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? 2000 SAGEPublications,
Journal
London,ThousandOaks,CAand
of Contemporary
History
Copyright
New Delhi,Vol35(1),39-55.
;39-55;01 184]
[0022-0094(200001)35:1
CatherineMerridale
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40
Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 35 No I
sphere and affected the responses of individuals exposed to violence, pain and
death.
The material for this article is taken from my wider study of death and
memory in twentieth-century Russia.2 The issue of trauma has been central to
this work. What it finds is that culture plays a major part in the identification
and treatment of sufferers, and even in the individual's willingness to be identified as a victim. This is not the same as arguing that human beings are not
equally susceptible to pain. The idea that 'they' do not feel pain in the same
way that 'we' do has been the basis for too many atrocities in history. The distinction comes at the next stage. Just as individuals cope with pain in a variety
of ways, so it seems that societies in turn sanction and encourage culturespecific and widely differing collective responses.3 The story in Russia is particularly interesting because the political and social context changed. West
European ideas which had briefly been fashionable in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries were abandoned by the Soviet government at the end
of the 1920s. An alternative paradigm of the individual and the mind, whose
origins were historically Russian as well as ideologically Stalinist, was widely
adopted. It is still predominant in Russia today. Post-communist Russian
society, and especially its responses to violence and alienation, cannot be
understood without considering it.
Russia's first experience of shell-shock came during the Russo-Turkish war
of 1877-8. But it was the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 which brought the
issue to the attention of the psychiatric profession as a whole.4 The majority,
and almost all non-specialist medical professionals, regarded new evidence
about battle trauma as an indication of malingering, personal weakness, or
moral turpitude. Every combatant state included military doctors who
adhered to this view, but the Russian variant was already distinctive, and suggested some of the ways in which future thinking might develop. In particular,
some psychiatrists, including the future Stalinist A.B. Zalkind, drew special
attention to the 'egocentrism' of shell-shock sufferers, to their lack of social
responsibility, and to their selfish personal weaknesses.5 More traditional
thinkers also explained the susceptibility of some individuals in terms of
supposedly self-inflicted and morally dubious illnesses such as syphilis and
alcoholism. Modern warfare, to these judges of the sick, was a test of manhood - albeit the harshest ever seen. The sight of otherwise healthy soldiers
falling prey to tremors, mutism, debilitating nightmares and paralysis fed the
2 To be published in the UK by Granta in 2000.
3 For an excellent discussion of this, see Derek Summerfield, 'The Social Experience of War and
Some Issues for the Humanitarian Field' in Patrick J. Bracken and Celia Petty (eds), Rethinking the
Trauma of War (London 1998), 9-37.
4 The Russian specialist S.A. Preobrazhenskii ascribed the first diagnosis of shell-shock to
German and French observers of the bombardment of Paris in 1870. The first Russians to write on
the subject were A.I. Ozeretskovskii and S.A. Sukhanov, both of whom based their work on the
Russo-Japanese war. S.A. Preobrazhenskii, Materialy o voprosu o dushevnykh zabolevaniyakh
voinov i lits prichastnykh k voennym deistviyam (Petrograd 1917), Introduction.
5 Psikhiatricheskaya gazeta, 1916, no. 5, 76.
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in Twentieth-century
Traumaand Shell-shock
Merridale:
Russia
41
panic of those who feared that Holy Russia was going down to defeat at the
front as well as collapsing from within. For Russian traditionalists, the only
way for a soldier to fight was 'with the cross of Christ before his eyes'. Such
men were always ready to die, and if they had to bury fallen comrades, they
would not weep.6 In Russia as elsewhere, the reality of shell-shock was resented partly because it menaced a cherished national myth about heroism.
While the conservatives muttered into their cigars, however, the most
enlightened (and widely-travelled) Russian psychiatrists were already discussing papers and cases which pointed in a different direction. At this stage,
the most innovative writing on the subject in Russian drew heavily on the findings of psychiatrists working in Germany and France. Most specialists believed
the new neurosis to be related to basic physical problems, including mechanical damage to the brain or nervous system. Very few had begun to suspect that
there might be a purely psychological cause, independent of physical wounds.
