REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, v.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
AND
JOSEPH
SOCORRO
B.
TAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013
Facts:
The petitioners assail through a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction resolution of the
Commission on Election ordering the cancellation of the Certificate of
Candidacy of petitioner for the position of the Representative of the lone
district of Marinduque.
On October 31. 2012, Joseph Socorro Tan filed with the Comelec an Amended
Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of
Regina Ongsiako Reyes, the petitioner, on the ground that it contained
material representations.On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC cancelled the
certificate of candidacy of the petitioner. She filed an MR on April 8, 2013.
On May 14, 2013, COMELEC en banc denied her MR.
However, on May 18, 2013, she was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013
Elections. On June 5, 2013, COMELEC declared the May 14, 2013 Resolution
final and Executory. On the same day, petitioner took her oath of office
before Feliciano Belmonte, the Speaker of the House of Representatives. She
has yet to assume office at that time, as her term officially starts at noon of
June 30, 2013.According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its
jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed 20 because pursuant to Section 17,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petitioner who is
proclaimed as winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the
position of member of the House of Representative of Marinduque.
Held:
Yes, COMELEC retains jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the HRET begins
only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
For one to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there
must be a concurrence of these requisites: (1) valid proclamation; (2) proper
oath, and (3) assumption of office.

Thus the petitioner cannot be considered a member of the HR yet as she has
not assumed office yet. Also, the 2nd requirement was not validly complied
with as a valid oath must be made (1) before the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she made the oath
before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during
plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required
oath of office was indeed complied.
Furthermore, petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of
discretion is alleged and proved to exist. For an act to be struck
down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse
of
discretion
must
be
patent
and
gross.
Here, this Court finds that petitioner failed to adequately and substantially
show that grave abuse of discretion exists.

Case Digest: Arroyo vs. DOJ

G.R.

No.

199082

September

18,

2012

JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE;

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Justice; HON. SIXTO BRILLANTES,
JR., in his capacity as Chairperson of the Commission on Elections;
and
the
JOINT
DOJ-COMELEC
PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
COMMITTEE
and
FACT-FINDING
TEAM,
Respondents.
FACTS:
The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a joint
committee with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct
preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies
committed
during
the
2004
and
2007
elections.
The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and
constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007
National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases composed of
officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. In its initial report, the Fact-Finding
Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007
senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato and
Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team recommended
that herein petitioners Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be subjected
to
preliminary
investigation
for
electoral
sabotage.

After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a

resolution ordering that information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be
filed against GMA, et al. while that the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo,
among others, should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ
Joint Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid?
HELD:

Petitions

are

DISMISSED.

FIRST ISSUE: The creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid.

POLITICAL

LAW:

powers

of

COMELEC

Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the powers and
functions of the Comelec. The grant to the Comelec of the power to
investigate and prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement
and administration of all election laws is intended to enable the Comelec to
effectively insure to the people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of
elections. The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec was
reflected in Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the
Omnibus
Election
Code.
Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct preliminary
investigation is vested exclusively with the Comelec. The latter, however,
was given by the same provision of law the authority to avail itself of the
assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. Thus, under the
Omnibus Election Code, while the exclusive jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation had been lodged with the Comelec, the prosecutors
had been conducting preliminary investigations pursuant to the continuing
delegated
authority
given
by
the
Comelec.
Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the creation of the Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team, should be viewed not as an abdication of
the constitutional bodys independence but as a means to fulfill its duty of
ensuring the prompt investigation and prosecution of election offenses as an
adjunct of its mandate of ensuring a free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections.
DOES THE COMELEC HAS EXCLUSIVE POWER TO INVESTIGATE ELECTION
CASES?

YES, UNDER BP 881 OR THE COMELEC ELECTION CODE. BUT NOT ANYMORE
UNDER SECTION 43 OF RA 9369.

While recognizing the Comelecs exclusive power to investigate and

prosecute cases under Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the Omnibus Election
Code, the Court pointed out that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not
have such intention. This exclusivity is thus a legislative enactment that can
very well be amended by Section 43 of RA 9369. Therefore, under the
present law, the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government,
such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and
prosecution of election offenses.
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING vs Comelec
Rommel Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence
of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America,
he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor. On 3 April
2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed
an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty
candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate
of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in
connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections. Respondent
Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by
the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of
Arnado as USA-American. The COMELEC First Division ruled that the
petition for disqualification be granted because he is still using his US
passport after his renunciation of his US citizenship which negates his
Affidavit of Renunciation. Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration before
the COMELEC En Banc. Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling),
another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second
highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and
filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with
an Opposition to Arnados Amended Motion for Reconsideration.

The COMELEC En Banc granted the Motion for Reconsideration of Arnado on

the ground that the use of a US passport. does not operate to revert back
his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law saying
such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to
unrenounce what he has earlier on renounced. Maquiling files a petition
before the Supreme Court to assail the decision of the COMELEC En Banc.
ISSUE: Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenship affects ones qualifications to run for public office.
RULING: Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign
citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his
US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of
renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado
positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect
declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that he is an
American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the
United States of America. The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a
hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the
next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign
citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the
foreign country which granted the citizenship. While the act of using a
foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No.
63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is
nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required
for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be
qualified to run for a local elective position.
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign
passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired
by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen,
Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual
citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado
represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport. This act
of using a foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is fatal
to Arnados bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a
disqualification to run for an elective local position. The citizenship
requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be
possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship
but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the
citizenship issue to attack.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his
American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took.
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is

disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from becoming a
candidate in the May 2010 elections.
A candidate for the House of
Representatives
who
was
disqualified for failure to comply
with the residence requirement
under the Section 6, Art, VI of the
Constitution could not be validly
substituted. Distinctions between
disqualification under Sec. 68 of the
OEC and Section 78.
SILVERIO
TAGOLINO
VS.
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL &
LUCY TORRES-GOMEZ, G.R. No. 202202, March
19, 2013
Actor Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his Certificate of Candidacy
seeking the congressional office of the House of Representatives for the 4 th
District of Leyte. He indicated his residence as 910 Carlota Hills, Ormoc City.
The same was questioned before the COMELEC by Buenaventura Juntilla,
one of the candidates for the said position claiming that Richard is a resident
of Colgate St., East Greenhills, San Juan City, MM. The COMELEC disqualified
Richard based on Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code for lack of
residence. On May 5, 2010, Lucy Torres-Gomez (Lucy) filed her Certificate of
Candidacy as SUBSTITUTE of Richard. Despite the vigorous objection of
Juntilla, the COMELEC allowed the substitution and Lucy was elected as
Representative of the 4th District of Leyte in the May 10, 2010 elections.
A case was filed before the HRET questinoning the election of Lucy on
the ground that the substitution is not valid but the HRET sustained the
validity of the said substitution
Issue:
as

Was there a valid substitution? Was Lucy Torres Gomez validly elected
representative
of
the
4th
District
of
Leyte?

Held:
A valid Certificate of Candidacy is a condition sine qua non for a
valid candidate substitution.Since Richards COC was not valid for material
representation as to his residence, then there was no valid substitution. In
short, since Richard is not considered a candidate or there was no
candidate to speak of, there would be no candidate to be substituted.

Unlike disqualification under Section 68 where he can be substituted

because the candidate therein has all the qualifications but disqualified
because of prohibited acts like election offences or because he is a
permanent resident of a foreign country, a candidate disqualified under
Section 78 could not be validly substituted.

ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS, vs

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and DAN ERASMO, SR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 191970
April 24, 2012
FACTS:
Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on October 26, 1973. He migrated
to Australia in 1981 when he was eight years old and there acquired
Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he decided to
return to the Philippines and lived with his brother in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay. Four days upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, hence, he was issued a Certificate of
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. On
September 1, 2009 he renounced his Australian citizenship, executing a
sworn renunciation of the same in compliance with Republic Act (R.A.) 9225.
From the time of his return, Jalosjos acquired a residential property in the
same village where he lived and maintained a fish pond.
He applied for registration as a voter in the Municipality of Ipil but
respondent Erasmo, the Barangay Captain, opposed the said act. Election
Registration Board approved it and included Jalosjos name in the COMELEC
voters list. Erasmo filed before the MTC a petition for the exclusion of
Jalosjos name from the official voters list. The MTC denied Erasmos petition.
He appealed to RTC but RTC upheld the MTC decision. On November 28, 2009
Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Governor of Zamboanga
Sibugay Province for the May 10, 2010 elections. Erasmo filed a petition to
deny due course or to cancel Jalosjos COC on the ground that Jalosjos made
material misrepresentation in the same since he failed to comply with (1) the
requirements of R.A. 9225 and (2) the one-year residency requirement of the
Local Government Code. COMELEC ruled against Jalosjos, because he failed
to comply with the 1-year residency ruequirement. Subsequently, Jalosjos
won the elections

ISSUE: Whether or not Jalosjos failed to comply with the 1-year residency
requirement
HELD:
Jalosjos complied with the 1-year requirement. It is true that his domicial
was Quezon City, his domicile of origin, the place of his birth. However, his
domicile was changed from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there
at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country
for 26 years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by
choice.
When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in
Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change
his domicile for good. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being
issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of
Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia,
clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there.He has since lived nowhere
else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
As to the issue that he cannot claim Ipil as his domicile as he was living in his
brothers house, the court said that a candidate need to have a house in a
community to establish residence. It is sufficient that he rents a house or in
the house of a friend or relative. Only 2 important things must be proved:
actual physical presence and an intention of making it his domicile. Jaloslos
was able to prove the two requirements. Hence, he is qualified.

Regio v. COMELEC
G.R.

No.

204828

December

3,

2013

JAIME C. REGIO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

RONNIE
C.
CO,Respondents.
VELASCO,
FACTS:

JR.,J.:

Petitioner Regio and private respondent Co, among other candidates, ran in
the October 25, 2010 barangay elections in District III of the City of Manila
for the position of punong barangay. Immediately following the counting and
canvassing of the votes, from 7 clustered precincts in the adverted
barangay, Regio, who garnered highest votes was proclaimed winner for the
contested
post.

On November 4, 2010, Co filed an election protest before the MeTC. He

claimed, among other things, that the Board of Election Tellers (BET) did not
follow COMELEC Resolution No. 9030, as it ignored the rules on appreciation
of ballots, resulting in misreading, miscounting, and misappreciation of
ballots.
Of the seven clustered precincts (CPs) initially protested, Co would later
exclude CP Nos. 1304A and 1305A from the protest. During the preliminary
conference, the trial court allowed the revision of ballots. During his turn to
present evidence, Co limited his offer to the revision committee report,
showing that he garnered the highest number of votes. Regio, on the other
hand, denied that the elections were tainted with irregularities. He claimed
that the results of the revision are products of post-elections operations, as
the ballots were tampered with, switched, and altered drastically to change
the
results
of
the
elections.
The trial court dismissed Cos protest and declared Regio as the duly-elected
punong
barangay.
According to the trial court, before it can accord credence to the results of
the revision, it should first be ascertained that the ballots found in the box
during the revision are the same ballots deposited by the voters. In fine, the
court "should first be convinced that the ballots counted during the revision
have not been tampered with before it can declare the ballots a) as superior
evidence of how the electorate voted, and b) as sufficient evidence to set
aside the election returns. For the ballots to be considered the best evidence
of how the voters voted, their integrity should be satisfactorily
established."Invoking Rosal v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 168253 & 172741, March
16, 2007the trial court ruled that Co failed to sufficiently show that the
integrity of the contested ballots had been preserved. It then cited the
presumption that election returns are genuine, and that the data and
information supplied by the board of election inspectors are true and correct.
The trial court said that the misreading, miscounting, and misappreciation of
ballots should be proven by other independent evidence. Without any
evidence, the allegation of misreading, miscounting, and misappreciation of
ballots remains a mere allegation without any probative value.
Aggrieved,

Co

filed

an

appeal

before

the

COMELEC,

The COMELEC First Divisiondismissed the appeal, noting, as the MeTC did,
that Co failed to show that the integrity of the ballots in question was in fact
preserved.
Co then filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The COMELEC En Banc

reconsidered the Resolution of the First Division, and accordingly declared Co

as
the
duly
elected
punong
barangay.
Thus, the present recourse, on the argument that the COMELEC En Banc
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it arbitrarily set aside the Decision of the MeTC and the
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division. Petitioner further argues that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it demanded from protestee
direct proof of actual tampering of ballots to justify consideration of the use
of the election returns in determining the winning candidate in the elections.
In fine, petitioner questions the ruling of the COMELEC giving precedence to
the results of the revision over the official canvassing results.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Co had
successfully discharged the burden of proving the integrity of the ballots
subjected
to
revision.
HELD:

The

POLITICAL

decision
LAW

of

the

COMELEC
moot

Division
and

is

reinstated.
academic

At the outset, it must be noted that the protest case is dismissible for being
moot and academic. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in
passing upon the merits. Generally, courts will not determine a moot
question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. Baldo v.
COMELEC,
G.R.
No.
176135,
June
16,
2009
In Malaluan v. COMELEC, 324 Phil. 676, (1996),this Court settled the matter
on when an election protest case becomes moot and academic: When the
appeal from a decision in an election case has already become moot, the
case being an election protest involving the office of mayor the term of which
had expired, the appeal is dismissible on that ground, unless the rendering of
a
decision
on
the
merits
would
be
of
practical
value.
In the case at bar, the position involved is that of a punong barangay. The
governing law, therefore, is Republic Act No. (RA) 9164, as amended by RA
9340. Sec. 4 of the law states that xxx the term of office of the barangay and
sangguniang kabataan officials elected in the October 2007 election and
subsequent elections shall commence at noon of November 30 next
following
their
election.
In fine, with the election of a new punong barangay during the October 28,
2013 elections, the issue of who the rightful winner of the 2010 barangay
elections
has
already
been
rendered
moot
and
academic.

COMELEC En Banc, committed grave abuse of discretion by the specifically

ignoring the rules on evidence, merits consideration. Still in line with the
Courts decision in Malaluanto the effect that the Court can decide on the
merits a moot protest if there is practical value in so doing, We find that the
nullification of the COMELEC En Bancs Resolution is in order, due to its gross
contravention of established rules on evidence in election protest cases.
POLITICAL

