FINAL REPORT

for

HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION STUDY

FPSO BROTOJOYO
FACILITIES

REV

DATE

DESCRIPTION

PREPD

CHKD

APPD

TABLE CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.4
3
3.1
3.2
3.2
4
4.1
5

INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
STUDY OBJECTIVES
SCOPE OF THE STUDY

2
2
2

HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION METHODOLOGY

OVERVIEW
HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUE
FACILITY SYSTEM REVIEWED
HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION GUIDEWORDS
RISK ASSESSMENT

5
5
6
7
8

FACILITY DESCRIPTION
LOCATION
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION PROCESS AREA
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION UTILITIES AREA

12
12
16

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RESULTS OF HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION STUDY
CONCLUSION

APPENDIX A HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION WORKSHEETS

19

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Joint Operating Body (JOB) Pertamina - PetrochinaSalawati is currently undertaking
TelukBerau A (TBA) and TelukBerau C (TBC) Field Development, which is located in the
Seram Sea East Indonesia. It will provide Petrochina with the FPSO to process, store and
offload crude oil.
The study shows that consequences to people mainly result in major injuries and/or
fatalities due to health issues. These hazards are those identified as health hazards, which
results consequence to personnel.
Since the Brotojoyo FPSO has sufficient mitigation measures in place to address the
significant hazards identified for health issues occurrence of high severity consequences,
based on the estimated probabilities, is very unlikely.

INTRODUCTION

1.1

BACKGROUND
Joint Operating Body Pertamina - PetrochinaSalawati (Petrochina) is currently
undertaking the development of TelukBerau-A (TBA) and TelukBerau-C (TBC) fields,
which are located in Seram Sea, East Indonesia. The facilities to be installed under this
development will comprise of the following major components:

Two fixed wellhead platforms (TBA in Phase 1 and TBC in Phase 2);

One Floating, Production, Storage and Offloading (FPSO) vessel i.e. a refurbished
60,000 tonne DWT vessel which will be spread moored. The FPSO will be named
Brotojoyo FPSO; and

One inter-field multiphase sub sea hose.

During production, a flexible high-pressure marine hose into the process facilities on
the Brotojoyo FPSO for treatment transports the well fluids produced from the
wellhead platform separately. Oil exporting is performed via offloading operation to
a shuttle tanker moored in tandem during the offloading operation. The FPSO will
become the control center of the overall oil field and provides the Living Quarters
(LQ) for the operators. Detailed design is now being carried out for the FPSO. In
support of this design work, a Health Hazard Identification study is required to be
performed.
The Health Hazard Identification is to be a desktop study and covers hazards from the
process plant, the shipboard system, as well as the off-loading operation including
new installation of lift gas compressors and fuel gas system. The findings of this study
will be presented and it will be submitted for review.
1.2

STUDY OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the Health Hazard Identification study were to:

1.3

Identify potential hazards and reasonably foreseeable accident events within the
overall design life of the facilities related to human health;

Assign a risk category to each hazard and rank them in accordance with the risk;

Identify whether mitigation or preventive measures exist and provide

recommendation for mitigation measures requirement; and

Provide initial qualitative guidance on areas where attention may be required to

control risks to personnel.

SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The scope of Health Hazard Identification review is limited to the potential hazards of
FPSO Brotojoyo facilities related to the additional equipment and design change
during Lift Gas Compression additional project. Plant process hazards was examined

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to identify possible consequences which contributes to Health, Safety, and

Environmental issues and operating problems.
The Health Hazard Identification study includes reviewing previous general Hazard
Identification (HAZID) in 2008(BRO-FMS-MNP-20-006) and new additional facility
such as lift gas compression system and fuel gas system. All recommendations during
previous HAZID have been re-visited in this Health Hazard Identificationreview
(especially for health issues) by referring the previous Hazard Identification document
(BRO-FMS-MNP-20-006).

