a labor union for purposes of
collective bargaining were allowed to vote therein.
Respondent director and private respondent BELU on the other
hand submit that members of a cooperative who are also rank and
file employees are eligible to form, assist or join a labor union
[Comment of Respondent Director, p. 4; Rollo, p. 125; Comment of
BELU, pp. 9-10; Rollo pp. 99-100].
The Court finds the present petition meritorious.
The issue of whether or not employees of a cooperative are
qualified to form or join a labor organization for purposes of
collective bargaining has already been resolved and clarified in the
case of Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. vs. Ferrer
Calleja, et al. [G.R. No. 7795, September 26,1988] and reiterated in
the cases of Batangas-Electric Cooperative Labor Union v. Young,
et al. [G.R. Nos. 62386, 70880 and 74560 November 9, 1988] and
San Jose City Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. v. Ministry of
Labor and Employment, et al. [G.R. No. 77231, May 31, 1989]
wherein the Court had stated that the right to collective bargaining
is not available to an employee of a cooperative who at the same
time is a member and co-owner thereof. With respect, however, to
employees who are neither members nor co-owners of the
cooperative they are entitled to exercise the rights to selforganization, collective bargaining and negotiation as mandated by
the 1987 Constitution and applicable statutes.
Respondent director argues that to deny the members of petitioner
cooperative the right to form, assist or join a labor union of their
own choice for purposes of collective bargaining would amount to a
patent violation of their right to self-organization. She points out
that:
Albeit a person assumes a dual capacity as rank and file employee
and as member of a certain cooperative does not militate, as in the
instant case, against his/her exercise of the right to self-organization
and to collective bargaining guaranteed by the Constitution and
Labor Code because, while so doing, he/she is acting in his/her
capacity as rank and file employee thereof. It may be added that

while the employees concerned became members of petitioner

cooperative, their status employment as rank and filers who are
hired for fixed compensation had not changed. They still do not
actually participate in the management of the cooperative as said
function is entrusted to the Board of Directors and to the elected or
appointed officers thereof. They are not vested with the powers and
prerogatives to lay down and execute managerial policies; to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline
employees; and/or to effectively recommend such managerial
functions [Comment of Respondent Director, p. 4; Rollo, p. 125.]
Private respondent BELU concurs with the above contention of
respondent director and, additionally, claims that since membership
in petitioner cooperative is only nominal, the rank and file
employees who are members thereof should not be deprived of their
right to self-organization.
The above contentions are untenable. Contrary to respondents'
claim, the fact that the members-employees of petitioner do not
participate in the actual management of the cooperative does not
make them eligible to form, assist or join a labor organization for
the purpose of collective bargaining with petitioner. The Court's
ruling in the Davao City case that members of cooperative cannot
join a labor union for purposes of collective bargaining was based
on the fact that as members of the cooperative they are co-owners
thereof. As such, they cannot invoke the right to collective
bargaining for "certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or
his co-owners." [Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. v.
Ferrer-Calleja, et al., supra]. It is the fact of ownership of the
cooperative, and not involvement in the management thereof, which
disqualifies a member from joining any labor organization within
the cooperative. Thus, irrespective of the degree of their
participation in the actual management of the cooperative, all
members thereof cannot form, assist or join a labor organization for
the purpose of collective bargaining.
Respondent union further claims that if nominal ownership in a
cooperative is "enough to take away the constitutional protections

afforded to labor, then there would be no hindrance for employers

to grant, on a scheme of generous profit sharing, stock bonuses to
their employees and thereafter claim that since their employees are
not stockholders [of the corporation], albeit in a minimal and
involuntary manner, they are now also co-owners and thus
disqualified to form unions." To allow this, BELU argues, would be
"to allow the floodgates of destruction to be opened upon the rights
of labor which the Constitution endeavors to protect and which
welfare it promises to promote." [Comment of BELU, p. 10; Rollo,
p. 100].
The above contention of respondent union is based on the erroneous
presumption that membership in a cooperative is the same as
ownership of stocks in ordinary corporations. While cooperatives
may exercise some of the rights and privileges given to ordinary
corporations provided under existing laws, such cooperatives enjoy
other privileges not granted to the latter [See Sections 4, 5, 6, and 8,
Pres. Decree No. 175; Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City v.
Ferrer-Calleja, supra]. Similarly, members of cooperatives have
rights and obligations different from those of stockholders of
ordinary corporations. It was precisely because of the special nature
of cooperatives, that the Court held in the Davao City case that
members-employees thereof cannot form or join a labor union for
purposes of collective bargaining. The Court held that:
A cooperative ... is by its nature different from an ordinary business
concern being run either by persons, partnerships, or corporations.
Its owners and/or members are the ones who run and operate the
business while the others are its employees. As above stated,
irrespective of the number of shares owned by each member they
are entitled to cast one vote each in deciding upon the affairs of the
cooperative. Their share capital earn limited interest. They enjoy
special privileges as-exemption from income tax and sales taxes,
preferential right to supply their products to State agencies and even
exemption from the minimum wage laws.
An employee therefore of such a cooperative who is a member and
co-owner thereof cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining

for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his coowners.

It is important to note that, in her order dated September 2, 1985,
med-arbiter Elnora V. Balleras made a specific finding that there are
only thirty-seven (37) employees of petitioner who are not members
of the cooperative and who are, therefore, the only employees of
petitioner cooperative eligible to form or join a labor union for
purposes of collective bargaining [Annex "A" of the Petition, p. 12;
Rollo, p. 22]. However, the minutes of the certification election
[Annex "C" of the Petition: Rollo, p. 28] show that a total of eightythree (83) employees were allowed to vote and of these, forty-nine
(49) voted for respondent union. Thus, even if We agree with
respondent union's contention that the thirty seven (37) employees
who were originally non-members of the cooperative can still vote
in the certification election since they were only "forced and
compelled to join the cooperative on pain of disciplinary action,"
the certification election held on October 1, 1986 is still null and
void since even those who were already members of the cooperative
at the time of the issuance of the med-arbiter's order, and therefore
cannot claim that they were forced to join the union were allowed to
vote in the election.
Article 256 of the Labor Code provides, among others, that:
To have a valid, election, at least a majority of all eligible voters in
the unit must have cast their votes. The labor union receiving the
majority of the valid votes cast shall be certified as the exclusive
bargaining agent of all workers in the unit . . . [Italics supplied.]
In this case it cannot be determined whether or not respondent
union was duly elected by the eligible voters of the bargaining unit
since even employees who are ineligible to join a labor union
within the cooperative because of their membership therein were
allowed to vote in the certification election. Considering the
foregoing, the Court finds that respondent director committed grave
abuse of discretion in certifying respondent union as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file employees
of petitioner cooperative.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed

resolution of respondent director is ANNULLED. The certification
election conducted on October 1, 1986, is SET ASIDE. The
Regional Office No. 1 of San Fernando, La Union is hereby
directed to immediately conduct new certification election
proceedings among the rank and file employees of the petitioner
who are not members of the cooperative.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-20307
February 26, 1965
YOUNG MEN LABOR UNION STEVEDORES, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET AL.,
respondents.
Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioner.
Doyon, Clarin and Ruiz for respondent Victory Stevedoring and
Labor Union.
Emiliano Morabe for respondent Nasipit Lumber Company, Inc.
Mariano B. Tuason for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On April 25, 1961, Nasipit Lumber Company, Inc. (NALCO)
entered into a contract with both Young Men Labor Union
Stevedores (YMLUS) and Victory Stevedoring and Labor Union
(VISLU) whereby the two unions bound themselves to undertake
on a 50-50 basis the stevedoring or loading jobs of the NALCO's
export products from the Port of Nasipit, Agusan. Said agreement
was concluded in a conference called for such purpose in the
presence of the Philippine constabulary officials stationed at Butuan
City, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan, the Justice of the Peace and
Chief of Police of Nasipit, Agusan, and the officials and
representatives of NALCO and the two unions.
On July 20, 1961, the YMLUS sent a letter to NALCO demanding
the withdrawal of the loading job from the VISLU on the ground
that the registration permit granted to the latter by the Department
of Labor had been cancelled, and when VISLU was notified by the
NALCO of such demand, it refused to abandon the 50% loading job

granted to it under the agreement on the ground that the order of

cancellation had not yet become final. On August 2, 1961, the
YMLUS sent a notice of picketing to NALCO in which the former
threatened to carry out to "our picket line beginning August 9, 1961
to continue uninterrupted until you make up your mind to stop the
loading of cargos by the defunct VISLU or reassign the same to us,
the YMLUS,"
On August 9, 1961, the NALCO filed a petition with the Court of
Industrial Relations which, as amended, prayed, among others, that
pending final determination of the case the court issue an order
enjoining both unions to observe the status quo; and, after due
hearing, to decide which of the two unions should be given the
stevedoring job in controversy or whether the 50-50 arrangement
which was arrived at on April 25, 1961 should be followed and
complied with by the parties.
On August 23, 1961, after a series of bloody incidents resulting
from the picketing by the members of the YMLUS and retaliation
from the members of the VISLU, the NALCO filed a petition
before the Court of Industrial Relations praying, among others, (1)
to issue a temporary restraining order against the officials, members
and agents of the YMLUS, ordering them to refrain from blocking,
obstructing, stopping, coercing, intimidating, or in any manner
preventing the loading or unloading operations then assigned to the
VISLU; (2) issue a similar temporary restraining order to the
officers, members, and agents of the VISLU ordering them to desist
in retaliating from the coercive acts of the YMLUS by any violent
means; and (3) after the hearing, to issue an order making the two
abovementioned injunctions permanent as to both unions.
At this stage of the proceedings both unions filed separate motions
to dismiss mainly on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court
of Industrial Relations to act on the controversy. Subsequently,
however, both unions withdrew their respective motions to dismiss
and voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the industrial court.
On May 16, 1962, Judge Arsenio Martinez, to whom the case was
assigned, rendered a decision enjoining the parties to continue

observing the 50-50 basis agreement entered into between them

until it shall have been decided in a certification election to be
undertaken by the Department of Labor which of the two unions
should have direct relationship, thru collective bargaining, with the
NALCO. The YMLUS and the NALCO filed each a motion for
reconsideration only insofar as the decision ordered the holding of a
certification election, and when both motions were denied by the
court en banc, the YMLUS interposed the present petition for
review.1wph1.t
In assailing the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations,
petitioner anchors his argument primarily on the doctrine
enunciated by this Court in the case of PAFLU v. Tan, L-9115,
wherein this Court enumerated the cases over which said court can
exercise jurisdiction. While said case does not include a controversy
of this nature among those enumerated therein, it does not follow
that the industrial court is bereft of jurisdiction over it for the same
involves a certification election. It is clear from the provisions of
Republic Act No. 875 that matters pertaining to certification
election involving two or more unions is one that is addressed to the
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations [Section 12(b),
Republic Act 875]. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped to
question the jurisdiction of the lower court for it is undisputed that
it withdrew its motion to dismiss raising that issue and voluntarily
submitted to its jurisdiction and presented its evidence. And so it
has been held that "One who subjects himself to the jurisdiction of a
court, even where he would not otherwise be subject to suit,
becomes subject to any valid claim asserted against him directly
relating to the subject matter of his voluntarily initiated
proceeding. ... To permit one to invoke the exercise of jurisdiction
within the general powers of the court and then to reverse its orders
upon the ground that it had no jurisdiction would be to allow one to
trifle with courts. The principle is one of estoppel in the interest of a
sound administration of the laws ... closes the mouth of the
complainant" (Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Company,
et al., L-1981-82, May 28, 1954).

We find no error in the order issued by respondent court requiring

the Department of Labor to hold a certification election to
determine which of the two unions should be the one to undertake
the stevedoring job of the company. This is sanctioned by Section
12(b) of Republic, Act 875. Moreover, this is the only expedient
way by which the rivalry between the two unions may be solved to
avoid friction and other unfortunate incidents. And considering that
certification proceedings are investigatory in nature which had been
entrusted exclusively to the Court of Industrial Relations, we do not
feel justified to interfere, unless a grave abuse of discretion is
shown. Such is not the case here.
Considering that certification proceedings are investigatory in
nature since
the object of the proceedings is not the decision of any alleged
commission of wrong nor asserted deprivation of rights but is
merely the determination of proper bargaining units and the
ascertainment of the will and choice of the employees in respect of
the selection of a bargaining representative. The determination of
the proceedings does not entail the entry of remedial orders or
redress of rights, but culmination solely in an official designation of
bargaining units and an affirmation of the employees' expressed
choice of bargaining agent. (Rothernberg on Labor Relation, pp.
514-515; Labor Laws by Francisco, 3rd ed., Vol. I, p. 458);
taking into account that the conduct of such proceedings has been
entrusted specifically to the Court of Industrial Relations (R.A. 875,
sec. 12), and that they should be expedited as much as possible, this
Court should not interfere with the discretion and judgment of that
specialized tribunal in connection with such proceedings, at least in
the absence of clear and patent abuse that in this case has not been
shown to exist." (Benguet Consolidated, Inc., et al. v. Bobok
Lumber Jack Association, et al., L-11029 & L-11065, May 23,
1958)
The claim that respondent court prohibited petitioner from
exercising its constitutional right to picket is not correct. What the
court prohibited was the commission of illegal acts in connection

with picketing which under our jurisprudence can be lawfully done.

As a matter of fact, the picketing has resulted in many bloody
incidents because of the acts of retaliation on the part of the other
rival union.
Finally, respondent court did not hold that petitioner is only entitled
to 50% of the stevedoring work. What it declared was that the 50-50
arrangement concluded between the parties should continue until
the result of the certification election shall have become final and
executory and a collective bargaining contract entered into between
the parties. This step is proper considering the situation then
obtaining.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed. Costs against
petitioner.
G.R. No. L-48007 December 15, 1982
PLUM FEDERATION OF INDUSTRIAL AND AGRARIAN
WORKERS, petitioner,
vs.
DIRECTOR CARMELO C. NORIEL, of the Bureau of Labor
Relations; MANILA JOCKEY CLUB RACE DAY
OPERATION EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION-PTGWO and
MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC., respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Pedro A. Lopez for respondent MJCRDOELU-PTGWO.
Armando V. Ampil for respondent Manila Jockey Club.
DE CASTRO, J.:
Petitioner seeks to set aside the Order and Resolutions dated May 6,
1977, September 17, 1977 and March 14, 1978 of the Bureau of
Labor Relations for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and
with grave abuse of discretion. It, likewise, prays for an order
directing respondent director to hold a certification election so that
the employees in the company can elect a union representative to
negotiate an improved connective bargaining agreement to replace
the agreement which has expired on February 1, 1976.
On May 5, 1976, Plum Federation of Industrial and Agrarian

Workers filed a petition, praying that it be certified as the sole and

exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file workers of Manila
Jockey Club, Inc.
On June 18, 1976, the Manila Jockey Club Race Day Operation
Employees Labor Union-PTGWO filed a motion to intervene and
opposition to said petition and alleged among other things, that it is
the recognized collective bargaining representative of all the
employees of the company and that it is in the process of
negotiating a modification of the collective bargaining agreement.
On August 30, 1976, another supplemental motion to dismiss was
filed by intervenor PTGWO, this time invoking the "No Union
Raiding Clause" of the "Code of Ethics" adopted by the members of
the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (T.U.C.P.) wherein
both petitioner and intervenor are members, and claiming that the
petition failed to satisfy the 30% requirement of the law. The entire
record of the case was forwarded to the Office of the President of
the T.U.C.P. for the purpose of submitting the matter to the
Congress for decision.
On March 16, 1977, the entire record of the case was returned by
the T.U.C.P. President to the Office of then Secretary of Labor
which in turn transmitted the same to the Bureau of Labor Relations
Office with a forwarding letter signed by the late Roberto S. Oca in
his capacity as President of the Congress, stating, among other
things, the following: 1
In a National Executive Board meeting of the Katipunang
Manggagawang Pilipino (TUCP) held last March 7, 1977 at the
Army & Navy Club, it was duly approved that the above-captioned
case be referred back to the BLR and that MJCR-OELU-PTGWO
be declared as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent, thus
dismissing the petition of PLUM.
On March 22, 1977, the BLR endorsed the case to Officer-inCharge Vicente Leodegardo, Jr., of Region IV for appropriate
action.
On May 5, 1977, Atty. Luna C. Piezas, Chief, Med-Arbiter Section
of Region IV, Department of Labor, promulgated an order

dismissing the case pursuant to the letter of the President of the

T.U.C.P.
Petitioner PLUM filed an appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations
predicated on the ground that TUCP has no authority in law to grant
or deny election under the Labor Code which mandated the secret
ballot to elect the true union representative.
On September 17, 1977, the Bureau Director issued a resolution'
dismissing the appeal. Pertinent portions 3 of said resolution read
thus:
While it may be true that the facts of the case may warrant the
holding of a certification election in the bargaining unit concerned,
to sustain first the decision arrived at by the National Executive
Board of TUCP appears of indispensable importance. Contenders in
the case at bar are both members of TUCP. Undeniably, there are
internal rules including their Code of Ethics to keep them intact, to
govern their actions and finally to preserve the Congress. It is
therefore, a matter of utmost necessity that a decision arrived at by
the National Executive Board be respected and enforced not only by
the members of the Congress themselves but also by this Bureau
and the Department if necessity arises,
The appealed order has the letter of Roberto Oca as its basis. It is
worthy to note that the letter sent said communication in his
capacity as President of the TUCP and nothing else. Whether or not
he happens also to be the president of intervenor union is of no
legal significance since the decision of the TUCP was handed down
by its National Executive Board and not by him alone.
Other recourse could have been taken by appellant. Very much
aware of the Decision of the National Executive Board on March 7,
1977, it could have asked for a reconsideration of the same. As
shown by the records, the first decision of the National Board was
for the holding of a certification election. But intervenor asked for a
reconsideration hence the March 7, decision. Appellant's failure
however could unequivocably be interpreted as satisfaction of the
Decision. For this Office now, to sustain appellant's stand and reopen the case again by giving due course to the instant appeal is not

only an open manifestation of non-recognition of the existence of

TUCP but a further obstruction to the goal of the Department to
establish one-union in one industry; thus at the end, to attain
industrial peace.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied by public
respondent for being pro-forma, hence the present recourse by way
of a petition for certiorari and mandamus.
It was asserted by petition that nowhere in the Labor Code or in the
new Constitution has TUCP been granted any authority to
supersede or impair the holding of a certification election or deny
the majority employees of their right to elect their own union; that
public respondent and the PTGWO acted without jurisdiction in
defiance of the rule of law and popular democracy, that it, is not
within the Code of Ethics to suppress the employees' freedom to
choose their own union; and that the TUCP, while asserting itself to
be a Labor Center did not call the parties involved for conference,
to submit evidence or to make a fair judicious and rational
evaluation of the dispute.
The Solicitor General in his manifestation and motion prayed that
he be relieved from filing the required answer to the instant petition
for the reason that he was unable to sustain respondent bureau
director's questioned orders and resolution. The records of the case
were returned to said public respondent and he was granted an
extension of time within which to submit his own answer to the
petition.
Respondent Noriel in his comment (answer) made it clear that he is
not opposed to the conduct of a certification election, and in fact he
is ready to hold such election if the case is returned to the
jurisdiction of his office. However, he stressed that the TUCP Code
of Ethics and General Council Resolution No. 76-2 are clear
expressions of consent by the signatory members, including their
locals or affiliates, to settle their disputes among themselves in
accordance with the decision of the National Executive Board and
the decision he made was made pursuant to such an agreement.

On the other hand, private respondent union maintained its stand

that no certification election should be held because the petition was
not supported by the written consent of at least 30% of all the
employees in the bargaining unit, and that this requirement is
mandatory.
A letter from the president of respondent union reveals the present
state of affairs of the employees wherein they are deprived of the
benefits of a collective bargaining agreement, for management
refused to bargain with the union. If this situation continues, the
employees would stand to lose a long-line of cases that the workers'
welfare can be promoted through the bargaining process.
Certification election is the fairest and most effective way of
determining which labor organization can truly represent the
working force. It is a fundamental postulate that the win of the
majrity if given expression in an honest election with freedom on
the part of the voters to make their choice, is controlling. 4
Protection to labor and freedom of peaceful assembly and
association are guaranteed by the Constitution.
As to the issue of whether or not the 30% minimum subscription
requirement was met, it was held that the Director is still
empowered to call for a certification election provided there was no
abuse of discretion. However, in the case at bar, instead of ordering
an election, respondent Director dismissed the appeal of PLUM
based on the decision of the TUCP, which the Court considers an
impairment of the freedom of the workers to voice out their choice
of the union to represent them. If there is any doubt as to the
required number having met, there would be no better way than the
holding of a certification election to ascertain which union really
commands the allegiance of the rank-and-file employees. 5 If the
desired goal is for the execution of a collective bargaining contract
to protect the workers, then certification election is the most
appropriate means to attain said end.
Since there has been no certification election for the past three (3)
years as well as a certified collective bargaining agreement which
should govern the economic and working conditions of the workers,

a certification election should immediately be ordered. This Court

had repeatedly made it clear that in labor controversies, time is of
the essence. 6
Accordingly, the questioned order and resolutions dated May 5,
1977, September 17, 1977 and March 14, 1978 are nullified and set
aside. Respondent Director is hereby ordered to hold a certification
election forthwith. This decision is immediately executory. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 97189 May 11, 1993
JISSCOR INDEPENDENT UNION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RUBEN TORRES and BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA,
in their capacity as Secretary and Undersecretary of Labor,
respectively; ASSOCIATED LABOR UNI0N (ALU) and
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG JISSCOR, respondents.
Romeo B. Igot Law Office for petitioner.
Joji L. Barrios for private respondents.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
On June 27, 1990, petitioner JISSCOR Independent Union (JIU)
filed a petition for certification election among the rank-and-file
employees of the Jacinto Iron and Steel Sheets Corporation
(JISSCOR) before the Med- Arbitration Unit of the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region, Manila.
By agreement of the petitioner, JIU, the intervenor SMJ-ALU and
the JISSCOR management, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order on
August 29, 1990, setting the certification election on September 4,
1990.
However, on the appointed date, instead of an election, as
previously agreed upon by all the parties, another pre-election
conference was held in the Department of Labor and Employment.
Another agreement was entered into by JIU, JISSCOR and SMJALU, providing that the election would be conducted on September
6, 1990 from 8:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M., and that "the mandatory five

(5) days posting is hereby waived by agreement of the parties" (p.