The most thoughtful, however, were already agreeing that the problem
affected even (and perhaps especially) the most conscientious soldiers, that it
struck all social classes, and that its sufferers needed rest, quiet and dedicated
treatment.7From 1905, people had begun to suggest that part of the reason for
the new phenomenon might lie in the peculiar horror of technological warfare.
'The cavalry are not affected', wrote one specialist. 'It seems that this disorder
is most common among the artillery.'8 The symptoms he observed included
hallucinations - 'some believe they are still swatting Germans like flies'. One
soldier could repeat nothing but the words, 'Oh Lord, save the Tsar and
Russia'. Others apparently heard and saw nothing at all. As early as 1905, too,
it was clear that the new mental illness might continue to cause problems well
into peacetime. Sufferers risked bearing their psychological scars for life.9 In
the decade after the Russo-Japanese war, a debate and exchange of findings
between Russian and west European psychiatrists greatly added to the stock of
case histories and hypotheses available to Russian specialists. These professional links endured into the war years, and by 1916, Russian psychiatrists
were publicly calling for the establishment of special hospitals for the treatment of traumatized patients 'such as they have in Britain, France and Italy'.10
The Revolution of February 1917 interrupted the public airing of this
debate for several months. Like many other periodicals, the professional
journal, Psikhiatricheskaya gazeta, ceased publication in 1917. By 1923, the
number of professionals calling for special facilities had been depleted by
war, hunger, cold, disease and emigration, but a dozen or more of the prerevolutionary psychiatric elite remained in post. Notable among these were
S.A. Preobrazhenskii, who specialized in the treatment of combatants (includ6 Olonetskaya nedelya, 1914, no. 42, 6.
7 Among the best accounts from the time are those by S.A. Preobrazhenskii, op. cit., and N.A.
Yurman, Psikhiatricheskaya gazeta, 1915, no. 9, 139-43.
8 V.K. Khoroshko, writing in Psikhiatricheskaya gazeta, 1916, no. 1, 3.
9 Peterburgskii listok, 1905, no. 10364.
10 Psikhiatricheskaya gazeta, 1916, no. 19, 378.
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42
Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 35 No I
ing medical and other civilian personnel exposed to the horrors of the front),
A.V. Livanov, who also had a background in military psychiatry, and V.I.
Frumkin, who would work closely with him in the years to come. As peace
and a fragile stability returned to the Soviet state in the early 1920s, these
specialists renewed their demand that facilities be provided for the men and
women traumatized by war. The numbers involved were staggering. One
expert is reported to have told Lenin that half the Soviet population was
suffering from trauma in some form.1' An All-Russian Committee for the
Support of Wounded War Veterans (Vserokompom) was established in 1919,
but its resources were limited, and it had no institution at its disposal in which
to treat psychiatric patients. Instead, patients suffering from nervous disorders
would be housed in ordinary hospitals, to the despair of local health authorities.12Doctors complained that their behaviour was disruptive, 'scandalous',
and 'disordered'.13They were reported to be 'undisciplined', 'forgetful' and
'evasive', and, as one report remarked, 'they do not take responsibility for
their own behaviour . . . and can create a very unpleasant atmosphere for
others'.14
It is well known that such unsympathetic, censorious views would ultimately prevail when it came to the treatment of psychiatric casualties in Soviet
Russia. Many ended up in exile, hidden from general view, living out their
shortened lives in colonies in the far north and east. It would be a mistake,
however, to assume that such harshness was the only option discussed at the
time. In 1923, an experimental institution was established with the aim of providing specialized neurological treatment. It was the fruit of years of agitation
on the part of its founders. The principles it upheld were among the most
advanced, in therapeutic terms, in the world. The idea was to provide a relaxing and attractive setting for long-term patients, which is why the institution
was based in Yalta, in the Crimea. The treatment on offer was intended to
address psychiatric disorders - among which the specialists included schizophrenia, hysteria and shell-shock (voennaya kontuziya) - directly. However,
Preobrazhenskii argued that other intervention might also be needed, as many
trauma patients also suffered from problems such as tuberculosis and malnutrition. His hope, which the other founders shared, was that this experimental hospital would be the first in a network of special institutions for the
rehabilitation of such casualties. Its pioneering and military mission was
enshrined in its name, Red Star.