LAW

election

protest

The doctrine in Rosal v. COMELEC and considering the results of the revision
vis-vis the results reflected in the official canvassing In Rosal, this Court
summarized the standards to be observed in an election contest predicated
on the theory that the election returns do not accurately reflect the will of
the voters due to alleged irregularities in the appreciation and counting of
ballots.
The Rosal ruling does not involve issues merely related to the appreciation or
calibration of evidence; its critical ruling is on the propriety of relying on the
revision of ballot results instead of the election returns in the proclamation of
a
winning
candidate.
The Rosal doctrine ensures that in election protest cases, the supreme
mandate of the people is ultimately determined. In laying down the rules in
appreciating the conflicting results of the canvassing and the results of a
revision later made, the Court has no other intention but to determine the
will of the electorate. The Rosal doctrine is also supplemented by A.M. No.
07-4-15-SC
establishing
the
following
disputable
presumptions.
Private respondent Co has not proved that the integrity of the ballots has
been preserved applying Rosal, viewed in conjunction with A.M. No. 07-4-15SC, this Court rules that the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of
discretion in ruling that private respondent had successfully discharged the
burden of proving that the ballots counted during the revision proceedings
are the same ballots cast and counted during the day of the elections.
What the protestant should endeavor to prove, however, in presenting
evidence of preservation, is not that the ballots themselves are genuine or
official, but that they are the very same ones cast by the electorate. The
Report, therefore, cannot be considered as evidence of the preservation, as
required
by
Rosal.
The fact of preservation is not, as respondent Co claims, "incontrovertible."
In fact, there is total absence of evidence to that effect. The incontrovertible
fact is that private respondent, during the proceedings before the trial court,
did not present any independent evidence to prove his claim. Without any

independent evidence, the trial court, the COMELEC, as well as this Court, is
constrained to affirm as a fact the disputable presumption that the ballots
were properly counted during the counting and canvassing of votes.
In sum, We find that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that
private respondent had discharged the burden of proving the integrity of the
ballots.
Petitioner need not prove actual tampering of the ballots Corollarily, the
COMELEC En Banc had ruled that petitioner, as protestee, failed to adduce
evidence that the ballots found inside the ballot boxes were compromised
and tampered. This strikes us as baseless and a clear departure from the
teachings
of
Rosal.
The duty of the protestee in an election contest to provide evidence of actual
tampering or any likelihood arises only when the protestant has first
successfully discharge the burden or providing that the ballots have been
secured to prevent tampering or susceptibility of charge, abstraction or
substitution. Such need to present proof of tampering did not arise since
protestant himself failed to provide evidence of the integrity of the ballots.

Case Digest: Abang-Lingkod v. COMELEC

G.R.

No.

ABANG LINGKOD
COMMISSION
REYES,

206952

OCTOBER

PARTY-LIST
ON

(ABANG LINGKOD),
ELECTIONS,

22,

2013

Petitioner, v.
Respondents.
J.:

FACTS:
ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of
peasant farmers and fisherfolks, and was registered under the party-list
system on December 22, 2009. It failed to obtain the number of votes
needed in the May 2010 elections for a seat in the House of Representatives.
On August 16, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD, in compliance with the COMELEC
August 9, 2012 resolution, filed with the COMELEC pertinent documents to
prove its continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941.

In a Resolution dated November 7, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc cancelled

ABANG LINGKOD registration as a party-list group. It pointed out that ABANG
LINGKOD failed to establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the
marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely offered photographs of
some alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections.
ABANG LINGKOD field a petitioner for certiorari alleging that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in cancelling its registration under the party-list
system. The said petition was consolidated with the separate petitions filed
by 51 other party-list groups whose registration were cancelled or who were
denied registration under the party-list system. The said party-list groups,
including ABANG LINGKOD, were able to obtain status quo ante orders from
the
court.
The Court remanded to the COMELEC the cases of previously registered
party-list groups, including that of ABANG LINGKOD, to determine whether
they are qualified under the party-list system pursuant to the new
parameters laid down by the Court and, in the affirmative, be allowed to
participate
in
the
May
2013
party-list
elections.
On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued the herein assailed Resolution, which,
inter alia, affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration under
the party-list system. The COMELEC issued the Resolution dated May 10,
2013 sans any summary evidentiary hearing, citing the proximity of the May
13,
2013
elections
as
the
reason
therefor.
On May 12, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD sought a reconsideration of the
COMELEC's Resolution dated May 10, 2013. However, on May 15, 2013,
ABANG LINGKOD withdrew the motion for reconsideration it filed with the
COMELEC and, instead, instituted the instant petition with this Court, alleging
that there may not be enough time for the COMELEC to pass upon the merits
of its motion for reconsideration considering that the election returns were
already
being
canvassed
and
consolidated
by
the
COMELEC.
ISSUE: hether or not ABANG LINGKOD was denied due process?
HELD:

BANG

POLITICAL

LINGKOD
LAW:

was

not

denied

administrative

of

due

due

process.
process

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or as

applied to administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in
all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the

controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or

hearing.
In the instant case, while the petitioner laments that it was denied due
process, the Court finds that the COMELEC had afforded ABANG LINGKOD
sufficient opportunity to present evidence establishing its qualification as a
party-list group. It was notified through Resolution No. 9513 that its
registration was to be reviewed by the COMELEC. That ABANG LINGKOD was
able to file its Manifestation of Intent and other pertinent documents to prove
its continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941, which
the COMELEC set for summary hearing on three separate dates, belies its
claim
that
it
was
denied
due
process.
There was no necessity for the COMELEC to conduct further summary
evidentiary hearing to assess the qualification of ABANG LINGKOD pursuant
to Atong Paglaum. ABANG LINGKOD's Manifestation of Intent and all the
evidence adduced by it to establish its qualification as a party-list group are
already in the possession of the COMELEC. Thus, conducting further
summary evidentiary hearing for the sole purpose of determining ABANG
LINGKOD's qualification under the party-list system pursuant to Atong
Paglaumwould
just
be
a
superfluity.
Contrary to ABANG LINGKOD's claim, the Court, in Atong Paglaum, did not
categorically require the COMELEC to conduct a summary evidentiary
hearing for the purpose of determining the qualifications of the petitioners
therein pursuant to the new parameters for screening party-list groups.
POLITICAL

LAW:

cancellation

of

party-list

registration

Court finds that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the
registration of ABANG LINGKOD under the party-list system. The COMELEC
affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration on the ground
that it declared untruthful statement in its bid for accreditation as a party-list
group in the May 2013 elections, pointing out that it deliberately submitted
digitally altered photographs of activities to make it appear that it had a
track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented.
Essentially, ABANG LINGKOD's registration was cancelled on the ground that
it failed to adduce evidence showing its track record in representing the
marginalized
and
underrepresented.
R.A. No. 7941 did not require groups intending to register under the party-list
system to submit proof of their track record as a group. The track record
requirement was only imposed in Ang Bagong Bayani where the Court held
that national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations seeking
registration under the party-list system must prove through their, inter alia,
track record that they truly represent the marginalized and

underrepresented.
In Atong Paglaum, the Court has modified to a great extent the
jurisprudential doctrines on who may register under the party-list system and
the representation of the marginalized and underrepresented. For purposes
of registration under the party-list system, national or regional parties or
organizations need not represent any marginalized and underrepresented
sector; that representation of the marginalized and underrepresented is only
required of sectoral organizations that represent the sectors stated under
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 that are, by their nature, economically
marginalized
and
underrepresented.
Contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as
ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their
track record, i.e. proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the
cause of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the ideals represented by the sectoral
organizations are geared towards the cause of the sector/s, which they
represent.
Dissenting, Mr. Justice Leonen, however, maintains that parties or
organizations intending to register under the party-list system are still
required to present a track record notwithstanding the Court's
pronouncement in Atong Paglaum; that the track record that would have to
be presented would only differ as to the nature of their group/organization.
He opines that sectoral organizations must prove their links with the
marginalized and underrepresented while national or regional parties or
organizations must show that they have been existing as a bona fide
organization.

Case Digest: Araro Party-List vs. COMELEC

G.R.

No.