172, Rollo).
The results of the certification election held on September 6, 1990
were the following:
JISSCOR Independent Union 46
Samahang Manggagawa ng JISSCOR-ALU 50
No Union 0
Spoiled 3
Total Votes Cast 99 (p. 21, Rollo.)
The JIU, which obtained only the second highest number of votes,
registered a protest in the minutes of the election stating that: "we
file protest on the following grounds using visor, emblem" (p. 174,
Rollo).
On September 11, 1990, the JIU filed a formal protest before the
Department of Labor, National Capital Region, on the following
grounds:
I. The election was conducted very disorderly and irregular (sic) as
there was no compliance of (sic) mandatory posting of notice of
certification election and necessary list of qualified voters in
accordance to (sic) Section 1 of Rule VI of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations;
II. The lack of the required posting had mislead (sic) and/or
misinformed the voters/workers of the manner of voting, thus it
resulted to some spoiled votes;
III. Escorting of workers by SMJ-ALU officers and members,
especially a certain Rene Tan from their place of work to the
election registration;
IV. Forcing the workers to vote for SMJ-ALU by posting of a very
big streamer with printed words: Vote! Samahang Manggagawa Ng
JISSCOR-ALU at the entrance front door of the chapel where the
election was held;
V. Forcing the workers to vote for SMJ-ALU by wearing of
sunvisors and pins with printed words: Vote! SMJ-ALU before and
during voting inside the polling place (chapel). (pp- 45-46, Rollo.)
On November 21, 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas F. Falconitin issued an

Order declaring the September 6, 1990 certification election null

and void.
On December 12, 1990, the winner, respondent SMJ-ALU appealed
to the DOLE Secretary and prayed that it be declared the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of
JISSCOR.
On January 18, 1991, a decision was rendered by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment granting the appeal of SMJ-ALU and
setting aside the Order dated November 21, 1990 of the MedArbiter. A new order was entered certifying SMJ-ALU as the sole
and exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank-and-file workers of
JISSCOR pursuant to the results of the certification election
conducted on September 6, 1990.
In due time, the JIU filed this petition for certiorari alleging that the
public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction in certifying SMJ-ALU as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of
JISSCOR.
The petition has no merit.
Section 3, Rule VI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules implementing the
Labor Code provides that the grounds of a protest may be filed on
the spot or in writing with the representation officer and shall be
contained in the minutes of the proceedings. Protests not so raised
are deemed waived.
The minutes of the certification election show, however, that JIU
only protested against the use of emblem, visor, pin. Hence, other
"protests [such as the posting in the chapel entrance of a huge
streamer with the words: "Vote! Samahang Manggagawa ng
JISSCOR-ALU"]not so raised are deemed waived" (Sec. 3, Rule
VI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code).
There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the non-posting
of the notice of the certification election as prescribed by Section 1,
Rule VI, Book V of the Onmibus Rules Implementing the labor
Code misled and confused the workers regarding the mechanics of
the election. The petitioner is estopped from raising that issue for it

signed an agreement with the private respondent to waive the

mandatory five (5) days posting of election notices. The doctrine of
estoppel is based on grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good
faith and justice, and its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his
own act, representations, or commitments to the injury of one to
whom they were directed and who reasonably relied thereon (PNB
vs. Court of Appeals, 94 SCRA 357).
The results of the certification election belie the petitioner's
allegation that the workers were misinformed about the election for
the records show that out of 104 eligible voters, 99 were able to cast
their votes and only 3 were spoiled ballots.
On the alleged use of sunvisors, pins, emblems and the posting of a
huge streamer, the Undersecretary found:
. . . nothing in the records shows that the alleged wearing of
sunvisors and pins, the posting of huge streamers, as well as the
alleged escorting of voters by SMJ-ALU have unduly pressured,
influenced, vitiated, or in any manner affected the choice of the
workers of their bargaining agent. (p. 49, Rollo.)
That finding of fact of the head of an administrative agency is
conclusive upon the court (Reyes vs. Minister of Labor, 170 SCRA
134).
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the public respondents, the Secretary and Undersecretary of Labor
and Employment, in rendering the questioned decision, the petition
for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the
Undersecretary of Labor, by authority of the Secretary of Labor, is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-18848
April 23, 1963
ACOJE WORKERS' UNION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED WORKERS' UNION
(NAMAWU), ACOJE MINES COMPANY and COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Dator, Real and Reyes for petitioner.

Jose C. Espinas and Associates for respondent National Mines and

Allied Workers Union.
Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Belo for respondent
Acoje Mines Company.
Mariano B. Tuason for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from an Order of the Court of Industrial
Relations certifying:
the National Mines and Allied Workers' Union as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in the Acoje Mining
Company at Santa Cruz, Zambales, excluding supervisors,
confidential employees and security guards, for purposes of
collective bargaining under Republic Act 875 as regards to wages,
rates of pay, hours of work and other conditions of employment.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing
stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable
Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
1wph1.t
Pursuant to an Order of the Court of Industrial Relations, dated May
19, 1961, and a Resolution thereof en banc, dated June 8, 1961, the
Department of Labor, through the Bureau of Labor Relations,
conducted on June 9, 1961, a "consent election" among the workers
of the aforementioned Company, in which five (5) labor unions
participated, namely, the Acoje United Workers' Union, the Acoje
Labor Union (PELTA), the Acoje Labor Union (PLUM), respondent
National Mines and Allied Workers' Union (NAMAWU), and
petitioner Acoje Workers' Union. On June 21, 1961, the Department
of Labor certified that the result of the election was as follows:
No. of Valid
Votes
874
cast ................
...................
No.
of11
Spoiled

Ballots ...........
.......................
..
No.
of
Challenged
19
Ballots ...........
......................
Total No. of
Votes
Cast ...............
904
.......................
.....
No. of Votes Cast for:
Acoje United
Workers Union
8
........................
........
Acoje Labor
Union11
Pelta ...............
....................
Acoje Labor
Union5
Plum ...............
.....................
National Mines
&
Allied
560
Workers'
Union .............
Acoje Workers'
Union .............278
.....................
No
Union12
desired ............

........................
..
874
Prior thereto or on June 12, 1961, petitioner Union which had
been defeated by respondent Union by a margin of 282 votes had
filed a motion to invalidate said election upon several grounds.
After due hearing, the lower court issued, on July 21, 1961, the
order appealed from holding that said motion was without merit,
and certifying respondent Union as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all the workers of the Company. A
reconsideration of said order having been denied by the Court en
banc, petitioner interposed the present appeal by certiorari, and now
maintains that the lower court should have invalidated the
aforementioned election for the same was "the result of acts of
terrorism, force, threat and intimidation employed by" agents of
respondent Union.
More specifically, petitioner alleges that, "if heard or given its day
in Court" it could have proven that: a) not less than 310 workers of
the Company were threatened the night immediately preceding the
election by agents of respondent Union individually "to cast their
vote for said Union ... or else;" b) the agents of respondent Union
were even aided by the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz, Zambales,
and his policemen, and, as a consequence, said Municipal Mayor
was suspended from office; c) the acts performed by said agents of
respondent Union "resulted into unlawful disorder, damaged
belongings, and physical injuries suffered by the workers"; d) many
workers were unable to vote for justified causes; and e) many
workers, subject of unfair labor practice case actually pending in
Court, were not allowed to vote, contrary to law.
The last two (2) grounds are clearly untenable. It appears that on
April 24, 1961, the labor unions concerned agreed, not only to the
holding of the aforementioned election, but, also, to the use of the
Company payroll of March 31, 1961, as the basis for determining
who are qualified to vote subject to the approval of the lower court.

On May 8, 1961, the Company presented its aforementioned payroll

to said court and stated that the labor unions had been furnished
copy thereof, at least three (3) days prior thereto. Said labor unions
were given an opportunity to make their comments and
observations on the list of workers contained in the payroll and to
ask or suggest the inclusion or exclusion of names therein or
therefrom. Petitioner's representative then stated that it would abide
by whatever ruling the court may make on the matter of inclusion
and exclusion of voters. Indeed, on May 19, 1961, the court issued
the corresponding order for the holding of the election and in made
its ruling on the question as to who were qualified to vote, and
petitioner did not move for a reconsideration of said ruling,
although two (2) other Labor Unions and that Company did so, and
their motions for reconsideration were denied by the Courten banc.
Hence, petitioner may no longer contest the accuracy of the
aforementioned voters list.
Pursuant thereto that Company had 1,019 workers, excluding
department heads foremen, but including 48 security guards.
Excluding the latter, there were, therefore, only 971 qualified
voters. Of these, 904 had voted, so that only 67 qualified voters had
to cast their votes. It is obvious, that this number plus the 19 ballots
challenged in the election are insufficient to offset the plurality of
282 votes obtained by respondent Union.
In connection with the duress claimed to have been used upon the
voters, it should be observed that in its motion dated June 12, 1961,
petitioner maintained that the election should be invalidated
because of alleged: a) insufficiency of the notice of said election; b)
failure to furnish the petitioner with a copy of the list of qualified
voters; c) inclusion among those who voted of confidential
employees, supervisors and security or police officers; d) failure of
many workers to vote due to said insufficient notice "as well as the
cases of violence that occurred on the eve of election". None of
these grounds is now invoked by petitioner herein. Worthy of notice
is the fact that petitioner did not claim that any voter had been
coerced to vote for respondent Union.

In fact, in its supplemental motion of June 22, 1961, petitioner

made more specific allegations to bolster up its pretense "that the
election held on June 9, 1961, is inconclusive because of the alleged
"failure of more than 300 workers to vote which, as above
indicated, is not a fact. It is true that the last ground out of the
seven (7) relied upon in the aforementioned supplemental
motion was to the effect that "there are many cases where the
workers were threatened, coerced and intimidated to vote for the
NAMAWU." But this general allegation, without anything to
indicate the number of workers involved, without the supporting
affidavit of any of them, and without an offer to introduce their
testimony or the testimony of any of them was in the light of the
attending circumstances clearly insufficient to warrant the
invalidation of the aforementioned election.
As regards the disorder that had allegedly characterized the
election, the minutes thereof suffice to refute petitioner's pretense.
We quote from said minutes:
Balloting went on smoothly up to closing time at 7:00 p.m. There
was spirit of comraderie among the representatives of the contesting
unions throughout the proceedings.
Peace and order was maintained by the 18th PC Company at Iba,
Zambales, graced by the presence of the Provincial Commander in
person.
SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA PACIFIC PLASTIC,
petitioner, vs. HON. BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA,
Undersecretary
of
Labor,
and
MALAYANG
NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG PACIFIC
PLASTIC, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari to set aside the
resolution, dated May 14, 1993, of respondent Undersecretary of

Labor and the order of the Med-Arbiter of January 31, 1993,

dismissing the election protest of petitioner Samahan ng
Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic (SAMAHAN) and upholding the
election of respondent Malayang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng
Pacific Plastic (MNMPP) as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the rank and file employees at the Pacific Plastic
Corporation.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner SAMAHAN and respondent MNMPP are labor unions of
rank and file employees at the Pacific Plastic Corporation (PPC) in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1990, MNMPP filed a
Petition for Certification Election, alleging that there were more or
less 130 rank and file employees at the PPC whom it was seeking to
represent. [1] SAMAHAN countered by seeking the cancellation of
MNMPPs union registration. As a result, MNMPPs petition to be
certified as the bargaining agent was dismissed. MNMPP appealed
to the Secretary of Labor who, on March 5, 1991, reversed the
decision of the Med-Arbiter and ordered the holding of a
certification election among the rank and file employees of the
PPC. The PPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration but its motion
was denied. Accordingly, the representation officer of the Secretary
of Labor held a pre-election conference on May 6, 1991, during
which the PPC was required to submit the list of its rank and file
employees based on the company payroll three (3) months prior to
the filing of the petition. As respondent company failed to submit
the list, it was given a stern warning by the Department of Labor
(DOLE) that should it fail to appear at the next conference on June
3, 1991, the list to be submitted by petitioner MNMPP would be
used as basis for determining the eligible voters. [2] But the PPC
again failed to appear at the conference, prompting the Department
of Labor Industrial Relations Division (DOLE-IRD) to issue a final
warning. [3]
Petitioner SAMAHAN also failed to appear at the June 3, 1991
conference. On June 18, 1991, it moved to defer the conference,

alleging that proceedings for the cancellation of union registration

of MNMPP were still pending resolution before the Med-Arbiter
which constitute a prejudicial question and that there existed a
collective bargaining agreement between PPC and SAMAHAN
which was a bar to the certification election. [4]
MNMPP opposed the motion, contending that the cancellation case
had already been finally decided by the DOLE and that the
execution of the subject CBA during the pendency of the
representation case did not bar the holding of a certification
election. [5]
On August 23, 1991, the DOLE-IRD summoned respondent
company once more, reiterating its warning that should the
company fail to submit the list of its rank and file employees, the
list to be submitted by private respondent MNMPP and petitioner
SAMAHAN would be adopted as the list of qualified voters and the
companys right to the exclusion proceedings would be deemed
waived. [6]
But again PPC did not comply with the DOLE order. Meanwhile,
on September 23, 1991, SAMAHAN and MNMPP agreed to hold
the certification election on October 29, 1991 on the basis of the list
of employees submitted by MNMPP, without prejudice to the
submission by petitioner SAMAHAN of its own list on October 17,
1991. [7] Thereafter, they agreed to postpone election to await the
list of employees requested from the Social Security System. [8]
On September 10, 1992, upon motion of MNMPP, the certification
election was finally set for October 6, 1992. But SAMAHAN
objected despite its agreement with MNMPP on September 23,
1991 to hold an election using the list furnished by the SSS. [9] It
also objected to the participation of a third labor union, Kalipunan
ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMAPI) which in the meantime had
filed a motion for intervention. Thereafter, SAMAHAN filed a
Manifestation/Motion that it was not participating in the
certification election and asked that the certification election held
on the same day be nullified for the following reasons: (1) it did not
receive notice of the certification as required by law; (2) its

opposition to KAMAPIs motion to intervene and its opposition to

setting the date of the certification election had not been resolved;
(3) there were discrepancies in the list of voters submitted by the
SSS; and (4) SAMAHANs President moved to strike out his
signature at the back of the official ballot. [10]
The certification election was held on October 6, 1992. Over
SAMAHANs objection KAMAPI was allowed to participate. The
following were results of the election: [11]
No. of Eligible Voters..98
Malayang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa Pacific
Plastic,...56
Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic..2
Kalipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino...0
No Union1
No. of Spoiled Ballots cast.3
Total no of Votes Cast..62
On October 9, 1992, SAMAHAN protested the result of the
certification election alleging the same grounds alleged by it in its
Manifestation/Motion of October 6, 1992. On October 15, 1992,
MNMPP opposed the petition raising the following arguments: (1)
that the mere filing of a motion for intervention will not suspend the
holding of a certification election under Rule V, 5 of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code; (2) that the results of the
election showed that intervenor was resoundingly repudiated by the
employees; (3) that it failed to specify the alleged discrepancies in
the list of employees furnished by the SSS; and (4) that matters not
raised during the election are deemed waived pursuant to Rule VI, 3
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. [12]
In his order dated January 31, 1993, the Med-Arbiter, Tomas F.
Falconitin, dismissed the election protest of SAMAHAN and
upheld the election of MNMPP as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of all rank and file employees at the PPC. On March 12,
1993, SAMAHAN appealed to the Secretary of Labor. It argued
that its opposition to KAMAPIs Motion for Intervention should first

be resolved before a certification election could be held and that the

contract-bar rule should be applied. In addition, it contended that
the use of the SSS list was in violation of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code which prescribe the use of the
company payroll as basis for the voters list.
On May 14, 1993, Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma
denied the appeal of SAMAHAN and affirmed the decision of the
Med-Arbiter. SAMAHAN moved for a reconsideration, but its
motion was denied on July 29, 1993. Hence, this petition for
certiorari.
Petitioner contends:
1. The certification election held on October 6, 1992 is null and
void on the ground that only 62 out of 130 employees participated
in the activity.
2. The SSS lists indicating 98 covered employees cannot be used as
substitute for three (3) monthly payrolls [sic] required for the
purpose of determining the qualified voters and the majority vote
needed in an election.
3. Hon. Bienvenido Laguesma committed a serious error amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in upholding the election of respondent
officers [sic] despite the absence of majority support which is 65
out of 130 admitted members in the bargaining unit.
4. Hon. Bienvenido Laguesma had abused his discretion in
sustaining the med-arbiter despite the absence of any legal or
factual support when he could otherwise declare failure of an
election, thereby constituting his acts to have been done in excess of
his authority amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and therefore his
resolution and order issued pursuant thereof are considered to be
null and void. [13]
The petition has no merit.
First. The certification election held on October 6, 1992 is
valid. Art. 256 of the Labor Code provides that in order to have a
valid election, at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit

must have cast their votes. The certification election results show
that more than a majority, i.e., 62 out of a total of 98 eligible voters
included in the list of employees obtained from the SSS, cast their
votes. Hence, the legal requirement for a valid election was met.
The bone of contention actually concerns the propriety of
utilizing the list of employees furnished by the SSS as basis for
determining the total number of eligible voters in the bargaining
unit. Petitioner claims that, according to the Implementing Rules,
the basis for the list of eligible voters should have been the payroll
three (3) months preceding the filing of the petition for certification
election and that if this was done the 62 votes cast would be short of
the majority because, instead of only 98 employees as shown in the
SSS list, there were actually 130 as alleged in MNMPPs petition for
certification election.
The contention is without merit. As petitioner itself says, the
figure 130 is based on the allegation that MNMPP made in its
petition for certification election that it was supported by at least
25% of the members of the bargaining unit. [14] Such statement was
a mere approximation of the size of the bargaining unit that the
petitioning union seeks to represent and cannot be used against
MNMPP for this reason.
It should ideally be the payroll which should have been used
for the purpose of the election. However, the unjustified refusal of a
company to submit the payroll in its custody, despite efforts to
make it produce it, compelled resort to the SSS list as the next best
source of information. After all, the SSS list is a public record
whose regularity is presumed. In Port Workers Union of the
Philippines (PWUP) v. Undersecretary of Labor and Employment,
[15]
this Court underscored the policy of the Labor Code of
encouraging the holding of a certification election as the definitive
and certain way of ascertaining the choice of employees as to the
labor organization in a collective bargaining unit. In Trade Unions
of the Philippines and Allied Services World Federation of Trade
Unions v. Laguesma, [16] we reiterated this policy thus:

It bears stressing that no obstacle must be placed to the holding of

certification elections, for it is a statutory policy that should not be
circumvented. We have held that whenever there is doubt as to
whether a particular union represents the majority of the rank and
file employees, in the absence of a legal impediment, the holding of
certification election is the most democratic method of determining
the employees choice of their bargaining representative. It is the
appropriate means whereby controversies and disputes on
representation may be laid to rest, by the unequivocal vote of the
employees themselves. Indeed, it is the keystone of industrial
democracy.
Insistence on the application of the Omnibus Implementing
Rules could defeat this policy. Worse, it could facilitate fraud by
employers who can easily suppress the payroll to prevent
certification elections from being held. This Court has therefore
consistently adhered to the principle announced in U.E. Automotive
Employees v. Noriel [17] that where it concerns the weight to be
accorded to the wishes of the majority as expressed in an election
conducted fairly and honestly, certain provisions that may be
considered mandatory before the voting takes place become
thereafter merely directory in order that the wishes of the electorate
prevail. Considering all the arguments presented above, we find no
substantial reason to nullify the certification election conducted on
October 6, 1992 on the basis of a mere technicality which finds no
justification considering the facts of the case nor upon close
examination of the true intent of the law to remove all impediments
to the conduct of certification elections.
At all events petitioner must be deemed to have waived the
objection based on this ground, considering that this objection was
raised for the first time in petitioners appeal from the decision of the
Med-Arbiter dismissing petitioners protest. [18] Even then,
petitioners objection to the use of the SSS list was not that this was
contrary to the requirement of the Implementing Rules that the
payroll three (3) months prior to the filing of the petition should be

used but rather that the list contained some discrepancy

allegation which petitioner failed to substantiate.