Why did Red Star fail? The simplest answer is that there were no resources
to keep it going. Annual reports by its director chillingly referred to the lack of
food, footwear and other basic necessities, at the hospital.15But beyond the
11 The doctor about whom this was told was Petr Gannushkin, and the story came via a group
of medical veterans interviewed by the author in Moscow in 1997.
12 State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), 4537/1/831, 74-5.
13 GARF, 4347/1/94, 101.
14 GARF, 4347/1/94, 70.
15 GARF 4347/1/831, 7.
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Merridale:
Traumaand Shell-shock
in Twentieth-century
Russia
43
resources problem was a wider lack of understanding or sympathy for the project. Red Star's patients were not the most attractive of individuals. Many
were alcoholics, some were addicted to morphine. More than a quarter also
suffered from syphilis.16Hard-pressed officials outside the hospital saw little
point in spending money and time on the care of such people. Exile seemed an
ideal way out. Failing that, insisted a member of the Moscow Soviet, the best
way to deal with these people was 'to stand over them with a loaded Mauser
in your hand'.'7 As a sanatorium for trauma patients, Red Star was quietly
closed after less than three years in operation.
Iron of a more general kind had entered the souls of many Communist Party
leaders by this time. To be fair, their practical options were limited. The Soviet
Union had become a society where extreme conditions were routine. Virtually
no one was spared. The revolutionary regime, still shackled by economic hardship and still desperate for trained personnel of any kind, could hardly have
addressed so large a problem with much effect. The evidence of widespread
neurosis, if not shell-shock, was overwhelming.18It was not confined to war
veterans, or even to the survivors of catastrophes such as displacement, famine
and cholera. Rank and file communists, especially the young, were vulnerable
to a particular kind of despair. They measured their contribution to the revolution against its vaunted ideals and found themselves wanting. The resulting
malaise, which was sometimes diagnosed as neurasthenia, had become the
most common cause of illness among the party mass by 1927. The suicide rate
among young communists soared.19Though social reformers and criminologists were sympathetic, the Party's own elite took a more astringent view.
Individuals who dwelt on their own problems were once again described as
egocentric. In December 1925, E.M. Yaroslavskii, the Communist Party's
ideological spokesman, told a meeting in Leningrad that communist suicides
were guilty of a lack of faith in 'the power and strength of the Party', that they
were 'weak-willed, weak of character'. Such judgments filtered down to the
potential victims themselves, many of whose suicide notes included apologies
to the Party for their failure to meet its demanding standards.20
By the end of the Revolution's first decade, then, official support for the
people who had suffered psychologically in its early years had evaporated.
This is not to say that members of the elite were uninterested in neurosis, especially where they were affected themselves. Many of Lenin's closest aides had
shared a life of exile in Europe, and for them, European ideas - including
16 GARF 4347/1/854, 3
17 GARF 4347/1/831, 75
18 The psychiatrist, Aleksei Smirnov, who has worked with veterans of the war in Afghanistan,
is among those who believe the 'prison mentality' in contemporary Russia to be a symptom of
long-term post-traumatic stress.
19 Aleksandr Etkind, Eros nevozmozhnogo: Istoriya psikhoanaliza v Rossii (Sankt-Peterburg
1993), 222. See also Izvestiya, 26 April 1925, and M.N. Gernet, Prestupnost' i samoubiistvo vo
vremya voiny i posle nee (Moscow 1927), 11.
20 N.B. Lebina, 'Tenevye storony zhizni sovetskogo goroda 20-30 gg.', Voprosy istorii, 1994,
no. 2, 30-42.
