LUIS PICHEL VS PRUDENCIO ALONZO (G.R. No. L-36902 Jan.

30, 1982)
FACTS: Alonzo was awarded by the Government a parcel of land in Basilan City in
accordance with RA 477. The award was cancelled by the Board of Liquidators on January
27, 1965 on the ground that, previous thereto, plaintiff was proved to have alienated the land
to another, in violation of law. In 1972, plaintiff's rights to the land were reinstated.
On August 14, 1968, Alonzo and his wife sold to Luis Pichel all the fruits of the coconut trees
which may be harvested in the land in question for the period, September 15, 1968 to January
1, 1976, in consideration of P4,200.00. Even as of the date of sale, however, the land was still
under lease to Ramon Sua, and it was the agreement that part of the consideration of the
sale, in the sum of P3,650.00, was to be paid by Pichel directly to Ramon Sua so as to
release the land from the clutches of the latter.
Pending said payment Alonzo refused to allow the Pichel to make any harvest. Later, Pichel
for the first time since the execution of the deed of sale in his favor, caused the harvest of the
fruit of the coconut trees in the land.
Pichel filed for the annulment of the contract on the ground that it violated the provisions of
R.A. 477, which states that lands awarded under the said law shall not be subject to
encumbrance or alienation, otherwise the awardee shall no longer be entitled to apply for
another piece of land. RTC ruled that although the agreement in question is denominated by
the parties as a deed of sale of fruits of the coconut trees found in the vendor's land, it
actually is, for all legal intents and purposes, a contract of lease of the land itself
ISSUE: 1. WON the subject matter of the sale is valid. (YES)
2. WON the sale of the coconut fruits violated RA 477. (NO)
HELD:
1st issue: The Deed of Sale is precisely what it purports to be. It is a document evidencing the
agreement of herein parties for the sale of coconut fruits of the lot, and not for the lease of the
land itself as found by the lower Court. In clear and express terms, the document defines the
object of the contract thus: "the herein sale of the coconut fruits are for an the fruits on the
aforementioned parcel of land during the years ...(from) SEPTEMBER 15, 1968; up to
JANUARY 1, 1976."
Moreover, as petitioner correctly asserts, the document in question expresses a valid contract
of sale. It has the essential elements of a contract of sale as defined under Article 1485 of the
New Civil Code which provides thus:
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer
the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price
certain in money or its equivalent.A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.
The subject matter of the contract of sale in question are the fruits of the coconut trees on the
land during the years from September 15, 1968 up to January 1, 1976, which subject matter
is a determinate thing. Under Article 1461 of the New Civil Code, things having a potential
existence may be the object of the contract of sale. And in Sibal vs. Valdez, 50 Phil. 512,
pending crops which have potential existence may be the subject matter of the sale.
According to Mechem, a valid sale may be made of a thing, which though not yet actually in
existence, is reasonably certain to come into existence as the natural increment or usual
incident of something already in existence, and then belonging to the vendor, and the title will
vest in the buyer the moment the thing comes into existence.
2nd issue: The contract was clearly a "sale of the coconut fruits." The vendor sold, transferred
and conveyed "by way of absolute sale, all the coconut fruits of his land," thereby divesting
himself of all ownership or dominion over the fruits during the seven- year period. The
possession and enjoyment of the coconut trees cannot be said to be the possession and

enjoyment of the land itself because these rights are distinct and separate from each other,
the first pertaining to the accessory or improvements (coconut trees) while the second, to the
principal (the land). A transfer of the accessory or improvement is not a transfer of the
principal. It is the other way around, the accessory follows the principal. Hence, the sale of the
nuts cannot be interpreted nor construed to be a lease of the trees, much less extended
further to include the lease of the land itself.
The grantee of a parcel of land under R.A. No. 477 is not prohibited from alienating or
disposing of the natural and/or industrial fruits of the land awarded to him. What the law
expressly disallows is the encumbrance or alienation of the land itself or any of the permanent
improvements thereon. While coconut trees are permanent improvements of a land, their nuts
are natural or industrial fruits which are meant to be gathered or severed from the trees, to be
used, enjoyed, sold or otherwise disposed of by the owner of the land. Herein respondents,
as the grantee of Lot No. 21 from the Government, had the right and prerogative to sell the
coconut fruits of the trees growing on the property.
BELINDA TANEDO vs CA AND SPOUSES RICARDO AND TERESITA TANEDO (G.R. No.