[19]

an

At the latest, petitioners objection to the use of the SSS should

have been raised during the elections and formalized in its election
protest. We agree with private respondent MNMPP in its
Opposition to SAMAHANs election protest dated October 15, 1992
that under the Implementing Rules, grounds of protests not raised
before the close of the proceedings and duly formalized within five
(5) days after the close of the election proceedings are deemed
waived. [20]
Second. Petitioners contention in its Motion for Deferment of
Pre-election Conference was that the CBA between it and the PPC
signed during the pendency of the representation proceedings,
rendered the certification election moot and academic. Rule V,
Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, 4
provides:
The representation case shall not, however, be adversely affected by
a collective bargaining agreement registered before or during the
last 60 days of a subsisting agreement or during the pendency of the
representation case.
This rule was applied in the case of ALU-TUCP v. Trajano [21]
where we held that the representation case will not be adversely
affected by a CBA registered before or during the freedom period or
during the pendency of the representation case. In ALU v. Calleja,
[22]
we also held that a CBA, which was prematurely renewed, is not
a bar to the holding of a certification election.Hence, the CBA
entered into between petitioner and PPC during the pendency of the
representation case and after the filing of the petition for
certification election on August 24, 1990, cannot possibly prejudice
the certification election nor render it moot.
Third. With respect to petitioners claim [23] that the proceedings
for the cancellation of MNMPPs union registration was a
prejudicial question, suffice it to say that as held in Association of

Court of Appeals Employees vs. Cal1eja, [24] certification election

can be conducted despite pendency of a petition to cancel the union
registration certificate. For the fact is that at the time the respondent
union filed its petition for certification, it still had the legal
personality to perform such act absent an order directing its
cancellation.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-32853 September 25, 1981
JUAN S. BARRERA, (doing business under the firm and trade
name,
MACHINERY
AND
STEEL
PRODUCTS
ENGINEERING MASPE petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
Philippine Associated Workers Union (PAWO) and MASPE
WORKERS' UNION, respondents.
FERNANDO C.J.:
It was the absence of any definite ruling at the time this petition was
filed on the question of whether or not a pending certification
election proceeding may be dismissed or held in abeyance, there
being such a motion on the part of the employer Juan S. Barrera,
doing business under the firm and trade name of Machinery and
Steel Products Engineering MASPE alleging an unfair labor
practice against one of the contending parties, private respondent
MASPE Workers Union, the other being private respondent
Philippine Associated Workers Union, that led this Court to give it
due course. The unfair labor practice imputed to such labor union
consisted of failure to bargain collectively, aggravated by an illegal
strike. Respondent Court of Industrial Relations denied such a
motion to dismiss, stating that the grounds therein alleged "appear
not to be indubitable A motion for reconsideration having proved
futile, this petition was filed.

Subsequently, to be precise, in 1973, in the case of B. F. Goodrich

Philippines, Inc. vs. Goodrich (Marikina Factory) Confidential and
Salaried Employees Union-NATU. 1 such a question was given an
answer by this Court, one adverse to the claim of petitioner. This
petition, therefore, must be dismissed.
The case for petitioner was put most vigorously in the exhaustive
and scholarly brief of its counsel, Manuel M. Crudo To quote from
its pertinent portion: "On September 22, 1970 the petitioner Barrera
filed a motion to dismiss or hold case in abeyance, in CIR Case No.
2759-MC. In said motion, we called attention to the admission of
MASPE Workers Union as intervenor in the case. We stated that the
intervenor union, its officers and members had committed various
acts of unfair labor practice and were on illegal strike punctuated by
force, violence and intimidation. We called attention to our formal
charge of unfair labor practice against the intervenor union. We
called attention to the fact that in the charge of unfair labor practice
among the reliefs prayed for were to declare respondents therein
collectively and individually guilty of unfair labor practice; to
declare the strike, and other concerted actions resorted to in
pursuance of said unfair labor practice illegal to declare the MASPE
Workers Union as consequently having lost all rights and privileges
accorded by law to a legitimate labor union; and to declare all
individual respondents therein and others as having lost their
employment status by virtue of the illegality of the strike staged by
them. We then pointed out that unless the case for unfair labor
practice against MASPE Workers Union, its officers and members
is decided the status of that union and its members who are
respondents would be uncertain (i.e., in relation to the requested
certification election and the outcome thereof). * * * Unfortunately,
the respondent Honorable Court of Industrial Relations denied our
motion to dismiss or hold case in abeyance. * * * ." 2 It remains
only to be added that subsequently the Court of Industrial Relations
en banc denied a motion for reconsideration, failing "to find
sufficient justification to alter or to modify the aforesaid Order." 3

To repeat, the petition cannot prosper.

1. As set forth in the B. F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc. decision:
"There is novelty in the specific question raised, as to whether or
not a certification election may be stayed at the instance of the
employer, pending the determination of an unfair labor practice case
filed by it against certain employees affiliated with respondentunions. That is a matter of which this Court has not had an
opportunity to speak on previously. What is settled law, dating from
the case of Standard Cigarette Workers' Union v. Court of Industrial
Relations, decided in 1957, is that if it were a labor organization
objecting to the participation in a certification election of a
company dominated union, as a result of which a complaint for an
unfair labor practice case against the employer was filed, the status
of the latter union must be first cleared in such a proceeding before
such voting could take place." 4
2. This is the more relevant excerpt: "The unique situation before
us, however, is exactly the reverse. It is management that would
have an unfair labor practice case filed by it for illegal strike
engaged in by some of its employees concluded, before it would
agree to the holding of a certification election. That is the stand of
petitioner. It does not carry conviction. The reason that justifies the
postponement of a certification election pending an inquiry, as to
the bona fides of a labor union, precisely calls for a different
conclusion. If under the circumstances disclosed, management is
allowed to have its way, the result might be to dilute or fritter away
the strength of an organization bent on a more zealous defense of
labor's prerogatives. The difficulties and obstacles that must be then
hurdled would not be lost on the rest of the personnel who had not
as yet made up their minds one way or the other. This is not to say
that management is to be precluded from filing an unfair labor
practice case. It is merely to stress that such a suit should not be
allowed to lend itself as a means, whether intended or not, to
prevent a truly free expression of the will of the labor group as to
the organization that will represent it. It is not only the loss of time
involved, in itself not likely to enhance the prospect of respondent-

unions, but also the fear engendered in the mind of an ordinary

employee that management has many weapons in its arsenal to
bring the full force of its undeniable power against those of its
employees dissatisfied with things as they are. There is no valid
reason then for the postponement sought. This is one instance that
calls for the application of the maxim, lex dilationes semper
exhorret. Moreover, is there not in the posture taken by petitioner a
contravention of what is expressly set forth in the Industrial Peace
Act, which speaks of the labor organizations 'designated or selected
for the purpose of collective bargaining by the majority of the
employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit [be the
exclusive] representative of all the employees in such unit for the
purpose of collective bargaining.' The law clearly contemplates all
the employees, not only some of them. As much as possible then,
there is to be no unwarranted reduction in the number of those
taking part in a certification election, even under the guise that in
the meanwhile, which may take some time, some of those who are
employees could possibly lose such status, by virtue of a pending
unfair labor practice case." 5
3. Even on the assumption that the vigorous condenmation of the
strike and the picketing were attended by violence, it does not
automatically follow that thereby the strikers in question are no
longer entitled to participate in the certification election for having
automatically lost their jobs. So it was made clear in another B.F.
Goodrich decision: 6 What was set forth in the facts as found by
respondent Judge Salvador would indicate that it was during the
picketing, certainly not peaceful, that the imputed acts of violence
did occur. It cannot be ignored, however, that there were injuries on
both sides because management did not, understandably, play a
passive role confronted as it was with the unruly disruptive tactics
of labor. This is not, by any means, to condone activities of such
character, irrespective of the parties responsible. It is merely to
explain what cannot be justified. Nonetheless, did the acts in
question call for an automatic finding of illegality? Again, the order
issued on February 4, 1972 appeared to be oblivious of a 1971

decision of this Court, Shell Oil Workers' Union v. Shell Company

of the Philippines, Ltd. There it was clearly held: 'A strike otherwise
valid, if violent in character, may be placed beyond the pale. Care is
to be taken, however, especially where an unfair labor practice is
involved, to avoid stamping it with illegality just because it is
tainted by such acts. To avoid rendering illusory the recognition of
the right to strike, responsibility in such a case should be individual
and not collective. A different conclusion would be called for, of
course, if the existence of force while the strike lasts is pervasive
and widespread, consistently and deliberately resorted to as a matter
of policy. It could be reasonably concluded then that even if
justified as to ends, it becomes illegal because of the means
employed.' It must be pointed out likewise that the facts as there
found would seem to indicate a greater degree of violence. Thus:
'Respondent Court must have been unduly impressed by the
evidence submitted by the Shell Company to the effect that the
strike was marred by acts of force, intimidation and violence on the
evening of June 14 and twice in the mornings of June 15 and 16,
1967 in Manila. Attention was likewise called to the fact that even
on the following day, with police officials stationed at the strike
bound area, molotov bombs did explode and the streets were
obstructed witlh wooden planks containing protruding nails.
Moreover, in the branches of the Shell Company in Iloilo City as
well as in Bacolod, on dates unspecified, physical injuries appeared
to have been inflicted on management personnel. Respondent Court
in the appealed decision did penalize with loss of employment the
ten individuals responsible for such acts. Nor is it to be lost sight of
that before the certification on June 27, 1967, one month had
elapsed during which the Union was on strike. Except on those few
days specified then, the Shell Company could not allege that the
strike was conducted in a manner other than peaceful Under the
circumstances, it would be going too far to consider that it thereby
became illegal.' Then, mention was made of a decision in Insular
Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees' Association vs. Insular Life
Assurance Co., Ltd. [where] there is the recognition by this Court,

speaking through Justice Castro, of picketing as such being

"inherently explosive." It is thus clear that not every form of
violence suffices to affix the seal of illegality on a strike or to cause
the loss of employment by the guilty party. " 7
G.R. No. L-46933 June 30, 1980
CONFEDERATION OF CITIZENS LABOR UNIONS (CCLU)
and PACIFIC KNITTING WORKERS' ORGANIZATION,
petitioners,
vs.
CARMELO C. NORIEL, as Director of Bureau of Labor Relations,
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS,
VICENTE ARNIEGO LUZON FEDERATION OF LABOR
ORGANIZATION, FUR CHAPTER, (LFLO-FUR) and PACIFIC
MILLS, INC. respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
An order by respondent Director Noriel 1 all the inclusion of
respondent Union, Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions
(PAFLU) to participate in a certification election 2 is assumed in
this certiorari and prohibition proceeding as amounting to a grave
abuse of discretion. It was objected to on the ground that the motion
to do so by such union "came too late for the order calling for a
certification election has already become final without an appeal
interposed by any party. 3 His order was justified by respondent
Noriel thus: "It may not be disputed that the order for an election
has already become final. But this per se did not eliminate PAFLU
from the picture since its motion for intervention was interposed
before the scheduled election. 4 A restraining order was issued by
this Court and respondents were required to comment. The Solicitor
General on behalf of respondent Noriel, submitted its comment
considered as the answer sustaining the issuance of the assailed
order not only because no certification election had as yet been held
but as the union in question had "established substantial interest in
the ordered election. 5 It was likewise contended by respondent
Noriel that the issue had become moot and academic as prior to the

issuance of the temporary restraining order, a certification election

among the rank and file employees resulted in respondent PAFLU
receiving 254 votes out of the 401 total votes cast.
Under the above circumstances, the petition cannot prosper.
1. From United Employees Union of Gelmart Industries v. Noriel,
6 a 1975 decision, it has been the consistent ruling of this Court that
for the integrity of the collective bargaining process to be
maintained and thus manifest steadfast adherence to the concept of
industrial democracy, all the workers of a collective bargaining unit
should be given t he opportunity to participate in a certification
election. The latest decision in point, promulgated barely a year
ago, is United Lumber and General Workers v. Noriel. 7 This Court
has resolutely set its face against any attempt that may frustrate the
above statutory policy. 8 The success of this petition would,
therefore, be an unwarranted departure from a principle that has
been firmly embedded in our jurisprudence. We are not inclined to
take that step.
2. Petitioner must have realized the futility of insisting on its
claim for on March 7, 1980, it filed a motion to dismiss alleging
lack of interest and recognizing the fact that respondent PAFLU "be
certified as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent 9 of
the employer firm, Pacific Mills, Inc.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit and the
restraining order issued on September 26, 1977 is lifted. No costs.
G.R. No. L-77415 June 29, 1989
ASIAN DESIGN AND MANUFACTURING CORPORATION,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. PURA FERRER- CALLEJA, in her capacity as the
Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, and SOUTHERN
PHILIPPINES FEDERATION OF LABOR KILUSANG
MAYO UNO (KMU), respondents.
Salutario J. Fernandez and Emmanuel O. Sales for petitioner.
Pedro A. Rosito for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari seeking the annulment of
the resolution (pp. 21-23, Rollo) dated November 24, 1986 of
respondent Director in BLR Case No. A-10-247-85 which affirmed
the appealed order of the Med-Arbiter dismissing petitioner's
complaint to declare the certification election of May 21, 1986 as
null and void and the resolution (p. 20, Rollo) dated January 21,
1987 which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Asian Design and Manufacturing Corporation
(ADMACOR) is a corporation duly organized and existing by
virtue of the laws of the Philippines. It operates a rattan furniture
factory at Maguikay, Mandaue City, Cebu.
Upon petition of Buklod ng Manggagawang Pilipino (BMP), one of
several labor unions at ADMACOR'S factory, the Labor Relations
Division, Regional Office VII (Cebu City) ordered a certification
election to be conducted on May 21, 1986, a regular business day.
On May 19,1986, several factory workers of ADMACOR held a
strike. No previous notice of strike was filed by the factory workers
with the Bureau of Labor Relations Regional Office. On May
20,1986, ADMACOR filed a petition (pp. 42-44, Rollo) for the
indefinite resetting of the scheduled certification election, which
petition was not acted upon by the Labor Relations Division.
On May 21, 1986, the scheduled certification election was
conducted, despite the strike. Of the 423 workers who voted, 413
voted for Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL) as their
exclusive bargaining agent (p. 82, Rollo), On the same day,
ADMACOR filed a complaint for illegal strike (RAB Vll-0136- 88;
pp. 37-41, Rollo) and for illegal picketing (RAB-040886; pp. 34-36,
Rollo) with the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII, Cebu City.
On May 23, 1986, ADMACOR filed a petition to declare the
certification election conducted on May 21, 1986 as null and void
on the ground that there being a strike by some workers in the
premises of the factory on the day of the certification election, such
day cannot be considered a regular business day, pursuant to
Section 2, Rule VI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing

the Labor Code, to wit:

Section 2. Election conducted during regular business day. - The
election shall be set during the regular business day of the company
unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties.
On August 5, 1986, the Med-Arbiter dismissed ADMACOR's
complaint to annul the May 21, 1986 certification election and
certified SPFL as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the
rank and file employees of ADMACOR. This dismissal was
appealed by ADMACOR to the Bureau of Labor Relations (Bureau)
by way of a motion for reconsideration and docketed as BLR Case
No. A-10- 247-85. On August 14, 1986, the Concerned Workers
Association of ADMACOR filed a motion for intervention in the
case appealed to the Bureau.
On November 24, 1986, the public respondent Pura Ferrer-Calleja
acting as Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations dismissed the
appeal of ADMACOR and affirmed the decision of the MedArbiter. The motion for intervention filed by the Concerned
Workers Association of ADMACOR was denied for having been
filed after the actual certification election had already been
conducted (pp. 3-4, Resolution dated Nov. 24, 1986, pp. 2223,
Rollo). The motion for reconsideration of the November 24, 1986
resolution was also denied in a resolution dated January 21, 1987.
These two resolutions are assailed in this petition for having been
issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion (p. 4, Rollo).
Meanwhile, on January 26,1987, a decision (pp. 45-54, Rollo) on
the twin complaints for illegal strike (RAB-0316-86) and illegal
picketing (RAB-0408-86) was rendered by Labor Arbiter Bonifacio
B. Tumamak declaring the strike held on May 20, 1986 against
ADMACOR as illegal.
In this petition, ADMACOR questions the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Labor Relations (Bureau) to resolve or determine the
factual and legal basis of a strike in relation to the question of
representation of employees (p. 9, Rollo). It said:
What is directly in issue is the jurisdiction of the Bureau to rule, as

it did, on the protest filed after the election by the petitioner.

Petitioner's protest involves the regularity of the election, due to the
contemporaneous, in fact, even antecedent conduct of an illegal
strike. Instead of holding in abeyance the election protest so that the
Labor-Arbiter could properly resolve the pending complaints, the
Bureau rendered its assailed Resolutions in excess of its
jurisdiction. The Bureau had assumed on its own an implied
determination of the legality or illegality of the complained strike
(pp. 10-11, Petition; pp. 11-12, Rollo).
Indeed, the question involving the legality of the strike which was
conducted against ADMACOR is an independent issue, the
resolution of which pertains to the Labor Arbiter pursuant to No. 5,
Article 217 of the Labor Code. On the other hand, the issue of the
validity of the certification election pertains solely to the Bureau of
Labor Relations, originally, the Med-Arbiter and by way of appeal,
to the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, pursuant to
Section 7, Rule V, Book V of the Rules; to Implement the Labor
Code. However, We find no overlapping by the Bureau of the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter on the question of legality, or
illegality of the complained strike. The allegation that the Bureau
assumed on its own an implied determination of said issue is belied
by the fact that the assailed resolutions of respondent Director
confined itself to the issue of the validity of the certification
election. There was nothing in the assailed resolutions which
contain any conclusion or ruling by the Bureau that the alleged
strike was legal or illegal.
What was resolved was whether or not there was compliance with
the procedural requirement set by Section 2, Rule VI, Book VI of
the Rules to Implement the Labor Code that the election shall be set
during a regular business day. In answer to petition's contention that
there being a strike on May 21, 1986, the day the certification
election was held, said day cannot be considered a regular business
day, the respondent Director ruled:
Furthermore, anent complainant's contention that the certification
election was conducted not on regular business day, the same is

devoid of merit. The records further show that during the preelection conference the contending parties agreed that the election
should be conducted on May 21, 1986 winch was, on that time, a
determined regular business day of the company. This was in
accordance with Section 2, Rule VI Book V, of the Implementing
Rules of the Labor Code which explicitly provides:
The election shall be set during the regular business day of the
company unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties.
The alleged strike and/or picketing of some employees at the
company's premises which coincided with the actual conduct of
certification election might, perhaps have affected the actual
performance of works by some employees, but did not necessarily
make said date an irregular business day of the company to go
against the aforesaid Rule (p. 22, Rollo).
We agree with the said ruling of respondent Director upholding the
validity of the certification election despite the strike. In the first
place, since petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of the Bureau when
it filed its election protest before the Med-Arbiter, it cannot now be
allowed to repudiate the same jurisdiction after failing to obtain
affirmative relief. Moreover, it can not be denied that an actual
election was conducted on said date where, of the 423 workers who
voted, 413 voted for SPFL as its exclusive bargaining agent. In the
"Minutes of the Certification Election among the Rank and File
Employees of Asian Design Manufacturing Corp.", the
representatives of the contending unions, and of the Ministry of
Labor even attested that the election was peaceful and orderly (pp.
79-83, Rollo) and none of the parties registered any protest on any
matter concerning the election proceedings. There is thus, no valid
reason to annul the certification election.
On the pretext that the issue deposited in this petition is the lack of
jurisdiction of the Bureau in dismissing its protest against the
certification election despite the pendency of the case before the
Labor Arbiter on the validity of the strike, petitioner seeks
exception to the rule that an employer has no standing to question a
certification election. We reiterate the rule that such concern over

the validity of certification election must come from the employees

themselves. The case of Trade Union Congress of the Philippines
and Allied Services vs. Trajano, G.R. No. 61153, January 17, 1983,
120 SCRA 64, 66, is clear on this point. This Court therein held:
A certification election is the sole concern of the workers. The only
exception is where the employer has to file a petition for
certification election pursuant to Article 259 of the Labor Code
because it was requested to bargain collectively. Thereafter the role
of the employer in the certification process ceases. It becomes
merely a bystander.
In the instant case, the petitioner for a certification election was
filed by a legitimate labor organization as stipulated by Article 258
of the Labor Code. Such being the case, ROBINA should not have
involved itself in the certification election. That it did gives rise to a
well-founded suspicion that it wanted a company union which is a
no, no in this jurisdiction.
The pronouncement of this Court concerning management
interference in certification elections is well worth repeating:
On a matter that should be the exclusive concern of labor, the
choice of a collective bargaining representative, the employer is
definitely an intruder. His participation, to say the least, deserves no
encouragement. This Court should be the last agency to lend
support to such an attempt at interference with a purely internal
affair of labor. (Consolidated Farms, Inc. vs. Noriel, L-47752, July
31, 1978, 84 SCRA 469, 473. See also Filipino Metals Corp. vs.
Ople, L-43861, Sept. 4, 1981, 107 SCRA 211)
ACCORDINGLY, for the reasons above-stated, the petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
HERCULES INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner, v. THE
SECRETARY
OF
LABOR,
UNDERSECRETARY
BIENVENIDO E. LAQUESMA, MED-ARBITER MELCHOR
S. LIM AND THE NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR,
Respondents.

Demosthenes S. Baban for Petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondents.

Hercules Industries, Inc., herein petitioner, is a corporation duly

registered under Philippine laws which employs more or less one
hundred eighty (180) workers.

SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR RELATIONS;
CERTIFICATION ELECTION; AS A GENERAL RULE,
EMPLOYER IS NOT A PARTY THERETO; EXCEPTION. In a
long line of decisions, this Court has undeviatingly ruled that the
employer is not a party to a certification election which is the sole
or exclusive concern of the workers (Rizal Workers Union v. FerrerCalleja, 186 SCRA 431). In the choice of their collective bargaining
representative, the employer is definitely an intruder. His
participation, to put it mildly, deserves no encouragement
(Consolidated Farms, Inc. v. Noriel, 84 SCRA 469; Filipino Metals
Corp. v. Ople, 107 SCRA 211). The only instance when the
employer may be involved in that process is when it is obliged to
file a petition for certification election on its workers request to
bargain collectively pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code.
After the order for a certification election issues, the employers
involvement ceases, and it becomes a neutral bystander.
DECISION
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
This petition for certiorari * seeks to set aside the resolution **
dated September 17, 1990 of the Undersecretary of Labor in the
case entitled, "National Federation of Labor v. Hercules Industries,
Inc." denying the herein petitioners appeal from respondent MedArbiters Order dated May 25, 1990 declaring the National
Federation of Labor (NFL) as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of the rank and file workers/employees of Hercules
Industries, Inc.

On July 30, 1987, private respondent National Federation of Labor

(NFL), a legitimate labor federation, filed a petition for certification
election alleging that the existing collective bargaining agreement
would expire in August, 1987 and that it enjoys the support of more
than twenty per cent (20%) of the rank and file employees in the
bargaining unit.
On August 21, 1987, by agreement of the parties, the Med-Arbiter
issued an order for the conduct of a certification election with the
following choices:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) National Federation of Labor (NFL);
(2) Hercules Employees Labor Union (HELU); and
(3) No Union.
On September 21, 1987, a pre-election conference was conducted.
The parties, however, could not agree on the list of qualified voters
who would participate in the election. Specifically, Hercules
Industries, Inc. charged that the list included ninety eight (98)
scabs; sixteen (16) capatazes; eight (8) security guards; and nine (9)
managerial employees.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
On October 26, 1987, the Med-Arbiter issued an order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, judgment should be, as
it is hereby promulgated, ordering the immediate conduct of the
Certification Election within fifteen (15) days from date hereof, at

the premises of the Hercules Industries, Inc., Laih, Siay,

Zamboanga del Sur, with all the regular rank and file workers
appearing in the payroll of July, 1987, and the strikers, who have
not executed Quitclaim and voluntarily accepted separation pay,
are eligible participants in the Certification Election, except those
that are hereinbelow expressly and categorically excluded by virtue
of their being classified as managerial employees, legally separated
and barred under the contemplation of law.
"A. MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES (Excluded).
"x

"B. SECURITY FORCE DEPARTMENT (Excluded).

"x

"C. STRIKES EMPLOYEES WHO HAVE EXECUTED DEED OF

QUITCLAIM AND VOLUNTARILY ACCEPTED SEPARATION
PAY
(Excluded)
"x

"1. The Med-Arbiter erred in unqualifiedly accepting all the names

appearing in the July 1987 payroll as eligible voters and in allowing
the 98 contract replacement worker to vote; and
"2. The Med-Arbiter erred in disregarding the fact that an earlier
order for certification election had already been handed down and
that the workers were on strike." (p. 29, Rollo.)
Pending the resolution of the NFLs appeal, a certification election
was conducted on November 7, 1990.
On January 6, 1988, BLR Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja of the DOLE
rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby granted
and the certification election held on 7 November 1987 declared
null and void.
"Let a new certification election among the rank and file workers of
Hercules Industries, Inc. be held. The payroll of July 1987
excluding the [ninety eight] 98 scab replacement, shall be the basis
of the voters list." (p. 32, Rollo.)

"The representation officer-designate is hereby ordered to post

immediately within five (5) days prior to the date of election the
notices of Certification Election together with the master list of
eligible voters in conspicuous places at the premises of the
Respondent." (pp. 27-28, Rollo.)
On November 4, 1987, NFL appealed the order to the Bureau of
Labor Relations (BLR Case No. A-1-10-88 LRD Case No. 014-87)
on the following grounds:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

On April 4, 1990, a pre-election conference attended by the

management of Hercules Industries, Inc. and NFLs representatives
was held at the Department of Labor and Employment Regional
Office in Zamboanga City. The NFL asked that a certification
election be immediately scheduled on May 4, 1990 at 9:00 a.m. to
be held in the Barangay Hall, Bato, Siay, Zamboanga del
Sur.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Accordingly, a certification election was held on May 4, 1990 with
the following results:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR 89 Votes

"2. HERCULES LUMBER & EMPLOYEES
LABOR UNION 0 (Zero)
"3. MANAGEMENT (NO UNION) 0 (Zero)
"4. SPOILED/INVALID VOTES 2 (Votes)
TOTAL VOTES CAST: 91 Votes"

On January 21, 1991, Zamboanga Rubber Workers Union, a duly

organized labor union affiliated with the Philippine Integrated
Industries Labor Union, filed a motion for intervention in this Court
alleging that it had requested the petitioner in writing to recognize it
as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of its workers. The
motion was noted by this Court without action.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner,
Hercules Industries, Inc., as employer, may question the validity of
the certification election among its rank-and-file employees. The
answer is no.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

(p. 188, Rollo.)

On May 25, 1990, Med-Arbiter Melchor S. Lim issued a resolution
declaring and certifying the National Federation of Labor as the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees
of the petitioner.
On July 5, 1990, the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration/appeal with the DOLE. It was denied on September
17, 1990 by Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laquesma on the
grounds that Sections 3 and 4, Rule 6, Book V of the Implementing
Rules of the Labor Code on protests had not been followed; that the
records disclose that no protest was made before the election, nor
formalized within five (5) days after the election, as provided for by
the rules; and the DOLE has not found any legal obstacle to the
proclamation of the NFL as the collective bargaining agent of
petitioners workers.
On September 29, 1990, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied on October 26, 1990 by
Undersecretary Laquesma.
Hence, the present recourse.

In a long line of decisions, this Court has undeviatingly ruled that

the employer is not a party to a certification election which is the
sole or exclusive concern of the workers (Rizal Workers Union v.
Ferrer-Calleja, 186 SCRA 431). In the choice of their collective
bargaining representative, the employer is definitely an intruder. His
participation, to put it mildly, deserves no encouragement
(Consolidated Farms, Inc. v. Noriel, 84 SCRA 469; Filipino Metals
Corp. v. Ople, 107 SCRA 211).
The only instance when the employer may be involved in that
process is when it is obliged to file a petition for certification
election on its workers request to bargain collectively pursuant to
Article 258 of the Labor Code. After the order for a certification
election issues, the employers involvement ceases, and it becomes
a neutral bystander. (Rizal Workers Union v. Calleja, supra.).
In this case, the Solicitor General correctly observed that while the
employees themselves never requested the petitioner to bargain
collectively, still, they did not object to the results of the
certification election. Hence, petitioners appeal to the Bureau of
Labor Relations from the Med-Arbiters Order certifying the NFL
as the exclusive bargaining agent of its rank and file employees, and

its filing of this petition for certiorari with us, must be rejected. The
employers intervention in the certification election of its workers is
frowned upon by law.
In any event, petitioners challenge against the validity of the
certification election of May 4, 1990 is devoid of merit. Its
allegations that no notice of the certification election had been
issued, hence, no copies of said notice were given to it, nor posted
in conspicuous places within the companys premises; that the
payroll of July 1987 was not used as the basis of the voters list; and
that only fifteen (15) out of the ninety eight (98) voters signed their
names showing that they actually voted, were belied by the minutes
of the pre-election conference (Annex "A" of Comment of private
respondent) which showed that petitioner was duly notified of the
conference and attended the same, and that during said conference
the Med-Arbiter set the certification election on May 4,
1990.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
The minutes of the certification election (Annex "C" of private
respondents Comment) also show that "the list of the names of the
voters were (sic) copied from the payroll of 1987 per order of the
Director, Bureau of Labor Relations, Manila, . . ." (p. 188, Rollo).
Finally, the same minutes certified that: "The certification election
just concluded was conducted in the most just, honest and freely
(sic) manner without untoward happening. Further, we certify that
the result above is true and correct" (p. 188, Rollo) thereby refuting
petitioners allegation that only fifteen (15) out of ninety eight (98)
workers signed the master list to show that they actually voted
again.
Besides, neither the records of the case nor the minutes of the
certification election show that petitioner protested the conduct of
the certification election as provided in Section 3 of Rule VI
(ELECTIONS) of Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the

Labor Code which states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 3. Representation officer may rule on any on-the-spot
questions. The Representation officer may rule on any on-thespot question arising from the conduct of the election. The
interested party may however, file a protest with the representation
officer before the close of the proceedings.
"Protests not so raised are deemed waived. Such protests shall be
contained in the minutes of the proceedings." (Emphasis
ours.)chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
On the basis of the election minutes, which are the only relevant
and competent evidence on the conduct of the election, the MedArbiter did not err in declaring the NFL as the duly elected
exclusive bargaining agent of the petitioners rank and file workers.
That finding should be accorded not only respect but also finality
by this Court for it is supported by substantial evidence (Chua v.
NLRC, 182 SCRA 354).
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion in the assailed
decision of the NLRC, the petition forcertiorari is DISMISSED,
with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 76111 March 14, 1990
EMMANUEL TIMBUNGCO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RICARDO C. CASTRO, in his capacity as Officer-inCharge, Bureau of Labor Relations, Ministry of Labor and
Employment, and DELICANO PAJARES, respondents.
Benjamin C. Sebastian for petitioner.
B.B. Julve & Associates Law Offices for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:

The petitioner in the special civil action of certiorari at bar prays for
nullification of the Resolutions of the Bureau of Labor Relations
dated September 9, 1986 1 and September 30, 1986 2 sustaining
that of Med-Arbiter Danilo Reynante dated July 3, 1986, 3 which
granted the petition for election of officers of the labor organization
known as Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Associated Anglo
American Tobacco Corporation.
The petitioner, Emmanuel Timbungco, was the president of the
above named union (hereafter, simply Kapisanan), composed of
employees of Associated Anglo American Tobacco Corporation.
The union had a three-year collective bargaining agreement with
said Corporation (hereafter, simply AAATC). The stipulated
expiration date was August 24, 1984.
On July 15, 1984 or within the so-called "freedom period" of
sixty (60) days a general meeting of all the members of
theKapisanan was convoked by Timbungco. At that meeting the
body unanimously approved, among others, the disaffiliation of the
Kapisanan from the mother union, Federacion FOITAF, and the
amendment of its constitution and by-laws. A new set of officers
was also elected which included Timbungco, who was re-elected
president without opposition. These events are set forth in the
minutes drawn up by the Kapisanan's Secretary, which also
recorded that the body had agreed to dispense with the formation of
a COMELEC (committee on elections) and the preparation of a
tally sheet showing the number of votes received by each candidate,
the members simply having entered individual nominations to the
different positions and listed their choices therefor.
On July 23, 1984 Timbungco submitted to the Bureau of Labor
Relations the following documents:
1) a certified copy of the Kapisanan's amended constitution and bylaws;
2) an affidavit jointly executed by him and the union secretary
declaring that the Kapisanan was the sole collective bargaining
agent in AAATC;

3) a copy of the minutes of the meeting of July 15, 1984; and

4) a copy of the Kapasiyahan (Resolution) of the rank and file
members to disaffiliate from the Federacion FOITAF.
A new registration certificate was thereafter issued in due course to
the Kapisanan, indicating its independence of FederacionFOITAF.
Then in the first week of September, 1985, Timbungco, as reelected President of Kapisanan commenced negotiations for a new
collective bargaining agreement with the representatives of
AAATC. The negotiations lasted for about a year and ultimately
resulted in the execution by Kapisanan and AAATC of another
three-year collective bargaining agreement. A copy of the
agreement was filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations as required
by Policy Instruction No. 17.
About seven months later, on April 8, 1986 to be exact, Leodegario
L. Zapanta, 1st National President of the Association of Democratic
Labor Organizations (ADLO, for short), sent a letter to the Bureau
of Labor Relations advising that Bureau that the majority of the
members of the Kapisanan had affiliated with ADLO. 4 And on
April 10, 1986, ADLO's Executive National Vice-President Tayo,
wrote AAATC to the same effect and requested in view of the
consequent loss by the Kapisanan of its status as recognized
representative of the bargaining unit that AAATC stop deduction
of union dues and thenceforth ignore and otherwise refuse to deal
with Timbungco and his group. 5 Another letter, also asking AAATC
to stop deducting union dues, or hold such dues in trust pending
resolution of the representation issue, was sent on April 12, 1986 by
Delicano Pajares, a member of the Kapisanan. 6
AAATC replied to Tayo's letter. It stated that it could not accede to
the request to stop deduction of union dues since it had been dealing
over many years with the Kapisanan as its workers' authorized
bargaining representative. 7
On April 23, 1986 Delicano Pajares filed with the Bureau of Labor
Relations a petition for election of officers of the Kapisanan, which

was docketed as Case No. NCR LRD-M-4-23486. He alleged that

he and his co-workers numbered 700, 62% of whom had signed the
petition; that the election of officers held on July 15, 1984 was
invalid, and they wished to exercise their right to vote for and elect
their union officers. He also adverted to the existing collective
bargaining agreement between Kapisananand AAATC.
After appropriate proceedings, Med-Arbiter L. Reynante issued an
Order dated July 3, 1986 declaring invalid the election of union
officers which took place on July 15, 1984 and ordering another
election of union officers to be conducted in the premises of
AAATC under the supervision of the Bureau of Labor Relations. 8
This Order was, on appeal, affirmed in toto in a Resolution rendered
by Bureau of Labor Relations Director Cresenciano Trajano under
date of September 9, 1986. 9 Timbungco's motion for
reconsideration was denied on September 9, 1986, by OIC Director
of Labor Relations, Ricardo Castro. 10
These are the orders which, in this special civil action of certiorari,
Timbungco would have this Court invalidate.
The case turns upon the issue of the validity of the election of
officers of July 15, 1984 it appearing that, as private respondents
argue, there is no record of the number of members who attended
the meeting, the number of those who actually voted, and the
number of votes obtained by each candidate, and that a COMELEC
(committee on elections) had not been formed to supervise the
election. Private respondents also argue that the "contract bar rule"
which proscribes any certification election during the life of a
collective bargaining agreement or any other action which may
disturb the administration of said agreement, except during the
"freedom period" (i.e., the period of 60 days prior to the expiration
of the agreement) 11 has no application to the election of officers
sought in the petition in accordance with the union's constitution
and by-laws. 12
The petition has merit. The writ of certiorari prayed for will issue.

In the first place, it does not at all appear that the dispensing by the
membership of the Kapisanan with certain technical requirements
or formalities in relation to the election of July 15, 1984 had
resulted in the deprivation of any substantial right or prerogative of
anyone, or caused the perpetration of a fraud or other serious
anomaly, or more importantly, precluded the expression and
ascertainment of the popular will in the choice of officers. In the
second place, as the Office of the Solicitor General points out, the
private respondents' objections to the elections of July 15, 1984
have come too late, and they must be deemed in the premises to
have forfeited their right to impugn the same. Under the Rules
implementing the Labor Code, protests against elections should be
formalized before the med-arbiter within (5) days from the close of
the election proceedings and must be decided by the latter within
twenty (20) working days. 13 In this case, the protest against the
election was presented to the med-arbiter only after the lapse of
almost two (2) years after it was held. And in that interval, no
informal protest, oral or written, was ever presented against the
election. Indeed, there was tacit acceptance of the regularity of the
elections and the results thereof, for during that period of almost
two (2) years, certain significant events took place without demur
or objection of any sort on the part of private respondents and the
rest of the members of the Kapisanan: Timbungco officially made
known to the Bureau of Labor Relations the Kapisanan's
disaffiliation from the Federacion FOITAF and obtained a new
certificate of registration for the union after complying with the
requisites prescribed therefor; he and the other officers of the
Kapisanan negotiated with the AAATC management and succeeded
in bringing about the execution of a new collective bargaining
agreement which was afterwards filed with the Bureau of Labor
Relations in accordance with pertinent regulations; and Timbungco
and the entire membership of the Kapisanan accepted benefits
granted and assumed the obligations set out in said collective
bargaining agreement.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Bureau of Labor Relations

dated September 9, 1986 and September 30, 1986 sustaining that

of Med-Arbiter Danilo Reynante dated July 3, 1986, are
NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. The officers of theKapisanan
elected on July 15, 1986 shall continue to hold their respective
positions in the union for the balance of the terms pertaning to them
as of July 3, 1986, counted from the time of finality of this decision,
and the collective bargaining agreement executed between the
parties in 1986 shall also continue in force and effect for the
balance of the three-year period still remaining as of July 3, 1986,
counted from the time of finality of the decision, unless sooner
amended or revised by voluntary covenant of the parties or by other
mode authorized by law. The temporary restraining order issued by
this Court on November 17, 1986 is DISSOLVED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-40810 October 3, 1975
UNITED EMPLOYEES UNION OF GELMART INDUSTRIES
PHILIPPINES (UEUGIP), petitioner,
vs.
HON. CARMELO NORIEL, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
LABOR
RELATIONS;
GEORGE
A.
EDUVALA,
REPRESENTATION OFFICER, BUREAU OF LABOR
RELATIONS; and NATIONAL UNION OF GARMENTS,
TEXTILE, CORDAGE AND ALLIED WORKERS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (GATCORD), respondents.
Benito P. Fabie for petitioner.
Assistant Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant
Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno and Solicitor Romeo C. de la
Cruz for respondents Carmelo Noriel, etc., et al.
Hermon C. Lagman for respondents Unions.
FERNANDO, J.:
The plea for setting aside a certification election earnestly and
vigorously pressed by petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition

proceeding is predicated on the proposition that it was held under

circumstances that manifested lack of fairness, thus raising a
procedural due process question. There was an equally firm and
vehement denial in a comprehensive comment filed on behalf of
private respondent, National Union of Garments, Textile, Cordage
and Allied Workers of the Philippines. The stress in the comment of
respondent Director Carmelo Noriel 1 was on the absence of a grave
abuse of discretion. As will be more fully discussed, a careful
scrutiny of what transpired as revealed not only in the pleadings but
in the oral argument will disclose that the attack on the certification
election cannot succeed. The petition lacks merit.
The petition sought to have the certification election declared null
and void ab initio and thus unenforceable, alleging that the
contending parties in a pre-election conference conducted by the
Bureau of Labor Relations agreed that petitioner would be listed in
the ballot as United Employees Union of Gelmart Industries
Philippines (UEUGIP). 2 In the notice of the certification election,
however, it was wilfully deleted and replaced by "a non-contending
party, namely, Philippine Social Security Labor Union (PSSLU),
which, although an existing labor federation ... has nothing to do
and has no interest or right of participation [therein]." 3 So it did
appear likewise in the sample ballot. 4 As a result, there was
confusion in the minds of independent voters and demoralization in
the ranks of those inclined to favor petitioner. 5 There was a protest
but it was not based on this ground; instead the grievance
complained of referred to the alleged electioneering of nuns and a
priest as observers or inspectors on behalf of private respondent. 6
The above notwithstanding, the certification election took place "on
the scheduled date, May 24, 1975 and respondent GATCORD
garnered the highest number of votes ...." 7 It was then set forth that
despite such defect in the mode of conducting the election which
for petitioner sufficed to cause "the nullity of the election in
question," respondent Director Carmelo Noriel of the Bureau of
Labor Relations "[was] about to certify respondent GATCORD as
the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of the

rank and file employees [and] workers of Gelmart Industries

Philippines, Inc." 8 Hence this petition with its overtones as
indicated of an alleged violation of procedural due process.
The comment to the petition filed on behalf of private respondent
National Union of Garments, Textile, Cordage and Allied Workers
of the Philippines (GATCORD) denied the imputation of
irregularity and sought to clarify matters by a factual presentation of
what did transpire. At the outset, however, it made clear that the
petitioner, which garnered only 291 votes or 4.5% of the total
number of votes cast as against the 3,970 or 63% of the votes in its
favor, certainly could not be heard to challenge the validity of the
certification election. Thus: "1. Pursuant to an order of the Bureau
of Labor Relations of the Department of Labor, a certification
election was conducted on 24 May 1975 in Gelmart Industries
Philippines, Inc., South Superhighway, Paraaque, Rizal, to choose
the collective bargaining agent of the company's rank and file
employees; 2. The certification election was conducted and
supervised by the Bureau of Labor Relations; it took almost the
entire personnel of the Bureau, including the Director himself, to
man the election, there were 11 precincts, each of which was
presided over by a med-arbiter of the Bureau, as chairman, and
another representation officer of the Bureau; there was also created
a central election committee composed of four top personnel of the
Bureau for optimum supervision; 3. There were some 8,900 eligible
voters out of about 10,000 employees of the company; out of the
8,900 eligible voters, duly agreed upon by all the parties and
approved by the Bureau, 6,309 or 79.7% voted; out of the 6,309
eligible voters cast, 3970 or 63% went to GATCORD, [with
UEUGIP placing] only fifth with a measly 291 votes or barely 4.5%
of the total number of votes cast. It may be noted that even if the
votes of all seven losing unions[were added], their total would only
be 2,057, which is still 1,823 votes short of GATCORD's 2,970
votes. It is thus clear that GATCORD won by an overwhelming
majority:" 9 It characterized such votes as an "unassailable
majority." 10 On the question of the alleged irregularity, the