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Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 35 No I
debates about the mind - continued to hold a special magic. Trotsky's close
friend, Adol'f Ioffe, enjoyed the best attentions of Kremlin doctors for his
neurotic and other ailments until his suicide in 1927.21Many other members of
the Party's inner circle travelled abroad for consultations, or took extended
leave in Black Sea resorts and mountain spas. They also experimented with the
talking cure. 'In the 1920s', recalled one witness, 'it was not just not dangerous to be involved in psychoanalysis. It was prestigious.'22The 'International
Solidarity' children's home, whose aims included the treatment of disturbed
babies, counted among its inmates in 1921 the six-month-old Vasilii Stalin,
son of the famous Iosif Vissarionovich.23Freud's ideas had begun to circulate
in Russia before 1914. But they remained acceptable, and even fashionable,
for the first decade after the Revolution. To some Bolsheviks, indeed, Freudian
analysis offered the possibility in the longer term of perfecting human beings
at an individual level as a preparation for their membership of the future
utopia.
Stalin's revolution from above was set to change all this by 1932. The first
signs of the new thinking were already clear on the eve of the 'great turn', in
1928. Psychoanalysis would be dismissed because it was slow, expensive and
potentially subversive. Quicker results were demanded, without the need for
unscripted private conversations between analyst and patient. The emphasis
shifted from analysis to re-education. Hypnosis, which had always been more
respectable in Russia than in Britain, became the therapy of choice. It was
quick, it was cheap, it did not involve the discussion of sexuality which an
increasingly prurient society found so disturbing, and it put the practitioner
firmly in control of any professional encounter.24 At the same time, the
engineers of human souls turned their attention from the individual to the
mass. Psychiatrist A.B. Zalkind summed up the new approach. In 1928 he
announced that
... in the USSR as nowhere else, enormous attention is drawn to the study of human personality. The toiling mass, the mass human personality, growing swiftly and creatively,
expanding the boundaries of their aspirations, have come to power, to culture, to construction.
The plan for the future was clear. 'These masses', he continued, 'ignored by
bourgeois science, must be studied anew both in the sense of identifying their
genuine characteristics and in the sense of identifying methods of educational
influence on them.'25Any individual who fell short of the collective criteria, or
who rejected socially-sanctioned norms, would eventually come to be regarded
as deviant.
21 Etkind, op. cit., 281.
22 N.N. Traugott, cited in Etkind, op. cit., 253.
23 Etkind, op. cit., 243.
24 Information supplied by Prof. V.A. Ababkov, Bekhterev Institute, St Petersburg, 21 October
1997.
25 Cited in David Joravsky, Russian Psychology: A Critical History (Oxford 1989), 250.
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in Twentieth-century
Traumaand Shell-shock
Russia
Merridale:
45
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Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 35 No I
but whatever their merits, there is no doubt that Soviet culture had roots
which went deeper than revolutionary Marxism.
Social and economic reality for ordinary people was also a collective matter
throughout the Stalinist period. Most city-dwellers lived in communal apartments, sharing service spaces such as kitchens and bathrooms with several
other families. Family groups themselves often shared the same room, and it
was not uncommon for more than one family, and several generations, to
occupy a single large room, divided, if they were lucky, by curtains. Under
these conditions, the concept of private emotion was likely to remain alien.
Grief and pain, like joy, childbirth and domestic violence, were shared because
they were public, at least within the bounds of the collective. At work, too, the
collective, the brigade, was the most common organizational form. From
home to school and then to the factory or the fields, Soviet citizens were far
less isolated than their counterparts in Britain or America. The sanctions
against all forms of deviance, including morbid introspection, began within
the family and were reinforced in every area of daily life.
It seems reasonable to allow that it is against this background, as well as in
the context of deliberate policy, that the disappearance of individual trauma as
an issue in public debate must be understood. But the other influence on emotional openness was more violent. Millions of Soviet citizens suffered unspeakable hardship and loss in the 1930s. Because much of this was state-directed
and officially denied, there was no forum at all - in many instances not even
the family - in which it could be discussed. Time after time, respondents told
me that the only way to cope with famine, arrest, hunger and bereavement was
'to get on with our lives'. Famine survivors also describe how hunger led to a
numbing indifference to their surroundings, their future, and ultimately to
their own emotions.28 Anna Larina, the young wife of Nikolai Bukharin,
described a similar 'greying' of her world as she awaited the news of his
execution from her prison cell. 'I could not believe', she wrote later, 'that
somewhere life went on in this world, and human happiness and earthly
pleasures.'29 'The torpor common to us all' was how Anna Akhmatova
described the mood of the late 1930s. Torpor, however, like depression, can
easily be rendered silent. Private pain went underground. The official slogans
of the time left no room for pity. 'You cannot make an omelette without
breaking eggs', people muttered, or 'when you cut wood, the chips fly'. It
became dangerous, in a world of informers and guilt by association, to weep
for supposed enemies of the people. All eyes were to be fixed upon the future,
28 Several dozen examples might be cited from interviews conducted by the author in 1997 and
1998, including those with survivors of the Leningrad blockade and the famines of 1933 and