192803:

December

10,

2013

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC., ALSO

KNOWN AS ARARO PARTY-LIST, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
LEONEN,
FACTS:

J.:

The COMELEC En Banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers in the May
10, 2010 elections initially proclaimed (28) party-list organizations as winners

involving a total of (35) seats guaranteed and additional seats. Petitioner,

Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc., (ARARO) was a duly
accredited party-list under Republic Act No. 7941 ranked fiftieth (50th).
Petitioner then filed an election protest before the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) questioning the Resolution of the COMELEC that
proclaimed
the
28
party-list
groups.
Petitioner asks that this Court to modify the COMELEC's interpretation of the
formula stated in BANAT v. COMELEC by making the divisor for the
computation of the percentage votes, from total number of votes cast minus
the votes for the disqualified party-list candidates, to the total number of
votes cast regardless whether party-list groups are disqualified; and enjoin
the public COMELEC from proclaiming the remaining winning party-list
candidates until it modifies the interpretation of the formula used in BANAT v.
COMELEC
to
the
formula
proposed
by
the
petitioner.
The Court did not issue any TRO, the National Board of Canvassers
proclaimed
the
winning
party-list
groups.
The petitioner suggests that the formula used by the COMELEC is flawed
because votes that were spoiled or that were not made for any party-lists
were
not
counted.
The National Board of Canvassers Resolution No. 10-009 applies the formula
used in BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271 and G.R. No. 179295, April 21,
2009to arrive at the winning party-list groups and their guaranteed seats,
where:
Number of votes of party-list over Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered
by party-list equals the Total number of votes for party-list candidates
The Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list should be
greater than or equal to 2% or 0.02 to entitle a party-list candidate to one (1)
seat in the first round. There will be a second round if the total number of
guaranteed seats awarded in the first round is less than the total number of
party-list
seats
available.
Thus:
Total number of party-list seats available - Number of seats allocated in first
round x Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list = Additional
seats
awarded
If the total seats available for party-lists are not yet awarded after the second
round (this is computed by getting the sum of the seats awarded in the first
round and the additional seats awarded in the second round), the next in the
party-list ranking will be given one (1) seat each until all seats are fully

distributed. A three-seat cap per party-list, however, is imposed on winning

groups. Fractional seats are not rounded off and are disregarded.
The petitioner argues that the Commission on Elections interpretation of the
formula used in BANAT v. COMELEC is flawed because it is not in accordance
with the law.The petitioner distinguishes the phrases,valid votes cast for
party-list candidates on the one hand as against votes cast for the party-list
system
on
the
other.
The petitioner argues that the correct interpretation of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-list Law does not distinguish between
valid
and
invalid
votes.
The COMELEC argues that this will contradict CIBAC v. COMELEC, 549 Phil.
767 (2007) and BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271 and G.R. No. 179295,
April 21, 2009. It asserts that neither can the phrase be construed to include
the number of voters who did not even vote for any qualified party-list
candidate, as these voters cannot be considered to have cast any vote "for
the
party-list
system."
ISSUES:
Whether

the

Whether

case

is

already

petitioners

moot

have

and

legal

academic
standing

Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in its

interpretation of the formula used in BANAT v. COMELEC to
determine the party-list groups that would be proclaimed in the
2010
elections.
HELD:
POLITICAL

The

petition
LAW

is
moot

moot
and

and
academic

academic
case

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable

controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such
case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness. Mendoza v. Villas, G.R. No.
187256,
February
23,
2011
Several supervening events have already rendered this case moot and
academic. First, the Commission on Elections En Banc already proclaimed
other winning party-list groups.Second, the term of office of the winning
party-list groups in the May 2010 national elections ended on June 30, 2013.
Finally, the conduct of the May 13, 2013 elections resulted in a new set of

party-list

groups.

We held that the expiration of the challenged term of office renders the
corresponding
Petition
moot
and
academic.
However, the following exceptions to the rule of declining jurisdiction over
moot and academic cases are allowed: (1) there was a grave violation of the
Constitution; (2) the case involved a situation of exceptional character and
was of paramount public interest; (3) the issues raised required the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the
public; and (4) the case was capable of repetition yet evading review. Funa v.
Acting Secretary of Justice Agra,G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013
On the importance of the assailed formula, this Court will discuss the issues
raised by the petitioner as these are capable of repetition yet evading review
and
for
the
guidance
of
the
bench,
bar,
and
public.
POLITICAL

LAW

real

party

in

interest

"A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgement in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." The
party's
interest
must
be
direct,
substantial,
and
material.
However despite any new computation, ARAROs proposed divisor of total
votes cast for the party-list system whether valid or invalid still fails to secure
one seat for ARARO. Petitioner does not suffer a direct, substantial or
material injury from the application of the formula interpreted and used in
BANAT in proclaiming the winning party-lists in the assailed National Board of
Canvassers Resolution. The computation proposed by petitioner ARARO even
lowers its chances to meet the 2% threshold required by law for a
guaranteed seat. Its arguments will neither benefit nor injure the party. Thus,
it has no legal standing to raise the argument in this Court.
POLITICAL LAW formula used for determination of winning party list
candidates
In applying and interpreting the provisions of Section 6 of Republic Act No.
6646, we said inCayat v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163776. April 24,
2007that votes cast in favor of a candidate "disqualified with finality" should
be considered stray and not be counted. To be consistent, the party-list
group in the ballot that has been disqualified with finality and whose final
disqualification was made known to the electorate by the Commission on
Elections should also not be included in the divisor. This is to accord weight
to the disqualification as well as accord respect to the inherent right of
suffrage
of
the
voters.

Thus, the formula to determine the proportion garnered by the party-list

group
would
now
henceforth
be:
Number of votes of party-list over the Total number of valid votes for partylist candidates equals the Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by
party-list
The total votes cast for the party-list system include those votes made for
party-list groups indicated in the ballot regardless of the pendency of their
motions for reconsideration or petitions before any tribunal in relation to
their cancellation or disqualification cases. However, votes made for those
party-list groups whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections
should be excluded if the electorate is notified of the finality of their
disqualification by the Commission on Elections. The divisor also shall not
include
invalid
votes.
Hence, modifying the formula used in BANAT v. COMELEC. The
refined formula shall apply prospectively to succeeding party-list
elections from the date of the finality of the case.

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC VS. COMELEC, G.R. No.

203766,
and companion cases, February 26,
2013
The two issues raised before the Supreme Court are:
first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners
from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by
denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list
system, or by
cancellation of their existing registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations using the criteria laid down by
the Supreme Court in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association
for
National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on
Elections (BANAT) ; and
second, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system
laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections
(BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May
2013 party-list elections.
The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following
prevailing decisions of the Supreme Court in disqualifying petitioners from

participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since

the Supreme Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the
qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list
system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the
COMELEC in
disqualifying petitioners, all the present petitions
are
remanded for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under
the partylist system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of
representation. Simply put, the party-list system is intended to democratize
political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district
elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. The 1987
Constitution provides:
Section 5, Article VI
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of
the total number of representatives including those under the party
list. For
three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of
the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.
In short, the party-list system is composed of three different
groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or
organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and
regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be
organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
The ruling of the Supreme Court in ANG BAGONG BAYANI and BANAT
that major and national parties are not allowed to join the party-list is
abandoned.

