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ABSTRACT Despite an increasing interest in reinsurance and environmental management systems (EMSs) concerning pollution, little research has been conducted on the
subject. This paper presents the findings from a survey of reinsurers views on this issue.
Reinsurers give EMSs a cursory consideration in their pollution risk assessments
because they inadequately appraise pollution liability, have no explicit requirements
regarding risk management and there is little evidence to show that they are effective at
reducing environmental risks. Reinsurers underwriting assessments and post-loss
investigations are poorly developed concerning public liability insurance. Reinsurance
and EMSs are currently weak methods to prevent and control pollution risks.
Introduction
Insurers, reinsurers, industry, academics and the UK government, are intensifying their focus on EMSs and insurance to lessen and control pollution risks
(Gunningham et al., 1999; Minoli, 2001). However, there is little, if any, practical
inquiry on using insurance and EMSs, separately and in conjunction with one
another as instruments in defence of the environment (Minoli, 2001).
To investigate this issue, a case study (involving a desk study and survey) was
conducted on the reinsurance industry, for the following reasons. Reinsurers
underwrite insurers and consequently, poor insurance underwriting can adversely affect reinsurers underwriting performance. Reinsurers, therefore, have
a personal stake in ensuring that pollution risks are properly assessed, rated and
priced. Additionally, reinsurers can potentially influence insurer practices regarding pollution because they can refuse to support insurance policies that
expose them to an unacceptable level of risk. For these reasons, it is important
to evaluate the attitudes of reinsurers on EMSs concerning pollution insurance,
in order to explore further the idea that insurance and EMSs can be used as
instruments in defence of the environment.
Accordingly, the case study had five purposes. First, to review current
reinsurer pollution risk assessment practices. Second, to determine if EMSs are
considered within these practices. Third, to identify any factors affecting reinsurers consideration of EMSs. Fourth, to determine if reinsurers were inclined to
0964-0568 Print/1360-0559 Online/03/050771-10 2003 University of Newcastle upon Tyne
DOI: 10.1080/0964056032000138490
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Research Methods
The data presented in this paper come from a desk study review of the literature
and a postal survey questionnaire. The questionnaire included open and closed
questions on the following seven topics:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
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(2) allocation of resources (time, capital and technical expertise) for pollution
risk management;
(3) management practices for preventing potential pollution (e.g. monitoring
and checking programmes, internal risk assessments of company weak
points, and external assessments by competent bodies to avoid internal
blindness); and
(4) management practices for controlling potential pollution (e.g. emergency
response procedures and crisis management plans).
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The presence of an EMS will never replace our own assessment and this
is partly because there are many loopholes and sticking points.
The effect of an EMS on claims experience is presently not a significant
driver to warrant their consideration as the positive effects of EMS on
loss experience have yet to be established.
EMS could be used as a risk management tool, provided the will is
there and the insured is not just window dressing/being fashionable.
I feel EMSs are only relevant for primary writers i.e. insurance from the
ground up.
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Discussion
It was postulated that poor insurer underwriting performance adversely affects
reinsurers underwriting performance. However, high deductibles and indemnity limits confine reinsurers exposure towards the financial consequences of
pollution risks. As such, insurers are buying catastrophe pollution cover. In the
UK market, however, there are not many pollution indemnities and those that
do arise are settled for under 500 000 (Minoli & Bell, 2003). Consequently, it can
be argued that inadequate risk assessment and poor risk control affect insurers
and insureds, rather than reinsurers, since the latter have few pollution indemnifications in the UK market. It was also suggested that reinsurers are in a
potentially important position to affect insurer practices concerning pollution,
since they can refuse to support insurance policies that expose them to an
unacceptable level of risk. Yet, at the time of writing, despite warning from
Cologne Re, reinsurers continue to support pollution cover under a PL policy in
the UK market.
With regard to reinsurer practices concerning pollution the following points
can be made. Some reinsurers conduct technical pollution risk assessments.
