Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Case:Printicomms Proposed
AcquisitionofDigitech:Negotiating
PriceandFormofPayment
WhyPriceGap?
Deterministic
Approach
Probabilistic
Approach
Deterministicanalysis(Exhibit:1)
Takesonepathofperformanceovertime
Ignoresuncertaintyaroundthatpath
Buyerandsellerhavedifferentoutlookaboutuncertainty
Sellerismoreoptimisticongrowthrateandmargins
Buyerislessoptimistic
Printicomm's View
Sales Growth Rate
High
Best guess
Low
Profit Margin
High
Best guess
Low
Digitech's View
15%
10%
5%
30%
20%
10%
15%
10%
5%
25%
20%
15%
2
HistoricalandProjectedIncome
StatementsandCashFlows
Actuals reported by Digitech
Sales
Forecast by Printicomm
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
15,350
10,633
11,313
6,747
7,400
18,651
23,450
28,140
32,361
36,244
39,506
-31%
6%
-40%
10%
152%
26%
20%
15%
12%
9%
9,655
8,700
8,890
5,096
3,850
14,800
16,850
21,867
24,868
27,539
30,018
S,G&A
2,500
1,900
1,950
2,200
2,400
2,600
2,600
3,374
3,837
4,249
4,632
55
55
55
55
65
65
65
84
96
106
116
Total Expenses
12,210
10,655
10,895
7,351
6,315
17,465
19,515
25,325
28,801
31,894
34,766
Operating Income
3,140
-22
418
-604
1,085
1,186
3,935
2,815
3,560
4,350
4,740
Operating Ratio
80%
100%
96%
109%
85%
94%
83%
90%
89%
88%
88%
1,689
2,136
2,610
2,844
84
96
106
116
-281
-324
-362
-395
-563
-647
-725
-790
929
1,261
1,629
1,775
Depreciation
37274.92
928.80
844.36
29,782
HistoricalandProjectedIncome
StatementsandCashFlows
Actuals reported by Digitech
Sales
Forecast by Digitech
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
15,350
10,633
11,313
6,747
7,400
18,651
23,450
28,609
34,331
40,167
45,389
-31%
6%
-40%
10%
152%
26%
22%
20%
17%
13%
9,655
8,700
8,890
5,096
3,850
14,800
16,850
21,985
25,789
30,173
34,096
S,G&A
2,500
1,900
1,950
2,200
2,400
2,600
2,600
3,392
3,979
4,656
5,261
55
55
55
55
65
65
65
85
99
116
132
Total Expenses
12,210
10,655
10,895
7,351
6,315
17,465
19,515
25,462
29,867
34,945
39,489
Operating Income
3,140
-22
418
-604
1,085
1,186
3,935
3,147
4,464
5,222
5,900
Operating Ratio
80%
100%
96%
109%
85%
94%
83%
89%
87%
87%
87%
1,888
2,678
3,133
3,540
85
99
116
132
-286
-343
-402
-454
-572
-687
-803
-908
1,115
1,747
2,044
2,310
Depreciation
48,514
1,115
1,747
2,044
50,824
1,014
1,444
1,536
34,714
38707.08
ValuationMethods
Bookvalue
MarketValue
DCFValues
withoutsynergies
DCFValueswith
Synergies
MarketMultiples
PE,PEG,EBITDA,
EBIT,Sales,CF,..
Comparable
Transaction
Multiples
TrueValueofanAcquisition
WhatisyourChoiceforthisDeal?
FixedPrice
Choice
5years
Earnout
3Years
IfyouareworkingwithPrinticomm whatwillyouprefer?
Earnout Structure
5YearEarnout
3.5
3
3YearEarnout
3.5
2.5
2.5
2000
2001
2.5
1999
2000
2001
2002
DownPayment:$20Million
2003
1999
DownPayment:$28Million
Sellerwillreceivealloperatingprofitsexceedingtriggeramountsoverthelifeofthedeal
Earnout HarmsPrinticomm
Affectpost
transaction
integration
Corporate
restructuringwill
bedifficult
Nocompulsionon
theacquiredfirms
managementto
support
Accounting
numberscanbe
easilymanaged
Balloonedcredits
sales
Sellingbelow
requiredROAor
ROE
Maynotmaintain
theassetscarefully
Failtospendany
sensiblemoneyin
Capex
Willnotbotherof
customerloyalty
Earnout HarmsPrinticomm
Digitechhaving
unlimitedupside
Digitechwillimpose
growthstimulating
behavior
Operatingincome
ignorescapital
spending
Stepwisemaynot
motivateDigitech
Digiticmay
cummulateandtry
tohitthetarget
once
Digitech may
cannibalize
products
Whatifthereisno
liquidityinbusiness
meetthepayment
ofDigitech?
