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TOWARD
A PHILOSOPHY
OF SOCIOLOGY
193
sociology is, as has been suggested, well known: it goes back to the German controversy over
Naturwissenschaften vs. Geisteswissenschaften. Obviously, the natural-science approach
is related to the former: the human approach, to the latter. In fact, "human studies" is
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KURT H. WOLFF
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195
selves. It should also be noted that the partial analysis which I shall try to
undertake will be implemented by examples to be discussed in Section 4.
It is not necessary to offer a definition of science; for our purposes, its customary conceptions are adequate. Rather, that aspect of science must be emphasized which is stressed in the human approach. This aspect has, I think, been
unduly neglected, but perhaps it can be, if appreciated, lead to a less one-sided,
hence more fruitful and more economical, sociology than we have at present.
This aspect, which may be called the "human equation,"6 refers to the continuous
challenge to remain aware of the relation between scientific pursuit and spontaneous experience and, consequently, it refers to the inclusion of this awareness in
the definition of the scientist.7 I am convinced that it is not only useful but
necessary for the development of sociology to include this awareness in the definition-of the sociologist. This conviction rests upon a conception of man which
stresses, more than American sociology does, his irrational as well as creative, and
hence inexhaustible,8 qualities. It emphasizes, with Cassirer9 man as a symbol
and myth-making animal, or with Durkheim,'0 man as an ideal-making animal,
both ethically and cognitively. In Western civilization, such a notion of man
has informed the artist, the religious person, and the philosopher more often and
more typically than the scientist. Yet I consider its incorporation into his
approach a challenge to the scientist, at the same time that I regard the incorporation of science and of scientific method into the study of man's creative effortsartistic, religious, philosophical (and scientific), etc.-a challenge to their traditional disciplines, i.e., mainly the humanities.
The following discussion of some examples of concerns which so far have not,
or only scarcely, been studied sociologically or, for that matter, scientifically, will
serve to implement the general outlines of the human conception of sociology.
For, this discussion will suggest how sociology might study three such phenomena
that are important on the basis of the conception of man sketched; that illustrate
the notion of the human equation of science; and that have hitherto been the
almost exclusive domain of the humanities. The three phenomena chosen are
the study of the unique, of the "meaning of history," and of aesthetic experience.
I shall begin with a description of the unique (Section 3), then consider its study,
and finally, more specifically though much more briefly, deal with the sociology
of the "meaning of history" and of aesthetic experience (Section 4).
3. The "Unique." The human conception of sociology here advocated and
developed agrees with the well-known tenet of science according to which science
aims at the establishment of uniformities-whether the avowed purpose of this
6 In parallel to the "cultural equation" pertinent to the study of cultures specifically.
(Cf. 29: 177a.)
7The question of whether it is useful to include this awareness in the definition of the
natural scientist may here be left unanalyzed. An affirmative, though modified, answer
would seem to be adequate in this case.
8 In the sense of the assumption that man can never be definitively defined.
9 Cf. (4)and (5). (Also see my review of the latter, American Sociological Review, 12:
372-373, June, 1947.
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establishment is to understand the structure of the universe, or to make predictions, or both. The human conception of science, however, advocates greater
scientific concern with the unique than is customary, in order to enrich materials
whence to hypothesize and eventually to establish uniformities.
After anticipating this emphasis of the human conception, it is necessary to
explain it; i.e., it is necessary to define or at least circumscribe "unique." In the
first place, "unique" is not a logical or ontological concept. Logically, there
either exists no unique, inasmuch as everything is homogeneous in some respect
to everything else, or there exist nothing but uniques, inasmuch as nothing is
homogeneous-in-all-respects, or identical, with anything but itself. Hence, logically speaking, "unique" is better replaced by "single," and "single" is not the
referent of "unique" as used here. And ontologically, "unique" makes sense
only in reference to something which is, on the basis of some conception of the
nature of being, in fact unique, i.e., outstanding in a particular way in respect of
reality or value. This is a use of the term which points to a frame of reference
outside any discussion in the present paper.
In the second place, while "unique" is neither a logical nor an ontological concept, it is, positively speaking, a psychological (teleological, creative) concept.
