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You are here: Parliament home page > Parliamentary business > Publications and Records > Committee
Publications > All Select Committee Publications > Commons Select Committees > Home Affairs > Home
Affairs
Select Committee on Home Affairs Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence

APPENDIX 8
Memorandum by Mr Colin Greenwood
FIREARM CONTROLS IN BRITAIN PART I THE HISTORY OF FIREARMS CONTROLS
IN GREAT BRITAIN
EARLYLEGISLATION
1.EarlyEnglishlegislationrelatingtofirearmswasconcernedonlywiththedutyofthecitizentoarmhimselfforthedefenceofthe
realmandforthemaintenanceoforder.Restrictionsontheuseoffirearmswereconcernedonlywiththemaintenanceofcompulsory
practicewiththelongboworwiththepreservationofgame.Therewasaclearandrecognisedright,aswellasadutyforthesubjectto
havearmsforhisownprotectionandtodischargehisdutytothestate,thoughthosearmswouldnotnecessarilyhavebeenfirearms.
2.TheBillofRightsof1688madeitclearthatParliamentconsideredthattherewasarightforcitizenstohavearmsandbythemid
18thcenturytheCommonLawwasveryclearinrecognisingaconstitutionalrighttohavearmswhichParliamenthadnoauthorityto
breachingeneralterms.Intheearly19thcentury,perceiveddangersofmajordisorderresultedinthe"SixActs"amongstwhichwas
theSeizureofArmsAct1820whichappearedtoabrogatetherighttokeeparms.DebatesinParliamentmadeitclearthatthe
GovernmentacceptedthattherewasindeedarighttokeeparmsbuttheirviewwasthattheConstitutionallowedforqualificationof
thatrightforalimitedperiodandinspecificareas.TheSeizureofArmsActautomaticallylapsedaftertwoyearsandwasappliedonly
tospecifiedareasofthecountry.Untilthestartofthe20thcentury,therefore,therighttokeeparmswasvigorouslyupheldby
Parliamentandallattemptsatlegislationtorestrictarmsgenerallyorfirearmsinparticularfailedcompletely.
3.ThataspectoftheAmericanConstitutionwhichrelatestotherighttokeeparmsis,infact,nomorethanamodificationofthe

EnglishCommonLawatthetimeoftheAmericanRevolution,themajordifferencebeingthattheAmericanscreatedawritten
constitutionlargelybecausetheBritishhasignoredtherightsofthecolonists,notleastinrespectoftheirkeepingofarms.
4.SofarasisknownthepeculiarsituationofScotlandhasnotbeenresearched.Parliamentmayhaveabrogatedanyrighttokeep
armsbytheDisarmingActsof1715and1746,buttheSeizureofArmsAct1820appliedtoRenfrewshireandLanarkshire,sothatby
thattimeParliamentclearlyacceptedtherighttokeeparmsinScotlandanditmaybethattheDisarmingActsshouldbeseeninthe
sameconstitutionallightastheSeizureofArmsAct,aslegislationappliedforaspecificpurposetoaspecificarea.
5.Theevidenceshowsthat,despitetheexistenceofanabsoluterighttokeeparmsandtheverywidespreadownershipoffirearms
asevidencedbythestateoftheguntradeatthetime,theuseoffirearmsincrimeanddisorderwasextremelyrare.
6.ThePistolsActof1903wasthefirstpieceoflegislationtoattemptsomecontrolonpistols.Itrequiredonlythataprospective
purchaserprovideproofthatheheldagunlicenceavailableondemandatapostoffice,orthathewasahouseholder,orwasto
proceedabroad.Despiteitsapparentweakness,theActdidhaveaneffectonsalesofpistols,thoughthatdoesnotappeartohavein
anywayinfluencedthelowlevelsofmisusewhichexisted.
7.Specificincidentsduringtheearlypartofthe20thcenturypromptedvariouscallsforlegislation,oftensupportedbystatistics
which,thoughinsomewaysilluminating,arenotcomparablewithmodernstatistics.IncidentsliketheSydneyStreetSiegeresultedin
proposalstorequirelicensingofalienswhopossessedfirearms.NoneofthislegislationreachedtheStatuteBookand,atthetimeof
WorldWarI,firearmswerefreelyavailableand,forexample,officersinthearmedforcesprovidedthemselveswithpistolswhichthey
retainedwhentheyleft.Bythattimeautomaticweaponshadbecomeavailable.TheGatlinggunhadbeenavailablefromthe1860s
andtheMaximmachinegun,essentiallythesameasmachinegunsinserviceuntilveryrecently,becameavailableinthe1880s.Self
loadingpistolswereavailableinlargenumbersincludingtheMauser,Luger,ColtandvariousBrownings.Therevolversofthedaywere,
inessence,littledifferentfromtherevolversnowavailable.
8.Duringtheearlypartofthiscenturyanyone,respectablecitizen,criminalorlunatic,couldwalkintoagunshopandbuyany
firearmhewanted.Thelawprohibitedsalestopersonswhoweredrunkatthetime,andthosewishingtobuyapistolwouldhavebeen
requiredtocallfirstatapostofficetoobtaina10shillinggunlicence.Despitethat,statisticsprovidedbytheCommissionerofPolice
fortheMetropolisshowedthattheuseoffirearmsincrimewasveryrareindeedasthefollowingtableshows:

RETURN OF FIREARMS USED AND POSSESSED IN CRIME IN LONDON 1911-13 AND

1915-17

Used
British
Aliens
Total

100
23
123

1911-13
Possessed
76
27
103

Used
42
5
47

1913-17
Possessed
44
10
54

9.Thefiguresrelatetoathreeyearperiodandthetotalsaretherefore41and34casesreducingto16and18casesperyear,on
average.Theyrelatetoalltypesofcrime,atermwhichwouldbeverybroadlyinterpretedatthattime.Theuseoffirearmsin"crime"
inLondonwasreducedbytwothirdsataperiodwhenthemalepopulationofthecountrywasatarmsandwithoutanyrealrestriction
onthesaleorownershipoffirearms.Whatevercausedsucharesult,itcouldnothavebeenmerefirearmsavailability.
THEFIREARMSACT1920
10.TherewasgravegovernmentalconcernaboutthevastquantitiesofarmsandammunitionavailableattheendofWorldWarI
andaCommitteeunderSirErnleyBlackwellreviewedthesituationbothnationallyandinternationally.Therewasconcernthatarms
mightreach"savageorsemicivilisedtribesmeninoutlyingpartsoftheBritishEmpire"orthe"anarchistorintellectualmalcontentof
thegreatcitieswhoseweaponsarethebombandtheautomaticpistol".TheCommitteemetinprivateandreportedinconfidencewith
nooutsideconsultationsavewiththepolice.Theyproposedfirearmslegislationbased,tosomeextent,onHomeOfficeproposalsof
1911whichhadbeenshelvedbecauseofperceivedparliamentaryopposition.TheBlackwellCommitteerecommendedmorestringent
restrictions,proposingthattherighttopossessfirearmsbelimitedtopersonsholdingacertificate.
11.Inrespectofshotguns,theBlackwellCommitteereportsaid,"Casesarerareinwhichtheyareusedforanycriminalorillegal
purpose"andconcludedthatcontrolsonshotgunwoulddamageindustryandcauseunemployment.TheReportdoesnotprovideany
statisticstosupportthatviewandmuchoftheirsupposedevidenceisanecdotalorincompleteandwouldnothavewithstoodcareful
scrutiny.ThereturnfromtheMetropolitanPolicecitedaboveincludesallclassesoffirearmbutanotherreturnrelatingtotheuseof
firearmsagainstpoliceovertheperiod1908to1912indicatedthat"revolvers"werefoundtobeinvolvedin34of47casesreported.
Widerstatisticsforcrimessuchashomicidewerenotexaminedyetitseemshighlylikelyfromlaterresearchthattheshotgunswould
featureinasignificantnumberofhomicides.
12.Thesituationwasexacerbatedbyrevolutionabroadandcivildiscontentathome.ThediaryoftheCabinetSecretary,Thomas
Jones,publishedin1969revealsthattheCabinetwasextremelyconcernedaboutaBolshevikrevolutionarisingfromtheindustrial
unrestandsoughtinformationaboutthenumbersoftroopsandaircraftavailableforuseagainstinsurgentsinthiscountry.Therewas
ademandforaBilltolicensepersonstobeararms.TheHomeSecretarypointedoutthathehadsuchaBillreadybut,"Inthepast
therehavealwaysbeenobjections".Itwassaidthat,"Allweaponsoughttobeavailableforredistributiontofriendsofthe
Government".
13.ItseemsthattheBlackwellReportwould,likeallotherproposals,havefoundgravedifficultiesinParliamentbutforthecivil

situationatthetime.Intheevent,becauseofconcernaboutrevolutionwhichwasneverpubliclyexpressed,the1920Actwaspassed
withhardlyavoiceraisedagainstit.Itstermsgivesomesemblanceofretainingtherighttokeeparmsinthewordsused,"Afirearms
certificateshallbegranted"etc,butthelimitationsonthediscretionofthepoliceandtheburdenofproofplacedonanapplicant
effectivelynegatedthatrequirement.Forallpracticalpurposes,firearmcertificateswereandareissuedatthediscretionofthepolice
withanapplicantbeingrequiredtoestablishhiscase.
14.ThedefinitionofshotgunsexemptedfromcontrolsintheFirearmsAct1920includedanysmoothboregunwithoutreferenceto
barrellengthandthusincludedshotpistols.
15.Withinmonthsofthe1920ActcomingintoeffecttherewereanumberofcomplaintstotheHomeOfficeaboutoverzealous
policeenforcement.DeficienciesintheActhadtoberemediedbyamendinglegislationorsomeverystrongactionbytheEnglish
CourtswhichtheScottishCourtsrefusedtofollowinsomeinstances.InCafferatavWilson[1936]53TLR34theEnglishCourtssought
toremedyaperceiveddefectbydecidingthatsomethingwhichcouldnotdischargeamissilecouldbeafirearmifithadcomponent
parts.InKellyvMackinnon1983ScotsLawTimes9,theCourtinScotlandrejectedthatmethodofclosingasupposedloopholeand
refusedtofollowthejudgementonthegroundthattheEnglishlanguagecouldnotproperlybeconstruedinthatway.
THE1934DEPARTMENTALCOMMITTEE
16.AnumberofamendingActshadcreatedaneedforconsolidatinglegislationandaDepartmentalCommitteewasconvenedin
1934toconsiderthedefinitionandclassificationoffirearms.ThisCommitteestartedapatterninreviewsoffirearmslegislationwhich
hascontinued.Therewasnostatementoftheobjectivesofthelegislation,orofwhethertheexistinglegislationhadservedany
purpose.Therewasanassumptionthatcontrolmustbegoodandanydefectswouldberemediedbyfurthercontrols.Therewas
certainlynoattempttogobacktofirstprinciplesandtrytothinkthroughtheproblem,norwasthereanyrealconsultationwiththose
whowouldbeaffectedbyfurtherrestrictions.
17.TheCommittee'sreport(Cmd4758/34)recommendedanumberofchangeswhichwerelaterincorporatedintoaconsolidating
Act,theFirearmsAct1937,whichpreservedalltheprinciplesoftheexistinglegislationandintroducedonlyrelativelyminor
corrections.Afirearmcertificatewasrequired(effectively)forriflesandpistolsbutshotgunsremainedentirelyoutsidethesystemof
controls.
SHOTGUNS
18.InconsideringthequestionofshotgunsinalittlemoredepththeDepartmentalCommitteeproposedthatanyshotgunwitha
barrellessthan20inchesinlengthshouldbebroughtwithinthetypeofcontrolwhichappliedtoriflesandpistolsandthisproposal
wasgiveneffectintheFirearmsActof1936andincorporatedintothe1937Act.
19.Inrelationtoordinarysportingshotguns,theCommitteecouldfindnoreasontodifferfromtheviewofthe1919Committee.
Theynoted,however,thatshotgunswereresponsibleformoresuicidesandaccidentsthananyotherclassoffirearm.Theyalsonoted
thattheywereusedmorefrequentlythanotherclassesoffirearmincasesofmurder,attemptedmurderandmanslaughter,butthey
werenotthefavouriteweaponofthebanditandburglar.Unfortunately,thestatisticsprovidenocomparisonwiththosefirearms
subjecttocontrolssuchaspistols.
20.Inthethreeyearsended28February1934policereportedthatshotgunsofthetypenowsubjecttoashotguncertificatehad
beenusedin378suicides,28criminalfatalities,18casesofcriminaluseinvolvingseriousinjuryand20involvingslightinjury,10
casesofcriminalintimidationand18caseswherethecriminalwasfoundinpossession.Theyhasalsobeeninvolvedin161fatal
accidents,111accidentsinvolvingseriousinjuriesand101involvingslightinjuries.Thosefigureslackcredibilitybecauseofthe
absenceofanybasefigureandbecauseofthedoubtfulstateofpolicerecordkeepingatthetimeandmayberegardedasanecdotal
ratherthanassomethingwhichcanbecomparedtocurrentstatistics.Themostreliablefigureswillbethoserelatingtosuicide,and
criminalfatalitiesandseriousinjuries.
21.TheCommitteecommentedonthewidespreaduseandownershipofshotguns,particularlyinruralareasandconcludedthat,"..
.thenumbersindailyusebyprivatepersonsfarexceedsthoseofanyothertypeoffirearm,[and]thefiguresinthetablearenot
surprisingandcannotberegardedasexcessive".Theyrecommendedthatshotgunsshouldremainoutsidethesystemofcontrolsand
the1937Actexcludedshotgunswithbarrelsexceeding20inchesinlengthfromcertificatecontrol.
AIRGUNS
22.The1934Committeealsoconsideredairgunsindepth.Theynotedthatpolicefiguresforthethreeyearsended28February1934
showedthatairpistolshadbeenusedin43"criminalcases",sixofwhichinvolvedonlyintimidation,36possessiononarrestandinone
case"alunaticshotandinjuredababybeforecommittingsuicidebysettingahouseonfire".Airpistolswereinvolvedin84accidents
withnineseriousinjuriesandtheremainderslight.Personsunder17wereinvolvedin70ofthe84accidents.Airgunsandrifleswere
involvedin4casesofcriminaluse,oneinvolvinganairgunfiredtoresistarrest,onefoundonapersonatthetimeofhisarrestand
twosuicides(thenacrime).Theywereinvolvedin303accidents,1fatal,63involvingseriousinjuryand239slightinjury.In233of
thosecasesthepersondischargingtheairgunwasunder17.
23.Thosefiguresarenotcomparablewithstatisticsproducedtodayanditseemshighlylikelythatmostofthecasesclassifiedas
accidentsatthattimewouldbecategorisedasassaultsinmoderncriminalstatistics.
24.TheCommitteefeltthattheevidencedidnotjustifyimposingcertificatecontrolsonairgunsexceptthosedeclared"specially
dangerous",butthe1937Actdidimposerestrictionsonthesaleorsupplyoffirearmsorammunition(includingairgunsandairgun
ammunition)tothoseunder17.
25.Therateofarmedcrimeandmisuseoffirearmshadbeenverylowwhenthelegislationwasfirstintroducedandremainedso.
Statisticsrelatingtocrimessuchasrobberyinvolvingfirearmswerenotevencollected,aclearindicationoftheabsenceofany
significantproblem.PoliceadministrationoftheActseemstohavebeengenerallyliberal.Theonlyfiguresavailablefortheperiodwere
giveninaParliamentaryReplyandshowedthatintheperiod1July1936to31December1937,only20personsarrestedinthe
MetropolitanPoliceDistrictwerefoundtobeinpossessionoffirearmsandofthese12hadairweaponsandoneatoy.
POSTWARLEGISLATION
26.TheendofWorldWarIIappearstohavegeneratedconcernssimilartothoseattheendofWorldWarIaboutfirearmsbrought
backbyservicemen,buttherewerechangesintheofficialapproachwhichwereillustratedbyanumberofParliamentaryquestions.
Despitethefactthatalmosteverymaleandmanyfemalemembersofthepopulationhadconsiderableexperienceoffirearmsandthe
factthatmanyuncertificatedfirearmswereincirculation,misuseoffirearmsincrimeandotherwiseremainedremarkablylow.Ina