1946. A total of 75 individual and group interviews were held, involving nearly 200 respondents.
The respondents included survivors of the Civil War, the 1933 famine, collectivization and the
purges, the Great Patriotic War, the Holocaust, the wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya, and the
disaster at Chernobyl. In addition, medical and psychiatric personnel were interviewed, as well as
social and aid workers, priests and professional carers.
29 Anna Larina, 'Nezabyvaemoe', Znamya, 1988, no. 10, 145.
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Traumaand Shell-shock
Merridale:
in Twentieth-century
Russia
47
on the buildingof socialism,and on the collectivegoals embodiedin the person of ComradeStalin. As we shall see, in psychologicalterms at least, the
war, which at least permittedcertainkinds of mourning,may have come as
somethingof a reliefto those who had sufferedduringthe decadesof repression.
fascism', people explained, 'it was a fight for survival.' True, witnesses still
remember the individual who went mad under the pressure, who shot a score
of his comrades and then turned the gun on himself, who ran screaming into
the enemy's fire, who was found naked and frozen a day after his strange
desertion. But such people are regarded as rare exceptions.
People who spent their war behind the lines take a similar view. Only the
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Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 35 No I
most intrusive questioning can now elicit stories of the panic and distress
which affected almost everyone in the darkest years of the war. The evidence
for it has been overlooked for decades by Soviet historians anxious to tell a
different, more heroic, story. Survivors who gather to remember still reiterate
the official tale, comforting each other with stories of endurance and comradeship. No one denies that their suffering, on a physical level, was unparalleled. But the idea that they have sustained any psychological damage is
entirely alien. 'I did have nightmares', a woman assured me. 'But what is this
post-dramatic (sic) stress?' One of the reasons I was interviewing her was that
she had been working as a psychologist immediately after the war. She assured
me that she had continued to consult psychological journals and to meet
professional colleagues ever since. 'Trauma?' a group of doctors echoed. 'We
would have been happy if there had been enough to eat.'
It must be admitted that the people I interviewed, more than half a century
after the event, shared a self-selected characteristic. 'It helped that we were
young', conceded an ex-nurse. 'I would not want to do it now.' But many of
them described how their parents (and particularly their mothers) had been
even more resilient. 'Mother survived the famine of 1921', was a common
remark, 'so she knew how to cope in 1942.' The myth, and it is almost universally believed, is that almost all Russians, whatever their age, got through the
war without suffering mental trauma. Archival evidence, however, confirms
that this was not the case. The victims may have disappeared from memory,
but they were numerous. At the time, some of the more perceptive of health
professionals were concerned that the cause of their nervous or somatic symptoms should not be overlooked. As a group of doctors wrote in 1948: 'The
pathology of high blood-pressure called Leningrad hypertension arises from
two factors: a prolonged and intensive nervous-psychological trauma and
dietary deficiencies. ... Of these, the nervous-psychological factor is of the
first importance.' The same report also noted the primacy of fear as a cause of
hypertension, and it observed that the most transparently neurotic symptoms
- such as those formerly associated with shell-shock - were more common
among survivors of bombardment and artillery fire than among those who had
merely starved.30
The idea of unbreakable mental resilience, then, is as much a myth in Russia
as it is anywhere else. But the story of the Leningraders' war neurosis has
vanished from memory. Even professional psychiatrists have forgotten that
some Soviet survivors bore scars that went deeper than the flesh. One of the
most respected professionals in St Petersburg, for example, a woman in her
late forties, assured me that there was no evidence of post-traumatic stress
after the blockade. Her elderly colleague, now retired, corrected her. 'There
was', she said, 'but no one ever talks about it now. There were even suicides.