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HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION METHODOLOGY

2.1

OVERVIEW
Health Hazard Identification is an early or the first stage of a risk assessment to define
all the potential hazards from any part of the facility or its operations, which can harm
personnel, the environment, the asset or the reputation of the company.
The Health Hazard Identification workshop took the form of a structured discussion
based upon a series of hazard guidewords. For each identified hazard, the discussion
was structured so as to consider the following:

Health Hazard description, including cause (potential with which the hazard
could rise), consequence/effect (the possible hazardous incident scenarios which
could occur) and from what equipment the hazard could occur (if applicable);

Preventive measures, including any existing aspects of the design that prevent,
detect, control or mitigate against the hazard; and

Recommendations, further measures that should be considered to reduce the

levels of risk associated with the identified hazard.

A qualitative risk ranking is then made to determine the possible frequency of

occurrence of these accident events and the severity of their results. The high-risk
events arising from the hydrocarbons handled in the facilities, leading to fires
orexplosions and events, which are mainly related to working practices, known as
non- hydrocarbon hazards, are identified so that they can be subjected to detailed
evaluation in the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study.
A brief discussion is provided in this report for the major hazards identified, with the
focus on the potential problems, rather than possible solutions. This report is seen as
an introduction to the hazard analysis work and it restricts the discussion to a
relatively limited level of detail.
2.2

HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUE

Preliminary Hazards Assessment (PHA) was originally developed to provide a
structured approach to the analysis of safety hazards throughout the life cycle of an
installation. The environmental and health risk assessment processes fulfill a
comparable function with respect to environmental and health hazards at all stages of
the life cycle. These assessments are based on the same concept. The process is
applicable to all business processes in the life cycle of an operation from inception to
abandonment. The tools and techniques available are applied in a logical and rigorous
way, setting acceptance criteria and screening against them as the process proceeds.
The arrangements identified as necessary to manage assessed threats and potential
consequences and effects are then incorporated in the design phase or for existing
operations it is necessary to verify that what is in place is suitable and sufficient. If not,
then remedial action is taken and all necessary procedures are incorporated into the
HSE Management System.

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A. Step 1: Identify Hazards and Potential Effects

Systematically identify the hazards, the threats and potential hazardous events and
effects that may affect, or arise from, a company's operation throughout the total
life cycle of the operation.
B. Step 2: Evaluate Risk
Systematically evaluate (assess) the risks from the identified hazards
againstaccepted screening criteria, taking into account the likelihood of occurrence
and the severity of any consequences to employees, assets, the environment and
the public. This includes the risks associated with deviation from limits set for
environmental and occupational health hazards.
C. Step 3: Record Hazards and Effects
Record all those hazards and effects identified as significant in relation to the
screening criteria in relevant documents.
D. Step 4: Compare with Objectives and Performance Criteria
Compare the evaluated risks against the detailed HSE objectives and targets for the
project or installation. For all cases these targets must be maintained and be
consistent with the Company Policy, and Strategic Objectives. Performance
standards at all levels must meet the criteria set in the HSE Case, which in turn
must comply with the Company's HSE Management System.
E. Step 5: Establish Risk Reduction Measures
Select, evaluate and implement appropriate measures to reduce or eliminate risks.
Risk reduction measures include those to prevent or control incidence (i.e.
reducing the probability of occurrence) and to mitigate effects (i.e. reducing the
consequences). Mitigation measures include steps to prevent escalation of
developing abnormal situations and to lessen adverse effects on Health, Safety and
the Environment. Risk reduction measures also include recovery preparedness
measures that address emergency procedures as well as restoration and
compensation procedures to recover. Revisit Step 3 to record fully the
activity/task requirements.
2.3

FACILITY SYSTEM REVIEWED

For this report, Hazards are identified for various systems of the Brotojoyo FPSO. The
various systems of the FPSO are as follows:
Process and Operation systems
The process and operations systems were divided into the following to enable detailed
review of their hazards:

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1. Incoming Piping Line

2. HC Process Module
3. Flare System
4. Compression System (Additional HC Process Module)
The hazards from these systems are identified for the operation phase of the facilitys
life cycle.
Ship Systems
The ship systems were divided into the following to enable detailed review of their
hazards:
1. Oil Storage and Offloading
2. Accommodation
3. Machinery and Systems
4. Mooring
The hazards from these systems are identified for the production phase of the facilitys
life cycle.
2.4

HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION GUIDEWORDS

The primary objective of this study is to identify potential hazards and possible
accidents using a generic hazard list. As for a proper Health Hazard Identification
study, the Health Hazard Identification uses a checklist approach with predefined
hazards (also known as guidewords). The guidewords used in this study are
summarized in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Process Variables and Guidewords for Health Hazard Identification

Guide Word Code
1

Toxic / Asphyxiating Gas Release

Toxic Liquid

Toxic Solid

Dropped Objects

Noise

Heat

Cold

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Guide Word Code

2.4

Electricity

Ultramagnetic Radiation

10

Ionizing Radiation

11

Biological Hazards

12

Ergonomic Hazards

13

Psychological Hazards

RISK ASSESSMENT
The likelihood and effects of the hazards to people, environment, asset and reputation
has been assessed based on the risk-screening matrix presented in Table 2. A semiquantitative approach, assigning numbers and letters to consequences and likelihood
based on their severity and frequency, is used. This approach separates the hazards in
the primary two dimensions of likelihood and consequence, with a third dimension of
impact i.e. what is affected (people, environment, asset and reputation) assessed for
increased resolution of the assessment. The objective of this approach is to separate the
hazards allowing for further specific analysis and focused action.
Table 2. Risk Matrix

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2.4.1

Likelihood/ Probability Assessment

The assessment of likelihood of occurrence of an event is independent of its effects or
consequences. The likelihood/probability categories stipulated for use by the PHA
methodology are presented in Table 3.
Table 3. Likelihood/Probability Categories used in PHA Analysis
Probability
Category

2.4.2

Definition

Has not happened in the oil and gas industry

Has happened in the oil and gas industry in the last 10

years

Has happened in our company in the last 10 years

Happened once in the last 12 months in our company

Happens several time per year at this location

Consequence Assessment
The consequence categories specified by the PHA methodology are based on the
specific impacts of a hazard especially for people due to health issues.
The hierarchy of impacts is as presented above. The following subsections present the
assessment consequence categories stipulated by the PHA methodology, by impact.
The consequences of the hazard to people consider the severity of injury or the
number of fatalities resulting should an incident occur. Table 4 presents the definition
of consequences to people.
Table 4. Definition of Consequences to People
Probability
Category

Potential Impact

Definition

Sight Injury

Not detrimental to individuals employability or to

the performance of present work

Minor Injury

Detrimental to the performance of present work,

such as curtailment of activities, or some days of
absence to recover, up to a maximum of one week

Major Injury

Leading to permanent partial disability or unfitness

to work or detrimental to performance of work over
an extended period, such as long term absence

Single Fatality

Single fatality or victim with permanent total

disability or unfitness to work. Also includes the

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Probability
Category

Potential Impact

Definition
possibility of multiple fatalities (maximum of 3) in
close succession due to the incident e.g. explosion

Multiple Fatality

FPSO BROTOJOYO HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION REPORT

May include four fatalities in close succession due

to the incident, or multiple fatalities (four or more)
each at different points and/or with different
activities

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FACILITY DESCRIPTION

3.1

LOCATION
Teluk Berau-A (TBA) and Teluk Berau-C (TBC) fields are located in Seram Sea, East
Indonesia and ismanaged by Thome Offshore Management (TOM) from Singapore.
The facility is located approximately 01o 3335 south and longitude 130o 3111 east
at a heading of 270.10.
Management and engineering support is provided from Thome offices in Singapore. A
supporting office is located in Sorong.

3.2

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION PROCESS AREA

Topside Separation Process, Flare system and Produced Water processing facility is
presented in the formof simplified block diagram below.