More specifically, the unique belongs to the process of understanding. (See
below.) In the third place, the unique is suggested by such terms as "empathy,"
"intuition," "insight," "apprehension,"
"mystical union," "trance,"
"g.rasp,"
"identification," "love" (most obviously "at first sight"), "vision," 'inspiration,"
"flash," "revelation," and the like. All of these terms refer to experiences which
to the experiencer are characterized, cognitively,'1 by a sudden, "passive-creative" incorporation of elements, that he believes to be important, into his "universe of discourse." This is by no means to suggest that any of these terms is
synonymous with "understanding." Understanding, rather, is here conceived
as a process which extends between the two extremes of complete strangeness
toward its object and complete identification with it, whereby the object changes
with the process of its understanding and, in this sense, is the subject matter or
given of understanding.12
In the fourth place, most concrete understanding lies between the extremes
indicated; and this is true, also, of scientific understanding. Scientific understanding, more precisely, may be defined as that understanding in which identification with the unique is counterbalanced by testable communicability. If the
11 If they are, to the experiencer, cognitively relevant at all. At least, these experiences
are not merely cognitive but involve affect and volition as well. This point is not imnportant in the present context, however, inasmuch as, at the moment, we are concerned with
developing the relevance of the unique in regard to the process of understanding.
Although
understanding, too, involves other than cognitive elements, it is nevertheless here (as is
commonly done) regarded as a significantly cognitive process. The participation of affective and conative elements in understanding will not be discussed in the present paper except that the question will once more be touched upon in connection with the discussion of
categories (in the context of the discussion of cultural relativism [Section 51).
12 Whether the unique is the predicate of the object of understanding
or of the understander is an ontological question which is irrelevant here, inasmuch as the unique, as has
been pointed out in the first instance, is a psychological concept.
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TOWARD
A PHILOSOPHY
OF SOCIOLOGY
197
paragraph 106.
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Here, then, as in T6nnies's Gemeinschaftand Gesellschaft,'8in Max Weber's con16 Cf., e. g., (28: esp. pp. 31-47); also (20) and (18: 272-281). It should be noted that the
use, here, of Weber's concepts as metaphors implies neither agreement nor disagreement
with the conception underlying them.
17 (24: 247-248).
18
(27).
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TOWARD
A PHILOSOPHY
OF SOCIOLOGY
199
See, e. g. (25).
21
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KURT H. WOLFF
the general by way of the communicable-to call attention, that is, to the process
of understanding as it overcomes the extremes of complete strangeness toward its
object (which is more customary) and of complete identification with it-I may
be allowed to use my own statements as an example: obviously, on the basis of
what has so far been said, the question arises whether there "is anything in" what
I am saying, whether there "is anything in" the concept of central attitude here
advocated. This question itself is one of the ways of introducing the understanding process-the most literal way, but not the only one. Whether the process of
understanding this (my) intellectual product is inaugurated in the manner indicated or in another manner, it is clear that the previously mentioned combination
of a sense for the unique with scientific training produces maximum understanding of this intellectual product. And it should be noted that both the inspector
of an intellectual product and its (immediate) author enrich their respective "universes of discourse" with this product. They "enrich" it both additively and
creatively: in the former sense, the process involved is a relatively passive one of
learning; in the latter sense, it is a relatively active one of developing.23
Does the concept of central attitude, then, give us the basis of a methodology
for the scientific study of cultures, personalities, and intellectual products? I believe it does because it combines the highest degree of indentification with the
object of understanding which is compatible with testable communicability.
And this combination, it will be remembered, was posited as a necessity for
maximum understanding.
It will probably be granted that the central-attitude method surpasses other
methods of understanding in terms of intimacy ("identification") with its object.
But its testability and even its communicability will be considered with skepticism. And it is true that its testability is precarious and its communicability
probably limited to persons attitudinally predisposed toward it. But this is not
a condemning statement, for more than precariousness can be predicated of its
testability and, hence, of its communicability. Positively, it can be stated that
testability and therefore communicability obtain to the degree (1) that the student of a unique making use of the central-attitude method is aware of, and makes
explicit, the processes by which he arrives at the central attitude-a task for his
mastery of the human equation of science; and (2) that his approach incorporates
into his and his public's "universe of discourse" (or "explains") demonstrably no
fewer, or demonstrably more, aspects of the phenomenon under study than does
any other competing approach.
The second of these criteria of testability is one in all understanding, whether
in its "everyday" or in its scientific forms. The first, reflecting the scientific
tenet of public inspection, is usually replaced by the public inspection of the scientific method but, in keeping with our suggestions regarding the human concep23 Thus, in the example at hand, the author of this intellecutal product developed, from
the concept of central attitude, that of "typical central attitude" (32: 114), etc. For
fuller presentations of "central attitude" and"typical central attitude," see ibid., 111-119,
and for other concepts believed to be useful for the study of (certain) uniques, ibid., 119121.