Whowillspendon
commonproblems?
Maynothavelong
termfocus
Earnout HarmsPrinticomm
Howtobringinscaleand
scopebenefits?
Liquiditypreferenceofthe
sellersshareholderscould
dominatethedesireto
maximizepayment
throughanearnout
Overlyaggressive
performancegoals
WhatisyourChoiceforthisDeal?
FixedPrice
Choice
5years
Earnout
3Years
IfyouareworkingwithDigitech whatwillyouprefer?
ItalsoHarmsDigitech
Acquirermaynot
supportacquiredto
reachthetarget
Stepwisetargetcreates
doubtinthemindsof
Digitech
Printicommmaynot
encourageDigitech
products
Toomuchcontrolfrom
parents
Whatifparentsgo
againsttheinterestof
Digitechs
management?
Whatwillhappento
earnoutsonnon
existenceofthe
company?
Whatiftheacquired
firmiffailstohonorthe
claimsofearnout?
Buyerfailstoprovide
resourcesnecessaryto
actuallygrowthetarget
andmaximizevalue
Occursonpostmerger
integrationishandled
badly
ItalsoHarmsDigitech
Mayinvitelegalactionbythe
selleronperceived
measurementproblemsand
Lackofseniormanagement
supporttomaximize
performance
Whatisthelevelofseniority
treatmentonliquidationof
thefirm?
Howprinticommwillpayon
anyassitancetakenfrom
Digitech?
Whatwillbethetax
treatmentontheearnouts?
Whatifthereisamacro
economicshockonthefirm?
Whatisregulationchanges?
Whatiftaxissuespopsin?
Whatifindustrygoesthrough
structuralchanges?
Failsifmanagersdontowna
significantearnout claim
ItalsoHarmsDigitech
Whatiftaxissuespops
in?
Whatifindustrygoes
throughstructural
changes?
Failsifmanagersdont
ownasignificant
earnout claim
Acquirermayallotmore
Fixedcost,todiscourage
bookinghigher
operatingprofits
HowtheEarnouts canbeImprovedto
beMoreEffective?
Triggeramountshouldrise
moreaggressively
Yearbyyearpayment
encourageshortterm
thinking
Relativelyconstantseriesof
triggersenhancesprobability
offuturepayoff
Canhaveoneoveralltarget
forall5or3years
Pegearnouttothe
accumulatedperformance
overtime
Structuretheearnoutasa
lumpsumpaymentatthe
terminusoftheearnout
periodbasedon
performanceoverwhole
period
WhyEarnouts inthisDeal?
Usedtomovepotentialtransaction
forward
Additional
paymentsto
seller
Someportionofpurchasepriceof
Digitech tobepaidbyPrinticomm on
Digitech attainingcertainagreed
uponperformancegoalsafterclosing
Motivation
of
shareholders
/managers
Benefits
Madelotofsensefromaneconomic
perspective
Retentionof
shareholders
and
managers
Winwinsituation
Bridgethe
valuation
gap
FeaturesofEarnouts
Instrumentoran
agreementora
contract
Valuinganincentive
paymentrequires
accountingfor
optionality
Incentivepayment
plansareoptions
Longtheterm,
moretheuncertain
inpayment;will
havemorevalue
Itschallengingto
structure
Extremelyuseful
devicetobreak
deadlocksindeal
negotiations
Earnout
Time
period
Deductedas
expense(Lower
willbecost)
Key
Drivers
Tax
Treatment
Basedonachievable
performancegoals
Elements
ProvideDigitech
managementwith
requiredresources
andoperating
freedom
Digitechmanagement
shouldreceive
adequate
compensation
creatingthatvalue
Earnout
Targets
ValuingEarnout:Simulationbasedvaluationmodel
Expecteddistributionforvaluedrivers salesgrowth,profitmargin
Asdividend
(Paidfromafter
taxearnings)
conservative
View
WhythereisaNeedforEarnout inthis
Deal?