debateintheHouseofLordson11November1952itwassaidthatthenumberofcasesinwhichpossessionoffirearms,whetherused
ornot,hadcometolightintheMetropolitanPoliceDistrictwere1948,481949,281950,39195114andinthefirstninemonths
of1952,17.
27.Thesituationremainedunchangedformanyyearsandlevelsofcrimeinvolvingallclassesoffirearmsincludinguncontrolled
shotgunsremainedsolowthatcriminalstatisticsdidnotdistinguishthemfromotherclassesofcrime.In1962,aPrivateMember'sBill
wasconcernedwiththeuseofshotgunsandairgunsbyyoungpeopleandcreatedtheprovisionsnowfoundinSections22to24ofthe
1968Act.TheGovernmentofthedaywaslukewarmtotheideaandhadremainedoftheviewexpressedbythethenHomeSecretary
inareplyin1956,"Ithasbeentheviewofsuccessivegovernmentsthattheresponsibilityfordeciding,ifatall,andonwhatconditions
childrenshouldhandlefirearmsmustremainwiththeparents."
28.NoevidencewasproducedtoshowthatfurtherlegislationwasneededorthattheBillhadbeentargetedatadefinedproblemin
amannerlikelytoproducebeneficialresults.
29.Latein1960areviewofcontrolsovershotgunsandairgunswasinitiatedbytheHomeOfficeandthePoliceanditisclearthat
thisreviewconcludedthatnocontrolswerenecessaryorappropriatethoughnosuchannouncementwasmade.
30.Asmallnumberofcasesinvolvingfirearmsmadenewspaperheadlinesandsomeoftheseinvolvedsawnoffshotguns.The
matterwasraisedinParliamentearlyin1965whenSirFrankSoskice,thethenHomeSecretary,rejectedanyideaofcontrolson
shotguns,saying,"TheGovernmenthaveconsideredcarefullythepossibilityofextendingtoshotgunsthefirearmcertificateprocedure,
buthavedecidedagainstit.Thereareprobablyatleast500,000shotguninlegitimate...theburdenwhichcertificationwouldputon
thepolicewouldnotbejustifiedbythebenefitswhichwouldresult."(Theestimateofthenumberofshotgunswaslowbyafactorof
fourorfive).
31.TheFirearmsAct1965wasclearlyapanicreactiontotheAbolitionoftheDeathPenaltyanddealt,amongstotherthings,with
carryingfirearmsinpublicandtrespassing.Itincreasedpenaltiesandmadeanumberofsmallamendments.Itwasrushedthrough
ParliamentwithconsiderablehasteandwasbeingamendedbytheHomeSecretaryrightuptotheThirdReading.
32.Duringthepassageofthe1965Acttheconclusionsregardingthepotentialbenefitofcontrollingshotgunswererepeatedand
thosegunsthusremainedcompletelyoutsidethesystemofcontrolsexceptthatalateamendmentproposedbyoneMemberchanged
thebarrellengthbelowwhichashotgunbecamesubjecttocertificateproceduresfrom20to24inches.Noreliableevidencewasever
producedoftheneedforsuchachangeotherthantheexistenceofa"shotpistol"withabarrelof20.5inches.
SHOTGUNCERTIFICATES
33.Latein1965,SirRoy(nowLord)JenkinsbecameHomeSecretaryand,inresponsetoquestionsaboutcontrolsonshotguns,
confirmedtheviewthattheyshouldnotbecontrolled.Hemadeafurtherstatementon23June1966whenheannouncedthathe
wouldnotimposecontrolsonshotguns,basinghisdecisionontheburdenwhichwouldbeplacedonthepolice,andstatingthat,"The
policedonotconsiderthatitwouldberighttomakeanextensionatthepresenttime."
34.Lessthanthreemonthslater,MrJenkinsannouncedthatheplannedtoimposerestrictionsonshotgunsonthegroundthatthey
couldbepurchasedtooeasily.Heclaimedthatthecriminaluseofshotgunswasincreasingdisproportionately.Thestatisticsfromthe
perioddonotjustifythatstatementandtheproposedlegislationwasthesubjectofnoresearch,littleifanyconsultationandevenless
opendebate.Itsintroductionflewinthefaceofallpreviousstatementsonthesubjectandresearchleavesnodoubtthatthecontrols
wereintroducedtodeflectattentionfrompopulardemandsforthereintroductionofcapitalpunishmentfollowingthemurderofthree
policeofficersinShepherdsBushmurderscommittedwithpistols.Shotguncontrolswereintroducedforpurelypoliticalreasonsand
notasareasonedandlogicalmeasurelikelytoinfluencetheiruseincrime.
35.ShotguncontrolswereintroducedintheCriminalJusticeActof1967whichcontainedmanycontroversialmeasuresincludinga
newsystemfor"paper"committalsfortrial,restrictionsonmediareporting,changesinthelawonproofofcriminalintent,admission
ofwrittenstatementsasevidenceandverymuchmore.Allthiseffectivelystifleddebateontheissueofshotguncontrols.
36.Thesystemcreatedinvolvedalicencerelatedonlytotheindividualandallowedunfetteredacquisitionofshotgunsbya
certificateholder.Itmaybethatthoserepresentingshootinginterestswerepersuadedthatthecontrolswouldhavenoeffectonthe
legitimateshootingcommunity,buttheyfailedtonotearesponsefromtheHomeOfficeMinisterintheLords,LordStonhamwhosaid,
"Thisprovisionastocertificatesisthebeginningofourplans,andtheonewhichwethoughtwouldbestgiveuscontrol".Researchers
haveinterpretedthisasanadmissionthatanagendaexistedwithintheHomeOfficeandtheintroductionofthecertificatewasmerely
stageone.
37.ThenewshotguncontrolswereconsolidatedwithallpreviouslegislationintheFirearmsAct1968whichremainsthebasic
Statuteforfirearmslegislationbutwhichhassincebeenamendedsooftenastobelargelyincomprehensible.
MODERNPOLICYDEVELOPMENT
38.InDecember1970,HMChiefInspectorofConstabulary,SirJohnMcKay,wasformallyaskedtoreviewthecurrentlawon
firearms.Hesetupaworkinggroupconsistingofchiefofficersofpolice,ScottishOfficeandHomeOfficeofficials.Thoughtherewere
somemeetingsofsubgroupswithrepresentativesofshootingorganisations,therewasnorealconsultationandtheentireproceedings
wereconfidential.
39.AlthoughthestudywasformallyauthorisedinDecember1970,preparatoryworkmusthavebeengoingonforatleastayear
priortothatbecausetheStaffOfficertoHMChiefInspectorofConstabularyvisitedCambridgeintheautumnof1969seeking
informationaboutresearchbeingconductedbyaseniorpoliceofficerandofferingtoshareavailableinformation.Hewasbriefedonthe
progressoftheresearchandwhenitbecameclearthatthestudyraiseddoubtsabouttheeffectivenessandefficiencyofthesystemall
contactwascutoffandnoliaisontookplace.TheresearcherconcludedthattheWorkingPartywasnotinterestedininformationwhich
didnotconformtoitspredeterminedresults.
40.TheMcKayreportwasproducedinSeptember1972,buthasneverbeenmadepublic.Itisknown,however,thatthefirstof70
conclusionsreachedinasummaryofthereportwasthatareductioninthenumberoffirearmsinprivatehandswasadesirableendin
itself.Thereportcontainednoevidencetojustifythisconclusion.
41.TheMcKayreportisalsoknowntohaverecommendedthatshotgunsbeplacedunderthesamecontrolsasriflesandpistolsso
thattherewouldbeareductioninthenumberofshotgunsinprivatehands.Itasserted,withoutsupportiveevidence,thatthisstep
wouldreducethenumberofshotgunsinunauthorisedhandsandthat,inthelongtermwouldmakeitmoredifficultforcriminalsto
obtainshotguns.Otherrecommendationswerevaguelyworded,butallseekfurtherrestrictionsonfirearmsofeveryclassandfurther
powersforthepolice.Thefactthatthisreportwasneverpublishedandnevermadeavailablefordebateraisesseriousdoubtsabout

theintentionsofthoseinvolved.
42.InMay1973,theHomeOfficeproducedaconsultativedocument(aGreenPaper),"TheControlofFirearmsinGreatBritain"
(Cmnd5297)whichwasaverymuchwatereddownversionoftheMcKayreportwithoutsomeofthemoreextremestatements.The
primaryaimexpressedintheMcKayReportwasnotincludedintheGreenPapernorwereotherproposalswhichtheHomeOffice,itself
heavilyinvolvedintheMcKayWorkingParty,musthaveseenaspoliticallyunacceptableevenifdesirablefortheirownpurposes.The
proposalssetoutintheGreenPaperwere:

(a)Total prohibition of all self loading rifles and pump action or repeater shotguns.
(b)The creation of a power to prohibit other types of firearms or ammunition by
Statutory Instrument.
(c )Statutory Instrument to define acceptable reasons for possessing a firearm.
(d)An effective ban on all collections of firearms.
(e)Banning of the retention of trophies.
(f)Minor changes to the declaration of and effect of convictions to the grant of a
certificate.
(g)Clarification of right of appeal against conditions imposed.
(h)Requirement to notify transfer of firearm to dealer.
(i)Power for police to revoke in cases where the "good reason" given may cease to exist.
(j)Shotguns to be subject to the same controls as Section 1 firearms.
(k)Requirement for numbering all firearms.
(l)Visitor's permits to require sponsorship by UK resident.
(m)Defining of antique firearms so as to exclude all cartridge firing weapons.
(n)All pump-up airguns to be declared specially dangerous.
(o)Safe keeping condition to be applied to shotgun ammunition.
(p)Purchaser of shotgun ammunition to produce certificate.
(q)Special permit for the holding of bulk shotgun ammunition.
(r)Authorisation to be required for small arms nitro compound.
(s)Self igniting airgun ammunition to be subject to Section 1.
(t)Dealers to establish personal suitability and suitability of premises.
(u)Mail order sales of firearms to be banned.
(v)Only full time dealers to be registered.
(w)Dealers to be at least 18.

(x)Dealers to be allowed to keep registers in a form acceptable to the police.

(y)Dealers to retain registers for five years.
(z)Separate registers to be kept for each place of business.
(aa)Dealers exhibiting at fairs to obtain temporary permit.
(ab)Dealers to see certificate before returning repaired gun.
(ac)Conditions regarding security in transit to be imposed on dealers.
(ad)Club approval to be by way of firearm certificate issued by police.
(ae)Exemption for miniature rifle ranges to be restricted to "long rifle" ammunition.
(af)Certificate to be required for shooting galleries.
(ag)Ages at which young people may possess firearms to be raised.
(ah)Ban on imitation and toy firearms likely to be mistaken for real firearms.
(ai)Penalty for possession of shotgun without a certificate to be the same as that for
possession Section 1 firearm.
(aj)An amnesty for illegally held firearms to be arranged.
43.Itquicklybecameclearthatmostoftheseproposalshadnotbeenfullythoughtthroughandhadramificationsfarbeyondthose
envisagedbychiefofficersofpolice.ThestatisticspublishedintheGreenPaperamount,atbest,toashorttermpresentationofraw
dataratherthanascientificevaluationofevidence.Theperiod1969to1971(onlythreeyears)wasusedinmosttableswithan
extensionto1967insomeinstances.Inrespectofshotguns,therewasnoattempttocompareprecontrolwithpostcontrolfiguresto
provideanyformofanalysisoftheeffectsofthelegislation.Thefiguresinmostofthetablesarethereforejustwhatanyresearcherin
thefieldwouldhaveanticipated.
44.Table4,forexample,showsthatinathreeyearperiodlongbarrelledshotgunswereinvolvedinatotal33murders,71
attemptedmurders,163woundingsand315robberies.Pistols,whichhadbeenstrictlycontrolledsince1920,wereinvolvedin10
murders,45attemptedmurders,twomanslaughters,56woundingsand534robberies.Thisreflectsinbroadtermsthesituationfound
in1934,thattheshotgunwasusedinmorehomicidesbutlessrobberiesthanthepistol.Aswillbeshownlater,thisreflectsthenature
ofthecrimeofhomicideinwhichdomestickillingsdominatethefigures.
45.Therewasnoattempttoisolatethosecrimesinwhichlegallyheldfirearmsofanyclasshadbeenusednorwasthereany
attempttorelatethesenumberswiththenumbersoffirearmsineachclasslikelytobeincirculation.Ifthenumberofcertificates
providesabasisforacalculationofthenumberoffirearmslegallypossessed,therewere793,092shotguncertificatesand228,921
firearmcertificatesin1971.Ofthefirearmcertificates,ithasbeenestimatedthatonly22.4percentrelatedtopistols.Thisveryrough
estimatesuggeststhatthenumberofshotgunslegallyincirculationexceedsthenumberofpistolsbyafactorof15.2.Ifthereisa
directcorrelationbetweennumbersoffirearmsincirculationandratesofcrime,thisshouldhavemeantthatshotgunswereusedinall
classesofcrimes15timesmorefrequentlythanpistols.
46.Nologicalconclusioncanproperlybedrawnfromthestatisticspresentedinthe1973GreenPaper.
47.TheGreenPaperwasgivenahostilereceptionbyallsectionsoftheshootingcommunityanditsflawsandfailingswerevery
forcefullypointedout.ItemergedthattherewasverystrongoppositionamongstMembersofParliamenttomanyofitsprovisions.
Perhapsmostimportantofall,therewasnoincidentlikelytoprovokemassivepublicconcernorpoliticalhysteriaofthetypewhichhad
beenusedasthemeansbywhichalmostallfirearmslegislationhadbeenrushedintoplace.
48.Noactionwastakenontheproposalsatthattime,thoughtheHomeOfficedidnotlosesightofanyofthemandhasused
subsequentperiodsofhysteriatoimplementmanyofthemeasures.Inaddition,manyintheshootingcommunityaccusechiefofficers
ofpoliceofseekingtoimposetheproposalsbyentirelyadministrativeaction.Inparticular,manychiefofficersstartedtoprefaceall
remindersforrenewaloffirearmandshotguncertificateswithastatementoftheirintentiontoreducetotheabsoluteminimumthe
numberoffirearmsinthehandsofmembersofthepublic.
49.TheFirearmsAct1968remainedtheprincipleActcontrollingthepossessionoffirearms,buttheFirearmsAct1992dealtwith
readilyconvertibleimitationfirearms,finallygivingsomeeffecttothecommentofthejudgesinKellyvMackinnon10yearsbefore.
FIREARMS(AMENDMENT)ACT1988
50.ThetragedyatHungerfordoccurredinAugust1987creatingademandamongstmediaandpoliticiansforfurtherlegislation.
Therewasnopublicenquiry,thoughashortinternalreportbyanInspectorofConstabularywasmadeavailabletoMembersof
Parliament.Thisappearstohavebeenamuchsanitisedversionofeventsandinparticular,didnotdealadequatelywiththequestion

ofwhetherMichaelRyanshouldhavebeentheholderofafirearmcertificate.Itisclearthatheshouldnothavebeenauthorisedto
possesstheselfloadingriflewhichhehadpurchasedandwhichheused,andtherearedoubtsaboutwhetherthepoliceactedproperly
ingrantinghiscertificateforthepistol.Theabsenceofathoroughenquiryintothistragedyissomethingwhichshouldbecorrected,
evenatthislatestage.
51.TherewasnoattempttoanalysetheHungerfordincidenttoestablishwhatfurthermeasuresmighthelppreventtherecurrence
ofsuchanevent.Inparticular,therewasnoattempttoexaminethegrowingnumberofsingleincidentlargescalekillingsinmany
partsoftheworldtodeterminewhythatclassofcrimehadsuddenlybecomemorefrequent.Inanattempttobeseentohavedone
something,politiciansappeartohaveinstructedtheHomeOfficetoproduceproposalsto"tightenthelegislation"andtheHomeOffice
simplyselecteditemsfromtheiragendainthe1973GreenPaperwhichmightbebroughtforwardagain.
52.ClaimsfromthethenHomeSecretary,MrDouglasHurd,thattheHomeOfficehadbeenconsideringchangestothelegislationfor
sometimecannotbereconciledwithprivatecorrespondencesignedbyhiminSeptember1986,makingitclearthattherewereno
plansforfurtherlegislation.
53.TheHungerfordincidentoccurredon16August1987.On22SeptemberaHomeOfficePressReleasequotedMrHurd's
statementtothePoliceSuperintendent'sAssociationinwhichheoutlinedhisproposals.