In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and

subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following
parameters:
Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national
parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3)
sectoral parties or organizations.
National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do
not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented
sector.
Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register
under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district
elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in partylist elections only through
its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system.
The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to
a political party through a coalition.
Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and
underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and
underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals,
the elderly, women, and the youth.
A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack welldefined political constituencies must belong to the sector they represent.
The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the
marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who lack
well-defined political constituencies, [A] either must belong to their
respective sectors, or [B] must have a track record of advocacy for
their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they
have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

******************************************************************************
******************************
ROBERTO L. DIZON vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MARINO P.
MORALES
CARPIO, J.:
Facts:
Roberto L. Dizon, a resident of Mabalacat, Pampanga filed a case with the
COMELEC to disqualify Marino P. Morales, the incumbent mayor of Mabalacat
because under Section 43 of the Local Government Code, no local elective
official is allowed to serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms for the
same position. Dizon alleged that Morales was municipal mayor in 1995,
1998, 2001 and 2004. Thus, Morales should not have been allowed to have
filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March 2007 for the same position and
same municipality.
Morales, on the other hand, asserts that he is still eligible and qualified to run
as mayor of Mabalacat because he was not elected for the said position in
the 1998 elections. He avers that the COMELEC en banc affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring Anthony D. Dee as the duly
elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998 elections. Morales also alleges that
his term should be reckoned from 2001 or when he was proclaimed as Mayor
of Mabalacat. Respondent further asserts that his election in 2004 is only for
his second term. Hence, the three term rule provided under the Local
Government Code is not applicable to him.
According to COMELECs second division, Respondent was elected mayor of
Mabalacat in 1995,1998, and 2001. When he ran in 2004, the Supreme Court
ruled in May 2007 (3 years later) that respondent has violated the three-term
limit and thus was not considered a candidate in the 2004 elections. The
vice-mayor assumed office as mayor from May 2007-June 2007. Hence, his
failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a gap and allows him to run again
for the same position in the 2007 elections.
Issue: WON Morales, in running for mayor in the 2007 elections, has violated
the three-term limit rule
Held: No. The petition has no merit.
Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales fifth term in office.
However, according to the SC, it unseated Morales in its May 2007 decision
by canceling his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30 December 2003. This

cancellation disqualified Morales from being a candidate in the May 2004

elections.
We concede that Morales occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the
following periods: 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998;
1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001;
1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004;
and 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007.
Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local
Government Code state that the term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, shall be three years, and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the
disqualification: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2) that he has
fully served three consecutive terms.
However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected
mayor for the 2004-2007 term and did not hold the position of mayor of
Mabalacat for the full term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served the
full term of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate his post before the
expiration of the term. Thus, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007
served as a gap. As a result, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is
effectively Morales first term for purposes of the three-term limit rule.
The respondents harp on the delay in resolving the election protest between
petitioner and his then opponent Alvez which took roughly about three year.
The SC notes that such delay cannot be imputed to the petitioner. There is
no specific allegation or proof that the delay was due to any political
maneuvering.

Aldovino vs Comelec
FACTS:
Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three
consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September
2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an order of

90-day preventive suspension against him in relation to a criminal case. The

said suspension order was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo
resumed the performance of the functions of his office.
Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His
disqualification was sought by herein petitioners on the ground that he had
been elected and had served for three consecutive terms, in violation of the
three-term Constitutional limit.
ISSUE:
WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of
COMELEC?
RULING:
NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their
term for purposes of the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and the
Local Government Code (RA 7160).
The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in
the 2007 elections was in contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X,
sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by
the preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC granted the petition of
Simon B. Aldovino, Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilos
disqualification.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective
interruption of service within a term and should therefore not be a reason to
avoid the three-term limitation, held the Court. It noted that preventive
suspension can pose as a threat more potent than the voluntary
renunciation that the Constitution itself disallows to evade the three-term
limit as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an easily fabricated
administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive
suspension has been imposed.

Maruhom

vs

COMELEC

Maruhom challenges in her Petition the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in

declaring her registration in Marantao void. She asserts that Section 2,
Article IX(c) of the Constitution prohibits the COMELEC from assuming
jurisdiction or deciding issues involving the right to vote. Section 33 of
Republic Act No. 8189, or the Voters Registration Act of 1996 (VRA), confers
upon the MTCs and MeTCs original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases of
inclusion and exclusion of voters in their respective cities or municipalities.
ISSUE: Is the challenge on Maruhoms registration, an issue on the right to
vote
and
thus,
beyond
COMELEC
jurisdiction?

HELD: The present case is not about her being denied her right to register as
a voter, but is all about her making false material representations in her
COC, which would warrant the cancellation of the same. The resolutions of
the COMELEC en banc merely defeated Maruhoms intent to run for elective
office, but it did not deprive her of her right to vote. Although Maruhoms
registration in Marantao is void, her registration in Marawi still subsists. She
may be barred from voting or running for mayor in the former, but she may
still exercise her right to vote, or even run for an elective post, in the latter.
It is settled that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over a petition filed under
Section 78 of the OEC.[21] In the exercise of such jurisdiction, it is within the
competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to
material facts was made in the COC.

[RICARDO P. PRESBITERO, JR., JANET PALACIOS, CIRILO G.ABRASIA, ARMANDO

G. ALVAREZ, NENITO A. ARMAS, RENE L.CORRAL, JOEMARIE A. DE JUAN,
ENRILICE C. GENOBIS, WILLIAMA. PRESBITERO and REYNO N. SOBERANO, vs.
COMMISSION ONELECTIONS, ROMMEL YOGORE, GLORY GOMEZ, DAN
YANSON, JOENITO DURAN, SR.,LUCIUS BODIOS and REY SUMUGAT. G.R. No.
178884. June 30,2008. Nachura
ELECTION LAW
A contention on failure of election and exercise of grave abuse of discretion
by
COMELEC
FACTS
The MCTC Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental ordered
theMunicipal Election Officer (EO) of Valladolid to include the names of
946individuals in the list of qualified voters of the said municipality for the
May 2007elections.Prompted by the advice of COMELEC Manila that
decisions of trial courts of limited jurisdiction in inclusion/exclusion cases
attain finality only after the lapseof five days from receipt of notice sans any
appeal there from, the actingprovincial election supervisor (PES), directed
the Election Officer on May 13, 2007not to comply with the MCTC order.
Thus, the said 946 were disallowed by theboard of election inspectors to
vote. These 946 moved for the issuance of a
Section 1-D
Page 4
Political Law
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to prevent the Municipal Board of
Canvassersfrom canvassing the election returns & from proclaiming the

winning candidatesfor the local positions in the municipality. Such was

granted.However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers continued canvassing
andproclaimed the winning candidates. Presbitero and others thus filed
before theCOMELEC a petition for declaration of failure of election and the
holding of aspecial election because 946 voters were disenfranchised, the
Election Officer of the municipality (also the Ex-officio Chair of the Municipal
Board of Canvassers)was abruptly replaced, the number of voters was
unusually low, no less
than2,000 supporters of petitioners failed to vote as their names were
missing fromthe list of voters. To the contrary, petitioners admitted that
elections were held,that 70% of the registered voters were able to cast their
votes, and that therespondents emerged as winners. The Municipal Board of
Canvassers defied the TRO, and the acting provincialelection supervisor and
acting election officer threatened & coerced the vice-chair and membersecretary of the Municipal Board of Canvassers to continuewith the
canvassing and the proclamation.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was a failure of election and contending that the
COMELECgravely abused its discretion in the issuance of the said resolution?
RULING
The court ruled in favor of the COMELEC and that there was no failure of
elections. A failure of election may be declared only in the three instances
statedin Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code:1. the election has not been
held2. the election has been suspended before the hour fixed by law3. and
the preparation and the transmission of the election returnshave given rise
to the consequent failure to elect, meaningnobody emerged as the
winner.Furthermore, the reason for such failure of election should be
force majeure
,violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. Finally, before
theCOMELEC can grant a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of
election, theconcurrence of 2 conditions must be established, namely:1. no
voting has taken place in the precincts concerned on thedate fixed by law or,
even if there was voting, the electionnevertheless resulted in a failure to
elect
Section 1-D
Page 4
Political Law
2. the votes cast would affect the result of the election.In the instant case, it
is admitted by the petitioners that elections were held inthe subject locality.
Also, the private respondents and four of the petitioners wonin the elections
and were proclaimed as the duly elected municipal officials. There is nothing
in the records from which the Court can make even a slimdeduction that
there has been a failure to elect. Absent any proof that the votingdid not take

place, the alleged disenfranchisement of the 946 individuals and2,000 more

supporters of the petitioners cannot even be considered as a basisfor the
declaration of a failure of election.Had petitioners been aggrieved by the
allegedly illegal composition andproceedings of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers, then they should have filedthe appropriate pre-proclamation
case contesting the aforesaid composition orproceedings of the board, rather
than erroneously raising the same as groundsfor the declaration of failure of
election. On the Temporary Restraining Orderissued by the MCTC and the
subsequent defiance thereof by the Municipal Boardof Canvassers, suffice it
to state that the propriety of suspending the canvass of returns or the
proclamation of candidates is a pre-proclamation issue that issolely within
the cognizance of the COMELEC. In sum, petitioners have notadduced any
ground which will warrant a declaration of failure of election.WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is
DISMISSED

Romulo F. Pecson Vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 182865. December 24, 2008
This petition for certiorari filed by Romulo F. Pecson (Pecson) under Rule 64,
in relation with Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeks to set aside and
annul the Resolution dated May 21, 2008 of the Commission on Elections en
banc (COMELEC) in SPR 60-2007.[1] The assailed Resolution nullified the
grant (via a Special Order) by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 56,
Angeles City, of the execution pending appeal of its Decision in the election
contest between Pecson and the private respondent Lyndon A. Cunanan
(Cunanan), the proclaimed winner in the 2007 mayoralty election in
Magalang, Pampanga.