However, for practical and economic reasons, these assessments are generally
confined to large companies involved in hazardous trades, when underwriting
pollution under an EIL policy. These assessments are generally not used in
conjunction with small-to-medium sized companies, under a PL policy. This is
an unsatisfactory situation, since all companies have the potential to cause
pollution and a small amount of pollution can cause a disproportionate amount
of damage.
The following points can be made on EMSs concerning reinsurer pollution risk
assessments. EMSs are generally given a cursory examination by reinsurers in
their pollution risk assessments for three reasons. First, and most importantly,
there is no evidence to show that such systems are effective at reducing
pollution risks, or that such systems have any practical relevance for reinsurers.
Second, EMSs inadequately assess pollution liability. Third, these systems have
no explicit requirements regarding the use of risk management. On the other
hand, if the remit of EMSs was broadened to include pollution liability and risk
management, coupled with it being shown that such systems are effective at
reducing pollution risk, then in theory reinsurers should have a heightened
interest in EMSs. This in turn could lead to companies with EMSs receiving
relatively better insurance terms and conditions. Moreover, even if EMSs reduced pollution risks, it is likely that insurers and insureds, rather than reinsurers, would gain the most, because the latter are generally too far removed from
the risk to take advantage of these benefits.
Reinsurers apparently believe that they could provide the following incentives/initiatives in support of EMSs. They are: educating insureds about EMSs,
providing risk management guidelines, adding EMSs to risk assessment criteria,
making EMSs a condition of cover and offering lower premiums to companies
with EMSs. The last two mechanisms, however, are unwise and unsound. This
is because they are somewhat draconian and ineffective since there are, respectively, good companies without EMSs and premiums are not a significant enough
inducement to encourage single-handedly the uptake of EMSs. In addition, for
such support to transpire, it needs to be shown that EMSs are effective at
reducing pollution risks, since it makes no commercial sense for reinsurers to
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support something of unknown value. Furthermore, insurers rather than reinsurers are in a relatively better position to initiate such support of EMSs (should
it transpire) because the former come into direct contact with insureds. Nevertheless, reinsurers could encourage insurers to improve their practices regarding
risk assessment and risk control, if they were to offer their support on the
condition that these matters were considered. However, these changes are
unlikely to happen in the near term, since reinsurers continue to offer their
support of pollution cover under a PL policy and the ABI believes that their
policy wording is robust.
Reinsurers, with the exception of those that have specialist pollution underwriting departments, also have a poor understanding of their potential exposure
toward the financial consequences of pollution risks, for two reasons. First,
pollution risks under a PL policy in the UK market are inadequately assessed,
rated and priced. Second, reinsurers have insufficient claims histories to calculate and set pollution premiums. Therefore, reinsurers do not really know if they
are charging the correct premium or setting aside enough money to meet future
claims. These practices regarding pollution could have serious financial implications for reinsurers. It is thus recommended that more reinsurers (and insurers)
sign the UNEP sponsored statement of environmental commitment by the
insurance industry, since it encourages companies to consider the environment
within their daily working practice.
Consequently, the conclusion is that there is little evidence to suggest that
reinsurance and EMSs separately and in conjunction are currently sufficiently
developed to act as instruments in defence of the environment.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to express sincere appreciation to the Economic and
Social Research Council and the Loss Prevention Council (now part of the
Building Research Establishment) for the provision of the CASE PhD Studentship which supported D.M.Ms research, Dr Charles Kirk for acting as an
industrial supervisor and the case study participants for answering the survey
questionnaire.
References
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Association of British Insurers (1996) Liability and accident insurance committee meetingpollution
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Department of the Environment (1994) Paying for our Past: Arrangements for Controlling Contaminated
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ENDS (1995) Pollution insurance freebies come under fire, The Ends Report, October, 249, pp. 1922.
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ENDS (2002) Environmental insurers report a boom in sales, The Ends Report, March, 326, p. 33.
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