Figure 1. Process Flow Diagram

A. Separation
The separation system separates the well fluid in to oil, gas and water. Production
separated gas is sent to HP Flare Knockout Drum. Oil is stabilized to meet storage
specification. Produced water is sent to produce water treatment to remove oil from
produced water to the acceptable level.
Separation train is designed for the following conditions:
Total Fluid Flow rate

20,000 BFPD

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 Total Oil Flow rate

15,000 BOPD

Produced water flow rate :

18,000 BWPD

Water Cut

0-90%

Separation is carried out in three stages. In order to produce stabilized crude

oilspecification as per Exhibit-M Attachment 5 to ITB, viz., RVP of max. 10 psi and
water in Oil content of max. 0.5 % by volume, a three stage separation system
consisting of First Stage Separator V-100, Second Stage Separator V-200 and
Electrostatic Coalescer V-300 has been adopted.
Gas separation from the liquids is achieved in the First stage Separator V-100. This
separator design allows up to 2250 BWPD water to be carried over to the Second Stage
Separator V-200.
The produced water from Electrostatic Coalescer is returned to the First Stage
Separator by means of one of two 100% capacity Produced Water Pumps. The
produced water from the pumps is also used for sand jetting the First stage Separator
in future.
The First stage Separator (V-100) is designed to operate at a pressure of 215 psia and
temperature 72F (22C).
Heating of the fluid at the inter-stage between First stage Separator V-100 and Second
Stage Separator V- 200 is provided to flash off the volatile components in Second stage
separator V-200. This is required to reduce the RVP of crude to storage.
The Second Stage Separator is designed to operate at 45 psia and 77F (25C).
Separator pressure is controlled by a pressure control valve. After the low pressure
flashing in V-200, the crude is sent to the Coalescer V-300. Final waterremoval is
achieved in the Electrostatic Coalescer V-300.
To operate effectively the Electrostatic Coalescer requires at least 2% BS&W in the
feed. It is expected that the required separation will be achieved. To guarantee the
0.5% BS&W it is necessary to have some 2% water in the feed. In the event the First
Stage separation is too effective this can be achieved by raising the water level in the
separator thereby giving greater carry-over.
The Coalescer is of Bielectric design. This design has three electrodes effectively
doubling the charged field. The Coalescer will operate to specification with up to 15%
water in the oil.
The separators are designed based on analysis of fluid dynamics inside the separator
when under the influence of Ships movement due to environmental condition.
Gas from the Second Stage Separator is flared in a low pressure flare system. The First
stage Separator and Second Stage Separators are provided with pressure control
system to vent excess gas to HP and LP flare system respectively.
B. Produced Water Treatment
Produced water treatment system consists of one Hydrocyclone (HC-100) and
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Degasser Drum (V-400). The Hydrocyclone contains centrifugal devices that are
enclosed in pressure vessel. After the centrifugal separation produced water is flashed
in Produced Water Degassing Drum (V-400) operating at near atmospheric pressure to
release any dissolved gas. Treated produced water is discharged overboard through
level control. Off-spec water can be diverted to slops tank manually. Diverting the
produced water to overboard or slop tank is decided based on the results of analyzer
AT-400.
C. Condensate Stabilization System
In order to produce stabilized crude oil meeting export specification to ITB, viz., RVP
of max. 10 psia and water in Oil content of max. 0.5 % by volume, Crude from the
Electrostatic Coalescer is sent to Condensate Stabilization system. Condensate
Stabilization System consists of Stabilizer column C-100 and Condensate Stabilizer
Reboiler E-200.
The stabilization process reduces vapour pressure, thereby making the crude safe for
shipment in tankers. Vapour pressure is exerted by light hydrocarbons, such as
methane, ethane, propane, and butane, changing from liquid to gas as the pressure on
the crude is lowered. If a sufficient amount of these light hydrocarbons is removed, the
vapour pressure becomes satisfactory for shipment at approximately atmospheric
pressure.
Crude from Electrostatic Coalescer V-300 is fed into the Condensate Stabilizer column
C-100. Condensate Stabilizer column C-100 is a packed column where crude from the
Electrostatic Coalescer flows downward to the Reboiler while gas from the Reboiler
flows upward stripping the light hydrocarbonfrom the Crude. Condensate Stabilizer
Column C-100 is packed with 7.94 m3 random packing over a height of 3600 mm.
Condensate Stabilizer Column C-100 is designed to achieve stabilized Crude RVP of
Max.10 psi. It operates at 45 psia and 76C (168F).
The resultant condensate from bottom of Condensate Stabilizer Column C-100 is sent
to the Condensate Stabilizer Reboiler E-200. Pressure inside the column is maintained
by PT-110 which controls the PV-110. Gas from the Stabilizer column is sent to the LP
Flare system under pressure control.
Rated duty of this Condensate Stabilizer Reboiler E-200 is 3652 kW and it is a BKU
(Kettle) type Reboiler. Hot oil (Therminol 55) comes from Hot oil supply header is
used as heating medium in Condensate Stabilizer Reboiler tube side.
The generated vapour is sent below the bottom tray of the Condensate Stabilizer
column V-200. Crude is stabilized to meet storage specification Hot oil enters under
temperature control to tube side of Condensate Stabilizer Reboiler E-200.
LICA-211 maintains level inside the shell side of the Condensate Stabilizer Reboiler by
controlling LV-104 on the outlet of Crude/Crude Exchanger E-100. The Reboiler is
provided with a HH and LL level trip function. The LL level closes the outlet SDV-300
while the HH level closes the Condensate stabilizer column inlet/ First stage Separator
outlet SDV-101.