(a)The prohibition of "high powered" self loading rifles.

(b)All burst fire weapons and short barrelled shotguns to be prohibited.
(c)Pump action and self loading shotguns capable of holding more than two rounds to be
Section 1 firearms.
(d)Ban on "downward" conversion of firearms to a lower Firearms Act classification.
(e)Security condition to be applied to shotgun certificates.
(f)Change to arrangements for visitors permits.
(g)Increased penalties.
(h)A firearms amnesty.
54.InDecember1987,theGovernmentproducedaWhitePaper(Cm261),"FirearmsAct1968ProposalsforReform"whichoutlined
proposalsforlegislationbroadlyinlinewiththeearlierannouncement.Therewasonesignificantchangefromtheannouncements
madetwomonthsearlierinthatmajorchangestothesystemofcertifyingshotgunswereproposed.
55.ThesechangescameaboutasaresultofpressurefromthepolicewhichwasoriginallyrejectedbyMrHurd.ThePoliceFederation
approachedtheLabourParty,theninoppositionandtheShadowHomeSecretary,MrHattersley,approachedMrHurdwithproposals
thatLabourwouldsupportthenewrestrictionsandensuretheeasypassageoftheBillthroughtheHouseofCommonsifMrHurd
agreedtotheadditionalrestrictionsonshotguns.
56.ThereissignificancetoseveralstatementsintheWhitePaperwhichshouldbehighlighted.Atparagraph29,theGovernment
statesthatithascarefullyconsideredfurtherrestrictionsonthestorageofammunitionbutconcludedthattherewereseriousobstacles
tothestorageofammunitionatclubs.Aboveall,itwasconcludedthatitwouldbeirresponsibletoprovidealargeandreadily
identifiablestoreofammunitionattractivetocriminalsandterrorists.Thatcontrastswithlaterproposalsforcentralstorageofsome
pistols.
57.Paragraph43oftheWhitePaperconsidersfurtherrestrictionsonfirearms,includingarbitrarylimitsonnumbersofweapons
whichanindividualcanpossessbutdecidedagainstsuchapolicy.
58.Paragraph47ruledoutpaymentofcompensationforfirearmswhichwerereclassifiedasprohibited,apolicywhichwastobe
modifiedlatersothatatinyfractionoftherealvalueofconfiscatedfirearmswaspaidbywayofcompensation.Thepolicywasinclear
contraventionoftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights(aswaslatertobeacknowledged)and,almostcertainly,oftheCommon
LawofEngland.
59.ItwasclaimedthattheGovernmenthadconsultedwidely.Infact,theresimplyhadbeennotimefordetailedconsultation,
thoughchiefofficersofpolicehadbeenallowedampleopportunitytocomment.Representativesofshootingorganisationsweresimply
toldthatthemainpillarsofthelegislationwerenotsubjecttoanysortofconsultation.The1988Actwasapanicreintroductionof
proposalswhichhadalreadybeenrejected,withouttheslightestattemptatanalysingtheproblemandseekingsolutionswhichwere
addressedtotheproblem.ThelegislationwasintendedtodonomorethanreducepoliticalpressureontheGovernmentoftheday.
60.The1988ActhadaverystormypassagethroughParliament.Iftherehadbeenfullconsultation,anActwhichwasessentially
technicalinitsnatureandforwhichgreatpublicsupportwasclaimedmightbeexpectedtopassalmostonthenod.Thefirststumbling
blockarosewhentheHouseofCommonsCommitteerefusedtofurtherconsidertheBilluntiltheGovernmentagreedtopay
compensation.Eventually,theGovernmentwascompelledtogiveway,thoughthecompensationofferedwasderisory.
61.TheCommitteeStageoftheBillwaslengthyandoftenacrimonious.Anenormousnumberofamendmentsweretabledandmany
ofthemwerecarried,onlytobereversedwhentheBillwasbeforetheHouse.TheCommitteesatnolessthaneleventimesonaBill
whichwasoriginallyofonly19Sections.
62.OnemajorchangeimposedattheCommonsCommitteeStagewastheimpositionofaFirearmsConsultativeCommittee.That
proposalwasvigorouslyresistedbytheHomeOffice,buttheGovernmentwascompelledtogiveway.Section22oftheFirearms

(Amendment)Act1988nowprovidesfortheCommitteeandsetsoutitstermsofreference.
63.TheFirearmsConsultativeCommitteewassubjecttoconsiderablecriticismduringitsearlyyearsbuthasestablisheditselfasa
forumfortheconsiderationofchangestolawandpracticeinthisfield.Fewofitsmanyrecommendationshaveactuallybeen
implementedandtheprogrammeofworksetforithasensuredthatitsrecommendationsaregivenshallowconsiderationandare
basedlargelyontheopinionsofitsmemberswhosequalificationsaresometimesfarfromthoseenvisagedinthelegislation.Asa
meansoftinkeringwithexitingpracticetheFirearmsConsultativeCommitteemayhaveservedsomesmallpurpose.Asaforumfor
research,considerationofprinciplesandproposalsforproperanalysisoftheeffectsofthelegislation,ithasfailed.Significantly,when
arealneedcameforsuchaCommittee,itwascompletelyignoredbyallpoliticiansandcivilservants.
EFFECTSOF1988ACT
64.The1988Acthadmanydifferenteffects.TheHomeOfficefailedtoproduceasinglecaseinwhichselfloadingrifleshadbeen
usedincrimeotherthantheHungerfordincident.Inthatcase,thefactthattheriflewasselfloadingwasofnosignificancebecause
therateatwhichshotswereactuallyfiredwaswithinthecapabilityofanyfirearmincludingthemostsimplesingleshotweapon.
Despitethat,selfloadingrifleswereconfiscatedfromsome8,000peoplewhopossessedthemlawfullyandhaddonenoharmwith
them.Theywereofferedalevelofcompensationbasedon50percentofthevalueatauctionwhichwas,effectively,lessthanone
thirdtherealvalue.
65.Byfarthegreatestimpactofthe1988Actwasonownersofordinaryshotguns.The1973GreenPapersuggestedatparagraph
61thatsomechiefofficersofpolicebelievedthattheimpositionofa"goodreason"requirementonshotgunswouldreducethenumber
ofcertificateholdersbyupto20percent.The1988Acttookeffecton1July1989whentherenewalcycleforcertificateswasofthree
years.Shotguncertificatenumbersarereportedattheendofeachcalendaryearandinthefouryearswhichcoverthefirstrenewal
cycleshotguncertificatesinBritainwerereducedfrom971,102in1988to761,343in1992,areductionof21.6percent.Asignificant
upwardtrendinshotguncertificatenumbersovertheprevioussixyearswassuddenlyandmarkedlyreversed.
POST1988ACTION
66.Followingtheimplementationofthe1988Act,therewasgrowingconcernaboutaneverywideningriftbetweenthelegitimate
shootingcommunityandthepolice.ThenatureofmanyofthecomplaintspromptedtheAssociationofChiefPoliceOfficersto
commissionaninternalenquirycalledaMultiForceFirearmsScrutiny,inwhichaSuperintendentfromtheDevon&CornwallPolice
conductedasurveyofpolicepractices.SuperintendentCampbellBeattiereportedinApril1991buthisreporthasnotbeenmade
public.ACPOrestrictedthemselvestoan"ExecutiveSummary"whichdoesnotreflectanyoftheveryseriouscriticismofpolice
inefficiency.
67.TheCampbellBeattieReporthighlightsinparticularfailuresinpoliceintelligencemanagement,notingthatinsomeforcesthere
wasnosystemfortransmittingtothefirearmsdepartmentthefactthatapersonhadbeenarrestedforaseriouscrimeunlessan
officerrememberedtotakeaction.TheReportalsotakesissuewiththefactthatpolicerelyentirelyontherenewalprocessfor
subsequentvettingofcertificateholders.Thereportissaidtolikenthistoclosingthestabledoorafterthehorsehasbolted.
68.InDecember1993,HMInspectorateofConstabularyforEnglandandWalesreportedonathematicinspectionofthe
administrationoffirearmslicensingintwelvepoliceforcesinEngland&Wales.Thatreport(TheAdministrationofFirearmsLicensing)
waspublishedbytheHomeOffice.Itisextremelycriticalofmanyaspectsofpoliceefficiencywhichwassaidtovarybetweenexcellent
andveryinefficient(para9.7).Italsonotesthatforthegrantingofcertificates,individualforcesimposedtheirowncriteria,someof
whichborderonthediscriminatory,withoutapparentjustification(Para9.5).
69.Inonlyoneofthetwelveforcesinspectedwasthereasystemforautomaticallycheckingthenamesofoffendersagainstfirearms
records.Mostforcesstillreliedonthepoliceofficertotriggerthesystem(Para5.3).CampbellBeattiehadreportedexactlythesame
problemstwoyearsbefore.Muchmoresignificantly,perhaps,wasthereportedfactthattherewasnosystemforlinkingincidentswith
firearmcertificaterecords.Thefirstindicatorofaseriousproblemconcerningacertificateholderislikelytobeinrelativelyminor
incidentswhich,inisolation,havelittlesignificance,butwhichwhenseenincontextmaywarrantfurtherinvestigation.
70.AsimilarinspectionofScottishpoliceforceswascommenced,butappearstohavebeenabandonedinthelightoftheCullen
ReportontheDunblanetragedy.
1992AND1994LEGISLATION
71.TheFirearms(Amendment)Act1992authorisedtheSecretaryofStatetovarytheperiodforwhichfirearmandshotgun
certificateswerevalidandOrdersmadeunderthatActhaveextendedfromthreeyearstofiveyearstheperiodofvalidityof
certificates.ThatdecisionwastakenontheadviceoftheFirearmsConsultativeCommitteeandwiththecompletesupportofthepolice
andHomeandScottishOffices.
72.TheFirearms(Amendment)Act1994createsnewcriminaloffencesofusingafirearmorimitationfirearmwithintenttocause
fearofunlawfulviolence.Itspurposewastoextendtheabilityofthepoliceandthecourtstodealwiththosewhomadethreatsin
circumstancesnotcoveredbyexistinglaw.
AEUROPEANDIMENSION
73.FirearmslawwasamendedyetagainbytheFirearmsAct(Amendment)Rules1992whichgiveeffecttoanECdirective.This
furthercomplicatesthealreadyovercomplicatedprovisionsaboutprohibitedweapons,makingthemextremelydifficulttounderstand
andprobablybeyondthecomprehensionofthepeopletowhomtheyapply.OtherprovisionsdealwiththeEuropeanFirearmsPassand
withvisitors'permits.
CONTROLSINEUROPE
74.ThesystemsoffirearmscontrolsinMemberStatesoftheEuropeanUnionvarywidelyandtheEuropeanDirectiveof1991was
intendedtoimposeabasicminimumsystemofcontrol,butcomplianceinmanycountrieshasbeenpatchy.
75.ECcountriesallrequireapermitofsomesorttoacquireahandgun,butingeneralthesearemuchmoreeasilyobtainedthan
theywereinthiscountry.Inmanycountriesawideclassofhandgunsisexcluded.InBelgium,forinstance,WorldWarIhandgunsare
consideredtobeantiquesandinFrance,modernreplicasoffirearmdatingbefore1870areexemptfromcontrol.IftheDirectiveisfully
imposed,manytypesoffirearmwillstillbefreelyavailableinEurope.Forexample,mostrepeatingriflesandshotgunswillbesubject
onlytoadeclarationafterpurchaseaswillsingleshot.22pistols.Alarmguns,CSdevices,signallingguns,slaughteringinstruments
andmanyotherdevicesarenotcontrolledthoughmanyaresimplyordinaryfirearmswithaminormodificationsuchasaspaceronthe

endofarevolvertomakeitintoaslaughteringinstrument.Singleanddoublebarrelshotgunswillremaincompletelyuncontrolledand,
asnow,willbefreelysoldingunshopsandevensupermarkets.
76.Whilst,intheoryatleast,apurchaserfromthiscountrywouldbecommittinganoffenceinpurchasingafirearminEuropeand
bringingitbackintothiscountry,theilldisposedwillhardlybedeterredbythat.Illegalfirearmsare,ifanything,morereadilyavailable
inEurope,thoughnottothecasualvisitor.Thecasualvisitorwouldalsohavedifficultyinobtainingahandgunpermitinanycountry,
butwouldhavenodifficultyobtainingsomeotherfirearmwhichcouldreadilybemodified,bysawingofforotherwise.
77.TheECDirectivecreatedtheEuropeanFirearmsPasswhichwassupposedtoprovideasingledocumentwhichwouldallowtarget
shootersandfieldsportsmentotravelthroughoutEurope.Theunwillingnessofsomecountriestoallowtheauthoritiesinanother
countrytoauthorisethepossessionoffirearmsintheirterritory(nomatterhowtemporarily)haseffectivelypreventedtheEuropean
FirearmsPassfromhavingmucheffect.TheBritishGovernment'ssystemofvisitors'permitshasmadetraveltotheUKwithafirearm
moredifficulttocitizensofEUStatesthanitisforvisitorsfromothercountries.Theformermust,inadditiontoallotherrequirements,
produceavalidEuropeanFirearmsPass.
78.Claimsthatthesystemofvisitor'spermitshassomevalueinrelationtocitizensofMemberStatesmustbequestioned.In
respectofthosevisitingtoshootinorganisedcompetition,thenationalbodyoftheparentcountrysubmitsalistofcompetitorstothe
nationalbodyoftheorganisingcountrywho,inturn,submitsthelisttothepolice.Thepolicehaveabsolutelynoknowledgeofanyof
thesepeopleandthereforeissuepermitsonthewordofthenationalbody.Visitorswhointendtoindulgeinfieldsportsmustbe
sponsored,usuallybythepersonwithwhomtheywillshoot,whomayknownothingaboutthemexceptthattheyhavemadea
booking.Thepolicemayknowsomethingaboutthesponsor,butwillknownothingaboutthevisitorwhereaspolicewhoissuehis
EuropeanFirearmsPasswillhavehadtheopportunitytomakeenquiries.
79.TheEuropeanFirearmsDirectiveiscurrentlyunderreview,butthereviewprocesshasonlyjuststartedandspeculationabout
possibleresultswouldbepointless.ThevalidityoftheBritishsystem(whichisreportedtoprovokeothercountries,includingGermany,
tosingleoutUKvisitorsforretaliatoryaction)mustbecalledintoquestion.
DUNBLANE
80.Onlyonewordisrequiredtodescribetheatrocitycommittedon13March1996attheDunblanePrimarySchoolwhenThomas
Hamilton,whoheldanumberoffirearmsontheauthorityofafirearmcertificateissuedbyCentralScotlandPolice,shotdead16small
childrenandoneoftheirteachersandwoundedanother10childrenandthreeotheradultsbeforekillinghimself.Suchatraumatic
eventwasboundtogenerateareactionakintohysteriaandwouldbeextremelydifficulttoplaceinanysortofcontext.Itwas
inevitablethat,theperpetratorbeingunavailable,thesearchwouldbeginforculprits.
81.ItmaybesignificantthattheMinisterresponsibleforfirearmslegislationrespondedtothegraveandproperconcernsofthe
HouseofCommonsbysaying,onthedayaftertheevent,