104482 January 22, 1996)
FACTS: On October 20, 1962, Lazardo Tanedo executed a notarized deed of absolute sale in
favor of his eldest brother, Ricardo Tanedo, and the latter's wife, Teresita Barera, private
respondents herein, whereby he conveyed to the latter in consideration of P1,500.00, "1
hectare of whatever share I shall have over Lot No. 191 of the cadastral survey of Gerona,
Province of Tarlac and covered by Title T-13829 of the Register of Deeds of Tarlac", the said
property being his "future inheritance" from his parents. Upon the death of his father Matias,
Lazaro executed an "Affidavit of Conformity" dated Feb 28, 1980 to "re-affirm, respect,
acknowledge and validate the sale I made in 1962."
On January 13, 1981, Lazaro executed another notarized deed of sale in favor of private
respondents covering his "undivided 1/12 of a parcel of land known as Lot 191". He
acknowledged therein his receipt of P10,000.00 as consideration therefor. In Feb 1981,
Ricardo learned that Lazaro sold the same property to his children, petitioners herein, through
a deed of sale dated Dec 29, 1980. Then, private respondents recorded the Deed of Sale in
their favor in the Registry of Deeds and the corresponding entry was made in TCT No.
166451.
Petitioners on July 16, 1982 filed a complaint for rescission (plus damages) of the deeds of
sale executed by Lazaro in favor of private respondents covering the property inherited by
Lazaro from his father. Petitioners claimed that their father, Lazaro, executed an "Absolute
Deed of Sale" conveying to his 10 children his allotted portion tinder the extrajudicial partition
executed by the heirs of Matias, which deed included the land in litigation (Lot 191).
Petitioners also presented in evidence: (1) a private writing purportedly prepared and signed
by Matias stating that it was his desire that whatever inheritance Lazaro would receive from
him should be given to his (Lazaro's) children; (2) a typewritten document signed by Lazaro in
the presence of 2 witnesses, wherein he confirmed that he would voluntarily abide by the
wishes of his father, Matias, to give to his (Lazaro's) children all the property he would inherit
from the latter; and (3) a letter of Lazaro to his daughter, Carmela, stating that his share in the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of his father was intended for his children, petitioners
herein.
Private respondents presented in evidence a "Deed of Revocation of a Deed of Sale",
wherein Lazaro revoked the sale in favor of petitioners for the reason that it was "simulated or
fictitious without any consideration whatsoever".
Lazaro executed a sworn statement which virtually repudiated the contents of the Deed of
Revocation of a Deed of Sale and the Deed of Sale in favor of private respondents. However,
Lazaro testified that he sold the property to Ricardo, and that it was a lawyer who induced him
to execute a deed of sale in favor of his children after giving him P5.00 to buy a "drink".

The trial court decided in favor of private respondents, holding that petitioners failed "to
adduce a preponderance of evidence to support (their) claim." On appeal, the CA affirmed the
decision of the trial court, ruling that the Deed of Sale was valid and that its registration in
good faith vested title in said respondents.
ISSUE: Is the sale of a future inheritance valid? NO.
HELD: The Court ruled that pursuant to Article 1347 of the Civil Code, "no contract may be
entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law."
Consequently, said contract made in 1962 is not valid and cannot be the source of any right
nor the creator of any obligation between the parties.
Hence, the "affidavit of conformity" dated Feb 28, 1980, insofar as it sought to validate or
ratify the 1962 sale, is also useless and, in the words of the respondent Court, "suffers from
the same infirmity." Even private respondents in their memorandum concede this.
However, the documents that are critical to the resolution of this case are: (a) the deed of sale
of January 13, 1981 in favor of private respondents covering Lazaro's undivided inheritance of
(1/12) share in Lot No. 191, which was subsequently registered on June 7, 1982; and (b) the
deed of sale dated Dec 29, 1980 in favor of petitioners covering the same property. These two
documents were executed after the death of Matias and after a deed of extra-judicial
settlement of his (Matias') estate was executed, thus vesting in Lazaro actual title over said
property. In other words, these dispositions, though conflicting, were no longer infected with
the infirmities of the 1962 sale.
Petitioners contend that what was sold on Jan 13, 1981 was only one- half hectare out of Lot
No. 191, citing as authority the trial court's decision. As earlier pointed out, what is on review
in these proceedings by this Court is the CA's decision which correctly identified the
subject matter of the Jan 13, 1981 sale to be the entire undivided 1/12 share of Lazaro in Lot
No. 191 and which is the same property disposed of on Dec 29, 1980 in favor of petitioners.
Article 1544 of the CC governs the preferential rights of vendees in cases of multiple sales, as
follows: Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in
good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in
good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. Should there be no inscription, the
ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the
absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
The property in question is land, an immovable, and following the law, ownership shall belong
to the buyer who in good faith registers it first in the registry of property. Thus, although the
deed of sale in favor of private respondents was later than the one in favor of petitioners,
ownership would vest in the former because of the undisputed fact of registration. On the
other hand, petitioners have not registered the sale to them at all.
