-CENTURY CANNING CORPORATION, vs COURT OF APPEALS and

GLORIA C. PALAD(G.R. No. 152894)

The Facts
cralawOn 15 July 1997, Century Canning Corporation (petitioner) hired Gloria C. Palad (Palad) as fish cleaner at petitioners tuna and sardines
factory. Palad signed on 17 July 1997 an apprenticeship agreement with petitioner. Palad received an apprentice allowance of P138.75 daily.
On 25 July 1997, petitioner submitted its apprenticeship program for approval to the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
(TESDA) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). On 26 September 1997, the TESDA approved petitioners apprenticeship
program. According to petitioner, a performance evaluation was conducted on 15 November 1997, where petitioner gave Palad a rating ofN.I.
or needs improvement since she scored only27.75% based on a 100% performance indicator. Furthermore, according to the performance
evaluation, Palad incurred numerous tardiness and absences. As a consequence, petitioner issued a termination notice dated 22 November
1997 to Palad, informing her of her termination effective at the close of business hours of 28 November 1997. Palad then filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, and non-payment of pro-rated 13th month pay for the year 1997.
ISSUES:
1
2

WHETHER OR NOT THE APPRENTICESHIP AGREEMENT WAS VALID AND BINDING BETWEEN THE PARTIES
WHETHER OR NOT PALAD WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED BY THE PETITIONER

HELD:
1

The Court held that the apprenticeship agreement which Palad signed was not valid and binding because it was
executed more than two months before the TESDA approved petitioners apprenticeship program.
The Court cited Nitto Enterprises v. National Labor Relations Commission, where it was held that an apprenticeship
program should first be approved by the DOLE before an apprentice may be hired, otherwise the person hired will be
considered a regular employee. It is mandated that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and
apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of
Labor and Employment. Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed
apprenticeship program is, therefore, a condition sine qua non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly
entered into. The Labor Code defines an apprentice as a worker who is covered by a written apprenticeship
agreement with an employer.
Since Palad is not considered an apprentice because the apprenticeship agreement was enforced before the
TESDAs approval of petitioners apprenticeship program, Palad is deemed a regular employee performing the job of
a fish cleaner. Clearly, the job of a fish cleaner is necessary in petitioners business as a tuna and sardines factory.
Under Article 280 of the Labor Code, an employment is deemed regular where the employee has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.

Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate the services of an employee for just causes or for authorized
causes. under Article 277(b) of the Labor Code, the employer must send the employee who is about to be terminated, a written
notice stating the causes for termination and must give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. Thus,
to constitute valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must concur: (1) the dismissal must be for a just or authorized
cause; and (2) the employee must be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.
Palad was not accorded due process. Even if petitioner did conduct a performance evaluation on Palad, petitioner failed to
warn Palad of her alleged poor performance. In fact, Palad denies any knowledge of the performance evaluation conducted
and of the result thereof. Petitioner likewise admits that Palad did not receive the notice of termination because Palad allegedly
stopped reporting for work. The records are bereft of evidence to show that petitioner ever gave Palad the opportunity to
explain and defend herself. Clearly, the two requisites for a valid dismissal are lacking in this case.