THE ANTECEDENTS

Pecson and Cunanan were candidates for the mayoralty position in the
Municipality of Magalang, Province of Pampanga in the May 2007 elections.
On May 17, 2007, Cunanan was proclaimed the winning candidate, garnering
a total of 12,592 votes as against Pecsons 12,531, or a margin of 61 votes.
Cunanan took his oath and assumed the position of Mayor of Magalang. Soon
thereafter, Pecson filed an election protest, docketed as EPE No. 07-51, with
the RTC.

On November 23, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision in Pecsons favor. The
RTC ruled that Pecson received a total of 14,897 votes as against Cunanans
13,758 a vote margin of 1,139.

Cunanan received a copy of the Decision on November 26, 2007 and filed a
Notice of Appeal the day after. The RTC issued on November 27, 2008 an
Order noting the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of appeal fee
and directing the transmittal of the records of the case to the Electoral
Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) of the COMELEC. Pecson, on the
other hand, filed on November 28, 2007 an Urgent Motion for Immediate
Execution Pending Appeal, claiming that Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Procedure in Election Contests before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal
and Barangay Officials[2] (Rules) allows this remedy.

The RTC granted Pecsons motion for execution pending appeal via a Special
Order dated December 3, 2007 (Special Order) but suspended, pursuant to
the Rules, the actual issuance of the writ of execution for twenty (20) days.
The Special Order states the following reasons:
1.
The result of the judicial revision show[s] that the protestant
garnered 14,897 votes as against protestees 13,758 votes or a plurality of
1,139 votes. The victory of the protestant is clearly and manifestly
established by the rulings and tabulation of results made by the Court x x x;

2.
It is settled jurisprudence that execution pending appeal in
election cases should be granted to give as much recognition to the worth of
a trial judges decision as that which is initially ascribed by the law to the
proclamation by the board of canvassers. The Court holds that this wisp of
judicial wisdom of the Supreme Court enunciated in the Gahol case and
subsequent cases citing it is borne by the recognition that the decision of the
trial court in an election case is nothing but the court upholding the mandate
of the voter, which has as its source no other than the exercise of the
constitutional right to vote. While it is true that the protestee can avail of the
remedy of appeal before the COMELEC, the Court is more convinced that
between upholding the mandate of the electorate of Magalang, Pampanga
which is the fruit of the exercise of the constitutional right to vote and a
procedural remedy, the Court is more inclined to uphold and give effect to
and actualize the mandate of the electorate of Magalang. To the mind of the
Court, in granting execution pending appeal the Court is being true to its
bounden duty to uphold the exercise of constitutional rights and gives flesh

to the mandate of the people. The foregoing is, as far as the Court is
concerned, considered far superior circumstance that convinces the Court to
grant protestants motion;

3.
Public interest and the will of the electorate must be respected
and given meaning;

4.
In the case of Navarosa v. Comelec, the Supreme Court held that
In the Gahol case, the Court gave an additional justification for allowing
execution pending appeal of decisions of trial courts, thus: Public policy
underlies it, x x x [S]omething had to be done to strike the death blow at the
pernicious grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest technique often, if not
invariably, resorted to by unscrupulous politicians who would render
nugatory the peoples verdict against them and persist in continuing in an
office they very well know they have no legitimate right to hold. x x x. A
primordial public interest is served by the grant of the protestants motion,
i.e., to obviate a hollow victory for the duly elected candidate. In the words of
Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, The well known delay in the adjudication of
election protests often gave the successful contestant a mere pyrrhic victory,
i.e., a vindication when the term of office is about to expire or has expired.

Expectedly, Cunanan moved to reconsider the Order, arguing that the RTC
gravely abused its discretion: (1) in ruling that there were good reasons to
issue a writ of execution pending appeal; and (2) in entertaining and
subsequently granting the motion for execution pending appeal despite the
issuance of an order transmitting the records of the case.

Thereupon, Cunanan filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Application of

Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for Status Quo Ante Order/Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) with Prayer for Immediate Raffle. He argued in his
petition that: (1) the RTC Decision did not clearly establish Pecsons victory or
his (Cunanans) defeat a requirement of Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules;
among other reasons, the number of votes the RTC tallied and tabulated
exceeded the number of those who actually voted and the votes cast for the
position of Mayor, and (2) the RTC had constructively relinquished its
jurisdiction by the issuance of the Order dated November 27, 2007 directing
the transmittal of the records of the case.

The Second Division of the COMELEC issued on January 4, 2008 a 60-day

TRO directing: (1) the RTC to cease and desist from issuing or causing the
issuance of a writ of execution or implementing the Special Order; and (2)
Cunanan to continue performing the functions of Mayor of Magalang.

In his Answer and/or Opposition, with Prayer for Immediate Lifting of TRO,
Pecson argued that: (1) preliminary injunction cannot exist except as part or
incident of an independent action, being a mere ancillary remedy that exists
only as an incident of the main proceeding; (2) the petition for application of
preliminary injunction, as an original action, should be dismissed outright;
and (3) Cunanan is guilty of forum shopping, as he filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Special Order simultaneously with the petition filed
with the COMELEC.

The COMELECs Second Division denied Cunanans petition in a Resolution

dated March 6, 2008. It ruled that: (1) the resolution of the motion for
execution pending appeal is part of the residual jurisdiction of the RTC to
settle pending incidents; the motion was filed prior to the expiration of the
period to appeal and while the RTC was still in possession of the original
record; and (2) there is good reason to justify the execution of the Decision
pending appeal, as Pecsons victory was clearly and manifestly established.
Ruling on the alleged defect in the RTC count, the Second Division ruled:
[A]fter a careful scrutiny of the Decision, We found that the error lies in the
trial courts computation of the results. In its Decision, the trial court, to the
votes obtained by the party (as per proclamation of the MBOC), deducted the
votes per physical count after revision and deducted further the
invalid/nullified ballots per the trial courts appreciation and thereafter added
the valid claimed ballots per the trial courts appreciation, thus:

Votes obtained per proclamation of the MBOC (-) Votes per physical count (-)
Invalid or nullified ballots (+) Valid claimed ballots = Total Votes Obtained

The formula used by the trial court is erroneous as it used as its reference
the votes obtained by the parties as per the proclamation of the MBOC. It

complicated an otherwise simple and straightforward computation, thus

leading to the error. The correct formula should have been as follows:

Total Number of Uncontested Ballots (+) Valid Contested Ballots (+) Valid
Claimed Ballots = Total Votes Obtained

Using this formula and applying the figures in pages 744 and 745 of the trial
courts Decision, the results will be as follows:

For the Petitioner Cunanan

Total Number of Uncontested Ballots 9,656
Add: Valid Contested Ballots 2,058
Add: Valid Claimed Ballots 36
Total Votes of Petitioner 11,750

For the Private Respondent (Pecson)

Total Number of Uncontested Ballots 9,271
Add: Valid Contested Ballots 2,827
Add: Valid Claimed Ballots 39
Total Votes of Petitioner 12,134
Using the correct formula, private respondent still obtained a plurality of the
votes cast and enjoys a margin of 384 votes over the petitioner. Although not
as wide as the margin found by the trial court, We are nevertheless
convinced that the victory of private respondent has been clearly established
in the trial courts decision for the following reasons:

First, the error lies merely in the computation and does not put in issue the
appreciation and tabulation of votes. The error is purely mathematical which
will not involve the opening of ballot boxes or an examination and
appreciation of ballots. It is a matter of arithmetic which calls for the mere
clerical act of reflecting the true and correct votes of the candidates.

