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doi:10.1093/philmat/nkn002
1. Introduction
In 63 of The Foundations of Arithmetic, Gottlob Frege attributes to David
Hume the principle that
the number of objects falling under concept F is identical to the
number of objects falling under concept G iff there is a one-one
correlation between F and G.
Frege uses the principle to define the concept of cardinal number, but
he does so in a system that, as Bertrand Russell showed, contains an
inconsistent theory of concepts and extensions. Russell rescued Freges
definition, however, by having Humes principle play a similar role to define
number in his theory of types: the Frege-Russell definition of cardinal
number.1
This paper has benefited from detailed written comments of Juliet Floyd, Bob Hale,
and Allard Tamminga, as well as from discussions with Charles Chihara, Hans Sluga,
Martin Stokhof, and audiences in Amsterdam, Groningen, and Kirchberg.
University of Groningen, Faculty of Philosophy, Oude Boteringestraat 52, 9712 GL
Groningen, The Netherlands. b.p.de.bruin@rug.nl
1 The principle is more exactly stated in 73 of Foundations. I follow the adherents of
George Boolos by naming the principle after Hume, Treatise, Bk I, Pt III, i. In contemporary vocabulary, a precise statement about the role of Humes principle in a definition
of cardinal number is this (Freges Theorem): second-order logic plus Humes principle
as the sole nonlogical axiom suffices to derive the Dedekind-Peano postulates. See, e.g.,
[Boolos, 1987], [Wright, 1983]. See [Demopoulos and Clark, 2005] for more details on the
differences between Frege and Russell in this respect.
C The Author [2008]. Published by Oxford University Press.
Philosophia Mathematica (III) Vol. 16 No. 3
All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org
Several scholars have argued that Wittgenstein held the view that the
notion of number is presupposed by the notion of one-one correlation,
and that therefore Humes principle is not a sound basis for a definition of number. I offer a new interpretation of the relevant fragments
from Wittgensteins Nachlass, showing that if different uses of presupposition are understood in terms of de re and de dicto knowledge,
Wittgensteins argument against the Frege-Russell definition of number
turns out to be valid on its own terms, even though it depends on two
epistemological principles the logicist may find too constructivist.
355
2 See [Dummett, 1978; 1991], [Floyd, 2001; 2005], [Marion, 1998], [Steiner, 1975].
Also see [ul Haque, 1978], and the lemma number in [Glock, 1996]. The primary sources
are: Philosophical Remarks, 118119; Philosophical Grammar, Pt II, Ch. IV, 21; Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Pt I, 2540. Secondary sources include minutes of a meeting of the Trinity Mathematical Society at Cambridge, May 28, 1930 (James
Klagge was so kind as to bring this to my attention; see [Wittgenstein, 2003, pp. 373374]);
Friedrich Waismanns Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, especially the addenda to the
notes of a meeting with members of the Vienna Circle, January 4, 1931, Definition of
Number (see [Waismann, 1979, pp. 164165]), lecture notes of seminars at Cambridge,
19321935, edited by Alice Ambrose [Ambrose, 1979]; and lecture notes of seminars at
Cambridge, 1939, edited by Cora Diamond [Diamond, 1975]. The argumentation in the
lecture notes is based on Wittgensteins rejection of the notion of logical identity, which I
do not deal with here. See [Marion, 1998, pp. 5255].
Throughout his philosophical career Ludwig Wittgenstein too was concerned with the notion of number. He first explained it as the exponent
of an operation (Tractatus 6.021), changed to a view aptly described by
Pasquale Frascolla as the arithmetic of strokes [Frascolla, 1994, p. 44],
which in turn paved the way for an account in terms of family resemblance
(Philosophical Investigations, 6768).
Apart from these positive contributions, Wittgensteins Nachlass contains an interesting critique of the Frege-Russell definition uncovered by
such scholars as Michael Dummett, Juliet Floyd, Mathieu Marion, and
Mark Steiner.2 Mathieu Marionwith whose interpretation this paper is
most concerneddiscusses at length various sources from Wittgensteins
intermediate period (ca. 19291933). He argues that Wittgenstein held
the view that the notion of number is presupposed by the notion of a oneone correlation, and that therefore Humes principle is not a sound basis
for a definition of cardinal number. While Marion does not evaluate the
plausibility of Wittgensteins view, he does credit him with having laid
bare a platonist assumption in Humes principle.
In this paper I give a different interpretation of the fragments from the
Nachlass. I argue that Wittgenstein thought of presupposition in terms
of knowledge, and that his distinction between knowledge about actual
and possible one-one correlations is to be understood as that between
knowledge that is de re and knowledge that is merely de dicto. Furthermore,
I argue that Wittgensteins argument is valid, even though it is dependent
on three epistemological principles, two of which the logicist may find too
constructivist.