comment set forth the following: "Petitioner UEUGIP did not lodge
any protest concerning the alleged misprinting or omission of its
name in the Notice of Certification Election in the Sample Ballot ...
before the election, during the election or shortly after the election,
[but merely questioned] the presence of the priests and nuns, over
which it filed a protest with the BLR, [not the alleged misprinting]
or omission of its name in the election notice and the sample ballot;
10. The fact is, when GATCORD petitioned for the certification
election (NLRC Case No. LR-4891, later numbered as BLR Case
No. 256) in July, 1974, the United Employees Union of Gelmart
Industries Philippines(UEUGIP) intervened, as represented by
Ruben Escreza, the union's duly elected president, [with] Antonio
Diaz, herein alleged representative of UEUGIP, [intervening] then
not for UEUGIP but for UEUGIP-Workers' Faction; 11. Since Mr.
Diaz was representing only a faction of UEUGIP, which faction had
no legal personality separate from UEUGIP which was duly
represented by Mr. Escreza, the order of the Bureau dated 15
January 1975 included only UEUGIP as one of the contending
unions, without including UEUGIP-Workers' Faction; 12.
Subsequently, the Philippine Transport and General Workers
Organization (PTGWO) intervened and, claiming that UEUGIP had
affiliated with PTGWO, moved for a correction of the name
UEUGIP in the order, making it UEUGIP-PTGWO, ...;13. During
the first two pre-election conferences in connection with the
certification election held on February 14 and 17, 1975, Mr. Diaz
appeared, but he was no longer representing UEUGIP-Workers'
Faction; he entered a new union - the Philippine Social Security
Labor Union (PSSLU); ... 14. In the succeeding pre-election
conferences, however, Mr. Diaz, apparently out to create trouble,
began claiming to represent UEUGIP and abandoned representation
of PSSLU [with the result that] UEUGIP had two representatives
often clashing with each other; Mr. Escreza and Mr. Diaz; 15. On
19 May 1975 the Bureau of Labor Relations caused the posting of
'Notice of Certification Election' with a 'Sample Ballot', [with said
posting being made at a time when] the parties had not yet agreed

as to how their names should appear in the ballot, ... 16. It was only
on 20 May 1974, after the election notice was already posted with
the original sample ballot, that the parties came to discuss how their
respective names should appear in the ballot,[at which time] the
parties had agreed that the names of the contending unions should
be printed in the ballots as they were printed, that is, with UNITED
EMPLOYEES
UNION
OF
GELMART
INDUSTRIES
PHILIPPINES (UEUGIP) there and without PSSLU." 11 Private
respondent then considered the following as the pertinent questions:
"If Mr. Diaz felt that the posting of the election notice and the
original sample ballot was erroneous and it was prejudicial to his
group, why did he not raise this question early enough? He could
have raised it soon after the posting was made, especially
considering that two more pre-election conferences, on May 20, 22
and 23 were held. Or he could have raised the question during the
election day. But he did not. Is it because he did not really care then,
is it because his people inside the company did not really care, or is
it because he had really no people inside to bother at all about said
'error?' If they were that disinterested in correcting the 'error' at least
during the last four days before the election, how could Mr. Diaz
claim now that his group was adversely affected by the alleged
'error' and that if said 'error' was not made, his group could have
won the election?" 12 The comment ended on a statement rather
rhetorical in character: "The truth is, Mr. Diaz had but a droplet of
support, which, dream as he would, could never match, much less
overcome, the raging torrents of GATCORD." 13 The comment on
behalf of respondent Director Noriel and the respondent
Representation Officer Eduvala stressed a grave abuse of discretion
to certify an action for certiorari. Petitioner sought permission to
reply and was granted. There was, as could be expected, a stout
denial of the recital of facts of private respondent, but it cannot be
said that it is impressed with a high degree of persuasiveness..
At any rate, after the Court considered the comments as answers
and set the case for hearing, with arguments coming from both
counsel Benito Fabie for petitioner and Jose W. Diokno for private

respondent, and with the labor leader Antonio Diaz referred to in

the comment of private respondent being questioned and presenting
petitioner's side of the controversy, a much clearer picture emerged.
It was none too favorable for petitioner.
As noted at the outset, we find for respondents. The petition lacks
merit.
1. The institution of collective bargaining is, to recall Cox, a prime
manifestation of industrial democracy at work. The two parties to
the relationship, labor and management, make their own rules by
coming to terms. That is to govern themselves in matters that really
count. As labor, however, is composed of a number of individuals, it
is indispensable that they be represented by a labor organization of
their choice. Thus may be discerned how crucial is a certification
election. So our decisions from the earliest case of PLDT
Employees Union v. PLDT Co. Free Telephone Workers Union 14 to
the latest,Philippine Communications, Electronics & Electricity
Workers' Federation (PCWF) v. Court of Industrial Relations, 15
have made clear. Thus is one of the earliest cases, The Standard
Cigarette Workers' Union v. Court of Industrial Relations, 16 it was
made clear in the opinion of Justice J. B. L. Reyes that "a complaint
for unfair labor practice may be considered a prejudicial question in
a proceeding for certification election when it is charged therein
that one or more labor unions participating in the election are being
aided, or are controlled, by the company or employer. The reason is
that the certification election may lead to the selection of an
employer-dominated or company union as the employees'
bargaining representative, and when the court finds that said union
is employer-dominated in the unfair labor practice case, the union
selected would be decertified and the whole election proceedings
would be rendered useless and nugatory." 17For it is easily
understandable how essential it is, in the language of former Chief
Justice Concepcion, in the leading case of LVN Pictures v.
Philippine Musicians Guild 18 "to insure the fair and free choice of
bargaining representatives by employees." 19 There must be such an
opportunity to determine which labor organization shall act on their

behalf. 20 It is precisely because respect must be accorded to the will

of labor thus ascertained that a general allegation of duress is not
sufficient to invalidate a certification election; it must be shown by
competent and credible proof. 21 That is to give substance to the
principle of majority rule, one of the basic concepts of a democratic
polity. 22 The matter is summarized thus in one of the latest
decisions of this Court, Federation of the United Workers
Organization v. Court of Industrial Relations: 23 "The slightest doubt
cannot therefore be entertained that what possesses significance in a
petition for certification is that through such a device the employees
are given the opportunity to make known who shall have the right
to represent them. What is equally important is that not only some
but all of them should have the right to do so." 24 If heed be paid to
the above well-settled principle and applied to the facts disclosed in
the present petition, it would be apparent that the grievance spoken
of is more fancied than real, the assertion of confusion and
demoralization based on conjecture rather than reality. The mode
and manner in which Antonio Diaz demonstrated how militant and
articulate he could be in presenting his side of the controversy could
hardly argue for the accuracy of his claim that his men did lose
heart by what appeared at the most to be an honest mistake, if it
could be characterized as one. Certainly then, the accusation that
there was abuse of discretion, much less a grave one, falls to the
ground.
2. Nor need this Court pass upon the ground of protest based on the
alleged participation by nuns and a priest who presumably aided the
cause of private respondent. Petitioner did not choose to press this
point. It is understandable why. In the leading case of Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 25 this Court, through Justice
Zaldivar, left no doubt as to the privacy of religious freedom, to
which contractual rights, even on labor matters, must yield, thus
removing any taint of nullity from the amendment to the Industrial
Peace Act, 26 which would allow exemption from a closed shop on
the part of employees, members of a given religious sect prohibiting
its devotees from affiliating with any labor organization.

Subsequently, in Basa v. Federacion Obrera de la Industria

Tabaquera, 27 such doctrine was reaffirmed, thus emphasizing that
one's religious convictions may be the basis for an employee joining
or refusing to join a labor union. Certainly, the wide latitude
accorded religious groups in the exercise of their constitutional
freedom would caution against reliance on such aground to
invalidate a certification election. It thus appears that such an
approach is reflected in the attitude adopted by petitioner, which in
effect amounts to an abandonment of such a possible ground of
protest, not at all lodged with this Court but merely mentioned in its
recital of background facts.
3. During the hearing of this case, reference was made to the
registration of private respondent allegedly having been revoked.
As the pleadings do not touch upon the matter at all, this Court is
not in a position to rule on such a question. The decision therefore
leaves that particular aspect of the litigation open.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is
dismissed for lack of merit. The restraining order issued by this
Court is lifted
G.R. No. 104556 March 19, 1998
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (NFL), petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
AND
HIJO
PLANTATION
INC.,
(HPI),respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner NFL (National Federation of Labor) was chosen the
bargaining agent of rank-and-file employees of the Hijo Plantation
Inc. (HPI) in Mandaum, Tagum, Davao del Norte at a certification
election held on August 20, 1989. Protests filed by the company and
three other unions against the results of the election were denied by
the Department of Labor and Employment in its resolution dated
February 14, 1991 but, on motion of the company (HPI), the DOLE
reconsidered its resolution and ordered another certification election

to be held. The DOLE subsequently denied petitioner NFL's motion

for reconsideration.
The present petition is for certiorari to set aside orders of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment dated August 29, 1991,
December 26, 1991 and February 17, 1992, ordering the holding of
a new certification election to be conducted in place of the one held
on August 20, 1989 and, for this purpose, reversing its earlier
resolution dated February 14, 1991 dismissing the election protests
of private respondent and the unions.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On November 12, 1988, a certification election was conducted
among the rank-and-file employees of the Hijo Plantation, Inc.
resulting in the choice of "no union." However, on July 3, 1989, on
allegations that the company intervened in the election, the Director
of the Bureau of Labor Relations nullified the results of the
certification election and ordered a new one to be held.
The new election was held on August 20, 1989 under the
supervision of the DOLE Regional Office in Davao City with the
following results:
Total Votes cast
1,012
Associated Trade Unions (ATU)
39
RUST KILUSAN
5
National Federation of Labor (NFL)
876
Southern Philippines Federation of Labor
4
SANDIGAN
6
UFW
15
No Union
55
Invalid
13
The Trust Union Society and Trade Workers-KILUSAN (TRUSTKilusan), the United Lumber and General Workers of the
Philippines (ULGWP), the Hijo Labor Union and the Hijo
Plantation, Inc. sought the nullification of the results of the
certification election on the ground that it was conducted despite the
pendency of the appeals filed by Hijo Labor Union and ULGWP
from the order, dated August 17, 1989, of the Med-Arbiter denying

their motion for intervention. On the other hand, HPI claimed that it
was not informed or properly represented at the pre-election
conference. It alleged that, if it was represented at all in the preelection conference, its representative acted beyond his authority
and without its knowledge. Private respondent also alleged that the
certification election was marred by massive fraud and irregularities
and that out of 1,692 eligible voters, 913, representing 54% of the
rank-and-file workers of private respondent, were not able to vote,
resulting in a failure of election.
On January 10, 1990, Acting Labor Secretary Dionisio dela Serna
directed the Med-Arbiter, Phibun D. Pura, to investigate the
company's claim that 54% of the rank-and-file workers were not
able to vote in the certification election.
In his Report and Recommendation, dated February 9, 1990, Pura
stated:
1. A majority of the rank-and-file workers had been disfranchised in
the election of August 20, 1989 because of confusion caused by the
announcement of the company that the election had been postponed
in view of the appeals of ULGWP and Hijo Labor Union (HLU)
from the order denying their motions for intervention. In addition,
the election was held on a Sunday which was non-working day in
the company.
2. There were irregularities committed in the conduct of the
election. It was possible that some people could have voted for
those who did not show up. The election was conducted in an open
and hot area. The secrecy of the ballot had been violated.
Management representatives were not around to identify the
workers.
3. The total number of votes cast, as duly certified by the
representation officer, did not tally with the 41-page listings
submitted to the Med-Arbitration Unit. The list contained 1,008
names which were checked or encircled (indicating that they had
voted) and 784 which were not, (indicating that they did not vote),
or a total of 1,792. but according to the representation officer the
total votes cast in the election was 1,012.

Med-Arbiter Pura reported that he interviewed eleven employees

who claimed that they were not able to vote and who were surprised
to know that their names had been checked to indicate that they had
voted.
But NFL wrote a letter to Labor Secretary Ruben Torres
complaining that it had not been informed of the investigation
conducted by Med-Arbiter Pura and so was not heard on its
evidence. For this reason, the Med-Arbiter was directed by the
Labor Secretary to hear interested parties.
The Med-Arbiter therefore summoned the unions. TRUST-Kilusan
reiterated its petition for the annulment of the results of the
certification election. Hijo Labor Union manifested that it was
joining private respondent HPI's appeal, adopting as its own the
documentary evidence presented by the company, showing fraud in
the election of August 20, 1989. On the other hand, petitioner NFL
reiterated its contention that management had no legal personality
to file an appeal because it was not a party to the election but was
only a bystander which did not even extend assistance in the
election. Petitioner denied that private respondent HPI was not
represented in the pre-election conference, because the truth was
that a certain Bartolo was present on behalf of the management and
he in fact furnished the DOLE copies of the list of employees, and
posted in the company premises notices of the certification election.
Petitioner NFL insisted that more than majority of the workers
voted in the election. It claimed that out of 1,692 qualified voters,
1,012 actually voted and only 680 failed to cast their vote. It
charged management with resorting to all kinds of manipulation to
frustrate the election and make the "Non Union" win.
In a resolution dated February 14, 1991, the DOLE upheld the
August 20, 1989 certification election. With respect to claim that
election could not be held in view of the pendency of the appeals of
the ULGWP and Hijo Labor Union from the order of the MedArbiter denying their motions for intervention, the DOLE said: 1
. . . even before the conduct of the certification election on 12
November 1988 which was nullified, Hijo Labor Union filed a

motion for interventions. The same was however, denied for being
filed unseasonably, and as a result it was not included as one of the
choices in the said election. After it has been so disqualified thru an
order which has become final and executory, ALU filed a second
motion for intervention when a second balloting was ordered
conducted. Clearly, said second motion is proforma and intended to
delay the proceedings. Being so, its appeal from the order of denial
did not stay the election and the Med-Arbiter was correct and did
not violate any rule when he proceeded with the election even with
the appeal. In fact, the Med-Arbiter need not rule on the motion as
it has already been disposed of with finality.
The same is true with the motion for intervention of ULGWP. The
latter withdrew as a party to the election on September 1988 and its
motion to withdraw was granted by the Med-Arbiter on October
motion for intervention filed before the conduct of a second
balloting where the choices has already been pre-determined.
Let it be stressed that ULGWP and HLU were disqualified to
participate in the election through valid orders that have become
final and executory even before the first certification election was
conducted. Consequently, they may not be allowed to disrupt the
proceeding through the filing of nuisance motions. Much less are
they possessed of the legal standing to question the results of the
second election considering that they are not parties thereto.
The DOLE gave no weight to the report of the Med-Arbiter that the
certification election was marred by massive fraud and
irregularities. Although affidavits were submitted showing that the
election was held outside the company premises and private
vehicles were used as makeshift precincts, the DOLE found that
this was because respondent company did not allow the use of its
premises for the purpose of holding the election, company guards
were allegedly instructed not to allow parties, voters and DOLE
representation officers to enter the company premises, and notice
was posted on the door of the company that the election had been
postponed.
Nor was weight given to the findings of the Med-Arbiter that a

majority of the rank-and-file workers had been disfranchised in the

August 20, 1989 election and that the secrecy of the ballot had been
violated, first, because the NFL was not given notice of the
investigation nor the chance to present its evidence to dispute this
finding and, second, the Med Arbiter's report was not supported by
the minutes of the proceedings nor by any record of the interviews
of the 315 workers. Moreover, it was pointed out that the report did
not state the names of the persons investigated, the questions asked
and the answers given. The DOLE held that the report was "totally
baseless."
The resolution of February 14, 1991 concluded with a reiteration of
the rule that the choice of the exclusive bargaining representative is
the sole concern of the workers. It said: "If indeed there were
irregularities committed during the election, the contending unions
should have been the first to complain considering that they are the
ones which have interest that should be protected." 2
Accordingly, the Labor Secretary denied the petition to annul the
election filed by the ULGWP, TRUST-KILUSAN, HLU and the
HPI and instead certified petitioner NFL as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of private
respondent HPI.
However, on motion of HPI, the Secretary of Labor, on August 29,
1991, reversed his resolution of February 14, 1991. Petitioner NFL
filed a motion for reconsideration but its motion was denied in an
order, dated December 26, 1991. Petitioner's second motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied in another order dated
February 17, 1992. Hence, this petition.
First. Petitioner contends that certification election is the sole
concern of the employees and the employer is a mere bystander.
The only instance wherein the employer may actively participate is
when it files a petition for certification election under Art. 258 of
the Labor Code because it is requested to bargain collectively.
Petitioner says that this is not the case here and so the DOLE should
not have given due course to private respondent's petition for
annulment of the results of the certification election.

In his resolution of August 29, 1991, the Secretary of Labor said he

was reversing his earlier resolution because "workers of Hijo
Plantation, Inc. have deluged this Office with their letter-appeal,
either made singly or collectively expressing their wish to have a
new certification election conducted" and that as a result "the firm
position we held regarding the integrity of the electoral exercise had
been somewhat eroded by this recent declaration of the workers,
now speaking in their sovereign capacity."
It is clear from this, that what the DOLE Secretary considered in
reversing its earlier rulings was not the petition of the employer but
the letter-appeals that the employees sent to his office denouncing
the irregularities committed during the August 20, 1989
certification election. The petition of private respondent was simply
the occasion for the employees to voice their protests against the
election. Private respondent HPI attached to its Supplemental
Appeal filed on September 5, 1989 the affidavits and appeals of
more or less 784 employees who claimed that they had been
disfranchised, as a result of which they were not able to cast their
votes at the August 20, 1989 election. It was the protests of
employees which moved the DOLE to reconsider its previous
resolution of February 14, 1991, upholding the election.
Nor is it improper for private respondent to show interest in the
conduct of the election. Private respondent is the employer. The
manner in which the election was held could make the difference
between industrial strife and industrial harmony in the company.
What an employer is prohibited from doing is to interfere with the
conduct of the certification election for the purpose of influencing
its outcome. But certainly an employer has an abiding interest in
seeing to it that the election is clean, peaceful, orderly and credible.
Second. The petitioner argues that any protest concerning the
election should be registered and entered into the minutes of the
election proceedings before it can be considered. In addition, the
protest should be formalized by filing it within five (5) days.
Petitioner avers that these requirements are condition precedents in
the filing of an appeal. Without these requisites the appeal cannot

prosper. It cites the following provisions of Book V, Rule VI of the

Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code:
Sec. 3. Representation officer may rule on any on-the-spot question.
The Representation officer may rule on any on-the-spot question
arising from the conduct of the election. The interested party may
however, file a protest with the representation officer before the
close of the proceedings.
Protests not so raised are deemed waived. Such protests shall be
contained in the minutes of the proceedings.
Sec. 4. Protest to be decided in twenty (20) working days. Where
the protest is formalized before the med-arbiter within five (5) days
after the close of the election proceedings, the med-arbiter shall
decide the same within twenty (20) working days from the date of
its formalization. If not formalized within the prescribed period, the
protest shall be deemed dropped. The decision may be appealed to
the Bureau in the same manner and on the same grounds as
provided under Rule V.
In this case, petitioner maintains that private respondent did not
make any protest regarding the alleged irregularities (e.g., massive
disfranchisement of employees) during the election. Hence, the
appeal and motions for reconsideration of private respondent HPI
should have been dismissed summarily.
The complaint in this case was that a number of employees were
not able to cast their votes because they were not properly notified
of the date. They could not therefore have filed their protests within
five (5) days. At all events, the Solicitor General states, that the
protests were not filed within five (5) days, is a mere technicality
which should not be allowed to prevail over the workers' welfare. 3
As this Court stressed in LVN Pictures, Inc. v. Phil. Musicians
Guild, 4 it is essential that the employees must be accorded an
opportunity to freely and intelligently determine which labor
organization shall act in their behalf. The workers in this case were
denied this opportunity. Not only were a substantial number of them
disfranchised, there were, in addition, allegations of fraud and other
irregularities which put in question the integrity of the election.

Workers wrote letters and made complaints protesting the conduct

of the election. The Report of Med-Arbiter Pura who investigated
these allegations found the allegations of fraud and irregularities to
be true.
In one case this Court invalidated a certification election upon a
showing of disfranchisement, lack of secrecy in the voting and
bribery. 5 We hold the same in this case. The workers' right to selforganization as enshrined in both the Constitution and Labor Code
would be rendered nugatory if their right to choose their collective
bargaining representative were denied. Indeed, the policy of the
Labor Code favors the holding of a certification election as the most
conclusive way of choosing the labor organization to represent
workers in a collective bargaining unit. 6 In case of doubt, the doubt
should be resolved in favor of the holding of a certification election.
Third. Petitioner claims that the contending unions, namely, the
Association of Trade Union (ATU), the Union of Filipino Workers
(UFW), as well as the representation officers of the DOLE affirmed
the regularity of the conduct of the election and they are now
estopped from questioning the election.
In its comment, ATU-TUCP states,
. . . The representative of the Association of Trade Unions really
attest to the fact that we cannot really identify all the voters who
voted on that election except some workers who were our
supporters in the absence of Hijo Plantation representatives. We
also attest that the polling precinct were not conducive to secrecy of
the voters since it was conducted outside of the Company premises.
The precincts were (sic) the election was held were located in a
passenger waiting shed infront of the canteen across the road; on
the yellow pick-up; at the back of a car; a waiting shed near the
Guard House and a waiting shed infront of the Guard House across
the road. Herein private respondents also observed during the
election that there were voters who dictated some voters the phrase
"number 3" to those who were casting their votes and those who
were about to vote. Number 3 refers to the National Federation of
Labor in the official ballot.