30 Gosudartvennyi Arkhiv Goroda Sankt-Peterburga (GAGSPb), 9156/4/321,14-15, report on
the neurological origins of hypertension among blockade survivors, principal signatory Prof. I. Ia.
Razdol'skii.
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in Twentieth-century
Russia
Memdale:Traumaand Shell-shock
49
Readers familiar with British myths such as the Dunkirk spirit or 'mucking
in together' during the Blitz may wonder whether the Soviet war mentality was
so very different. The Soviet war effort, as an example of collective solidarity,
is not unique. Most combatant nations, and certainly Great Britain, saw fewer
reports of individual trauma in the second world war than they had in the first.
The Soviet survivors' statements that they were fighting for their neighbours,
for Russia, or for their town or district all have parallels in other parts of
Europe. Many go one step further, in fact, and deny altogether that they
'really' fought, in the famous phrase, 'for the motherland, for Stalin'. 'I think I
was fighting for my city', a veteran mused. 'I don't think the motherland really
featured.' As for Stalin, his name was invoked less, in some quarters at least, as
the crisis intensified. Soldiers sang songs of hatred for Hitler, not love for
Stalin.34Many turned to God, for 'it is one thing to flirt with death, and an31 Interview with Valentina Karlovna Myager and Nina Pavlovna Vyanchakova, 20 October
1997.
32 This was one of the abiding impressions described by historian, Mikhail Gefter, himself a
veteran of this generation. See E. Iu. Zubkova, Obshchestvo i reformy, 1945-1964 (Moscow
1993), 19.
33 Zubkova, op. cit., 36.
34 See L.N. Pushkarev, 'Iz nablyudenii nad tvorchestvom frontovikov', Etnograficheskie
obozrenie, 1995, no. 4, 25-35.
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Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 35 No I
other to die in fact'. The son of a political activist remembered his father's
blockade diary from 1942. Page after page read simply, 'God save us, God
help us.'35
But in the public-private world of the Soviet collective, Stalin could never be
far away. This, surely, is the crucial issue. For whatever parallels there were
between Soviet and west European combatants, military or civilian, there can
be no denying that the Soviet people were not free. Twenty years of increasingly authoritarian rule, a decade at least of consistent repression, and years of
pervasive propaganda had not failed to change them. Even in the midst of the
war, waverers and spreaders of panic were liable to be shot on the spot. The
snipers who carried out this task show little regret even now, affirming in their
old age the certainty that ideological unity was paramount.36Then as previously and for decades after, the state's aspirations were undeniably totalitarian. But did the system work? Was there an extra element in Soviet sacrifice, the product of a generation of Stalinism? Did it influence the history of
individual trauma? The answer which survivors give is that there was. Their
testimony suggests that it has had profound implications, not only for the
Great Patriotic War, but more generally also for the subsequent history of
individual pain and victimhood.
The crucial ingredient which was missing from Soviet esprit de corps was
choice. It may, of course, be argued that powerful social sanctions operated in
the democratic systems, denying to all but the most determined their option to
object, opt out or even grumble about the personal costs of winning the war.
But the same kinds of sanction existed in Russia, too. The crucial difference
was that in Soviet Russia the option to speak out in the teeth of social opprobrium did not exist. Dissidents were liable to be arrested. Thousands - the
numbers are not easy to count - faced death, a bullet in the neck or the long
cold ride to Kolyma. The years which followed the peace did not see a relaxation. Under the circumstances, there was nothing to be gained, in Soviet
Russia, from cynicism (of a kind which later became fashionable in western
Europe) or even from the cultivation of a personal tale of victimhood. After a
few years of numb silence, the only acceptable account of one's war was the
one which could be shared in the singing of patriotic songs, the exchange of
endurance stories and the solemn commemoration of the heroic dead.