Second, the error did not affect the final outcome of the election protest as
to which candidate obtained the plurality of the votes cast.

We are likewise convinced that the assailed order states good or special
reasons justifying the execution pending appeal, to wit:

(1) The victory of the protestant was clearly and manifestly established;
(2) Execution pending appeal in election cases should be granted to give as
much recognition to the worth of a trial judges decision as that which is
initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation by the board of canvassers;
(3)
Public interest and the will of the electorate must be respected and
given meaning; and
(4)
Public policy underlies it, as something had to be done to strike the
death blow at the pernicious grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest
technique often, if not invariably resorted to by unscrupulous politicians.

Such reasons to Our mind constitute superior circumstances as to warrant

the execution of the trial courts decision pending appeal.
Pecson thus asked for the issuance of a writ of execution via an Ex-Parte
Motion. Despite Cunanans opposition, the RTC granted Pecsons motion and
issued the writ of execution on March 11, 2008. Pecson thereafter assumed
the duties and functions of Mayor of Magalang.

The Assailed Resolution

On Cunanans motion, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution dated May
21, 2008 reversing the ruling of the Second Division insofar as it affirmed the
RTCs findings of good reasons to execute the decision pending appeal. It
affirmed the authority of the RTC to order execution pending appeal; it
however nullified the March 11, 2008 writ of execution on the ground that
the RTC could no longer issue the writ because it had lost jurisdiction over
the case after transmittal of the records and the perfection of the appeals of
both Cunanan and Pecson (to be accurate, the lapse of Pecsons period to
appeal).

On the propriety of executing the RTC Decision pending appeal, the

COMELEC en banc ruled that it was not convinced of the good reasons stated
by the RTC in its Special Order. It ruled that recognition of the worth of a trial
judges decision, on the one hand, and the right to appeal, including the
Commissions authority to review the decision of the trial court, on the other,
requires a balancing act; and not every invocation of public interest will
suffice to justify an execution pending appeal. It added that at a stage when
the decision of the trial court has yet to attain finality, both the protestee
and the protestant are to be considered presumptive winners. It noted too
that the Second Division already cast a doubt on the correctness of the
number of votes obtained by the parties after the trial courts revision; thus,
the resolution of the pending appeal becomes all the more important.
Between two presumptive winners, considering the pending appeal of the
election protest to the Commission and public service being the prime
consideration, the balance should tilt in favor of non-disruption of
government service. The execution of the RTC Decision pending appeal
would necessarily entail the unseating of the protestee, resulting not only in
the disruption of public service, but also in confusion in running the affairs of
the government; a subsequent reversal too of the RTC Decision also results
in the unseating of the protestant. This situation (i.e., the series of turn-over
of the seat of power from one presumptive winner to another) cannot but
cause irreparable damage to the people of Magalang, and overweighs the
reasons asserted by the RTC in its Special Order. In the end, according to the
COMELEC, public interest is best served when he who was really voted for
the position is proclaimed and adjudged as winner with finality.
The Petition and the Prayer for the issuance of a Status Quo Order

In imputing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC en banc, Pecson

argues that: (1) the RTC Decision clearly showed Pecsons victory; (2) the
reasons for the reversal of the RTC Decision practically render impossible a

grant of an execution pending appeal; and (3) the RTC correctly found the
presence of the requisites for execution pending appeal.

Threatened to be unseated, Pecson asked, as interim relief, for the issuance

of a Status Quo Order. He claimed that: (1) the Department of Interior and
Local Government already recognized (based on the issuance of the assailed
Resolution) Cunanans assumption of office even if the assailed Resolution
had not attained finality; and (2) in order to prevent grave and irreparable
injury to Pecson and the perpetuation of a travesty of justice, a Status Quo
Order must immediately issue.

THE COURTS RULING

We find the petition meritorious.

The remedy of executing court decisions pending appeal in election contests

is provided under the Rules as follows:
SEC. 11. Execution pending appeal . On motion of the prevailing party with
notice to the adverse party, the court, while still in possession of the original
records, may, at its discretion, order the execution of the decision in an
election contest before the expiration of the period to appeal, subject to the
following rules:

(a)
There must be a motion by the prevailing party with three-day
notice to the adverse party. Execution pending appeal shall not issue without
prior notice and hearing. There must be good reasons for the execution
pending appeal. The court, in a special order, must state the good or special
reasons justifying the execution pending appeal. Such reasons must:

(1)
constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that will
outweigh the injury or damage should the losing party secure a reversal of
the judgment on appeal; and

(2)
be manifest, in the decision sought to be executed, that the
defeat of the protestee or the victory of the protestant has been clearly
established.

(b)
If the court grants execution pending appeal, an aggrieved party
shall have twenty working days from notice of the special order within which
to secure a restraining order or status quo order from the Supreme Court of
the Commission on Elections. The corresponding writ of execution shall issue
after twenty days, if no restraining order or status quo order is issued. During
such period, the writ of execution pending appeal shall be stayed. [3]

This remedy is not new. Under prevailing jurisprudence,[4] the remedy may
be resorted to pursuant to the suppletory application of the Rules of Court,
specifically its Section 2, Rule 39.[5] What the Rules (A.M. No. 07-4-15-C) has
done is to give the availability of the remedy the element of certainty.
Significantly, the Rules similarly apply the good reason standard (in fact, the
even greater superior circumstances standard) for execution pending appeal
under the Rules of Court, making the remedy an exception rather than the
rule.

At the heart of the present controversy is the question of whether there has
been compliance with the standards required for an execution pending
appeal in an election contest. As heretofore cited, the RTC found all these
requisites present. The Second Division of the COMELEC supported the RTCs
ruling, but the COMELEC en banc held a contrary view and nullified the
execution pending appeal. This en banc ruling is now before us.

Our review of a COMELEC ruling or decision is via a petition for certiorari.

This is a limited review on jurisdictional grounds, specifically of the question
on whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction, or whether the assailed order or
resolution is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Correctly understood, grave abuse of discretion is such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or [an] exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by

reason of passion or personal hostility, or an exercise of judgment so patent

and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined, or to act in a manner not at all in
contemplation of law.[6]

Because this case is essentially about the implementation of an RTC decision

pending appeal, we must first dwell on the writ the RTC issued. The COMELEC
ruled in this regard that the writ of execution the RTC issued on March 11,
2008 was void; the RTC could no longer issue the writ because of the lapse of
the period for appeal, and because the RTC no longer held the records of the
election contest which had then been transmitted to the ECAD-COMELEC.

Cunanan argues in his Comment that this ruling has become final and
executory because Pecson did not question it in the present petition. In
Cunanans view, the finality of this aspect of the COMELEC ruling renders the
issue of the nullification of the Special Order moot and academic, as any
ruling we shall render would serve no practical purpose; it can no longer be
implemented since the means (obviously referring to the writ the RTC issued
on March 11, 2008) of executing the RTC decision (i.e., seating Pecson as
Mayor of Magalang) has, to all intents and purposes, been nullified and
rendered ineffective.