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TOWARD
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OF SOCIOLOGY
201
It should not be forgotten that they become data or givens in the sense indicated ear-
lier.
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H.
WOLFF
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TOWARD
A PHILOSOPHY
OF SOCIOLOGY
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Thus:
Cognitive predispositions are simply organic potencies of response as oriented toward
knowledge of the world rather than toward some feeling of it or some action upon it.36
More precisely, in regard to the distinction between categories and other elements of thought, and hence in regard to universal identity as over against cultural relativitv in human behavior, Child writes as follows:
While the primal categories are presumably invariable in essence, the concepts correlated
with them continue, when once formulated, to develop and to undergo theoretical formulation and concatenation. And the conceptual correlates of the primal predispositions react upon those predispositions in the sense, at least, of acquiring themselves predispositional correlates which cluster around the original primal predispositions and which, in consequence, affect the apprehension,as well as the understanding, which occurs in the sphere of
the predispositionsconcerned. Indeed,it is in and throughthis process of accretionthat the
primal categoriesexhibit their primordiality. As exampleof the way in whichthe concepts
of the understanding may condition or provide the mode within which the primal categories
operate, consider the fact that space and time may be differently felt in different cultures
while the basic biotic forms of apprehension remain the same in the individuals of all different cultures. But, in so far as concepts function in this way, they do so as functionalized
in supervenient categories. These categories, the a priori formalizing factors which do not
inhere in men as animals, are those persistent and powerful tendencies to take the world as
such-and-such which, under certain circumstances, in certain people or certain groups of
people, have become compulsions. By becoming compulsions they become categories.3"
Although several questions can be raised in regard to this theory (the discussion
of which, however, would far exceed the scope of the present paper), it seems to
me that Child has made it exceedingly difficult to maintain absolute epistemological relativism and, because of his conception of the categories, has at the same
time made it exceedingly difficult to maintain absolute ethical and aesthetic
relativism as well.
If, then, we accept Child's distinction between primal and supervenient categories, we are enabled to resolve the seeming contradiction between the incommunicability of the unique, on the one hand, and the unique as the object of
understanding, on the other. Now we can say that "unique" is a primal category which has been conceptualized, and probably functionalized into a supervenient category, on the basis of certain cultural circumstances and more precisely, even if still vaguely, on the basis of certain developments in philosophy
and the social sciences, some elements of which have been alluded to in this
paper.37 But if we accept these developments, what follows for the relation
between epistemology and sociology or sociology of intellectual behavior?
35Ibid.,
322.
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To answer this question, we do well to act on the postulated principle of becoming aware of the processes by which we have arrived at our position, to the
limited extent, at least, of retracing our major steps up to this point. We began
by distinguishing approach from methodology (Section 1). We then sketched
two conceptions of sociology, the natural-science and the human-studies conceptions, and in clarification and defense of the human conception, w1ecircumscribed a conception of science which is characterized by what was called the
human equation (Section 2). Through this conception our attention was called
to some phenomena-the unique, meaning of history, and aesthetic experiencewhich we maintained were not studied as scientifically as our conception of
scientific study would wvarrant. We gave a general description of the unique
(Section 3) and hence indicated the outlines of the scientific study of the phenomena mentioned by introducing the notion of the central-attitude method.
And we suggested their study as both data and emergents and expanded on their
study as data by requesting that it include their sociological investigation. This
led us to one of the fundamental problems of the sociology of intellectual behavior, that of interpretation (Section 4). But the question of the object itself
of interpretation, whether immanent or socio-cultural, led, further, to the formulation of the contradiction between the incommunicable unique, on the one hand,
and the unique as object of understanding, on the other, and to the resolution of
this contradiction with the help of Child's statements regarding categories.
The formulation of this contradiction, and its resolution, were recognized as an
epistemological concern (Section 5 up to this point). But epistemological concerns, we now continue, are not sociological concerns; or, more generally, they
are the business of the philosopher (partictularlyof the theorist of knowledge or
epistemologist), not of the scientist.
One can admit this and hence maintain38that whenever the behavior scientist
deals with epistemological questions he no longer functions as a scientist but as
an epistemologist. Yet the question may be raised whether we should stop at
this recognition or, rather, consider the foregoing discussion of the philosophy
of sociology as a challelnge to undertake an even more radical reclassification of
our intellectual efforts. This reclassification would be based upon the twofold
proposition, which is derived from preceding discussion, that it requires the
articulation of the relation between epistemology and intellectual efforts and
that, inversely, the articulation of the relation between epistemology and intellectual efforts requires the classification of the latter. It is beyond the scope
of this paper to undertalkethese articulations: here it must suffice to suggest the
place of them and the need for them.39
6. Summary: Implications for Sociological Practice. In this last section
an attempt will be made to point out the implications of the present paper for
the practice of sociological study. This will be done through a twofold applica38As has most explicitly been done by Virgil G. Hinshaw, Jr.: see (12) and (11).