Section 2 gives a brief survey of Marions interpretation. Section 3
gives the interpretation of presupposition in terms of de re and de dicto
knowledge. Section 4 gives the interpretation of Wittgensteins entire argument against the Frege-Russell definition of cardinal number. Section 5
discusses the plausibility of the argument. Section 6 relates the argument
to Poincares objections to logicism as well as to Wittgensteins earlier
views.
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All in all, Marion takes Wittgenstein to argue that the possibility of establishing a one-one correlation cannot be explained without reference to
numbers, i.e. without any circularity [Marion, 1998, p. 79]. The notion of
number, that is, is presupposed by the notion of one-one correlation.
3. An Epistemic Interpretation of Presupposition
Not without any circularity, all right. But circular in which sense? What
does Wittgenstein mean by saying that the notion of number is presupposed by the notion of one-one correlation? Philosophical Remarks, 118,
Imagine I have a dozen cups. Now I wish to tell you that I have got
just as many spoons. How can I do it?
If I had wanted to say that I allotted one spoon to each cup, I
would not have expressed what I meant by saying that I have just as
many spoons as cups. Thus it will be better for me to say, I can allot
the spoons to the cups. [Waismann, 1979, p. 164] (emphasis added)
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In a passage remarkably close to the one above from Wittgenstein and the
Vienna Circle, Waismann summarizes Wittgensteins entire argument. I
give a rather lengthy quotation to add to the plausibility of using this text
as a basis of an interpretation of Wittgensteins notion of presupposition,
and also because it is in its own right a nice way to state the argument.
Later in this section I examine the textual evidence Philosophical Remarks,
118, gives for my interpretation.5
Two sets are said to be numerically equivalent [i.e, same in number]
if they are related to one another by a [one-one correlation]. How
then shall we establish that two sets are numerically equivalent?
Evidently we must exhibit such a relation. If I wish to establish, let
us say, that I have as many spoons as cups, according to this precept
I must find a [one-one correlation] which associates each spoon to
a cup. For example, such a relation could be: every spoon lies in a
cup and no cup is left empty. But, suppose the spoons are in a box
and the cups in another? Is there a relation which associates them to
one another in this case, too? We could say that If there isnt one,
it is at any rate very easy to set one up; I only have to distribute the
spoons among the cups. We merely remark that this would mean
that the relation at least did not exist beforehand. Consequently, we
would have to say that as long as the spoons were not in the cups the
3
A third source is Louis Goodstein, one of Wittgensteins five favorite students according to Ray Monk, who also combines the epistemic reading with a similar view
on relations of presupposition. See [Goodstein, 1951, p. 19] for the epistemic reading,
[Goodstein, 1951, pp. 6970] for the view on presupposition, and see [Monk, 1990, p. 336]
for the biographical detail.
4 The Austrian edition, with the same acknowledgements, was first published in 1936
[Waismann, 1936]. Waismann may have referred to a manuscript on which Philosophical
Remarks, 118119, was based. Marion says, The MS must have been an early one
(19291931), possibly that which was published under the title Philosophical Remarks
[Marion, 1998, p. 45n]. Waismann repeated the argument in [Waismann, 1982, pp. 4546].
5 For reasons of consistency I use one-one correlation where Benac translates
Waismanns ein-eindeutige Relation as single-valued relation.
3.1. Knowledge
359
What on the face of it only seems to restate what was already contained
in Waismanns reports about the meetings of the Vienna Circle reveals,
upon closer inspection, an essential ingredient missing there: knowledge.
Waismann writes that in order to recognize whether the correspondence
is possible, I must already know that the sets are numerically equivalent,
and this strongly suggests an epistemic interpretation of presupposition.
Wittgensteins objection to the Frege-Russell definition of number, then,
amounts to the claim that knowledge about cardinalities is entailed by
knowledge about one-one correlations.
This interpretation is supported by first-hand evidence from Philosophical Remarks, 118. Wittgenstein relates knowledge about cardinalities to
knowledge about one-one correlations:
Can I know there are as many apples as pears on this plate, without
knowing how many? And what is meant by not knowing how many?
And how can I find out how many? Surely by counting. (emphasis
added)
Wittgenstein sketches a picture of one horizontal line separating or connecting two sets of many vertical lines
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If the lengths are lengths in the visual field we can say the two lengths
are the same, without in general being able to name them with a
number.