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D.HP/LP Flare System

There are two flare headers collecting relief loads and vent loads from various
equipment.
HP flare is designed to handle 30 MMSCFD continuous relief and 75 MMSCFD
Emergency relief at higher radiation levels. Capacity of HP Flare is 75 MMSCFD.
LP flare is designed to flare the flashed gas from the Second stage separator,
Condensate stabilizer Column and Degassing Drum. LP flare capacity is 13 MMSCFD.
Note:During blow down/depressurization of subsea lines Thome will ensure that
hydrates are not formed due to pressure reduction.
Separate knockout drums have been provided for LP and HP flare headers. In addition
gas outlet from the Degassing Drum and Stabilizer column will also be routed to the
LP flare knockout drum. Two LP Knockout drums 1 & 2 have been provided for
handle large quantity of LP gas. Liquid with lower vapor pressure than the operating
pressure of the HP flare Knockout drum will be routed to LP Flare knockout drum
through the level control system.
Drains from the separation Process module will also be routed to the LP Flare
Knockout Drum 1.
Excess heavy liquids from both the LP Flare Knockout Drums have been routed to
Slops tank. 2 x 100% pneumatic type LP Flare Knockout Drum Pumps have provided
for boosting the LP Flare Knockout Drum drains to Slops Tank. The LP Flare Knockout
Drum Pump design capacity is 21.7 gpm (5m3/hr).
Two separate flare Stacks are provided for HP and LP Flare system. High-energy
direct ignition system has been chosen for flare ignition. The ignition system will then
monitor the flame using the same electrodes using flame ionization technique.
Flare headers are continuously purged with gas from the production separator. Prior
to start up flare headers will be purged with Nitrogen. Provisions have been made for
Nitrogen purging.
Flare height is calculated on the basis of radiation on the operating deck limited to 501
BTU/hr.
ft2
(1.58
kW/m2).Thiswillenablemaintenanceworktobecarriedouton
thecompressorswithoilproductionatthe maximum rate. Coincidental wind velocity for
the maximum flow condition has been considered at 11.8 m/s.
Dispersion levels will be limited to 15 % LEL at Air intake or exhaust area and 25 %
LEL at the deck level.
Flare gas flow rates and volume are continuously metered and recorded. Purge gas
from First stage separator gas outlet is provided for continuous purging of both LP
and HP Flare headers. Nitrogen is provided as start-up purge gas.
E.Hot Oil System
The hot oil system is used as a heating medium for Condensate stabilizer Reboiler. Oil
(Therminol 55) from the expansion vessel is pumped to the Heater where it is heated
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by hot flue gas from burner. The burner uses the fuel gas from the First stage separator
outlet at required pressure using pressure control and air from external blower
assembly. The hot oil obtained in this process is sent to the Reboiler for heating the unstabilized crude.
F. Closed Drain
All process equipment with hydrocarbon liquid inventory under normal operating
conditions are provided with closed drains to enable draining of liquid during
maintenance of these equipment. All hydrocarbon level instruments will also drain in
to the closed drain header. A systematic collection system is provided to collect closed
drains from different equipment. The collectors are connected to a central closed drain
header that will route all collected fluid to the LP Flare knockout drum.
G. Hazardous Open Drains
Drains from process pancakes shall be collected and routed to the slops tank through
liquid seal. Each pancake is provided with coaming plates to contain the maximum
liquid inventory on the pancake. Each pancake is also provided with drain channels to
collect, hold and route the liquid to Hazardous open drain header.
H. Chemical Injection
Chemical injection is envisaged to aid production of oil, gas and water and to control
corrosion. Corrosion properties and settling characteristics of are not available. Hence
based on the best available information and experience the chemical injection system is
designed. Provisions are available for addition of any chemicals that may be found
necessary during production.
Chemical injection will be from dosing tanks. Chemicals from tote tanks will be
transferred to dosing tanks using portable pneumatic chemical transfer pumps.
I. Lift Gas Compression and Fuel Gas System
Lift gas compression and fuel gas system is new system and installed separately from
the main project FPSO Brotojoyo. Details information for lift gas compression and fuel
gas system is not available. Refer to the reviewed PID, the gas outlet from V-100 will
be utilized as fuel gas and to gas lift injection system. The liquid outlet of the system
will be drained to the open drain and closed drain.
3.2