We see no merit in Cunanans argument. The writ of execution issued by the

RTC is a mere administrative enforcement medium of the Special Order the
main order supporting Pecsons motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.
The writ itself cannot and does not assume a life of its own independent from
the Special Order on which it is based. Certainly, its nullification does not
carry with it the nullification of the Special Order. This consequence does not
of course hold true in the reverse situation the nullification of the Special
Order effectively carries with it the nullification of its implementing writ and
removes the basis for the issuance of another implementing writ. In the
present case, the reality is that if and when we ultimately affirm the validity
of the Special Order, nothing will thereafter prevent the RTC from issuing
another writ.

Another legal reality is that the COMELEC is wrong in its ruling that the RTC
could no longer actually issue the writ on March 11, 2008 because it no
longer had jurisdiction to do so after the appeal period lapsed and after the

records were transmitted to the ECAD-COMELEC. That the RTC is still in

possession of the records and that the period to appeal (of both contending
parties) must have not lapsed are important for jurisdictional purposes if the
issue is the authority of the RTC to grant a Special Order allowing execution
pending appeal; they are requisite elements for the exercise by the RTC of its
residual jurisdiction to validly order an execution pending appeal, not for the
issuance of the writ itself. This is clearly evident from the cited provision of
the Rules which does not require the issuance of the implementing writ
within the above limited jurisdictional period. The RTC cannot legally issue
the implementing writ within this limited period for two reasons: (1) the cited
twenty-day waiting period under Section 11(b); and (2) the mandatory
immediate transmittal of the records to the ECAD of the COMELEC under
Section 10 of the Rules.[7]

On the substantive issue of whether a writ of execution pending appeal

should issue, we do not agree with the COMELECs view that there are two
presumptive winners prior to its ruling on the protest case. We likewise
cannot support its balancing act view that essentially posits that given the
pendency of the appeal and the lack of finality of a decision in the election
protest, the unseating of the protestee, and the need for continuity of public
service, the balance should tilt in favor of continuity or non-disruption of
public service; hence, the execution pending appeal should be denied.

As Pecson correctly argued, this reasoning effectively prevents a winner (at

the level of the courts) of an election protest from ever availing of an
execution pending appeal; it gives too much emphasis to the COMELECs
authority to decide the election contest and the losing partys right to appeal.
What is there to execute pending appeal if, as the COMELEC suggested, a
party should await a COMELEC final ruling on the protest case? Effectively,
the two presumptive winners and the balancing act views negate the
execution pending appeal that we have categorically and unequivocally
recognized in our rulings and in the Rules we issued. To be sure, the
COMELEC cannot, on its own, render ineffective a rule of procedure we
established by formulating its own ruling requiring a final determination at its
level before an RTC decision in a protest case can be implemented.

We additionally note that disruption of public service necessarily results from

any order allowing execution pending appeal and is a concern that this Court
was aware of when it expressly provided the remedy under the Rules. Such

disruption is therefore an element that has been weighed and factored in and
cannot be per se a basis to deny execution pending appeal.

What comes out clearly from this examination of the COMELEC ruling is that
it looked at the wrong material considerations when it nullified the RTCs
Special Order. They are the wrong considerations because they are not the
standards outlined under Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules against which the
validity of a Special Order must be tested. Significantly, the use of wrong
considerations in arriving at a decision constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
[8]

The proper consideration that the COMELEC made relates to the correctness
of the RTCs Decision in light of the Rules requirement that the victory of the
protestant and the defeat of the protestee be clearly established for
execution pending appeal to issue. According to the COMELEC, no less than
the Second Division cast a doubt on the correctness of the number of votes
obtained by the parties after the revision of ballots when the Second Division
proposed a mathematical formula to correct the RTC count. At the same
time, the COMELEC noted that the Second Division could not have corrected
the RTC count, as the petition before it was one for certiorari while the
correction of errors in computation properly pertained to the resolution of
Cunanans pending appeal. To the COMELEC, all these showed that the
correctness of the RTC Decision in favor of Pecson was far from clear and
cannot support an execution pending appeal.

We disagree once more with the COMELEC en banc in this conclusion, as it

failed to accurately and completely appreciate the Second Divisions findings.
The RTC Decision, on its face, shows that Pecson garnered more valid votes
than Cunanan after the revision of ballots. The Second Division properly
recognized, however, that the RTC computation suffered from a facial defect
that did not affect the final results; as Cunanan pointed out, the votes for
Pecson and Cunanan, if totally summed up, exceeded the total number of
valid votes for mayor.

Duly alerted, the Second Division looked into the purported error, analyzed it,
and found the error to be merely mathematical; the RTC formula would
necessarily exceed the total number of votes cast for mayor because it
counted some votes twice. In making this finding, the Second Division was

guided by the rule that one of the requisites for an execution pending appeal
is a clear showing in the decision of the protestants victory and the
protestees defeat. Its examination of the RTC Decision was only for this
limited purpose and this was what it did, no more no less. Specifically, it did
not review the RTCs appreciation of the ballots on revision; it did not review
the intrinsic merits of the RTC Decision issues that properly belong to the
appeal that is currently pending. It merely found that the defect Cunanan
noted was actually inconsequential with respect to the results, thus showing
Pecsons clear victory under the RTC Decision. In other words, the Second
Divisions corrected view of the RTC count confirmed, rather than
contradicted or placed in doubt, the conclusion that Pecson won.

Other than the clarity of Pecsons victory under the RTC Decision, the Special
Order cited good and special reasons that justified an execution pending
appeal, specifically: (1) the need to give as much recognition to the worth of
a trial judges decision as that which is initially given by the law to the
proclamation by the board of canvassers; (2) public interest and/or respect
for and giving meaning to the will of the electorate; and (3) public policy
something had to be done to deal a death blow to the pernicious grab-theproclamation-prolong-the-protest technique often, if not invariably, resorted
to by unscrupulous politicians who would render nugatory the peoples
verdict against them.

Unfortunately, the COMELEC en banc simply glossed over the RTCs cited
reasons and did not fully discuss why these reasons were not sufficient to
justify execution pending appeal. A combination, however, of the reasons the
RTC cited, to our mind, justifies execution of the RTC Decision pending
appeal.

A striking feature of the present case is the time element involved. We have
time and again noted the well known delay in the adjudication of election
contests that, more often than not, gives the protestant an empty or hollow
victory in a long drawn-out legal battle.[9] Some petitions before us involving
election contests have been in fact dismissed for being moot, the term for
the contested position having long expired before the final ruling on the
merits came.[10] In the present case, the term for mayor consists of only
three (3) years. One year and six months has lapsed since the May 2007
election; thus, less than two years are left of the elected mayors term. The
election protest, while already decided at the RTC level, is still at the
execution-pending-appeal stage and is still far from the finality of any

decision on the merits, given the available appellate remedies and the
recourses available through special civil actions. To be sure, there is nothing
definite in the horizon on who will finally be declared the lawfully elected
mayor.

Also, we reiterate here our consistent ruling that decisions of the courts in
election protest cases, resulting as they do from a judicial evaluation of the
ballots and after full-blown adversarial proceedings, should at least be given
similar worth and recognition as decisions of the board of canvassers.[11]
This is especially true when attended by other equally weighty
circumstances of the case, such as the shortness of the term of the
contested elective office, of the case.

In light of all these considerations, we conclude that the COMELEC erred in

nullifying the RTCs Special Order in a manner sufficiently gross to affect its
exercise of jurisdiction. Specifically, it committed grave abuse of discretion
when it looked at wrong considerations and when it acted outside of the
contemplation of the law in nullifying the Special Order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly
ANNUL the assailed COMELEC Resolution.
SO ORDERED.