Abandonmentnot
desirable good
strategicand
organizational
motivesforthe
deal
Negotiation
reachedan
impasseoverprice
Havetowalkawayfromthe
dealinabsenceofcreative
alternative
HowthePerformanceGoalsinthe
Earnout canbeImproved?
Clearly
defined
Easily
measurable
Elements
Attainable
Mutually
understood
SuitabilityofPerformanceGoalsinEarnouts
TargetVariable
Suitability
Integratingoperationsoftwocompanies
Revenue
Whentargetmanagementisnotexpectedto
bewiththecompany
GrossMargin
Targettobeprofitable
PreTaxProfit
Targetbusinesstoperformwellinallrespects
Cashflow orEBITDA
WhenEBITDAmultipleusedtovaluethe
target
Whenbuyerisshortofcash
RiskInvolved
Sellingproductsatlowmargin
Capacitylimitations
Buyerwilldictateonexpenses
Discouragesintegration
Requiresfreedomofoperationsforthetarget
Willnotworkonafirmwithaccrualconcept
ofaccounting
Milestone
Nonfinancialrequirements R&D,new
product,licensing,IPR
Measuringthemilestoneachievementmay
beambiguous
CombinationofAbove
Attachingappropriateweightforeach
variable
Veyconfusingandtoomuchpressureon
Targetfirm
WhataretheCriticalIssuesthatPrinticomm
ShouldConsiderWhileDesigningtheEarnout?
Accountingpolicies
oftargetfirm
Availabilityof
financing
Management
processes
Changein
ownershipduring
earnoutperiod
Liquidityand
transferabilityof
earnout
agreements
Impactonbuyers
financialstructure
(asleverage)
Taxandaccounting
consideration
ValuingEarnouts
Simulation
Simulationdrawsassumptionsregardingsales
growthratesandoperatingprofitmarginfrom
theirownuncertaindistributions
Probability
ofNPV
Repeating probabilityofNPVdistribution
Mean,medianandmode
SDandrange
Probability
ofNPV
Cumulativedistributionlefttozeroon
horizontalaxis
Dealwoulddestroyvalue
ValuingEarnouts
Workslikeacall
option
Likelytobe
valuable,evenif
theyareoutof
themoneytoday
Notfreeto
buyer;very
costly
Tailormadefor
situationsof
greatuncertainty
Bridgesthe
differences
betweenan
optimisticseller
andapessimistic
buyer
ApproachestoEarnout Valuation
Simulation
Valuation
Approaches
CallOption
Approach
SimulationApproach
Identifytherelationship
betweenRevenueandExpense
Variable
TakeadecisiononVariableto
beSimulated
Usetheparametersas
describedbythebuyersand
sellersandsimulate(Monte
CarloSimulation)theselected
variableseries(maybe1000
times)
AddDownpayment+Vlaue of
Earnout togetalistofpossible
totalvaluefortheseller/
buyer
Estimatingthepresentvalueof
Earnouts ateachpointand
summinguptogetthetotal
valueofearnouts
EstimatetheValueofEarnout
oneachsimulatedpoint(Using
definedtargetforeachyear)
Evaluatethedistribution
structureofthetotalvalueof
thoseEarnouts byconstructing
aFrequencyDistributionChart
InferthelikelyvalueofEarnout
0.04
0.02
0.16
0.14
0.12
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
$2
0,
00
$2 0
0,
46
$2 1
0,
92
1
$2
1,
38
$2 2
1,
84
$2 2
2,
30
3
$2
2,
76
$2 3
3,
22
$2 4
3,
68
4
$2
4,
14
5
0.14
0.14
0.12
0.1
0.12
0.1
PROBABILITY
0.06
PROBABILITY
$2
8,
00
$2 0
8,
47
$2 6
8,
95
$2 2
9,
42
$2 8
9,
90
$3 3
0,
37
$3 9
0,
85
$3 5
1,
33
$3 1
1,
80
$3 7
2,
28
3
PROBABILITY
0.08
$3
3,
55
$3 0
5,
36
$3 6
7,
18
$3 3
9,
00
$4 0
0,
81
$4 7
2,
63
$4 4
4,
45
$4 0
6,
26
$4 7
8,
08
$4 4
9,
90
1
$3
5,
57
$3 1
6,
51
$3 9
7,
46
$3 6
8,
41
$3 3
9,
36
$4 1
0,
30
$4 8
1,
25
$4 5
2,
20
$4 3
3,
15
$4 0
4,
09
7
PROBABILITY
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
0.16
0.14
0.12
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