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION UTILITIES AREA

The FPSO systems consist of the cargo and ballast system, cargo offloading system,
cargo tank control system and inert gas system. These systems extend across the vessel
and in conjunction with the hydrocarbon process facilities are supported by utilities
systems located within the Engine Room. Figure 2 shows utility diagram of FPSO
Brotojoyo.
Open deck areas are classified in accordance with the Area Classification. The Engine
Room is designated a non-hazardous area and contains the following main equipment
items.

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Figure 2. Utility Flow Diagram

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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1

RESULTS OF HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION STUDY

The two main elements i.e. Process and Ship Systems of the Brotojoyo FPSO facility
were systematically reviewed using the detailed PHA Health Hazard Identification
checklists. The completed sheets are included in Appendix A. Every hazard that was
identified was assessed with a corresponding frequency and consequence estimated
for each initiating event. The risk-screening matrix was then used to rank the risk as
'Low', 'Med/Marginal' or 'High'. The following are list of recommendation related to
health issues in facility.
Table 4. Recommendation from Health Hazard Identification

Rec. No

Recommendation

1 Perform noise mapping and create noise map to warn personnel

regarding to noise hazard

Noise can be potential hazard as new installation of compressor in facility. High noise
of compressor can lessen capacity to hear for human. Noise mapping is required to
defined adequate procedure of personal protection when entering facility area,
especially compressor system including its engine room. Noise mapping shall be
attach and publish in certain area so that every personnel can be informed regarding
to area health status.

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CONCLUSION
Health Hazard Identification is an early or the first stage of a risk assessment to define
all the potential hazards from any part of the facility or its operations, which can harm
personnel, the environment, the asset or the reputation of the company.
In total, 2 recommendations raised during the review. Those are related to health
issues especially noise related to new installation of compressor. The study shows that
consequences to people mainly result in major injuries and/or fatalities.
Since the Brotojoyo FPSO has sufficient mitigation measures in place to address the
significant hazards identified for Process and Ship Systems, the occurrence of high
severity consequences, based on the estimated probabilities, is very unlikely.