"We should first wait to find out the full facts before any Honourable Member jumps to
conclusions about what solutions may be in the future. I have not seen anything which
could have prevented yesterday's tragedy. All of us, as legislators and politicians, should
be humble enough to accept that some things may be beyond our ability to solve and
control. Comment overnight has tended to focus on weapons and their availability and
use, but perhaps we should also look at the beginning of the cycle and ask what makes
someone want to commit such an act in the first place. I have read in the history books
that many people returned from the First and Second World Wars with a lot of weapons,
but only in the past 20 years, during which films and television have shown violence of
this nature, have such incidents taken place."
82.Perhapsrealisingtheextraordinarydifficultyofarationalresponsetothisatrocity,theGovernmentofthedayrapidlyappointed
LordCullentoheadaninquiryandaskedthatjudgementbedelayeduntilhehadreported.Perhapstheyhopedthatabalancedreport
wouldallowthemtodealwiththemattereffectivelyandthatashortlapseoftimewouldcalmsomeofthehysteria.
83.TheindicationsarethatthiswastheinitialresponseoftheConservativeGovernmentandthat,forashortperiodatleast,there
wasagenuinedesiretoseekrealsolutions.
84.ThetermsofreferenceofLordCullen'senquirywere,"Toinquireintothecircumstancesleadinguptoandsurroundingthe
eventsatDunblanePrimarySchoolonWednesday13March1996,whichresultedinthedeathsof18peopletoconsidertheissues
arisingtherefromtomakesuchinterimandfinalrecommendationsasmayseemappropriateandtoreportassoonaspracticable."
85.HavingappointedLordCullentoconductanenquiry,theGovernment,throughitscivilservants,producedajointScottishOffice
andHomeOfficesubmissionwhichpurportedtodonomorethansetoutaseriesofoptionsforLordCullentoconsider.Thereare
aspectsofthatdocumentwhichfallwelloutsideanysuchparametersandtheywillbedealtwithlater.
86.TheLabourPartyinoppositiontookanentirelydifferentapproachandrapidlyproduceda15pagesubmissiontoLordCullen
whichwasqualifiedbyafinalparagraphthatthesubmissionsetoutonlyinitialviewsandsuggestingthatthePartywouldconsiderall
theevidenceandtheviewsofLordCullenbeforereachinganyfinaljudgement.
87.Itisclearthatthosewhopreparedthesubmissionsoughtnoprofessionalassistanceinproducingthisdocumentandthatthey
didnotconsultwiththeshootingcommunity.Itseemsthattheydidnotregardthematterassufficientlyimportanttowarrant
extensiveresearch.Adetailedcritiqueofthedocumentwillbeprovided.
88.Thedocumentdisplaysacompleteunawarenessofthenatureandeconomicvalueofshootingsportsingeneralorofpistol
shootinginparticular.Overamillionpeopleparticipatedirectlyinshootingsports.Fieldshootingaloneisworth600millionperyear
andiftargetshootingisaddedthetotalbecomesoveronebillion.Itcreates14,000jobsdirectlyandprobablydoublethatindirectly.In
Scotlandalone,shootingcreates12,000fulltimejobsinareaswheretherewouldbelittleornootheremploymentopportunityand
bringsin78millionperyearfromoutsidetheborders.Atthattime,pistolshootingalonehadatotaleconomicvalue(inclusiveof
fixedassets)ofaround60million.

89.TheLaboursubmissionalsodemonstratedanincompleteknowledgeofthesafeguardsalreadyinplaceinfirearmslegislationand
ofthemanyobstaclesplacedinthewayofapersonwishingtoholdafirearmcertificate.Theynotedtheincreaseinreportedcrime
involvingfirearms,thoughtheiranalysisofthetrendwasflawedandfailedtoevenattempttocorrelatethereductioninlegallyheld
firearmsandchangesinratesofarmedcrime.
90.WhentheLaboursubmissionturnedtotheextremelycomplexquestionofinternationalcomparisons,theresearchersfailedto
realisethatpublishedstatisticsarenotcomparableandquotedconclusionsfromcarefullyselectedworksthathavenotstoodupto
evenmodestexaminationoftheirreliability.
91.Onthebasisofthisflimsyandentirelyunreliableevidence,theLabourPartysuggestedawholeraftofreformsoffirearms
legislation,includingmanywhichhavecivillibertiesimplications.Theyproposed,forexample,thatchiefconstablesshouldhave
absolutediscretiontorefuseanyapplicationandshouldnotberequiredtogivereasonsfordoingso(Para32).Theyconcededthata
StarChambersystemmightfurtherconsiderthechiefconstable'sdecisioninsomecases,thoughtheapplicantwouldnotbetoldwhy
thedecisionhadbeentaken.Theywantedpublicnoticeofallapplicationsadvertisingtocriminalswheretheymightfindafirearm!
Theymadenocommentaboutpoliceefficiencyandthemannerinwhichtheexistingsystemwasoperated.Theydidnotrestricttheir
proposalstohandguns,butmadesweepingandunsupportedproposalsfordraconianrestrictionsonallclassesoffirearms.
THE1996HOMEAFFAIRSCOMMITTEEHEARINGS
92.LordCullen'senquirywasauthorisedon21Marchandhecommencedhearingsinconnectionwithhisenquiryon29May1996
andclosedthehearingson10July1996.TheParliamentaryHomeAffairsCommitteeasthenconstitutedexaminedthematterand
concludedthatitwasappropriateforthemtolookattheissueoftheavailabilityofhandgunswhichtheydecidedwasmuchwiderthan
thetermsoftheCullenenquiry.On28March,theyannouncedthattheywouldholdtheirownenquiryintothesubjectofthe
PossessionofHandgunswhichwas,inonesensemuchmorerestrictedandinanothermuchbroaderthantheyunderstoodtheremitof
LordCullen.
93.TheHomeAffairsCommitteereceivedaveryconsiderableamountofwrittenevidence,someofwhichwasidenticaltothat
submittedtoLordCullenandsomeofwhichdifferedmarkedlyfromthattransmittedtotheCullenenquiry.TheOfficialsubmissionof
theHomeandScottishOfficeswaspresentedtotheHomeAffairsCommittee,buttheLabourPartysubmissionwasnot.Oralevidence
wastakenonlyon8May1996.
94.OralevidencewasgivenonbehalfoftheAssociationofChiefPoliceOfficersandthePoliceSuperintendents'Associationand
commentwillbemadelaterabouttheenormousdifferencesbetweenthatandthesubmissiontoLordCullenontheirbehalf.In
essence,theirevidencetotheHomeAffairsCommitteewasthatitwouldbewrongandunnecessarytobanhandguns.Theirevidence
toLordCullendemandedsuchaban,toonedegreeoranother.Bothsubmissionslackedanyfactualevidenceandanalysistojustify
anyoftheconclusionsreached.
95.OralevidencewasalsotakenfromHomeOfficeMinister,DavidMcLean,MP,andateamofcivilservantsandfrom
representativesoftheBritishShootingSportsCouncil.Noneoftheoralevidencecontainedclaimsthatacompleteorpartialbanon
handgunsshouldbeimposed.
96.Writtensubmissionscontainedsomeproposalsforbansonfirearmsofvarioustypes.Forexample,theBritishAssociationof
SocialWorkersproposedthatitbemadeunlawfultopossessahandgun,rifleorautomaticweapon,andthatthepossessionof
shotgunsberestrictedtothosewhohadaneed,forthedestructionofverminetc.Theyclaimedthat"gunpossessionisbecomingmore
widespread"andactionshouldbetaken"againstthosewhousegunsforcriminalactivities".Theyofferednosupportingevidenceand
failedtoappreciatetheverysubstantialreductioninthenumbersoflegallyheldgunswhilstthenumberusedincrimehadincreased.
97.TheRoyalCollegeofPsychiatristshasthedistinctionofbeingwronginallthestatisticsitchosetopresent409,000licencesfor
riflesand1,296,000shotguncertificatesand9percentofhomicidescommittedwithshotgunsbutthethrustoftheirsubmissionwas
todispelthesuggestionthatpsychiatristscouldbeusedtofilteroutunsuitableapplicantsforfirearmorshotguncertificates.
98.Inwhatturnedouttobeasignificantitem,thePoliceFederationsubmissionreproducedintolessthanonepageoftheHome
AffairsCommitteeReportabout800words.Thisorganisationclaimed,withoutpresentinganyevidence,withoutreportingonany
studies,butmerelyasamatterofopinion,thattheonlypossiblesolutionwasatotalbanonallhandguns.Inthat,theydiffered
entirelyfromthepoliceorganisationsrepresentingthehigherranks.
99.TheParliamentaryHomeAffairsCommitteereportedon24July1996(FifthReport199596393IandII).TheCommitteehad
dividedonstrictlyPartylineswiththeConservativemajorityapprovingareportwhichsaidthatabanonhandgunswasnotjustified
whilstalltheLabourmemberssupportedaminorityreportbyChrisMullinMPproposingthat,(1)Thegoalofresponsiblepoliticians
shouldbedramaticallytoreducetheownershipofgunsinprivatehands.(2)Thattheprivatepossessionofhandgunsshouldbe
banned,thoughsometargetshootingmightcontinueusinggunskeptatcentrallocationsandsomeoccupationalusewasessential.(3)
Thatmethodsforreducingthenumberoflegallyheldshotgunsmustbelookedat.(4)Thatshotguncertificatesshouldnolongerbe
grantedtoresidentsinurbanareas.(5)Thattheycouldseenooccupationalneedforairguns,founditdifficulttoseeanyjustification
forpersonalownershipofthemandthatconsiderationshouldbegiventobringingthemwithinthelicensingsystem.
100.TheminorityconclusionmayhaverepresentedthepersonalopinionsofsomeoftheLabourgroup,butitwasnotbasedonany
evidencepresentedtotheCommitteeandwentoutsideitstermsofreferencewhichwererestrictedtohandguns.Fewpeopleoutside
fulltimepoliticswillunderstandhowagroupofpeoplecanlistentothesameevidenceandthenreachdiametricallyopposed
conclusionssplitentirelyalongpoliticalPartylines.
101.LordCullen'sReportwascompletedearlyinSeptember1996butanannouncementwasmadethat,toavoidcreatingaparty
politicalissueduringthevariousPartyConferencesthenabouttobeheld,publicationwouldbedelayeduntilalltheConferenceshad
beencompletedandParliamentwasabouttoresumeitssittings.
POSTCULLENPOLITICS
102.TherewasnodebateonthisissueattheConservativePartyConference,butiftheCullenReporthadreallybeenwithheldit
seemsstrangethatseniorpoliticiansandJuniorMinisterswereabletotellrepresentativesofshootingorganisationswholobbiedthe
Conferencethattherewouldbenobanonpistolsorpistolshootingbutthatunspecifiedadditionalrestrictionswouldbeimposed.
103.IftherehadbeenanunofficialagreementnottoraisetheissueatthePartyConferences,theLabourPartybrokethat
agreement,givingtheplatformovertoMrsAnnePearstonoftheSnowdroppetitionwhosehighlyemotionalspeechhadadevastating
effectonthevastmajorityofthoseattending.Noonecouldhavefailedtobemovedbythestoryofthemassacreofsmallchildrenby
amadman,thoughtheunderstandableemotiondidnotcreateanenvironmentinwhichrealsolutionscouldbesought.