TotalValuetoBuyers/SellersusingSimulationMethod
Earnout vs.StockOption
ComparisonofEarnoutandCallOptionsonCommonStock
CallOptioninCommonStock
Earnouts
ImplicationforValueofEarnouts
Someindexoffinancialoroperating
performance
Revenues
Earnings
Cashflows
Underlyingasset
Shares
Marketshareorproductintroduction
Earnoutisaderivativesecurity
Exerciseprice
Statedstrikeprice
Benchmark,hurdleortriggeringevent
Lowerthebenchmark;greaterthevalueoferanout
levelofindex
Highertheperformance;greaterthevalue
Priceoftheunderlyingasset Stockpriceofunderlying
Revenues,Earnings,Cashflows
Interimpayouts
Dividends
Interimcashflowsassociatedwithearnouts Highertheinterimpayout;lowerthevalueofearnout
Termoftheoption
Termofthecontract
Max.of5years
Longerthelife;morevaluable
Unceratinity
Volailityofunderlyingstocksreturn Uncertainityofunderlying
Greatertheuncertainity;morevaluabletheearnout
PriceNegotiationTips
1
DetectingEscalationontheotherside
Avoidinducingbold,firmstatementsfromanopponent
Dontletacquisitionsynergytomovetotheopponent
Considertheothersidesposition,beforedivingheadfirst
intoanegotiation
Thinkthroughthemotivationsoftheotherdecisionmakers
32
PriceNegotiationTips
4
Recognizehowattractiveistheauctiontoyouandaswellas
toothers
Ignoresunkcost
Money,time,andenergyyouvespentinthepastshould
rarelyaffectyourfuturecommitments
Seekthecounselofawiseadviser,onewithoutavested
stakeinyourdecision
Listenopenlytotoughadviceandfollowthroughonit
33
PriceNegotiationTips
7
Discourageothersfromescalating
Communicationcanbeaveryeffectivetool
Stayoutofthetrap
Identifynegotiationasatrapbeforeitevenbegins
Relationshipbetweenthesizeofthepremiumand
thesuccessofthedealisnotlinear
34
PriceNegotiationTips
10
11
12
Rightpriceisrelative,notabsolute!
Theremaybeavastdifferencebetweenthepriceone
companycanpayforanacquisitionandthepriceanother
canpay
Itsthelastdealofitskind, Myth
35
PriceNegotiationTips
13
14
15
Assetsunavailabletodaycouldeasilybeupforsale
tomorrow
Ifyoudontacquireatarget,amajorcompetitorwill ,
ifthenumbersdontworkforyou,youshouldletyour
rivalhavethetargetcompany
Userealoptionanddecisiontreesifrequired
PriceNegotiationTips
16
Usesimulationtoestimatein
uncertainty
17
Neverallowthemangerinvolvedin
negotiationtofixtheprice
18
Establishstringenttimeboundpost
acquisitiontargets
PriceNegotiationTips
19
20
21
Comparethevaluecreatedbytheacquisitiontothevalue
thatcouldbecreatedbybuyingbackyourownshares
Routinelyrevieweachcompletedacquisitionrigorouslyto
betterunderstandwhatmakesforsuccessorfailure
Keepdataontheperformanceofpreviousacquisitionsto
help
thempricefuturedeals
PriceNegotiationTips
22
23
24
Useposttransactionmonitoringprocesstotrackhowwellthe
acquisitionormergerwasperformingrelativetoexpectationsand
todrawlessonsaboutwhatshouldbedonedifferentlyinthefuture
Ensurethatanalyticalrigortriumphsoveremotionandego
Doathoroughriskanalysis
PriceNegotiationTips
25
Thepriceofmakingamistakeisgreaterthanthepriceof
missinganopportunity
26
Doagoodjobofcommunicatingwithemployees,both
beforeandafterthe
dealcloses
27
Improveexternalcommunicationtothecapitalmarkets,
customers,suppliers,regulatorybodies,andgeographic
communities
PriceNegotiationTips
28
29
Explaintoexternalstakeholderswhatthe
benefitsofthedealareandhowthe
stakeholderswillbeaffected,bothpositivelyand
negatively
Quantifyingthevalueofexpectedsynergiesand
reporttheprogressmadeinachievingthem