ATU-TUCP explains that it did not file any protest because it

expected workers who had been aggrieved by the conduct of the
election would file their protest since it was in their interests that
they do so.
Fourth. Petitioner points out that the letter-appeals were written
almost two years after the election and they bear the same dates
(May 7 and June 14, 1991); they are not verified; they do not
contain details or evidence of intelligent acts; and they do not
explain why the writers failed to vote. Petitioner contends that the
letter-appeals were obtained through duress by the company.
We find the allegations to be without merit. The records shows that
as early as August 22 and 30, 1989, employees already wrote
letters/affidavits/
manifestoes alleging irregularities in the elections and
disfranchisement of workers. 7 As the Solicitor General says in his
Comment, 8 these affidavits and manifestoes, which were attached
as Annexes "A" to "CC" and Annexes "DD" to "DD-33" to private
respondent's Supplemental Petition of September 5, 1989 just 16
days after the August 20, 1989 election. It is not true therefore that
the employees slept on their rights.
As to the claim that letters dated May 7, 1991 and June 14, 1991
bear these same dates because they were prepared by private
respondent HPI and employees were merely asked to sign them,
suffice it to say that this is plain speculation which petitioner has
not proven by competent evidence.
As to the letters not being verified, suffice it to say that technical
rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases.
The allegation that the letters did not contain evidence of intelligent
acts does not have merit. The earlier letters 9 of the workers already
gave details of what they had witnessed during the election, namely
the open balloting (with no secrecy), and the use of NFL vehicles
for polling precinct. These letters sufficiently give an idea of the
irregularities of the certification election. Similarly, the letters
containing the signatures of those who were not able to vote are
sufficient. They indicate that the writers were not able to vote

because they thought the election had been postponed, especially

given the fact that the two unions had pending appeals at the time
from orders denying them the right to intervene in the election.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the
questioned orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-56902 September 21, 1982
CONFEDERATION OF CITIZENS LABOR UNIONS (CCLU)
and
REDSON
EMPLOYEES
AND
LABORERS
ASSOCIATION,petitioners,
vs.
Hon. CARMELO C. NORIEL, Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau
of Labor Relations, MARGARITA C. ENRIQUEZ, Election
Supervisor of the Ministry of Labor and Employment,
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU) and REDSON
TEXTILE MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, respondents.
Oliver B. Gesmundo for petitioners.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Asst. Solicitor General
Ramon A. Barcelona and Solicitor Dennis M. Taningco for
respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
These special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition deal with the
alleged irregular holding of a certification election.
Petitioner Confederation of Labor Unions (CCLU) was one of the
four unions wanting to be certified as the collective bargaining
representative of the employees in the Redson Textile
Manufacturing Corporation with place of business at Brixton Hill
Street, Capitolyo, Pasig, Metro Manila. Its co-petitioner, the Redson
Employees and Laborers Association, is a CCLU local in the said
corporation.
The other unions aspiring to become the collective bargaining
representative were the National Union of Garments Textile and

General Workers of the Philippines (GATCORD) the National

Trade Union (NATU) and the Associated Labor Unions (ALU).
On August 7, 1980, a certification election was held in the premises
of the corporation from eight-twenty in the morning to five-thirty in
the afternoon. Out of the 831 votes cast, CCLU garnered 356 votes;
ALU 338 votes; NATU, 82 votes and GATCORD 42 votes. Eight
votes were spoiled and five votes were challenged or segregated.
As no union obtained a majority vote, CCLU and ALU, which had
the two largest number of votes, agreed in a pre-election conference
on September 2, 1980 that a run-off election would be held on
November 6, 1980 from six o'clock in the morning to six o'clock in
the evening. CCLU requested that the certification election be
conducted for two days but ALU objected to that request.
On November 6, 1980, Margarita C. Enriquez, Reynaldo F. de Luna
and one Francisco, three election supervisors from the Ministry of
Labor and Employment, arrived at around seven o'clock in the
morning near the Redson Textile compound but they were not
allowed by the security guard to enter the company premises in
spite of the heavy rain. So, after consulting through the phone with
their chief, a certain Attorney Padilla. the said election supervisors
decided to hold the certification election "outside the premises of
the company in a small store outside of the annex building" (Annex
C, Rollo, p. 27). They used as ballot box "an improvised carton
box." The union representatives did not object to the improvised
polling place and ballot box.
Voting started at eleven o'clock. During the election and just before
it was closed at six-thirty in the evening, the ALU representative,
Sebastian P. Taneo, executed a written protest or manifestation,
alleging that the management of Redson Textile did not allow the
run-off election to be held within its premises; that the company
prevented fifty percent of the workers from voting by not allowing
them to get out of the company premises and inducing them to work
overtime; that its security guards "manhandled" the ALU vicepresident and that their "active intervention" caused "chaos and
confusion" for around thirty minutes; that the company refused to

furnish election paraphernalia like the polling place and the ballot
box and that the election supervisors declared the election closed in
spite of ALU's objection.
Taneo prayed that the votes should not be counted, that another day
be scheduled for the continuation of the election and that the
company be ordered to allow its workers to vote (Rollo pp. 29-35).
At around seven-thirty in the evening, the votes cast were
canvassed. Of the 692 votes cast, ALU got 366 votes as against
CCLU's 313 votes, or a margin of 53 votes. There were 1,010
voters. Because ALU won, its representative, Taneo, withdrew his
protest or manifestation by writing on the minutes of the proceeding
that his protest or manifestation was withdrawn "before the close of
the proceedings". On the other hand, the CCLU representatives
refused to sign the minutes of the election.
On the following day, November 7, CCLU through its
representative, Juan L. Fresnoza filed with the Bureau of Labor
Relations a protest wherein he prayed that the November 6
certification election as well as the "continuation of the election" on
November 7 be annulled.
Fresnoza alleged that the previous day's certification election was
irregular and disorderly because (a) no booths were provided for by
the company; (b) the election started much later than the hour
agreed upon by the parties, and (c) ALU distributed white T-shirts
printed with "ALU TAYO", gave free tricycle rides to ALU voters
and hired around fifteen husky men and around twenty-five women
who "forced" voters to vote for ALU.
According to Fresnoza, when he and Oscar Sanchez, the acting
president of Redson Employees and Laborers Association (RELACCLU), protested against those activities before election supervisor
Margarita C, Enriquez, the latter allegedly retorted, "Wala akong
magagawa, magagalit na naman si Mr. Taneo" (,Rollo, pp. 36-37).
On November 10, 1980, Fresnoza and Sanchez filed with the
Bureau of labor Relations a joint affidavit attesting to what
transpired during the certification election as alleged in the
aforesaid protest and added therein that when they protested before

the election supervisors, the latter told them to "place their protest
in writing so that they (supervisors) could consolidate the protests
in their election report" (Rollo, pp. 38-39).
On February 19, 1981, CCLU informed the Bureau of Labor
Relations that the election was conducted without regard to the
provisions of section 6, Rule VI, Book V of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.
Carmelo C. Noriel, Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, in his resolution of February 26, 1981, dismissed
CCLU's protest for lack of merit. He observed that CCLU failed to
submit the pleadings and evidences required in the hearing on
January 19, 1981 and that CCLU failed to file a protest either
"before or during the election proceeding" and, therefore, pursuant
to section 3, Rule VI, Book V of the aforementioned rules, CCLU is
deemed to have waived its right to protest.
Noriel in his resolution of March 26, 1981, denying CCLU's motion
for reconsideration, certified ALU as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees in Redson Textile Manufacturing
Corporation.
On June 6, 1981 CCLU and RELA-CCLU filed the instant petition
for certiorari and prohibition to annul the certification election.
They complained that the certification election was conducted in
violation of the following provisions of Rule VI, Book V of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code:
SEC. 6. Duties of representation officer. Before the actual voting
commences the representation officer shall inspect the polling
place, the ballot boxes, and the polling booths to insure secrecy of
balloting. The parties shall be given opportunity to witness the
inspection proceedings. After the examination of the ballot box, the
representation officer shall lock it with three keys one of which he
shall keep and the rest forthwith given one each to the employer's
representative and the representative of the labor organization. If
more than one union is involved, the holder of the third shall be
determined by drawing of lots. The key shall remain in the
possession of the representation officer and the parties during the

entire proceedings and thereafter until all the controversies

concerning the conduct of the election shall have been definitely
resolved.
The Solicitor General in his comment contends that the certification
election should be upheld because CCLU, by not filing a protest
with the election supervisor before the close of the election
proceeding, waived its right to protest (Sec. 3, Rule VI, Book V of
Implementing Rules and Regulations).
We hold that the certification election is invalid because of certain
irregularities such as that (1) the workers on the night shift (ten p.m.
to six a.m.) and some of those in the afternoon shift were not able to
vote, so much so that out of 1,010 voters only 692 voted and about
318 failed to vote (p. 88, Rollo); (2) the secrecy of the ballot was
not safeguarded; (3) the election supervisors were remiss in their
duties and were apparently "intimidated" by a union representative
and (4) the participating unions were overzealous in wooing the
employees to vote in their favor by resorting to such tactics as
giving free tricycle rides and T-shirts.
The purpose of a certification election is to give the employees
"true representation in their collective bargaining with an employer"
(51 C.J.S. 969). That purpose was not achieved in the run-off
election because many employees or union members were not able
to vote and the employer, through apathy or deliberate intent, did
not render assistance in the holding of the election.
It should be noted that ALU's written protest (later withdrawn) was
based on the same grounds invoked by CCLU in its protest. That
fact alone should have alerted Noriel to disregard the technicality
that CCLU's protest was not filed on time.
WHEREFORE, the resolutions of the Officer-in-Charge of the
Bureau of Labor Relations dated February 26 and March 19, 1981
are hereby set aside. Another run-off certification election should be
conducted inside the premises of Redson Textile Manufacturing
Corporation. The management is ordered to allow all its employees
to participate in the certification election and to assist in the holding
of an orderly election. The election supervisors or representation

officers are also enjoined to fulfill their duties under the Labor Code
and the rules and regulations implementing the same.
SO ORDERED.
mimiThe Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
MILITANTE VS NLRC
This is a petition for certiorari to reverse the Decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CA
No. 004908-93, affirming the order of the Labor Arbiter which
dismissed, for having been barred by prior judgment, NLRC-NCR
Cases Nos. 00-01-00618-93, 00-03-01784-93, and 00-03-02073-93.
I
The Golden Taxi Employees and Workers Union ANGLO
(GTEWU-ANGLO), represented by Ernesto Serrano, as union
president, filed a case against respondent Golden Taxi Cab Co.
(Company) and/or Lorenzo Zamora and Jose Zamora (NLRC-NCR
Case No. 00-05-02875-90) for illegal lock-out, violation of B.P.
Blg. 130, as amended by R.A. No. 6715, unfair labor practice, and
payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees. In his decision, Labor Arbiter Patricio P. Libo-on found that
the closure of respondent company was illegal, and ordered private
respondents to pay the members of GTEWU-ANGLO
P22,947,200.00 as separation pay and the equivalent of 10% of the
award as attorney's fees (Rollo, p.48). Upon appeal, NLRC in
NLRC NCR CA No. 003194-92, reversed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter and in lieu thereof directed private respondents to pay, as
financial assistance, the workers named in the list attached to its
decision the amount of P5,646,699.50 plus P564,669.95 as
attorney's fees (Rollo, p. 69).
On January 25, 1993, a complaint was filed by Danilo Q. Militante
against Lorenzo Zamora, Doa Nena Zamora and Doa Pacing
Zamora for illegal lockout, illegal dismissal, non-remittance of SSS
deduction, deduction for burial benefits, non-payment of premium
pay for rest day, thirteenth-month pay and separation pay with a

prayer for reinstatement, upgrading of SSS payments, payment of

separation pay, thirteenth-month pay and premium pay for rest day
(NLRC NCR Case No. 00-01-00618-93).
On March 9, 1993, another complaint was filed by Miguel C.
Salonga against respondent Company, Lorenzo Zamora, Doa Nena
Zamora and Doa Pacing Zamora, for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of retirement benefits with a prayer for payment of
retirement benefits and other benefits (NLRC NCR Case No. 00-0301784-93).
On March 15, 1993, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss
the complaints on the grounds of res judicata and prescription,
arguing that the NLRC decision in NLRC NCR CA No. 003194-92
barred these subsequent complaints.
On March 19, 1993, another complaint was filed against respondent
company, Lorenzo Zamora, Doa Nena Zamora and Doa Pacing
Zamora by Bernardino O. Tejada again for illegal lockout, illegal
deductions of SSS and burial benefits, illegal dismissal, nonpayment of separation pay, holiday pay and thirteenth-month pay,
and payment of moral damages and attorney's fees with a prayer for
upgrading of SSS payments, payment of separation pay, thirteenthmonth pay, premium pay for rest day, attorney's fees, moral
damages, holiday pay and reimbursement of illegal deductions
(NLRC NCR CA No. 00-03-02073-93).
On April 28, 1993, Labor Arbiter Ramon V. C. Reyes issued an
order dismissing the three consolidated cases on the ground of bar
by prior judgment. Upon appeal (NLRC NCR CA No. 004908-93),
NLRC rendered a decision dismissing the appeal for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
II
Petitioners argue that NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction: (1) in holding that
petitioner's causes of action are barred by the prior final judgment
in NLRC NCR CA No. 003194-92 despite the lack of jurisdiction of
NLRC over the complaint therein and the lack of identity of parties,
subject matter, and cause of action between the two cases; (2) in not

holding that the decision in the previous case did not prejudice but
even entitled petitioners, who are members of the exclusive
bargaining representative Philippine Agricultural Commercial and
Industrial Workers Union Trade Union Congress of the
Philippines (PACIWU-TUCP), to the award of financial assistance;
and (3) in failing to comply with its duty to use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain speedily and without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure the facts in each case.
III
We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by NLRC in
applying the principle of res judicata in NLRC NCR CA No.
004908-93 (NCR No. 00-01-00618-93; 00-03-01784-93; 00-0302073-93), subject of this petition by reason of the previous
judgment rendered in NLRC NCR CA No. 003194-92 (NLRC NCR
Case No. 00-05-02875-90).
Res Judicata has the following elements: (1) that the previous
judgment has become final; (2) that the prior judgment was
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; (3) that the first judgment was rendered on the merits;
and (4) that there was substantial identity of parties, subject matter
and causes of action, as between the prior and subsequent actions
(Diwa v. Donato, 234 SCRA 608 [1994]).
It is undisputed that the NLRC decision in NLRC NCR CA No.
003194-92 was decided on the merits and has already become final.
Petitioners insist, however, that they, being members of the rival
union PACIWU-TUCP, were not parties in the first case filed by
GTEWU-ANGLO (Rollo, p. 12). Such claim is not supported by
the records of the case. The Labor Arbiter' s decision in the
subsequent consolidated cases, which was affirmed by NLRC,
states:
It is not disputed that on May 27, 1990, the date the company filed
its notice of closure with the Department of Labor and
Employment, copy furnished the complainant Union, the said
Union was already "certified" (in fact more than a year earlier after
winning the March 17, 1989 Consent election) as "the exclusive

bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees" of respondent

company. The effect of such a certification brought about the legal
mandate that henceforth, complainant Union "shall be the exclusive
representative" (Art. 255, Labor Code) of all the "rank and file
employees (take note, not just the union members) of respondent
company not only for the purpose of entering into a collective
bargaining agreement" on "terms and conditions of employment"
(Arts. 251, 252, ibid), but also in the matter of "rights, benefits and
welfare" (Art. 255, ibid) of the said represented workers. . . . (Rollo,
p. 41).
In their opposition to respondents' motion to dismiss filed in NLRC
NCR Case No. 00-01-00618-93, petitioners apprised the Labor
Arbiter thus:
For the information of the Honorable Labor Arbiter, the herein
mentioned case was initiated by Ernesto Serrano who was the union
president of GTEWU-ANGLO for and in behalf of all the workers
and employees of the Golden Taxi Co. numbering about 1649,
whether or not the worker is a member of the union as the law on
this point is clear that as the winner of the certification/consent
Election on March 17, 1989, GTEWU-ANGLO, became the
exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees of the
respondent company. . . . (Rollo, p. 103).
Petitioners further explained in said opposition:
What happened in this case was that, while the herein mentioned
case was first filed before the Arbitration Branch of this Honorable
Commission and assigned to the Honorable Labor Arbiter
PATRICIO LIBO-ON, all the workers of respondent company were
complainants until the case was decided in complainants' favor, but
when the herein mentioned case was elevated on appeal by
respondent company to the First Division of the Honorable
Commission and was decided on 20 November 1992, the
complainants in this instant case were no longer included, hence,
this instant complaint (Rollo, p. 104).
In the first case (NLRC NCR CA No. 003194-92), NLRC resolved
two issues insofar as the award is concerned: (1) the determination

of the employees who are to receive financial assistance; and (2) the
amount they are entitled to receive. In conclusion, NLRC took out
those who no longer worked with respondent company before its
closure, and favored only those who actively pursued the case. It
limited the award of financial assistance only to those mentioned in
the list attached to its decision resulting in the exclusion from the
benefits of petitioners.
We cannot simply disregard these factual findings made by the
Labor Arbiter, as well as the conclusion arrived at by NLRC,
inasmuch as the same are supported by the records of the case and
in accord with law and jurisprudence. In Five J Taxi v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 235 SCRA 556 (1994), we ruled:
This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of
quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, which have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters,
are generally accorded not only respect but, at times, finality if such
findings are supported by substantial evidence. Where, however,
such conclusions are not supported by the evidence, they must be
struck down for being whimsical and capricious and, therefore,
arrived at with abuse of discretion (at p. 560).
The legal conclusion of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC on the binding
effect of the judgment in the NLRC NCR CA No. 003194-92 on
petitioners finds support in Article 255 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, as amended. Said article provides:
Exclusive bargaining representation and workers participation in
policy and decision making. The labor organization designated
or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate
collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of
the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining. . . . .
Inasmuch as GTEWU-ANGLO was certified as the exclusive
bargaining agent in the consent election conducted on March 17,
1989, petitioners cannot now claim that they were not parties in the
first case filed by GTEWU-ANGLO, which represented not only
PACIWU-TUCP but also GTEWU-ANGLO. Hence, all the

requisites of res judicata being present, said principle should be

made to apply, thus barring any subsequent action such as the
consolidated cases subject of this petition.
The Solicitor General, in his comment filed for NLRC, observes
that with the exception of the complaint docketed as NLRC NCR
No. 00-03-01784-93, charging private respondents with illegal
dismissal and non-payment of retirement benefits, the other two
complaints contained monetary claims such as non-remittance of
SSS deduction and deductions for burial benefits, non-payment of
holiday pay and thirteenth-month pay. However, inasmuch as these
claims were neither raised nor determined in the first case, even
indirectly, petitioners cannot be said to be precluded from filing and
pursuing these claims. We agree with the Solicitor General.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without prejudice to
petitioners' right to submit before the Labor Arbiter all the
unresolved money claims.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 75810 September 9, 1991
KAISAHAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (KAMPILKATIPUNAN), petitioner,
vs.
HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as
Director, Bureau of Labor Relations, and VIRON GARMENTS
MFG., CO., INC., respondents.
Esteban M. Mendoza for petitioner.
R E S O LU T I O N
NARVASA, J.:p
The propriety of holding a certification election is the issue in the
special civil action of certiorari at bar.
By virtue of a Resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated
February 27, 1981, the National Federation of Labor Unions

(NAFLU) was declared the exclusive bargaining representative of

all rank-and-file employees of Viron Garments Manufacturing Co.,
Inc. (VIRON).
More than four years thereafter, or on April 11, 1985, another union,
the Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino KAMPIL Katipunan filed
with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition for certification
election among the employees of VIRON. The petition allegedly
counted with the support of more than thirty percent (30%) of the
workers at VIRON.
NAFLU opposed the petition, as might be expected. The MedArbiter however ordered, on June 14, 1985, that a certification
election be held at VIRON as prayed for, after ascertaining that
KAMPIL had complied with all the requirements of law and that
since the certification of NAFLU as sole bargaining representative
in 1981, no collective bargaining agreement had been executed
between it and VIRON.
NAFLU appealed. It contended that at the time the petition for
certification election was filed on April 11, 1985, it was in process
of collective bargaining with VIRON; that there was in fact a
deadlock in the negotiations which had prompted it to file a notice
of strike; and that these circumstances constituted a bar to the
petition for election in accordance with Section 3, Rule V, Book V
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, 1 reading as
follows:
SEC. 3. When to file. In the absence of a collective bargaining
agreement submitted in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a
petition for certification election may be filed at any time. However,
no certification election may be held within one year from the date
of issuance of declaration of a final certification election result.
Neither may a representation question be entertained if, before the
filing of a petition for certification election, a bargaining deadlock
to which an incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a party had
been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the
subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout.
If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in

accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification

election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within
sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of such agreement.
Finding merit in a NAFLU's appeal, the Director of Labor Relations
rendered a Resolution on April 30, 1986 setting aside the MedArbiter's Order of June 14, 1985 and dismissing KAMPIL's petition
for certification election. This disposition is justified in the
Resolution as follows:
... While it may be true that the one-year period (mentioned in
Section 3 above quoted) has long run its course since intervenor
NAFLU was certified on February 27, 1981, it could not be said,
however, that NAFLU slept on its right to bargain collectively with
the employer. If a closer look was made on the history of labor
management relations in the company, it could be readily seen that
the delay in the negotiations for and conclusion of a collective
agreement the object of the one-year period could be
attributed first, on the exhaustion of all legal remedies in the
representation question twice initiated in the company before the
filing of the present petition and second, to management who had
been resisting the representations of NAFLU in collective
bargaining.
The one-year period therefore, should not be applied literally to the
present dispute, especially considering that intervenor had to
undergo a strike to bring management to the negotiation table. ...
KAMPIL moved for reconsideration, and when this was denied,
instituted in this Court the present certiorari action.
It is evident that the prohibition imposed by law on the holding of a
certification election "within one year from the date of issuance of
declaration of a final certification election result' in this case,
from February 27, 1981, the date of the Resolution declaring
NAFLU the exclusive bargaining representative of rank-and-file
workers of VIRON can have no application to the case at bar.
That one-year period-known as the "certification year" during
which the certified union is required to negotiate with the employer,
and certification election is prohibited 2 has long since expired.