39 It should be noted that lines of thought similar to-those developed in regard to epistemology could (and should) also be articulated in respect of other traditional fields of philosophy such as logic, methaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, etc.
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tion of the general conception presented. First, I shall outline a specific research
example which shows how the human conception of sociology, more particularly,
the central-attitude method, applies to the study of a culture. Secondly, I shall
make some general methodological observations which are primarily designed
to dispel possible misconceptions of points raised in the present essay.
(a) It has been suggested that in the study of a culture the aim of sociological
understanding is terminologically more conveniently designated as "culture
pattern" (or the like) than as "central attitude." And if the goal of the study
is maximum understanding, the culture under examination must be conceived
as a unique, even if its student (or other students) uses the results of the studyof-the-culture-as-a-unique as materials whence to hypothesize and eventually
to establish uniformities. In following the cultural approach-the variant,
relevant to the study of cultures, of the more general human approach-the
student is aware of the cultural equation. This awareness makes him suspicious
of analyzing the culture in terms of contentual divisions such as, e.g., childrearing, marriage, death customs, etc., because he fears that these are naively,
i.e., relatively unawares, taken over from his own (general and special-scientific)
culture. He, therefore, discards this approach in favor of the pattern method
which he finds more in keeping with the study of the culture as a unique.40
The two fundamental tasks of any scientific study of uniques-(1) to grasp the
unique to the highest degree compatible with (2) testability and communicability
-formulate themselves for the study of a culture as the question of how to ascertain, or select, patterns in such a way as testably to present an interpretation
of the culture which is superior to all competing interpretations. That is, the
student must present patterns and their interrelations in a manner Nwhichenables
him and his public to understand and predict the culture under study. The two
criteria of understanding have been formulated as the demonstration of the degree to which the student is aware of the processes underlying his study, on the
one hand, and as the demonstration of the degree to which his study can compete
with other studies, on the other; and the criterion of prediction is the degree to
which the propositions made in his study are confirmed in the future.4"
Similar remarks-as has already been suggested-could obviously be made in
regard to the study of personalities and of intellectual products. It will also be
recognized that they could generally be made concerning the investigation of any
kind of human behavior. To recognize this amounts to admitting that the
present paper suggests the beginnings of a philosophy of the study of man as a
socio-cultural animal-a study to which social sciences other than sociology
have made claims. It has been impossible to do more here than to show the
relevance of this philosophy to sociology by taking examples from sociology and
40 In a definition which is inadequate,
but sufficient for the present purpose, "culture
patterns" may be designated as certain types of uniformities of emotion, attitude, thought,
knowledge, and "overt action"; in short, as certain types of uniformities of behavior.
41 For a considerably fuller presentation of the empirical establishment of culture patterns, see (29). (The application of the conception outlined here and in the paper cited is
the topic of a monograph [in preparation] on the culture of a small, relatively isolated,
largely Spanish-speaking community in northern New Mexico.)
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noting challenges to sociology, rather than taking them from other social sciences
and challenging them: sociology has not been defined nor has it been delimited
in regard to other disciplines. To repeat, therefore,42the next step is to develop
the conception outlined by investigating whether-and if so, how-it lends itself
as an instrument for classifying subdivisions of the study of man. In line with
this conception, such a classification itself is seen as a vehicle toward a greater
understanding of ourselves.
(b) Fundamentally, this paper advocates both the application of scientific
method to topics traditionally outside the domain of sociology, and a greater
awareness in the scientific treatment of traditional topics (as here exemplified,
particularly, by the topic "culture"). Furthermore, the paper suggests several
tools designed to translate this advocacy into research practice. To avoid
misunderstandings, it is appropriate to conclude with a few remarks which, it is
hoped, are clarifying.