Victimhood was not an attractive option in medical terms, either. At the
front, the only treatment for psychological trauma available to the small band
of military psychiatrists was overwhelming chemical intervention. Tranquilisers were the drug of choice, and their purpose was to return the soldier to
active service within days. The maximum time allowed for treatment, said one
textbook, was three weeks.37This was the kind of heroic medicine which suited the Stalinist regime. But it was also the only realistic option in practical
35 Anonymous respondent interviewed in St Petersburg, 22 October 1997.
36 Interview in Moscow, 1997; respondent anonymous.
37 The treatment was described in textbooks for military psychiatrists such as Voennaya psikhiatriya (Leningrad 1974).
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Merridale:
Traumaand Shell-shock
in Twentieth-century
Russia
51
terms. As it was, there were very few reports of shell-shock among Soviet
troops in this war. Among civilians, too, the extent of psychiatric illness arising from artillery fire, bombardment, loss, bereavement and starvation was
never publicized. Even the patients were reluctant to draw attention to themselves. The records of psychiatric hospitals in the Leningrad region from 1945
onwards suggest some of the reasons why.38There was no money, for a start,
the hospitals were run-down and cold, and there were very few staff to
support in-patients. More worryingly, there were almost no male staff to
restrain those whose illness made them violent or aggressive. In-patients fled
whenever they could.39 Patients with head injuries refused surgical or other
intervention.40Most of the out-patients who turned up with stories of war or
blockade neurosis were also suffering from more immediate problems, principally vitamin deficiencies and anxiety arising from practical difficulties such as
homelessness. The best the medical services could do with the resources they
had was to prescribe food supplements, talk to the municipal housing authorities, and hope that the patients would find their own way. Most seem to have
done so. Any whiff of madness or debility, after all, was also likely to damage
a person's economic and social prospects irreparably. Referrals for hypertension, anxiety and stress dropped dramatically after 1946. Even the amputees
came less often. There were almost no drugs to give them anyway.
More troubling evidence of the coercive suppression of trauma came from a
group of people who had been injured as children by landmines, unexploded
grenades or stray bullets. Some were blind, others suffered amputation or the
loss of movement in their remaining limbs. All would have been shocked by
the experience at the time. In many cases, physical injury was compounded by
grief - the loss of parents or the destruction of a home. But none of them
mentioned psychological trauma when we talked about their lives one afternoon in the Ukrainian city of Kiev.41For them, mutilation was only the beginning of a life-long struggle to be allowed to remain visible, to lead a reasonably
normal life in full view of their fellow-citizens, to go to university. Many were
stigmatized because they could not fulfil their military service obligations. The
suggestion was encouraged that they might have injured themselves deliberately in order to avoid serving in the army. Neighbours shunned them. Far
from receiving pensions, bursaries, or special encouragement, in other words,
these innocent casualties of war, most of whom were under twelve years old
when they were injured, were virtually ostracized. The same fate befell most
genuine psychiatric casualties of the war. They disappeared into institutions
where the regime of treatment, to say nothing of the general living conditions,
38 Contained in Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Goroda Sankt-Peterburga (GAGSPb), fond 9156 opis
4. The information which follows relates to the years 1942-8.
39 GAGSPb, 9156/4/491, 1. The same report notes an increased incidence of 'accidents', but
whether this was a euphemism for suicide is unclear.