Thus the question for resolution is whether or not KAMPIL's

petition for certification election is barred because, before its filing,
a bargaining deadlock between VIRON and NAFLU as the
incumbent bargaining agent, had been submitted to conciliation or
arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or
lockout, in accordance with Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the
Omnibus Rules above quoted.
Again it seems fairly certain that prior to the filing of the petition
for election in this case, there was no such "bargaining deadlock ...
(which) had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had
become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout." To be
sure, there are in the record assertions by NAFLU that its attempts
to bring VIRON to the negotiation table had been unsuccessful
because of the latter's recalcitrance and unfulfilled promises to
bargain collectively; 3 but there is no proof that it had taken any
action to legally coerce VIRON to comply with its statutory duty to
bargain collectively. It could have charged VIRON with unfair labor
practice; but it did not. It could have gone on a legitimate strike in
protest against VIRON's refusal to bargain collectively and compel
it to do so; but it did not. There are assertions by NAFLU, too, that
its attempts to bargain collectively had been delayed by continuing
challenges to the resolution pronouncing it the sole bargaining
representative in VIRON; but there is no adequate substantiation
thereof, or of how it did in fact prevent initiation of the bargaining
process between it and VIRON.
The stark, incontrovertible fact is that from February 27, 1981
when NAFLU was proclaimed the exclusive bargaining
representative of all VIRON employees to April 11, 1985
when KAMPIL filed its petition for certification election or a period
of more than four (4) years, no collective bargaining agreement was
ever executed, and no deadlock ever arose from negotiations
between NAFLU and VIRON resulting in conciliation proceedings
or the filing of a valid strike notice.
The respondents advert to a strike declared by NAFLU on October
26, 1986 for refusal of VIRON to bargain and for violation of terms

and conditions of employment, which was settled by the parties'

agreement, and to another strike staged on December 6, 1986 in
connection with a claim of violation of said agreement, a dispute
which has since been certified for compulsory arbitration by the
Secretary of Labor & Employment. 4 Obviously, however, these
activities took place after the initiation of the certification election
case by KAMPIL, and it was grave abuse of discretion to have
regarded them as precluding the holding of the certification election
thus prayed for.
WHEREFORE, it being apparent that none of the proscriptions to
certification election set out in the law exists in the case at bar, and
it was in the premises grave abuse of discretion to have ruled
otherwise, the contested Resolution of the respondent Director of
the Bureau of Labor Relations dated April 30, 1986 in BLR Case
No. A-7-139-85 (BZEO-CE-04-004-85) is NULLIFIED AND SET
ASIDE. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-67485 April 10, 1992
NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR
INDUSTRY OF THE PHILIPPINES (NACUSIP)-TUCP,
petitioner,
vs.
DIR. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, Bureau of Labor
Relations, Ministry of Labor and Employment, Manila,
FEDERATION OF UNIONS OF RIZAL (FUR)-TUCP, and
CALINOG
REFINERY
CORPORATION
(NASUREFCO),respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision
rendered by the respondent Director Cresenciano B. Trajano of the
Bureau of Labor Relations, Ministry of Labor and Employment,
dated November 18, 1983 affirming the order of Med-Arbiter
Demetrio Correa dated May 2, 1983 giving due course to the
petition for certification election filed by private respondent

Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR)-TUCP; and the order dated

March 21, 1984 denying the motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the
Philippines (NACUSIP)-TUCP is the certified exclusive bargaining
representative of the rank and file workers of Calinog Refinery
Corporation. Private respondent Federation of Unions of Rizal
(FUR)-TUCP is a labor organization duly registered with the
Department of Labor and Employment while private respondent
Calinog Refineries Employees Union (CREU)-NACUSIP is the
certified exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file
workers of the private respondent Calinog Refinery Corporation by
virtue of the certification election held on March 30, 1981.
On June 21, 1982, petitioner union filed a petition for deadlock in
collective bargaining with the Ministry of Labor and Employment
(now Department of Labor and Employment). In order to obviate
friction and tension, the parties agreed to submit the petition for
deadlock to compulsory arbitration on July 14, 1982 and was
docketed as RAB Case No. VI-0220-82.
On July 21, 1982, private respondent FUR-TUCP filed with the
Regional Office No. VI, MOLE (now DOLE), Iloilo City a petition
for certification election among the rank and file employees of
private respondent company, alleging that: (1) about forty-five
percent (45%) of private respondent company's employees had
disaffiliated from petitioner union and joined private respondent
union; (2) no election had been held for the past twelve (12)
months; and (3) while petitioner union had been certified as the sole
collective bargaining agent, for over a year it failed to conclude a
collective bargaining agreement with private respondent company.
Petitioner union filed a motion to intervene in the petition for
certification election filed by private respondent union.
By order dated July 23, 1982, the Acting Med-Arbiter Pacifico V.
Militante dismissed the petition for certification election for lack of
merit since the petition is barred by a pending bargaining deadlock.

On August 25, 1982, private respondent union filed an appeal to the

Bureau of Labor Relations, Manila.
The Bureau of Labor Relations through respondent Director
Cresenciano B. Trajano rendered a decision on September 30, 1982
setting aside the order of the Acting Med-Arbiter and remanding the
case to Regional Office VI, Iloilo City for hearing and reception of
evidence.
On May 2, 1983, Honorable Med-Arbiter Demetrio Correa issued
an order in LRD Case No. 4293 giving due course to the petition of
private respondent FUR-TUCP and ordering that an election be held
within 20 days from receipt of the order.
From the order of Med-Arbiter Correa, petitioner interposed an
appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations.
During the pendency of the appeal or on September 10, 1983, a
collective bargaining agreement was entered and executed by the
management of the National Sugar Refineries Co., Inc. and
petitioner union and was subsequently ratified by a majority of the
rank and file employees. On the basis of the concluded CBA, the
Honorable Executive Labor Arbiter Celerino Grecia II issued an
award dated September 12, 1983 adopting the submitted agreement
as the CBA between the parties.
On November 18, 1983, respondent Director Trajano rendered a
decision affirming with qualification the order of Med-Arbiter
Correa dated May 2, 1983, the pertinent portions of which provide
as follows:
It appears that the Calinog Refinery Employees, Union-NACUSIPTUCP no longer commands the support of the majority of the
employees. This observation is buttressed by the fact that more than
seventy five percent (75%) of the workers have disaffiliated from
the intervenor and joined the ranks of the petitioner. Thus,
intervenor's status as sole and exclusive bargaining representative is
now of doubtful validity.
For the above-mentioned reason, we stand obliged to resort to the
most expeditious, practical and democratic option open to us, that
is, the conduct of a certification election. Through this forum, the

true sentiments of the workers as to which labor organization

deserves their loyalty can be fairly ascertained. In any event, it is
our view that the 10 September 1983 collective agreement should
be respected by the union that shall prevail in the election not only
because it is an arbitration award but also because substantial
benefits are provided thereunder. Otherwise stated, the winning
union shall administer said agreement. In passing, it may be pointed
out that CAREFCO has been included as one of the contending
parties in the election. We feel that it is error for the acting MedArbiter to do so considering that the company is a mere bystander
in this representation dispute.
WHEREFORE, as above qualified, the Order dated 2 May 1983 is
affirmed.
SO DECIDED. (Rollo, pp. 40-41)
From the decision of respondent Director Trajano, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration dated December 6, 1983.
The respondent Director in his order dated March 21, 1984 denied
the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and affirmed the
Bureau's decision of November 18, 1983.
Hence, this petition.
This Court in a resolution dated December 10, 1984 resolved to
grant the urgent motion of petitioner for the issuance of a
restraining order and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
the respondents from conducting and holding the certification
election on December 17, 1984 among the rank and file employees
of respondent company (see Rollo, p. 99).
Petitioner maintains that respondent Director Trajano committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
rendered a decision affirming the order of Med-Arbiter Correa
finding that the deadlock is "nothing but a mere subterfuge to
obstruct the exercise of the workers of their legitimate right to selforganization, a last minute maneuver to deny the workers the
exercise of their constitutional rights" (Rollo, p. 28) and ordering a
certification election among the rank and file workers of respondent
company.

Furthermore, petitioner stresses that the finding that the contract

(deadlock) bar rule has no room for application in the instant case,
runs counter to the provision of Section 3 of the Rules
Implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 which prohibits the filing
of a petition for certification election during the pendency of a
bargaining deadlock.
In conformity with the petitioner's contentions, the Solicitor
General insists that the respondent Director has acted arbitrarily in
issuing the assailed decision and order. In addition, it argues that the
CBA concluded on September 10, 1983 has a life span of three (3)
years and constitutes a bar to the petition for certification election
pursuant to Section 3 of the Rules Implementing Batas Pambansa
Blg. 130.
The pivotal issue therefore, is whether or not a petition for
certification election may be filed during the pendency of a
bargaining deadlock submitted to arbitration or conciliation.
After a careful review of the records of this case, the Court finds the
petition meritorious and holds that the respondent Director gravely
abused his discretion when he affirmed the order of Med-Arbiter
Correa calling for a certification election among the rank and file
workers of private respondent company.
The law on the matter is Section 3, Book V, Rule V of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code, to wit:
Sec. 3. When to file. In the absence of a collective bargaining
agreement duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the
Code, a petition for certification election may be filed at any time.
However, no certification election may be held within one year
from the date of issuance of a final certification election result.
Neither may a representation question be entertained if, before the
filing of a petition for certification election, a bargaining deadlock
to which an incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a party had
been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the
subject of valid notice or strike or lockout.
If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in
accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification

election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within

sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of such agreement.
The clear mandate of the aforequoted section is that a petition for
certification election may be filed at any time, in the absence of a
collective bargaining agreement. Otherwise put, the rule prohibits
the filing of a petition for certification election in the following
cases:
(1) during the existence of a collective bargaining agreement except
within the freedom period;
(2) within one (1) year from the date of issuance of declaration of a
final certification election result; or
(3) during the existence of a bargaining deadlock to which an
incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a party and which had
been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the
subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout.
The Deadlock Bar Rule simply provides that a petition for
certification election can only be entertained if there is no pending
bargaining deadlock submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had
become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout. The
principal purpose is to ensure stability in the relationship of the
workers and the management.
In the case at bar, a bargaining deadlock was already submitted to
arbitration when private respondent FUR-TUCP filed a petition for
certification election. The same petition was dismissed for lack of
merit by the Acting Med-Arbiter in an order dated July 23, 1982 on
the sole ground that the petition is barred by a pending bargaining
deadlock. However, respondent Director set aside the same order
and subsequently affirmed an order giving due course to the petition
for certification election and ordering that an election be held.
The law demands that the petition for certification election should
fail in the presence of a then pending bargaining deadlock.
A director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, by the nature of his
functions, acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. We find no reason why
his decision should be beyond this Court's review. Administrative
officials, like the director of the Bureau of Labor Relations are

presumed to act in accordance with law but this Court will not
hesitate to pass upon their work where there is a showing of abuse
of authority or discretion in their official acts or when their
decisions or orders are tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness.
Noteworthy is the fact that a certification was issued by Executive
Labor Arbiter Celerino Grecia II on October 21, 1982 certifying
that the petition for deadlock in RAB Case No. VI-0220-82 was
forwarded to the Executive Labor Arbiter for compulsory
arbitration (see Rollo, p. 19). The respondent Director erred in
finding that the order issued by the Med-Arbiter dismissing the
petition for certification election was irregular and was merely
based on information.
All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the assailed
decision and order of the respondent Director is tainted with
arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED; the decision dated
November 18, 1983 and order dated March 21, 1984 of the
respondent Director Cresenciano B. Trajano are hereby nullified
and the order of Med-Arbiter Militante dated July 23, 1982
dismissing the petition for certification election is hereby reinstated.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-38955-56 October 31, 1974
CONFEDERATION OF CITIZENS LABOR UNIONS
(CCLU), CONTINENTAL EMPLOYEES AND LABORERS
ASSOCIATION (CELA) AND REDSON EMPLOYEES AND
LABORERS ASSOCIATION (RELA), petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, THE
SECRETARY OF LABOR, FEDERATION OF FREE
WORKERS,
CONTINENTAL
MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION
AND
REDSON
TEXTILE
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION,respondents.
O. B. Gesmundo and R. E. Maderazo for petitioners.
Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo for respondent
Redson Textile Manufacturing Corporation.

F. F Bonifacio, Jr. for respondent Federation of Free Workers.

A. K. Tan for respondent Continental Manufacturing Corporation.
Sol. Gen. E. P. Mendoza and Sol. Romeo C. de la Cruz for
respondents Secretary of Labor and The Commission.
FERNANDEZ, J.:p
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition to have the
respondents National Labor Relations Commission declared
without jurisdiction over its cases Nos. LR-2751 and 2883 with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin said
Respondent from proceeding with the scheduled certification
election on July 23, 1974.
G. R. No. L-38895. On February 15, 1974 the Continental
Manufacturing Corporation, (hereinafter referred to as CMC)
renewed for another three years or until February 15, 1977 its
collective bargaining agreement with Continental Employees and
Laborers Association (hereinafter referred to as CELA) an affiliate
of petitioner Confederation of Citizens Labor Unions, (hereinafter
referred to as CCLU) which is a legitimate labor organization. Copy
of this collective bargaining agreement was attached to the petition
as Annex A, and appears to have been acknowledged on February
21, 1974. Three days before February 15, 1974 however, that is, on
February 12, 1974, respondent Federation of Free Workers
(hereinafter referred to as FFW), another legitimate labor
organization, filed with the National Labor Relations Commission
(hereinafter referred to as NLRC), a "Petition for Certification
Election at the Continental Manufacturing Corporation", 1 and
docketed as NLRC Case No. LR-2751. A copy of this petition was
furnished CMC on February 22, 1974. Subsequently, on February
25, 1974 a copy of the CMC-CELA collective bargaining
agreement was filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations for
certification. The collective bargaining agreement was certified on
March 4, 1974. 2 On February 28, 1974, CMC filed its answer to the
petition praying for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of

the contract-bar rule.

G.R. No L-38956. A three-year collective bargaining agreement 3
was signed on March 4, 1974 4 but to be effective as of February 16,
1974 by Redson Textile Manufacturing Company (hereinafter
referred to as REDSON) and Redson Employees and laborers
Association (hereinafter referred to as RELA). Said agreement was
filed with the NLRC on March 7, 1974, and certified on March 15,
1974. The FFW, however, had already filed on February 25, 1974 it,
"Petition for Certification Election at Redson and Company, Inc."
with the NLRC, and docketed as NLRC Case No. LR-2883. 5
REDSON was furnished a copy of the petition on March 7, 1974.
On March 18, 1974 REDSON filed its answer praying for the
dismissal of the petition principally on the ground that the petition
was barred by the collective bargaining agreement which it had
signed with RELA.
The CELA-CCLU and RELA-CCLU filed on April 23, 1974 a
motion to dismiss 6 the petitions for certification election, and on
May 8, 1974 a supplemental motion to dismiss. 7
Respondent NLRC rendered its decision dated April 26, 1974,
which consolidated the two petitions for certification election
inasmuch as they raised identical issues, granted the petitions, and
directed the Bureau of Labor Relations to conduct the certification
elections within ten days from receipt thereof. 8 Copy thereof was
received by petitioners on May 11, 1974.
Petitioners filed on May 15, 1974 their "Motion for Reconsideration
and/or Appeal from the NLRC Decision of 26th of April 1974," 9
and their Appeal to the Secretary of Labor on May 16, 1974. 10
On July 6, 1974, petitioners, through counsel, received a telegram
dated July 5, 1974 from the Bureau of Labor Relations, requesting
them to attend the pre-election conference in LR-2751 and LR-2883
on July 15, 1974. 11 On July 12, 1974, petitioners filed a motion to
cancel the pre-election conference. 12

Claiming that notwithstanding the fact that the NLRC's decision

had not yet become final or they had not received a copy of the
decision of the Secretary of Labor and that their motion to cancel
the pre-election conference had not yet been acted upon,
Respondent NLRC already scheduled the election on July 23, 1974,
which unless enjoined, it intended to hold, petitioners filed on July
18, 1974 the instant petition, praying, on the basis of the
irregularities allegedly committed by the NLRC, for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the NLRC from taking
any action on the cases in question.
On July 22, 1974, the Second Division of this Court, resolved to
require the respondents to comment on the petition, to set the date
for the hearing of the matter of issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction, and to allow the holding of the certification election on
July 23, 1974. At the same time this Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondents from opening the ballot
boxes, canvassing the votes, and announcing the results thereof.
In their comments, respondents CMC and REDSON, thru counsel,
asserted that the scheduled certification elections on July 23, 1974
were cancelled until further orders from the NLRC at the preelection conference called on July 18, 1974 by the Bureau of Labor
Relations; that CMC signed with petitioner CELA a collective
bargaining agreement on February 15, 1974; that REDSON and
petitioner RELA also signed a collective bargaining agreement on
February 15, 1974; that in both NLRC Cases Nos. LR-2751 and
LR-2883, counsel submitted memoranda to sustain the proposition
that both petitioners for certification election should be dismissed
for the collective bargaining agreements of CMC and REDSON
were in effect certified as of February 15, 1974, and no certification
election could be entertained during the life of said bargaining
contracts; that CMC and REDSON received copy of the NLRC
decision on May 11, 1974 ordering an election within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof to select an exclusive collective bargaining
agent; that the Secretary of Labor denied in a resolution dated May
29, 1974 the appeal of CMC and REDSON; that CMC and

REDSON filed with the Secretary of Labor on July 10, 1974 a

manifestation to the effect that as long as their collective bargaining
agreements were honored, an election might not jeopardize the
rights of their employees who were already enjoying the benefits of
the collective bargaining agreements; that CMC and REDSON
would obey whatever may be the resolution of this Court regarding
the holding of the certification elections during the life of the
certified collective bargaining agreements. 13
Respondent FFW, in its comments, alleged that petitioners cannot
legally avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari and/or
prohibition as they did not raise the issue of jurisdiction in their
motions to dismiss NLRC cases Nos. 2751 and 2883 and that
petitioners did not move that respondent FFW be required to
present evidence of its claimed 60% or 10% membership of the
employees and workers; that neither the NLRC nor the Secretary of
Labor had acted with grave abuse of discretion for their orders were
issued pursuant to the rules of the Commission; that neither the
NLRC nor the Secretary of Labor acted in excess of jurisdiction as
the certification election order was issued pursuant to the
Implementing Rules of the Commission issued under Presidential
Decree No. 21; and that the certification election scheduled set for
July 23, 1974 were cancelled. 14
The Solicitor General's Office, as counsel for respondents NLRC
and the Secretary of Labor, refuted in its comments petitioners'
contentions that said respondents did not have jurisdiction over the
NLRC cases or that said respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion, or that they committed the irregularities imputed to
them. 15
ISSUES RAISED AND OUR RULINGS
1. Petitioners contend, first, that respondent NLRC had no authority
to modify the "contract-bar rule" by requiring that a collective
bargaining agreement had to be certified before it could constitute a

bar to a petition for certification election. 16 The contract-bar rule is

a principle in labor law that a collective bargaining agreement of
reasonable duration is, in the interest of the stability of industrial
relations, a bar to certification elections.
We think otherwise for the following reasons.
The NLRC issued on October 18, 1972, Rules and Regulations Re
Its Organization and Definition of Functions, which among other
things, provided thus:
Section 30. All collective bargaining agreements and other
agreements settling or adjusting labor disputes must be filed with
the Commission by the parties therein for certification. The widest
publicity shall be given by the management and the union to such
collective bargaining agreements for the information and guidance
of the workers concerned.
Section 31. During the life of a certified collective bargaining
agreement, the Commission shall not entertain any representation
issues which may in any manner affect the administration of the
agreement.
Labor Relations Implementing Instruction No. 2, dated December
21, 1972, establishing rules and regulations concerning certification
elections provides thus:
Section 3. When Petition May Be Filed. Where the collective
bargaining agreement is certified, a petition may be filed within
sixty (60) days before its expiration date. In the absence of a
certified collective bargaining agreement, a petition may be filed
any time. If a petition is filed during the life of a collective
bargaining agreement, the same shall be dismissed without
prejudice to its refiling within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration
date of the certified collective bargaining agreement.
It shall be the duty of the petitioner to serve a copy of the petition to
each of the interested parties either personally or by registered mail.
Proof of such service must be shown in the petition.
But where from does the NLRC's authority to promulgate its rules
emanate? From Presidential Decree No. 21, dated October 14,
1972, section 2 whereof gave the NLRC, which the Decree created,

original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving all

disputes and grievances which may otherwise lead to strikes and
lockouts under Republic Act No. 875. Section 9 thereof also
enjoined the NLRC to promulgate rules and regulations governing
collective bargaining.
Petitioners, however, contend that respondent NLRC had no
authority to promulgate Section 3 of Implementing Instructions No.
2 because it violates not only General Order No. 3 but also the
existing jurisprudence on the matter. 17
We do not agree. The President in General Order No. 3, dated
September 22, 1972, ordered "all executive departments, bureaus,
offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the National
Government ... to function ... in accordance with existing laws, until
otherwise ordered by me or by my duly designated representative,"
and the Judiciary to continue trying and deciding cases in
accordance with existing laws. Assuming, gratia argumenti, that the
existing law on collective bargaining at the time of the
promulgation of Implementing Instructions No. 2 was that a
collective bargaining agreement need not be certified in order to be
a bar to a certification election, it does not mean that it could not be
changed by virtue of General Order No. 3. This Order did not
render unchangeable the existing law, for it is expressly provided
therein that the executive departments and their agencies may
function not in accordance with the then existing law if so ordered
by the President or by his duly authorized representative, and as
stated above, the President granted the NLRC original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving employeeemployer relationship, and the authority to issue rules and
regulations concerning collective bargaining.
Assuming arguendo, furthermore, that a non-certified collective
bargaining agreement may serve as a bar to a certification election
as petitioners would want us to hold, petitioners would still be
bereft of cause to complain. The petition for certification election
filed by FFW at the Continental Manufacturing Corporation (NLRC