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Appendix A

Health Hazard Identification Review Worksheets

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Brotojoyo FPSO Project

Hazard Identification Worksheet

Health Risk Assessment

Functional Group

FACILITY AREA
Risk Matrix

Hazard ID
1,1

Hazard
Toxic / Asphyxiating
Gas Release

Cause
Cloud of hydrocarbon
vapour released

Effect
Risk of asphyxiation if
personnel are trapped in
gas cloud and cannot
escape quickly

1,2

Toxic / Asphyxiating
Gas Release

Immediate Fatality due to

toxic (i.e. H2S)

1,3

Toxic / Asphyxiating
Gas Release

Toxic gas release (H2S)

contained in gas within
its IDLH (Immediately
Dangerous to Life or
Health)
Excessive N2 while
performing purging
activity

2,1

Toxic Liquid

Personnel injury.

2,2

Toxic Liquid

Spill of chemicals and

other toxic liquid
materials in facility area
Oil based sludges

FPSO BROTOJOYO HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION REPORT

Risk of asphyxiation if
personnel lead to fatality

Personnel injury.

Preventive Measures
Gas detection system in
process area. Single solid
deck, well ventilated. Air
intake points for TR are
located aft, which is away
from process area. Sufficient
pocket gas detectors have
been provided onboard for
the person working around
incoming pipe line and
process area.
Gas detection system in
process area. Single solid
deck, well ventilated. Use
adequate respiratory
protection while working.
Gas detection system while
perform purging. Use
adequate respiratory
protection while working.
Use adequate personnel
protection while handling
toxic liquid.
Use adequate personnel
protection while handling
toxic liquid.

Health Risk
SIG

Rec. No

Reccommendations

SIG

SIG

LOW
LOW

JANUARY 2015

3,1

Toxic Solid

No issues applicable for

this scenario

4,1

Dropped Objects

Object dropped from

deck crane damages
process module and
causes leak

Potential injury and

fatality to personnel.

5,1

Noise

High Noise in lift gas

compression system

Potential to hearing
dissability

6,1

Heat

Heat exposed to human

from high temperature
containment surface.

Potential injury and

fatality to personnel.

6,2

Heat

Potential injury and

fatality to personnel.

7,1

Cold

8,1

Electricity

Heat exposed from

engine and turbine
exhaust system.
No issues applicable for
this scenario
High voltage exposed to
human

8,2

Electricity

Lightning discharge

9,1

Ultramagnetic
Radiation

No issues applicable for

this scenario

FPSO BROTOJOYO HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION REPORT

Control of lifting operations

where work permit and safe
job analysis were in place.
Consider restriction on
crane operational were be
in place in material handling
philosophy.
Wear proper ear protection
while working and aware to
working period in high noise
area.

MED

Attach proper insulation at

high temperature
containment, attach
warning sign at the area,
wear proper PPE while
working.
Heat shall be exhaust to safe
location where personnel
rarely to be there.

MED

Potential Fatality to
personnel.

Attach sign/ warning at high

voltage area. Wear proper
PPE for high voltage use.

SIG

Potential Fatality to
personnel.

Attach lightning strike, apply

procedure to avoid any
activities regarding to
ligthning hazards.

LOW

MED

Perform noise mapping

and create noise map to
warn personnel
regarding to noise hazard

MED

JANUARY 2015

10,1

Ionizing Radiation

11,1

Biological Hazard

11,2

Biological Hazard

12,1

Ergonomic Hazard

12,2

Ergonomic Hazard

13,1

Psychological Hazard

No issues applicable for

this scenario
Contaminated food
and/or improperly
cleaned foods, hands,
etc.
Influenza due to
wheather changes

Potential sick to
personnel.

Cleaned foods, hands, cloth,

etc properly.

LOW

Potential sick to
personnel.

Cleaned foods, hands, cloth,

etc properly.

LOW

Inappropriate
equipment handling

Potential injury to
personnel

Adequate working
procedure.

MED

Insufficient light while

working
Fatigue

potential to lessens
eyesight.
Potential sick and injury to
personnel.

Adequate light on working

area.
Time management while
working.

LOW

FPSO BROTOJOYO HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION REPORT

LOW

JANUARY 2015