Petitioners contend that they were in possession of the property and that private respondents
never took possession thereof. As between two purchasers, the one who registered the sale
in his favor has a preferred right over the other who has not registered his title, even if the
latter is in actual possession of the immovable property.
MARTINEZ VS CA (G.R. L-31271 April 29, 1974)
FACTS:
The spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez, , are the registered owners of two (2)
parcels of land located in Lubao, Pampanga. Both parcels of land are fishponds and the
property involved in this case is the 2nd parcel of land.

The disputed property was originally owned by one Paulino Montemayor, who secured a
"titulo real" over it way back in 1883. After the death of Paulino Montemayor the said property
passed to his successors-in-interest, Maria Montemayor and Donata Montemayor, who in
turn, sold it, as well as the first parcel, to a certain Potenciano Garcia.
Because Potenciano Garcia was prevented by the then municipal president of Lubao from
restoring the dikes constructed on the contested property, the former, filed with the CFI
against municipal president to restrain the latter in his official capacity from molesting him in
the possession of the lot.
The Court, by decision promulgated the preliminary injunction and the dikes around the
property in question remained closed until a portion thereof was again opened just before the
outbreak of the Pacific War. On April 17, 1925. Potenciano Garcia applied for the registration
of both parcels of land in his name and the CFI granted the registration. Thereafter, the
ownership of these properties changed hands until eventually they were acquired by the
herein appellee spouses.
To avoid any untoward incident, the petitioners agreed to refer the matter to the Committee on
Rivers and Streams. Said Sub-Committee submitted its report, which said that the subject
property was not a public river but a private fishpond owned by the herein spouses.
ISSUE: W/N the subject property belongs to the petitioners. (NO)
HELD: IT IS A PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMINION
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that the lot of the petitioners-appellants is a public stream
and that said title should be cancelled and the river covered reverted to public domain, is
assailed by the petitioners-appellants as being a collateral attack on the indefeasibility of the
torrens title originally issued in 1925 in favor of the petitioners-appellants' predecessor-ininterest, Potenciano Garcia, which is violative of the rule of res judicata. It is argued that as
the decree of registration issued by the Land Registration Court was not re-opened through a
petition for review filed within one (1) year from the entry of the decree of title, the certificate
of title issued pursuant thereto in favor of the appellants for the land covered thereby is no
longer open to attack under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) and the
jurisprudence on the matter established by this Tribunal. Section 38 of the Land Registration
Act cited by appellants expressly makes a decree of registration, which ordinarily makes the
title absolute and indefeasible.
At the time of the enactment of Section 496, one right recognized or existing under the law is
that provided for in Article 339 of the old Civil Code which reads as follows:
Property of public ownership is:
1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges
constructed by the State, and banks shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character. (Par.
1)
The above-mentioned properties are parts of the public domain intended for public use, are
outside the commerce of men and, therefore, not subject to private appropriation.
A simple possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens system does not necessarily
make the possessor a true owner of all the property described therein. If a person obtains title
under the Torrens system which includes by mistake or oversight, lands which cannot be
registered under the Torrens system, he does not by virtue of said certificate alone become
the owner of the land illegally included.
It is useless for the appellant now to allege that she has obtained certificate of title No. 329 in
her favor because the said certificate does not confer upon her any right to the creek in
question, inasmuch as the said creek, being of the public domain, is included among the

various exceptions enumerated in Section 39 of Act 496 to which the said certificate is subject
by express provision of the law.
Torrens certificate of title does not operate when the land covered thereby is not capable of
registration.
It is, therefore, clear that the authorities cited by the appellants as to the conclusiveness and
incontestability of a Torrens certificate of title do not apply here. The Land Registration Court
has no jurisdiction over non-registerable properties, such as public navigable rivers which are
parts of the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of a
private applicant.
HEIRS OF ARTURO REYES VS SOCCO-BELTRAN (G.R. No. 176474 November 27, 2008)
FACTS: The subject property in this case is a parcel of land originally identified as Lot No. 6B (with an area of 360 square meters).It was originally part of a larger parcel of land,
measuring 1,022 square metersallocated to the Spouses Marcelo Laquian and
ConstanciaSocco (Spouses Laquian). Upon their death, they left the original parcel of landto
Constanciassiblings(Filomena,Isabel, Miguel R. Socco, and Elena Socco-Beltran). Pursuant
to an unnotarized document entitled Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased
Constancia R. Socco, executed by Constancias heirs sometime in 1965, the parcel of land
was partitioned into three lotsLot No. 6-A, Lot No.6-B, and Lot No. 6-C. The subject
property, Lot No. 6-B, was adjudicated to respondent Elena Socco-Beltran, but no title had
been issued in her name.