CASE No. LRO 2751) was filed, as shown by Annex C to the

petition, on February 12, 1974. The collective bargaining agreement
between the CMC and the CELA (Annex A) which, as claimed,
should bar said petition, had not yet been filed as of that date for
certification, for it was acknowledged before the Notary Public only
on February 21, 1974.
The petition for certification election at Redson and Company
(NLRC Case No. LR-2883) was filed on February 25, 1974. As of
said date, no collective bargaining agreement had been entered into
between REDSON and RELA which could serve as a bar to the
petition, for their collective bargaining agreement was signed only
on March 4, 1974, as admitted by REDSON in its answer, 18 and
acknowledged only on March 7, 1974. 19
We do not see, moreover, any violation of the existing law which
NLRC allegedly committed when it gave due course to the petitions
for certification election. Section 12 (b) of Republic Act No. 875
makes it plain that after a certification election has been made "the
court shall not order certification in the same unit more often than
once in 12 months," and under Section 12 (d) of the same law, "an
employer may petition the court for an election if there has been no
certification election held during the 12 months prior to the date of
the request of the employees," which provision tends to show that
after the lapse of such period of 12 months a certification election
may be requested either by the employer or by the requisite number
of employees of a particular union. 20 The petitions for certification
election in both NLRC Cases Nos. 2751 and 2883 alleged "that
there has been no certification election in the company for the last
12 months," 21 which allegation was not denied by CMC and
REDSON in their answers.22
Section 12 (c) of the same law furthermore provides that it shall be
mandatory on the Court to order an election for the purpose of
determining the representative of the employees for the appropriate
bargaining unit, where a petition is filed by at least ten per cent of

the employees in the appropriate unit requesting an election. In LR

No. 2751, FFW claimed that it represented 60% of the employees
and workers in CMC, and in LR No. 2883, it claimed that it
represented more than 10% of the employees in REDSON.
II. Secondly, petitioners contend that inasmuch as the collective
bargaining agreements (Annexes A and B to the Petition) contain
standard and substantial benefits and their duration is reasonable,
there was no reason why said agreements should still be certified
before they could be considered bars to the petitions for
certifications election. 23 In the light of what has been said above
regarding NLRC's authority to promulgate Labor Relations
Implementing Instruction No. 2 and the clear provisions of section
12 of Republic Act No. 875, it is obvious that petitioner's complaint
on this point is not meritorious. Even if a certification of the
collective bargaining agreements were not necessary, the
certification elections could still be ordered by virtue of Republic
Act No. 875.
III. Petitioners complain, thirdly, that respondent NLRC favored
FFW and allowed it to raid CCLU locals when it granted the
petitions for certification elections. 24 It has been shown that FFW
had legal right to petition for certification elections. If in exercising
said right, FFW would reap benefits and petitioners would suffer
damage, such damage would be no more than a damnum absque
injuria, damage without legal injury.
IV. Fourthly, petitioners also complain that the respondent NLRC
committed an irregularity when it took cognizance of the petitions'
for certification elections despite the fact that there was no schism
and the grievance procedure provided in the collective bargaining
agreements 25 have not been resorted to. Assuming arguendo, that
petitioners were correct on this point, NLRC's error would still be
only an error in judgment and not of jurisdiction, hence, this
petition for certification would still fail.
For it is elementary that a petition for certiorari in order to succeed,
must be based on jurisdictional grounds because as long as the
respondent official acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by

him in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an

error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by
appeal. 26 It is true that an application for the issuance of the writ of
certiorari may likewise be based on grave abuse of discretion. But it
is equally true that there is grave abuse of discretion which justifies
the issuance of the writ of certiorari only if and when there is a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility, amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in
contemplation of law. 27 In other words, the writ of certiorari will lie
when an inferior Court, board or officer exercising judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 28
In the case at bar, the alleged error of the respondent Commission is
one of judgment. And as already pointed out, even assuming that
such judgment is indeed erroneous, the same does not constitute a
grave abuse of discretion within the meaning of the Rules and
established jurisprudence, there being no showing that said
Commission exercised its power on the matter "in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility, amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of
law." 29
The "grievance procedure" provided in the collective bargaining
agreements Annexes A and B need not be resorted to in the instant
cases for said procedure was not applicable. The collective
bargaining agreements defines a grievance as a "controversy
between the COMPANY and the UNION or any employee or
employees covered by this Agreement." The instant cases do not
involve a controversy between the company and the union, but

between two unions.

V. Fifth, petitioners contend that the decision (Annex H) dated April
26, 1974 was void for not having been personally and directly
prepared by the members of the Commission, 30 alleging as reason
therefor that the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners, being
saddled with administrative duties, have no time to personally
prepare decisions such that their decisions are prepared by other
employees. 31
There was no evidence introduced that that particular decision
complained of was not personally prepared by the NLRC Chairman
and Commissioners. Because an official has much administrative
work to do, and which he does, it does not follow that he does not
have time to prepare decisions, for the preparation of the decisions
is one of those duties he must do. Such bare allegation of petitioners
cannot furthermore prevail over the presumption that "official duty
has been regularly performed."32
This presumption is particularly strong as regards respondent
Commission a government agency vested with quasi-judicial
powers, in connection with the enforcement of labor laws and social
legislations affecting particular fields of activity involving labor and
capital. Thus, it was held that a legal presumption is particularly
strong as regards administrative agencies vested with powers
considered to be quasi-judicial in nature, in connection with the
enforcement of laws affecting particular fields of activity, the
proper regulations and/or promotion of which requires a technical
or special training, aside from a good knowledge and grasp of the
overall conditions, relevant to said field, obtaining in the nation. 33
VI. The sixth alleged irregularity complained of by petitioners is
that they were deprived of their day in court for the parties seeking
certification elections were not required to prove the allegations in
their petitions, particularly their claimed membership consisting of
"more than 60% of the employees and workers" of CMC and "10%

of the employees of Redson and Company." 34 We note that this

question was not raised in the proceedings before the NLRC. It was
not raised in the Answer in NLRC Case No. LR-2751 35 or in the
Answer in NLRC Case No. LR-2883. 36 Too repeatedly enunciated
as not to require citation of authorities is the rule that no issue may
be raised on appeal which was not raised in the lower court.
Moreover, before an act of an official may be questioned in
certiorari proceedings, said official must first be given the
opportunity to correct the error by moving that he reconsider the
same. 37 The NLRC was not given this opportunity.
VII. Petitioners' last complaint was that the NLRC attempted to
implement its decision even before they received copy of the
alleged resolution or decision on their "Motion for Reconsideration
and/or Appeal." 38
Assuming that there was an irregularity on this point, it was
corrected when the certification elections scheduled on July 23,
1974 as well as the pre-election conference set for July 18, 1974
were cancelled. 39
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
temporary restraining order issued on July 22, 1974 is LIFTED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
BUKLOD G SAULOG TRANSIT, Petitioner,
MARCIANO CASALLA, ET ALS., Respondents.

vs.

DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
On 7 December 1953 the Respondents, 65 in number, employees of
the Saulog Transit, Inc., filed in the Court of Industrial Relations a
petition for a certification election, alleging that the total number of
employees in the Saulog Transit, Inc. was 583; chan

roblesvirtualawlibrarythat there were two labor organizations which

represented the employees in the Saulog Transit, Inc., to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary the Buklod g Saulog Transit and
the
Saulog
Transit
Employees
Union
(PFL);
chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand that the certification election prayed for
was for the purpose of determining the sole bargaining
representative of the employees in the Saulog Transit, Inc. On 23
December 1953 the president of the Buklod g Saulog Transit filed
its answer stating that on 1 (15) July 1953 a collective bargaining
agreement had been entered into by and between the Buklod g
Saulog Transit, a duly registered union with the Department of
Labor, on the one hand, and the Saulog Transit, Inc., on the other;
chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat on 5 December an election was held
peacefully and orderly, the result thereof having been forwarded to
the Department of Labor, against which election and the result
thereof no protest as regards the legality thereof was lodged; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat having acquired a juridical personality
from the time of its registration, on 15 July 1953 the Buklod g
Saulog Transit entered into a collective bargaining contract already
referred to covering the well-being of the members of which the
Respondentswere still members. On 16 February 1954 the Saulog
Transit, Inc. filed a pleading entitled Appearance and
Manifestation averring that the allegation that the Respondents
constituted 10 per cent of the total number of employees of the
Saulog Transit, Inc. was for the Court to determine; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand that it had dealt and had been dealing
with the Buklod g Saulog Transit in accordance with a collective
bargaining agreement entered into by and between them, the
Buklod g Saulog Transit representing the employees of the Saulog
Transit, Inc. as an industrial unit.
After hearing, on 17 May 1954 the Court rendered judgment
directing
cralaw that a certification election be held among the employees
and/or laborers of the Saulog Transit, Inc. at Pasay City, in
accordance with section 12 of Republic Act No. 875, and in

conformity with the Rules promulgated by this Court on September

4, 1953.
All the employees and/or laborers whose names appear in the list
submitted by the company and marked as Exhibits E to 7,
attached to the records of this case, minus the supervisory personnel
composed of the General Manager, Assistant General Manager, the
two guards, one shift foreman, and one accountant, shall be eligible
to vote.
Let a copy of this order be furnished the Department of Labor for
its information and guidance.
A motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court in
banc on 12 July 1954, the Buklod g Saulog Transit prays for a
review of the order of the Court of Industrial Relations dated 17
May 1954 and the resolution of the Court in banc dated 12 July
1954 denying its motion for reconsideration.
The logical inference that may be drawn from the order appealed
from is that the Court of Industrial Relations could not determine or
at least was in doubt as to which of the two labor unions named in
the petition was the true choice of the laborers or employees of the
Saulog Transit, Inc. to represent them in all their dealings or for the
purpose of collective bargaining with their employer as regards the
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment and other conditions of
employment, and for that reason the trial court ordered a
certification election pursuant to section 12(b), Republic Act No.
875.
The Court of Industrial Relations
findings:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

made

the

following

From the evidence, the following are explicit in the pleadings and
documents as well as the testimonies submitted by the parties. It
appears that the Saulog Transit, Inc. is engaged in the transportation
business in Manila and surrounding cities and employs 583 workers
including supervisory personnel; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat
there exists in the company two unions, namely, the Buklod g

Saulog Transit, the intervenor in this case, and the Saulog

Employees Union (PFL); chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat
thePetitioners numbering 65 are all employees of the company;
chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat there exists a collective bargaining
contract (Exhibit 10) dated July 15, 1953, between the Saulog
Transit, Inc. and the Buklod g Saulog Transit with a
supplementary agreement (Exhibit 10-1) entered into on January
10, 1954, a month after the petition for certification election was
filed and already being investigated by this Court.
The fundamental issue to be resolved in the present case is whether
or not an order of certification election shall issue on the basis of
the evidence established.
By stipulation of the parties it was agreed in open Court that instead
of a petition for certification election confined to drivers and
conductors as the appropriate bargaining unit in the Saulog Transit,
Inc., the parties have agreed on the employers unit.
At the hearing on January 16, 1954, counsel for Petitioner
manifested in open Court that out of the 65 signatories to the
petition, 3 are inspectors and inasmuch as the inspectors are
supervisors he moved that they be stricken out of the petition,
thereby leaving a total of 62 signatories to the petition.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The evidence show that a total of 583 are employed in the Saulog
Transit, Inc. Out of said number, the Court holds that the following
should be excluded as they come within the disqualifying category
of supervisors, namely, one (1) assistant General Manager; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarytwo
(2)
guards;
chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryone
(1)
shift
foreman;
chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand one (1) accountant. With regards to the
28 inspectors, which counsel for Petitioners contends to be
supervisors without presenting evidence on the matter, the Court is
of the opinion that inspectors in transportation business by the
nature of their work do not fall within the category of supervisors

under Section 2 (k) of Republic Act No. 875.

On the basis of those retractions, intervenor maintains that the
Petitioner can only lay claim to forty-two (42) on their side and,
therefore, this number no longer constitute ten (10%) per cent of all
the employees in the company minus the supervisory personnel. On
the subject of these retractions during the hearings of this case by
the signatories to the petition, the Court cannot help but entertain
doubts that it was their free and untrammeled will without pressure
from without (within). It is to be noted that during one of the
hearings of this case, counsel for intervenor presented a letter
(Exhibit A) dated December 23, 1953, purportedly signed by 53
signatories to the petition addressed to Marciano Casalla, president
of the Saulog Employees Union (PFL) and one of the Petitioners in
this case, wherein it was stated that what they signed before
Marciano Casalla was not what they really signed for. During the
next hearing on January 19, 1954, counsel for Petitioners presented
a document (Exhibit B) dated January 9, 1954, addressed to the
Court and purportedly signed by 21 out of the 53 signatories of the
letter marked as Exhibit A, wherein it was stated that when the
company knew of their signatures to the petition for certification
election, they were told to sign the letter (Exhibit A) or else they
will lose their jobs.
Marciano Casalla testified at the hearings on January 19, 1954,
when confronted with the aforementioned documents, that the
signatories of Exhibit A told him that they were forced to sign
said letter. Asked by counsel for intervenor how the signatories
were forced to sign, he testified that some of the signatories told
him that they did not like to sign; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat
some told him they have to be rendered drunk first before they
could sign; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that some could not ask
for vale in the company unless they signed. (Recross examination
of Marciano Cassalla, t.s.n., p. 27, hearing of January 19, 1954.).
Again at the hearing on February 4, 1954, 16 signatories to the
petition for certification election present signified in open court

their desire for a certification election. Counsel for intervenor in an

effort to refute what they have previously testified regarding their
desire for a certification election presented affidavit previously
signed by some of them. Feliciano Ignacio when shown the
affidavit (Exhibit D-1) he previously signed stated that he signed
said affidavit in his desire to work; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryP. de
Luna testified that he signed the affidavit (Exhibit 3) believing
that it was for the return of the fund deposits and there was nothing
mentioned
about
certification
election;
chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryGallardo testified that he signed the affidavit
(Exhibits D-3 and D-4) in his desire to be employed; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryA. Alde testified that he signed the affidavit
because he wanted to be assigned to a trip; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryN. Alcantara testified that he signed the
affidavit because he was afraid to be rejected in his work.
From the demeanor of the witnesses in the witness stand and the
testimonies of the above-mentioned witnesses, the Court believes
that those retractions could not destroy the desire of all signatories
constituting, at least, ten (10%) per cent of the employees in the
appropriate unit desiring a certification election. The manner in
which the retractions were obtained more than convinces the Court
of the need for a certification election so that the doubt as to the true
bargaining representative will be finally resolved. Republic Act No.
875 states the remedy - a certification election. Besides, it should be
noted that section 12 of Republic Act No. 875 speaks of the ten
(10%) per cent at the time of the filing of the petition. Retractions
and withdrawals, therefore, after the petition is filed cannot affect
the number of the Petitioners at the time the petition is filed.
Intervenor also offered in evidence a collective bargaining
agreement it had with the Saulog Transit, Inc., marked as Exhibit
10 and contends that it is a bar to the petition for certification
election. A careful scrutiny of such contract reveals that it does not
touch in substantial terms the rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, and other conditions of employment of all the
employees in the company but seeks to establish merely a grievance

procedure for drivers, conductors and inspectors who are members

of the Buklod g Saulog.
xxx

xxx

xxx

From the evidence on record, it appears that a supplementary

contract (Exhibit 10-1) providing for increase in pay, fixing of
guarantee deposits nor conductors and drivers, granting of loans to
immediate members of the family of the union employees in case of
death, and granting daily bonus to drivers and conductors who have
reached their daily quota of collection, have been executed between
the Saulog Transit, Inc., and the Buklod g Saulog Transit cralaw
In its brief the Petitioner contends that (1) the Court of Industrial
Relations erred in holding that it did not lose jurisdiction over the
case notwithstanding the fact that the Respondents (Petitionersin the
court below) were reduced to less than 10 per cent of the
appropriate unit; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (2) the Court of
Industrial Relations erred in its interpretation of section 13,
Republic Act No. 875, relative to the kind of collective bargaining
agreement which would constitute a bar to a certification election,
and in declaring that Exhibit 10 (whether by itself or as
supplemented by Exhibit 10-1) did not constitute a sufficient bar to
a certification election. In support of its petition filed in the Court of
Industrial Relations the Petitioner Buklod g Saulog Transit raised
the following questions:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Does the collective bargaining agreement between the Buklod
and the Saulog Transit, Inc. (consisting of Exhibits 10 [and] 10-1)
conform as to contents to the bargaining contract contemplated in
Section 13 of Republic Act 875? If so, is it a bar to certification
election? (Exhibits 10 and 10-1 are Annexes D and E, respectively.)
2. What is the effect of the holding of certification election on the
collective bargaining agreement previously entered into by the
parties mentioned in Question 1?
The first error the Petitioner claims the Court of Industrial Relations
committed is not well taken, not only because of the rule laid down

in cases decided under section 4, Commonwealth Act No. 103, as

amended by section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 559, consistently
followed and maintained in this jurisdiction, 1 to the effect that the
Court of Industrial Relations acquires jurisdiction of an industrial
dispute upon the filing of a petition by 31 employees or laborers
bringing such dispute to the Court for determination, and that a
diminution in number by retraction or withdrawal of any of them
does not divest it of its jurisdiction already acquired, but also
because as found by the Court of Industrial Relations, the retraction
by some members who originally had signed the petition was not of
their own free will. The petition filed by 65 laborers or employees
of the Saulog Transit, Inc., was sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon
the Court of Industrial Relations, for their number was more than 10
percent of the laborers and employees of the Saulog Transit, Inc. 2
It is argued that under and pursuant to section 13, paragraph 1, of
Republic Act No. 875, which provides that
In the absence of an agreement or other voluntary arrangement
providing for a more expeditious manner of collective bargaining, it
shall be the duty of an employer and the representative of his
employees to bargain collectively in accordance with the provisions
of this Act. Such duty to bargain collectively means the
performance of the mutual obligation to meet and confer promptly
and expeditiously and in good faith, for the purpose of negotiating
an agreement with respect to wages, hours, and/or other terms and
conditions of employment, and of executing a written contract
incorporating such agreement if requested by either party, or for the
purpose of adjusting any grievances or question arising under such
agreement, but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a
proposal or to make concession.
there was no need or reason for ordering a certification election,
because on 15 July 1953 thePetitioner Buklod g Saulog Transit
and the Saulog Transit, Inc. had already entered into a collective
bargaining agreement, as shown by Exhibit 10.
The provisions of section 13, paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 875,

contemplate a situation not only where there had been no agreement

entered into by and between employees or laborers and employer or
management as to terms and conditions of employment, but also
where there had been an agreement that leaves out many or some
matters on which the parties should have stipulated, if the collective
bargaining agreement is to achieve its purpose and aim industrial
peace. 1
The trial court found that the collective bargaining agreement
entered into by and between the Saulog Transit, Inc. and the Buklod
g Saulog Transit on 15 July 1953 (Exhibit 10; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryAnnex D) does not touch in substantial
terms the rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other
conditions of employment of all the employees in the company but
seeks to establish merely a grievance procedure for drivers,
conductors and inspectors who are members of the Buklod g
Saulog. And even in the supplementary agreement (Exhibit 10-1;
chan roblesvirtualawlibraryAnnex E), there is no clear-cut
stipulation as to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions or employment. 2 In their reply the Respondents claim
that
such
an
agreement
(Exhibit
10;
chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryAnnex D) and the supplementary agreement
(Exhibit 11; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryAnnex E) have not been
identified and offered in evidence and should not be taken into
consideration. The trial court took, however, into consideration both
agreements and found that the first agreement being incomplete
does not bar a certification election; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand
as to the supplementary agreement the Court held that it having
been entered into after the filing of the petition for a certification
election the same cannot and does not bar a certification election.
The affidavit filed by the President of the Buklod g Saulog Transit
(Annex F) is not mentioned in the order and resolution appealed
from. It is clearly an effort on the part of the Petitioner to supply
what was lacking in the two agreements already mentioned. The
contention that as section 13, Republic Act No. 875, does not
require that the agreement be in writing unless either party request

that it be reduced to writing, thereby insinuating that there had been

a verbal understanding before the written agreement was entered
into, has no bearing and effect in a case where there is a written
agreement which the Court of Industrial Relations found
incomplete. In these circumstances we are of the opinion that the
collective bargaining agreement entered into on 15 July 1953 is no
bar to a certification election at the instance of at least 10 per cent
of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit,
pursuant to section 12, paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), Republic Act No.
875.
The second question raised by the Petitioner in support of its
petition filed in the court below need not be passed upon. It has not
arisen. Any pronouncement thereon would be obiter and not
binding.
The order and resolution appealed from are affirmed, with costs
against the Petitioner.