The contrast is between Waismann reporting that in order to recognize whether the
correspondence is possible, I must already know that the sets are numerically equivalent
[Waismann, 1951, p. 109], and Wittgenstein writing in Philosophical Remarks, 118, that
it is obvious that you can discover that there are the same number by correlation, without
counting the classes.
7 The epistemic subject is suppressed here in line with the non-psychological interpretation of Wittgensteins critique of logicism (see below).
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3.3. Intuitionism
To conclude my epistemic interpretation of presupposition, let me note a
striking similarity between results from intuitionistic logic and Wittgensteins constructivist ideas, in particular, his conception of knowledge,
existence, and provability.10 Wittgensteins constructivism in a way antic9 Note that the distinction between actual and possible is not that of certainty versus
probability. That a one-one correlation is possible does not mean that one exists with some
probability.
10 See [Marion, 1998], especially Ch. 34. On p. 83, for instance, Marion says that
Wittgensteins attitude towards numerical equivalence is supported by his view that it is
the proof which fixes the content of a mathematical proposition. Two pages later, Marion
says that, for Wittgenstein, the proposition x F(x) can be asserted only if one knows
already a specific number a of which one can show that it satisfies the predicate F. It is
I know that there is some one-one relation correlating F and G, but I cannot
name it.
Stated more precisely, the interpretation I propose is that whenever
Wittgenstein speaks about presuppositions of actual one-one correlations,
what he in fact means is knowledge de re about a particular one-one
correlation; and when he speaks about possible such correlations he means
knowledge about a correlation that is merely de dicto.9
This reading easily accommodates Wittgensteins writings on the FregeRussell definition and Waismanns reports about Wittgensteins remarks.
When Wittgenstein writes, in Philosophical Remarks, 118, that you can
discover that [two concepts] . . . are the same [in] number by correlation,
without counting [them] he should be read as saying that de re knowledge
about the cardinalities of two concepts (the typical kind of knowledge obtained by counting them) is not presupposed by de re knowledge about a
one-one correlation between them. When Waismann writes that in order
to recognize whether the correspondence [between two concepts] is possible, I must already know that [they] are [the same in number] [Waismann,
1979], he means that de dicto knowledge about the one-one correlation
between the two concepts presupposes de re knowledge about their cardinalities.
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(x)g = Px g
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In this section, I argue for the rather opposite claim that Wittgensteins
argument is valid, but fails to demonstrate platonism. I show that Wittgensteins argument depends on three epistemological principles. The first
possible one-one correlations is one between knowledge about such correlations that is de re and knowledge about such correlations that is merely
de dicto. It is now time to set to work my interpretation of presupposition
to revisit Wittgensteins entire argument against the logicist conception of
number. This can be done without much further ado.
The first step of Marions reconstruction was to show that Humes
principle is unacceptable as it refers to actual one-one correlations, while
the second step was that phrasing the principle in terms of possible oneone correlations makes it circular. The interpretation I suggest builds on
the two-step format, adding the epistemic interpretation of presupposition.
This yields the following alternative.
According to Wittgensteins first claim, Humes principle requires
actual one-one correlations: de re knowledge about such correlations.
The modal reformulation, in turn, requires possible one-one correlations:
merely de dicto knowledge about a one-one correlation. The modal version,
however, leads to circularity. Under the interpretation of presupposition in
epistemic terms, and of the difference between actual and possible one-one
correlations as one between de re and merely de dicto forms of knowledge,
the kind of circularity is easily describedand it is here that we can reap
the fruits of the preceding interpretative work. The modal reformulation of
Humes principle leads to circularity because, Wittgenstein holds, merely
de dicto knowledge of one-one correlation presupposes de re knowledge
about sameness of cardinality. That is,
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13
See [Marion, 1998, p. 81]. Dummett knew the argument via Waismanns Introduction
to Mathematical Thinking, and rejects it in [Dummett, 1991, pp. 148149].
14 I am indebted to Bob Hale for pressing me on this point.
367
whether it is possible to possess merely de dicto knowledge about oneone correlation. Basing a critique of Humes principle on principle (3) is
flawed. Or so the objection would go.