40 GAGSPb, 9156/4/1516, 104 and elsewhere.
41 Interview, June 1998.
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Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 35 No I
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in Twentieth-century
Merridale:
Traumaand Shell-shock
Russia
53
We should not be surprised by this. The trendiest western cognitive psychotherapy only offers a de-ideologized version of the same idea: give the
patients a sense of purpose, encourage them to adopt a positive outlook, steer
them away from a morbid focus upon their personal darkness. A handbook
distributed by the British Broadcasting Corporation in conjunction with a programme entitled 'How to be Happy' urges converts to smile at themselves in
the bathroom mirror for two minutes every morning.45Soviet citizens transcended the dirt, poverty, pain and deprivation of their real lives by smiling
into a distorting mirror whose reflection promised victory, moral superiority
and social justice. The ultimate catalyst for clearing non-clinical depression,
according to Professor Michael Argyle, one of the psychiatrists who participated in the BBC's programme, is Scottish country dancing, 'a very powerful
package', in his words, which encourages its practitioners to take exercise in a
co-operative and collective way.46During the Great Patriotic War, the Communist Party's Agitation and Propaganda Department issued free harmonicas
to the troops on much the same basis.47
As far as shell-shock was concerned, in its modern form of post-traumatic
stress, the mirror cracked during Brezhnev's war in Afghanistan. Like the
USA's conflict in Vietnam, this was a war which the rest of society, the bulk of
the Soviet people, preferred to ignore. The young men who fought it, many of
whom were inspired by the heroic stories of their fathers' generation, came
home to find that their sacrifice had earned them little approval. On the contrary, many were shunned by people who were beginning to view the Afghan
war as a mistake committed by an increasingly unpopular government. But the
war did not fade away for many of those who had fought it. Afghan veterans
had seen fear, injury and death on a scale and in a setting which marked them
for life. It was only a matter of time, in the more liberal atmosphere of the
1980s, before some would reach out to their American counterparts. Joint
meetings were arranged, and selected Soviet Afghantsy were even offered programmes of treatment in California and elsewhere.48The money for this came
largely from the USA, and it was the USA which funded most of the conferences to which Afghan veterans travelled, thereby enjoying their first taste
of capitalism and their first experience of fully-funded western psychotherapeutic (including alternative psychotherapeutic) care.49For many of them the
combination of travel, attention, talk and treatment seems to have helped.
They were largely responsible for introducing a new expression into the
Russian language: post-travmaticheskii stress. They use it, and so do foreign
45 Brian Edwards and Wendy Sturgess, How to be Happy, BBC Education, 1996, 12.
46 Ibid., 20.
47 Russian Centre for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History
(RTsKhIDNI), 89/11/1, 9.
48 Interview with a group of Afghan veterans, Zelenograd, 10 February 1997.
49 The group of veterans I met were especially keen on the approach used by Dr Benjamin
Colodzin of the Olympia Center, California. See B. Colodzin, How to Survive Trauma (New York
1992).
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Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 35 No I
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55
in Twentieth-century
Russia
Traumaand Shell-shock
Merridale:
which characterized Soviet culture at its best are among the things most frequently mourned by Russians as they contemplate the incursions of capitalism.
Veterans of war, repression and disaster in the former Soviet Union are
sceptical of individual therapy, self-analysis and talk. Most have survived until
now by suppressing their memories and focussing on work and family.
Anyone who forces them to confront the hidden past risks wakening images
which still have the power to injure. The last thing most Soviet survivors want,
especially as their whole lives have been built around concealment, is to be
encouraged to explore their personal histories. 'Even now', a former sniper
confided, 'we still have nightmares .... I wake up and find it hard to believe
that I am still alive. And I don't want to recall it.'52Among the respondents
who talked to me, several admitted that the conversation would leave them
sleepless and distressed. Others refused to see me, explaining their unhelpful
decision (they always blamed themselves) on the reaction they had suffered
after talking to other European interviewers. And yet, almost everyone I met,
including several who acknowledge that the pain in their lives has damaged
their mental and physical health, was neither incapacitated nor diminished by
their choice of lifelong silence. On the contrary, the majority were fulfilled and
powerful individuals. Many, indeed, were inspiring, of a presence too large, in
some cases, for the tiny flats into which their lives are squeezed.
Citizens of the democratic and affluent west may question the ethical basis
of this survivors' culture. Although it grew from deep popular roots, Stalinism's collectivist and stoical approach to mental trauma was basically coercive. But a tradition whose origins were dubious is not necessarily bankrupt. A
people accustomed to silence, or at least to a certain kind of tact, does not
necessarily need to be coerced again, this time into the disclosures characteristic of a society where victimhood is acceptable and even faintly chic. 'We have
our own ways of dealing with trauma', the bishop insisted at my conference.
'Perhaps you should be considering whether yours would be as effective if
your people had shared our history.'
CatherineMerridale
is Senior Lecturer in European History at the University of Bristol.
She is the author of Moscow Politics and the Rise of Stalin
(Macmillan 1990) and of numerous articles on Stalinist politics, and
on death, mourning, trauma and memory in Soviet Russia. She is
currently working on a book on death and memory in modern
Russia.
52
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