104.TheeffectoftheLabourPartyConferencewastoshiftthegroundentirelyfromtheoriginalagreedapproachofcalmnessand
rationalitytomakingtheissueaPartyPoliticalfootballinthelightofacomingelection.ItisclearthatLabourpoliticiansinparticular,
butalsosomeConservativepoliticians,sawtheissueasavotewinnerorvoteloser.Fromthatmomentonrationalpoliticalaction
becameincreasinglylesspossible.
105.TheCullenReportwasformallydeliveredtotheSecretaryofStateforScotland,MrMichaelForsyth,on14Octoberandwasto
bepresentedtoParliamenton16October1996.On15OctobertheHomeOfficeheldaconfidentialpressbriefingatwhichselected
pressrepresentativeshadbeentoldthattheGovernmentdidnotproposetobanhandguns,butwouldmerelyrequirethattheybe
disabledandthatpartsofthegunshadtobeleftinsecureconditionsatclubs.Suchpressbriefingsare,ofcourse,entirelyconfidential,
butthemembersofthepressconcernedusuallyrequirecommentonproposalsfrominformedsourcesandcouldnotthereforekeep
thematterentirelytothemselves.Confirmationofwhatwassaidcanbefoundinvariousnewpapersonthemorningof16October
1996.
106.Onlythosewhowerepresentcanknowexactlywhathappenedatthatbriefingandsubsequently,butMrForsythrefersinhis
statement(Hansard16October1996Col825)toameetingwithcolleaguesonthepreviousdayatwhichtheGovernment'sposition
wasdecided.InresponsetocommentsbytheOppositionspokesman,hedeniedthattherehadbeenashiftintheGovernment's
position,butotheroppositionspeakersalsomadereferencetotheshiftinpolicyanditseemsthattheGovernment'splanwasalready
wellknowninsomecircles.
107.Informedsourceshaveindicatedthatatameetinglateon15October,MrForsythindicatedthathewouldresignasScottish
Secretaryunlesstherewasatotalbanofhandguns.Hefearedthatintheforthcomingelectionhewouldcertainlylosehisseat(which
coveredtheDunblanearea)ifnosuchbanwasimposed.Atthatlatestage,itwasdecidedtodoacompleteaboutfaceandimposea
totalbanonlargecalibrehandgunswhilstpermittingtheretentionofsmallcalibrehandgunsunderdraconianconditions.Itisinthe
natureofthingsthatthesereportsofeventscannotbesubstantiatedwithrealevidence,butallthecircumstantialevidencesupports
them.
108.TheCullenreportwaspresentedtotheHouseofCommonsbyMrForsyth,at3.30pmon16October1996.Despiteapleafrom
MrTobyJesselMP,addressedtoMrForsyththat,havinghadtheCullenreportParliamentshould"Pause,hesitateandstudy,andmake
quitesurethatwegetthechangeinthelawabsolutelyright",theHomeSecretaryroseat4.06pmtoannouncethatthegovernment
wouldbanalllargecalibrehandgunsandwouldrestrictsmallcalibrehandgunstoclubswheretheywouldhavetobesecurelystored.
109.TheCullenReportwassupposedlyacceptedbyallpoliticalparties,butnoopportunitywasgivenforwiderstudyordebate.
Therewastobenoconsultation,noGreenPaper,noWhitePaper,notimeforanyonetoreflectonwhatwasproposed.Althoughthe
Government,theHomeOfficeandthePolicehavesincedrawnfromtheCullenreportthoseitemswhichtheywishedtopursueand
ignoredthosepartswhichdidnotsuitthem,therewastobenoopportunitytotestthatreport.
110.TheCullenreportwillbeconsideredindetaillaterinthispaper[15]andtheevidenceshowsthatitisadeeplyflaweddocument,
thattheconclusionsitreachesarenotsubstantiatedbytheevidenceandthatmattersvitaltotheattributionofblameinthiscasehave
beencarefullyavoidedinthereport.
111.StudyofthereportisilluminatingevenatthisstagebutthefailureoftheGovernmenttoallowtimeforstudyandconsultation
amountstoadenialofdemocracyandresultedinyetanotherpieceofpaniclegislationonfirearms.
112.Mattersweremadeworsebytheuseofthe"guillotine"toensurethatmuchoftheActwasneverdebatedintheHouseof
Commons,thepackingoftheStandingCommitteesothatnomemberofitwascapableofspeakingfortheshootingcommunityand
mostoftheConservativeMemberswereontheGovernmentpayroll.ItmayormaynotbesignificantthattheresponsibleMinister,Mr
DavidMcLeanfeltunabletopilottheBillthroughtheCommonsandthetaskwaslefttoMissAnnWiddecombe.
113.Itmaybesaidthatpublicopiniondemandedswiftaction,mattershadbeennecessarilydelayedbyseveralmonthsbutafurther
delaytoallowforproperdebateandconsultationwouldhavebeenbothreasonableandproper.TheBillaffectedpeoplewhowerenot
pistolshootersandmanyofitsprovisionshavealreadyprovedtobeseriouslyflawed.Theproceduresadoptedwereadenialofthe
democraticprocesstoalargegroupofpeoplewhohaddonenothingwrong.ThedemocraticprocessdoesnotrelyonParliamentalone,
itreliesalsoonconsultation,particularlywiththosewhowillbeaffectedbydraconianmeasures.
114.Theeffectontheshootingcommunity,harshthoughitwas,isfarlessimportantthanthestatementwhichwasmadeaboutthe
natureofdemocracyinmodernBritain.TheFirearmsAct1997wasforcedthroughParliamentwithitsinjustices,flawsandweaknesses
andthosewhowouldeffectivelybepunishedbylossoftheirvaluedproperty,theirsportandtheirrightshadnoopportunitytomake
representations,adduceevidenceorproducearguments.
115.ThecompensationschememadeundertheActhasbeenexaminedbyNationalAuditOfficeandfoundtobeseriouslyflawed.
Lackofconsultationwasagaintoblame.Manywhoshouldbecompensatedforthemostseriouslossessustainedbecauseofthis
legislationareunlikelytoreceiveanycompensationandalmostallhavehadtowaitforunreasonablelengthsoftime.
116.Intherunuptothe1997GeneralElection,theLabourPartymadeacommitmentthat,ifelected,itwouldbanallhandguns,
includingthesmallcalibrehandgunswhichtheConservativeshadfailedtoban.Infacttherewouldhavebeenveryfewsuchhandguns
whichwouldhavebeenstoredundersecurityconditionsfarstricterthanhaveeverbeenappliedtoanyfirearmsinademocracy,and
theirownerssubjecttoimpositionsfarmoredraconianthanthoseappliedtoconvictedmurderers.Fewpistolclubscouldhavecomplied
withthesecurityrequirements,andevenfewerwouldhaveattemptedtodoso.Fewsmallcalibrepistolownerswouldhavesuffered
theindignitieswhichtheActwouldhaveimposedonthem.Followingtheirvictory,Labourimplementedtheircommitmentinthe
Firearms(Amendment)(No2)Act1997,whichmadefewchangesexcepttorevokethoseprovisionsintheearlierActwhichhad
allowedthepossessionofsmallcalibrehandgunsunderrestrictedcircumstances.Thoughtherewasnominaloppositionfromthe
ConservativeParty,theirownearlieractionsensuredthattheoppositionwasmutedandtheirweakpositioninParliamentensuredthat
itcouldhavenoeffect.
117.ThecompensationschemefortheNo2ActmirroredpreciselythatcreatedfortheearlierActwithallitsdefectsandinjustices.
118.Bothcompensationschemesandthemannerinwhichtheyhavebeenadministeredhavebeenthesubjectofagreatdealof
criticisms,butthepoliticalfactisthattheLabourGovernmentwasimplementingaConservativeGovernment'sschemeandneither
Partyhasbeenwillingtoraisetheissueforcefullyorproposemajorchangestothesystem.Thosewhohavesufferedbecauseofthe
flawsintheschemesthereforehadnoeffectiveParliamentaryrepresentationandnoprospectoffairtreatmentinapoliticalissue.
THELESSONSOFHISTORY
119.TheregulationoffirearmsinBritainisnowgovernedbyamassofprimaryandsecondarylegislationbutofalmostequal
importanceisthepolicyonadministeringtheAct,particularlyinthoseareaswhereitremainsincomprehensible.Asanexampleofthe
complexityofthelegislation,Section5ofthe1968Actdealswithprohibitedweaponsand,whenbroughtintoeffectitconsistedof305

words.Itnowconsistsof2,545wordsandisbeyondthegraspofmostofthosewhomitaffectsand,indeed,mostofthosewhomust
administerit.
120.Thismassoflawwasbasedonintrinsicallyflawedpaniclegislationof1920.Ithasbeenaddedtobyonepanicmeasureafter
another.Ithasneverbeenthesubjectofrationalconsideration.Theprincipleswhichshouldapplytoalllegislationarelost.Noonehas
everstatedapreciseobjectiveforthelegislationorindicatedhowitwillbemeasuredagainstthatobjectivetoseewhetherornotitis
working.
121.Ifpastexperienceisanyguide,Parliament,thepoliceandtheGovernmentwillnowtrytomakethismassofunworkable
legislationfunctioninsomewaydespitethecost,despitethebureaucracyanddespiteanyinjustice.Nothingwillnowhappenuntil
anothermajorincidentcreatesaperiodofpanicandhysteriawhenmoreillconceivedlegislationwillbeaddedtotheheap.Thereal
problems,andtherealdangertosocietywillremainunaddressed.

PART II
THE LINK BETWEEN GUNS AND CRIME THE USE AND MISUSE OF STATISTICS
THEAVAILABILITYOFGUNS
1.Thosedemandingstricterrestrictionsonaccesstofirearmsoftenclaimthatthereisadirectcorrelationbetweenthenumberof
gunsavailableandratesofhomicide,violentcrime,suicideandaccidents.Theyclaimthatifaccesstogunswererestrictedorfurther
restricted,thoseantisocialeffectsofgunswouldbereduced.
2.Toexaminethisphilosophyitisnecessary,firstlytoestablishthelevelofavailabilityoffirearms.Thisisoftendonebyreferenceto
thenumberoflicencesissuedtomembersofthepublic,butthatignoresthefactthatsoldiers(fulltimeorparttime),policeandothers
havereadyaccesstofirearmsandareinvolvedwiththosefirearmsincrime,suicidesandaccidents.
3.Theextenttowhichthesestateorganisedgroupsareinvolvedvariesovertime.InBritaintheArmyhasbeendrasticallyreduced
innumbersinrecentyears,buttheaccesstofirearmsbypoliceofficershasincreasedandtheyhaveshownthemselvestohaveahigh
accidentpotential.
4.Firearmsofsomecategoriesfalloutsidethesystemofcontrolsthoughtheyareusedincrime.Theairgunisprobablythebest
example,butantiquesmightfeatureincrimerarely,asmightclassesofsignallyingdevicewhicharenotsubjecttocontrols.Imitation
anddeactivatedfirearmsfalloutsidethesystemofcontrolsbutareusedtothreatenincrimessuchasrobbery.
5.Thoughtheyfeaturesignificantlyincrime,apotentiallylargenumberofillegallyheldfirearmscannotbeincludedinanyaccurate
measurementofthenumberoffirearmsincirculation.Therecanbenosystemofmeasuringthenumberofillegallyheldfirearmsand
estimatesmadevaryconsiderably.SomecommentatorshavesuggestedafigureoffourmillionillegalfirearmsincirculationinBritain.
Bearinginmindthtalmostonemillionillegallyheldfirearmshavebeensurrenderedto,orconfiscatedby,thepolicesincetheendof
WorldWarIIandthatthenumberoffirearmsavailableforuseincrimedoesnotseemtohavediminished,itseemsreasonableto
suggestthatthenumberofillegalfirearmscannotfallfarshortofthetotalnumberlegallyheld.
6.Thereisnothingwhichmightshowwhateffectfirearmslegislationandthemannerinwhichithasbeenadministeredmighthave
hadonthetotalillegalmarket,whichincludessocalled"benign"firearmsaswellasthoseactivelyusedbycirminals.Benignfirearms
includethosebroughtbackaswarsouvenirsbutneverlicensed.Benignorotherwise,thosefirearmsareavailableforuseincrime,
accidentsorsuicides.
7.Thenumberoffirearmswhicharesubjecttocurrentpolicelicensingproceduresthereforeseriouslyunderstatestheoverall
availabilityoffirearmswhichmightbeusedtocauseharm,butitistheonlymeasurewhichisreadilyavailableandprovidesa
relativelystableindicatorofoneaspectoffirearmsownership.Further,licensedfirearmsaretheonlyoneswhichtheStatecantarget.
Theydonotknowwhomayhaveillegalfirearmsandsocantargetthemonlyveryrarelybypoliceaction.Butthelicensedfirearms
owneriswellknown,welldocumentedandeasilyavailable.
8.Recordsofthenumbersoffirearmandshotguncertificatesinexistencewerenotkeptatnationallevelpriorto1968andfora
numberofyearsthereafterwereproducedonlysporadically.ThefollowingtableshowsthefiguresforBritainanditwillbenotedthat
overtheentireperiodthenumberoffirearmcertificateshasbeenindecline.Theapparentriseinshotguncertificatenumbersbetween
1968and1974wasaproductofthetimetakenforthethennewsystemofcontroltohaveitseffect.Therisefrom1975to1988is
attributable,inpart,toincreasedinterestinthesportofclaypigeonshootingwhichoccurredworldwide,whilsttheenormousdecline
from1988wasdirectlycausedbythestrictercontrolsimposedthatyear.

NUMBERS OF SHOTGUNS AND FIREARM CERTIFICATES ENGLAND, WALES AND

SCOTLAND
Year

Shotgun Certificates

Firearm Certificates

1968
1969
1971
1974
1979
1980
1981

701,562
793,092
850,507
867,149
866,980
870,132

256,061
228,921
224,665
209,954
206,799
203,360

1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

864,802
867,684
882,958
905,531
928,479
950,369
971,102
952,154
877,865
800,085
761,343
751,881
740,441
722,574
704,135
686,294

200,808
197,718
198,507
198,550
198,562
197,430
193,809
182,903
175,164
170,288
168,182
169,875
172,821
174,020
173,912
164,690

Figures for 1998 are not available at the time of writing.

9.HomeOfficefiguresshowthat,in1977therewere2.2shotgunspercertificateand2.3firearmsperfirearmcertificate.Thetotal
numberofeachclassoffirearmovertheyearsisrathermorethandoublethenumberofcertificates.In1977,therefore,morethan
1.5millionshotgunswerelegallyincirculationtogetherwithabout378,000Section1firearms,aratioof4to1infavourofshotguns.
MEASURINGTHEEFFECTSOFLEGISLATION
10.Theabovetableindicatesthat,particularlyinrelationtoshotguns,recentlegislationhassignificantlyreducedthenumberof
legallyownedfirearms.IttellsusnothingaboutillegallyownedfirearmsoraboutfirearmsinthehandsofservantsoftheState.Asa
measureofoverallgunownershipinBritain,itisthereforeflawed,butitisthebestwehaveanditistheonlypartofthespectrumof
firearmsownershipwhichcanbechangedbyfurtherlegislation.
11.Comparisonofthosefigureswithratesofcrimeinvolvingfirearmsorwithaccidentsorsuicidesmightprovideameasureofthe
correlationbetweenlegallyheldfirearmsandantisocialfirearmsbehaviour,butsuchadirectcomparisonmakesanassumptionthat
thelicensedfirearmsaresignificantinthetypeofantisocialbehaviourtobemeasured.Thatisnotnecessarilythecase.
12.Publishedcriminalstatisticsaresubjecttomanyseriouslimitationswhichmakethemverydifficulttounderstandandimpose
considerabledifficultyindrawingvalidconclusions.However,whentheirlimitationsareunderstood,conclusionscanproperlybedrawn
providedthatthestatisticalbaseislargeenoughandallpossiblestepsaretakentoeliminatevariables.
13.Comparativestudiesshowingchangesinthecriminaluseoffirearmsfallintotwobroadclassesonestudieseventsovertimein
aparticularcountryorarea(timeseriesanalysis),theotherselectsaparticularperiodoftimeandstudieseventsinanumberof
countries(crosssectionalanalysis).
TIMESERIESANALYSES
14.Timeseriesstudiesmaybecomplicatedbysomevariables,includingchangesinsocialattitudes,policeeffectiveness,public
reportingpractices,crimereportingprocedures,penalpoliciesandsoon,butthemoredifficultvariablesfoundincrosssectional
analysesareeliminatedunlesstherehavebeenvastsocialupheavalsinaparticularcountry.Atimeseriesstudyismorelikelytobe
capableofsupportingconclusionsifthestudycoversasufficientnumberofoffencesandasufficientperiodoftime.Shortterm
changesproducedinatimeseriesstudyarerarelyaccurateindicatorsofrealchange,butlongtermtrendscanaccuratelyshowhowa
problemhasdevelopedorwhetherparticularfactorssuchaschangedlegislationhaveproducedeffects.
TimeSeriesAnalysisofFirearmsCrimeinBritain
15.AtimeseriesstudyrelatingtoGreatBritainisarelativelysimpleprocess,butsimplisticconclusionsshouldnotbedrawnfromit.
However,ifthethesisthatmoregunsmeansmoreviolentcrimeiscorrect,itmustfollowthatfewergunsshouldmeanfewerviolent
crimes.HomeOfficecriminalstatisticsforEnglandandWaleshavegivenfiguresfortheuseoffirearmsincrimeonlyforrelatively
moderntimes,priortowhichtheonlyinformationavailablewasthatfrommajorcities,notablyLondon,orfromanecdotaland
unreliableevidence.Alltheevidencethatcanbefoundfromthesesourcesshowsthatwhentherewerenocontrolsonfirearmstherate
ofarmedcrimewasverylowanditremainedsountilthemid1960swhenitbegantoescalate.Buttherateoflegalfirearmsownership
wasdecliningandhascontinuedtodeclinewhilsttherateofarmedcrimehasgrown.
16.ThebasicdatawhichtheHomeOfficesuppliesisbasedonthenumberofoffencesrecordedbythepoliceinwhichfirearmswere