In the first place, numerous questions dealt with in methodological literature
here have remained unanswered because they are irrelevant to the arguments
expounded in the present paper. One of these questions is the applicability of
the ideal-type method. Among many others, the following may be mentioned:
What, in theory and in research, is the line between "description" and "explanation"; between "idiographic" and "nomothetic" study; between "structure"
and "content" or "structure" and "function?"43 All that can be said here in
regard to these problems is that although, inasmuch as they are methodological
questions, they are irrelevant to the present discussion, they nevertheless require
investigationy in the framework of the approach here presented and will, it is
hoped, receive clarification from such discussion. The same goes for the various
aspects of the relation between the "unique" and the "general." Yet, in the
42Cf. the end of the preceding section of this paper where (in the discussion of the relation
between philosophy, particularly epistemology, and behavior sciences, particularly sociology) some clues to such a classification are presented.
43There is a similarity-which cannot be analyzed here-between the utilization of
"unique" emphasized here and what Clerk Maxwell called the "Dynamical" method. The
following quotation (which I owe to Dr. J. N. Spuhler, Department of Sociology, The Ohio
State University) may be reproduced as an example of the numerous passages found in
methodological literature that need analysis in terms of the approach here suggested.
(This passage is especially noteworthy for coming from the pen of such an eminent "natural scientist.") In the "statistical method of investigating social questions . . . [persons]
are grouped according to some characteristic, and the number of persons forming the group
is set down under that characteristic. This is the raw material from which the statist endeavours to deduce general theorems in sociology. Other students of human nature proceed on a different plan. They observe individual men, ascertain their history, analyse
their motives, and compare their expectation of what they will do with their actual conduct.
This may be called the dynamical method of study as applied to man. Howeverimperfect
the dynamical study of man may be in practice, it evidently is the only perfect method in prin-
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latter case it must be noted that while the "unique" has been defined in the
present paper as to its status both in the approach and in the methodology of
sociology, it is still necessary to define "general," at least in one of its various
denotations, and more precisely, in the deniotation which supplements that of
"unique." The "general," like the "unique," is a psychological concept.
Logical and ontological questions are as irrelevant to the concept of "general"
as a concept within the approach of sociology as they are in regar-dto "unique."
More precisely, "general" refers to the methodologically unquestioned, whereas
(as stated earlier) the "unique" emerges exactly where methodology becomes
questioned.44 It thus becomes obvious that contemporary sociology (like any
intellectual effort at any given time) is full of (conceptualized) "generals," as
well as of whole "general areas," such as, e.g., "population," "family," "urban,"
And the present paper, far from advocating the abandonment of these
etc.45
"generals," merely urges an examination of the legitimacy with wvhichtheir
methodologies have been established: it urges a questioning of the division of
sociology into these and similar "branches," even as it urges, more articulately,
that of our intellectual efforts in general.46
In the second place, a general placement of the conception of sociology here
advocated ought to be worked out. Suffice it to state that the one single conception to which it comes closest is that of Max Weber.47 It is evident, however,
that it would greatly benefit from a systematic investigation of similarities and
differences between itself and Weber's conception, as well as those of Dilthey,
Simmel, Znaniecki, Parsons, and of various recent cultural anthropologists.
It is hoped that the remarks in the last section place this paper within current
problem complexes. Clearly, the paper entails two tasks. One is theoretically
to solve the problems presented or merely mentioned in it. The other is to
translate these problems into research as far as possible at present, and to further
their translatability into research. It is in the hope that response to this paper
will contribute to the solution of one or both of these tasks that it is submitted
at this juncture.
The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
REFERENCES
In Harry Elmer
(1) Howard Becker. Constructive Typology in the Social Sciences.
Barnes, Howard Becker, and Frances Bennett Becker, eds., Contemporary Social
Theory. New York and London: Appleton-Century, 1940, pp. 17-46.
-.
Processes of Secularisation, An Ideal-Typical Analysis with Special Refer(2)
ence to Personality Change as Affected by Population Movemeint.
Sociological
Review, 24: 138-154, 266-286, April-July, October, 1932.
44 It may thus be said that "structurally,"
the two concepts belong in the same category,
while "contentually," they are opposite and complementary.
45 It is interesting
to note that Durkheim, both in (10) and again, thirteen years later,
in (8: 419, n.i), suspects the economic sphere-to use the terminology here employed-to
be the only one that sociology may have to leave unquestioned whereas all other social
spheres must be redefined (as religiously derived).
4" Cf. the end of the preceding section.
47 Cf. (23), esp. "Weber's Methodology
of Social Science," pp. 8-29.
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(31)
(32)
Philo-
(33) Florian Znaniecki. The Methodof Sociology. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1934.
. The Proximate Future of Sociology: Controversies in Doctrine and Method.
(34)
American Journal of Sociology, 50: 514-521, May, 1945.
(35) -
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