This objection, however, takes epistemology too psychologically. Principle (3) is nowhere dependent on actual human practices of obtaining
knowledge about number, whether counting or otherwise. Rather it is completely neutral as to how human beings establish de re knowledge about
cardinality. To underscore this point, let us turn to another way to obtain
knowledge about cardinality that Wittgenstein himself seems to have been
aware of. Pasquale Frascolla ascribes to Wittgenstein the view that
Of these criteria, the first is quite interesting here as it connects to psychological research on number perception. Psychologists have found that
human beings can determine the number of elements of a certain set, say
the number of cups on a table, without actually counting; they just see
that there are, say, four of them. This phenomenon, called subitization,
has been studied quite extensively, and there is wide agreement that most
adults can subitize sets of up to six elements.15 While counting is a human
practice to obtain knowledge about cardinality that may bring about knowledge about one-one correlation simultaneously, subitization is decidedly
different: if I have come to know by subitization that there are four cups
on the table and four saucers in the cupboard, that does not give me de re
knowledge about one-one correlation.16
15
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follows:
K(xy(F x F y) xyz(F x F y F z)) nKN x:F x = n,
where I use the Wittgensteinian convention that different variables get different interpretations. If I know that there is a cup x and a cup y and no
cup z on the table, then I have de re knowledge about cardinality n = 2 of
is a cup on the table]. The consequent of this statethe concept F = x[x
ment is rather similar to the consequent of the statement that expresses
Wittgensteins critique (that is, de dicto knowledge about one-one correlation entails de re knowledge about cardinalities), but the antecedent is
different, because it involves knowledge about two objects falling under
concept F rather than about a one-one correlation between F and another
concept G.
This shows that, while Poincare and Wittgenstein both tried to spot
non-logical presuppositions in the logicist framework of the Frege-Russell
definition, they zoomed in on different places. Wittgenstein unearthed
mathematical presuppositions in Humes principle itself, thus attacking at
a rather abstract level the key principle underlying the logicist conception
of number. Poincare, by contrast, zoomed in on the propositions about
numerals that can be made in the logicist framework, thus finding fault
with logicism at the concrete level of the Frege-Russell definition itself.18
But although they may differ with respect to the precise logical form
of their attacks on logicism, Wittgenstein and Poincare do seem to share
their epistemic motivation.19 If this is right, the next question to answer is
whether Wittgensteins objection carries the psychologism that Poincares
epistemic critique is sometimesbut not alwaysaccused of.20 Goldfarb,
for instance, argues that Poincare failed to see that logicism was only
concerned with the question of how mathematical beliefs can be justified,
and not with the question of how human beings actually adopt mathematical
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here.
This section was inspired by a discussion with Juliet Floyd. I follow her [2001; 2005]
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22 The argument from the intermediate period was, as we saw, threatened by the same
objection, and it was countered by adopting a non-psychological, yet truly epistemological,
interpretation of the argument. Such a move would of course not make sense for the
epistemic version of the Tractarian argument. No psychology can be removed.
The Tractarian argument amounts to observing that what shows the possibility of a one-one correlation between F and G shows their cardinalities
(one-one correlation presupposes number), but that showing cardinality
has to be possible before talk of one-one correlation is cogent [Floyd,
2005, p. 98] (number does not presuppose one-one correlation).
Both the Tractarian argument and the argument from the intermediate
period are phrased in terms of possible one-one correlations, but while the
reasons for doing so are similar, the means are very different. The Tractarian
argument grasps possibility explicitly rather than by means of the epistemic
terms of the later argument. According to the Tractatus the difference
between actual and possible one-one correlation seems to be one of saying
and showing. While the proposition that all the cups are placed on all the
saucers says that there actually is a one-one correlation between the cups
and the saucers, it is the shared form of the two propositions above involving
F and G that shows that they can be one-one correlated. Furthermore, the
distinction between de re and de dicto, of which Wittgenstein was aware
when he wrote Philosophical Grammar, Pt II, Ch. IV, 21, was not available
in the Tractatus. In fact, such a distinction is quite an untractarian idea in the
first place, since showing cardinality and showing possibility of one-one
correlation is, if one wishes to use that terminology, always de re.
Nor would a Tractarian argument plausibly position circularity in
Humes principle if cast in epistemic terms. It would state that knowledge
about one-one correlation entails knowledge about cardinalities, and the
argument would be that, if one obtains knowledge about the two propositions that show that F and G can be one-one correlated, one simultaneously obtains knowledge about their cardinalities. While correct, the
converse would be correct, too: knowledge about the cardinalities of F
and G obtained from what these propositions show simultaneously yields
knowledge about one-one correlation. As a result, cast in epistemic terms
the Tractarian argument would not detect any priority here, only a certain
equivalence.22
The Tractarian argument does not so appeal to knowledge, though. As
a result, two really different lines of critique of Humes principle come
into sight. An early one builds on the distinction between saying and
showing and is cast in terms of the picture theory, while the later one
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exploits the distinction between de re and de dicto and is phrased, nonpsychologically, in terms of knowledge. Substantially, the two arguments
may not be compatible, but they consistently lead up to locating a problem
of the logicist account of cardinal number in Humes principle, and this, I
believe, is a mark of Wittgensteins originality.
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373
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