used,butthatclassificationisextremelycomplicated.Firstly,itcoversoffencesspecifiedbytheHomeOfficeandincludescriminal
damagewherethedamagecausedexceed20.Therealvalueof20hasbeenreducedovertheyears.Abrokenwindowwhichcost
10toreplacein1980wouldcost24.40toreplacein1998andsowouldberecordedinthestatisticsifitwasbrokenbya"firearm".
In1997,12,410offencesinvolvingafirearmwererecorded,ofwhich5,906werecriminaldamage.
17.Thewordusedmightbemisinterpretedtomeanfiredbutinfactencompassesuseasathreat,useasabluntinstrumentand
effectivelymeansonlythatthepresenceofafirearmcontributedinsomewaytothecommissionoftheoffence.
18.Thetermfirearm,asusedinthestatisticsisallembracingandincludesimitations,airgunsand"supposed"firearms.Airguns
featuredisproportionatelyincriminaldamageandinthelessseriousassaultsandin1997accountedfor7,506ofthe12,410offences.
Thus,asingleentryundertheclassificationof"offencesinwhichfirearmswereused"couldbeahomicide,orcouldbeacaseinwhich
ayouthbrokeawindowwithanairgunpellet.
19.Statisticsforoffcencesinwhichafirearmwasused,particularlywhenbrokendownintocategories,arequitesmallandthe
natureoftherecordingsystemsissuchthatfiguresforoneparticularyearhaveverylittlemeaning,butfiguresoveranumberofyears
provideareliableindicatoroftrends.Thosetrendsdonotprovideaprecisemeasurementatanypointintablesbutaresufficiently
accurateforthedecisionmakingprocess.
20.Inadditionaltothevariouscomplexitiesmentioned,otherrecordingpoliciescreatefurtherdifficulties.Forexample,inthe
statisticsforEnglandandWales,thedivisionbetweenburglaryinwhichafirearmwasusedandarobberyinwhichafirearmwasused
willoftendependontheprecisemomentatwhichthefirearmwaspresentedandthenatureofitsuse.Ifthefirearmwasusedto
demandthatpropertybehandedover,theoffencewouldberobbery.Ifthefirearmwasusedtofacilitateescape,wouldbeburglary.
21.Similarly,statisticsforviolenceinvolvingfirearms,andparticularlyhomicides,arecomplicatedbythehighnumberofoffences
whicharedomesticinnature.Thoughdomestichomicideisnolessseriousthananyotherclass,itinvolvesmanyfactorsnotpresentin
homicidesofothertypes.Thepicturecreatedfromastudyoftheuseoffirearmsinhomicidepointstoconclusionswhichdifferfrom
thosetobedrawnfromstudiesoftheuseoffirearmsinothercriminalactivity.
22.Asameasurementoftrendsintheuseoffirearmsbycriminals,thefiguresforrobberyprovidethemostaccurateindicator,
thoughtheydonotaprovideameasureforanyparticularyear.
23.Forthereasonsoutlined,ameasurementoftheextenttowhichcriminalsresorttofirearmsisbestfoundinthefiguresfor
robberywhilstamuchmorecomplexsetoffiguresfortheuseoffirearmshomicideillustratesseveralphenomenawhicharenot
necessrilysusceptibletothesamesolutions.
24.AsimpleexaminationofthenumbersoffirearmandshotguncertificatesinEnglandandWalescomparedwithtablesfor
homicidesandrobberiesinvolvingafirearmfrom1969to1997setoutbelowwillshowthatthereisnostatisticalrelationshipbetween
thenumbersoffirearmslegallyheldinBritainandtheuseoffirearmsinhomicideorrobbery.
USEOFFIREARMSINHOMICIDEANDROBBERY
25.Thenumberofrobberiesandhomicidesinwhichafirearmwasusedsince1969isshowninthefollowingtable.

HOMICIDES IN WHICH CERTAIN FIREARMS WERE USEDENGLAND AND WALES

Year

Firearms Homicides

% of all
Homicides

Firearms
Robberies

% of All
Robberies

1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

26
29
38
31
32
51
45
45
29
40
55
25
34
46
43
67

6.6
7.4
8.3
6.6
6.9
8.5
8.9
8.0
6.1
7.5
8.7
4.0
6.1
7.4
7.8
10.8

464
478
574
539
487
650
958
1,076
1,234
996
1,038
1,149
1,893
2,560
1,957
2,098

7.7
7.6
7.7
6.0
6.6
7.5
8.5
9.3
9.0
7.6
8.3
7.7
9.3
11.2
8.8
8.4

1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

45
51
77
36
45
60
55
56
74
66
79
49
59

7.3
7.7
11.2
5.8
7.0
8.9
7.6
8.1
11.0
9.1
9.4
7.2
8.0

2,531
2,629
2,831
2,688
3,390
3,939
5,296
5,827
5,918
4,104
3,693
3,617
3,029

9.2
8.8
8.7
8.6
10.2
10.9
11.7
11.0
10.2
6.8
5.8
4.9
4.8

Figuresfor1998,whicharecrucialfortheirrelationshipwiththeimplementationofthe1997legislation,arenotavailableatthetime
ofwriting.
26.Thosefiguresillustratethat,thoughtherehasbeenagradualincreaseintheuseoffirearmsinhomicideithasremainedafairly
constantproportionofallhomicides.Thenatureofthosehomicideswillbediscussedlater.Therehasbeenanenormousincreaseinthe
numberofrobberiesinwhichfirearmsareusedbut,thoughitfluctuates,buttheproportionofsuchrobberieshas,until1993,beena
fairlyconstantproportionofacrimewhichmustinvolveviolenceorthethreatofviolence.
FIREARMSROBBERIESINLONDON1946TO1969
27.Tolookbackfurtherintotheuseoffirearmsincrime,wemayexaminethefiguresforrobberiesinLondonwhichwas,until
recently,thecentreofarmedrobberyinGreatBritain,withveryfewcasesbeingrecordedoutsideLondonandnostatisticsforthose
casesbeingavailable.ThefollowingtableshowstheLondonfiguresfromtheendofthewarto1969.

ROBBERIES IN LONDON IN WHICH FIREARMS WERE USED

Year

Firearms Robberies

1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960

25
46
28
13
19
10
19
17
4
13
19
20
35
51
39

1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

53
62
43
92
114
142
165
225
272

28.Notuntil1965didthenumberofcasesruntothreefiguresanditseemsthatthemid1960smarkawatershedinthecriminal
useoffirearmsinthiscountry.
29.Bycontrast,thefigurehadrisento1,618casesin1991buthadbeenreducedto597casesby1994.Accordingtoareportfrom
themagazinePoliceReviewcreditedtotheheadoftheMetropolitanPoliceFlyingSquad,thatreductionisadirectresultofa
concentrationonthisclassofcrimebythepolice.Similarconclusionsarereportedfromseveralpoliceforcesinthemorerecentissues
oftheAnnualCriminalStatistics.
TYPESOFFIREARMSUSEDINHOMICIDEANDROBBERY
30.Thenatureofthecontrolexercisedbytheauthoritiesvarieswiththetypeoffirearm,withshotgunsbeingmuchlessstringently
controlledpriorto1989whenthe1988Acttookeffectandremaininglessstringentlycontrolledafterchangesinlegislation.The
followingtablesshowthemajortypeoffirearmusedinrobberyandhomicidefrom1980todate.Thereisnothinginthetablesto
indicatethatthe1988Acthadanydiscernibleimpact.

ROBBERIES IN WHICH CERTAIN FIREARMS WERE USEDENGLAND AND WALES

Year

Total firearms

Shotgun

Sawn-off shotgun

Pistol

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

1,149
1,893
2,560
1,957
2,098
2,539
2,651
2,831
2,688
3,390
3,939
5,296
5,827
5,918
4,104
3,963
3,617
3,029

127
262
364
269
216
282
256
280
241
280
280
381
406
437
274
235
224
121

181
292
372
342
378
399
471
450
451
524
448
650
602
593
373
281
232
178

529
1,001
1,440
1,011
1,106
1,221
1,196
1,374
1,321
1,772
2,233
2,988
3,544
3,605
2,390
2,478
2,316
1,854

HOMICIDES IN WHICH CERTAIN FIREARMS WERE USEDENGLAND AND WALES

Year

Total firearms

Shotgun

Sawn-off shotgun

Pistol

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

24
34
46
42
67
45
51
77
36
45
60
55
56
74
66
70
49
59

11
21
28
27
34
22
31
33
19
19
25
25
20
29
22
18
9
12

1
7
5
7
7
6
10
8
7
8
7
5
10
14
10
8
4

8
11
9
8
21
8
10
10
7
13
22
19
28
35
25
39
30
39

31.Thetwotablesindicatethat,inrobbery,thepistolisverymuchthepreferredweaponofthecriminal,butthatshotguns,
includingsawnoffshotgunsaresignificant.Therehasbeenampleresearchdatingbackmanyyearsandconfirmedmanytimessince,
thatrobberyisrarelyifeverafirstoffence.Criminalstendtograduatetowardsrobberyandwillthereforebeprohibitedpersonsunder
theFirearmsAct.Theirfirearmsmust,therefore,beunlawfullyheld.Itisfurthernotedthatthepistol,thoughmuchmorestrictly
controlled,ispreferredoverthelessstrictlycontrolledshotgun.Thismaybeparticularlyrelatedtoeaseofconcealment,butlong
barrelledshotgunsareusedinasignificantproportionofthecasessothatconcealmentisnotafactorinthosecases.
32.Inhomicidethepicturechanges.Intheearlieryears,theshotgunwasthemostcommonweapon.Alargenumberofhomicides
aredomesticinnaturewithabout60percentofmalehomicidevictimsandover80percentoffemalevictimscloselyacquaintedwith
theoffender.Insuchcircumstances,theshotgun,whichismorewidelyowned,ismorelikelytobeavailable.Agooddealofresearch
confirmswhathascometobecalledtheweaponssubstitutiontheory.Itiswidelyacceptedthatthepresenceorabsenceofaparticular
weaponwouldhavelittleinfluenceontheoutcomeofahomicidalattackinadomesticsituationandwhatmattersisthestateofmind
ofthekiller.Ineffect,theabsenceofafirearminthatclassofoffencewouldleadonlytotheuseofanotherweaponwiththesame
result.
33.Theriseintheuseofpistolsinhomicidesince1992reflectsamostimportantchangeinthenatureofhomicideandmaywellbe
associatedintheriseofdrugandcriminalgangrelatedshootingswhicharebeingreportedinthemediaandbythepolice.A
discerniblechangeinthepatternofhomicidesinvolvingfirearmsistakingplacewhichmayreflectatotalfailuretoeffectivelypolicea
segmentofthecommunityandwhichwillhavefarreachingimplicationsifnottackledeffectively.Tacklingthisphenomenonthrough
themediumofstrictercontrolsofpistolsisclearlynotanoption.Theywereextremelystrictlycontrolledthroughouttheperiodandare
noweffectivelybanned.
CROSSSECTIONALANALYSES
34.Intermsoftherelationshipbetweengunownershipandhomicide,crosssectionalanalyses,comparingonecountrywithanother
orcomparinggroupsofcountries,createenormousproblemsbecauseofthehugenumberofvariablesthatmayexist.Thesimplerof
thesevariablesarethedifferentmethodsofdefiningandcountingthenumberoffirearms.Onlythosefirearmswhichhavebeen
declaredtotheauthoritiescanbecounted.Insomecountries,licensesarerequiredforalmostallclassesoffirearms,including
antiquesandairweapons.Inothercountries,thetermantiqueisextendedtocoveritemsconsideredtobesubjecttolicense

elsewhere,andmanyclassesofshotgunandriflearenotcontrolledsoarenotcountable.
35.Homicidestatisticstoovarywidely.Insomedevelopingcountries,thestatisticsareknowntobefarfromcomplete.Figuresfor
crimeslabelledashomicideinvariouscountriesaresimplynotcomparable.Since1967,homicidefiguresforEnglandandWaleshave
beenadjustedtoexcludeanycaseswhichdonotresultinconviction,orwherethepersonisnotprosecutedongroundsofselfdefence
orotherwise.Thisreducestheapparentnumberofhomicidesbybetween13percentand15percent.Theadjustmentismadeonlyin
respectoffiguresshowninonepartoftheAnnualCriminalStatistics.Inanotherpartrelatingtotheuseoffirearms,noadjustmentis
made.AtableofthenumberofhomicidesinwhichfirearmswereusedinEnglandandWaleswillthereforedifferaccordingtowhich
sectionoftheannualstatisticswasusedasitsbase.Similarlyinstatisticsrelatingtotheuseoffirearms,ahomicidewillberecorded
wherethefirearmwasusedasabluntinstrument,butinthespecifichomicidestatistics,thatcasewillbeshownunder"blunt
instrument".
36.Manycountries,includingtheUnitedStates,donotadjusttheirstatisticsdowninthatwayandtheirfiguresincludecasesofself
defence,killingsbypoliceandjustifiablehomicides.InPortugal,casesinwhichthecauseofdeathisunknownareincludedinthe
homicidefigures,inflatingtheapparenthomiciderateveryconsiderably.
37.CausingdeathbydangerousdrivingisnotclassedashomicideinEnglandandWales,butisclassifiedashomicideinsome
countries.Over200suchcasesoccurinEnglandandWaleseachyear.
38.InFrance,Switzerlandandseveralothercountries,attemptsandcompletedhomicidesaretreatedasasinglestatisticalunitand
canbeseparatedoutonlybyspecialenquiry.
39.Thevariablescreatedbythefactorslistedabovecouldbeeithereliminatedorcontrolledforinathoroughstudy.Othervariables
aremuchmoredifficulttoeliminateorbalance.Social,ethnic,historicalandgeographicalfactorshavebeenshowntobeextremely
important,andpoliceefficiency,arrestratesandsentencingpolicieswhichdifferfromcountrytocountrymaybeimportantinsome
classesofhomicide,butarelessimportantinothers.
40.Theavailabilityoffirearmstolawabidingcitizensmayincreaseorreducecrimeofdifferentclassesandtheeffectofsuch
phenomenamayalsovaryaccordingtosocialfactorssuchasthelevelofacceptanceofforcetodealwithviolentcrime.
HOMEOFFICESTATISTICALPRESENTATIONS
41.HomeOfficestatisticalpresentationsarealmostinvariablytimeseriesanalysisofeventsinEnglandandWales.Briefinternational
comparisonsaremadefromtimetotime,thelastbeingintheCriminalStatisticsfor1986.Inthatpresentation,considerableemphasis
islaidonthedifficultyofdirectcomparisonsandanumberofimportantfactorsarelistedwhichmitigateagainstcomparability.
Becauseofthosefactors,theHomeOfficechosetolookatchangesincrimelevelsindifferentcountriesontheassumptionthatthe
importantfactorsremainconstantineachcountry.Fromtheirtabletheyseekonlytoidentifytrendsineachcountryovera10year
period.
42.HomeOfficepolicyinthisareachangedquitedramaticallyandwithoutexplanationinrespectoftheevidencepresentedtothe
CullenInquiryandtothe1996HomeAffairsCommitteehearings.Forthoseinquiries,theHomeOfficeResearchandStatisticalBranch
chosetorelysolelyoncrosssectionalanalysesofratesoffirearmsownershipandhomicide.Theyapparentlyrejectedthevalueofa
timeseriesanalysisbasedontheirowninhousestatisticsonfirearmsownershipandhomicideratesinEnglandandWalesandonthe
useoffirearmsinrobbery,despitetheimmediateavailabilityofmaterialforatimeseriesstudy.
43.Theirassumptionsweremadeonthebasisofjustfourpiecesofresearchfromthescoreswhichhavebeenconducted:

(a)A 1995 Canadian Department of Justice survey in which the Home Office was
consulted.
(b)Two studies carried out by Professor Martin Killias in 1989 and 1992.
(c)Research carried out by Sloan et al 1988 in which homicide and gun ownership in
Seattle and Vancouver were compared. The Home Office paper claims that the two cities
were comparable in climate, history, demography and socio-economic factors but differed
only in gun control measures.
(d)Their own comparison of crime and violence in the United States and England and
Wales which they claimed drew on new or updated material.
Eachofthesestudiesisbrieflysummarisedwithlittledetail.Alargenumberofotherstudiesarenotreferredtoandtheincomplete
bibliographyignorestheworksofauthoritieslikeKates,Kukla,Kopel,Mauser,Krug,LottandGreenwood.
44.TheCanadianstudywasdoneinsupportofcontroversialFederalLegislationwhichhadjustpassedintolaw.Proposalsforthat
legislationweresetoutinadocumentpublishedin1994,butannouncedsometimebeforethat.Theresearchwasconductedin1995
insupportofdecisionswhichhadalreadybeentakenanditwouldbesurprisingifagovernmentdepartmentcameupwithanswers
whichdidnotsupporttheMinister'sprestateddecisions.TheCanadianJusticeDepartmenthasbeencriticisedforitspoorrecordof
statisticalanalysisbytheirAuditorGeneralinhis1993ReporttotheHouseofCommons(Ch27cl27.20and27.27).Thisparticular
reporthasbeenchallengedbyacademicsinCanadaandelsewhere.
45.TheCanadiansurveyusesonlyeightselectedcountries,buttheHomeOfficeremovedFrancefromtheirconsideration.Thereis
noindicationwhythosecountrieswereselectedandtherewasnoattempttocontrolforthemostextremevariationsincludingthefact
thatattemptsareincludedinthehomicidestatisticsofsomecountries.Gunownershipfiguresarenotmerelysuspect,butinsome
instances,veryclearlywrong.
46.WemaynotethattheauthorsarenotsurewhetherthehomiciderateforSwitzerlandincludesattempts,butthatforFrance
certainlydoes.Wemayalsonoteinthetableatthetopofpage83ofthe1996HomeOfficesubmissionthatthegunhomiciderateper

millionintheUSAissaidtobe6.4whichisconfirmedinthegraphonpage78.Thesecondtableonpage83,theUSgunhomiciderate
isgivenas44.6permillion.Oneofthesemustbeveryfarout.
47.TheworkofProfessorKilliasisthemostcontroversialinthisfield,andcertainlythemostcondemned.Hearrivesatfiguresfor
levelsofgunownershipbymeansofatelephonesurveyonrandomlyselectedtelephonenumberswhichwerecalledby"researchers"
whoaskedifanyoneinthehousehadagun.Itseemsrighttosaythatfewgunownerswouldrespondpositivelytotelephone
questionsabouttheirownershipofguns.
48.InhisfirststudypublishedinSecurityJVol1No3(Butterworth)KilliassaidthathisfindingsunderminedthemythoftheSwiss
experiencethatwidespreadownershipoffirearmsdidnotresultinarmedcrime.Hismethodsandhisfindingshavebeensubjectto
almostuniversalattack,perhapsthevehementbeinginhisowncountry.
49.WhenProfessorKillias'ssecondarticleappearedintheCanadianMedicalAssociationJournalinDecember1993,itwasthe
subjectofanextraordinaryresponsewithnolessthanfivedetailedattacksonhismethodologyandconclusions.Killias'sanswersto
themincludeassertionsthatheignoredthemilitaryfirearmswhichallSwissmalesarerequiredbylawtokeepathomebecausethey
areheavyandcannotbeconcealed.TheSwissAssaultrifleislittleovertwofeetlongwhenfoldedandweighsjustoversevenpounds.
Manyshotgunsaremustlongerandheavier.Swissmilitarypistolsdifferlittlefromanyothersintermsofbulk.
50.TheHomeOfficepaperinfers,inafootnotetopage74,thatmilitiagunsinSwitzerlandcanbediscountedbecausetheir
ammunitioniskeptinsealedboxeswhicharecheckedeachyearandisnotavailableforsale.Infact,the"emergency"ammunitionis
keptinplasticcoveredpackswhichshouldnotbebroken,butthisisreplacedeveryyearandammunitionisonsaleatdiscountedrates
ateveryriflerangeandgunshop.InafurthercommenttoLordCullen,theHomeOfficeacceptedtheerroronthispoint.
51.TheKilliasdataishighlyquestionable,andhisconclusionshavebeencontinuouslychallenged,mostrecentlybyProfessorGary
Kleckinhis1997workwherehereworksKillias'sowndatatoshowthatitfailsentirelytoshowaninternationalcorrelationbetween
gunownershiplevelsandhomicide.
52.Tofurtheritsownclaimofacorrelationbetweengunownershiplevelsandhomiciderates,theHomeOfficepapercitesa
comparisonbetweenSeattleandVancouverwhichshowedthatthehomiciderateintheUScitywastwothirdshigherthanthatofthe
Canadiancity,allthedifferencebeingattributabletogunhomicide.Thatstudywassomewhatdiscreditedwhenotherresearchers
showedthattheentiredifferencecouldbeaccountedforbydemographicfactors.Bothcitieshavesimilarwhitepopulationsandlarge
ethnicminorities.InVancouver,theethnicminorityislargelyChineseandJapanesewhosehomiciderateisfarlowerthanthatofthe
whitemajority.InSeattletheethnicminorityisblackandtheirhomiciderateis10timeshigherthanthatofthewhitepopulation.
Virtuallyallthedifferencebetweenthetwocitiescouldbeaccountedforinthatway.
53.ButtheSloanstudywasevenmoredeeplyflawedbecauseofthewayinwhichgunownershipwasestimated.InVancouverthe
FirearmsAcquisitioncertificaterelatedmerelytothepurchaseofadditionalfirearmsanddidnotmeasureactualgunownership.That
factwaspublishedin1989byProfessorJamesWrightwhilstinthesameyearProfessorGaryMauserofVancouverwasabletoreport
thatgunownershipinthetwocitieswaseffectivelythesame.
54.TheSloanstudyisusedbymanyauthoritiesinthefieldasanexampleoftotallyflawedresearch.ProfessorGaryKleckhas
describeditas"Arguablythemostprimitivestudyofgunsviolencelinkseverpublished"andProfessorJamesWrightdescribeditin
1989as,"Littlemorethanpolemicsmasqueradingasresearch".TheHomeOfficecanhardlyhavebeenunawareofthefactthatthe
studywaseffectivelydiscreditedandtheiruseofitraisesseriousissues.
55.ThoseissuesbecomeevenmoreseriouswhenitemergesthattheHomeOfficefailedeventomentionacomparisonofgun
ownershipandhomicideratesinProvincesandStatesalongtheUS/Canadianborder.ProfessorBrandonCenterwall'sstudywas
publishedin1991and,fromsubsequentresponses,wasknowntotheHomeOffice.Centerwallconcludedthat,althoughtheoverall
levelofhandgunownershipinCanadawasonetenthofthatintheUStheratesofhomicideintheborderStatesandProvinceswere
littledifferent.SomeCanadianProvinceshadhigherhomicideratesthanadjoiningStatesandsomelower.Theprevalenceofhandguns
intheUnitedStateshadnotresultedinhigherhomiciderates.
56.InasecondresponsetheRSDcriticisedtheCenterwallstudybecauseitconsidereditsresultinrelationtoadjoiningterritories,
yettheyacceptedtheSloanStudywhichdidjustthesamethingbutwithmuchlessaccuracy.Theveryleastthatcanbesaidabout
thisselectivityisthatitwasunprofessional.
57.IntheirfinalattempttoproveadirectrelationshipbetweenlevelsofgunownershipandhomicidetheRSDattempteda
comparisonbetweentheUSandEnglandandWalescomparedhomicidesandaggravatedassaultsinLondonwithselectedUScities
andthenproducedadditionalsummariesfromtheearlierCanadianandKilliasdata.
58.Theirpublishedresultsraisesomeimportantquestions.Thesupposeddirectcomparisonofgunandnongunhomicidesfailseven
toattempttocontrolforanyvariables,andinparticularforlevelsofexistingguncontrol.Itisknown,forexample,thatthehomicide
ratesinsomeUScitieswheregunsareeffectivelybannedisextremelyhigh,withWashingtonDCshowingarateofabout80per
100,000.Inlesspopulousareas,thehomicideratesareentirelycomparablewithEuropeanandBritishlevels.Centerwallnotesthatin
Vermontwherethereiseffectivelynocontrolonfirearms,themeanannualrateofcriminalhomicideoverafouryearperiodwas0.4
per100,000whilstNorthDakotalevelswereevenlower.HadthecomparativefiguresusedBritain,insteadofEnglandandWales,we
wouldfindthattheseUSStateswerelowerthanthoseinthiscountry,forScotlandhasahomiciderateconsiderablyhigherthanthat
ofEnglandandWales.
59.Thecarefullyselectedtableofaggravatedassaultsin1993(Table4oftheHomeOfficesubmission)fliesinthefaceoflater
studieswhichmusthavebeenongoingatthetime.TheFarringtonandLanganstudyreferredtolaterestablishesthatin1993ratesof
assaultintheUnitedStateswerelessthanthoseinEnglandandWalesandthatbetween1981and1996,BritainhadovertakentheUS
inpercapitaratesofmostcrimesexcepthomicide.Thus,theHomeOfficecomparisonofassaultlevelsinselectedcitiesisatbest
disingenuousandquestionable.
60.TheHomeOfficeResearchandStatisticsDirectorate'ssubmissiontoLordCullenandtothe1996HomeAffairsCommitteecanbe
seentobeatbestunprofessionalandatworstbiasedintheextreme.Itwasheavilycriticisedbyanumberofcommentatorswho
raisedrealdoubtsaboutmotivation.Butthe1996submissionwasnotthefirstrevelationofthepoliciesbeingadoptedinthe
Directorate.In1993,theDirectorofStatisticsenteredintocorrespondencewithTheGuardianclaimingthattherelationshipbetween
numbersoffirearmsandratesofcrimewasabsoluteandthat,iftheUShadthesamesystemofguncontrolthatappliedinthis
country,itcouldreduceitsoverallnumberofhomicidesbybetween12,000and15,000.MrNuttall'sconclusionsappeartohavebeen
basedalmostexclusivelyontheKilliasstudies.
61.InaninterviewgiventoTheTimes(24June1999)onhisretirement,MrNuttallmadethesameclaimaboutthepotentialfor
reductioninUShomicidesthroughguncontrol,thoughhethenclaimedthatthenumbersavedwouldbe10,000.Hewasreportedin
thatinterviewtobe"somethingofanevangelistonthesubjectofguncontrol".Itisnotclearwhetherthatwashisownpersonalclaim