G.R. No. 114337

September 29, 1995

NITTO ENTERPRISES vs. NLRC and ROBERTO CAPILI

FACTS:
Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum products, hired Roberto Capili sometime
in May 1990 as an apprentice machinist, molder and core maker as evidenced by an apprenticeship agreement 2for a period of six
(6) months from May 28, 1990 to November 28, 1990 with a daily wage rate of P66.75 which was 75% of the applicable minimum wage. On
August 2, 1990, Roberto Capili who was handling a piece of glass which he was working on, accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office
secretary who was treated at a nearby hospital. Further, Capili entered a workshop within the office premises which was not
his work station. There, he operated one of the power press machines without authority and in the process injured his left thumb. The
following day he was asked to resign. Three days after, , private respondent formally filed before the NLRC Arbitration Branch,
National Capital Region a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of other monetary benefits.
The Labor Arbiter rendered his decision finding the termination of private respondent as valid and dismissing the
money claim for lack of merit. On appeal, NLRC issued an order reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC declared that Capili
was a regular employee of Nitto Enterprises and not an apprentice. Consequently, Labor Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution ordering for the
reinstatement of Capili and to collect his back wages. Petitioner, Nitto Enterprises filed a case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Does the NLRC correctly rule that Capili is a regular employee and not an apprentice of Nitto Enterprises?
LAW: Article 280 of the Labor Code
RULING:
Yes. The apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent was executed on May 28, 1990
allegedl y employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of "care maker/molder. However, the apprenticeship Agreement was
filed only on June 7, 1990.Notwithstanding the absence of approval by the Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship agreement
was enforced the day it was signed. The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and
Employment is a preliminary step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.
Nitto Enterprises did not compl y with the requirements of the law. It is mandate d that apprenticeship agreements entered into
by the employer and apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor
and Employment. Thus, the apprenticeship agreement has no force and effect; and Capili is considered to be a regular employee of the
company.
OPINION:
I concur with the Courts findings that since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent have no force
and effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE, private respondent's assertion that he was hired not
as an apprentice but as a delivery boy ("kargador" or "pahinante") deserves credence. He should rightly be considered as a regular employee
of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code.
G.R. No. 187320, January 26, 2011
ATLANTA INDUSTRIES, INC. and/or ROBERT CHAN, petitioners, vs. APRILITO R. SEBOLINO, KHIM V. COSTALES, ALVIN V.
ALMONTE, and JOSEPH H. SAGUN, respondents.
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
Sebolino et al. filed several complaints for illegal dismissal, regularization, underpayment, nonpayment of wages and other money claims as
well as damages. They alleged that they had attained regular status as they were allowed to work with Atlanta for more than six (6) months
from the start of a purported apprenticeship agreement between them and the company. They claimed that they were illegally dismissed when
the apprenticeship agreement expired.
In defense, Atlanta and Chan argued that the workers were not entitled to regularization and to their money claims because they were
engaged as apprentices under a government-approved apprenticeship program. The company offered to hire them as regular employees in
the event vacancies for regular positions occur in the section of the plant where they had trained. They also claimed that their names did not
appear in the list of employees (Master List) prior to their engagement as apprentices.
The Labor Arbiter found the dismissal to be illegal with respect to nine out of the twelve complainants. Atlanta appealed the decision to the
NLRC which reversed the illegal dismissal decision with respect to Sebolino and three others. They moved for reconsideration but this was
denied. They then brought the case up to the Court of Appeals, which held that Sebolino and the three others were illegally dismiised.
The CA ruled that Sebolino and the three others were already employees of the company before they entered into the first and second
apprenticeship agreements. For example, Sebolino was employed by Atlanta on March 3, 2004 then he entered into his first apprenticeship
agreement with the company on March 20, 2004 to August 19, 2004. The second apprenticeship agreement was from May 28, 2004 to

October 8, 2004. However, the CA found the apprenticeship agreements to be void because they were executed in violation of the law and the
rules. Therefore, in the first place, there were no apprenticeship agreements.
Also, the positions occupied by the respondents machine operator, extruder operator and scaleman are usually necessary and desirable in the
manufacture of plastic building materials, the companys main business. Sebolino and the three others were, therefore, regular employees
whose dismissals were illegal for lack of a just or authorized cause and notice.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Sebolino and three others were illegally dismissed.
HELD: The petition is unmeritorious.
The CA committed no reversible error in nullifying the NLRC decision and in affirming the labor arbiters ruling, as it applies toCostales,
Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun. Specifically, the CA correctly ruled that the four were illegally dismissed because (1) they were already
employees when they were required to undergo apprenticeship and (2) apprenticeship agreements were invalid.
The following considerations support the CA ruling.
Based on company operations at the time material to the case, Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun were already rendering service to the
company as employees before they were made to undergo apprenticeship. The company itself recognized the respondents status through
relevant operational records in the case of Costales and Almoite, the CPS monthly report for December 2003 which the NLRC relied upon
and, for Sebolino and Sagun, the production and work schedule for March 7 to 12, 2005 cited by the CA.
The CA correctly recognized the authenticity of the operational documents, for the failure of Atlanta to raise a challenge against these
documents before the labor arbiter, the NLRC and the CA itself. The appellate court, thus, found the said documents sufficientto establish the
employment of the respondents before their engagement as apprentices.
The fact that Sebolino and the three others were already rendering service to the company when they were made to undergo apprenticeship
(as established by the evidence) renders the apprenticeship agreements irrelevant as far as the four are concerned. This reality is highlighted
by the CA finding that the respondents occupied positions such as machine operator, scaleman and extruder operator - tasks that are usually
necessary and desirable in Atlantas usual business or trade as manufacturer of plastic building materials. These tasks and their nature
characterized the four as regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code.Thus, when they were dismissed without just or authorized
cause, without notice, and without the opportunity to be heard, their dismissal was illegal under the law.
DENIED.