So respondent Socco-Beltran filed an application for the purchase of Lot No. 6-B before the
DAR, alleging that it was adjudicated in her favor in the extra-judicial settlement of
ConstanciaSoccos estate.
Now, petitioners, the heirs of the late Arturo Reyes, filed their protest to respondents petition
before the DAR on the ground that the subject property was sold by respondents brother,
Miguel R. Socco, in favor of their father, Arturo Reyes, as evidenced by the Contract to Sell,
dated 5 September 1954. Petitioners averred that they took physical possession of the
subject property in 1954 and had been uninterrupted in their possession of the said property
since then.
Investigation was conducted by the legal officer Pinlac, and in the end, the legal officer
recommended the approval of respondents petition for issuance of title over the subject
property, ruling that respondent was qualified to own the subject property pursuant to Article
1091 of the New Civil Code. However, DAR Regional Director Mr. Acosta, dismissed
respondents petition for issuance of title over the subject property on the ground that
respondent was not an actual tiller and had abandoned the said property for 40 years. It went
up to the Department Secretary, then to the OP.
Aggrieved, the petitioners went the to the Court of Appeals but it promulgated its decision,
affirming the that of the Office of the President. It held that petitioners could not have been
actual occupants of the subject property, since actual occupancy requires the positive act of
occupying and tilling the land, not just the introduction of an unfinished skeletal structure
thereon. The Contract to Sell on which petitioners based their claim over the subject property
was executed by Miguel Socco, who was not the owner of the said property and, therefore,
had no right to transfer the same.
ISSUES: 1. WON title to the property was transferred to petitioners by virtue of the Contract
to Sell executed by Miguel Socco. (NO)
2. WON petitioners are in OCEAN possession of the property since 1954 (more than 30
years). (NO)
HELD:

Petitioners claim over the subject property is anchored on the Contract to Sell executed
between Miguel Socco and Arturo Reyes. Petitioners additionally allege that they and their
predecessor-in- interest, Arturo Reyes, have been in possession of the subject lot since 1954
for an uninterrupted period of more than 40 years.
Petitioners cannot derive title to the subject property by virtue of the Contract to Sell. It was
unmistakably stated in the Contract and made clear to both parties thereto that the vendor,
Miguel R. Socco, was not yet the owner of the subject property and was merely expecting to
inherit the same as his share as a co-heir of Constancias estate. It was also declared in the
Contract itself that Miguel R. Soccos conveyance of the subject to the buyer, Arturo Reyes,
was a conditional sale. It is, therefore, apparent that the sale of the subject property in favor of
Arturo Reyes was conditioned upon the event that Miguel Socco would actually inherit and
become the owner of the said property. Absent such occurrence, Miguel R. Socco never
acquired ownership of the subject property which he could validly transfer to Arturo Reyes.
Under Article 1459 of the Civil Code on contracts of sale, The thing must be licit and the
vendor must have a right to transfer ownership thereof at the time it is delivered. The
law specifically requires that the vendor must have ownership of the property at the time it is
delivered.
Petitioners claim that the property was constructively delivered to them in 1954 by virtue of
the Contract to Sell. However, as already pointed out by this Court, it was explicit in the
Contract itself that, at the time it was executed, Miguel R. Socco was not yet the owner of the
property and was only expecting to inherit it. Hence, there was no valid sale from which
ownership of the subject property could have transferred from Miguel Socco to Arturo Reyes.
Without acquiring ownership of the subject property, Arturo Reyes also could not have
conveyed the same to his heirs, herein petitioners.
Petitioners, nevertheless, insist that they physically occupied the subject lot for more than 30
years and, thus, they gained ownership of the property through acquisitive prescription.
In the case of San Miguel Corporation it was underscored that open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious occupation of property for more than 30 years must be no less than conclusive,
such quantum of proof being necessary to avoid the erroneous validation of actual fictitious
claims of possession over the property that is being claimed. In the present case, the
evidence presented by the petitioners falls short of being conclusive. Apart from their selfserving statement that they took possession of the subject property, the only proof offered to
support their claim was a general statement made Barangay Captain Carlos Gapero,
certifying that Arturo Reyes was the occupant of the subject property since peace time and
at present.
In contrast, respondents claim over the subject property is backed by sufficient evidence. Her
predecessors-in-interest, the spouses Laquian, have been identified as the original allocatees
who have fully paid for the subject property. The subject property was allocated to respondent
in the extrajudicial settlement by the heirs of Constancias estate which its authenticity or
legality was never put into question. Moreover, respondent has continuously paid for the
realty tax due on the subject property, a fact which, though not conclusive, served to
strengthen her claim over the property.