orwhetheritwasaconclusiondrawnbyanexperiencedreporteronwhatMrNuttallsaid.Suchacommentcannotbedrawnfromthe
airanditmustbethatthethenDirectorofResearchandStatisticshadmadeclearhispersonalviewwithanevangelicalfervour.
62.IfthesubmissionoftheHomeOfficeResearchandStatisticsBranchwasasbiasedasitprovedtobeandifitsheadwasaperson
whoregardedhimselforwasregardedbyothersasanevangelistonthesubjectofguncontrol,thereareatleastgroundsfor
suspectingthatthenatureoftheRSDresponsewasaproductoftheevangelicalmovementwithintheHomeOfficeratherthanafair
appraisalofthestatisticalevidence.
RECENTCROSSSECTIONALANALYSES
63.ActingwithintheremitofEconomicandSocialCounciloftheUnitedNations,theCommissiononCrimePreventionandCriminal
Justicerecommendedthatastudybeundertakeninmemberstatesintotheregulationoffirearmstogetherwithothertopicsassumed
toberelatedtosuchregulation.AreportwaspresentedtotheCommissioninMay1997.Thedocumentispublishedas"AReportof
theSecretaryGeneraltotheUnitedNationsonMeasurestoRegulateFirearms(E/CN.15/1997/4)"andincludesasummaryofan
"InternationalStudy"offirearmregulation.
64.Thereportwasproducedbyanexpertgroupwhichhasbeenseverelycriticisedforpartialityandlackofclarityinits
requirements.Thesurveyinstrumentlackedclarityandsomerespondentsdidnotknowwhatwasbeingaskedofthem.Major
obstaclestocomparabilityoflevelsoffirearmsownershipindifferentstateswerenotovercome,buttwosetsoffiguresgivecrude
levelsoffirearmsownershipwhichallowverybroadcomparisons.Figuresforfirearmsdeathsare"asreported"andtheauthorscaution
abouttheircomparability.Providedthefiguresareusedasabroadindicationoflevelsofharm,somecomparisonscanbemade.
65.TheauthorsoftheUNReportdrawaseriesofconclusionswhicharenotjustifiedbytheirownevidence.Theonlyconclusion
whichcansafelybedrawninthatthereisnocasualrelationshipbetweenthenumberoffirearmsinaStateandthelevelsofdeath
throughhomicide,suicideoraccident.
66.Atableonthestudypurportstoshowthenumbersoffirearmslicencesand,inanumberofways,reflectthenumberoffirearms
availabletolawabidingcitizensoftheState.Thesefiguresaresubjecttoalltheshortcomingsoutlinedearlier.
67.Giventheknownpotentialforerror,relativelysmalldifferencesbetweenthenumberoffirearmsownersandthetotalnumberof
firearmsfromStatetoStateshouldbeignored,butarangeofresponsesfrom0.1to411per1,000peoplemustallowofsome
generalisation,withcertaincountriesstandingoutashavingextremelyhighlevelsoffirearmsownership.TheseincludeAustralia,
Canada,Finland,NewZealandandSweden,allwithfirearmslevelswellover100per1,000people.Germanyshouldalsobeplacedin
thatclassonthebasisofitsnumberoffirearmsowners.Ifasecondstageissetarbitrarilyat50to99,wefindCostaRica,Greece,
SouthAfrica,andSpain.Between25and49wefindArgentina,CzechRepublic,Estonia,SlovakiaandtheUnitedKingdom.The
remainingcountrieseitherfallintothelessthan25bandordidnotrespond.Figuresfromanumberofcountries,includingtheUnited
Statesareavailablefromothersources.
68.Anothertableprovidesdetailsofthenumberofdeathsineachcountryundertheheadingsofhomicide,suicideandaccidental
deaths.Alargernumberofcountriesareincludedinthistableandthefigureswillbeacceptablyaccurateinrespectofmostcountries,
thoughtheaccuracyofrecordsinsomecountriesmaybeopentodoubt.
Accidents
69.Thefiguresshowthataccidentaldeathswithfirearmsareverylow,themaximumfigurebeing0.75per100,000occurringin
Brazil,acountrywithoneofthelowerlevelsoffirearmsownership.TheUnitedStateshasanaccidentlevelof0.58per100,000.Its
firearmsownershipfiguresarenotshown,butareknowntobehigherthananyshowninthetables.
70.Thecountrieswiththehighestlevelsoffirearmsownershiphavelevelsoffirearmsaccidentslowerthanmanycountrieswith
muchlowerlevelsoffirearmsownership.Australiahasanaccidentrateof0.11,Canada0.13,Finland0.12,NewZealand0.29,Sweden
0.05andGermany0.03.Withinthatgroupthereisnocorrelationbetweenlevelsoffirearmsownershipandaccidentrates.
71.Inthehighermiddlebracketoffirearmsownership,CostaRicahasanaccidentlevelof0.29,Greece,0.02,andSpain0.26.
Similarly,inthelowermiddlebandof25to49firearmsper100,000theCzechRepublichasanaccidentrateof0.07,Estonia0.40and
theUnitedKingdom0.02.
72.Asimplecomparisonoffirearmsownershipratesandaccidentsinvolvingfirearmsfailstotakeaccountofmanyotherfactors.For
example,insomecountrieshuntingiscarriedoutlargelyonpubliclands,oftenwithrelativelylargenumbersofpeopleonasingletract
ofland.Inothercountrieshuntingisonprivatelyownedlandwhereaccessisseverelyrestricted.
73.Thedataproducedinthesurveyprovidenoevidenceofanycorrelationbetweenfirearmsownershipandfirearmsaccidentlevels.
Suicide
74.Thegreatmassofevidenceindicatesthatthesuiciderateisnotdependentontheavailabilityofonemethodandthatif,bysome
means,allfirearmscouldberemovedfromasociety,therateofsuicidewouldremainlargelyunchanged.Theonlyevidencetothe
contrarywasgeneratedbythechangefromtoxicdomesticgas(whichhasbeenasignificantmethodofsuicide)tonontoxicnatural
gas.Studiesinseveralcountriessuggestedthat,thoughthishadresultedinasignificantreductioningassuicides,therehadbeenno
overallreductioninsuiciderates.OneexceptionwasastudyinEnglandbyClarkeandMayhewwhichsuggestedthatthereductionin
gassuicidehadbeenaccompaniedbyasignificantreductioninoverallsuicide(thoughalaterstudybythesameauthorssuggested
thatthesamewasnottrueforScotland).
75.Thelatestanalysisofavailableevidence,whichincludesacritiqueoftheClarkeandMayhewstudyisthatdonebyProfessorGary
KleckwhofoundthatClarkeandMayhew'sconclusionscouldnotbesupportedbytheevidence.Anowdatedtimeseriesanalysesof
SuicideFiguresforEnglandandWalesoveralongperiodshowsthatthesuicideratehasbeenunaffectedbymassivereductionsin
legitimategunownership.
76.TheauthorsoftheUNSurveyincludedetailsofoverallsuicideratesaswellasfirearmsuiciderates,somethingnotdoneinother
studies.Iftheweaponsubstitutiontheoryisevenpartiallycorrect,thenanyconclusionsshouldbedrawnonthebasisofoverallsuicide
ratesandnotonthebasisofgunsuicideratesonly.
77.Highsuicideratesofover20per100,000occurinBelarus,Estonia,FinlandandHungary,buttheproportionofthosewhich
involvefirearmsvariesfrom0.88to5.78per100,000andfirearmsownershiplevelsvaryfrom16.5(Belarus)to411.2per1,000
(Finland).EstoniaandHungaryhaverelativelylowfirearmsownershiplevels.JamaicaandJapan,withfirearmsownershiplevelsof
7.35and3.28per1,000respectively,havesuicideratesof1.45and17.95per100,000respectively.Ithasbeenseparatelyreported
thatthesuiciderateinJapanrosebyamassive34.7percentbetween1997and1998andcommentatorsconcludethatthisisa

productoftheeconomicdownturninthatcountry.
78.TheUNsurveymakesnopretenceofcontrollingforanyofthemanyvariablesknowntoinfluencesuiciderates,buteventhese
crudefiguresshowthatthereisnocorrelationbetweenfirearmsownershipandeitheroverallsuicideratesorfirearmssuiciderates.
Homicide
79.Totalhomicideratesreportedinthissurveyshowfiguresoffrom0.04to64.64per100,000,butseveralofthemraiseissues.
TheUnitedKingdomfigureforfirearmsownershipisshown,butthefigureforhomicideexcludesNorthernIreland.Ifthisprocesshad
beentakenfurtherandEnglandandWaleshadbeenshownseparately,thefigurewouldhavebeenevenlowerat1.3per100,000
whilstScotlandunderpreciselythesameregimeofguncontrolhasarateof2.1andtheNorthernIrelandrateis2.6.
80.Thedatainthesurveyare"asreported"andtheauthorssuggestthatcomparisonsshouldbemadewithcare.Certainly,the
figuresdifferfromthosepublishedinothersources,oftenbysignificantmargins.However,providedthatthedataareseenasbeing
onlyroughlycomparable,somecomparisonscanbemade.
81.Manyofthosecountrieswithhomiciderateslessthan4per100,000peoplehaveveryhighlevelsoffirearmsownership.
Australia(2.4homicidesper100,000),Canada(1.99),Finland(3.25),Germany(1.81),NewZealand(1.35)andSweden(1.35)areat
thelowerendofthehomicidescalebuthavethehighestfirearmsownershiprates.Brazilhasahighhomiciderateinthissurveyat
29.17per100,000butthenumberoffirearmsownersperthousandisshownasonly8.18.
82.Anumberofcountrieswithfirearmsownershiplevelsatornearthe100markhavehomiciderateswhichareafractionofthatin
Brazil.Bycontract,Estoniahasatotalhomiciderateof22.11per100,000butafirearmsownershiprateofonly28.56per1,000.
Jamaicahasaverylowrateoffirearmsownership,butextremelyhighhomicideandfirearmshomiciderates.Incontrast,SouthAfrica
featureshighratesoffirearmsownership,homicideandfirearmshomicide.
TheUnitedStates
83.AnydebateontheeffectsofhighlevelsofgunownershipisbedevilledbyspuriouscomparisonswiththesituationintheUnited
Stateswhere,inmanyareastherearehighlevelsofgunownershipandinmanyareasthereareveryhighlevelsofhomicideand
particularlyfirearmshomicide.CommentatorswithintheUnitedStatesandfromoutsidehavesuggestedthatreducinghandgun
ownershipwillreducelevelsofhomicide.Butlegislationcanonlyreducelevelsofhandgunownershipamongstthosewhochoseto
complywiththelaworamongstthattinyminorityofillegalownerswhomaybeapprehendedandevenifthetheorywascorrect,
changewouldbeveryslowindeed.
84.ThedebateseemstoassumethattheUnitedStatesisahomogenousunit,butthatdoesnotseemtobethecase.Homiciderates
varyfromtheextraordinarilyhighlevelofabout80perhundredthousandinWashingtonDCwhichhasatotalbanontheownershipof
mostfirearms,torateslessthanthoseintheUKandEuropeinStateslikeVermontwhichdoesnotallowanyrestrictionsonfirearms
ownership.
85.Thevastarrayofdemographicfactorstendstobeignored.Foralargenumberofreasons,manyofwhichareimperfectly
understood,manypartsoftheUnitedStateshavehistoricallysufferedveryhighratesofviolentcrimewhilstotherparts,often
adjoiningparts,havenot.CertainlywhengunswereuncontrolledinGreatBritaintherateofcriminaluseoffirearmswasverylow
indeed,whilstinNewYorkCity,forexample,itwasveryhigh.
86.IntheUnitedStatesthedistributionofhomicideandparticularlyfirearmshomicidevariesverywidelybetweenracialgroups,as
itdoesinothercountries.ThelargeandwellestablishedJapanesepopulationintheSanFranciscoareahasthesameaccessto
firearmsasanyothergroup,buttheirrateofhomicidehasbeenshowntobeslightlylowerthanthehomiciderateinJapanandvery
muchlowerthanothergroupsinthesamearea.
87.Itisunarguablethatruralhomiciderates,includinggunhomicideratestendtobehigherinsouthernstatesthantheyarein
northernstates.Itwouldbefarcicaltosuggestthatthequitesignificantdifferencesareattributableonlytotheavailabilityoffirearms,
becausefirearmsareatleastequallyavailableinbothareas.Ifcausativefactorsartobeidentified,itisnecessarytolookdeeperthan
that.
88.ToisolatetheUnitedStatesfromallothercountriesforthepurposeofcomparisonwiththeUnitedKingdomandtosuggestthat
differenceincrimeratesareattributabletoonesinglefactor,thesupposedavailabilityoffirearms,issoillogical,fallaciousandextreme
thatitshouldnotbearconsideration.Itisnotpossibletoidentifyallthevariableswhichareapplicable,muchlesscontrolforthemin
anystudy.
89.ButthosewhoinsistondirectcomparisonsmightcaretonotethatinrecentyearsseriouscrimehasbeenfallingintheUnited
StatesandincreasinginEnglandandWales.IntheStudy,CrimeandJusticeintheUnitedStatesandinEnglandandWales,198196
byProfessorDavidFarringtonofCambridgeUniversityandDrPatrickLanganoftheUSDepartmentofJustice,comparedratesof
reportedassaults,robberyandburglaryinthetwocountrieswerecomparedtodiscoverthatinallcases,EnglandandWaleshas
overtakentheUnitedStates.Thereportwasbasedonbothcrimevictimsurveysandpolicestatisticsandsoisasreliableasanysuch
reportcanbe.Thesituationwasreachedin1996wheretherobberyrateinEnglandandWalesis40percenthigherthanitisinthe
UnitedStateswhilstassault,burglaryand"autocrime"inEnglandandWalesarealmostdoublethoseintheUnitedStates.
90.Ofevenmoresignificanceisthatthefactthatthe"hot"burglaryrate(burglarycommittedwhilstsomeoneisinthehouse)
involved13percentofburglariesintheUnitedStatesandabout50percentinEnglandandWales(WrightandRossi1986).
91.Thereportalsofoundthat,since1981,thechancesofbeingcaughtandconvictedofaseriousoffencehaverisensignificantlyin
theUnitedStatesandhavefalleninEnglandandWalesformostmajorcrimes.Further,thechancesofacustodialsentencearemuch
higherintheUnitedStates.
92.ThehomiciderateintheUnitedStatesismuchhigherthanthatoftheUnitedKingdomandtheuseoffirearmsinhomicideis
similarlyverymuchhigher,butitiswrongtoassumethatthesamethingappliestoalltypesofcrime.
CONCLUSION
93.Manyoftheinternationalstudiesontherelationshipbetweenlevelsoffirearmsownershipandcrimerateshavevalueonlyif
studiedwithgreatcaretakingproperaccountofthemanyvariables.Atimeseriesstudyinthiscountryshowsthatnosuchrelationship
existshereandastudyofthemorereliablecrosssectionalanalysesfailstodisclosesufficientevidenceofanysuchrelationshipand
tendstodisproveit.
94.Attemptshavebeenmadethroughoutthiscenturytoreducelevelsofcrimegenerallyandlevelsofviolentcrimeinparticularby

imposingstrictcontrolsonaccesstofirearms.Thesehavebeenappliedinmostpartstheworldandoveralongperiod.Therehasyet
tobeasinglefollowupstudywhichshowsthattheimpositionofcontrolsonfirearms,orthetighteningofexistingcontrols,hascaused
anyreductionintheuseoffirearmsincrimeovertimeinanyparticularcountryormoregenerally.
95.OneofthemostsignificantpiecesofresearchundertakenbytheHomeOfficemightoffersomeexplanationforthis.In1996,in
responsetorequestsfromtheCullenInquiry,theHomeOfficeconductedasurveyoffirearmshomicides.
96.TheoriginalHomeOfficestudyhasbeenupdatedandwaslastpublishedintheAnnualCriminalStatisticsfor1997.Theremaybe
moreinformationinthe1998figureswhentheyareavailable.Thestudycoveredaperiodofthreeyears(1992to1994)withtotalof
151homicidesinvolvingafirearminwhichthelegalstatusofthefirearmwasestablished.Itexaminedthecircumstancesofthe
homicideinaccordancewithstandardHomeOfficecategories.Therewere45casesinwhichthestatusofthefirearmwasnotknown.
Thetableshowstheupdated1997figures.

Firearm used
Legally held Not legally held

Circumstances of homicide
Organised crime, drugs related, contract killing etc
Domestic
Robbery or gain
Argument, jealousy, revenge
Other
Total

none
14
1
4
4
23

43
41
17
17
10
128

97.Thefiguresareforaperiodofthreeyearssothateachentryshouldbedividedbythatnumbertogiveanannualaverage.
98.HomeOfficeclassificationsmaynotbethemosthelpfulforthesefigures.Thereisnobreakdownoftheclassoffirearminvolved,
butitwouldbesafetoassumethatshotgunsfeaturesignificantlyinthesmallnumberofhomicidesinwhichalegallyheldfirearmwas
usedinthedomesticandjealousycategories.Theseamounttosixcasesperyear.Bycontrast,illegallyheldfirearmspredominate
eveninthoseclassesofcrime.Mostofthehomicidesinvolvingargument,jealousyorrevengewillinvolvepeoplewhowerewellknown
toeachother,asdothedomestichomicides.
99.Ifthesefiguresareaddedtothesignificantchangeinthepatternoffirearmsuseinhomicidereferredtoearlier,theevidence
showsthatlegallyheldfirearmsfeatureinhomicidealmostexclusivelyinthetypeofoffenceinwhichtheweaponssubstitutiontheory
ismostvalidandthattheabsenceofthosefirearmsisunlikelytohaveaffectedtheoutcomeofthatclassofcrime.Inthosecases
wherethepresenceorabsenceofafirearmmightbesignificant,illegallyheldfirearmsareusedalmostexclusively.
100.Thestatisticalevidenceshowsthatextendingthealreadycomplexandcostlysystemofcontrolsonlegallyheldfirearmsisa
policywhichismostunlikelytoreduceratesofarmedcrimeorthedangertosociety.Theevidencesuggeststhatasignificant
simplificationofcontrols,withitsresultantsavinginpoliceandofficialtimewouldhaveenormousbenefits,notleastofwhichwouldbe
aconcentrationinthosealternativetacticswhichcanbeshowntobesuccessfulinthefield.

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