ALTERNATE DIGEST:
FACTS:
Atlanta Industries, Inc. (petitioner) is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of steelpipes. Almoite and Costales (respondents)
were employed by petitioner as early as December 2003,while Sebolino and Sagun were employed as early as March 2004. Respondents
occupied positionssuch as machine operator, extruder operator and scaleman. Two apprenticeship agreements wereentered between Atlanta
Industries, Inc. and private respondents, one in 2004 and the other in 2005. After the second apprenticeship agreement expired the
respondents were dismissed, hence they fileda case for illegal dismissal. In defense, Atlanta Industries, Inc. argued that the workers were
notentitled to regularization and to their money claims because they were engaged as apprentices under a government-approved
apprenticeship program. The company offered to hire them as regular employees in the event vacancies for regular positions occur in the
section of the plant where they hadtrained. They also claimed that their names did not appear in the list of employees (Master List) prior
totheir engagement as apprentices.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the apprenticeship agreements were valid.
HELD:
NO. The first and second apprenticeship agreements were defective as they were executed in violationof the law and the rules. The
agreements did not indicate the trade or occupation in which theapprentice would be trained; neither was the apprenticeship program
approved by the TechnicalEducation and Skills Development Authority (TESDA). Moreover, with the expiration of the firstagreement and the
retention of the employees, the employer, to all intents and purposes, recognizedthe completion of their training and their acquisition of a
regular employee status. To foist upon themthe second apprenticeship agreement for a second skill which was not even mentioned in
theagreement itself, is a violation of the Labor Codes implementing rules and is an act manifestly unfair to the employees.

Bernardo et al v. NLRC & FEBTC

GR No. 122917, 12 July 1999
Facts: The dismissed complainants, numbering 43, are deaf-mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to 1993 by respondent Far
East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded agreement called "Employment Contract for
Handicapped Workers". Disclaiming that complainants were regular employees, respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company maintained
that complainants were hired temporarily under a special employment arrangement which was a result of overtures made by some civic and
political personalities to the respondent Bank; that complainant[s] were hired due to "pakiusap"; that the tellers themselves already did the
sorting and counting chore as a regular feature and integral part of their duties; that through the "pakiusap" of Arturo Borjal, the tellers were
relieved of this task of counting and sorting bills in favor of deaf-mutes without creating new positions as there is no position either in the
respondent or in any other bank in the Philippines which deals with purely counting and sorting of bills in banking operations. The LA &, on
appeal, the NLRC ruled against petitioners, holding that they could not be deemed regular employees since they were hired as an
accommodation to the recommendation of civic oriented personalities whose employments were covered by Employment Contracts w/ special
provisions on duration of contract as specified under Art. 80. Hence, the terms of the contract shall be the law between the parties.
Issue: Whether petitioners have become regular employees
Held: Only the employees, who worked for more than six months and whose contracts were renewed are deemed regular. Hence, their
dismissal from employment was illegal. The facts, viewed in light of the Labor Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, indubitably
show that the petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be deemed regular employees.
The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a period of one month, after which the employer
shall determine whether or not they should be allowed to finish the 6-month term of the contract. Furthermore, the employer may terminate the
contract at any time for a just and reasonable cause. Unless renewed in writing by the employer, the contract shall automatically expire at the
end of the term.
The stipulations in the employment contracts indubitably conform with Art. 80 LC w/c provides for the requisites in the employment agreement
between an employer who employs handicapped workers. Succeeding events and the enactment of RA No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for
Disabled Persons), 13 however, justify the application of Article 280 of the Labor Code.
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and renewed the contracts of 37 of them. Verily,
the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and
necessary to the bank. More important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. In other
words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee should be given the same terms and
conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied person.
The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment contracts from the ambit of Article 80. Since
the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code.
Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. With the exception of
sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for more than six months. Thus, the twenty-seven petitioners should be deemed regular
employees.
The contract signed by petitioners is akin to a probationary employment, during which the bank determined the employees' fitness for the job.
When the bank renewed the contract after the lapse of the six-month probationary period, the employees thereby became regular employees.
16
No employer is allowed to determine indefinitely the fitness of its employees.
Moreover, it must be emphasized that a contract of employment is impressed with public interest. Provisions of applicable statutes are
deemed written into the contract, and the "parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws
and regulations by simply contracting with each other." Clearly, the agreement of the parties regarding the period of employment cannot
prevail over the provisions of the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, which mandate that petitioners must be treated as qualified able-bodied
employees.

An employee is regular because of the nature of work and the length of service, not because of the mode or even the reason for hiring them.